Middle East Politics

Tο βιβλίο αυτό καλύπτει την ελληνική πολιτική στο χώρο της Μεσογείου από το 1950 ως το 2004. Το1ο κεφάλαιο εστιάζει στην ελληνική διπλωματία τη δεκαετία του 1940, η οποία περιλαμβάνει το Β Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο, τον ελληνικό εμφύλιο και την έναρξη του Ψυχρού Πολέμου. Τα κεφάλαια 2 και 3 αναλύουν τις ελληνοαραβικές σχέσεις και τη στάση της Ελλάδας στο παλαιστιανιακό ζήτημα, ενώ τα κεφ. 4 και 5 επικεντρώνονται στο κυπριακό ζήτημα, την τουρκική εισβολή στην Κύπρο και τις ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις και το κυπριακό ως το 2004 (σχέδιο Ανάν και ένταξη Κύπρου στην ΕΕ).

Η μελέτη απευθύνεται στο γενικό αναγνωστικό κοινό, που επιθυμεί να γνωρίσει την πολιτική της Ελλάδας στο περιφερειακό της περιβάλλον τον περασμένο αιώνα, αλλά και στους ειδικούς των επιστημών της ιστορίας, της πολιτικής επιστήμης και των διεθνών σχέσεων, για να εμβαθύνουν ακόμα περισσότερο σε ζητήματα ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Διδάσκοντες, φοιτητές, σπουδαστές και ειδικοί μπορούν να βρουν στο βιβλίο αυτό το απαραίτητο υλικό για να κατανοήσουν έννοιες και θέματα που σχετίζονται με θέματα εξωτερικής πολιτικής, περιφερειακών διενέξεων, ξένης επιρροής και εμπλοκής και τοπικών ιδιαιτεροτήτων

[PL]
Zdecydowana większość systemów politycznych na Bliskim Wschodzie jest sklasyfikowana jako autorytaryzmy lub reżimy hybrydowe, tj. łączące elementy demokratyczne i autorytarne. Jak dotychczas klasyczne teorie demokratyzacji nie były w stanie w pełni wyjaśnić zjawiska trwałości autorytaryzmu w tym regionie, co doprowadziło do wykształcenia się tzw. nurtu post-demokratyzacji. Niniejszy artykuł pokrótce wyjaśnia przyczyny deficytu demokracji na Bliskim Wschodzie oraz wskazuje jak model analityczny Hinnebuscha (2010, 2014), traktujący o procesach państwotwórczych z perspektywy socjologii historycznej, może przyczynić się do lepszego zrozumienia problemu. Artykuł konkluduje, że demokratyzacja lub jej brak jest reakcją decydentów politycznych na impulsy (możliwości, ograniczenia i zagrożenia) krajowe oraz międzynarodowe. Demokratyzacja jest tylko jedną z opcji, jaką dany reżim może obrać w procesie państwotwórczym, który z kolei opiera się na trzech filarach: procesie narodotwórczym, rozwoju gospodarczym oraz procesie budowania władzy.

[ENG]
The vast majority of political systems in the Middle East is classified as authoritarian or hybrid, i.e. entailing both democratic and authoritarian features. So far the classical democratisation theories have failed to explain the problem of authoritarian resistance in the region which resulted in the emergence of so-called post-democratisa-tion. This article briefly explains the democracy deficit in the Middle East and indicates how the analytical model of historical sociology of state formation, as advanced by Hinnebusch (2010, 2014), can contribute to our understanding of the problem. The analysis concludes that democratisation, or lack of thereof, is a reaction of decision-makers to impulses reaching them from both national and international environments: possibilities , constraints, and threats. Democratisation is only one of the multiple options available , which the regime can select in the state-formation process, which in and of itself is based on three pillars: nation-building, economic development, and authority-building.

While the canonical literature on oil wealth suggests that hydrocarbon windfalls encourage repressive despotism, Kuwait provides a case of an oil-rich autocracy governing instead through popular rentierism-that is, through a broad coalition of social forces, one that furnishes enduring loyalty from below while constraining abuses of state power from above. This paper provides a theoretically guided explanation for this exceptional outcome. I argue that the Kuwaiti regime's coalitional bargains originated in the pre-oil era, when domestic opposition and geopolitical constrictions compelled it to forge new social alliances at the dawn of modern statehood. This inclusionary strategy mediated the subsequent effect of oil rents, which the regime used to institutionalize its mass base with costly material and symbolic side payments. Such popular incorporation bound large constituent classes to the regime's survival, precluding the need for widespread repression. After 50 years, these coalitional bargains have also proven remarkably resilient, as social actors have continued to endorse the autocratic leadership despite economic crisis and wartime defeat.

Short of the war, the destruction, and the massive loss of life, Ukraine is in many ways similar to the Gulf crisis in which the UAE, together with Saudi Arabia, led a 3.5-year-long economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar that, like the Russian invasion, was designed to hollow out the sovereignty of a neighbouring state.

La France et l'Iran : entre attirance stratégique et rupture idéologique

Du point de vue des révolutionnaires khomeynistes iraniens, la France est un pays de type « petit Satan » (sheytân koutchik), une catégorie à mettre en perspective avec le statut de « grand Satan » (sheytân bozorg) réservé aux Etats-Unis ; pour les élites politiques de la République islamique, ce statut se justifie avant tout par le non-respect par la France de l’accord Eurodif et par le soutien de Paris à Saddam Hussein pendant la guerre Iran-Irak (1980-1988). Cette vision caricaturale de ce que représente la France et de son comportement sur la scène internationale s’inscrit en contrepoint de la perception réductrice qu’ont les néoconservateurs français de l’Iran. Selon eux, l’agressivité et l’intransigeance sont les éléments indispensables à la mise en œuvre d’une diplomatie iranienne lucide et efficace. Cette posture politique est étayée par des experts français qui réduisent l’ensemble de la politique iranienne de la France à une stratégie d’endiguement (containment) nucléaire. 

Allant encore plus loin, François Heisbourg estime que « la paix et la guerre nucléaires dans le monde dépendent de l’avenir des ambitions nucléaires iraniennes ». Ce prisme nucléaire réduit à néant toute autre proposition de définition de l’intérêt national français s’agissant des relations avec Téhéran. Les impératifs économiques, géopolitiques (stabilisation de l’Irak et de l’Afghanistan) ou de sécurité énergétique (notamment concernant le secteur gazier) ne sont donc plus des critères permettant de définir, de manière équilibrée, avec le dossier nucléaire, la stratégie française vis-à-vis de l’Iran. Il s’agit au contraire de lutter idéologiquement contre ce que Bruno Tertrais appelle « le double révisionnisme » iranien qui concernerait la Shoah et l’utilisation de la bombe nucléaire (Hiroshima). 

Cette perception réductrice des enjeux iraniens s’est plus particulièrement imposée parmi les élites politiques en France au lendemain de l’accession de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005) et de Nicolas Sarkozy (2007) à la présidence de leur pays respectif.

Dear Colleagues,‎

We are proud to bring to you the latest edition of the FORTNIGHTLY, a review of Middle East ‎business, developments and news, for the period ending 2 October 2019.‎

Some highlights of this issue include the following:‎

‎2.3  Cox Automotive Begins Israel Auto-Tech Operations

‎3.3  Dubai's Retail Sector Undergoing a Major Transformation Due to e-Commerce

‎8.3  Strauss Group Reduces Sugar in Its Milk Chocolate by 30% with No Artificial Substitutes

‎9.8  US Defense Innovation Unit Selects D-Fend Solutions' Counter Drone System

‎10.1  Israel Ranked 38th in the World for Economic Freedom

‎11.4  EGYPT:  Israel to Start Exporting Natural Gas to Egypt as Last Obstacle Is Removed

In addition, if you would like to bring to our attention any relevant Middle Eastern regional ‎development of interest, please notify me at: seth.vogelman@atid-edi.com.‎

Abstract:
Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for Award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY.

The root causes of the GCC's employment problems are interlocked – a system of national education that has largely not been competitive or well aligned with the needs of modern industry, a culture of citizens conditioned to a protective government, a public sector that is overstaffed and inefficient, and counterproductive policies in areas such as immigration and social welfare. It is also reflected in the highly distorted labour market in the region, founded on a socio-ethnic duality. In some respects the labour market is rigid, with pronounced differences in the wages for non-nationals and nationals. In other aspects it is flexible as current laws make it very easy to import or deport foreigners based on hiring/firing. This is also why“unemployment” is a national issue, for if and when a foreigner‟s work visa is terminated, he or she is obliged to return to the home country.
In the final analysis  –
• At the GCC level, the dissertation research disproves the hypothesis that growing numbers of GCC nationals have entered the private sector due to workforce nationalisation programmes, replacing foreign labour.
• The second hypothesis has been validated in that the growing mismatch between available local labour and the labour market requirements has undermined the success of Emiratisation.
• Finally, the failure of Emiratisation has been concluded while validating the hypothesis that Indian labour migration to the UAE has been vigorous despite Emiratisation.

There are more types of borders today than ever before in history. Borders of all kinds define every aspect of social life in the twenty-first century. From the biometric data that divides the smallest aspects of our bodies to the aerial drones that patrol the immense expanse of our domestic and international airspace, we are defined by borders. They can no longer simply be understood as the geographical divisions between nation-states. Today, their form and function has become too complex, too hybrid. What we need now is a theory of the border that can make sense of this hybridity across multiple domains of social life.

Rather than viewing borders as the result or outcome of pre-established social entities like states, Thomas Nail reinterprets social history from the perspective of the continual and constitutive movement of the borders that organize and divide society in the first place. Societies and states are the products of bordering, Nail argues, not the other way around. Applying his original movement-oriented theoretical framework "kinopolitics" to several major historical border regimes (fences, walls, cells, and checkpoints), Theory of the Border pioneers a new methodology of "critical limology," that provides fresh tools for the analysis of contemporary border politics.

The present monograph examines post-revolutionary Iran’s grand strategy by way of its adjustments at three key inflection points. The first spans the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the collapse of the bipolar order and the First Gulf War, along with internal structural changes following Ayatollah Khomeini’s death (1988-91). The second inflection point encompasses the events of 11 September and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (2001-3). The third corresponds to the more recent Arab uprisings and the increasing internal and external pressures Iran faced over its nuclear program (2011-15).

Given the epistemic challenges inherent in any reckoning of intentions or ends, as opposed to capabilities or means, a strict focus on the notion of ‘grand strategic adjustments’ instead permits an empirically-grounded analysis of grand strategy as opposed to a more sweeping but potentially speculative reading. In examining these inflection points, the author adopts Neoclassical Realism as a theoretical framework to structure the narrative, furnishing a systematic account linking systemic pressures and incentives (independent variable), via domestic filters (intervening variables), to final outcomes or grand strategic adjustments (dependent variable). Given the prominence and predominance of ideas and the structure of rule in the Islamic Republic, the focus of domestic factors specifically falls on the ‘ideational-constitutive’ (national identity, regime ideology, status aspirations and state interests) and ‘institutional-competitive’ (elite interfactional bargaining) aspects.

The author concludes that while Iran’s leaders have over the decades proven the capacity to both reconcile ends and means, and identify and respond to grand strategic threats and opportunities, they have ultimately yet to transcend the vicious circle of self-manufactured challenges.

Classical geopolitical analysis comes to remind us that it is still present as a tool for decoding the interstate antagonisms as well as the global and the regional re-distributions of power. To be accurate , this never stopped happening; the post-Cold War 'neo-liberal vertigo' simply permitted many well-known fi gures of the greater academia to forget, to ignore and to doubt. The evolutions, during almost the last decade in the Greater Middle East, have made geopolitical analysis timelier than ever. The subsystem of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey is the operator of the geopolitical factor of the Islamist movement and, in these terms, it represents a main set of forces behind the pressures for redistribution of power and roles in the region. The current paper refers to the systemic geopolitical analysis to focus on Turkey's historical role in the Greater Middle East, its current ambitions and the mistakes having led its strategy to a stalemate. In this context, it is questioned which mistakes Turkey made, whether the overall neo-ottoman geostrategic policy recommendations are feasible and which elements of power are available for Turkey. Undoubtedly, power is the key towards an effective maximization of gains and a substantial increase of infl uence. For instance, Turkey's emphasis on the energy reserves of its greater region is still reasonable, while their nature itself underlines the worth of geopolitical analysis since it is identifi ed with the ontology of space and the intervening roles of group interests.

Why do Muslim-majority countries exhibit high levels of authoritarianism and low levels of socio-economic development in comparison to world averages? Ahmet T. Kuru criticizes explanations which point to Islam as the cause of this disparity, because Muslims were philosophically and socio-economically more developed than Western Europeans between the ninth and twelfth centuries. Nor was Western colonialism the cause: Muslims had already suffered political and socio-economic problems when colonization began. Kuru argues that Muslims had influential thinkers and merchants in their early history, when religious orthodoxy and military rule were prevalent in Europe. However, in the eleventh century, an alliance between orthodox Islamic scholars (the ulema) and military states began to emerge. This alliance gradually hindered intellectual and economic creativity by marginalizing intellectual and bourgeois classes in the Muslim world. This important study links its historical explanation to contemporary politics by showing that, to this day, ulema-state alliance still prevents creativity and competition in Muslim countries.

An updated history of modern Lebanon is long overdue as the
last such attempt dates from the mid-1960s. Much has happened
since and a lot of new historical material has been uncovered and
researched. The last civil war (1975–90) was the occasion for a wealth
of intellectual production on Lebanon in a variety of fi elds. Some are
remarkable path-breaking works. Nevertheless, the modern history
of Lebanon is still full of serious gaps, especially concerning the
post-Independence period. On the other hand, researchers have
extensively drawn upon European government archives, leaving
important primary sources untapped. The Ottoman archives, for
one, have been recently organised and made accessible to the public.
Unfortunately, the results of most of the research on this vast stock
are not yet available for use. Other, more recent, untapped primary
sources have been strangely ignored, such as the US State Department
Archives. Nevertheless, a number of secondary sources in Arabic,
French and English have made precious contributions to the study of
different periods of Lebanese history and various aspects of Lebanese
life. I am referring here to the works of `Abd al-Rahim Abu Husayn,
Albert Hourani, Engin Akarli, Leila Fawaz, Irene Gendzier, Michael
Johnson, Kamal Salibi, Meir Zamir, Carolyn Gates, Theodor Hanf,
Georges Corm, Wajih Kawtharani, Selim Nasr, Ahmad Beydoun,
Samir Kassir, Marwan Buheiry, Mas`ud Dhahir, Waddah Sharara, Eyal
Zisser, and others. Their contributions have enriched the present
volume in many ways.

https://journalistethics.com/
Download free at this link.

This publication is about the Deep State and pursues four core objectives.

This book: 

• Defines the notion of the so-called ‘Deep State’;
• Outlines 101 tools that the Deep State uses to achieve short-term objectives;
• Analyzes the mechanisms that the Deep State uses to pursue its arch objective;
• Synthesizes an original diagram that summarizes the Deep State’s modus operandi.

This book is written for those with zero to little knowledge of the ‘Deep State’. It analyzes credible sources that claim a Deep State apparatus exists. Much discussion is cutting-edge. The Deep State’s existence has not mainstreamed in public knowledge during pre- or recorded history.

This book synthesizes the consensus that appears in various public sources. Examples include mainstream and alternative media reports, scholarly publications and institutional documents. Discussions are Western-centric. They focus on power structures in Europe, the Near East (e.g. Israel) and the United States of America (USA). These are the core locations of Deep State bases.

This book aims to arm readers with the tools required to form their own opinions. Much language in this book unambiguously informs the audience of the author’s informed opinions. May critical readers conduct their own independent research and always draw their own conclusions.

Under Turkey’s neoconservative government, the Directorate of Religious Affairs deploys state-employed religious functionaries to provide Sunni Muslim citizens with advice and guidance on family life. By inculcating government-sanctioned sensibilities and dispositions related to kinship, these Islamic authorities have become instrumental to extending state power into the domestic lives of the religious majority. This particular entwinement of religion with state power is no aberration. Indeed, the Turkish case reveals a contradiction that lies at the heart of secular governance: the continuing involvement of religion in the politics of the family despite the assumed separation of religion and politics. Secular states may appropriate religious discourses and authority in regulating intimacy and the family while aligning these with biopolitical rationalities, as well as with secular laws and expertise. [secularism, kinship, family, intimacy, governmentality, the state, expertise, Islam, Turkey].

In her new book, Turkish-American Relations (1800-1952): Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent, Associate Prof. Şuhnaz Yılmaz of the Department of International Relations at Koç University, aims to take the reader on a fascinating journey along the intricate history of Turkish-American relations. The book critically examines how Turkish-American relations evolved from those of strangers into an occasionally troubled, yet resilient alliance. Through the extensive use of Turkish, American and British archival documents and numerous private paper and manuscript collections, the book examines Turkish-American relations from 1800 to 1952, starting with the earliest contacts and ending with the institutionalization of the alliance after Turkey’s entry into NATO. The book aims to provide a better understanding of the significant issues pertaining to Turkish-American relations, such as the impact of international developments on foreign policy decisions, the role of key figures and organizations in shaping the relations, the interaction of political, economic, cultural and military factors in policy formation, and the importance of mutual perceptions in shaping actual relations. This highly interdisciplinary study situated at the intersection of diplomatic history, foreign policy analysis and international relations, not only enhances our knowledge of Turkish-American relations for the period of 1800-1952, but also provides valuable insights for the relations during the Cold War and its aftermath, with significant implications for a turbulent region in constant transformation and change.

Patterns of Nationhood and Saving the State in Turkey tackles a  theoretical puzzle in understanding the state policy changes toward minorities and  nationhood, first by placing the state in the historical context of the international system and second by unpacking the state through analysis of intra-elite competition in relation to the counter-discourses by minority groups within the context of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.
What explains the persistence and change in state policies toward  minorities and nationhood? Under what conditions do states change their policies toward minorities? Why do the state elites reconsider the state- minority relations and change government policies toward nationhood? Adopting a comparative-historical analysis, the book unpacks these  research questions and builds a theoretical framework by looking at three paradigmatic policy changes: Ottomanism in the mid-19th century, Turkish nationalism in the early 1920s, and multiculturalism in Turkey in the early 2000s. While the book reveals the role of international context, intrastate elite competition, and non-state actors in such policy changes, it argues that state elites adopt either exclusionary or inclusionary policies based on the idea of “survival of the state.”

Die Nationalmannschaft Katars hat zum ersten Mail die Asienmeisterschaft gewonnen. Zuvor hat sie bei neun Teilnahmen an dem Turnier insgesamt nur sechs Spiele gewonnen. Hinter dem Aufstieg steht unter anderem eine intensive Nachwuchsförderung. Bei der WM 2022 im eigenen Land wollen die jungen Spieler ihren Zenit erreichen.

The essay seeks to determine how UNRWA, as a unique international investment in the welfare of one single category of refugees, has assumed these roles and reflects on their impact on the Palestine refugees and the overall Middle Eastern context. In so doing, it offers insight into the interplay of humanitarian/development operational concerns, as articulated by UNRWA, and of more normative and political interests that have underlain the stances of donor and host countries as well as those of the refugees and their representatives. In this respect, UNRWA has been a site of conflicting claims its management has had to grapple with. The two first sections trace the dynamics behind the creation and the evolution of its mandate in terms of institutional and operational development and overview the impact of its assistance programs. The third section focuses on the political dimensions attached to the concepts of “community participation” and of “protection” that UNRWA has recently mainstreamed across its various activities.

Believers say he preaches a new, modern form of Islam. Critics charge he is a power hungry wolf in sheep's clothing preparing to convert secular Turkey into an Islamic republic; a conspirator who has created a state within the state and attempted this weekend to topple democratically elected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a failed military coup.

That was not how past Turkish governments or for that matter Mr. Erdogan in his first eight years as prime minister saw Fethullalh Gulen, the leader of one of the world’s largest and wealthiest Islamic movements.

Facilitating access to asylum and other forms of refugee protection for the millions displaced by mass atrocities in Syria and Iraq is essential to the implementation of the international norm of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). This responsibility, however, has been disproportionately shouldered by several states in the Middle East and Europe. This article explores the challenges associated with refugee responsibility-sharing in the context of RtoP and draws on work in climate justice and political realism to articulate a framework for integrating culpability as a key criterion in allocating states' responsibilities to protect refugees. An empirical and normative assessment of U.S. responsibilities to protect refugees in the cases of conflict-induced displacement in Syria and Iraq outlines several potential paths of culpability. The article ultimately argues for greater attention to culpability, equity, and legitimacy within the discourse surrounding RtoP and refugee protection. The article also advocates linking the benefits of refugee responsibility-sharing with states' national interests and highlights several such links with regard to U.S. responsibilities in Syria and Iraq.

Under the Bush administration, the US has aggressively promoted democracy in the Middle East and North Africa.  By replacing repressive tyrants with moderate liberals and giving voice to hitherto suppressed social forces, US-backed democratization would drain the swamp of ideological extremism and reduce violent conflict, all while underscoring the role of America as a moral beacon of international enlightenment.  However, as this chapter argues, the project of encouraging Arab democracy faltered under a devastating self-contradiction. Democratization requires that autocratic incumbents surrender their monopolies over executive authority to legal opposition groups ensconced in parliaments and civic institutions. Yet, in the Arab world, this would likely bring into power Islamist groups that evoke fierce hostility toward Washington’s vital strategic interests. An Arab spring of democracy might thus result in a winter of discontent for U.S. policymakers bound by stringent imperatives, such as sponsoring Israeli policies and securing regional oil reserves. Such dissonance has exposed American democracy promotion as an ideological cloak for a darker agenda: paying lip service to gradual reform while quietly sustaining long-standing support for  autocratic allies. The theoretical lesson is stark: observers should expect not the imminent breakdown or even the slow erosion of Arab authoritarianism, but rather its renewed durability in an era of continuing patron-client ties.

Nicholas Blincoe’s More Noble Than War: A Soccer History of Israel-Palestine (Bold Type Books, 2019) is a beautifully narrated and written history of a century of conflict between pre-state Jews and Palestinians and Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians after the establishment of the state. It is a story that goes far beyond the history of the conflict, the mirror images of developments in Jewish and Palestinian society, and the internecine ideological infighting and power struggles within the two communities. It paints in graphic detail the incestuous and inseparable relationship between sports and politics and the importance of soccer, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, in identity and nation formation as well as nation building. It also demonstrates in graphic detail how first Jews and then Palestinians exploited soccer to first achieve international recognition of their struggles and then as nations by dispatching teams to tour other countries and being granted membership in world soccer body FIFA. In doing so, Israelis and Palestinians set an example that decades later became a key pillar of the Algerian liberation struggle in the 1950s and 1960s with the National Liberation Front (FLN)’s creation of its own national soccer team that put its fight for independence on the world map. The skeletal facts of Blincoe’s tale have long been known. The significance of Blincoe’s contribution is that he puts flesh on the skeleton by weaving the facts into a meticulously researched and reported, easily accessible narrative in which he brings key players and ideological trends to life. It’s a tale that is all fact but reads like a thriller.

Listen to the podcast at: https://dcs-b.megaphone.fm/LIT4403670488.mp3?key=ad2e7300cfe9b3f4d918bfd05eaa8bd6