Habit formation, so this chapter argues, is crucial for every form of identity as it structures our engagements with our surroundings in typical ways and thereby establishes a familiarity with our environment. Habit formation provides... more
Habit formation, so this chapter argues, is crucial for every form of identity as it structures our engagements with our surroundings in typical ways and thereby establishes a familiarity with our environment. Habit formation provides permanence, coherence, and thus identity to the objects we deal with and so turns the world into an inhabitable place. At the same time, we ourselves acquire a practical potential and an individual style through habitual performance, what is called a habitual identity. In the first part, a phenomenology of habit will be provided by distinguishing different levels, that is, passive-receptive, bodily, and personal habit. The chapter will focus on the bodily level of habit because here the intertwinement of individual and social aspects of identity formation becomes most prominent. The second part will relate habitual identity to practices of resilience or resistance. It will be shown that habitual identity is needed to cope with radical changes in one's body or environment, while also being an expression of an involuntary incorporation of social norms. The final part argues that my habitual self must be made thematic: I have to identify my habitual doings as typical of me (or my culture), only then can I become what I already am, or be able to change it.
Research Interests:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Agency, Philosophy of Action, Self and Identity, Resilience, and 13 morePhenomenology, Identity (Culture), Performativity, Resistance (Social), Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Judith Butler, Habitus, Social Norms, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Responsibility, Habits, and Critical Phenomenology
In this paper, I show that a phenomenological concept of normality can be helpful to understand the experiential side of post-truth phenomena. How is one's longing for, or sense of, normality related to what we deem as real, true, or... more
In this paper, I show that a phenomenological concept of normality can be helpful to understand the experiential side of post-truth phenomena. How is one's longing for, or sense of, normality related to what we deem as real, true, or objective? And to what extent is the sense for "what (really) is" related to our beliefs of what should be? To investigate this, I combine a phenomenological approach to lived normality with a genealogical account of represented normality that sheds light on the social and historical contingency of definitions of normality and their intertwinement with structures of power. It is my contention that such an approach to normality is well-suited to investigate how is and ought are interrelated within subjective experience and practice. This might in turn help overcoming one-sided debates on post-truth, which rely on the strict opposition of objectivity versus subjectivity, universal truth versus subjective experience, facticity versus meaning, or reason versus stupidity. It also sheds light on the ambivalent or contested status of experience within debates of post-truth and feminist theory. I will conclude that post-truth is related to what Hannah Arendt has termed the lack of a common world (i.e., normality), arguing that a plurality of experiences is needed to let the "real world" stand its ground again.
Research Interests:
Throughout her philosophical and literary career, Simone de Beauvoir was concerned with existential problems like singularity, freedom, and responsibility. Beauvoir transforms phenomenological concepts like intentionality, situation,... more
Throughout her philosophical and literary career, Simone de Beauvoir was concerned with existential problems like singularity, freedom, and responsibility. Beauvoir transforms phenomenological concepts like intentionality, situation, lived body, project, and existence from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and most of all Sartre into a genuine existential ethics based on the ambiguity of the human condition. This ambiguity of our finite existence, namely, the fact that we are both subject and object, active and passive, immanent and transcendent, is for her the precondition of real ethics. Two insights are crucial for such an approach: that existence is always embodied and situated (concretizing and complementing Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) and that freedom can never be absolute but must be realized within concrete situations and in relation with others (arguing against Sartre).
In this chapter, I will present Simone de Beauvoir's philosophy as a responsive ethics, in which freedom and vulnerability, mind and body, we and others, are necessarily intertwined. Her entire work, so I would like to argue, not merely her "ethics of ambiguity", can be characterized as an attempt to develop such a performative ethics - an ethics that argues for the response-ability to accept and embrace one's ambiguity to live an "authentic," that is, ethical life.
In this chapter, I will present Simone de Beauvoir's philosophy as a responsive ethics, in which freedom and vulnerability, mind and body, we and others, are necessarily intertwined. Her entire work, so I would like to argue, not merely her "ethics of ambiguity", can be characterized as an attempt to develop such a performative ethics - an ethics that argues for the response-ability to accept and embrace one's ambiguity to live an "authentic," that is, ethical life.
Research Interests:
Autoriteit lijkt niet langer belangrijk als men complexe moderne democratische samenlevingen wil analyseren. Tegelijkertijd kan men een toenemend verlangen naar autoriteit in het sociale en politieke leven waarnemen, een verlangen naar... more
Autoriteit lijkt niet langer belangrijk als men complexe moderne democratische samenlevingen wil analyseren. Tegelijkertijd kan men een toenemend verlangen naar autoriteit in het sociale en politieke leven waarnemen, een verlangen naar oriëntatie en sturing. Dit artikel onderzoekt hoe autoriteit en gender met elkaar verweven zijn en hoe dit tot uiting komt in de huidige crisis van de normaliteit. De paper laat zien waarom een terugkeer naar een premoderne autoriteit deze crisis niet kan oplossen. Om een nieuwe normaliteit te co-creëren moet men de dubbelzinnigheid van het bestaan accepteren en beseffen dat vrijheid altijd relationeel is (zie Simone de Beauvoir).
Research Interests:
Der folgende Beitrag thematisiert die Interrelation von historischen Strukturen und leiblicher Praxis aus den Perspektiven von Foucault und Merleau-Ponty. Dabei wird versucht, zwischen strikt normierten und offeneren Formen der... more
Der folgende Beitrag thematisiert die Interrelation von historischen Strukturen und leiblicher Praxis aus den Perspektiven von Foucault und Merleau-Ponty. Dabei wird versucht, zwischen strikt normierten und offeneren Formen der Habitualisierung zu unterscheiden. Abschließend soll gezeigt werden, dass auch normierte Formen der Habitualisierung eine gewisse leibliche Praxis voraussetzen. Geschichtliche Strukturen oder Macht schreiben sich nicht einfach so in die Körper ein, sondern müssen wiederholt angeeignet und praktisch eingeübt werden. In diesen individuellen Prozessen liegt immer auch die Möglichkeit der Verschiebung, Veränderung oder gar Neuentstehung von geschichtlichen (Macht-)Strukturen.
Research Interests:
Introduction to the forthcoming volume "Access and Mediation. Transdisciplinary Perspectives to Attention", edited by Maren Wehrle, Diego D’Angelo and Elizaveta Solomonova. Berlin: De Gruyter (volume 11 in the series: Age of Access:... more
Introduction to the forthcoming volume "Access and Mediation. Transdisciplinary Perspectives to Attention", edited by Maren Wehrle, Diego D’Angelo and Elizaveta Solomonova. Berlin: De Gruyter (volume 11 in the series: Age of Access: Grundfragen der Informationsgesellschaft).
https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9783110647242/html
https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9783110647242/html
Research Interests:
Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Media Studies, Selective Attention, Visual attention, and 15 moreEmbodied Cognition, Phenomenology, Attention (Psychology), Attention, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Philosophy of perception, Cognitive Neuroscience, Social cognition (Psychology), Joint attention, Enactivism, Postphenomenology, Cognitive Sciences, 4E Cognition, and Philosophy of Attention
In this paper, I will investigate the potential of what I term Merleau-Ponty's 'situated phenomenology' for an investigation of normality from within and from without. First, I will argue that the concept of situation in the Phenomenology... more
In this paper, I will investigate the potential of what I term Merleau-Ponty's 'situated phenomenology' for an investigation of normality from within and from without. First, I will argue that the concept of situation in the Phenomenology of Perception demarcates Merleau-Ponty's turn from a mere epistemological to a concrete critical phenomenology. Second, I will apply Merleau-Ponty's concept of situation as being situated and as being in situation to an investigation of normality. In doing so, I endeavor to differentiate between lived and represented normality, a difference which in turn corresponds to an operative (immanent) and established (external) normativity. A situated account of normality thereby combines a phenomenological and a genealogical perspective. My aim is to provide a toolkit to investigate the intertwinement of represented and lived normality, that is, of being situated and being in situation.
Research Interests:
Social Psychology, Nursing, Gender Studies, Disability Studies, Embodiment, and 15 morePhenomenological Psychology, Phenomenology, Feminist Phenomenology, Continental Philosophy, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Normativity, Social Norms, Philosophy of perception, Merleau-Ponty, Iris Marion Young, Critical Phenomenology, and Normality
In phenomenology, normality is neither an objectively measurable average nor a mere historical or social construct. Rather than being understood from without, looked at from the outside of lived experiences, normality is approached from... more
In phenomenology, normality is neither an objectively measurable average nor a mere historical or social construct. Rather than being understood from without, looked at from the outside of lived experiences, normality is approached from within as a condition and mode of lived experience. In the first part of the paper, I will show why it is relevant to turn to a phenomenological investigation of normality if one is interested in normativity. This perspective, so I will argue, is needed if one wants to understand not only how external norms actually become part of subjective experience but also how norms develop in the first place through repeated practices. As such, the experience of normality, understood here as consisting of selfevident feelings of orientation and familiarity, can be interpreted as the result of an operative normativity. In the second part, I will present Husserl's theory of normality in more detail in order to demonstrate how it could be applied to a more systematic investigation of normality and norms on different genetic levels. Lived normality is seen here as a dynamic and fragile system of balances; a constant attempt to achieve an equilibrium with one's environment and fellow subjects. (Re)turning to normality allows us to see normativity at work, embedded in the need for constant development, appropriation, and transformations of regular structures in experience.
Research Interests:
Aesthetics, Perception, Normative Ethics, Embodied Cognition, Embodiment, and 15 morePhenomenological Psychology, Phenomenology, Attention, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Research Methodology, Normativity, Phenomenology of the body, Social Norms, Philosophy of perception, Normative Political Theory, Alfred Schutz, Critical Phenomenology, Normality, and Social Construction of Normality
This paper will focus on the aims, methods and problems of both Husserl's and Foucault's projects in order to mark their differences and their similarities. In so doing, it will underscore their shared (Kantian) goal: to strengthen the... more
This paper will focus on the aims, methods and problems of both Husserl's and Foucault's projects in order to mark their differences and their similarities. In so doing, it will underscore their shared (Kantian) goal: to strengthen the human capacity for reason as a critical means of theoretical and practical reflection. It is my contention that the differences between the thinkers' specific aims only reinforce their respective routes towards a common objective. In this respect, I will argue that both thinkers actually engage in a project to objectify subjective reason. My reasoning follows that both apply a methodological reduction in order to understand and thereby reduce the discursive and social powers that determine the praxis of reasoning. As a result, Husserl sought to make the sciences aware of their foundations in the life-world, while Foucault sought to expose their basis in and through the workings of power.
Research Interests:
Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Research Methodology, Michel Foucault, Critique, and 8 moreFoucault (Research Methodology), Husserlian phenomenology, Foucault power/knowledge - discourse, Phenomenological Reduction, Critique of Pure Reason, Foucault Archaeology Geneology Method, Husserl and Foucault, and Foucault and phenomenology
This paper will interpret Judith Butler's theory of performativity and materialization as a theory of identity, and so put it into dialogue with a phenomenological account of habit formation. The goal is to argue that identity is... more
This paper will interpret Judith Butler's theory of performativity and materialization as a theory of identity, and so put it into dialogue with a phenomenological account of habit formation. The goal is to argue that identity is developed already at a bodily level and that this takes place via the processes of habit formation. The constitution of subjectivity, in other words, requires at the most basic level some kind of bodily performativity. What follows intends to draw out the concept of 'the body' in Butler's work, the role of which is surprisingly meagre given her clear favour of language signification in the elaboration of her theory of performativity. Alternatively, this paper will provide a phenomenology of habit formation that reintroduces the body not as thematic materiality, but as lived materiality. The body will therefore be conceived as something which is already skilful and creative, sensitive and vulnerable, and ultimately, as Butler anticipates, responsive to the intertwinement of individual and social aspects of identity formation. In this regard, I will argue for a performative theory of (bodily) habitual identity.
Research Interests:
Self and Identity, Feminist Theory, Plasticity, Embodiment, Phenomenological Psychology, and 15 morePhenomenology, Identity (Culture), Identity politics, Performativity, Gender, The Body, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Judith Butler, Habitus, Phenomenology of the body, Personal Identity, Performativity of Gender, Identity, and Habits
While embodiment is crucial for Husserl’s theory of perception and his account of empathy, it is also the beating heart of his transcendental philosophy. For Husserl, there is neither a purely formal transcendental ego, nor pure forms of... more
While embodiment is crucial for Husserl’s theory of perception and his account of empathy, it is also the beating heart of his transcendental philosophy. For Husserl, there is neither a purely formal transcendental ego, nor pure forms of intuition. Transcendental subjectivity must necessarily be embodied to make (spatially and temporally concordant) experience possible and thereby to guarantee an objective perception of the world and of others. This article will discuss three dimensions of normality and objectivity as embodied space. It will start by introducing the double constitution of the body as both Leib and Körper, which defines the primordial spatiality of embodiment. It will then highlight the general necessity of a sensing and moving body for the constitution of space and for a concordant and optimal disclosure of the world. The third part explains embodiment in terms of concrete subjectivity, hence articulating the relevance of the body for habitually inhabiting the world and for developing a concordant and stable identity. Finally, the role of the body for intersubjective normality and objectivity will be interrogated. Embodiment, as I will argue, must firstly be understood as a general transcendental condition of every possible experience and objectivity. Secondly, it must be understood as a genetic condition of individual (and intersubjective) experience, that is, as concrete a priori. As such, embodiment dictates the experience of individual subjects and corresponds to a habitual style of experience.
Research Interests:
The following article investigates the extent to which not only linguistic acts, but embodied experience and action itself must be accounted for as "performative." In doing so, I will take Judith Butler's account of performativity as a... more
The following article investigates the extent to which not only linguistic acts, but embodied experience and action itself must be accounted for as "performative." In doing so, I will take Judith Butler's account of performativity as a starting point and complement it with a phenomenological account of embodied experience. I will critically engage with the problem of how norms "work upon bodies" and how bodies themselves "work on" these norms to change and even create new ones. I will argue that the need for repetition and iteration of norms, which is at the heart of Butler's account of performativity, presupposes bodily subjects who do the repeating, i.e. enact those very norms that act upon them. In this respect, bodily performativity has a "dual dimension": it preserves and stabilizes prevailing social norms, plus, it changes these norms through their enactment. Therefore, we give norms a reality by enacting them, but also have the possibility to transcend them.
Research Interests:
Gender Studies, Feminist Theory, Feminist Philosophy, Embodiment, Phenomenology, and 15 moreFeminist Phenomenology, Performativity, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Simone de Beauvoir, Phenomenology of the body, Social Norms, Norms, Habits, Philosophy of Praxis, Normalization, Sara Ahmed, Gender Norms, and Theory of Praxis
The aim of this chapter is to investigate how gender norms enter human bodily experience. My focus is not on the explicit ways in which social norms affect and constitute our relation to knowledge and the world but how these epistèmes... more
The aim of this chapter is to investigate how gender norms enter human bodily experience. My focus is not on the explicit ways in which social norms affect and constitute our relation to knowledge and the world but how these epistèmes become embodied, that is, become an assimilated part of our bodily experience. Gender, as a specific social norm, is of particular interest for a number of reasons. First, gender structures all domains of human social life: From matters of family, education, profes- sion, and public life. Second, gender is a norm that structures life not only in explicit ways (e.g., when one is directly addressed as or identifies oneself assertively as female, male, or other) but also in implicit ways and thereby operatively defines our sense of normality. Third, gender norms typically mirror existing power relations insofar as they represent forms of socio-political organization. Gender is not a norm that we are necessarily forced to obey or even naturally identify with, but it remains incorporated and acquired within concrete and repeated bodily experi- ences and practices.
In this way, the following analysis is inspired by Judith Butler’s theory of performativity. While Butler is well-known for her analysis of the discursive, I will probe the phenomenological potential of performativity by applying the analy-sis to the human body. Butler’s theory of gender performativity opens up the picture of social norms as a two-way street – not only do norms effect our language and discursive behaviors, but language must also enact (take up or appropriate) norms in order for them to be effective. This applies, as I will argue, also in the case of the human body. As material and lived bodies, we are situated in a historically and culturally- informed world, wherein norms manifest as well-ordered and typified social practices according to which we live. Yet, at the same time, we are practical agents insofar as we must bodily enact certain norms for them to be effective.
In this way, the following analysis is inspired by Judith Butler’s theory of performativity. While Butler is well-known for her analysis of the discursive, I will probe the phenomenological potential of performativity by applying the analy-sis to the human body. Butler’s theory of gender performativity opens up the picture of social norms as a two-way street – not only do norms effect our language and discursive behaviors, but language must also enact (take up or appropriate) norms in order for them to be effective. This applies, as I will argue, also in the case of the human body. As material and lived bodies, we are situated in a historically and culturally- informed world, wherein norms manifest as well-ordered and typified social practices according to which we live. Yet, at the same time, we are practical agents insofar as we must bodily enact certain norms for them to be effective.
Research Interests:
Gender Studies, Political Philosophy, Feminist Theory, Embodiment, Phenomenology, and 13 moreFeminist Phenomenology, Performativity, Gender, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Judith Butler, Habitus, Pierre Bourdieu, Simone de Beauvoir, Phenomenology of the body, Social Norms, Iris Marion Young, Gender Norms, and Theory of Praxis
It seems rather obvious that the experience of ageing is not indifferent to gender, and that studies of gender ought to account for ageing and old age. Yet, the two subject matters have been rarely investigated together. This is due to... more
It seems rather obvious that the experience of ageing is not indifferent to gender, and that studies of gender ought to account for ageing and old age. Yet, the two subject matters have been rarely investigated together. This is due to the tendency to reduce ageing (as well as its gendered aspects) either to supposedly biological necessities or to their social construction and restrictions. Notwithstanding, both ageing and gender are first and foremost bodily phenomena. Aging, as well as gender are dimensions we experience, incorporate and express through our bodies.
The aim of the proposed paper is to bridge the gap between the biological and social approaches to ageing and gender with a phenomenological-anthropological approach. In this respect, I want to argue that the biological and the social are intertwined in human embodiment. The paper thus addresses ageing and gender neither as purely biological nor as merely discursive phenomena, but as phenomena of an embodied experience. Experience in this sense is necessarily situated, constituted by biological, material, historical and socio-cultural circumstances. As situated bodily beings, we not only have a first, but also a second nature: social norms are incorporated in the ways we habitually relate to the world, ourselves and others. While the process of ageing always confronts us with the finitude and materiality of our bodily being in general, with respect to gender and ageing, this means, as situated, specific circumstances and norms influence not only the way we think about ageing, but also the processes of becoming older and the experience of our aged bodies.
The aim of the proposed paper is to bridge the gap between the biological and social approaches to ageing and gender with a phenomenological-anthropological approach. In this respect, I want to argue that the biological and the social are intertwined in human embodiment. The paper thus addresses ageing and gender neither as purely biological nor as merely discursive phenomena, but as phenomena of an embodied experience. Experience in this sense is necessarily situated, constituted by biological, material, historical and socio-cultural circumstances. As situated bodily beings, we not only have a first, but also a second nature: social norms are incorporated in the ways we habitually relate to the world, ourselves and others. While the process of ageing always confronts us with the finitude and materiality of our bodily being in general, with respect to gender and ageing, this means, as situated, specific circumstances and norms influence not only the way we think about ageing, but also the processes of becoming older and the experience of our aged bodies.
Research Interests:
Historical Anthropology, Medical Anthropology, Women's Studies, Philosophical Anthropology, Social and Cultural Anthropology, and 15 moreFeminist Philosophy, Embodiment, Phenomenology, Feminist Phenomenology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, Phenomenology of the body, Ageing and Health, Sociology of Ageing, Women and Gender Studies, Ageing, Women's Studies, Social Gerontology, Old Age, Active Ageing, and Ageing
There is a paradox that lies at the heart of every investigation of normality, namely, its dependence on its other (e.g., deviation, break, difference). In this paper, I want to show that this paradox is the reason for the dynamism as... more
There is a paradox that lies at the heart of every investigation of normality, namely, its dependence on its other (e.g., deviation, break, difference). In this paper, I want to show that this paradox is the reason for the dynamism as well as fragility of normality. In this regard, I will not only argue that every normality is fragile, but also that normality can only be established because it is fragile. In the first part of this paper, I will present and re-visit Husserl’s account of normality as concordant and optimal with regard to its dynamic or fragile aspects. In the second part of this paper, I will apply this account to recent findings in phenomenological pathology regarding schizophrenia and depression to show how Husserl’s account could be helpful for differentiating between different aspects (such as concordance and optimality) as well as genetic levels of (disturbances of) normality.
Research Interests:
The body is both the subject and object of intentionality: qua Leib, it experiences worldly things and qua Körper, it is experienced as a thing in the world. This phenomenological differentiation forms the basis for Helmuth Plessner’s... more
The body is both the subject and object of intentionality: qua Leib, it experiences worldly things and qua Körper, it is experienced as a thing in the world. This phenomenological differentiation forms the basis for Helmuth Plessner’s anthropological theory of the mediated or eccentric nature of human embodiment, that is, simultaneously we both are a body and have a body. Here, I want to focus on the extent to which this double aspect of embodiment (qua Leib and Körper) relates to our experience of temporality. Indeed, to question, does this double bodily relation correspond to a twofold temporality of embodied intentionality? In the first part of this paper, I differentiate between the intentional temporality of being a body and the temporal experience of having a body . To further my argument, in the second part, I present examples of specific pathologies, as well as liminal cases of bodily experiences, wherein these temporal dimensions, which otherwise go hand-in-hand, become dissociated. Phenomenologically, I want to argue that Husserl’ s differentiation between Leib and Körper corresponds to two genetic forms of intentionality – operative and act (or object) intentionality
– and that these are, in turn, characterized by different temporalities. Anthropologically, I want to argue that having a body – what occurs as an inherent break to human embodiment–is the presupposition for the experience of a stable and object-like time. I will conclude that the double aspect of human embodiment and in particular the thematic experience of having a body enables both the experience of a past, which is remembered, and a future that is planned.
– and that these are, in turn, characterized by different temporalities. Anthropologically, I want to argue that having a body – what occurs as an inherent break to human embodiment–is the presupposition for the experience of a stable and object-like time. I will conclude that the double aspect of human embodiment and in particular the thematic experience of having a body enables both the experience of a past, which is remembered, and a future that is planned.
Research Interests:
Philosophical Anthropology, Social and Cultural Anthropology, Embodiment, Phenomenological Psychology, Phenomenology, and 12 moreEmbodied Mind and Cognition, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Intentionality, Phenomenology of the body, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Temporality, Temporality, Phenomenology- Mind/Body Problems/ Merleau-Ponty's Philosophical Thought/Phenomenology and Embodiment, Helmuth Plessner, and Dan Zahavi
Research Interests:
Psychology, Philosophy, Schizophrenia, Phenomenological Psychology, Phenomenology, and 11 moreMaurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Philosophy of Psychiatry, Psychopathology, History Of Madness And Psychiatry, Phenomenology of the body, Jean Paul Sartre, Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Daseinsanalyse, and Maine de Biran
Philosophers frequently focus on the differences between humans and (non-human) animals. To be sure, there is much to say about the differences in perception, movement, sensation, and the world-directedness of humans and specific animals.... more
Philosophers frequently focus on the differences between humans and (non-human) animals. To be sure, there is much to say about the differences in perception, movement, sensation, and the world-directedness of humans and specific animals. In this paper, however, with the help of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Helmuth Plessner's phenomenological approaches, I want to focus on what humans and specific animals have in common. Concretely, I will try to investigate in what sense humans and some (non-human) animals (can) share lasting situations and therefore share habits acquired in these situations. To share a situation does not merely mean that both humans and animals are spatially or temporally situated, i.e. that we have a common environment or habitat. Instead, sharing a situation presupposes the direct contact, participation, and interaction of agents that extends over a longer period of time. As such, I want to argue that one essential characteristic of such situations, namely the one that makes it sustainable and particular at the same time, is the formation of habits in both humans and animals. In this sense, situations and lasting habits in agents mutually presuppose each other. In the first part of my paper, I will present the general conditions of embodiment that human and animals have in common and that make it possible to share situations. In the second part, I refer to examples of concrete situations we (can) share with animals: how we interact, mutually respond to each other, but also how we indirectly attune our behavior to one another or to the respectively generated situation. Consequently, I want to argue that we not only have experiences and habits in common with animals with similar embodiment and sensory experiences, but rather that we can share experiences and habits in a stronger sense, that is to say, that we develop habits together in repeated cooperation.
Research Interests:
Anthropology, Human-Animal Relations, Anthropology of the Body, Situated Cognition, Embodiment, and 14 morePhenomenology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Habitus, Phenomenology of the body, Human-Animal Relationships, Merleau-Ponty, Human-Animal Studies, Animals and non-humans, Animal-Human Interaction, Wildlife Ecology (habitat Selection and Animal Movement), Helmuth Plessner, Study Habits, and Habitat
The human body can be regarded in at least two ways: objectively, as a physical and organic body; and subjectively, as the center of orientation and lived affective unity. However, this distinction can lose sight of the fact that the... more
The human body can be regarded in at least two ways: objectively, as a physical and organic body; and subjectively, as the center of orientation and lived affective unity. However, this distinction can lose sight of the fact that the 'lived body' is not reducible to subjective idiosyncrasies. Transindividual norms are embodied too, as Michel Foucault and Judith Butler have shown. Phenomenological investigations of normalization and habitualization help bring these two important dimensions of embodiment together and overcome simplistic oppositions between phenomenological and poststructuralist approaches. These investigations lead into issues of female body optimization and control that we take to be characteristic of contemporary neoliberalist embodiment.
Research Interests:
Phenomenologically speaking, one can consider the experiencing body as normative insofar as it generates norms through repeated actions and interactions, crystallizing into habits. On the other hand according to Foucauldian approaches,... more
Phenomenologically speaking, one can consider the experiencing body as normative insofar as it generates norms through repeated actions and interactions, crystallizing into habits. On the other hand according to Foucauldian approaches, the subjective body does not generate norms but is itself produced by norms: Dominant social norms are incorporated via repeated practices of discipline. How is the individual level of habit formation in phenomenology related to this embodiment of supra-individual norms? In what sense can we differentiate between a habit formation that results in a skill and one that disciplines a body? To address these questions the paper will analyze examples of the embodiment of norms in Foucault and feminist philosophy and show how they rely on the phenomenological concept of the actual and habitual body.
Research Interests:
Der folgende Beitrag möchte das Ineinander von Erfahrung und Diskurs als leiblich erfahrene und repräsentierte Normalität explizieren. Zunächst wird aus phänomenologischer Perspektive untersucht, was eine normale Erfahrung ausmacht.... more
Der folgende Beitrag möchte das Ineinander von Erfahrung und Diskurs als leiblich erfahrene und repräsentierte Normalität explizieren. Zunächst wird aus phänomenologischer Perspektive untersucht, was eine normale Erfahrung ausmacht. Zentral ist hierbei eine habituelle Normalität, die einen unmittelbaren Umgang und Orientierung mit der Umwelt ermöglicht. Mit Hilfe von diskursiven Ansätzen (Foucault und Butler) soll dies kritisch hinterfragt werden. Inwiefern lässt sich Normalität auch als Normalisierung beschreiben, in welcher sich gewaltsam und doch unbemerkt herrschende Normen und Machtverhältnisse in die Körper einschreiben?
Research Interests:
Husserl seldom refers to feelings, and when he does, he mainly focuses on their axiological character, which corresponds to a specific kind of value apprehension. This paper aims to discuss the role of feelings in Husserl from a different... more
Husserl seldom refers to feelings, and when he does, he mainly focuses
on their axiological character, which corresponds to a specific kind of value apprehension. This paper aims to discuss the role of feelings in
Husserl from a different angle. For this purpose it makes a detour through Husserl’s early account of attention. In a text from 1898 on attention the aspect of interest, which is said to have a basis in feeling, plays an essential role. Although Husserl argues here that every specific interest is dependent on an objectifying act of perception, he at the same time states that every act of perception necessarily has to be accompanied by an interest of some sort. In the latter sense, the genuine motivational force and necessity of this feeling aspect, namely interest, is emphasized. This ambiguity – or even contradiction – shall be the point of departure for the following considerations. The paper argues that it is possible to interpret the role of feelings in intentionality in a different way, namely not as an effect of current perception but as
a cause of further perceptions. This tendency is first indicated in the text from 1898 and elaborated further in Husserl’s genetic approach in Experience and Judgment. In Experience and Judgment Husserl develops a broader notion of interest, defining it as a general perceptual drive. This general drive (as a general interest in perceiving) – so the paper will argue – expresses itself in concrete perception as a specific preference: it discloses or makes manifest what is relevant for an individual subject at a given time.
on their axiological character, which corresponds to a specific kind of value apprehension. This paper aims to discuss the role of feelings in
Husserl from a different angle. For this purpose it makes a detour through Husserl’s early account of attention. In a text from 1898 on attention the aspect of interest, which is said to have a basis in feeling, plays an essential role. Although Husserl argues here that every specific interest is dependent on an objectifying act of perception, he at the same time states that every act of perception necessarily has to be accompanied by an interest of some sort. In the latter sense, the genuine motivational force and necessity of this feeling aspect, namely interest, is emphasized. This ambiguity – or even contradiction – shall be the point of departure for the following considerations. The paper argues that it is possible to interpret the role of feelings in intentionality in a different way, namely not as an effect of current perception but as
a cause of further perceptions. This tendency is first indicated in the text from 1898 and elaborated further in Husserl’s genetic approach in Experience and Judgment. In Experience and Judgment Husserl develops a broader notion of interest, defining it as a general perceptual drive. This general drive (as a general interest in perceiving) – so the paper will argue – expresses itself in concrete perception as a specific preference: it discloses or makes manifest what is relevant for an individual subject at a given time.
Research Interests:
Perception, Interest, Embodied Cognition, Phenomenological Psychology, Phenomenology, and 13 moreAttention, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Intentionality, Habitus, Philosophy of perception, Affect/Emotion, Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Perception; Phenomenology, Feelings, Phenomenology (of Perception), Picture Theory, Photography, Theory of Perception, Philosophy of Perception, Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Intentionality, and Genetic Phenomenology
Research Interests:
Attention is a complex process that modulates perception in various ways. Phenomenological philosophy provides an array of concepts for describing the rich structures of attention, thereby avoiding reductions to singular aspects of an... more
Attention is a complex process that modulates perception in various ways. Phenomenological philosophy provides an array of concepts for describing the rich structures of attention, thereby avoiding reductions to singular aspects of an experien-tial spectrum. By suggesting various modes and levels of attentional experience, we intend to do some justice to its complexity, taking into account sub-personal and personal factors on the side of subjective (noetic) horizons and feature-oriented as well as context-oriented aspects on the side of objective (noematic) horizons.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
In Foucault’s later works, experience and embodiment become important for explaining the normative constitution of the subject: for norms to be effective, discourses are insufficient – they must be experienced and embodied. Practices of... more
In Foucault’s later works, experience and embodiment become
important for explaining the normative constitution of the subject:
for norms to be effective, discourses are insufficient – they must be
experienced and embodied. Practices of “discipline” inscribe power
constellations and discourses into subjective experience and
bodies. In his lectures on the Hermeneutics of the Subject, he turns
this “violent” form of normative embodiment into an ethical
perspective by referring to the Stoic tradition. Even though
Foucault never developed a notion of experience and embodiment
himself, his ideas can be re-read and complemented from a
phenomenological perspective.
The article tries to investigate the role of bodily experience and
practice in Foucault’s Genealogy and to bring it into dialogue with
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of the lived body. It will
attempt to show that concepts like sedimentation and habituality
can help to explain how cultural norms not only influence the way
we think about, but also how we perceive and are affected by the
world. This operation of norms happens already at the lowest
stages of experience, where embodied experience leaves its traces,
in sedimentation and habitualization. These passive layers of
experience are permeable to historical discourses, so that norms
are literally inscribed in the body. These are the foundations for
what I seek to define as normative embodiment.
important for explaining the normative constitution of the subject:
for norms to be effective, discourses are insufficient – they must be
experienced and embodied. Practices of “discipline” inscribe power
constellations and discourses into subjective experience and
bodies. In his lectures on the Hermeneutics of the Subject, he turns
this “violent” form of normative embodiment into an ethical
perspective by referring to the Stoic tradition. Even though
Foucault never developed a notion of experience and embodiment
himself, his ideas can be re-read and complemented from a
phenomenological perspective.
The article tries to investigate the role of bodily experience and
practice in Foucault’s Genealogy and to bring it into dialogue with
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of the lived body. It will
attempt to show that concepts like sedimentation and habituality
can help to explain how cultural norms not only influence the way
we think about, but also how we perceive and are affected by the
world. This operation of norms happens already at the lowest
stages of experience, where embodied experience leaves its traces,
in sedimentation and habitualization. These passive layers of
experience are permeable to historical discourses, so that norms
are literally inscribed in the body. These are the foundations for
what I seek to define as normative embodiment.
Research Interests:
The paper is guided by the idea that experience is not only a priori guided by norms, but these norms, the deviations from these norms, are experienced as normal or abnormal. The paper critically analyzes Husserl’s account of normality,... more
The paper is guided by the idea that experience is not only a priori guided by norms, but these norms, the deviations from these norms, are experienced as normal or abnormal. The paper critically analyzes Husserl’s account of normality, where normality is characterized as concordant experience with an inherent relation towards an optimum. The paper argues that on a concrete level of experience this concordance is based on habits and the optimum is relative to them. Here one can see that normality is not an objective category but rather an expression of a habitual style of experience. It thus presents not an objective world, but a perspective out of many, the one with which we are most familiar.
Research Interests:
How should we best describe the nature of subjective experience? Is it something we actively do or just something that passively happens to us? Husserl provides a wide range of concepts to grasp the character of experience, from explicit... more
How should we best describe the nature of subjective experience? Is it something we actively
do or just something that passively happens to us? Husserl provides a wide range of concepts
to grasp the character of experience, from explicit intentionality to passive forms of affection.
On the one hand, one can find the static conception of consciousness of a specific object, on
the other hand, there is the passive genesis of an object in terms of temporal and associative
syntheses and pre-affective unities. But how do these poles relate to each other in situated everyday
experience? To answer this question on the level of content and on the methodological
level, one has to integrate the phenomenon of attention into the phenomenological description
of experience. Attention manifests itself in the basic dimensions of perception as well as
on higher levels of cognition. Husserl himself was concerned with this theme mainly in the
context of static phenomenology. Although there are some genetic thoughts on this topic,
Husserl never worked them out systematically. This article attempts to develop such a genetic
concept of attention in order to highlight the continuity of passive and active, actual and inactual
moments in experience. In this sense, attention is not only defined by an explicit thematic
intention, but contains different genetic stages of subjective reference. At the same time
it is surrounded and motivated by objective and habitual horizons. The nature of every subjective
experience is therefore not only to be characterized as a formal temporal unity or an intentional
structure. From the very beginning, experience necessarily has a concrete semantic
preference, which amounts to the selective and integrative functions of attention.
do or just something that passively happens to us? Husserl provides a wide range of concepts
to grasp the character of experience, from explicit intentionality to passive forms of affection.
On the one hand, one can find the static conception of consciousness of a specific object, on
the other hand, there is the passive genesis of an object in terms of temporal and associative
syntheses and pre-affective unities. But how do these poles relate to each other in situated everyday
experience? To answer this question on the level of content and on the methodological
level, one has to integrate the phenomenon of attention into the phenomenological description
of experience. Attention manifests itself in the basic dimensions of perception as well as
on higher levels of cognition. Husserl himself was concerned with this theme mainly in the
context of static phenomenology. Although there are some genetic thoughts on this topic,
Husserl never worked them out systematically. This article attempts to develop such a genetic
concept of attention in order to highlight the continuity of passive and active, actual and inactual
moments in experience. In this sense, attention is not only defined by an explicit thematic
intention, but contains different genetic stages of subjective reference. At the same time
it is surrounded and motivated by objective and habitual horizons. The nature of every subjective
experience is therefore not only to be characterized as a formal temporal unity or an intentional
structure. From the very beginning, experience necessarily has a concrete semantic
preference, which amounts to the selective and integrative functions of attention.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Im folgenden Beitrag wird versucht, eine implizite Ebene sozialer Erfahrung, eine passive Konstitution des Sozialen aufzuzeigen: Ausgangspunkt hierfür soll das Konzept einer Gemeinschaftshabitualität sein. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass... more
Im folgenden Beitrag wird versucht, eine implizite Ebene sozialer Erfahrung, eine passive Konstitution des Sozialen aufzuzeigen: Ausgangspunkt hierfür soll das Konzept einer Gemeinschaftshabitualität sein. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass diese als Voraussetzung für höhere Stufen sozialer Erfahrung bzw. Handlung fungiert. Sie ermöglicht ein vorprädikatives Verständnis anderer Subjekte innerhalb derselben Heimwelt und erleichtert soziale Handlungen. Zugleich wird aber auch die Einfühlung und soziale Interaktion mit Subjekten erschwert, die einer anderen Gemeinschaft oder Kultur angehören: Die gleichen Prozesse und Mechanismen, die so zur Kontinuität und Identität einer sozialen Gemeinschaft gehören, können so auch zur Normierung und Ausschluss Anderer führen. Das gemeinsame Umfeld, die gemeinsame Tradition fungiert hier als eine soziale Konstitution, die jede weitere Erfahrung leitet. Gemeinschaftshabitualität als implizite Ebene sozialer Erfahrung hat insofern nicht nur eine ermöglichende, sondern auch eine beschränkende Funktion.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Jeder scheint zu wissen, was Aufmerksamkeit ist: Sie ermöglicht uns die Konzentration auf Wichtiges und damit zugleich das Ignorieren von Unwichtigem. Sieht man jedoch genauer hin, ist es nicht ganz so eindeutig, was Aufmerksamkeit ist.... more
Jeder scheint zu wissen, was Aufmerksamkeit ist: Sie ermöglicht uns die Konzentration auf Wichtiges und damit zugleich das Ignorieren von Unwichtigem. Sieht man jedoch genauer hin, ist es nicht ganz so eindeutig, was Aufmerksamkeit ist.
Es reicht nicht, Aufmerksamkeit auf den aktuellen Akt, Gegenstand oder die jeweils messbare Verhaltensleistung zu reduzieren, wie dies in Philosophie und empirischer Psychologie oft der Fall ist. Um das Phänomen Aufmerksamkeit in seiner Dynamik zu beschreiben, muss man die Horizonte der Aufmerksamkeit thematisieren. Nicht nur die gegenständlichen Horizonte, sondern vor allem die subjektiven Horizonte: die zeitliche, leibliche und habituelle Dimension der Aufmerksamkeit.
Es reicht nicht, Aufmerksamkeit auf den aktuellen Akt, Gegenstand oder die jeweils messbare Verhaltensleistung zu reduzieren, wie dies in Philosophie und empirischer Psychologie oft der Fall ist. Um das Phänomen Aufmerksamkeit in seiner Dynamik zu beschreiben, muss man die Horizonte der Aufmerksamkeit thematisieren. Nicht nur die gegenständlichen Horizonte, sondern vor allem die subjektiven Horizonte: die zeitliche, leibliche und habituelle Dimension der Aufmerksamkeit.
Research Interests:
Das Lehrbuch stellt die phänomenologische Methode nicht nur theoretisch vor, sondern auch ihre aktuellen intra- und interdisziplinären Anwendungen. Zurück zu den Sachen selbst, wie sie in der Erfahrung gegeben sind – das ist das Motto der... more
Das Lehrbuch stellt die phänomenologische Methode nicht nur theoretisch vor, sondern auch ihre aktuellen intra- und interdisziplinären Anwendungen. Zurück zu den Sachen selbst, wie sie in der Erfahrung gegeben sind – das ist das Motto der Phänomenologie im Ausgang von Edmund Husserl. Diese vorurteilslose Beschreibung muss Selbstverständliches hinterfragen. Wie aber lässt sich ein solcher Einstellungswechsel erreichen, wie gelangt man von der Wahrnehmung zum Wesen der Dinge? Dies wird mit phänomenologischen Texten erläutert sowie anhand aktueller Beispiele illustriert und praktisch eingeübt.
This intro is unique as it entirely focusses on the method(s) of phenomenology and illustrates them by examples. It is for students, teachers, and all people interested in phenomenology. It aims at representing and uniting all past and present branches of phenomenology (whether classical, critical, post, interdisciplinary or applied).
It is short, user-friendly, and practical, in containing info/definition-boxes and practical exercises. No jargon, no personal cult, just phenomenology in action – back to the things themselves!
What are we doing when we do phenomenology?
This was the question behind this book, which I started writing in 2017, when I was asked to represent phenomenology in this series of the methods of philosophy.
It is my contention, that all phenomenologies/phenomenologists, whether they are traditional, post-, critical, political, interdisciplinary, or applied, (need to) engage in and aim for one or all of the three activities below:
1) Describing (what appears) without prejudices/presuppositions
2) Searching for generalities (structure or eidos)
3) Asking back to the conditions (historical or transcendental)
The English version will be published in 2023 by Springer. I am happy for any feedback and comments (to improve further editions) by all of you who teach and study phenomenology.
This intro is unique as it entirely focusses on the method(s) of phenomenology and illustrates them by examples. It is for students, teachers, and all people interested in phenomenology. It aims at representing and uniting all past and present branches of phenomenology (whether classical, critical, post, interdisciplinary or applied).
It is short, user-friendly, and practical, in containing info/definition-boxes and practical exercises. No jargon, no personal cult, just phenomenology in action – back to the things themselves!
What are we doing when we do phenomenology?
This was the question behind this book, which I started writing in 2017, when I was asked to represent phenomenology in this series of the methods of philosophy.
It is my contention, that all phenomenologies/phenomenologists, whether they are traditional, post-, critical, political, interdisciplinary, or applied, (need to) engage in and aim for one or all of the three activities below:
1) Describing (what appears) without prejudices/presuppositions
2) Searching for generalities (structure or eidos)
3) Asking back to the conditions (historical or transcendental)
The English version will be published in 2023 by Springer. I am happy for any feedback and comments (to improve further editions) by all of you who teach and study phenomenology.
Research Interests:
Philosophy of Mind, Phenomenology, Feminist Phenomenology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, and 11 moreMartin Heidegger, Phenomenological Research Methodology, Simone de Beauvoir, Phenomenology of the body, Jean-Paul Sartre, Phenomenology of Temporality, Postphenomenology, Phänomenologie, Critical Phenomenology, Phenomenological Psychopathology, and Applied Phenomenology
Recent years have seen a rise in interdisciplinary approaches to the study of the mind. However, relatively little emphasis has been placed on integrating a systematic view on attention, its functions, and phenomenology. As a result,... more
Recent years have seen a rise in interdisciplinary approaches to the study of the mind. However, relatively little emphasis has been placed on integrating a systematic view on attention, its functions, and phenomenology. As a result, there are a multitude of definitions and explanatory frameworks that describe what attention is, what it does, and how it works. This volume proposes that one way to discuss attention more comprehensively is by utilizing an integrative multidisciplinary framework that takes into consideration aspects of attention as a means of accessing the world and as mediator of experience. It brings together contributions from cognitive science, philosophy, and psychology in order to shed light on these aspects of attention. By including both theoretical and empirical approaches to attention, this volume will provide (1) an innovative framwork for examining attention as something that mediates experience and (2) new perspectives on foundational and definitional issues of what attention is and how it contributes to our ability to access the world. By drawing together different disciplines, this volume broadens the concept of attention. It opens up a new way of looking at attention as an active process through which the world is disclosed for us.
Research Interests:
Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Technology, Media Studies, Visual attention, and 12 moreEmbodied Cognition, Social Cognition, Phenomenological Psychology, Phenomenology, Attention, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Philosophy of perception, Postphenomenology, Awareness, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, and Philosophy of Attention
This volume explores the role and status of phenomena such as feelings, values, willing, and action in the domain of perception and (social) cognition, as well as the way in which they are related. In its exploration, the book takes... more
This volume explores the role and status of phenomena such as feelings, values, willing, and action in the domain of perception and (social) cognition, as well as the way in which they are related. In its exploration, the book takes Husserl’s lifelong project Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins (1909-1930) as its point of departure, and investigates these phenomena with Husserl but also beyond Husserl. Divided into two parts, the volume brings together essays that address the topics from different phenomenological, philosophical, and psychological perspectives. They discuss Husserl’s position in dialogue with historical and recent philosophical and psychological debates and develop phenomenological accounts and descriptions with the help of Geiger, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Plessner, Sartre, Scheler, Schopenhauer, and Reinach.
Research Interests:
Just published anthology, edited with Dr. Maren Wehrle (formerly Leuven, now Rotterdam). See here URL: http://www.springer.com/de/book/9783476026019. See here the review by Corinna Lagemann:... more
Just published anthology, edited with Dr. Maren Wehrle (formerly Leuven, now Rotterdam).
See here URL: http://www.springer.com/de/book/9783476026019.
See here the review by Corinna Lagemann:
http://reviews.ophen.org/2018/04/16/sebastian-luft-maren-wehrle-hrsg-husserl-handbuch-leben-werk-wirkung/
See here URL: http://www.springer.com/de/book/9783476026019.
See here the review by Corinna Lagemann:
http://reviews.ophen.org/2018/04/16/sebastian-luft-maren-wehrle-hrsg-husserl-handbuch-leben-werk-wirkung/
Research Interests:
Despite all controversies that might otherwise divide them, most phenomenologists agree that consciousness entails some form of self-consciousness. In fact, they go even further, as they virtually all agree on the necessity of fleshing... more
Despite all controversies that might otherwise divide them, most phenomenologists agree that consciousness entails some form of self-consciousness. In fact, they go even further, as they virtually all agree on the necessity of fleshing out this insight in bodily terms: from the phenomenological point of view, self-consciousness is primarily experienced as a form of bodily self-consciousness (or self-awareness). Following Edmund Husserl's insight that the lived body (Leib), i.e. the body as it is subjectively felt or experienced, must necessarily be presupposed by all object consciousness, including the thematic consciousness of me as a body, there is a long-standing discussion within the phenomenological movement on how to conceive of this self-relation. This entry focuses on the French reception of Husserl and highlights the distinctive ways in which French phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry, Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques Derrida have elaborated on and disputed this key insight. It will be shown that discussions on this question have open onto two further debates: one revolves around the paradigmatic role Husserl grants to touch in the analysis of consciousness, while the other concerns the differences between the experience of one's own body and the experience of the body of others. Finally, we point to the fact that one's body can be experienced and evaluated as other, as is shown in the critical analyses of Frantz Fanon, Simone de Beauvoir, Michel Foucault, and recent critical phenomenology. Here, it becomes clear that the bodily self-awareness of concrete subjects is shaped by the material conditions, norms, and discourses of their respective situation.
Research Interests:
Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Embodied Cognition, Embodiment, and 15 morePhenomenological Psychology, Phenomenology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida, Body Image, Michel Henry, Jean Paul Sartre, Cognitive Neuroscience, Phenomenology (Research Methodology), Frantz Fanon, Self-awareness, Bodily Awareness, Body Schema, French Phenomenology, and Critical Phenomenology
Research Interests:
This is a survey of some of the dominant ideas about 'the body' in the phenomenological literature. To appear in : D. De Santis, B. Hopkins, and C. Majolino (Eds.): Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy... more
This is a survey of some of the dominant ideas about 'the body' in the phenomenological literature. To appear in : D. De Santis, B. Hopkins, and C. Majolino (Eds.): Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (London: 2020).
Research Interests:
Philosophy of Mind, Feminist Theory, Feminist Philosophy, Embodied Cognition, Embodiment, and 23 morePhenomenological Psychology, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, The Body, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Feminism, Extended Mind, Body Image, Normativity, Phenomenology of the body, Husserl, Phenomenology of Space and Place, Enaction (Psychology), Merleau-Ponty, Enactivism, Optimization, Enaction, Normalization, Enactive cognition, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Female body, and Femisnism
Review in Information Philosophie 1/2019