Nathan Marcus

This paper puts forward the methodological view that certain data produced by financial markets can be used without the need to look into how they were compiled. It argues that when trying to understand the causes of the Austrian Boden-Kredit Anstalt's collapse of September 1929, data from bank balance sheets are not a reliable source, whereas data such as bond yields and interest rate differentials help locate the origin of the financial crisis in the resignation of Austria's Chancellor Ignaz Seipel in April 1929.

accounts of World War I and the interwar era. Nunan analyzes the evolving debates on selfdetermination among Persian intellectuals from the wartime Brest-Litovsk treaty to post1918 settlements, showing, for example, that the independence of Ukraine briefly appeared as a model. He reveals the currency in Iran’s quest for independence of not only Paris principles, but also alternative visions developed by the Germans and the Bolsheviks. Here also, contingencies were more decisive for the outcome beyond the broken promises from foreign powers and the effective appropriation of the language of self-determination by local elites. Less original is Simões de Araújo’s distinction between the diplomatic chancelleries of “Versailles” and the “Paris spirit” that flourished among the international intellectuals who came to the French capital during the peace conference. This chapter focuses on attempts to mobilize Black international networks for political enfranchisement both in the colonial w...

The end of the First World War marked a turning point in the practices of sovereign borrowing. The League of Nations loan for Austria issued in 1923 precluded foreign creditor control of Austrian assets and policies. Instead, financial control and oversight were placed in the hands of the League of Nations Council and the technocrats advising it. International negotiation and collaboration in Geneva preempted Austria’s neighbour countries from turning economic reconstruction into a tool of their particularistic foreign policy interests. Neither foreign bondholders nor guarantor governments were granted direct oversight over Austrian policies. In order to keep emergency borrowing by bankrupt states free from the machinations of international power struggles and coveted spheres of interest, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund continued the practice of multilateral oversight and control following the Second World War.

Abstract Hyperinflations are a modern phenomenon often associated with periods of transition. By accelerating the dynamics that govern the financial, political and private spheres of life, hyperinflations necessitate a quickened decision-making process in which alternative choices are eliminated. Using the example of Austria following the First World War, this article shows that hyperinflations are likely to have a path-determining effect on multiple levels. While periods of transitions offer the rare opportunity for countries to break with historical path dependence, hyperinflations carry the risk of creating new path dependence prematurely. By speeding up dynamics during transformative processes, hyperinflations eliminate possible alternatives that might otherwise have been chosen. Hyperinflations are thus best understood as neither the cause nor the consequence of transitions, but as their accelerating catalyst.

"This dissertation focuses on Austria, which in spite and because of its small size, played a pivotal role in the financial and diplomatic history of inter-war Europe. The author argues that three basic principles of post-war reconstruction – credibility, confidence and capital – were established in Austria, but not pursued wholeheartedly, so that Austria collapsed when European reconstruction failed in 1931. Austria regained credibility in the eyes of its citizens and investors through the help of the League of Nations. Following the League’s intervention in late 1922 hyperinflation in Austria was terminated and confidence in the country’s future improved, not least because the League assumed control over Austria’s fiscal policies. For political reasons, however, control was terminated prematurely and before Viennese banks had obtained sufficient levels of long-term capital. The League’s departure removed the vital credibility bestowed through its control and at the same time political conflict in Austria grew fiercer. In 1929, fears of civil war led to a decline of confidence and to the withdrawal of foreign capital and savings by concerned depositors, bringing down the second largest bank in Vienna. Confidence was ultimately shattered in 1931, when the Credit-Anstalt had to be bailed out by the Austrian government. The Austrian National Bank, however, managed to contain the crisis within less than a month. Only after much larger problems surfaced in Germany and Britain did an attacked on the Austrian currency ensue, which led to the collapse of the gold-standard. Rather than claim that the Credit-Anstalt rescue was a failure and that the bank’s collapse was the first in a series of events leading to the Great Depression, the author argues that international efforts to save Austria in 1931 were promising, and that only larger developments, particularly the unfolding crisis in Germany and Britain, brought about the end of global finance. The thesis brings together primary documents from public and private archives, originating with governments, diplomats, the League of Nations, central banks and private financiers, both in Austria and abroad. The narrative account is complemented by a continuous analysis of financial data, illustrating and substantiating the claims."

מטרתו של מאמר זה היא לספק לקוראים תיאור של וינה 1900 תוך הסתמכול על מקורות ראשוניים שנוצרו על-ידי הווינאים עצמם סביב 1900. סטטיסטיקאים אוסטרים ליקטו חלק מהאינפורמציה המוצגת ואינפורמציה נוספת ניתן למצוא במדריך הטלפון ומסחר הווינאי. ביחד מקורות אלה מספקים לנו חומרים שבעזרתם ניתן לשחזר איך הווינאים עצמם ראו, תיארו והציגו את עירם סביב 1900, איך אפיינו, העריכו ותייגו אותה. בנתונים הסטטיסטיים ובמדריך קיימת השאיפה לכלול הכול, לספק מערך שלם של אינפורמציה. אך, למעשה, הם אינם עושים זאת, ומה שנשאר מחוץ להם איננו אינפורמטיבי או חשוב פחות ממה שנחשב ראוי להיכלל בהם.

The two largest Jewish communities of interwar Bombay - the Baghdadis and the Bene Israel - led segregated lives and operated their own synagogues, cemeteries and communal institutions. This chapter looks at their sporting clubs and athletic activities from the 1920s to the 1940s to discern whether their mutual animosity was perhaps overcome on the playing fields. The two communities supported their own sports clubs and their respective teams never competed against each other. The arrival of Zionist sports offered a national ideology and practice that was opposed to sectarianism, but a careful analysis of the Bombay Jewish press attests to just a few encounters between sportsmen of the two communities.

Hyperinflations are a modern phenomenon often associated with periods of transition. By accelerating the dynamics that govern the financial, political and private spheres of life, hyperinflations necessitate a quickened decision-making process in which alternative choices are eliminated. Using the example of Austria following the First World War, this article shows that hyperinflations are likely to have a path-determining effect on multiple levels. While periods of transitions offer the rare opportunity for countries to break with historical path dependence, hyperinflations carry the risk of creating new path dependence prematurely. By speeding up dynamics during transformative processes, hyperinflations eliminate possible alternatives that might otherwise have been chosen. Hyperinflations are thus best understood as neither the cause nor the consequence of transitions, but as their accelerating catalyst

https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2016.1182121

While it is helpful to look at internatinoal bailouts through the wide-angled lens of financial imperialism across the twentieth century, we must not neglect the transnational and domestic class relations and specific social histories that underpinned them.

כלכלנים גילו זה כבר את השפעתן של ציפיות על עיצוב המצב הכלכלי. כפי שמסביר נתן מרקוס, הדבר נכון במיוחד כאשר בוחנים את הקשר בין ציפיותיהם של אנשים, רמת האינפלציה והנטייה לחסוך או לצרוך. המאמר דן באירוע כלכלי־היסטורי חשוב אך מוכר פחות מפרשות דומות במאה העשרים במדינות אחרות: האינפלציה הדוהרת (היפר־אינפלציה) באוסטריה בשנים 1922-1921, שהקדימה את ההיפר־אינפלציה בגרמניה בשנים 1923-1922. מה היו הציפיות של האזרחים האוסטרים באותן שנים ואיזה תפקיד הן מילאו בהחרפת המשבר ובהתייצבות שבאה אחריו? ציפיות האזרחים נדונות כאן לא רק כתופעה כלכלית אלא גם כתופעה .תרבותית ופוליטית, בין היתר דרך האספקלריה שלקריקטורות בנות הזמן

The maturity mis-match between short-term deposits and long-term loans at Austrian banks during the 1920s was an important cause of their weakness during times of crisis. This paper investigates why Austrian banks came to rely on short-term foreign deposits to finance their long-term lending. It focuses on the period of reconstruction which lasted from 1922 to 1926, and particularly on the role of the League of Nations, the Austrian National Bank and the Bank of England during this time. While all thee institutions worked towards economic and financial stability in Austria, they did not pursue common policies with regard to financial flows. A large loan in 1923 channeled foreign capital towards Austria, but after the Viennese Stock Exchange crashed in 1924, the League of Nations and the Bank of England opposed additional long-term borrowing by Austrian authorities. In order to accumulate foreign reserves, the Austrian National Bank felt compelled to pursue a policy of high interest-rates, which induced Austrian banks to borrow abroad. For want of confidence, foreign institutions were only prepared to provide short-term funds in the form of renewable deposits.

In our haste to explain away the 2008 crisis, we have tended to put all the blame on bankers and regulators. This simplification, while soothing, might be just as misguided as Germans’ or Austrians’ tendency in the 1920s and 1930s to put the blame on France and Britain for their economic difficulties, or later for World War Two. Crises are the stuff of legend, but we should find other ways to cope with them.

other. Moreover, the two benefited from one another both technically and organizationally because of the fact that both countries were located at the same economic level of development, that is, in the second phase of industrialization. It was exactly here—in addition to the issue of the world's financial system—that the stark contrast with the British–American economic relationship can be found. After all, the British were not as dependent as Germany on the import of commodities from the US because of their Commonwealth. The fact that this and other key factors have not been taken into account—such as the very different currency policies of Germany and Great Britain during the period under examination—means that Berghahn's description of the three countries' economic relationships amounts to a partial account of the overall picture. This, however, does nothing to take away from the fact that his study is highly stimulating, not least because of its comparative approach and its consideration of the perceptions of contemporary actors, all of which allows an entirely new perspective on foreign economic relationships between the US and western Europe.

"This dissertation focuses on Austria, which in spite and because of its small size, played a pivotal role in the financial and diplomatic history of inter-war Europe. The author argues that three basic principles of post-war reconstruction – credibility, confidence and capital – were established in Austria, but not pursued wholeheartedly, so that Austria collapsed when European reconstruction failed in 1931. Austria regained credibility in the eyes of its citizens and investors through the help of the League of Nations. Following the League’s intervention in late 1922 hyperinflation in Austria was terminated and confidence in the country’s future improved, not least because the League assumed control over Austria’s fiscal policies. For political reasons, however, control was terminated prematurely and before Viennese banks had obtained sufficient levels of long-term capital. The League’s departure removed the vital credibility bestowed through its control and at the same time political conflict in Austria grew fiercer. In 1929, fears of civil war led to a decline of confidence and to the withdrawal of foreign capital and savings by concerned depositors, bringing down the second largest bank in Vienna. Confidence was ultimately shattered in 1931, when the Credit-Anstalt had to be bailed out by the Austrian government. The Austrian National Bank, however, managed to contain the crisis within less than a month. Only after much larger problems surfaced in Germany and Britain did an attacked on the Austrian currency ensue, which led to the collapse of the gold-standard. Rather than claim that the Credit-Anstalt rescue was a failure and that the bank’s collapse was the first in a series of events leading to the Great Depression, the author argues that international efforts to save Austria in 1931 were promising, and that only larger developments, particularly the unfolding crisis in Germany and Britain, brought about the end of global finance. The thesis brings together primary documents from public and private archives, originating with governments, diplomats, the League of Nations, central banks and private financiers, both in Austria and abroad. The narrative account is complemented by a continuous analysis of financial data, illustrating and substantiating the claims."