Freewill, Q adar ‫ إ‬and Kasb in the Epistle ef ‫ ؛‬lasan al-Basri te ‘A bd al‫־‬Malik Feryal Salem Hartford Seminary Hasan al-Basri: His Life and Works1 bü Said b. Abi al-Hasan Yasär al-Basri was born in 21/642 and lived until 110/728. The esteem with whieh he was regarded is dem©nstrated through the extensive influence of his sermons and his fame, both during and after his lifetime. Lectures and sayings attributed to him have been quoted in numerous works which followed and the prominence of his figure as a model of piety has prompted diverse groups to claim him as adhering to their own theological and political positions. The epistle claimed to be written by ï^asan al-Ba‫؟‬rI to Abd al-Malik is an important work that has been a source of controversy among a great many studies focusing on the figure of ‫ ؛‬lasan al-Ba‫؟‬rI. The apparent advocacy of freewill in the letter has caused many to accuse him of Qadarism or ^ ’tazilism. while, yet, others deny the authenticity of the epistle altogether. A close re-examination of the epistle however, reveals far greater complexity in the theological positions maintained than a mere advocacy of freewill. This study seeks to analyze the epistle comprehensively in an attempt to more accurately understand the theological views supported in the text. A uthenticity and Content Much of the debates regarding the authenticity or lack thereof of the treatise attributed to ‫؛‬lasan al-Basrï have been based on the nature of the contents of this letter. The most prominent proponents of the epistle’s authenticity have been Ritter and Van Ess, while Wansbrough, Cook, and Mourad believe it to be a forgery attributed to I^asan 1 For biographical data on ‫؛‬lasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬rI the following sources were consulted: Shams al-DIn b. Khallikän (d. 681/1282), W afayätal-dyän wa a n b ä a b n ä al-zamäfi, ed. Ihsän Abbäs, 8 vols. (Beirut: Där al-Thaqäfa, 1968) 2:69-72. Muhammad b. Sa‘d (d. 230/845), Tabaqät al-kubrä, ed. Ihsän Abbäs, 12 vols. (Beirut: Där al-‫ ؟‬ädir, 1958) 7:156-176. Alomad b. Abd Alläh Abü Nu'aym (d. 429/1038), Hilyat al-awliyä wa tabaqät al-asfiya, ed. Muhammad al-Khänjl, 10 vols. (Beirut: Där al-Kitäb al-Arabl, 1967)2:131-61. Josef Van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und3JahrhundertH idschra: ein Geshichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam 6 vols. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991) 2: 41-50. Helmut Ritter, “Hasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬rI” in EI2, online edition. Süleyman uludag, “Hasan-i-Basri” in Islam Änsiklopedisi, (Istanbul: Maarif Matbasi, 1941-). © 2014 Hartford Seminary. DOI: 10.1111/m uw o.l2039 198 F r e e w i l l , Q a d a r ., A ND ‫ه‬ IN THE E p i s t l e o f ^ ï a s a n a l - B a $ r i t o A bd a l-M a lik al-Basrl.2 Others have argued that the letter Is distinetly ^ ’tazilite in its eutlook.^ The various positions taken on the authenticity of this letter are in great part derived from the nature of the contents of the epistle itself. This study seeks to demonstrate that a re-examination of the epistle’s discussion on freewill and determination as well as a greater emphasis on the analysis of the concept of kasb which is prevalent in the epistle, will offer a nuanced perspective on the nature of the contents of the epistle itself. The significance of a closer examination of the contents of the letter to discussions regarding its authenticity as well as wider implications regarding the development of early Islamic theology will he further discussed in the conclusion of this analysis in light of the study presented on the contents of the letter. For the sake of brevity and clarity in presentation, Hasan al-Basrl will he referred to as the author of the epistle throughout this analysis. Main Arguments o f the fitte r The style of presentation of this letter is similar to that of a religious sermon or khutba. Much of the letter is composed of quotations from the Qur’an followed by relevant ' related to the relationship between these verses and the concepts of freewill, qadar, and kasb4 tts style raises the possibility that this letter was intended to be conveyed orally, possibly by being read to the caliph or another subsequent audience. Because the contents of this letter are decisive in the debate regarding I^asan al-Basrl’s theological views, a systematic study of the letter will facilitate a more profound understanding of what the views conveyed in foe letter actually are. In an attempt to engage in a clear and thorough examination of the entirety of foe epistle, I have adopted the following schema in my presentation of fois study. First, foe entire letter has been divided into segments which summarize foe main argument within each segment. This system is intended to ensure that foe entirety of foe letter is taken into account in foe commentary that follows and to also aid foe reader in following foe * of foe many tangential arguments he makes in a letter that may be characterized as difficult to follow at times. After this somewhat tedious, but essential 2 This topic is discussed in the following sources: Michael Cook, Early Muslim Dogma: A Source Critical Study, (Cambridge University Fress, 1981) 117-23; Helmut Ritter, “Studien zur Geschichte der islamischen Frömmigkeit, I^asan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬ri,” Der Islam 21 ( 1933), 1-83; Suleiman Mourad, Early Islam Between Myth a nd History: al-Hasan al-Basrt (d.llOH /7 2 8 CE) and the Formation ofH is Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship (Leiden: Brill, 2006) 161-239; John Wansbrough, Q uranic Studies: Sources and Methods o f Scriptural Interpretation, (Oxford: Oxford University Fress, 1977) 160-3; Josef Van Ess, Theologie u nd Gesellschaft im 2. Und 3 . Jahrhundert Hidschra (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991- 97 ) 2 : 46-50. 3 Cf. Michael Schwarz, “The Letter of riasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri,” Oriens 20 ( 1967), 15-30. 4 The discussion in the epistle appear to define freewill as the freedom to choose one’s own actions. Similarly, qadar is defined as God’s determination of events and kasb is the ac(}uisition of punishment ٠ ٢ reward based on the merits of one’s actions. The nuances and subtleties associated with this term as well as that of qadar and will be discussed further within this study. 2014 Hartford Seminary. 199 T h e M u s l im W o r l d V o l u m e 104 January/A p r il 2014 division of the entire epistle, ! have seleeted each of the references to freewill, qadar, and kasb and categorized them accordingly. Each of these categories will then be closely analyzed. Finally, it is important to note that in addition to what is arguably the original version of the epistle published by Ritter‫ ؟‬in 1933, there is also what appears to be a truncated version of this letter published by ‘Imära.^ There are also various references to the letter in Mutazilite sources.7 While a comparison of these versions is beyond the scope of this study, it appears that Ritter’s version is indeed the original version of this letter due to the relative congruency of the themes in Ritter’s version and the fluidity in the development of the arguments.^ Hence, Ritter’s edition of this epistle will be utilized in this study. A. Request from the Caliph for the C larification ofH asan al-Basrï’s Views9 This relatively short section establishes the context in which this letter is composed. According to this introduction to the epistle, the Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Malik has asked Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri to clarify his views regarding qadar. Abd al-Malik states that some unfavorable news regarding Hasan al-Basri’s discussion of qadar has reached him and he wishes Hasan to clarify his position. B. God Created Hum ans to W orship H im 10 In this section, Hasan al-Basrl initiates his discussion by establishing the purpose of hum ans as being to w orship God. After citing appropriate Q ur’anic verse, Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri argues that it is inconsistent with divine justice that God w ould create hum ans for a purpose and then obstruct them horn achieving this purpose, ?resumably, the implication is the Jabri idea of the divine decree for acts of disobedience. He then goes on to say that the fulfillment of the divine injunction of w orship requires action and not wishful thinking. Furthermore, he criticizes those w ho attribute their acts of disobedience to God. c. God Forbids Coumrittlug Evil Acts Evil is from Hum ans '1 All Good and Guidance Is from Him w h ile Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri argues that G od’s com m and to abstain from evil acts is indicative that they could not originate from Him. Furthermore, he quotes the verses which says that disbelief is reprehensible to God and argues that this too is evidence that disbelief 5 Helmut Ritter, “Studien zur Geschichte der islamichen Frömmigkeit, Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri,” Der Islam 21 (1933), 1-83. 6 Muhammad Imära, Rasäil ‘adl wa tawhid, (Cairo: Dar al-Shurüq, 1988) 77-88. 7 Excerpts of this letter and other relevant information (such as biographical references to Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri) are included in the following Mu’tazilite sources: al-Qädl Abü al‫־‬FIasan b. Ahmad Abd al-Jabbär (d. 415/1024), Fadl al-itizäl wa tabaqät al-mdtazila, ed. Fuad Sayyid, (Tunis: Dar al-Ttinisiyya, 1974) 215-24; Abti Sad al-Ma^assin b. Muhammad al‫־‬Häkim al-Jushami (d. 494/1101), Shark) Vyün al-masâil, in Rasail ‘adl wa tawhid, ed. Muhammad Imära, (Cairo: Dar al-Shurüq, i 988) 1:117-22; Alomad b. Yahyä b. al-Murtada (d. 840/1437), Kitäh tabaqät al-mutazila, ed. Susanna Diwald-Wilzer, (Beirut: Dar al‫־‬Hayät, 1980) 19-20. 8 The other letters are substantially less clear and reflect evidence of tampering and/or editing. 9 Ritter, 67. 10 Ritter, 68. 11 Ibid. 69. 200 2014 Hartford Seminary. F r e e w i l l , Q a d a k ٠A ND K a sb i n t h e E p i s t l e o f ï ^ a s a n a l - B a $ r i t o A bd a l - M a l i k cannot be due to G od’s decree since it is not reasonable that God w ould find His own decree reprehensible. ï^asan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬ri adds that disobedience comes from hum ans while guidance comes from God. D. God D oes Not Order Evtl Acts. The Ability to Do So is w ith H um ans’^ In this segment, ‫ ؛‬lasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri argues that the verse, “W hosever wills, let him believe and w hosoever wills let him disbelieve ,”٧ indicates that the freedom of Will to believe or disbelieve has been granted to humans. Had hum ans not had freewill, then the author ‫׳‬a rgues that God w ould have said, “W homever 1 will to believe will believe and w hom ever 1will to disbelieve will disbelieve.” He also cites other verses which state that God does not order evil actions. He goes on to state that God also grants humans pow er to do good or withhold from doing so. This is so that the good person deserves Heaven and the sinner deserves Hell. Following the appropriate Q ur’anic citations, ‫ ؛‬ïasan states that the final abode is a recom pense (j a z ä ) for the type of deeds perform ed in the world. E. God Inspires Humans w ith th e Ability to D istinguish Betw een Good and Evil‫'؛‬ Q uoting the verse, “By the soul and He w h o perfected it in proportion. Then show ed it w hat is corrupt for it and virtuous for it,”15 the author states that God has inspired hum ans with the ability to distinguish right from wrong. This leads to another argument supporting hum an freewill. ‫ ؛‬ïasan al-Basrï proceeds citing, “Indeed he succeeds w ho purifies it. And he fails w ho corm pts it.” He argues that if it had been God w ho corrupted the soul (i.e. through predeterm ination) then it is not reasonable that He w ould associate Himself with failure, as would be implied in this verse. This is followed by references to num erous other relevant verses and a final discussion of the acquisition of punishm ent or reward through o n e’s ow n work. F. Guidance is from God and straying is from H um ans‫؛؛‬ This is a repetition of the point m ade earlier that guidance is from God and straying is from humans. This statement is supported with the author’s quoting verses which make references to Satan and other corm pt i n d i v i d u a l s w ho lead to m an’s perdition. ‫ ؛‬lasan then argues that in the verses discussing the sin of Adam, he does not blame God for his mistake but rather himself. Had God R edeterm ined Adam’s sin, he w ould have sad, “You have predeterm ined this for m e ih ä d h ä q a d ä u k a wa qadaruka),” rather than “We have w ronged ourselves (.za la m n ä a n fu sa n â).” G. Verses C oncerning God’s Qadar Are Frequently Taken Out o f C ontext and Guidance and ^ sg u id a n ce Are Acquired by Humans^ In this section ‫ ؛‬lasan al-Ba‫؟‬rI argues that foe verse, “He leads astray w hom He wills and guides”** are used out of their proper context to support the belief that humans have an inability to control their actions. Hasan al-Basrï qualifies this verse by his assertion that 12 Ibid. 70. 13 Qur’an 18:29. 14 Ritter, 17. 15 Qur’an, 91:7-8. 16 Ibid. 71. 17 Ibid. 72. ** Qur’an, 27 : ‫ و ل‬. It is significant that the complete ending of this verse mads, “. . . Verily, God leads astray whom He wills and guides unto Himself those who turn to Him in repentanee.” w hat appears © 2014 Hartford Seminary. 201 T h e M u s l im W o r l d V o l u m e 104 J anuary/A p r il 2014 while guidance and misguidance are ultimately determ ined by God, this determination is acquired through action. He then cites relevant verses which specifically make mention of G od’s guidance and lack thereof being based on individual actions. H. H asan al-Basri cla rifies that He D oes n ot D eny the Verses Related to Q a d a r but Asserts that th ese Verses need to Re Viewed in R elation to o th er Relevant Verses19 It is important that Hasan al-Basri emphasizes in this segment of the letter that he does not deny qadar. After quoting the verse, “For him among you w ho will go straight. And you will not will except that God, the Lord of the worlds, wills,”20 Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬rI responds by saying, uSadaqa Allah. ”He adds that one € ‫ ا ﻫ ﺂ آل ﻟ ﺔ‬properly understand the intended meaning in the Q ur’anic verse without looking at it in relation to other verses.21 He quotes relevant verses which state that God wishes to guide hum ans and turn towards them (yatüha ،alaykum ). l^Iasan al-Basri interprets these verses to mean that G od’s will to guide humans precedes the will of individuals to seek guidance. The implied logic is that hum ans have the freedom to choose or not to choose belief (imäri) in God, since He does not prevent or force this belief upon humans. 1. There is a D istinction Between Events w h ich Hum ans are Granted C ontrol Over by God and o th er Events w h ich God D oes Not Grant Hum ans C ontrol Over22 There are events w hich are under hum an control and acquire either punishm ent or reward. Likewise, there are events which are determ ined by God and hum ans have little or no control over. The occurrences that are under hum an control are those which God holds hum ans accountable for. w hile God does not punish hum ans for those occurrences they cannot control, flasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬ri regards this distinction to be evident in the case of the adulterer w hom God punishes for the sin of adultery, but not for foe child born out of wedlock. G od’s holding the sinner accountable for the sin but not the child w ho is born indicates that God does not hold humans accountable for that which they possess no control over. In this case presented by flasan, the sin is freely committed by the individual but the child is born out of divine will independent of hum an control. j. More Exam ples o f the D lstinetion Betw een Events In w h ieh Hum ans Are Granted Freedom o f Action and Events w h ich God D eterm ines and th e Misunderstanding o f Related Qur’anic R eferences2‫؛‬ flasan al-Ba‫؟‬r! continues his distinction of events freely acquired and those predeterm ined by God in his analysis of the pertinent Q ur’anic verses which discuss qadar. He asserts that the verse, ،،No disaster befalls in the earth or in yourselves except that it is in a book before We bring it into existence. Surely that is easy for G od,”24 is to be conveyed by the author in this section is that this verse is not only used out of proper context, but is also selectively quoted by those who oppose freewill. ‫ و ا‬Ritter, 73. 20 Qur’an, SI: 28-9. 21 This method of using Qur’an to explain Qur’an ( tafsïr al-quran hl al-quräfi) is common throughout the epistle. 22Ritter, 74. ‫ص‬Thirl- 74. 24 Qur’an, 3 7 2 2 ‫؛‬ 202 2014 Hartford Sem^ary. F r e e w i l l , O fiD A R , A ND K a s b i n t h e E p i s t l e o f H a s a n a l - B a s r i t o A b d a l - M a l i k misused by som e to m ean that God R edeterm ines “disbelief, belief, obedience, and d is o b e d ie n c e .H a s a n writes that this is not the case with these R rticular hum an actions. He lo in ta in s that the above-m entioned verse refers to calamities, misfortunes, and blessings which happen to an individual during his life. Humans are in this way tested with divinely determ ined difficulty and ease in order to assess their ability to respond to them in a way that will lead humans to guidance. The verses on the rewards of patience are quoted which are indicative that there are events which are divinely decreed and there are appropriate reactions which are not decreed but freely chosen by humans. Had this not been the case, then God would not urge humans to exercise patience in the occurrence of these events since he would have already predeterm ined their actions. The argument is further established with the same type of reasoning. K. God is More Just than to “Create a Man Blind th en Command Him to See” and More M isused Verses from th e Qur’an^ fïasan al-Basri resumes his argument for hum an freewill by appealing to elements of divine justice. He malees the argument that God is more just than to create a man blind and then order him to see. The analogy is that God similarly would not predeterm ine that specific individuals w ould disobey Him, and then command them to obey Him and punish them for a failure to do so. This example is then immediately followed by the quotation of the verse, “Some of them will be w retched and others will be blessed.”^ According to Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri, the previous analogy cited makes it unreasonable that God w ould predeterm ine “in their m other’s w om bs” w ho will be wretched (shaqi) and blessed cs a id ) without any effort or actions to reach these states. He further argues that had this been the case, God would not send prophets and messengers to guide humanity since their guidance or lack thereof w ould have already been predeterm ined by God. After citing relevant Q ur’anic evidence, Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri asserts that this state of being “w retched” or “blessed” are references to hum an states on the Day of Judgm ent rather than ones which an individual is born wtth.^ L. In con sisten cy on the part o f th ose w h o Assert that Sins are Predeterm ined29 Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri asserts that those w ho claim that guidance and misguidance are predeterm ined employ a double standard in their implementation of these beliefs. He writes that these individuals are careless w hen it comes to matters of religious practice, by saying their actions have been predeterm ined; but vigilant in their pursuit of matters regarding wealth and worldly benefit. He argues that despite their claim that events have been predeterm ined, the same individuals still take precautions such as watering their fields, tying their camels, and locking their stores. Ritter, 74. 26 Ibid. 74. 2 ‫ ^ آ‬r ’an, 11:105. 28 Though not specifically mentioned in the epistle it is important to note that this reasoning is further justified by the fact that the beginning of the verse discussed (Q. 11:105) speeifically says that this is the state of people on “that Day,” meaning the Day of Judgment. ‫ص‬Ritter, 75. 2014 Hartford Seminary. 203 T h e M u s l im W o r l d V o l u m e 104 January/A p r il 2014 M. The M isuse o f Q uranic Verses that Specifically Refer to the Quraysh30 Hasan al-Basrï quotes the verse, “And had God willed He w ould have gathered them together on true guidance, so be not one of those w ho are ignorant,”3* saying that this segm ent of the verse is taken out of context once again. He argues that this verse is actually G od’s censuring the Quraysh for their rejection of His Prophet and the hardship which they caused him. He adds that this verse is understood in light of another verse, “So that you might grieve yourself to death in their trail, if they do not believe in this d is c o u r s e .H e continues by saying that rather than the predeterm ined disbelief they attribute to the verses, a more comprehensive analysis of the collection of the verses discussing matters related to the Quraysh indicates the contrary. He quotes, “And had your Lord willed, those on the earth w ould have believed all of them together. So will you then compel m ankind until they becom e believers,”3^ saying that this verse unequivocally indicates that had God willed to force upon a people obedience to Him, He could have but does not do so. Rather, God wishes to try them in order to recom pense them in accordance to their deeds . ٢ N. O bedience and D isobedience Are Not U ncontrollable Traits Such as H eight and Skin Color35 l^asan al-Basrï resumes his discussion of freewill by arguing that those w ho advocate ja b r also misconstrue certain Q ur’anic verses to mean that God has predeterm ined a group of individuals destined for Hell and there is nothing they can do to avoid it. While He has predestined a group to Heaven and there is nothing they could do that w ould change their fate. He likens this belief to other physical traits which individuals have no control over such as height and skin color. He writes that the abominable or com m endable states referred to in these verses are in fact the result of w hat one has earned with his freely chosen actions. ‫ه‬. Refutation o f the Argum ent that God’s Prior K now ledge o f Events Causes Events to be Unalterable^ The author writes that some argue that God omniscience is the factor which causes all events to be predeterm ined and thus unchangeable. ^ïasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬rï contends that the people of disbelief claim that they have no control over their disbelief since G od’s prior know ledge of their sin prevents them from having faith. Hasan refutes this by first stating that such a notion is antithetical to G od’s justice laid out in the Q ur’anic verse, “God does not charge a soul with more than it can bear.”37 He then adds to the argument by quoting other Q uranic verses which depict G od’s knowledge of potential events that w ould take place w ithout Khidr’s interference (which God also knew w ould occur), and w ere changed due to his actions. In addition, I^asan cites the 30 Ibid. 76. 31 Quran, 6:35 32 Quran, 18: 6. 33 Qur’an, 10: 99· 34 The epistle reads, “Akhbaranä Allah ‘a n qudratihi wa In law sh a a an yajburahum ‘alä al-taati lakäna qädiran . . . wa innam ä aräda an yabtaliyahum li-yukäfl kullan ‘aid ‘a malihi. ” 35 Ritter, 76. 36Ibid. 77. 37 Qur’an, 2: 286. 204 © 2014 Hartford Seminary. F r e e w i l l , Q a d a r ^ a n d K asb i n t h e E p i s t l e d e H a s a n a l - B a s r i t o A bd a l-M a lik dishonesty of those w ho told the Prophet Muhammad that they could not accompany him in battle, while God knew that they w ere lying as portrayed in the verse, “Had it been an immediate gain or a m oderate journey they would have followed you, but the distance seem ed too far for them. ‘Yet they still swear by God: If w e had been able we w ould surely have set out with you.’ They destroy themselves and God knows they are liars.”38 Thus the epistle argues that G od’s prior know ledge of events is not related to the choices hum ans make since he is aware of these as w ell . ‫و آ م‬ P. Ail is from God40 ^ a sa n al-Ba‫؟‬rI emphasizes in this section, that he does not reject qadar. He quotes the Q ur’anic verse w hich states that if some of the Quraysh w ere to be afflicted with hardship, they w ould attribute it to the Prophet while if they were afflicted with good fortune they w ould attribute it to God. Hasan al-Basrï finishes the verse by saying, “all is from G od.”41 It is important to distinguish that what is being specifically referred to here are worldly hardships {diq a l-m a tsh a wa m ashaqqat al-abdän aw ju d ü b ä t al-ard aw naqs f t al-harth wa al-nasl),42 rather than acts of disobedience which he m ade reference to earlier. ^lasan al-Basrï also discusses the verses regarding the Prophet Noah’s preaching to his people. He states that the references to their disbelief and punishm ent are after they have freely chosen to disobey God and that it w ould be inconceivable that God w ould send a Prophet to preach to his people if God had already predeterm ined that they will not believe in his Messenger. Q. Guidance and M isguidance Come from God but they Are Acquired through O ne’s A ctions43 ^lasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬rï makes a distinction here betw een disobedience and misguidance as well as betw een obedience and guidance. He writes that obedience and disobedience are freely committed actions but guidance and misguidance are determ ined to be granted by God in accordance with the merits of these freely committed actions. This is an important section which has been translated in this study and will be analyzed in greater depth. R. Final clo sin g Argum ents in Support o f Freewill·“ ^lasan al-Ba‫؟‬rï utilizes the last lines of his epistle to make his final arguments supporting hum an freedom of choice in their ow n actions. He writes that it w ould be illogical for God to send Prophets calling humanity to leave disobedience and follow God’s path had hum ans lacked control over their actions. ^lasan al-Ba‫؟‬r! quotes various Q ur’anic verses which call humanity to obedience and declares the absurdity of the claim that God has m ade hum ans incapable of w hat He has com m anded them in the Q ur’an to do. Qur’an, 9: 42. 39The distinction he makes between God’s knowledge and God’s power will be examined in depth below. 40 Ritter, 78. ‫ ״‬Qur’an, 4:78. 42 Ritter, 78. Examples given here are paucity in earnings, misfortunes in one’s health, desiccation of the ground, as well as the deficiency in crops and progeny. 43 Ritter, 79. 44 Ibid. 81-2. ‫ﺀ‬ 2014 Hartford Seminary. 205 T h e M u s l im W o r l d V o l u m e 104 January/A p r il 2014 in . The Relation Betw een Freewill, Qadar, and K asb in the Epistle Much of the discussion concerning i^asan al-Basrl’s views have revolved around his advocacy of freewill and the implication of his position within the larger framework of the theological views of other important Muslim figures. However, such an analysis would lack accuracy if it fails to examine the contents of the epistle in a comprehensive manner that also takes into consideration the references to qadar and kasb in the epistle. A closer analysis of the reasoning in the epistle reveals a more nuanced theological vision that combines all three elements of freewill, qadar, and kasb. A. Freew ill in th e Epistle Upon a cursory reading, flasan al-Basri’s advocacy of freewill, or the freedom of humans to chose their ow n actions, is most apparent and unam biguous to the reader. He begins his arguments supporting freewill by saying that God commands hum ans to worship Him, and that God w ould not make an injunction upon hum ans and then prevent them fulfilling His com m and by decreeing otherwise. Hasan argues that such an injunction w ould be contrary to the Q ur’anic references to G od’s divine justice.^ He adds that the Q ur’anic verse, “Do w hat you will”^ w ould say “do w hat I have determ ined for you,” had deeds been predeterm ined and uncontrolled by hum ans.^ Similarly, he says the verse, “W hosoever wills, let him believe and w hosoever wills let him disbelieve,”48w ould read, “W hom soever I will may believe and whom soever I will may disbelieve,” had God been the one predeterm ining hum an acts.49 He then proceeds to compare the two verses in the Q ur’an which discuss the relationship betw een a m r (G od’s command) and qadar5‫ن‬° After quoting the verse, “And the com m and of God is a decree determ ined ika n a am rullahi qadran m aqdüräy*1 he cites, “And w hen they commit indecency, they say ‘We found our fathers doing it and God has com m anded us to do it.’ Say: ‘God never commands indecency ( inna Alläha lä y a m u r u bi al-fahshài). Do you say of God what you know not?’ ”52 By demonstrating where qadar and a m r are equivalent in the Q ur’an, fíasan argues that God does not predeterm ine wrong actions since the Q ur’an states that God does not com m and indecency {inna Alläha lä y a m u r u bi al-fahshai) and this com m and is also his qadar, which w ould in turn m ean that God does not predeterm ine indecent acts of disobedience either. He utilizes similar logic in his reference to the verse 45 Ibid. 68. ‫ ه‬Qur’an, 41:40. It appears that the knowledge of the context of the entire verse describing foe consequences of good and bad deeds is assumed. This is significant because it strengthens his argument. The entirety of the verse reads, “Verily those who turn away from Our signs are not hidden from Us. Is he who is cast into Hell better or he who comes secure on foe Day of Judgment? Do as you will. Verily, He is the All-Seer ( 1hasir) of what you do.” ٠ Ritter, 69-70. 48 Qur’an, 18:29. ‫ص‬Ritter, 70، ‫؟‬٠ Ibid. 70. 51 Qur’an, 38 :‫ و و‬. 52 Qur’an, 7:28. 2 2014 © 6 ‫ ه‬Hartford Seminary. F r e e w i l l , Q a d a r , AND K a s b i n t h e E p i s t l e d e I^ Ia sa n a l - B a s r i t o A bd a l-M a lik which discusses the soul or ego, “He is indeed successful w ho purifies it and he is indeed at a loss w ho corrupts it.”‫ و؟‬fïasan ’s argument that had it been God that corrupts hum an souls, He w ould not be referring to Himself as being “at a loss,” is one of his most cogent arguments that strengthens Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬r i’s argument in support of freewill. This is followed by one of his m ore famous heew ill arguments in this letter. Namely he com pares the notion of God predeterm ining o n e’s actions to a blind man w ho is created blind and then com m anded to see.^ Similarly, ^ a sa n al-Ba‫؟‬ri argues that ^ o d is more just than to predeterm ine the sins of hum ans and then com m and them to act righteously w hen they have no ability to do so. Finally, the rest of the arguments in support of freewill revolve around related Q ur’anic verses and how they are either misused or w ould be deem ed illogical if God had predeterm ined hum an actions. The former line of reasoning refers to the verse, “Some am ong them will be w retched and others blessed (;wa m inhum sh aqi wa sa id ).”55 He proceeds saying that his opponents claim that God created hum ans either w retched or blessed in the wom bs of their mothers, with the w retched unable to becom e blessed and the blessed unable to becom e wretched. Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri rejects this interpretation based on two premises. First, he argues that had this been the case, there w ould have been no point in God sending prophets to call people to God, since their religious standing had already been predeterm ined before birth. Second, he writes that those w ho use this verse to justify the predeterm ination of hum an actions do so out of context, fïaasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri cites the verse almost directly preceding it saying, “That is the Day for w hich humanity will be gathered together, and that is the Day that will be w itnessed,”^ and the first part of the same verse, “The Day it comes, no soul shall speak except with divine perm ission”^ to demonstrate that this “w retched” or “blessed” state is a reference to hum ans in the Day of Judgm ent rather than a predeterm ined disposition. Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri concludes his epistle with final arguments in support of freewill by quoting various Q ur’anic verses which exhort humans to do good and writes that the many verses he cites w ould have no relevant meaning had humans not had a choice in their actions. For instance he cites, “So believe in him it is better for you (fa -ä m in ü khayran lakum ) ”58 and contrasts this with his opponents’ claims that they have no choice w hether to believe or not.^ Similarly he cites, “Compete with one another in hastening towards forgiveness from your Lord and Faradise (säbiqü ilä maghfiratin m in rabbikum w a ja n n ä tin )”6° and says the “ignorant folk” claim they are unable to compete. While the Q ur’an also asks, “W hat is the matter with them that they believe not?”^ and 53 Qur’an, 91:9-10. ‫ ؛ و‬Ritter, 74. 55 Qur’an, 11: 105. 56Qur’an, 11:103. Q u r ’an, 11: 105· 58 Qur’an, 84:20. 59Ritter, 82. 66 Qur’an, 57: 21. 61 Qur’an, 84: 20. 2014 Hartford Seminary. 207 T h e M u s lim W o r l d ٠ V o l u m e 104 January/A p r il 2014 Hasan al-Basri says those w ho are in error respond, “it is because God has obstructed them from guidance and placed them into disbelief. B. Q a d a r in the Epistle flasan al-Basri’s advocacy of freewill, is relatively clear and undisputed, w h a t has received far less attention is the way in which qadar is described in the epistle. Although the references to qadar are far less frequent than references to free will and kasb, it is nevertheless essential to note that Hasan al-Basri does not reject qadar in this epistfe, as many Qadaris are charged with but rather qualifies his understanding of G od’s determ ination of events within a more sophisticated framework. In his reference to qadar ‫ إ‬flasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri distinguished betw een w hat he deems to be uncontrollable circumstances and controllable hum an actions/^ He begins his argument by referring to the verse, “No calamity occurs on earth, or to yourselves but is in a decree before w e create it. That is easy for God. So that you might not sorrow over w hat eludes you nor exult over w hat comes to you.”64 He specifically cites the segment, “So that you might not sorrow over w hat eludes you nor exult over w hat comes to you,” and says “w hat eludes you” and “w hat comes to you” cannot possibly be referring to faith, flasan al-Ba‫؟‬rl appeals to fee reader’s com m on sense by asking: if one is not to sorrow over the loss of faith and rejoice over its gain, then what other loss could be more sorrowful and w hat other gain could be m ore joyous to a believer? He develops his argument further by citing another verse ‫؛‬٢٠^ the Q ur’an that specifically instructs humanity to rejoice over the favor and mercy of God rather than material gains, flasan al-Basri argues that the verse, “Let them rejoice in the favor and mercy of God, that is better than w hat they amass,” clearly contradicts a predestinarían interpretation of the previous verse, which says that God com m ands hum ans to not rejoice in these same spiritual resources of faith and G od’s favor. Hence following this reasoning based on Q ur’anic exegesis through Q ur’an (,tafsïr al-Q u rä n bi a l-Q u rä n ), the references to G od’s determination in these verses are alluding to the determ ination of material gains and losses rather than spiritual ones of faith and divine favor. W hat is significant to our analysis here is that Hasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬rl asserts that certain events are in fact determ ined by God. The events, in this specific context, that are referred to as dictated by qadar are material w ealth ( rizq) and its like. This understanding of qadar w here a distinction is m ade betw een uncontrollable occurrences and controllable actions is encountered again in the epistle. After citing, ،،We have created many of the jin n and hum ans for Hell. They have hearts w herew ith they understand not, and they have eyes w herew ith they see not, and they have ears wherewith they hear not,”65 Hasan al-Basri writes that this verse is commonly m isinterpreted to mean that God has predeterm ined a group to put in Hell and predeterm ined a group to be put in Heaven without any ability for these individuals to change their states. He compares this inability to change o n e’s final abode of Hell or Heaven to the predeterm ined creation of human 62 Ritter, 82. 65 Ibid. 74-5. 64 Qur’an, 57:22-5 (Mä asäba min m u sïb a tin fl al-ardi wa lä ß a n fu sik u m illäßkitäbin min qabli an nabrdahä. Innä dhälikdala Allähi yasïr. Likaylä ta su a lä m äfätakum wa lä tafrahü bimä atäkum 65 Qur’an, 7: 179. 208 © 2014 Hartford Seminary. F r e e w i l l , Q a d a r ., A N D K a s b i n t h e E p i s t l e d e H a s a n a l - B a $ r i t o A b d a l - M a l i k physical features. Hasan al-Basrï writes that this is similar to the way which an individual w ho is short is unable to becom e tall and how an individual w ho is black is unable to becom e white. Thus what w e see here is an affirmation that physical features, in addition to w ealth as m entioned earlier, also fall under the category of events which are controlled by divine determination. In presenting his analogy betw een physical features and reward and punishm ent, Hasan seeks to m ake a distinction betw een types of events which God grants humanity control and those which he does not. In this context, w e see an allusion to the discussion of kasb, w hereby Hasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬ri argues that hum ans do have an influence over their circumstance in the afterlife (äkhira) in a way that they do not over many circumstances in this life. Fhysical appearance is described as being limited by qadar and beyond the hum an capacity to ch an g ed A similar depiction of physical features reappears during the course of ^ïasan al-Ba‫؟‬r i’s discussion of the aspects and functions of G od’s knowledge.67 The epistle states, “God knows that they harbor disbelief due their choosing it and of their following their desires. They com pare this to w hat God knows regarding w hat they will achieve of [physical] height, shortness, form, color — all of which God knows that they have no m eans to alter. This [assumption] is false because [physical] height, shortness, form, and color are [of what] God has done to hum ans and they are offered no choice nor do they possess pow er to change them .’ This distinction betw een controllable and uncontrollable events is an essential theological concept in this epistle. As will be clarified in his discussions of kasb, the epistle argues that many events, such as material circumstances, arc determ ined by God without any ability to be altered by humans. This is while hum ans possess control over other events, such as their own actions. This distinction is essential to understand w hat is m eant in the example i^asan al-Ba‫؟‬ri gives of the adulterer. In this example, he mentions that the adulterer is punished for the sin of adultery but not the child which may be born out of it.69The logic in the exam ple above is that the actor has control over the sin of adultery but does not have control over a child which may be born as a result. This example in the epistle is key to revealing flasan al-Ba‫؟‬r i’s understanding of qadar. He believes that God punishes hum ans for actions which they have the capacity to freely choose and does not question hum ans regarding actions they possess no control over. Therefore, anything that hum ans will be called to account for is based on actions dictated through fteewill, and anything they are not called to account for are is based on events dictated by qadar. 1t is also significant that ‫ ؛‬lasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬ri specifically m entions that he does not deny the verses on qadar. ‫؛‬iasan refers to the verse: “And w hoever amongst you wills to walk straight. And you cannot will unless God, the Lord of the worlds, wills”"‫ ؛؛‬by saying “Sadaqa Allah.”11 He explains that this m eans that hum ans could not be guided had God not wished goodness to humanity in the first place. He cites as evidence of G od’s good Ritter, 76. 67 Ibid. 77. 68Ibid. 77. 69 Ibid. 74. 76 Qur’an, 81:28-9· 71 Ritter, 73. © 2014 Hartford Semtnar>'. 209 ‫ط‬ . M u s lim W o r l d V o l u m e 104 January/A p r il 2014 will: “God intends for you ease and He does not wish to make things difficult for you , ’ ‫ص‬ and, “God wishes to make clear to you and show you the ways of those before you and accept your repentance. God is All Knowing, all Wise.”^ Accordingly, I^asan al-Ba‫؟‬r!’s argum ent is that God wishes for all of humanity to be guided but does not force this guidance upon them .74 In addition, he reminds the reader of the verse: “And if some good reaches them they say, ‘This is horn G od,’ and if some hardship befalls them they say, ‘This is from you [Muhammad].’ Say: All things are from God. So what is the matter with these people that they understand not?”75 flasan then proceeds to criticize those w ho believe the statement, “all is from G od,” to include their wrong actions by declaring that they take this verse, as many others, out of its proper context. He writes that this verse is referring to the hypocrites (■m unäfiqün ) w ho used to attribute losses to the Prophet. Hasan al-Basri writes in response to this, that once again all material gains and losses ( rizq) come from God. He also specifically criticizes w hat he perceives as double standards among individuals w ho take precautions with protecting their material wealth (such as locking their shops and watering their crops) and do not take similar precaution in matters of faith.^ It is this type of adherence to qadar which the author of the epistle objects to, rather than across-the-board denial of G od’s determination of events. Finally, Muslih BayytimI makes a useful classification of the actions described in foe epistle. He writes that the epistle categorizes actions into one of three categories. The first, are events hum ans have no control over and are entirely predeterm ined by God, such as physical appearance and lifespan. The second category, are events humans have partial control over in terms of limited influence, examples of this are traits which are inherited and control o n e’s environment. The third, are events that humans are granted full control over such as actions and all that hum ans are held accountable for in the eyes of God.77 In summary, w hat we see in this epistle is that Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬rI does not deny qadar p erse, but rather makes a distinction betw een occurrences which humans cannot control and those which hum ans do have control over. As will be discussed below, it w ould be inaccurate to classify the hum an actions hum ans can control to be beyond G od’s pow er either, since the epistle explicitly describes freewill as an ability that is divinely granted in the first place. For a more profound understanding of I^asan al-Basri’s perception of freewill and qadar are linked, foe num erous references in the article to kasb must be ex a m in e d - 72 Qur’an, 2: 185. 75 Qur’an, 4: 26. 74 Ritter, 76. In fois discussion which appears later, Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬rï specifically argues with reference to the verse: “And had your Lord willed, those on the earth would have all believed. So will you then compel humanity, until they become believers? (Qur’an, 1 9 9: ‫ ”) ه‬that it is in God’s power to force guidance upon all of humanity but the Qur’an states that God does not do so in order to reward each individual in accordance with their deeds. 75 Qur’an, 4:78. 7 ‫ة‬Ritter, 75-6. 77 Muslih Bayyümí, al-Hasan al-Basrïmin ٠am äliqatal-fikrwa al-zu h d iva al-daw afîal-Islâm , (Cairo: Maktabat Nahçla al-Misriyya, 1980) 331. 210 © 2014 Hartford Seminary. F r e e w i l l , Q a im r .٠ AND K a sb i n t h e E p i s t l e d e H a s a n a l - B a $ r i t o c. A bd a l-M a lik K asb in the E pistle Considering that freewill and qadar are commonly presented as being concepts antithetical to one another, it must be asked, if this epistle is intending to promote freewill, as asserted by some scholars, then w hat accounts for the explicit affirmation of qadar that is exhibited in this letter? Is it possible for ^iasan ^ B a‫؟‬r i’s letter promotes both freewill and qadar? 1 propose in this study that the position attributed to l^asan al-Ba‫؟‬ri in this letter is one that neither rejects freewill, nor qadar. Rather he appears to reconcile both of these disparate theological elements with the idea of kasb, or the acquisition of reward and punishment, guidance and misguidance, based upon the merits of freely chosen actions. In his outline of the theological debates on qadar, Watt states the following: At a later date the Ash’arites developed a theory that their doctrine — that of ‫ — أ س‬acquisition was a m ean betw een and qadar,78 ‫ س‬Jabriyya then becam e a convenient classificatory term for the purposes of heresiography like ^-B aghdädl and ^-Shahrastänl.^ While Watt rightfully recognizes kasb as a middle ground betw een doctrines of freewill and qadar, the above quote also presents an important question that must be asked before delving into the epistle’s discussion of kasb. Is the concept of kasb n ach ro n istic to I^asan al-Ba‫؟‬rI’s period and does al-Ash’a rl’s systematized discussion of the concept kasb preclude the possibility of this having been an idea existent well before his period? w h eth er or not the theological concept of ‫ أ س‬are present in the Q ur’an, is one important way to test the answ er to this question. In looking up the w ord uka sb ” in a lexicon of QLir’anic terms, it can be found that there are in fact almost twice as many references to kasb as there are to qadar. Verses such as the following occur profusely throLighout the Q ur’an: “God burdens not a person beyond his ability. He gets reward for that which he has earned and is punished for that which he has earned Qahä m ä kasabat wa ‘alaybä maktasabat),80 “That God may requite each person according to w hat he has earned, God is swift in reckoning ( liyujäziya A lläbu kulla nafsifi πια kasabat in n a Aliaba sa r iu al-bisäb),”81 or “To those of you w ho wish to go forward or remain behind. Each S0L11 is held in pledge to w hat it earns (kullu nafsin bim ä kasabat rabino).”82 I have found a total of thirty eight references to the w ord kasb alone83 and this does not take into account other usages such as haqqat (deserve) that is also used to convey the same concept that reward and punishm ent are acquired consequences of actions. In light of the extensive quranic 78 Watt uses qadar here to mean freewill whereas it has been used throughout this study to mean God’s determination of events. This type of alternative usage of the term is not uncommon in works on heresiography. 7 ‫^و‬ntgom eryW att, The Formative Period o f Islamic Thought, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Fress, 1973)118. 80 Qur’an, 2: 286. 81 Qur’an, 14: 51. 82 Qur’an, 74: 37-8. 83 See Abd al-Wahld NUru Ahmad's, Al-M ujam al-mufahras // kalimät al-qurän al-karïm, (Riyadh, Dar ^-Salam, 1999) 7 ‫ﻫ ﻘ ﻞ‬ © 2014 Hartford Seminary. 211 T h e M u s l im W orld V o l u m e 104 J a n u a r y / A pr il 2014 references, not only should It not be unexpected that discussions regarding kasb would precede later Ashari theology, but rather it would arguably have been highly unusual if no discussions of the notion of kasb ever occurred earlier. Rather than regarding the Ash’aris as “inventors” of the concept of kasb, perhaps a more reasonable position is that they w ere its most persuasive proponents w hose arguments were a culmination of earlier theological debates. ‫ ؛‬tasan al-Ba‫؟‬r i’s belief that guidance and misguidance, and reward and punishm ent are acquired through action is as clear as his belief in freewill. O ne of the first references to kasb occurs in his comments on the verse, “To any of you w ho chooses to go forward or remain behind.”^ Hasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬ri interprets this verse to indicate that God has given hum ans the ability to choose their actions in order that, “the righteous deserves Heaven and the w rong doer deserves Hellfire ( li-yastahiq al-muhsinu al-janna wa yastahiq al-musi al-när).”85 He continues to say that if actions were predeterm ined as some claim, then w hy w ould God punish them or reward them for actions they did not commit. He writes that such an assumption w ould contradict the quranic statement, “In order that they may be requited for w hat they used to do.”87 w hile he is advocating freewill in this section, his argument is based on the assumption that reward and punishm ent are acquired through these freely committed actions. This is w hy he regards it as both consistent with the concept of divine justice as well as a matter of common sense that a reward or punishm ent is granted for what hum ans deserve. In addition, ‫ ؛‬lasan cites, “And as for Thamtid, We show ed and made clear to them the of truth through our Messenger, but they preferred blindness to guidance so the cry (saiqa) of disgracing torm ent seized them because of what they used to earn ( bimä känü yaksib11n).”HHHasan al-Basrï comments that they were initially guided and they w ere later led astray by w hat they deserved as a result of their “misleading desires” (istihqäqihim al-amä bi ahwàibim al-mudillä).m Furthermore, Hasan al-Basrï argues that G od’s justice prevents such a state to be placed upon anyone undeservingly. Another important element of I^asan al-Basrï’s views on kasb ’m relation to qadarand freewill is his distinction he makes betw een w rong actions (masiya) versus misguidance (daläla) and good works (taa) versus guidance ( bîdâya).90After citing the verse, “God confirms those w ho believe with a firm utterance in the present life and in the Hereafter. God leads the unjust astray and God does what He wills,”9*Hasan al-Basrï interprets this to m ean that God makes firm (in belief) w hom ever He wills as a result of their faith and righteousness (bl fmänibim wa saläbihim) and leads astray w hom He wills as a result of their rejection of the truth and animosity towards it (bi nafyihim wa cudwänihim).92 8 ‫ه‬Qur’an, 74:37. 85 Ritter, 70. 86Ibid. 70. 87Qur’an, 32: 17. 8‫*؛‬Qur’an, 41:17. 8 ‫و‬Ritter, 72. 90 Ibid. 73. 91 Qur’an, 14:27. 92 Ritter, 73. 212 2014 Hartford Seminary. F r e e w i l l , ‫وق‬/‫ﺑﻤﺆ‬ A ND K a s b IN THE E p i s t l e o f H a s a n a l - B a s r i t o A bd a l-M a lik Ho then proceeds to explain the verse, “And w hen they deviated God m ade their hearts deviate,”^ saying that this deviation of the hearts is a result of the willfal straying of the individual at first.^ The argument is developed further by his references to the following two verses w hich speak of a “justification” (,baqqat) or “deseiving” of punishm ents by humans: “Is the one against w hom the w ord of punishm ent is justified cafaman baqqa ‘alayhi kalimatu al-adhabi), will you rescue him w ho is in the fire?”95 and also, “Thus has the w ord of your Lord been justified against those w ho disbelieved that they will be dwellers of the Fire .”9‫ ة‬In the context of the discussion, Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri is referring to actions as being the determining factor which “justifies” consepuences in the Hereafter. Hence, it appears that the epistle uses the variances of the term interchangeably with those of hash to denote either a deserving or earning of punishm ent or reward. In fact, I^asan al-Ba‫؟‬rI explicitly notes after citing these verses that punishm ent became justified (or deserved) after they partook in corruption and inclined towards it.97 Thus their punishm ent was due to kasb, or their acquisition of it through freely chosen actions. As for the meaning of the verse, “No soul can believe except by the permission of G od,” I^asan al-Ba‫؟‬rI defines the “perm ission” m entioned here as an allowance and capacity to believe rather than a restriction (wa idhin takbliya faqad khallälhä wa al-imän wa jaala lahä qudra calaybi).98 As commonly seen throughout the epistle, I^asan al-Basri justifies his interpretation with a quranic exegesis derived from the Q ur’an. He writes that the logical interpretation of this “perm ission” referred to more explicitly in the verse, “We sent n Messenger except that he should be obeyed by the permission of G od,”99 is that it is divine consent rather than a restriction upon humanity’s ability to believe. He argues that this is because it is not reasonable that God w ould send humanity Messengers and then prevent people from believing in them. In other words according to I^asan al-Basrl’s perspective, the reason hum ans have the capacity to believe in the first place is because God wishes and consents that they do so. This goodwill towards humanity is not however, a factor which forces guidance or misguidance upon people without any previous actions of their own. Thus w hat w e find in this im portant section of the epistle are the main points through which freewill, qadar‫ إ‬and kasb are interconnected, flasan al-Basri emphasizes in this section that he does not deny qadar. After citing the verses which state that humans cannot believe if God does not will it, he says: “‫؟‬adaqa Alläh.”*99 But he uses other citations to support his claim that this will is an allowance for humans to believe rather than a restrictive condition w hich prevents hum ans from believing or vice versa. 9‫ لل‬Thus this free ability to believe is not a pow er independent of G od’s power, but rather 93 Qur’an, 61: 5. *Ritter, 73. 95 Qur’an, 39: 19. 96 Qur’an, 40: 6. 97Ritter, 73. 98Ibid. 73. 99 Qur’an, 4: 64. 100Ritter, 73. 101 This has been analyzed in greater depth in the section on qadar in this paper. 2014 Hartford Seminary. 213 T h e M u s l im W o r l d V o l u m e 104 January/A p r il 2014 according to the reasoning of this epistle freewill can be characterized as a privilege granted to humanity through the permission and allowance ( takhliya) of God. In looking closely at the reasoning in this discussion, it becom es clear that ‫ ؛‬lasan is not denying God as the ultimate bestower, and hence determiner, of guidance or misguidance. Rather he makes a distinction betw een ta a (acts of obedience) and hiääya (guidance). Likewise, he makes a distinction betw een m asiya (acts of disobedience) and daläla (misguidance). T a a and m a siya leads to the acquisition (kasb) of guidance or misguidance, which is ultimately granted and therefore determ ined by God. D. Translation o f the Section on K asb Finally, I will end this analysis of the epistle with a partial translation of the section of the epistle that discusses kasb in even more explicit term s.102 And from w hat they argue regarding the words of God the exalted: “So whom ever God wishes to guide, God opens his heart to surrender, and w hom ever God wishes to delude, God makes his heart constricted, congested, as if he were trying to ascend into the sky. Thus does God place a penalty on those w ho do not b e l i e v e . S o they claim in their ignorance that God has designed a [group of] people to expand their chest without any good works put forth by them and a [group of] people to constrict their chest — m eaning their hearts — w ithout disbelief (kufr) on their part, corruption, straying cdaläla), or a means for these id iv id u a ls to [fulfilling] the responsibility of obedience; while they remain in Hell for all of eternity. This is not — o com m ander of the Faithful — the case, as the ignorant misguided ones have claimed. Our Lord is more merciful, more just, and more generous than to inflict this on his servants. And how [could this be so] w hen He says: “O ne gets w hat one has earned and is responsible for what one deserves (labä m ä kasabat ‫ ﻳﺲ‬calayhä maktasabat).104‫ ״‬Verily, he has created the jin n s and the hum ans to w orship Him and w hoever from among them w ho obeys (a ta d ) w hat God has com m anded will have his chest expanded to Islam as a pre-emptive reward in this world (tbaw äban m inhu b ita a tih ifi al-äjil m in al-dunyâ) and have the perform ance of good deeds facilitated and have disbelief, corruption, and disobedience m ade heavy upon him, while in this state [which he is] he is capable of engaging in all of G od’s commands and prohibitions. In this way God has decreed for everyone w ho attains obedience his due, of [those w ho are] noble and lowly [in social stature, alike]. And he w ho abandons w hat God has com m anded from obedience, and persists in his disbelief and straying in fois world all the while being capable of proximity to God (inabd) and repentance, God makes his heart tight and constricted as if he is ascending foe heavens as pre-emptive punishm ent in this 102 Ritter, 7931. 103Quran, 6: 125. 104 Qur’an, 2: 286. It is also important to note that the beginning of this verse says, “God does not compel a soul to do what is beyond its ability.” This verse is presumably being cited to an audience who is familiar with foe Qur’an and so not only the specific reference to kasb but that of the context in which this verse appears serves to bolster the argument further as will be diseussed. 214 © 2014 Hartford Seminary. F r e e w i l l , Q a d a r ,٠A ND K a s b i n t h e E p i s t l e o f H a s a n a l - B a s r i t o A bd a l-M a lik world for his disbelief and straying Ç uqübatan lahu . . . f t ‘äjil al-dunya). And repentance is that which he is obligated and called to. In this way, God has decreed for everyone w ho has attained disbelief and corruption his due. In fact, constriction and expansion are m entioned — o Commander of the Faithful — as a mercy from Him to his servants and a warning for them from Him regarding the deeds which acquire, in accordance with His wisdom, acquire the constriction of hearts. He does not mention [these verses] to them in order to sever their hope of [causing them to] despair from His mercy and favors (fadlihi); nor to obstruct them from His forgiveness, His pardon, and His generosity if they becom e virtuous. God the most exalted has made clear in His book: “W herewith God guides all those w ho seek His good pleasure to ways of peace and He brings them out of darkness by His Will unto light and guides them in the straight w ay.”105 So ponder over it — o Commander of the Faithful — and understand. For God the exalted says: “Those w ho listen to the Word and follow the best thereof, those are w hom God has guided and those are m en of understanding.”™0 And listen to the w ords of God the exalted w hen he says: “And if only had the people of the scripture had believed and w arded off evil and had becom e of the pious. We w ould indeed have expiated from them their sins and admitted them to Gardens of pleasure. And if only they had acted according to the Torah, the Gospel, and w hat has been sent dow n to them from their Lord, they w ould surely have gotten provision from above them and from underneath their feet.”™^ The Exalted has said: “And if the people of the towns had believed and had piety, certainly w e would have opened for them blessings from the heaven and the earth, but they lied so w e took them for w hat they used to earn { fa a kh a d h n ä h u m bim ä kä n ü yaksibürï).”108 And know — o Commander of the Faithful — that God does not make matters conclusive upon hum ans ( lam y a fa l a l-u m ü r batm an calä al-'ibäd). Rather He has said, if you do such I will do unto you such and if you do such I will do unto you such,109 verily He rewards them (y u jâ zïh im ) in accordance with their deeds. Indeed He has com m anded them to w orship Him, call upon Him, and seek support from Him. ff they seek that which is from Him, they will receive assistance from His assistance and success from His success. The ^ rfo rm a n c e of good deeds and the avoidance of sin are m ade easy upon them. This is w hat God has decreed for he w ho obeys Him and seeks from that which is with him [of assistance and so forth]■ Hasan’s position that reward and punishment are acquired through kasb is conveyed most visibly in this portion of the letter. In his analysis of the verse that refers to God as expanding or constricting the hearts of humans to guidance or lack thereof, he criticizes those who believe that this divine intervention is not associated with the actions of 105 Qur’an, 5:16. 106Qur’an, 39:18. 107 Qur’an, 5: 65-6. 108 Qur’an, 7: 96. 109 This repetition is part of the original text as presented in Ritter’s publication of the letter. 2014 Hartford Seminary. 215 T h e M u s l im W o r l d V o l u m e 104 J anuary/A p r il 2014 humanity. I^asan appeals to his audienee’s sense of logic and common sense in putting forth his argument that foe assumption of eternal reward and punishment for actions that one has no control over performing would he inconsistent with foe Qur’anic principles of divine mercy, justice, and generosity (.kam m a). Moreover, he writes that this contradicts foe verse in foe Qur’an which specifically refers to kasb: “One gets what one has earned and is responsible for what one deserves (lahä mä kasabat wa ‘alayhä maktasabatX”**° Based on this analogy, ^lasan offers his own explanation of the verse stating that God creates humans and jin n to worship Him and whoever obeys God will have his chest expanded as a preemptive reward in fois life and the performance of good actions are made preferable to him. He adds that this is achieved all foe while foe individual is fully capable of participating in acts of disobedience in order that each person receives what he deserves (kadhälika hakama Allähu f i kulli m an balagha taatihi mablaghahü). He writes that the same principles hold true for foe constriction of foe heart and misguidance. I^asan’s explanation of this verse, once again provides substantial insight into several points regarding foe epistle’s vision of the dynamics of free will, qadar, and kasb. First, we see that I^asan clearly deems actions to be freely chosen by foe actor, hence his comments about an individual who obeys God while being fully capable of disobedience. Second, we see that though these actions freely performed, one acquires the consequences of these actions from God. Hence, we see foe concept of kasb in this discussion which is sealed with foe justification “that each who attains God’s obedience may receive his due.” Third, it must not be overlooked that this guidance and expansion is divinely awarded, and therefore determined by God. Thus we see that God’s qadar is not denied but rather the author of foe epistle perceives God’s qadar or determination as being derived from whatever one has chosen to do in foe world. This derivation of consequences does not implicate a delimitation of divine will but rather reflects another divine will to act with justice, as described in the Qur’an. Finally, foe distinction implied here between ta a and hidäya is pronounced more clearly in the continuation of this portion of the epistle. flasan proceeds to cite numerous Qur’anic verses which describe guidance as being attained as a consequence to both good deeds and striving for its acquisition. Hence, foe verse above states that God guides those who seek His pleasure,*** and foe verse which states those who listen to God’s word and follow it are those who attain guidance.‫ ق * آ‬In addition, Hasan cites other verses which state that if individuals had believed and avoided evil and became pious then God would have admitted them into Heaven.113This is followed by a commentary that lucidly establishes foe epistle’s position of kasb and the ‫ ״‬٠ Qur’an, 111 Qur’an, 112 Qur’an, 113 Qur’an, 216 2: 286. 5: 16. 39: 18. 5:65-6. © 2014 Hartford Seminary. F r e e w i l l , Q a d a r ., A ND ‫ﺀم‬ IN THE E p i s t l e o e H a s a n a l - B a $ r i t o ،A b d a l - M a l i k position that hidäya is acquired through taa. Hasan comments on these verses, “And know — o Commander of the Faithful — that God does not make matters conclusive upon humans Çalà al-(ibäd). Rather He says, ifyou do such ‫ ل‬will do such unto you and if you do such 1will do unto you such, verily He awards them (yujäzfbim) in accordance with their deeds . ” ‫ ص‬This is followed by his appeal to his audience to seek divine guidance and his restatement that those who strive will be directed through the divine principle to find the performance of good deeds and the avoidance of sin facilitated for them by God, “If they seek that which is from Him, they will receive assistance from His assistance and success from His success. The performance of good deeds and foe avoidance of sin are made easy upon them. This is what God has decreed for who obeys Him and seeks from that which is wkh him [of assistance and so forth].”115 IV. Concluding Remarks Hasan al‫־‬Ba‫؟‬rI’s position on foe role of human freewill with relation to qadar has been a matter of ontroversy from his own time to our present day. This examination of ^lasan al-Basrl’s epistle to Abd al-Malik reveals that a view that he supported freewill while rejecting God’s determination is neither accurate nor does it take into to account the ^ h is tic a tio n of the entirety of the epistle. Furthermore, the findings of this study indicate that a labeling of Hasan al-Basri as a Qadarite based on foe contents of this epistle would be a hasty assessment, while foe letter certainly indicates an advocacy of freewill, it must be asked whether an advocacy of freewill alone is sufficient to be accurately categorized as a Qadarite. If this were true, then a superficial reading of the Ash’arî doctrines which also contend that humans have the freewill to choose their actions would place them in the category of Qadarism. The staunchly anti-Qadarite Ash’ari theological school attach many strings to their understanding of freewill that maintain a belief in qadar, without attributing evil actions to God. The most important of these “strings” is foe concept of kasb which reconciles between the concepts of freewill and qadar. The contents of foe epistle seem to have many parallels with the theological discussions of freewill, qadar, and kasb that emerge by the Ash’arl period. Some scholars have challenged the letter’s authenticity by proposing it to be a forgery of either Qadarites or Mutazilites who wished to attribute their perspective to a highly respected early Muslim figure. However, a close reading of foe epistle challenges this view, since foe theological positions presented in fois epistle are arguably more similar to the views of foe Sunni theological doctrines (as embodied by the Ash’arites) rather than those of the Qadarites or the Mu’tazilites. If it is necessary to assume a forgery of the text, then foe contents of foe letter seem to indicate that it would be by those adhering to views attributed to later mainstream Sunni theological schools. 114 Ritter, SI. 115 Ibid. 81. 2014 Hartford Seminary. 217 T h e M u s l im W o r l d V o l u m e 104 J anuary/A p r il 2014 This analysis of the epistle supports the position that the theological views presented in the epistle are quite distinct from those of the Mu’tazilite theologians and are in fact fairly consistent with what much of the arguments of the Ash’arite schools would develop to counter the Mu’tazilites. It appears that some of the arguments that assume the existence of elements advocating freewill in the epistle necessitate a contradiction to Asha’arite theological views which assume that the Ash’arites held a position similar to the Jabrites in which they rejected freewill. This assumption, however, misrepresents Asha’rite positions on freewill and as a result leads to the conclusion that an advocate of freewill is likely an adherent of Mu’tazilite thought and in the case of the epistle, a Mu’tazilite forgery. In fact, both Asharites and Mu’tazilites held that humans have the freedom to choose their actions, w hat they differed on was whether these actions were ultimately created by God or whether humans had the power to create their actions independent of God. The Ash’aris held the former view arguing that Mu’tazilites made exceptions to God’s omnipotence by assuming humans had a power to create their own actions independent of God’s creation. The Mu’tazilites held foe former position arguing that foe A h ’arites attributed evil to God by identifying Him as foe ultimate originator of both good and evil actions. It may be argued that a more nuanced position which acknowledges foe epistle’s usage of all three elements of kasb, freewill, and determination is anachronistic due to the sophistication of these ideas and their ^ p earan ce in third century theological texts. This objection is, however, unconvincing because almost all of the arguments made in foe epistle are in fact based on qur’anic verses. Moreover, it is important to note that the notion of kasb is a distinctly qur’anic one which occurs more often in foe Qur’an than qadar, as cited earlier in this study, w hat would have been odd is if there were no early references or recognitions of these verses in foe Qur’an discussing kasb. Rather than assuming a later invention of the concepts of kasb by third century Sunni theologians, it is more reasonable that major figures such as Baqillänl and Ash’arl based their own ideas on theological arguments that developed in earlier periods and that they consolidated these ideas during a period which much of foe other Islamic sciences such as law and hadith were also being systematized. A consideration of such a perspective makes Hasan al‫־‬Basr!’s letter all foe more significant in our analysis of foe development of Islamic theology. Works Cited Bayyümî, Muslih. al-Hasan al-Basri min ,a mäliqat al-fikr wa al-zuhd wa a l-d a w a fi al-Isläm, (Cairo: Maktabat Nahda al-Misriyya, 1980). Cook, Michael. Early Muslim Dogma: A Source Cntical Study, (Cambridge University ?mss, 1981). ïmâra, Muhammad. RasaiVadl wa tawhid, (Cairo: Där al‫־‬shurüq, 1988). Abd al-Jabbär, al-Qädl Abu al‫־‬Basan b. Alomad (d. 4 2 4 ‫ ا‬5/1 ‫) م‬. Fadl al-itizäl wa tabaqät al-mütazil ed. Fu’äd S a^id, (Tunis: Där al‫־‬Tünisiyya, 1974). 218 2014 Hartford Seminary. F r e e w i l l , Q a d a r ,٠A N D K a s b i n t h e E p i s t l e o e H a s a n a l - B a s r i t o A b d a l - M a l i k al-Jushaml, Abü Sa cl al-Mahäsin b. Muhammad al‫־‬Bäkim (d. 494/ 1101). Shark ,Uyün al-masail, lu Rasäil ‘a dl wa tawhid, ed. Muhammad Imära, (Cairo: Dar al-Shurúq, 1988). Ibn Khallikän, Shams al-DIn (d. 681/1282). Wafayât al-a'yän wa a n b â abn â al-zamän, ed. 1‫ﺻأل‬ Abbäs, 8 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Thaqäfa, 1968). Mourad, Suleiman. Early Islam Between Myth and History: al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 110H/728 CE) and the Formation o f His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship (Leiden: Brill, 2006). al-Murtada, Ahmad b. Yahyä b. (d. 840/1437). Kitäb tabaqätal-mutazila, ed. Susanna Diwald-Wilzer, (Beirut: Dar al-Hayät, 1980). Abü Nuaym, Ahmad b. Abd Allah (d. 429/ 1038). Hilyat al-awliyä wa tabaqät al-asfiyâ, ed. Muhammad al-Khänjl, 10 vols. (Beirut: Där al-Kitäb al-Arab!, 1967). Nüru Ahmad, Abd al-Wahld. Al-Mujam al-mufahras // kalimät al-qurän al-karïm, (Riyadh, Dar al-Salam, 1999). Ritter, Helmut. “Hasan al-Basn” in El^, online edition. Süleyman uludag, “Hasan-i-Basri” in Islam Ansiklopedisi, (Istanbul: Maarif Matbasi, I 94 I-). Ritter, Helmut. “Studien zur Geschichte der islamischen Frömmigkeit, Hasan al-Ba‫؟‬ri,” Der Islam 21 (1933), 1-83. Ibn Sa‘d, Muhammad, (d. 230/ 843). Tabaqät al-kubrä, ed. Ihsän Abbäs, 12 vols. (Beirat: Där al-Sädir, 1958). Schwarz, Michael. “The Letter of Hasan al-Basn,” Oriens 20 ( 1967), 15-30. Van Ess, Josef. Theologie u nd Gesellschaft im 2. u nd 3■ Jahrhundert Hidschra: ein Geshichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam 6 vols. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991-97). Wansbrough, John. Q uranic Studies: Sources and Methods o f Scriptural Interpretation, (Oxford: Oxford University Fress, 1977). Watt, Montgomery. The Formative Period o f Islamic Thought, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973). 2014 Hartford Seminary. 219 ‫آلﻣﺂورلم؛‬ Copyright and Use: As an ATLAS user, you may priut, dow nload, or send artieles for individual use according to fair use as defined by U.S. and international eopyright law and as otherwise authorized under your resp ective ATT,AS subscriber agreem ent. No eontent may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the copyright holder(s)’ express written permission. Any use, decompiling, reproduction, or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a violation of copyright law. This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS eollection with permission from the eopyright holder(s). The eopyright holder for an entire issue ٥ ۴ ajourna! typieally is the journal owner, who also may own the copyright in each article. 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