Skip to main content
Log in

One naturalized epistemological argument against coherentist accounts of empirical knowledge

  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  • Bender, J.: 1989,The Current State of the Coherence Theory, Kluwer, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonjour, L.: 1976, ‘The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge’,Philosophical Studies 30, 281–312.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonjour, L.: 1985,The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard U.P., Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonjour, L.: 1989, ‘Replies and Clarifications’, in J. Bender (ed.),The Current State of the Coherence Theory, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 276–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cherniak, C.: 1986,Minimal Rationality, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P.: 1989a, ‘On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective’, inA Neurocomputational Perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P.: 1989b, ‘On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach’, inA Neurocomputational Perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cummins, R.: 1983,The Nature of Psychological Explanation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D.: 1980, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, in Davidson (ed.),Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 1–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreyfus, H. and S. Dreyfus: 1986, ‘How to Stop Worrying about the Frame Problem Even though Its Computationally Insoluble’, in Z. Pylyshn (ed.),The Robot's Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence, Ablex, pp. 95–111.

  • Dreyfus, H. and S. Dreyfus: 1988, ‘Making Mind versus Modelling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branch Point’, in S. Graubard (ed.),The Artificial Intelligence Debate, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 309–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foley, R.: 1993,Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G.: 1986,Change in View, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henderson, D. K.: 1993,Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences, SUNY Press, Albany, NY.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henderson, D. K.: 1994, ‘Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism is Not Just the Poor Person's Coherentism’,Journal of Philosophy 91, 627–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henderson, D. K.: 1995, ‘Epistemic Competence’, forthcomingPhilosophical Papers.

  • Horgan, T. and J. Tienson: 1989, ‘Representations without Rules’,Philosophical Topics 17, 27–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T. and J. Tienson: 1990, ‘Soft Laws’,Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15, 256–79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T. and J. Tienson: forthcoming a, ‘Levels of Design in Neoclassical Cognitive Science’,Philosophy.

  • Horgan, T. and J. Tienson: forthcoming b, ‘A Neoclassical Framework for Cognitive Science’,Synthese.

  • Horgan, T. and Tienson, J.: forthcoming c,Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology: Representational Realism without Rules. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

  • Kitcher, P.: 1992,The Naturalists Return, Philosophical Review 101, 53–114.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, P.: 1993,The Advancement of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kornblith, H.: 1989, ‘The Unattainability of Coherence’, in J. Bender (ed.),The Current State of the Coherence Theory, Kluwer, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smolensky, P.: 1988, ‘On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism’,Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11, 1–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, M.: 1980, ‘Coherence, Justification, and Truth’,Review of Metaphysics 34, 243–72.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, M.: 1977,Groundless Belief, Yale University Press, New Haven.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Henderson, D.K. One naturalized epistemological argument against coherentist accounts of empirical knowledge. Erkenntnis 43, 199–227 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01128196

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01128196

Keywords

Navigation