Chinese nuclear forces, 2019

China is continuing the nuclear weapons modernization program that it initiated in the 1980s, fielding more types and greater numbers of nuclear weapons than ever before. Since our previous Chinese Nuclear Notebook in June 2018, China has continued fielding a new version of an existing nuclear medium-range mobile ballistic missile, a new dual-capable intermediate-range mobile ballistic missile, and an improved road-mobile launcher for an existing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It has also continued development of a road-mobile multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV)-capable ICBM and an air-launched dual-capable ballistic missile.

We estimate that China has a stockpile of approximately 290 nuclear warheads for delivery by 180 to 190 land-based ballistic missiles, 48 sea-based ballistic missiles, and bombers (see Table 1). This estimate was more or less confirmed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) director in May 2019: “We estimate … the number of warheads the Chinese have is in the low couple of hundreds” (Hudson Institute Citation2019).

This stockpile is likely to grow further over the next decade as additional nuclear-capable missiles become operational. One upgraded ICBM appears to capable of using MIRVs. While many non-official sources attribute very high numbers of warheads to MIRVed missiles (for example, 10 warheads per DF-41), we assess that the purpose of the MIRV program is to ensure penetration of US missile defenses, rather than to maximize the warhead capacity of the Chinese missile force. We therefore estimate that the MIRVed missiles are assigned a low number of warheads (perhaps three each), and that part of the missile payload capability is intended for decoys and penetration aids. As the United States strengthens its missile defenses and offensive capabilities, China will likely further modify its nuclear posture to ensure the credibility of its retaliatory strike force. This dynamic could potentially further increase the size of the Chinese nuclear warhead inventory. Given these developments, we estimate that China will soon surpass France as the world’s third-largest nuclear-armed state, though China’s arsenal will remain far below the levels of both Russia and the United States.

In a new intelligence assessment, the DIA declared in May 2019 that it expects “China is likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile … over the next decade” (Ashley Citation2019). It is unknown what the basis is for this dramatic projection, which implies China could have more than 600 nuclear warheads by the late-2020s. DIA projections are known for being prone to worst-case thinking and several previous projections have been exaggerated (Kristensen Citation2019a).

Although there are rumors that China might have mated warheads with some of its missiles to increase their readiness, we have not seen or heard official sources confirming this. Some Chinese military officials reportedly have advocated for increasing the readiness of China’s nuclear missiles (Kulacki Citation2016), and Admiral Philip Davidson, the current commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), told Congress in April 2018 that the “[Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)] Rocket Forces maintain a high degree of combat readiness” (Davidson Citation2018). High readiness can be achieved without necessarily loading nuclear warheads onto the missiles, and Davidson may have been referring to the portion of the Rocket Forces operating conventional missiles. China is thought to store most of its nuclear warheads in its central storage facility in the Qinling mountain range, and to a lesser degree at smaller regional storage facilities.¹

China’s land-based ballistic missile forces are organized under the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which is responsible for maintaining conventional and nuclear weapons and the “ability to deter and strike across the entire defense area.” It was established in 2016 to “enhance nuclear deterrence and counter-strike capacity” with medium- and long-range precision-strike ability (Xinhua Citation2016). Importantly, the Rocket Force will be responsible for all strategic missiles, including those on navy submarines. The Chinese defense ministry said the reorganization did not mean a major change in its nuclear policy, which would continue to be based on its no-first-use pledge and defensive nuclear strategy (Global Times Citation2016).

Nuclear doctrine and policy

China has maintained a doctrine of minimum deterrence since its first nuclear test in 1964. Historically, Chinese leaders have emphasized that a credible second-strike capability would be sufficient to deter an attack on China and placed the bulk of their efforts into ensuring the survivability of their nuclear arsenal. As such, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has maintained a “low alert level” for its nuclear forces and does not have warheads mated with the missiles under normal circumstances.

Additionally, the Chinese government has a long-standing nuclear policy not to use nuclear weapons first, not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or in nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to maintain a minimum deterrent designed to ensure a survivable second-strike capability. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Although there is much discussion in China about increasing the size and the readiness of the nuclear arsenal as well as when the no-first-use policy would apply, there is no evidence to suggest that the Chinese government has deviated from these longstanding policies; however, one element of China’s nuclear modernization program––the emphasis on developing strategic early warning systems––has prompted the US Defense Department to question whether China might adopt a “launch-on-warning” posture in the future (US Defense Department Citation2019, 67). Such a shift could potentially undermine China’s future commitment to its no-first-use policy if, for example, China launched its nuclear forces under a warning which turned out to be a false alarm.

Similarly, Chinese officials privately say that China would respond with nuclear weapons if its nuclear forces were attacked with conventional weapons. If that view is reflected in national strategy, it would contradict the no-first-use pledge.

Land-based ballistic missiles

China is continuing the gradual modernization of its land-based, nuclear-capable missile force. Overall, we estimate that it possesses approximately 180 to 190 nuclear-capable land-based missiles that can deliver nearly 220 nuclear warheads. The force is slowly increasing in both number and variety.

Over the past three years, China has fielded three road-mobile nuclear-capable versions: a new modification of the existing DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), designated the CSS-5 Mod 6 by the US military; a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) known as the DF-26; and the DF-31AG, a modified version of the DF-31A ICBM launcher. China has also made some of its silo-based DF-5 ICBMs capable of carrying multiple warheads and is working on completing development of the road-mobile DF-41, which will also be capable of carrying multiple warheads.

The modernization, which began in the 1980s, is part of a transition from older, transportable, liquid-fuel, slow-launching missiles to longer-range, road-mobile, solid-fuel, quicker-launching missiles. China’s last liquid-fuel mobile ICBM – the DF-4 (CSS-3) – is down to a single brigade and will likely be retired in the near future. China’s 20 liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBMs––the DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) and MIRVed DF-5Bs (CSS-4 Mod 3)––will potentially be replaced by incoming solid-fueled DF-41 ICBMs. It is possible that China intends equip all of its DF-5s with MIRVs before they are eventually retired, potentially with the new DF-5C variant that reportedly was flight tested in 2017 with MIRVs (Gertz Citation2017).

The nuclear command and control system needed to operate these missiles is also being modernized. The end result will be a land-based missile force better able to survive US (or Russian or Indian) surprise attacks, particularly given the advances in adversarial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and precision-guided conventional weapons.

The National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), an intelligence unit within the US Air Force, says that “China continues to have the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world” (US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center Citation2017, 3). But most of that program is conventionally armed. The nuclear portion of China’s missile force is significantly smaller than the nuclear missile arsenal of either Russia or the United States. Most of China’s nuclear missiles are medium- and intermediate-range. The size of the ICBM force has remained relatively stable over the past five years but appears to be increasing again. The US Defense Department estimates that there are approximately 90 ICBMs available for 90 launchers (US Defense Department Citation2019, 117), although we estimate that 90 is probably the high end of a range estimate of 65–90 launchers and missiles.

The Pentagon’s 2019 Missile Defense Review stated that “China can now potentially threaten the United States with about 125 nuclear missiles” (Missile Defense Review Citation2019a, v). But that estimate appears to include many weapons that can reach US territories and peripheral states but not the continental United States (the lower 48 states). Of the 125 missiles, we estimate that roughly 80 have sufficient range to target the continental United States from their deployment areas in China.

China’s primary regional nuclear missile is the two-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2), a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of about 2,150 km. Since 2016, China has been fielding a new version, possibly known as DF-21E (CSS-5 Mod 6). We estimate that China has approximately 40 launchers for the nuclear DF-21, each with one reload. China has also deployed two conventional versions of the DF-21, the DF-21C (CSS-4 Mod 4) land-attack missile and the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) anti-ship missile.

For the past decade, the focus of China’s ICBM modernization has been the DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) and a longer-range version known as the DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2). The DF-31, which was first deployed in 2006 but now appears leveled out with fewer than 10 launchers fielded, is a three-stage, road-mobile missile that is transported in a 15-meter canister on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). The DF-31 has a range of about 7,200 km, but cannot reach the continental United States from its deployment areas in China.² It is presumed to have taken over much of the regional targeting (of Russia, India, and Guam) previously done by the DF-4, which we estimate will be retired soon. The reasons for the DF-31’s apparently slow introduction are unclear and some recent US overviews don’t mention the missile at all.

The DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) – a solid-fueled, three-stage, road-mobile ICBM – is an extended-range version of the DF-31, designed to reach targets in most of the continental United States. The launcher appears identical to the one used for the DF-31. China appears to continue to field additional DF-31As, which with a range of 11,200 km have the capability to reach nearly all parts of the continental United States. We estimate that the country deploys about 24 DF-31A ICBMs in four brigades.

During a parade in 2017 celebrating the 90th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army, China unveiled an improved launcher known as the DF-31AG. Rumors quickly emerged that it was for a new ICBM, possibly even one with MIRV capability; however, it remains to be seen if it will carry the same missile as the DF-31A launcher or a new system. The 2017 NASIC report did not mention the DF-31AG, but the 2018 Defense Department report describes it as “an enhanced version of the DF-31A ICBM that also uses a transporter-erector-launcher to increase its mobility and survivability” (US Defense Department Citation2018a, 76).

Perhaps the biggest recent nuclear missile development for China has been fielding the new DF-26 intermediate-range road-mobile missile in significant numbers. First displayed during a parade in 2016 and again in 2017, the Pentagon claims that 80 DF-26s are now deployed, although we estimate that number is probably closer to 70. If so, at least two brigades now appear to have been equipped with the DF-26. Like the existing DF-4 and DF-31 ICBMs, the 4,000-km range DF-26 is capable of targeting important US bases in Guam. The DF-26 was reported operating in a new training area in Inner Mongolia in January 2019 (Kristensen Citation2019b). Unlike the DF-4 and DF-31, however, the DF-26 is thought to be dual-capable and more accurate, and so could also be used to target aircraft carriers with conventional warheads, prompting some media sources to dub it the “Carrier Killer” (Axe Citation2019), a name previously also given to the DF-21D anti-ship missile. Chinese analysts claim that the missile’s upgraded control surfaces and guidance system will provide it with the necessary capability to target ships at sea (Liu Citation2019a), but some Western analysts have expressed skepticism that the DF-26 would be able to successfully target moving ships, given the tactical and procedural challenges involved with such an operation (Lendon Citation2019).

The dual-capable role of the DF-26 (and also the DF-21) raises some thorny issues about command and control and the potential for misunderstandings in a crisis. Preparations to launch or the actual launch of a DF-26 with a conventional warhead against a US base in the region could potentially be misinterpreted as a launch of a nuclear weapons and trigger nuclear escalation (or even preemption). The mixing of nuclear and conventional capability on medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles has been implemented in China, India, and Pakistan.

China has still not completed development of the long-awaited DF-41 ICBM (CSS-X-20), which has been reported in development at least since 1997. The US Defense Department believes that this missile is capable of carrying MIRVs (US Defense Department Citation2019, 45), and rumors have spread in the media that the DF-41 can carry six to 10 warheads (Gertz Citation2016.) As is likely the case with the DF-5B, though, the number of warheads that the DF-41 carries may be significantly less––perhaps three––and the additional payload capability may focus on decoys and penetration aids to overcome the US ballistic missile defense system. The PLARF conducted its tenth test of the DF-41 in May 2018, and followed it up with a simulated second-strike exercise in January 2019, which may have included the DF-41 (Liu Citation2019b). This could indicate that the missile has nearly completed its development and testing cycle; however, the missile is not yet listed as operational in the 2019 Defense Department report. The DF-41 is expected to eventually replace the aging DF-5 ICBM and could potentially be launched from silos and railcars, in addition to mobile TELs (US Defense Department Citation2019, 45).

Land-based short-range ballistic missiles

Despite many unsubstantiated Internet-rumors to the contrary, we estimate that all of China’s short-range ballistic missiles are conventional with possibly one exception: the DF-15 (CSS-6). After reporting that the nuclear test China conducted on August 16, 1990, may have been “related to development of a warhead for a Chinese short-range ballistic missile” (CIA Citation1990, 1), the CIA three years later concluded “that China will begin to field nuclear-armed CSS-X-6’s next year.” The 1993 memorandum went on, “China almost certainly has already developed the warhead for this system. Testing might be needed for formal weaponization or for additional warhead options” (CIA Citation1993, 5). Despite the apparent nuclear capability China developed at that time, though, it is unclear whether it ever completed and fielded a nuclear warhead for the DF-15. The 2019 Defense Department report lists the DF-15 as a conventional missile (US Defense Department Citation2019, 44); however, China might have developed the capability as a potential option for future deployment.

Submarines and sea-based ballistic missiles

China currently operates a fleet of four Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which are based at the Longposan naval base near Yulin on Hainan Island. An additional two Jin-class SSBNs are currently under construction at Huludao Shipyard (US Defense Department Citation2019, 66).

Each Jin SSBN is designed to carry up to 12 JL-2 (CSS-N-14), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that is a modified version of the DF-31. Each JL-2 is equipped with a single warhead and, possibly, penetration aids. The JL-2 has not been flight-tested to its full range but is thought to have a range of 7,200 km, although US range estimates have varied over the years. The 2017 NASIC report sets the range at 7,000-plus km (US Air Force Citation2017, 33). That would be sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Russia, and India from waters near China – but unless the submarine carrying the weapon sailed deep into the Pacific Ocean, its JL-2s could not target the continental United States.

Although the Jin-class is more advanced than China’s first experimental SSBN – the single and now inoperable Xia (Type 092) – it is still a very noisy design and China would face constraints and challenges when operating its SSBN force (Kristensen Citation2009b). It therefore seems likely that China will end production after six boats and turn its efforts to developing the quieter third-generation (Type 096) SSBN, which is expected to begin construction in the early-2020s. Given that China’s SSBNs are assumed to have approximately a 40-year service life, the Department of Defense expects that the Type 094 and Type 096 boats will operate concurrently (US Defense Department Citation2019, 66). If so, that could potentially result in a fleet of about 10 SSBNs.

It remains uncertain whether Jin submarines have ever sailed on deterrent patrols with nuclear weapons on board. US Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Joseph Mulloy said in early 2015 that one Chinese SSBN had gone on a 95-day patrol (Osborne Citation2015). In late 2015, STRATCOM Commander Admiral Cecil Haney said Chinese SSBNs had been at sea, and that he didn’t know if they had nukes on board but had to assume that they did (Gertz Citation2015). In early 2016, the head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency said the Chinese navy “deployed the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in 2015” on an extended patrol far from Chinese waters (Stewart Citation2016, 12).

These statements indicate that although one of the Jin submarines apparently sailed on an extended voyage in 2015, it is not clear that it carried nuclear warheads, or whether it was conducting a formal deterrent patrol. The voyage might have been a first step towards developing the capability to conduct deterrent patrols in the future.

To achieve that capability, the Chinese SSBN fleet will face several doctrinal, technical, and operational constraints. Although Chinese missile forces frequently practice the procedures required to load warheads onto missiles, China’s Central Military Commission has long resisted handing out nuclear warheads to the armed services to deploy on missiles under normal circumstances. Giving custody of nuclear warheads to deployed submarines during peacetime would constitute a significant change of Chinese policy. Moreover, before doing so, the Central Military Commission and China’s navy would first have to build up experience operating an SSBN force during realistic military operations, which would require development of improved command-and-control technologies and procedures.

The SSBNs would also need a launch destination. Even if China deployed nuclear-armed SSBNs to sea in a crisis, where would they sail? For a JL-2 to be able to strike targets in the continental United States, a Jin SSBN would have to sail across the East China Sea and well into the Pacific Ocean, through dangerous choke points where it would draw attention and be vulnerable to hostile antisubmarine warfare. It seems more likely that China plans to operate its Jin SSBNs in a “bastion” in the South China sea protected by attack submarines. China’s next-generation Type 096 SSBNs will carry an extended-range SLBM, the JL-3, which is estimated to have a range in excess of 9,000 kilometers. Although such a range would allow a submarine to target the north-western parts of the continental United States from Chinese waters, it would still not be able to target Washington, DC without sailing far past north-east Japan. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) reportedly conducted its first test of the JL-3 in November 2018 from a Type 032 auxiliary test submarine (Gertz Citation2018).

China’s main strategic goal is making sure that its minimum nuclear deterrent can survive a first strike, and for that reason it spends considerable resources on modernizing and hiding its land-based missiles. This makes its submarine program somewhat puzzling, for it seems much riskier for China to deploy nuclear weapons at sea, where submarines can be sunk by adversaries, than to hide the nuclear weapons deep inside China’s vast landmass (Kristensen Citation2014a).

Bombers

Aircraft, including the H-6, were used to deliver at least 12 of the nuclear weapons that China detonated in its nuclear testing program between 1965 and 1979. A Defense Intelligence Agency brief in 1984 estimated China had about 165 nuclear bombs for aircraft, although the agency also said “we are unable to identify associated airfield storage sites” (US Defense Intelligence Agency Citation1984, 3–4). By the end of the 1980s, the agency reduced the estimate to 75 bombs, but said H-6 (Tu-16) and H-5 (Tu-28) medium-range bombers and A-5 fighter-bombers were “all capable of delivering nuclear weapons” (US Defense Intelligence Agency Citation1989, 3). Moreover, various Chinese military museums display a variety of shapes of what is said to be strategic and tactical nuclear bombs (globalsecurity.org (Citationn.d). We estimate the stockpile for years might have included a small inventory––perhaps up to 20––gravity bombs for potential use by aircraft although the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) nuclear mission was officially dormant.

The PLAAF was assigned a “strategic deterrence” mission in 2012––which includes long-range strikes with conventional cruise missiles––and the US Defense Department appears to have altered its assessment of the PLAAF’s nuclear mission in recent years. While the 2017 version of the Defense Department report noted that the “[People’s Liberation Army Air Force does not currently have a nuclear mission” (US Defense Department Citation2017, 61), the 2018 version noted that “the PLAAF has been newly re-assigned a nuclear mission” and that the “H-6 and future stealth bomber could both be nuclear capable” (US Defense Department Citation2018a, 75, 34). The 2019 report references unidentified “Chinese media” sources which have apparently labelled the upgraded H-6K as a “dual nuclear-conventional bomber” since 2016 (US Defense Department Citation2019, 41).

The Defense Intelligence Agency reported in 2016 that China was developing two air-launched ballistic missiles for the H-6 bomber, “one of which might include a nuclear payload” (Stewart Citation2016, 10). This appears to involve yet another modification of the H-6 bomber known as the H-6N, which will carry an air-launched version of the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (Rogoway Citation2017), designated by the US intelligence community as CH-AS-X-13. This new air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) was first tested in December 2016 and again in January 2018 (Panda Citation2019). Notably, the 2019 DoD report states that upon completion, this nuclear ALBM would “for the first time, provide China with a viable nuclear ‘triad’ of delivery systems dispersed across land, sea, and air forces” (US Defense Department Citation2019, 67).

Chinese officials announced in 2016 that China is developing a new long-range bomber that US officials expect will have a nuclear mission (Coats Citation2018, 7; US Defense Department Citation2019, 61). The new bomber, which is known as the H-20 and appears to have some similarity to the American B-2, might become operational by the late-2020s.

Cruise missiles

From time to time, various US military publications have asserted somewhat ambivalently that one or more of China’s cruise missiles might have nuclear capability.

The CIA concluded in 1995 that a Chinese test scheduled for that year “may include warhead testing for … a cruise missile” (CIA Citation1995). And in 2013, a US Air Force Global Strike command briefing listed the CJ-20 air-launched land-attack cruise missile carried by the H-6K as possibly dual-capable (Kristensen Citation2013).

Likewise, in 2009 NASIC described the DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile as “conventional or nuclear,” but in 2017 designated it and all other Chinese air-launched land-attack cruise missiles “conventional” (NASIC 2017, 37). Even so, a nuclear modernization fact sheet published by the Pentagon in connection with the release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review claimed, without identifying them, that China had both air-launched and sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles (US Department of Defense Citation2018b).

Although China might have developed warhead designs for potential use in cruise missiles, these conflicting statements should be evaluated with caution.