I argue that the Seleukid Empire transformed from a system of direct control through appointed governors, mostly Macedonians, into a system of indirect rule through independent vassal rulers, mostly Iranians. The central idea is, that the original elites to whom imperial rulers delegate power and give land, eventually become independent from the central power, and may even turn against it; this compels imperial rulers to look for new allies, often beyond the established court circles. The conflicts accompanying the accession of Antiochus III reveal that Hellenistic kings were not automatically in control of their own court societies. Even though Antiochus initially succeeded in rearranging the social composition of his court, he later ruled primarily through favorites who were outsiders within the society of philoi: Macedonians, defectors from rival courts, refugees from the Greek mainland, a Carthaginian outlaw, and a queen. Despite his military successes, Antiochus moreover was forced to acknowledge the rising power of autochthonous aristocracies and the progressively independent position of governors, especially in Central Asia. The king reacted by expanding an already ongoing process of indirect rule through local dynasts and thereby managed to keep the Seleucid Empire together and even expand its borders. The vassal kings were fitted into the imperial superstructure through dynastic marriages and the cohesive facilities of the court, which they or their envoys visited on specific festive and ceremonial occasions. The new arrangements found expression in Antiochus' use of the title Great King.

From the Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean (P. Bang, W. Scheidel eds), 2013.

R. Strootman, ‘Eunuchs, renegades and concubines: The “paradox of power” and the promotion of favorites in the Hellenistic empires’, in: A. Erskine, L. Llewellyn-Jones, and S. Wallace eds., The Hellenistic Court: Monarchic Power and Elite Society From Alexander to Cleopatra (Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 2017) 121–142.

Original English version of R. Strootman, Regalità e vita di corte in età ellenistica’, in: M. Mari ed., L’età ellenistica. Società, politica, cultura (Rome: Carocci Editore, 2019) 133–144.

Paper presented at the 3rd Seleucid Study Day, Université de Bordeaux III, September 6, 2012.

R. Strootman, ‘The Great Kings of Asia: Universalistic titulature in the Seleukid and post-Seleukid East’, forthcoming in: R. Oetjen and F. X. Ryan eds., Seleukeia: Studies in Seleucid History, Archaeology and Numismatics in Honor of Getzel M. Cohen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019 [in press]).

R. Strootman, ‘The coming of the Parthians: Crisis and resilience in Seleukid Iran in the reign of Seleukos II’, in: K. Erickson ed., The Seleukid Empire, 281–222 BC: War Within the Family (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2018) 129–150. I have noticed that this article is often interpreted as an argument against Parthian independence under Arsakes I and his immediate successors. That is not what I believe. I argue that in the later third century BCE, the Arsakid dynasty did become an independent polity but that it remained loosely integrated into a wider Seleukid imperial koine. I also argue that it is wrong to think of the Arsakid kingdom (or any ancient kingdom) as a sovereign territorial state comparable to the modern nation state, and that not every kingdom is also an empire. The Hellenistic ‘state’ system was hierarchical; it did not resemble the Westphalian chess board model. In other words, I argue not against Parthian independence but against the prevailing opinion among contemporary scholars that Parthian independence made the Arsakid royal dynasty the internationally recognized equal of the Seleukid imperial dynasty, and that Parthian independence immediately and irreversibly terminated Seleukid claims to imperial hegemony in the Upper Satrapies (Iran and Central Asia). There is evidence for an ongoing Seleukid presence in the Upper Satrapies until 148 BCE, while Arsakid coinage shows that an Arsakid empire was not established until after that date, when Mithradates I ‘the Great’, conquered western Iran and Babylonia, and appropriated Seleukid imperial titulature and imagery. I assume that during the decades preceding Mithradates’ conquest of Babylonia, Arsakids and Seleukids competed for hegemony in Iran: because premodern Eurasian empires usually are not bounded territorial ‘states’ but dynamic network polities aimed at accessing manpower and resources, it is perfectly possible that two (or more) empires simultaneously maintain networks of allegiance within the same region, in this case Iran. History rarely follows a clear-cut, unidirectional trajectory, and imperial histories in particular can be quite messy.

From the conquests of Seleukos Nikator, Seleukid rulers presented themselves as heirs to the age-old Near Eastern ideal of universal monarchy. But since their power had started to decline in the 2nd century BC, new claims to 'Great Kingship' were made by the Parthian Arsakids, the Mithradatids of Pontos, the Ptolemies, and conspicuously by Antiochos I of Kommagene, whose house had been bound to the imperial centre by ties of intermarriage and kinship. The same Antiochos famously displayed his royal ancestors in the sanctuary on Nemrut Dağı. While such dynastic expressions are predominantly viewed as fictitious Persian revivalism, it will be argued that the idea of universal monarchy had always been pivotal to Seleukid rule and that with the demise of the Seleukid patriline new claims to empire were based on matrilineal descent. This was possible due to the importance of Seleukid women as transmitters of inheritance and royalty.