Byzantine Military History

After almost two decades of research on the subject of byzantine arms and armour, and military history, as well as experience with re-enactment and experimental archeology, this presentation marks the culmination and fulfilment of a long-due obligation. The thesis of this presentation aims to provide an archeology-based, evidence-based and profoundness-based answer to the evertroubling question of what a 10th-11 th (the high byzantine era) imperial soldier most likely appeared like. For the sake of this thesis, any reliance to iconographical sources (byzantine hagiography, miniature manuscripts and religious ivory carvings) was eliminated completely, and it is only cited and linked to when there exists one or more elements that can allude, even vaguely, to archeological evidence and/or written source descriptions. The latter have been treated as the main and primary gauge of this research, as well as the careful reading and translation of primary medieval Greek textual sources.

By the time of Muhammad's death in 632 CE, the armies of Islam had already consolidated their control of the vast territories of the Arabian Peninsula.[1] It was from these strongholds in Arabia that the first Rashidun Caliph, Abu Bakr, began several well-organized and coordinated military campaigns against the war-weary Byzantine and Sassanid empires. In 634 CE the Arabs launched a devastating military campaign into Roman Syria. The success of the Arabs against the Byzantine Empire owes as much to their own discipline and flexibility as it does the repeated tactical and logistical failures of the Byzantines.[2] There are multiple additional factors which ultimately led to the Byzantine defeat in Roman Syria: recurring plagues during the 6 century, depleted imperial coffers, inadequate recruitment and retention of seasoned troops, and the appointment of inexperienced military commanders.

The paper reassesses the significance of the work of Uxtanes of Sebasteia as a source written by an Armenian priest under the Byzantine rule in 980s. According to Stepanos Taroneci and other sources, there were tensions between Byzantines and Armenians in the city, as a result of the simultaneous progress of the influx of Armenians and the reinforcement of the Byzantine military presence. This led to the interactions among Byzantines and Armenians several ways. As a strong anti-Chalcedonianist, Uxtanes tried to reflect his antagonism in his description of the Roman past in Part One of his work (on the history of Armenians until fifth century). But at the same time, he is keen to underline the presence of the Armenians who work with Romans. This is also the projection of the situation surrounding him. There were also Armenians who tried to approach the Byzantine rule in the tenth century. Uxtanes is of course criticising them, but in doing so he implies the presence of those who reacted differently to the Byzantine rule. Thus, Uxtanes' work can be an important clue to understand the multiple interactions among Byzantines and Armenians in the frontier, during the age of the Byzantine eastward movement.

ABSTRACT: This chapter addresses the textual relationship between Maurice's Strategicon and its classical antecedents, a largely unexplored question, given that this late sixth-century military treatise has been studied primarily by Byzantine historians and as a foundational document of Byzantine military theory. While the unprecedented vernacular idiom, institutional jargon, technical content and documentary source-material of the Strategicon are consistent with Maurice’s professed intention to write a non-literary elementary compendium, his familiarity with examples of classical military writing is evident in explicit references to ‘the Ancients’, his adherence to the conventions and rhetorical repertoire of the genre and a self-conscious positioning of his treatise in relation to this literary tradition, as well as in conceptual and structural parallelism and similarities of language and/or substance. Without claims to exhaustive Quellenforschung, the paper examines the extent and nature of Maurice’s interaction with ‘the Ancients’ in general, and Aelian’s Tactica theoria and Arrian’s Acies contra Alanos in particular, with a view to differentiating the various ways in which Maurice exploited this classical heritage, whether as conceptual models, sources of technical content, validatory antique authority or allusive literary ornament. Greater clarity in this regard sheds light on the Nachleben of these two classical treatises, Maurice’s methodology, authorial credentials and literary-cultural milieu, and the transmission and reception of Greco-Roman military literature in late antiquity.

KEYWORDS: Maurice’s Strategikon / Strategicon, Aelian / Ailianos, Arrian, Greco-Roman military literature, Late Antiquity, Classical Reception, Late Roman army.

Byzantium was heir to a tradition of Greco-Roman military literature stretching back to the fourth century BC, a legacy manifest in both the collection, editing and adaptation of surviving texts from classical antiquity and the composition of new military treatises. This broad genre always exhibited diversity of content, style, language and approach reflective of different categories of author and audience. Among Byzantine readers, writers and editor-copyists, one of the most popular, influential and fashionable ancient military works was Onasander’s Strategikos (Στρατηγικός), a treatise on generalship written by a Platonic philosopher in the 50s AD. Onasander presents a wide-ranging evaluation of the qualities, duties and conduct of an ideal general, while his abstractive analysis of the Roman military leadership is notable for its sensibility towards ethical aspects of war and modern-seeming psychological insights. Accordingly, the Strategikos is often characterized as a “philosophical” discourse addressed to well-born aspirants to high command, distinct from specimens of “scientific” military literature. The currency and reputation of Onasander’s work as a military “classic” in Byzantium may be gauged by its ample manuscript transmission and abundant evidence for late antique/Byzantine interest in the text, as witnessed by editorial interpolations and frequent citations, adaptations and paraphrases. This paper charts how Onasander’s text was successively modified by Byzantine writers/editors from the sixth to eleventh centuries and influenced the form and content of Byzantine military writing. Investigation of the Byzantine reception of the Strategikos aims to account for the enduring popularity, authority and relevance of the treatise, and to identify its potential readership and impact, highlighting the socio-cultural, intellectual, didactic and literary functions of this genre as a component of the education, outlook and “Roman” identity of military and civilian élites.

This paper will reassess the course of the 1078 Battle of Kalavrye, a crucial battle between Alexios Komnenos and the rebel Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder. Modern accounts of this important battle adhere very closely to the narration of events provided by Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger in the Hyle Historias, with consideration given to the scant points of divergence presented by Nikephoros’ wife and contemporary Anna Komnene in her account of the battle presented in the Alexiad. Modern assessments of Alexios Komnenos’ skills as a general, particularly those presented by John Birkenmeier in The Development of the Komnenian Army:  1081 – 1180 are predicated upon a close reading of the Hyle Historias. The accuracy of Nikephoros’ account has, so far, being taken for granted.
Historians have largely ignored, however, an earlier account of the Battle of Kalavrye presented in Michael Attaleiates’ History. I will seek to rectify this imbalance and to demonstrate that a crucial element of modern narrations of the Battle of Kalavrye – the serendipitous arrival of Turkish mercenaries at the eleventh hour, whose timely intervention won the battle for Alexios Komnenos – is based on the Hyle/Alexiad tradition of events but which is contradicted by Michael Attaleiates’ History. I will then demonstrate that the ‘arrival’ of the Turks presented in the Hyle is a misrepresentation of Alexios Komnenos’ tactics, and that the Turks were always present on the battlefield. This paper will therefore address Byzantine military tactics and Byzantine historiography in equal measure, and endeavor to provide a compelling reinterpretation of the course of this crucial battle.

The barbarians of the Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages were of scholarly interest from the 19th c. onwards. Though there are numerous publications on various aspects of the barbarians, most of it focuses on the role they had in the collapse of the Western and the trails of the Eastern Roman Empire.  During the last two decades, an enormous scholarly contribution is given into dampening the negative representation of the Early Medieval barbarians as primitive, belligerent people who were inferior to the Romans and Byzantines in any regard. This article gives a review on the accounts of the contemporary authors held as authorities on the history of the barbarian tribes, which combined with the survey of the material evidence, retrieved with archaeological excavations, offers another perspective of the barbarians and the Romaioi as equal participants in the events that shaped their world, instead of the image of superior, civilized people of a great Empire and the savage tribes of inferior culture who threatened the same Empire.

Αim of this study is to examine why the presence of select Turkic warriors
in the Abbasid armies had little impact on the course of the Arab-Byzantine
conflicts. The article focuses mainly on the campaigns conducted by the
commander Bughā al-Kabīr against the Byzantine Empire and other
Caliphate enemies.

On the 6th March 845 the Arabs executed forty-two Byzantine prisoners, some of them very eminent, who had been captured after the fall of the city of Amorion, in Asia Minor. This seems, at first glance, to defy logic, as it was common practice at those days to keep prisoners in custody while negotiating an exchange, particularly of high ranking officials.  It seems even more perverse if one considers that these prisoners had been kept in prison for six-and-a-half years before their execution and that an agreement for an exchange had been conducted between the caliph and the emperor some months before. Moreover the Byzantines had a greater number of prisoners awaiting exchange. However, 
by looking at the internal policies of the caliph, al-Wathiq, one can see a different picture: 
His determination to impose the religious Mutazila doctrine, by force if necessary, provoked a series of uprisings. The public decapitation of the forty-two officers after they had refused to pray with the caliph, was a valuable propaganda exercise, a show of power, which mattered much more to him in those circumstances than the freedom of
a number of his soldiers and officials.

Στις αρχές του 7ου αιώνα η Βυζαντινή αυτοκρατορία βρέθηκε μπροστά στο φάσμα της καταστροφής από τους Πέρσες. Η κακή οικονομική κατάσταση, η στυγνή φορολογία των λαών της Ανατολής από την Κωνσταντινούπολη και η ανίκανη κεντρική εξουσία οδήγησαν τους Πέρσες να προελάσουν με ορμή στην Μέση Ανατολή και την Μικρασία, τις οποίες κατέκτησαν. Η λαφυραγώγηση από τους Πέρσες του Τίμιου Σταυρού έδωσε στην σύγκρουση χαρακτήρα «Ιερού Πολέμου».

ABSTRACT: The continued use of Latin as the official Heeressprache of the East Roman Empire up to the 630s supplies the context for an examination of a text virtually unknown to classical scholarship. Mediceo-Laurentianus graecus LV-4 contains an anonymous and mutilated Greek military treatise, published by Karl Müller in 1880 and subsequently styled De Militari Scientia. Its character, date and textual affinities are briefly considered, concluding that it is an informal epitome or ‘working copy’ of Maurice’s Strategicon (ca. 590s), possibly compiled ca. 630s–640s as an aide-mémoire for a senior officer. This treatise is a unique witness to two loanwords from Latin – παλμάριον (palmarium) and ῥέκαλα (*recala), neither previously documented in lexica, and the latter not directly attested in Latin. The author’s usage of the construction ῥέκαλα δίδωμι  ῥέκαλα ποιέω, with the sense ‘to make a withdrawal’, now permits recognition of the corresponding expression recala facio in the highly corrupted text of a Latin speech preserved in the Strategicon.

KEYWORDS: Maurice’s Strategikon / Strategicon, Müller Fragment, De Militari Scientia, Late Roman army, Latin Language, Vulgar Latin

The current chapter represents a first effort to map the research field of civil war as a distinct political and military phenomenon that marked the history of the Byzantine Empire during the Middle Ages. If the majority of the rebellions that resulted in a civil war in the Constantinopolitan emperor’s realm between the 4th and the 12th century aimed at the usurpation of the imperial throne, that is, the reproduction of the imperial system, the increasing number of internal conflicts after the late-11th century whose aim was provincial autonomy or semi-autonomy from centralized rule points to the phenomenon’s importance in explaining the process of political fragmentation of the East Roman world that culminated in 1204.

Dymydyuk D.Blade weapons in the medieval Armenian chronicles of the Bagratid era (end of 9th – middle of 11th centuries): the problem of terminology, History and culture. Journal of Armenian studies, Yerevan 2019, Vol. 2, p. 33-48.

Դիմիդյուկ Դ. Սառը զենքերը Բագրատունյաց դարաշրջանի ժամանակագրություններում (IX դ. վերջ-XI դ.). հարցի տերմինաբանությունը, Պատմություն եվ մշակույթ. Հայագիտական հանդես, Երեվան 2019, №2, 33-48.

В статье рассматривается терминология холодного оружия, а именно проблема значения и использования слов “սուր” (сур), “սուսեր” (сусер) “թուր” (тур)”, “վաղակ” (вагхак), а также “պողովատ” (погховат) в средневековых армянских хрониках времен Багратидов (конец IX – середина XI вв.) и смежных эпох. Анализируется различия между упомянутыми терминами, закономерности их использования в хрониках, а также характеристика описываемого оружия.
Обращено внимание на то, что в средневековых армянских летописях существует полный хаос относительно использования тех или других военных терминов, потому что в большинстве случаев выбор термина зависел от стиля хрониста, его языковых предпочтений и других причин, из-за чего невозможно точно идентифицировать значение тех или иных терминов.
Предполагаем, что в эпоху Багратидов слово “սուր” (сур), скорее всего, означало простой обоюдоострый меч и вместе со словом “սուսեր” (сусер) чаще всего использовалось в хрониках, в то время как термин “թուր” (тур) использовался крайне редко.
Чтобы уточнить информацию о том, как выглядел тот или иной меч, летописцы могли использовать дополнительные слова, как “երկսայր” (ерксайр – обоюдоострый) или “միասեռ” (миасер – однолезвийный). Заметим, что в хрониках отсутствовала информация, которая бы указывала на кривизну лезвия меча.

Ключевые слова: меч, палаш, сабля, սուր, սուսեր, թուր, Багратидская Армения, оружие.

The article discusses terminology of blade weapons, namely the problem of the meaning and using the words “սուր” (sur), “սուսեր” (suser), “թուր” (tur), “վաղակ” (vaghak) and “պողովատ” (poghovat) in the medieval Armenian chronicles of the Bagratid era (late 9th – middle of 11th c.) and adjacent periods. The differences between the mentioned terms, dependences of their use in the chronicles, and the physical characteristics of the described weapons were analyzed.
Attention was drawn to the fact that in the medieval Armenian chronicles there was complete chaos regarding the using of military terms, because in most cases the choice of the term depended on the style of the chronicler, his language preferences and other reasons. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the accurate meaning of these terms.
We can assume that in the Bagratid era, the word “սուր” (sur) probably meant a simple double-edged sword, and together with the word “սուսեր” (suser) they were the most popular in medieval Armenian chronicles, while the word “թուր” (tur) was used rarely. In order to clarify the information about on what the swords looked like, chroniclers could use additional words like “երկսայր” (yerksayr – double-edged) or “միասեռ” (miaser – single-edged). Please note, that in those times chronicles did not contain any information which would indicate the curvature of the blades.

Keywords: sword, broadsword, palash, saber, սուր, սուսեր, թուր, Bagratid Armenia, weapons.

Հոդվածում քննվում են Բագրատունյաց Հայաստանում  (IX դ. վերջ–XI դ.) ստեղծված “Ժամանակագրություններ”-ի տվյալները, որոնք վերաբերում են սառը զենքերի տեսակներին: Խոսքը, մասնավորապես, վերաբերում է “սուր”, “սուսեր”, “թուր”, “վաղակ”, ինչպես նաև “պողովատ” բառերի կիրառությանը և նշանակությանը: Վերլուծվել են վերոնշյալ տերմինների միջև առկա տարբերությունները, “Ժամանակագրություններ”-ում նրանց կիրառության օրինաչափությունները: Բնականաբար, տրվել է դրանց ընդհանուր բնութագիրը:
Պետք է նշել, որ հայ միջնադարյան տարեգրքերում զենքերի հիշատակությունները խիստ անկանոն են: Շատ հաճախ տերմինի ընտրությունը կախված էր տարեգրի ոճից, նախընտրությունից և այլն: Նման հանգամանքը թույլ չի տալիս հստակ որոշել տերմինների նշանակությունը և նույնականությունը:
Պետք է ասել, որ Բագրատունյաց շրջանում “սուր” բառը հիմնականում կիրառվել է երկսայր զենքերի վերաբերյալ: “Սուր” և “սուսեր” բառերը ավելի շատ են օգտագործվել տարեգիրների կողմից: Մինչդեռ “թուր” բառը հազվադեպ է հանդիպում: Տարեգիրները զենքի տեսքն առավել մանրամասն նկարագրելու համար երբեմն օգտագործել են “երկսայր” (երկու կողմից սուր) և “միասեռ” (մեկ կողմից սուր) հավելյալ բառերը: Պետք է նկատել նաև, որ տարեգրքերում բացակայել են շեղբի կորության մասին տվյալներ:

Բանալի բառեր. սուր, թրադաշույն, սվին, սուսեր, թուր, Բագրատունյաց Հայաստան, զենք:

MA thesis, Budapest 2019
I offer in this paper a new perspective of Leo's ideal general in the Taktika. I argue for a social management dimension of the Taktika and contextualise the development of the archetype of the virtuous and pious general as it eventually appears in the Taktika in relation to the manual's literary tradition. By doing so, I demonstrate both the foundations and innovations of the ideal general of the Taktika as a tool of imperial control and challenge previous analyses of the Taktika’s contents.

Following a historical review of Leo’s reign and literary production, in Chapter 1 I focus on literary influences and the lineage of the ideal general, with discussion on the genre of military writing in Antiquity and Byzantium and the particular tradition in which the Taktika is situated. In Chapter 2, I examine the Taktika as a paraenetic text and provide close readings of its representations of moral virtues.

The Middle Ages are a time of the visual and, in Moldavia as in the rest of Eastern Europe, the painted walls of the churches illustrate the strong currents of the peoples’ mundane beliefs. As cultural images go, the imprint of the current belief on the sacred image is one of the best sources available, as the minor, custom alteration of the canonical scene reveals how the ordinary person viewed a certain behavior, object, person or phenomenon. We found compelling the way the executioners, persecutors and generally the “bad” personages, on the historiated walls of the 16th century church of the Moldavian of monastery of Probota, were depicted holding, wearing and swinging curved “Turkish” swords (sabers), as opposite to the military saints, the archangels and the rest of “good” personages wearing straight ones. The association between the curved sword and “enemy of Christ” is revealed to be, following our superficial analysis, not an element of byzantine tradition, as the whole sacred painting phenomenon and canons in our region points to as its origin. In fact the Palaeologan and earlier painting depict a more realist image of the military man, i.e. the “bad” and the “good” personages are wearing curved swords, while the straight sword is, as rarely as it appears, associated with the “franks” (the westerners of bad reputation in the Byzantine world). The fact that most of the western and Central European medieval and Renaissance imagery holds to the association sabre=bad is significant for the weight of the European cultural stratum in 16th century Moldavia or, at least for the painters of St.Nicholas church of Probota monastery and several other painted churches of Moldavia.

This chapter examines the place of soldiers in the society, economy and culture of civilian communities during the Middle Byzantine period, and the implications for the ‘militarisation’ of social relationships. It explores how the localisation and integration of provincial soldiers in towns and villages of Anatolia from the mid-seventh century, through kinship, personal associations, landownership/-holding and communal tax liabilities, affected the dynamics of soldier–civilian interactions and socio-cultural homogeneity. While legal distinctions between soldier and civilian remained clearly demarcated, insofar as military status accorded judicial privileges and fiscal immunities upon a soldier’s person, family and household, the intricacies of the Byzantine military-fiscal apparatus created significant ambiguities. In particular, the rootedness of soldiers’ in village communities, together with soldiers’ partial dependence on private or familial resources to fulfil their military service, created circumstances in which military-fiscal obligations could be transferred directly and personally onto civilian neighbours. Correspondingly, the very presence of soldiers in rural society, and especially the vulnerability of poorer soldiers to exploitation or coercion by provincial elites, could draw soldiers away from official duties and shape local power relationships.

This study of the status and peace-time functions of Byzantine soldiers (300-1200) examines diverse interactions between military personnel and civilian society. Acknowledging various categories and shifting contemporary definitions of “soldier”, a survey of socio-cultural backgrounds, modes of recruitment, terms of service and institutional environments distinguishes differences in rates and methods of remuneration, fiscal-legal privileges, socio-economic standing and professional identities. The vexed question of military landholdings becomes of pivotal significance for locating soldiers in agrarian society. Official spheres of military-civilian relations include policing and internal security, enforcement of religious policies, interventions in imperial politics and regional economic impact. Broader consideration of military sociology explores how the presence and behaviour of soldiers, on and off duty, affected the socio-economic patterns, cultural complexion and power relationships of urban and rural communities, and reflected soldiers’ varying levels of integration into civilian society, through origin, kinship, property and culture, mirroring longer-term changes in the composition of Byzantine armies.

Renowned since antiquity as the legendary “Land of The Beautiful Horses,” Cappadocia region in Turkey has been an important horse-breeding center throughout its history. The present work is a study on horses and horse breeding in the region in the Middle Byzantine period with special attention being paid to the architectural evidence: the rock-cut stables. During this time, Cappadocia played a vital role in the defense and expansion of Byzantium in the east and the provincial elite that emerged in the region gained power and wealth through border defense. As possessors of great estates and large private troops, they held high positions in military and provincial administration. Recent studies have revealed that Cappadocia bears rich architectural evidence to illuminate this frontier environment during the Middle Byzantine period. This paper will investigate the stables of elite mansions in three settlements in Cappadocia, Açık Saray, Çanlı Kilise, and Selime-Yaprakhisar in order to understand the nature of horse breeding in Medieval Cappadocia. The architecture of the stables will be discussed in a broad context along with their possible functions and meanings and with reference to literary sources.

Byzantine arms and armour were researched by many historians. For this reason, Byzantine military history received a dominant position in medieval historiography that provoked the situation, where the military history of small nations (under Roman influences) was written from the Byzantine perspective.
So, our task is to change this conception and bring medieval Armenian military sphere to light. The idea is to analyse the relief on the door of Msho Arakelots monastery where four equestrians and one infantryman are depicted make comparisons with other Armenian, Byzantine and Muslim sources. Unfortunately, Armenian written sources are less important for us because they give only general information about weapons and armour without their detailed description.
In this relief spherical mace head and sword with sleeve cross-guard are presented which have many parallels with Byzantine archaeological and figurative sources. No less important is the depiction of the military trumpet because it is the first image of this object in Armenian art, which we can compare to pictures from Madrid Skylitzes (XII c.). In addition, the only defensive weapon, which is presented in this relief, is round shield with flower ornament. We have many depictions of round shields in Armenian miniatures and reliefs from X–XI c.
Moreover, this relief is one of the few where stirrups and chape of the scabbard are shown. It is important information because these pictures can be compared with other Byzantine archaeological sources to reconstruct their real look.
The conclusions are that the majority of Armenian weapons have similarities to the Byzantine one but no less important are Muslim influences which we have found in some examples. Located between two civilizations (Byzantine and Muslim), Armenians adopted the best examples of military sphere creating their own culture. Moreover, thanks to the comparative analysis we will prove the idea that medieval figurative sources is a good and more or less accurate source for studying medieval military history and our research will serve as evidence for this.

Byzantium was heir to a tradition of Greek and Roman military literature stretching back to the fourth century BC, which was manifest both in the collection, editing and adaptation of surviving texts from classical antiquity and in the composition of numerous new treatises devoted to warfare on land and sea. This broad genre always exhibited a diversity of content, style, language and approach, reflective of different categories of author and reader. Originating in a research project to prepare a full critical edition of Nikephoros Ouranos’ Taktika (c.1000), conventionally acknowledged as the longest and last representative of this literary and intellectual tradition, this paper explores the subsequent and more obscure history of this genre in the Late Byzantine period. Aspects of continuity are discernible in isolated instances of military writing, specifically a tactical opusculum by the scholar-courtier Michael Psellos (c.1050s-70s) and evidence for a lost work by the general Michael Doukas Glabas Tarchaneiotes (c.1297-1305/8), and in a partially overlapping but distinct genre of advisory literature (Kekaumenos, c.1075-8; Theodore Palaiologos, c.1326/7). The investigation addresses the more difficult question of the Late Byzantine audience(s) of military treatises, as reflected in evidence for aristocratic education and literary culture and in what can be inferred from manuscript production and ownership. In particular, these criteria show the continued esteem accorded to Greco-Roman ‘classics’, notably Ailianos’ Taktika Theoria (c.106-13 AD). More generally, they highlight the socio-cultural function of this genre as a component of the schooling, identity and perspectives of Late Byzantine military and civilian elites, over and above whatever practical utility these texts might (or might not) have possessed as ‘technical’ or ‘scientific’ literature. The discussion introduces some hitherto unexploited manuscripts in the Topkapı Palace Library (TSMK G.İ. 19 and 36).

(This paper was originally presented at the First International Conference on the Military History of the Mediterranean Sea, Fatih Üniversitesi, Istanbul, 26-28 June, 2015).

Bagratid Kingdom of Armenia (884/886 –1045/1064 ) was the second major kingdom in Armenian history. After being controlled by the Persians and Umayyad Arabs for centuries, the Royal House of Bagratid was finally able to secure their independence from the Arabs in the end of 9th century. Located between Byzantine Empire and the Muslim world, Armenia became an object of encroachment for these Empires but on the other hand Armenians accept different military tricks and inventions.
Our task is analyzed the shape and size of a bow as well as the structure of an arrow based on Armenian, Georgian, Bizantine and Arabo-Persian sources. The primary attention was paid to the reliefs from The Cathedral of the Holy Cross on Aghtamar Island (915–921, modern Turkey) where virtually the only image of the composite bow is located (hunter with composite bow). Note, that another relief of horse archer from this church was dated the 12th–14th c. and has Turk or Mongolic features, therefore we will not analyze it.
In order to describe a bow, the majority of Armenian historians used the word լայնալիճ (broad bow) which means that this weapon was long. There is an assumption that self-bows could also be used but the most popular (since Antiquity) was composite bow
In the Armenian consciousness of that time, a bow (as a weapon) was associated with Muslim (Arab–Persian–Turkish) world. It is interesting to note that archers were not often mentioned in written sources (only as garrison fortress or ship (on the lake Sevan) and as
auxiliary troops at battlefield). However, lack of horse archers in Armenian army was noticed in written sources.
The level of bow’s popularity among Armenian warriors was relatively not big. Attention was paid to the lack of dating problem, description and three-dimensional image of found arrows in the works of Armenian historians and archeologists. The necessity of new photographing and re-description of the available arrowheads was proven, because they are only archeological sources to this topic.

BROŃ BIAŁA W ARMENII BAGRATYDÓW (KONIEC IX– POŁOWA XI W.)
ХОЛОДНОЕ ОРУЖИЕ В БАГРАТИДСКОЙ АРМЕНИИ
ХОЛОДНА ЗБРОЯ У БАГРАТИДСЬКІЙ ВІРМЕНІЇ
SWORDS IN BAGRATID ARMENIA

Text was written in Polish.
NB! Sorry for grammatical mistakes. This text will be edited soon.

Najbardziej znanym i efektywnym typem broni w średniowieczu był miecz, który został dostępnym tylko elitom społeczeństwa, ponieważ był drogim w wyprodukowaniu i symbolizował władzę. Arystokracja specjalnie kupowała sobie drogi miecze, którzy byli inkrustowani złotem lub kamieniem szlachetnym dla demonstracji swojej wysokiej pozycji w społeczeństwie, a prezent komukolwiek w formie miecza był przejawem wielkiego szacunku.

Wiemy, że w IX–XIII w. żołnierze ormiańscy wykorzystywali około 17 różnych typów broni. Wśród głównych rodzajów broni białej kronikarze wymieniają trzy nazwy: սուր (sur), սուսեր (susser) oraz թուր (tur).

Miecze dwusieczne byli najbardziej popularny w ówczesnej Armenii. Głównie dzięki analizie źródłom graficznym IX–XI w. stworzyliśmy własną typologizacje mieczów na podstawie analizy formy jelców prostych mieczów: Prosty jelec; Jelec w formie półksiężyca; Jelec typu “Pliska-Galovo” (za V. Jotowym); Jelec typu “Garabonc” (za V. Jotowym). Na pewno nie mniej popularnym był prosty jednosieczny miecz (pałasz czyli paramerion), chociaż i źródeł ormiańskich o nim są bardzo mało.

Najbardziej trudną i kontrowersyjną jest kwestia pojawienia i popularności szabli. Szabla została stworzona w VII w. wśród ludów tureckich w Ałtaju i w IX–XI w. trafiła do Bizancjum z Bałkan, a do Kalifatu z Azji Środkowej przez kontakty z koczownikami, którzy służyli w armiach obu Państw jako najemnicy. Uważamy, że w IX–XI w. szabla pojawiła się w Armenii przez bizantyjski lub muzułmański wpływy, ponieważ do ekspansji Seldżuków w XI w. ormiańscy nie mieli bezpośrednich kontaktów z koczownikami, bo Państwo Bagratydów było otoczone na Zachodzie Bizancjum, a na Południu i Wschodzie – emiratami muzułmańskimi. Na Północy znajdują się Góry Kaukaskie, które przez długie lata oddzielali Kaukaz Północny (gdzie mieszkali koczownicy) od Południowego. Na pewnie, tylko przez Abchazje odbywali się niektórzy kontakty z koczownikami, przykładem czego jest wyżej wymieniona szabli z Wani. Przez prawie całkowity brak źródeł o wykorzystaniu szabli uważamy, że ona w nie była popularna w IX–XI w. i tylko po ekspansji Seldżuków w końcu XI–XII w. zaczęła odzyskiwać swoją popularność w Armenii o czym świadczą źródła archeologiczny oraz graficzny.

Обсадата на Константинопол (717-18г.) и спасяването на Европа Обсадата на Константинопол от огромната арабска армия на Маслама през 717-18г., завършила с разгром за силите на Халифата, отдавна заема ключова позиция в българската историография. Причините за това са повече от очевидни – всички съвременни извори пряко или косвено отбелязват значителната роля, изиграна от българите в спасяването на ромейската столица и прогонването от Балканите на най-голямата азиатска армия, стъпвала тук от времето на Ксеркс. Арабската заплаха за Европа е несъмнена – падането на византийската столица би означавало безпрепятствено разширение на халифата към Балканите, а също така и Италия, тъй като византийския флот е този, който държи силите на исляма далеч от Апенините. В този смисъл, победата над арабските сили с право може да се отбелязва като една от двете критични победи на Християнството над Исляма за цялото Ранно Средновековие. Втората, противно на наложения мит, не е успеха на Карл Мартел (718-741г.) 1 над маврите при Поатие (732г.), а победата на аквитанския херцог Одо Велики (688-735г.) при Тулуза през 721г. Преди да преминем към същинския ход на кампанията и обсадата, ще се занимаем с няколко ключови въпроса, които обикновено не получават достатъчно внимание в научните трудове и популярните електронни публикации. Извори и историография Обсадата на Константинопол е отразена в няколко извора, познати на съвременната историческа наука. Водещият византийски източник остава Хрониката на Теофан Изповедник. Текстът е частично достъпен на български в ГИБИ, том III (виж библиография към статията), но изданието на БАН (както и всички от поредицата ГИБИ и ЛИБИ) съдържа един сериозен пропуск – то цитира само онези откъси, касаещи конкретно българите, изваждайки ги от контекста на самата хроника. Подобно " изрязване " е доста опасно за всяко нормално проучване и спестява на четящите полезни детайли, които могат да бъдат открити в пълния текст. 2 Самият Теофан е автор, чиято оценка, макар и доста изчерпателна, трябва да се подложи на сериозно съмнение, с оглед на факта, че самият той е иконопоклонник, който в случая с Лъв III Сириец описва император-иконоборец. В този смисъл, хронистът е крайно предубеден към действията на императора и обективността на оценките му трябва да бъде разглеждана твърде предпазливо от всеки изследовател на периода. Следващата важна хроника, която ни дава информация за обсадата е труда на Михаил Сирийски (патриарх на Антиохия 1166-1199г.) Текстът на неговата " Хроника " е написан на сирийски (средновековен диалект на арамейския) и се основава на предходни съчинения, записани от сирийските монаси през IX и X 1 Дадените дати посочват периода на управление, а не на целия жизнен път на съответната личност. 2 Имената на изворите в бележките под линия ще бъдат дадени на Български език (Теофан Изповедник – Хроника; Михаил Сирийски – Хорника и т.н.) В Библиографията са посочени оригиналните заглавия, от които са цитирани текстовете.

Theory (as attested by the military manuals) and practice prove that attrition warfare and the associated military tactics of deception and surprise played an important role in the byzantine military history. The paper studies cases of attrition warfare and surprise attacks exercised by the Byzantines from 11th till 13th century. Important military leaders such as Alexios I Komnenos were masters of attrition warfare and used skillfully that strategy whenever an open battle against a strong opponent was very precarious.

            The Byzantines took advantage of the Balkan and Asia Minor mountainous terrain as well as the recruitment of foreign fast moving troops armed with long range shooting weapons that facilitated the exercise of tactics of deception and surprise.  These military tactics were mostly successful against the Latins while were occasionally successful against the Seljuks and the Turkomans. The paper concludes that attrition warfare and the tactics of deception and surprise were more often applied during the 13th century –a period that Byzantium’s military resources and capabilities diminished– thus being a distinctive byzantine method of warfare and gave rise to an active role of the infantry who under special circumstances could threaten the western cavalry.

The campaign of Rus’ against Constantinople in 941 was reflected in several sources. In particular, the Primary Chronicle (Povest’ vremennykh let) put it under right 6449 / 941 year while the Novgorod First Chronicle of the Younger Recension along with several compilations of the Chronograph for the Great Narration’s circle placed the event under 6428 / 920. The prominent scholar Alexey Shakhmatov offered explanation for such different dating, creating a theory where both chronicle have a common core influenced by the earliest Chronograph. In his concept Povest’ vremennykh let in fact is not the “Primary” chronicle but is secondary after the Novgorod Chronicle. Textual analysis is complicated because all accounts are based on George Hamartolos’s text and sometimes versions differ one from another in the smallest detail. However, a comprehensive comparison of all data allows us to reconstruct the interrelations of these writings. It turns out that the compiler of the Novgorod First Chronicle produced contamination from fragments of the Chronograph for the Great Narration and borrowings from Povest’ vremennykh let itself, i.e. the Novgorod chronicle was created later than both of its sources.

Bagratid Armenia (884/886 –1045/1064) was a decentralized state in South Caucasus region. Located at the frontier between Byzantine Empire and the Muslim world, Armenia became an object of encroachment for these Empires but, on the other hand, adopted the best examples of military sphere from both sides, creating its own military culture.
The aim of this presentation is to analyze what type of short cold weapons (knives or daggers?) are presented on the Armenian figurative sources (9th–11th c.) and how they looked at that time.
Unfortunately, Armenian written sources do not give us any information about physical properties or size of the knives/daggers in Medieval Armenia (դանակ, դաշույն, նրան, խանջալ etc.). In addition, most archaeological artefacts of weapons from Bagratid era were unpublished or poorly researched and were dated too broadly (9–13 c.). In Soviet times, few historians and archaeologists (Valentina Abrahamyan, Babken Arakelyan, Aram Kalantaryan and others) published separate archaeological findings from Ani, Dvin, Garni, Anberd, etc. Unfortunately, almost all of these pictures were redrawn only from one side (not photocopied!) without any information about measure, the material of these artefacts etc.
The problem of our study is also related to the methodology of research – what is the difference between knife and dagger? Armenian historian Arman Kalantarian suggests some criteria in order to distinguish between knives and daggers: daggers are much longer than knives; they had longer hilt and wider two-edged blade. Also, sometimes they could have a small cross-guard (approx. 2 cm.). The problem is that almost all finds of blades from Armenia are short (up to 10–14 cm.) and the hilts of the knives are only a few centimetres shorter than the blades (pic. 6, 8). So that makes us think that, in fact, difference between knifes and daggers were not in lengths but in the presence of certain physical characteristics (two-edged blade, availability of cross-guard or wider blade). So, probably it is better to use the term “battle knife” instead of “dagger” in its classical meaning. An example of such a knife could be the archaeological find from Bulgaria (pic. 7).
Taking into account this information we would like to draw attention to the Armenian miniatures. On picture 1–2 we see the scene “Sacrifice of Abraham”, where Abraham is holding the knife in his right hand trying to kill Isaac (pic. 1–2). Such a scene was popular in Christian art of that time. For example, we found a similar depiction of Abraham with the knife in the Byzantine Homilies of St. Gregory of Nazianzus (pic. 3). Please note that on these miniatures the length of the blade is almost similar to the length of the hilt (perhaps the blade was a little bit longer).
However, analyzing reliefs from Aghtamar Church (pic. 4–5) we see two hunters holding in an unusual way “long knives” making a piercing attack. Especially it’s good to see on the pic. 5, where the hilt of the “knife” is twice as long as the palms. Moreover, the lengths of hilts are almost equal to the lengths of blade. Does this mean that it could be a dagger? Taking into account the abovementioned facts we think that it could be schematically a depiction of the battle knives, because we do not know the archaeological find of long daggers. Also, equal lengths of hilt and blade make them similar to archaeological finds of abovementioned battle knives (pic. 6–8).

We think that in medieval Armenia there existed two types of “short cold weapons” – an ordinary knife and a battle knife/short dagger(?). Please note, that we cannot name them “daggers” in the classical meaning, because it will not be in proportion to classical Armenian daggers (e.g. from Ancient times), where the length of the blade could be 40 cm, and hilt – 10 cm. The battle knife/dagger was a weapon of personal protection, popular among different social groups of people which was used for hunting or during battle. It was short, because of the expensive production of such weapons and lack of the high-quality iron. However, it was most often used on the battlefield when a warrior lost his main weapon (sword, mace, spear etc.). Also, even an ordinary one-edged knife could become a weapon but its properties were worse than the ones of a battle knife, which could be two-edged with a wide blade.

Poster presentation at the conference "Turning Points. European Arms and Armour from the Migration Period to the early Modern Period". Sanok 2019.

Preparation and organization of the military campaign of the army of Bagratid Armenia (end of 9 – mid. 11 c.).
Підготовка та організація військового походу армії Багратидської Вірменії (кін. ІХ – сер. ХІ ст.)
Подготовка и организация военного похода армии Багратидськой Армении (кон. IХ - сер. XI в.)

Introduction. The history of early medieval Armenia is often studied in the context of struggle between Byzantine Empire and the Arab Caliphate for Armenia and the Caucasus in general. When the Caliphate began to win this fight, as for example at the beginning of the VIII сentury, Armenia immediately became a part of Caliphate. However, the strengthening of Byzantium and the Arabs’ weakening in the second half of the ІХ century led to the change of geopolitical situation in the Caucasus, which allowed Armenians to create an independent Bagratid Armenian state.
Armenian Kingdom (884/886–1045/1064) was a decentralized state with a highly developed suzerain-vassal relationship where some princes (ishkhan) recognized the power of the king of the Bagratid dynasty only in matters of war and peace. In contrast to Armenia, Byzantine Empire didn’t have a feudal type of army and maintain their military forces from the state treasury.
In spite of the actual fragmentation of the state, representatives of the royal dynasty of Bagratids created a flexible system of gathering troops and their movement, relying on developed suzerain-vassal relationship to protect the borders of the state from Muslim incursions and Byzantine intervention.
Purpose. On the basis of fragmentary evidences of the Armenian and other chronicles, the aim of this article is to reconstruct the process of a military campaign – from the gathering of troops, camp organization, intelligence and food supply issues to the location of troops on the battlefield and tactics.
Results and Originality. Military campaigns began in spring and lasted until late autumn and the Bagratid king or other trusted person was involved in the preparation and organization. The king directed the creation of a camp which was surrounded by palisade and moose and divided into sectors where separately housed troops of separate princes.
On the battlefield Armenians used a standard (sometimes with certain modifications) disposition of troops: avant-garde, center with flanks and rearguard. Although the other system was equally popular, when the troops «were not stationed according to the rules of military art, but around their suzerain, with whom they came to the battlefield». The main military unit – cavalry (azats) were located in the avant-garde and rearguard. Also, Armenian army didn’t know state centralized food supply, so army independently acquired it during campaigns.
In most military conflicts against Muslims (especially turks), the Armenian troops wanted to avoid battles on the plains, because in this case the advantage would be on the enemy’s side, which had maneuverable equestrian archers that allowed them to conduct a distant battle for a long time. This forced Armenians to use the tactics of defensive battle, luring the enemy to the mountains, which offset the possible numerical superiority of the Muslims and didn’t allow them to fully use maneuverable equestrian archers.
Conclusion. The prospect of the research is to attract and compare all available Armenian, Georgian, Byzantine, Arab and other chronicles to create an overall picture of the military history of Armenia, which will help to better understand social-economical and political situation in region and further events in the history of Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia (1080–1375).

У статті реконструйовано процес збору вірменських військ у разі військового конфлікту. Проаналізовано особливості облаштування та оборони табору, роль сторожової служби та розвідки, а також визначено джерела забезпечення армії продовольством. Подано кілька схем розташування військ на полі бою, акцентуючи увагу на тому, що вірмени найчастіше займали оборонну позицію, ставлячи основну ставку на складний природній рельєф місцевості. Ключові слова: Багратидська Вірменія, Візантія, тактика, військо, похід, армія, сюзеренно- васальна система.

Димидюк Д. Підготовка та організація військового походу армії
Багратидської Вірменії наприкінці ІХ – всередині ХІ ст. / Дмитро Димидюк //
Вісник Черкаського університету. Серія: Історичні науки (напрям: Історія та
Етнологія). – Черкаси, 2017. – №4. – С. 50–58.

[Dymydyuk, D. (2017). Preparation and organization of the military campaign
of the army of Bagratid Armenia at the end of the IX – in the middle of the XI c.
Visnyk of the Cherkasy Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University. Series history and
ethnology. 4, 50–58 (in Ukr)].

In Part One we examined several of the factors which had severely weakened the Byzantines in the century prior to the Arab invasion of Roman Syria. These factors included a series of devastating plagues, severe economic stress and a war-weary military. The Muslim Invasion of Syria (April, 634 CE) The grand military strategy of the Byzantine Empire was designed to be primarily defensive.[1] This defensive plan relied upon the establishment and maintenance of border garrisons along the frontiers of the empire. These border forts were designed to defend strategic strong points and provide vital information regarding enemy troop movements. In theory, as well as previous practice, an enemy that overwhelmed or bypassed one or more of these garrisons would have given the Byzantine military the time necessary to mobilize field forces stationed in the imperial provinces.[2] The prevailing military mindset of the empire prior to this period was that any attack which penetrated into the interior of the empire would eventually be repulsed. Thus, any territories lost to an enemy would be temporary, regionally limited and eventually restored to imperial control.

The article describes for the first time a new find of a Byzantine sword-guard and a pommel in Cherkasy Raion, Cherkasy Oblast, Ukraine. The items are in a good state of preservation and are made of a non-ferrous metal (bronze?).
The sword-guard belongs to the Garabonc type of swords proposed by the Bulgarian researcher Valery Yotov.
As was found out, the sword-guard from Cherkasy Oblast is almost identical to sword-guards that are pictured on drawings in the Paris manuscript of Homilies of St. Gregory of Nazianzus (BNF, Grec 510). This allows to date the sword-guard to the last quarter of the 9th century.
The sword-guard from Cherkasy Oblast that has almost exact analogies on Byzantine drawings is an important link between monuments of Byzantine visual arts and archeological materials which proves the Byzantine origin of this type of artifacts.

Irene di Bisanzio, unica donna ad assumere il titolo imperiale maschile, è conosciuta soprattutto per aver sconfitto l’iconoclastia, riportando la Chiesa d’Oriente in comunione
con tutte le altre. Per questa ragione venne proclamata Santa e ricordata come colei che salvò l’unità del mondo cristiano. Forse non tutti sanno però che Irene fu anche e principalmente
una donna di governo e di guerra, che non esitò a uccidere il figlio e altri nemici politici per perseguire quello che riteneva
essere il bene dell’Impero. Una donna di potere e di fede che può essere compresa a fondo solo prescindendo dalla mentalità moderna e cercando di interpretare lucidamente
una società estinta, quale quella bizantina.
Nicola Bergamo, dottorando presso l’EHESS di Parigi, racconta in questo libro la vita di un’imperatrice, Santa e madre figlicida.