Article

NPT IN 2000: CHALLENGES AHEAD

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal *

The 2000 Review Conference of the parties to the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was held at the United Nations in New York from April 24 to May 19, 2000. The parties to the Treaty issued the final document at the conclusion of their conference. The general commitments and resolutions that were adopted had little to show in terms of substantive progress on nuclear disarmament. The Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) - United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France and China - reiterated their ‘unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed under Article VI of the NPT’.¹ However, they did not provide any tangible time-frame for the destruction of their respective nuclear arsenals. The NWS while they support the objectives of the NPT, in reality they ignore the directives of the Treaty. Furthermore the ongoing defence policies of the NWS continue as relics of the Cold War. Their strategic thinkers and military planners believe that stability and security would necessarily be jeopardised in the absence of ‘nuclear deterrence’.² Perhaps the biggest stumbling block to the NPT is the nuclear deterrence theory and its importance in the NWS defence policies.³

The NPT is endlessly cited by the defence analysts as the cornerstone of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime (NNPR). This is because, under the NPT, 182 Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), as parties to the treaty, have pledged never to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. NNWS have submitted their nuclear programmes to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, intended to verify their compliance with the NPT.⁴   It is alleged by the Western states particularly, the US that some NNWS, for example, North Korea, Iran, are involved in clandestine nuclear weapons development. Political leaders, experts, and public opinion the world over, have identified proliferation of nuclear weapons, rather than war among the NWS, as the most significant threat to international security.⁵ The realisation that nuclear weapons proliferation would undermine international security and stability has increased the importance of the NPT. The objective of this study is to identify as well as to analyse the challenges, which the NPT is currently experiencing, and to chalk out the strategy, which would enhance the credibility of the Treaty. Before examining these challenges to the NPT, a brief review of developments in nuclear arms control and disarmament is undertaken.

Review Progress: 1995-2000 Nuclear Developments

The period between 1995 and 2000 saw both positive and negative developments in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation. The achievements and disappointments with respect to the objectives outlined in the NPT particularly, and the NNPR in general, have promoted debate at all levels about the practicality of the NPT regime. The following discussion examines the questions: How much genuine effort have the NWS made towards nuclear disarmament? How much more are they prepared to make? What are the decisions of defence-related taken by NWS and NNWS, which impede the progress of NPT?

a) Advice by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

In response to a request made by the UN General Assembly in December 1994 the ICJ in The Hague gave an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons on July 8, 1996. The Court gave the unanimous advisory opinion that the threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons might be legal in extreme circumstances of self-defence. However, it would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. The court decision did not outlaw nuclear war, and so many say it in fact legitimised use of nuclear weapons.⁶

On September 10, 1996, the General Assembly of UN adopted the CTBT by a vote of 158 against 3, with 5 abstentions and was opened for signature on September 24, 1996.⁷ The Treaty prohibits nuclear explosions of more than 2kg TNT of fissile material. However, it permits nuclear hydrodynamic experiments including sub-critical amounts of fissile materials; Inertial Confinement Fusion experiments; the experiments using pulsed power facilities; and the operation of nuclear power or research reactors.⁸   Moreover, the Treaty authorises computer simulation of nuclear weapons.⁹ Since 1996, the Treaty has been signed by more than 155 states (including five NWS). The non-signatories de-facto NWS India and Pakistan have been observing a moratorium on their nuclear testing. Despite these developments, the entry into force of the provisions of the CTBT are still in limbo. In October1999, the US Senate refused to ratify it. India, Pakistan and North Korea have not even signed it.¹⁰

c) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (the START Process)

START I calls for the reduction of the total strategic nuclear warheads in possession of the US and Russian Federation, to 6000 warheads each.¹¹ The implementation of START I is proceeding ahead of schedule.¹² The Russian Federation on May 4, 2000 had ratified the START II Treaty. US had already ratified it in January 1996. According to START II the number of strategic weapons of Russian Federation and US would be reduced to 3000 and 3500, respectively. In March 1997, at the Helsinki Summit, Russia and US agreed to a framework for a START III Treaty. It is to include the obligation to reduce the respective nuclear arsenal to 2000-2500 each by December 31, 2007.¹³

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies non-proliferation commitments and provides assurances to the international community about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities by the NNWS.¹⁴  The controversy over the Iraqi and the North Korean clandestine enrichment and nuclear weapons programmes had strengthened the demand for improving the safeguards system of IAEA.¹⁵ The IAEA has begun to introduce strengthening measures for the perfection of the IAEA safeguards. Consequently, the Committee constituted by IAEA Board of Governors negotiated the text of the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards. The Board of Governors approved it in May 1997. This protocol gave the Agency new powers in collecting information.¹⁶

In June 1998, the foreign ministers of eight states- Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, Slovenia (which later withdrew), South Africa, New Zealand and Sweden - issued a joint declaration entitled, ‘Towards a nuclear-free world: the need for a new agenda’, calling upon states to commit themselves to the elimination of their nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capability. The UN General Assembly adopted its nuclear disarmament resolution in December 1998 by 114 in favour and 18 against, with 38 abstentions.¹⁷ Among other things, this resolution called for the full implementation of the decisions adopted by the NPT parties in 1995.

Following the May 1998 nuclear test explosions, India and Pakistan announced that they had became nuclear weapon states and refused to submit to the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1172. Nevertheless, their nuclear policies have been consistent with the key provision of the treaty so far. Without being a signatory to the NPT Islamabad and Delhi have been fulfilling the obligations as laid down under Article I and II of the Treaty.¹⁸

Since the 1995 NPT Review Conference, some progress has been made in consolidating the existing NWFZ and establishing, two further NWFZ, in Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and Africa (Pelindaba Treaty). The Bangkok Treaty entered into force in 1997. The protocol of the Bangkok Treaty has not yet been adopted by the NWS. The Pelindaba Treaty was signed in 1996, although progress has been slow in acquiring the 28 ratifications needed to bring the treaty into force. Mongolia has created the unilateral precedent of declaring itself a nuclear weapon free zone. Negotiations are also in progress on a treaty establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia.¹⁹ However, there has been no real progress on NWFZ in the Middle East.

h) Deadlock in Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations

On August 11, 1998, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) established an ad-hoc committee to commence negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. But negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons have not yet commenced. Perhaps the biggest stumbling block to the constitution of FMCT is whether it will be a disarmament or a non-proliferation treaty.

i) Illicit Nuclear Trade

The international nuclear safeguard regime has failed to control the illicit trade of nuclear bombs. Alexander Lebed, former Secretary of the Russian Security Council, claimed in an interview with the US television network CBS in 1997 that more than 100 portable atomic bombs, approximately the size of a suitcase, have gone missing from the Russian Federation, in September1997.²⁰

j) 2000 Review Conference of the NPT

The Sixth Review Conference of the NPT adopted a Final Declaration comprising more than 150 paragraphs of a recommandatory nature, reviewing all the aspects of the NPT.²¹ The Review Conference declared that the nuclear test explosions carried out by the India and the Pakistan in May 1998, do not confer them NWS status and called upon them to undertake the measures set out in the United Nations Security Council resolution 1172 and joins the NPT as NNWS.²²  Moreover, it called for an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons and establishing agreed practical steps for further progress in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It also affirmed that the provisions of Article 5 of the NPT, which permits the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions to the NNWS, are to be interpreted in the light the CTBT.

Challenges

There have been concepts within nuclear debates relating to the utility of nuclear weapons and developments such as refusal by US Senate to ratify the CTBT and the US revival of National Missile Defence programme (NMD), which pose a continuing hurdle to the process of the NPT’s full implementation. Amongst the important challenges that have surfaced in recent times are:

The pro-nuclear weapons lobby still believes that a nuclear deterrence ought to be retained for ensuring peace in the prevailing anarchic global political system. The NWS have used this deterrence theory to justify their possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the nuclear deterrence theory remains a big hurdle and a significant challenge in making a world free of nuclear weapons. The non-implementation of Article 6 of the NPT²³ and the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan have augmented the vitality of the nuclear deterrent theory.²⁴

The defence policies of NWS manifest the fundamental importance of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons to their security. Except China, the rest of the NWS continue to insist on the right of first use of nuclear weapons. The NWS collectively maintain thousands of nuclear weapons. The Russians decided to store, rather than destroy, their 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons, it had withdrawn from active deployment. Similarly, Washington intends to maintain its nuclear weapons, which will be withdrawn from deployment, after the implementation of the START II.²⁵ Thus these states have not initiated any serious moves for the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Through their research and development activities, they are developing advanced nuclear technology and devising methods to manufacture new nuclear weapons under the pretext of checking the effects of age on the existing ones. They are testing nuclear weapons under simulated conditions. For instance, as part of America’s Stockpile Stewardship Programme, America conducted sub-critical nuclear tests at its Nevada testing site in 1997. The US is also working on a new model submarine warhead, at its Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico, which it plans to deploy without actual testing. These developments invalidate Article VI of the NPT and the CTBT’s objectives. The UN Under Secretary for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala stated, ‘there is a widespread feeling among non-nuclear weapons states that the record as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned requires much more progress than has actually been recorded’.²⁶

c) Nuclear weapons capability in the basement

There is no mechanism to cap and finally eliminate the nuclear weapons capability in the basement. Japan, for example, does not possess nuclear weapons. However, it can very easily develop them, once any such political decision is taken and in a very short span of time. The factor fuelling such suspicions are: Japan is continuing its research and development work on its ‘Fast Breeder’ reactors for power generation even after the majority of countries have given up the technology as impracticable, and it has been stockpiling plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons. Secondly, the impact of domino theory - in case North Korea withdraws from the NPT and declares itself a Nuclear Weapon State. Japan has its capability ready in the basement.

According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) war policy, the control of US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe under the NATO command could be transferred to the NNWS in times of war.²⁷ The US tactical nuclear weapons are currently stationed in seven NATO countries.²⁸ The transfer of nuclear weapons among NATO members violates Article I and II of the NPT, which infact ban the nuclear weapons and their relevant technology trade. Moreover, these Articles do not permit the NWS to delegate the control of their nuclear weapons directly or indirectly to others.²⁹ Therefore, the NATO members parties to the NPT are bound not to acquire, receive, manufacture, and even gain control over the US nuclear weapons stationed in some of them. However, NATO and US policies are based on the assumption that the NPT allows some exceptions of control in times of war.³⁰ Despite the end of the Cold War NATO members ignore the provisions of the Treaty. There is a debate for the cessation of nuclear weapons sharing arrangement among NATO members. Yet, this debate is unproductive, because the NATO members do not desire to give up their nuclear security umbrella and they are wilfully ignoring this issue.

The NWS and many of their allies advocate NPT objectives. While campaigning for de-nuclearisation they are thinking of "horizontal proliferation" only and deliberately ignoring ‘vertical proliferation’. Interestingly, when they refer to NPT holdouts - India, Israel, and Pakistan - they adopt a biased approach because they overlook Israel’s nuclear weapons capability. Yet, in the case of India and Pakistan, they repeat the old line of "Do as I say and not as I do".³¹   Such approaches are not conducive to the harmonization of efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The NPT does not provide any mechanism to force its members to live up to their obligations described in the Treaty. At the end of the 2000 NPT review conference, parties to the Treaty agreed on the consensus document. But practically, the 2000 Conference did not settle any of the contentious issues that have been the source of differences among the parties to the Treaty, since its foundation in 1968. Instead, the conference has merely deferred their resolutions. The postponement of the demands of NNWS in the recent Review Conference was once again exposed the non-existence of an enforcement mechanism, which would devise modes of penalty or punishments for the violator of Article 1 and 2 of the NPT. Ironically, the NWS always express their support for nuclear disarmament in theory. But they have not agreed on any time-bound framework for total nuclear disarmament. They have never even discussed the mode of penalty or punishments for violators of Article I and 2 of the Treaty.

The proposed US NMD programme has aroused a controversy in the Russian Federation and impacted upon China’s relations with the US. Hopes for significant nuclear arms control achievements have dimmed. The Russians and Chinese have opposed any amendment in the ABM Treaty. Senior spokesmen from both countries have warned that any amendment or abolition of the ABM treaty would lead to disastrous consequences for nuclear arms control. Both states have announced that they would build enough warheads to keep their deterrent forces credible by overwhelming any imaginable US missile shield.³²   Despite the Russian and Chinese opposition, the Americans conducted tests in order to test out their anti missiles defence capabilities. There is a danger that this could bring a halt to the bilateral nuclear disarmament between the Russians and Americans. In addition, it would have a negative impact on the multilateral nuclear disarmament and arms control treaties and agreements, such as NPT and CTBT. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, while discussing the ramifications of US NMD programme observed, ‘the growing pressure to deploy national missile defences ... is jeopardising the ABM treaty ... and could well lead to a new arms race, setbacks for nuclear disarmament and non proliferation, and create new incentives for missiles proliferation’.³³

Following the US example, several leading Indian defence scientists such as the Scientific Advisor to the Indian government, Dr. A P J Abdul Kalam, have begun lobbying for an anti-missile defence programme for India. This would certainly undermine Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and force Pakistan to seek counter measures such as expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal, and lead to a further arms race in the region, one which would not be limited to India and Pakistan alone, nor be confined to the region of South Asia.

Suggestions for strengthening the NPT regime

1. Tougher compliance and inspection procedures should be adopted by the UN to make sure that parties to the Treaty fully honour their obligations.

2. New initiatives should be encouraged to enable the Treaty to adapt to altered circumstances. Therefore the Treaty should be amended to make it acceptable to all countries of the world. These amendments will either eliminate the discriminatory elements of the treaty or accommodate India, Pakistan and Israel in the framework of these discriminatory elements.

3. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons in one stroke is not possible in the near future. Therefore, the process of nuclear disarmament should be based on a step by step approach, such as the START1 and 2 treaties. For this reason, bilateral nuclear arms reduction processes (START etc) could at a later stage be transformed into multilateral nuclear disarmament processes, in order to include United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel.³⁴

4. The attempts were made to provide NNWS Positive and Negative security assurances.³⁵  But these initiatives have failed to provide real or legitimate security assurance to NNWS (Party to the Treaty) within the context of the NPT. Therefore, for enhancing the credibility of the NPT, the legitimate security assurances should be provided to the NNWS by a UN resolution.

5. NWS have not ruled out the possible use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against attacks with chemical or biological weapons and in response to large-scale aggression utilising conventional weapons. This problem could be resolved by the clear commitment or undertaking by the NWS not to use nuclear weapons against any NNWS. Therefore, by way of a UN resolution, NATO and NWS ought to give a formal pledge that they will not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into a conventional war.

6. The global security can be further stabilised by a series of practical, realistic manoeuvres. For instance, the Canberra Commission³⁶  in August 1996 proposed several measures, such as; taking nuclear forces off alert, removing warheads from delivery vehicles, ending the deployment of non-strategic weapons, and conducting further negotiations to reduce US and Russian nuclear arsenals, and so forth.³⁷

Conclusion

The NPT allows the five NWS - US, Russian Federation, UK, France and China to keep their nuclear weapons, while also pursuing nuclear arms control. This division of nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ disturbs the NNWS, especially those which are not enjoying the ‘nuclear security umbrella’ of the NWS. The non-compliance of NWS with the legal obligations (as in Articles (1), (2), and (6) of the NPT and the political commitment to which they agreed in the Principles and Objectives, in the 1995 Review Conference), undermines the objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the US Senate’s refusal to ratify the CTBT in October 1999 and the revival of its NMD programme have kept open the possibility of making more sophisticated nuclear weapons, despite US commitments in the Treaty to work for nuclear disarmament. There is a possibility that the US desire for maintaining superiority in military power would invalidate the whole fabric of nuclear arms control.

However, at the same time, one must recognise that some very substantial developments have occurred in nuclear disarmament, such as the completion of negotiations on two nuclear weapon free zones in Southeast Asia and Africa; the finalisation of the CTBT draft and its opening for signing and ratification for the members of the UN; the fact that presently all NWS, Israel, India, and Pakistan are observing a moratorium on their nuclear weapons testing; the ratification of START II by the Russian Federation in May 2000 (the US did it in 1996); the on going negotiations on START III; and the agreement on IAEA’s Model Protocol. The UK and France have been carrying out disarmament measures unilaterally. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests did not lead other states (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq), suspected of harbouring nuclear weapon ambitions, to follow suit.

Nuclear status is at the heart of NWS security doctrines, self-awareness and self-confidence. They have made huge investments of their political credibility, scientific efforts, and financial resources in developing these deadly arsenals. Nuclear weapons are also viewed as a great equaliser - who guarantees protection to states with limited resources and inferior conventional armaments, against invasions and humiliations by the stronger enemy. Since adversarial relations exist alongside violent confrontations, therefore, to construct scenarios in which NWS would give them up in the near future is not a realistic approach. The policies of the established NWS as well as the de-facto NWS indicate that the true renunciation of nuclear weapons lies beyond any political agenda. For all practical considerations, Washington’s commitment to nuclear disarmament is merely rhetoric. It is worth recalling, the words of French Admiral Jaxques Lanxade: ‘there is indeed something paradoxical about the representatives of nuclear powers condemning the evils of proliferation and at the same time defending the virtues of their own nuclear deterrent’.³⁸  It is a reminder that merely relying on the present language of the NPT and the UN Security Council resolution of 1172 are not rational solutions for nuclear disarmament. What is required is a balance of rights and obligations in the entire field of nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, the anti-nuclear weapons campaign focus should be on the early establishment of a non-discriminatory Nuclear Weapons Convention.

References

1. The parties of the NPT reassess the Treaty after every five years in a review conference as per the provisions of Article 8, paragraph 3). They review the progress in achieving the goals set out by the Treaty. The Sixth Review Conference of the State Parties to the NPT was convened in New York from 24 April-19 May, 2000. Mr. Abdullah Baali, permanent representative of Algeria to the UN presided over the conference. See the text of the Final Document Issued by 2000 NPT Review Conference May20, 2000).  http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/finaldoc.htm.

2. The Russian Federation (RF) Military Doctrine signed by President Vladimir Putin on April 21, 2000 stated that nuclear weapons are an effective deterrent against aggression directed at RF or its allies. RF nuclear weapons are to be used only in response to large scale conventional as well as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack on RF or its allies, in situations critical to national security. See Charles J. Dick, ‘Russia’s new doctrine takes dark world view’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No.1, (January-2000) pp16. ‘Russia’s Military Doctrine’, Arms Control Today (May-2000), pp. 31. Similarly, the US continues to maintain a nuclear deterrence both nationally as well as part of NATO defences. See Walter Slocombe, ‘Is there still a role for nuclear deterrence?’, NATO review, (November/ December-1997) pp. 24, 26.

3. The nuclear deterrence theory obstructs the reversal of nuclear weapons proliferation. States, for example, India had used inadequate disarmament progress as the pretext for its own nuclear weapon programme. China’s nuclear posture is linked to those of US and Russia and Pakistan to that of India. See George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, The Impact on Global Proliferation, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 8.

4. The NPT members are permitted to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. There are 44 states that are using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. These states, which have an access to the peaceful nuclear technology, can use this know-how for military purpose. There is no difference in nuclear explosive technology whether it is used for peaceful purposes or weapon testing. The IAEA safeguards on the nuclear facilities of the NNWS help to deter the use of nuclear material for nuclear weapons by the NNWS.

5. President Chirac of France, Prime Minister Blair of the UK and Chancellor Schroeder of Germany noted in the opinion published in the New York Times on October 8, 1999, that ‘As we look to the next century, our greatest concern is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and chiefly nuclear proliferation. We have to face the stark truth that nuclear proliferation remains the major threat to world safety’. This observation has been taken from Thomas Graham, ‘Strengthening Arms Control’, The Washington Quarterly, 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 183-196.

6. The ICJ’s ruling has undermined the anti-nuclear weapons proliferation movement. Because when it legitimised the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances, it encourages the others to develop or acquire nuclear weapons for the sake of their security. See SIPRI Year Book 1997 (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 391-392.

7. The three states voted against the resolution were Bhutan, India and Libya. For more details see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘CTBT: Salient Features and Implications For Pakistan’, National Development and Security, Serial No. 28 (Rawalpindi: FRIENDS, May, 1999).

8. According to the Clinton Administration’s Article by Article analysis of the CTBT, the Treaty permits zero yield nuclear explosions. See for more explanations Richard L Garwin, ‘The Future Of Nuclear Weapons Without Nuclear Testing ‘, Arms Control Today (November/December, 1997) pp. 3 See also, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘ A Case For Signing the CTBT’, Strategic Issues, No. 3 (March 2000) pp. 31.

9. Ibid.

10. Article 14 of the CTBT requires that this Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the instrument of ratification by all states listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty. US, India, Pakistan and North Korea are included in that list.

11. The US and the USSR had begun the START negotiations, since the early 80s. They opted for different negotiating strategies, agreeing only on the principal objectives of significant nuclear reductions and of the strengthening of strategic stability. These negotiations received great importance in the changed political and security environment due to the end of cold war and demise of the USSR. For more details about START1 see, Regina Cowen Karp, ‘The START Treaty and the future of strategic nuclear arms control,’ SIPRI Yearbook 1992: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) pp. 13-26. And also see Shannon Kile, ‘Nuclear arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 365-393.

12. Mitsuru Kurosawa, The 7th Carnegie International Non Proliferation Conference (Washington D.C. January 11-12, 1999) www.ccip.org/programs/npp/kurosawa.htm .

13. Ibid.

14. IAEA safeguards are applied pursuant to safeguards agreements concluded between the Agency and the state(s) concerned. In the case of NNWS parties to the NPT, comprehensive (sometimes referred to as full-scope) safeguards agreements cover all of state’s nuclear material and activities.

15. Iraq in 1991 and North Korea in 1994 were alleged to have diverted their nuclear material from their nuclear facilities for military purposes. The IAEA failed to detect it in a timely manner, because of the shortcomings of its safeguard system.

16. According to this protocol, a state is required to provide information to the Agency and access mechanisms related to: all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle; nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development; all buildings on a nuclear site; the manufacture and any export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies; long-term plans for the development of the nuclear fuel cycle; and wider physical access than previously provided for the purpose of ensuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities or resolving questions and inconsistencies. The new protocol is voluntary. "International Atomic Energy Agency", 2000 NPT Review Conference - Press Kit 3 (Published by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, February 2000).

17. US, France, Turkey voted against the Resolution out of 16 NATO members. Others abstained while Russia, India, Pakistan, and Israel also voted against. See William Epstein, ‘Voting by abstention’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March/April 1999), pp. 6.

18. Article1 of the NPT states that NWS parties to the Treaty do not transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-weapon state to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons. Article 2 of the NPT states that NNWS do not to receive, acquire, or develop nuclear weapons.
    

Following the nuclear tests, Pakistan amended its Import and Export Procedure Order, through a Statutory Regulatory Order on February 25, 1999. It tightened control over the export of nuclear technology and materials to a foreign country or an organisation. Before this, Pakistan also formally proposed Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) to India in October 1998. This encompassed prevention of nuclear and ballistic missile race, risk reduction mechanisms and the proposition that nuclear deterrence should be pursued at the lowest possible level. India has rejected Pakistan’s SRR proposal and is developing its nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. See also the draft of Indian Nuclear Doctrine, released in August 1999.

19. 2000 NPT Review Conference, http://www.un.org/Depts/ dda/WMD/nptrevhome.htm.

20. According to the Russian Scientist, Alexy Yabloko, the suitcase - size nuclear bombs were made for terrorist applications in the 1970s, under the direction of the then Soviet KGB. See Asahi Shimbun, The Road to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co. Ltd., 1999) pp.55.

21. Article 8, clause 3 of the NPT says that after five years a conference of parties to the Treaty shall be held, in order to review the operation of this Treaty.

22. In June 1998, following the South Asian nuclear tests, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1172(1998), which urged India, Pakistan, and all other states that have not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT without delay and without conditions.

23. Article 6 of the NPT stipulates that all parties to the Treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith for effective measures for nuclear disarmament. It means that under this Article, NWS have also given a pledge to the international community that they shall engage themselves in nuclear disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

24. The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, following their respective nuclear tests in May 1998, announced that they had conducted their nuclear test explosions because of their security requirements. Many defense analysts disagree with the Indian official stance on the India’s May 1998 nuclear tests explosions, that India faces a significant military threat from China and Pakistan and its security needs cannot be met through alternative means other than nuclear weapons. They claim that ‘proliferation begets proliferation’ dictum does not explain the cause of the Indian overt nuclearization. If the threat (Chinese threat) was as urgent as the Indian government perceived, India would have carried out its first nuclear test much sooner than 1974. Moreover, India would have not only developed but deployed its nuclear weapons and delivery systems, which it has not done. Sumit Ganguly, ‘India’s Pathway to Pokhran II. The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Programme’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (US: Spring 1999), pp. 148-177. For more understanding see Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (US: Winter 1996/97) pp. 54-86. And also see Eric Arnett, ‘What threat’? The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (March/April 1997), pp.53-54.

25. Walter Pincus, ‘Amid Nuclear Talks, New Plans for Better Weapons’, International Herald Tribune (April 25, 2000). See also, Philipp C Bleek, ‘Putin Elected President, Addresses Nuclear Agenda’, Arms Control Today (April 2000), pp. 29.

26. Voice of America (April 20, 2000) http://sun00781.dn.net/nuke/control/npt/news/000420- npt1.htm.

27. Rebacca Johnson, ‘Trouble Treaties: Is the NPT tottering?’ The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March/April 1999). pp. 16-17.

28. The some NATO members have the US nuclear gravity bombs on their soil. Bulk of these gravity bombs is stationed in Germany, Italy, and Turkey (for host country dual-capable aircraft) and US and in UK (for American aircraft only). Belgium, Greece, and the Netherlands host a small number of bombs in one air base each solely for use by national aircraft. Therefore, for the purpose of nuclear war, European host nations air forces are trained, and their aircraft equipped, to deliver the US nuclear weapons in wartime under, a system requiring a formal US release. See Bruno Tertrais, ‘Nuclear Policies in Europe’, Adelphi Paper 327( (London: Oxford University Press, March 1999) pp. 12-13. And also see Rebacca Johnson, ‘Divisions and Doubts At the Third NPT Prep-com’, Arms Control Today (April/May 1999), pp. 10-16.

29. Article 1 and 11 of the NPT, Op. cit.

30. Bruno Tertrais, Op.cit. Notably, the NPT is binding on its parties at all times and in all circumstances. The Treaty does not allow exceptions, such as the transfer of the US nuclear weapons stationed in some NATO countries. Thus the NATO war strategy is against the provisions of the NPT.

31. In its statement to UN General Assembly first committee, on October 12, 1998, EU only mentioned India and Pakistan by name and urges them to adhere to the NPT as it stands, i.e. as NNWS. See Miguel Marin-Bosch, ‘Nuclear Disarmament, 1995-2000: Isn’t it pretty to think so?’, Disarmament Forum one – 2000, (Geneva:UNIDIR, December 1999), pp 13-19.

32. The US has been seeking an amendment in the ABM Treaty of 1972, in order to deploy its NMD system. Some high level US officials have threatened withdrawal from the Treaty if Russia does not accommodate the changes sought by the US. Whereas, Russia considers any change in ABM treaty as a beginning for a nuclear arms race. China’s representative to the NPT Review Conference (2000) said on April 24, 2000, that US development of a missile defence system would impede the international disarmament process, thus shattering the basis for international nuclear non-proliferation. See Lawrence Scheinman, ‘Politics and Pragmatism: The Challenges for NPT 2000’, Arms Control Today, (April 2000), pp. 18-23. And also see, Zachary S. Davis, ‘NPT 2000-Is the treaty in Trouble?’ Arms Control Today, (December 1999) pp. 10-14.

33. ‘NPT Review Conference Opens’, Arms Control Today, (May 2000), pp. 45.

34. The present international environment is conducive to a multilateral disarmament treaty. The unilateral reduction by UK and France has signalled the openness of both states for joining multilateral nuclear disarmament process. See Patricia Lewis, ‘1995-2000: Progress Reviewed’, Disarmament Forum-one, 2000, (Geneva, UNDIR, December 1999), pp. 5-12.

35. The first initiative to deal with the security assurances was through the Security Council resolution 225, adopted in 1968. According to the resolution, the UK, US, and USSR pledged to provide immediate assistance to any NNWS party to the NPT, which was a victim of an act, or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used. Again in 1978 at the UN Special session on Disarmament, the US, the UK, and USSR, each made official policy statements giving Negative security assurances, that they would not use nuclear weapons against NNWS. Nevertheless, these assurances never became the formal part of the NPT.

36. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was set up by the Australian Government as an independent body in 1995 to develop a programme to achieve a world totally free of nuclear weapons.

37. Strategic Survey 1996/97, (London: Oxford University Press, April 1997), pp. 69. See also, SIPRI Year Book 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 392.

38. Rajesh Kumar Mishra, ‘NPT Review Conference 2000: So near yet so far’, South Asia Analysis Group, www.saag.org/papers2/paper118.htm.

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