Showing posts sorted by date for query MERS. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query MERS. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Tuesday, May 28, 2024

USDA: HPAI H5N1 Detected In Alpacas


 #18,087

While I was away from my desk for a few hours doing some badly needed pre-hurricane season prepping (4 new tires for the car), Helen Branswell tweeted a belated announcement from the USDA on the first detection of H5 in Alpacas. 

The statement provides little information, other than these alpacas were from a premises where HPAI affected poultry were recently culled.  
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 Detections in Alpacas
Last Modified: May 28, 2024

The National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) confirmed the detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in alpacas from a premises where HPAI-affected poultry were depopulated in May 2024. While this HPAI confirmation is not unexpected due to the previous HPAI detection on the premises, the high amount of virus in the environment, and co-mingling of multiple livestock species on-farm, it is the first HPAI detection in alpacas.

NVSL has confirmed that the viral genome sequence for these samples is the same sequence currently circulating in dairy cattle (B3.13), which is consistent with sequences from the depopulated poultry on this premises. (NVSL PCR confirmation was completed on May 16. APHIS reported the confirmation to the World Organisation for Animal Health and on the HPAI livestock website upon completion of additional gene sequencing, per APHIS policy for disease detections in new species.)

Alpacas belong the the family Camelidae, which includes 3 types of camels ( dromedary camels, Bactrian camels, wild Bactrian camels), and 4 lamoids (llama, alpaca, guanaco, and vicuña).

Camelidae - including both camels and alpacas - are known to be susceptible to MERS-CoV (see EID Journal: MERS-CoV Antibodies In Alpacas - Qatar), but less is known about their susceptibility to influenza A viruses. 

A 2022 study, Influenza A Virus Infections in Dromedary Camels, Nigeria and Ethiopia, 2015–2017, reported:

We examined nasal swabs and serum samples acquired from dromedary camels in Nigeria and Ethiopia during 2015–2017 for evidence of influenza virus infection. We detected antibodies against influenza A(H1N1) and A(H3N2) viruses and isolated an influenza A(H1N1)pdm09–like virus from a camel in Nigeria. Influenza surveillance in dromedary camels is needed.

Last year Chinese scientists reported finding LPAI A/H7N9 in Mongolian camels back in 2020 (see  ASM Journal: Characterization of an H7N9 Influenza Virus Isolated from Camels in Inner Mongolia, China), while in 2014 we saw an EID Journal report on the discovery of Equine H3N8 In Mongolian Bactrian Camel. 

Immunization of Alpacas with H5N1 has been done in a laboratory setting (see Single-Cell Transcriptome Analysis of H5N1-HA-Stimulated Alpaca PBMCs) resulting in the animals mounting a robust immune response.

As far as I can tell, however, there have been no confirmed reports of natural infection of camelids with HPAI H5 until now.  But, given H5's rapidly expanding host range, it is getting harder and harder to be surprised when a new species is added to the list..  

The dangers of mixed-species farming, where poultry, pigs, cattle, mink, and yes . . . even alpacas, can readily exchange viruses are well known (see Study: Seroconversion of a Swine Herd in a Free-Range Rural Multi-Species Farm against HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b Clade Virus ).

But whether we've got the will, or the time, to change those practices is the $64 question.   


Monday, May 20, 2024

The Lancet: Proactive Surveillance for Avian Influenza H5N1 and Other Priority Pathogens at Mass Gathering Events

image

Credit Wikipedia

 #18,069

Even though we are not currently in the midst of a COVID pandemic, mass gathering and travel events like Carnival in Rio, the Super Bowl, Mardi Gras, Chunyun (aka the Chinese New Year), the Summer & Winter Olympics, Umrah and the Hajj pose unique public health challenges not only for the host country, but for the world at large.

In all of these events - hundreds of thousands, sometimes millions - of people travel from all over the world to spend a few days or a week in a common, usually crowded, location where they can easily exchange viral and bacterial pathogens - both common and exotic - before returning home. 
 
Since many infectious diseases have relatively long incubation periods (7-10+ days), or may present mildly or even asymptomatically in some people, carriers - traveling both to and from the venue - may not be obvious.  

In a little over 3 weeks Saudi Arabia will host the Hajj, with upwards of 2 million devout expected to make the pilgrimage during the second week of June. Like many other mass gathering events, the Hajj has the potential to amplify and disperse emerging and existing infectious diseases on a global scale (see J, Epi & Global Health: Al-Tawfiq & Memish On Hajj Health Concerns).

While COVIDMERS-CoV, and Avian Flu are often the first threats that come to mind, most infectious illnesses acquired during these mass gathering/migration events are far more common; seasonal flupneumoniavector borne infections (Zika, CHKV, Dengue, Malaria, Yellow Fever, etc.), norovirus, etc (see CDC's Traveler's Health Saudi Arabia).

While these events (and over the weeks that follow) can be periods of enhanced risk, last week in The Lancet Dr. Ziad Memish et al. argued that they can also offer unique opportunities to identify, and quantify new or emerging disease risks, including HPAI H5N1. 

First the commentary, after which I'll have a brief postscript.

Proactive surveillance for avian influenza H5N1 and other priority pathogens at mass gathering events

Recurring mass gatherings at religious, sporting, or festival events have historically been the focus and sources of infectious disease transmissions1 since they serve as hubs for international spread. Advanced planning, risk assessment, and updates on guidance to countries hosting the event, and to those from which the attendees arise, are crucial for reducing risk, prevention, surveillance, and outbreak response.in2,3 Preventing outbreaks of influenza has always been on the radar of WHO 4 and of countries hosting mass gathering events.5,6,7 

In 2004, the emergence of the novel Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) virus, A(H5N1), had focused attention of Saudi Arabia's government and of WHO because of the nearly 1·6 million pilgrims from across the world expected for the annual Hajj pilgrimage at the time.5 Fortunately, there have been no major outbreaks from any mass gathering events.

Most of the human avian influenza cases reported worldwide to date, have been avian influenza A(H7N9), A(H5N1), and A(H5N6) viruses.48 Although these viruses do not currently transmit easily from person to person, the recent (April, 2024) reports of mild or asymptomatic human cases of A(H5N1)8,9,10 infections detected in the USA, China, Viet Nam, and Europe should be taken seriously by countries preparing to host mass gatherings at religious, festival, and sporting events. The first human case of influenza A(H5N1) in the USA was reported in 2022 in a person in Colorado who had direct exposure to poultry.9 In England, UK, there have been 298 cases reported since October, 2021, with four cases since October, 2023.10 

The widespread circulation of HPAI viruses in millions of birds has been driving rapid diversification with emergence of different genotypes and reassortment events. Although circulating avian influenza viruses continue to prefer avian-type receptors, sporadic mutations are being detected in infected wild birds and domestic poultry, associated with onward transmission to mammals.11

Public health preparedness and careful planning and surveillance before and during mass gathering events remain important for preventing major outbreaks, interruption of the events, or onward transmission globally after the event. Evidence of this preparedness comes from no adverse outcomes of mass gatherings at religious events held over the past decade during WHO's public health emergency of international concern of Zika virus disease, Ebola virus disease, and COVID-19 for Hajj (2015–23) and Kumbh Mela (2015, 2017, 2023). Similarly, during mass gathering sporting events, such as the Tokyo 2022–2023 Olympics, during the COVID-19 pandemic; the 2015 Africa Cup of Nations Football tournament in Equatorial Guinea during the outbreak of Ebola virus disease; and the Rio 2016 Olympics during the Zika virus outbreak.

Proactive detection and surveillance programmes need to be incorporated using the latest diagnostic platforms for the whole range of viral and bacterial pathogens (panel). The shared risk for preventing spread of zoonotic pathogens and antimicrobial resistance should be addressed jointly through a One Health approach by countries hosting mass gathering events in liaison with the quadripartite alliance of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the UN Environment Programme, WHO, and the World Organisation for Animal Health.Panel

Growing list of viral and bacterial pathogens with epidemic potential of concern at 2024 mass gathering events

Viral pathogens

WHO Blueprint Priority pathogens list
  • Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
  • Ebola virus
  • Marburg virus
  • Lassa fever virus
  • MERS-CoV
  • SARS-CoV
  • SARS-CoV-2
  • Nipah virus and henipaviruses
  • Rift Valley fever virus
  • Zika virus
  • Monkeypox virus
Other re-emerging viruses of concern
  • Highly pathogenic avian Influenza virus (H5N1)
  • HIV (antiretroviral resistant strains)
  • Non-polio enteroviruses (EV-71, EV-68)
  • Influenza A and variants
  • Dengue virus
  • Yellow fever virus
  • Rabies virus
  • Equine encephalitis virus
  • Other
Bacterial pathogens
WHO priority AMR pathogens list
Critical priority

  • Acinetobacter baumannii (carbapenem-resistant)
  • Pseudomonas aeruginosa (carbapenem-resistant)
  • Enterobacteriaceae (carbapenem-resistant, ESBL-producing)
  • Mycobacterium tuberculosis (multidrug-resistant, extensively drug-resistant, and totally drug-resistant)
High priority
  • Enterococcus faecium (vancomycin-resistant)
  • Staphylococcus aureus (meticillin-resistant, vancomycin-intermediate, and vancomycin-resistant)
  • Helicobacter pylori (clarithromycin-resistant)
  • Campylobacter spp (fluoroquinolone-resistant)
  • Salmonellae spp (Typhi and non-typhoidal; fluoroquinolone-resistant)
  • Neisseria gonorrhoeae (penicillin-resistant, cephalosporin-resistant, and fluoroquinolone-resistant)
Medium priority
  • Streptococcus pneumoniae (penicillin non-susceptible)
  • Haemophilus influenzae (ampicillin-resistant, azithromycin-resistant, ceftriaxone-resistant)
  • Shigella spp (fluoroquinolone-resistant)
  • Bordetella pertussis (macrolide-resistant)
  • Vibrio cholerae (resistant to ampicillin, nalidixic, chloramphenicol, and tetracycline)

Mass gathering events provide several opportunities to identify current risks and mitigate the transmission of HPAI H5N1. The actual burden of HPAI in the animal and human populations globally is unknown due to a lack of active surveillance. The mode of transmission of HPAI H5N1 from different animal groups and risk to humans is not fully understood.
Several knowledge gaps on H5N1 need to be filled and mass gathering events provide opportunities to address them. Because many animal products are consumed at mass gathering events and some religious rituals require live animal sacrifice, extensive screening and testing for HPAI H5N1 of poultry, the meat industry, and sacrificial animals, both local and imported, should be mandated and monitored. 

Currently, not enough testing is being done by countries across the globe. Standardised protocols need to be put in place for wastewater surveillance for detection of HPAI at any mass gathering events. Animals used at religious mass gathering events for sacrifice or consumption need to randomly be sampled and tested. Imported animals should be screened at the source or on arrival, and quarantined if tested positive to prevent spread to humans and other animals. Ultimately, the development, advancement, and scaling up of the production of a vaccine for human A(H5N1) and its variants will be crucial for preventing spread at mass gathering events.

Mass gatherings offers an opportunity to collect evidence on H5N1. Any findings could be eye-opening, particularly if H5N1 is widely present in animals given the apparently lack of human infection.

We declare no competing interests. AZ acknowledges support from the Pan-African Network For Rapid Research, Response, Relief and Preparedness for Infectious Disease Epidemics funded by the EU-EDCTP2–EU Horizon 2020 Framework Program; is in receipt of a UK National Institute for Health and Care Research Senior Investigator Award; and is a Mahathir Science Award and EU-EDCTP Pascoal Mocumbi Prize Laureate.

These are exactly the sort of things we should be doing for mass gathering events, even if H5N1 weren't in the wings.  

But, in our current climate of `Don't Test, Don't Tell' - where 90% of global COVID hospitalizations and deaths are no longer reported, where avian flu infections are often only belatedly announced (if at all), and even testing of cattle and dairy workers for H5N1 in the United States has met stiff resistance, it isn't at all clear whether the resources, or the political will, currently exists to get it done. 

But with a little less hubris, I suppose it could come in handy for the pandemic-after-next.

Thursday, May 09, 2024

WHO DON on MERS-COV Cluster In Saudi Arabia


 #18,051

While the WHO Epi curve (above) suggests that the threat from MERS-CoV - which first emerged a dozen years ago on the Arabian Peninsula - has declined since the start of the COVID pandemic, various clades of this novel coronavirus continue to circulate in camels - and occasionally spill over into humans - primarily in Saudi Arabia.

Surveillance and reporting of cases has often been lacking in the Middle East (and is nearly non-existent in Africa where the virus can also be found), leading many researchers to believe that a significant number of cases go unreported (see EID Journal: Estimation of Severe MERS Cases in the Middle East, 2012–2016).

Overnight the WHO published a DON update on a cluster of MERS-CoV cases in Riyadh, which began when the index case fell ill in late March.  Notably the index case had no known exposures to  common `risk factors' (camels, camel products, hospitals, etc.), and was not tested until after he'd been admitted to a hospital for at least two days.

The other two cases were the results of nosocomial transmission of the virus.  The index case died a day after admission to the ICU, and as of April 21st, the other two cases were still in the ICU and intubated. 

I reproduced some excerpts from the WHO statement below, including their risk assessment.  I'll have a bit more after the break.  

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus-Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

8 May 2024

Situation at a glance

The World Health Organization (WHO) was notified of three human cases, including one death, of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) between 10 and 17 April 2024, by the Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). All three cases were males from Riyadh aged between 56 and 60 years with underlying health conditions and were not health care workers. The three cases are epidemiologically linked to exposures in a health-care facility in Riyadh, although investigations are ongoing to verify this and understand the route of transmission. Since the beginning of the year, a total of four cases and two deaths have been reported from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The notification of these cases does not change WHO’s overall risk assessment, which remains moderate at both the global and regional levels.

Description of the situation

Between 10 and 17 April 2024, the Ministry of Health (MoH) of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) reported three cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), including one death, to WHO. All three cases were reported in Riyadh and linked to the same health-care facility. Two of the cases were identified through contact tracing following identification of the index case. The second and third case are suspected to be secondary health care associated cases due to contact with the index case. The investigations are ongoing to verify this and understand the route of transmission.

The index case is a 56-year-old male school teacher, and a Saudi national residing in Riyadh. On 29 March, he developed a fever, cough, runny nose and body aches. He sought medical care at the emergency room (ER) of a hospital in Riyadh on 4 April, where case number three was also being treated. He was then admitted to a ward on 4 April, where he shared a room with case number two.
On 6 April, he was transferred to Intensive Care Unit (ICU) isolation and intubated, was tested by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), and was confirmed positive for MERS-CoV. The case had underlying health conditions, including hypertension and chronic renal failure requiring hemodialysis . There was no clear history of exposure to typical MERS-CoV risk factors. Close contacts, including 20 health and care workers and seven household members, were followed up, which promptly identified the two secondary cases. Investigations, including determining the source of the infection, are still ongoing. The index case died on 7 April.

The second case is a retired 60-year-old male Saudi national, residing in Riyadh. He was admitted to the ICU at the same hospital in Riyadh on 8 March 2024. On 31 March, he was transferred to a ward, where he subsequently shared a room with the index case on 4 April. The case developed a fever on 6 April and tested positive for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR on 8 April. He has underlying health conditions including heart disease and being a smoker. With no history of exposure to camels, the case is suspected to be a secondary healthcare-associated case due to contact with the index case, with investigations ongoing. The follow-up of 13 health and care workers and one patient has been completed, with no additional cases identified to date.

The third case is a 60-year-old male, retired military personnel and Saudi national, residing in Riyadh. On 4 April, he went to the ER of the same hospital in Riyadh, where the index case was also admitted. He was then admitted to the ward (different to the one that the index case and case number two shared) on 5 April. He developed shortness of breath on 10 April and was transferred to the ICU on 15 April. He tested positive for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR on the same day. He has underlying health conditions including chronic renal failure requiring hemodialysis, malignancy, and liver disease. No history of exposure to camels was identified and, like the second case, he is suspected to be a secondary healthcare-associated case due to contact with the index case. A follow-up of 14 health care workers is ongoing, with no additional cases identified to date.

As of 21 April 2024, the second and third cases remained in the ICU and were intubated on 9 April and 18 April, respectively.

Additionally, since the last Disease Outbreak News (DON) published on 16 February 2024, one further case has been notified through IHR mechanisms with no epidemiological link to the three cases described above. The case is a 32-year-old male with comorbidities from Taif, KSA who had had direct contact with camels, he had onset of symptoms on 21 January and died on 17 February 2024.

(SNIP)

WHO risk assessment


The notification of these cases does not change the overall risk assessment. WHO expects that additional cases of MERS-CoV infection will be reported from the Middle East and/or other countries where MERS-CoV is circulating in dromedaries. In addition, cases will continue to be exported to other countries by individuals who were exposed to the virus through contact with dromedaries or their products (for example, consumption of raw camel milk), or in a health-care setting. WHO continues to monitor the epidemiological situation and conducts risk assessments based on the latest available information.

         (Continue . . . )

 

The sharp decline in MERS-CoV cases over the past five years has attributed to a number of factors, including the adoption of pandemic precautions, and potential immunity gained by COVID infection or via the COVID vaccine (see CIDRAP COVID vaccine may boost antibody response to MERS, other coronaviruses). 

But since MERS-CoV continues to evolve, and COVID-derived immunity tends to wane over time, it is unknown how long its decline might last.

While mostly theoretical, concerns that MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 might infect a common host and produce a dangerous recombinant have been given serious consideration in scientific journals, including:

Thursday, April 25, 2024

CDC: Monitoring For Signs Of Human Infection With H5N1

FluView Interactive Novel Influenza

#18,024

Depending upon the strain, the method of exposure, viral load, and an individual's immune response and overall health, human influenza A infection can present a wide range of symptoms, ranging from asymptomatic-to-sub-clinical, mild-to-moderate, all the way up to severe and even life threatening..

With seasonal flu, asymptomatic carriage has been estimated to run as high as 35%, while sub-clinical cases may account for > 60% of cases (see EID Journal: Prevalence of Asymptomatic Influenza Virus Infections).

A 2015 study (CID: Viral Detection Increases With Family Size), followed 26 households over the course of one year, testing family members for 16 different respiratory viruses, including influenza, rhinovirus, and RSV on a weekly basis.

While the incidence varied widely by household size (no surprise, the more kids in the house, the more sickness), across the board only about 50% of the PRC positive cases reported cold or flu-like symptoms. 

Understandably, most influenza infections go unreported.  Most people do not consult a doctor unless their symptoms are severe, and even when they do, sub-typing for novel strains is rarely done outside of a sentinel hospital.

Since 2010, the CDC has detected 500 novel flu infections in the United States (see chart below), although this almost certainly represents just the tip of the iceberg.


During a small outbreak of H3N2v (n=13) a dozen years ago, researchers estimated that fewer than 1 in every 200 cases was identified (see CID Journal: Estimates Of Human Infection From H3N2v (Jul 2011-Apr 2012).

Results. We estimate that the median multiplier for children was 200 (90% range, 115–369) and for adults was 255 (90% range, 152–479) and that 2055 (90% range, 1187–3800) illnesses from H3N2v virus infections may have occurred from August 2011 to April 2012, suggesting that the new virus was more widespread than previously thought. 

We've seen similar estimates with H7N9 in China and MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia.  Quite obviously, there are some regions of the world better equipped to detect novel viruses than others, but even in the UK their Health Security Agency has warned of the difficulties in detecting community spread of HPAI H5N1. 

A little over a year ago, the UKHSA published UK Novel Flu Surveillance: Quantifying TTD) which estimated the TTD (Time To Detect) a novel H5N1 virus in the community via passive surveillance might take 3-10 weeks, and the infection of dozens (or even hundreds) of people, before community spread could be established. 

They present different scenarios based on various levels of testing, but even under the best case scenario, it could take weeks to detect ongoing community transmission of the virus. 


While we can be comforted by the detection of only one mildly symptomatic (conjunctivitis) case in Texas, before the alert to monitor dairy workers went out a month ago, that case would likely have been dismissed as a mild viral infection, and testing would not have been done. 

Mild or sub-clinical cases are obviously less worrisome in the short run, but they are much harder to detect. 

The concern is, they give the virus additional opportunities to adapt to a new species, and potentially spread to their contacts. For a virus that hasn't quite adapted to human hosts, that's quite an advantage.

Yesterday the CDC published the following update on their efforts to detect any spread of the H5N1 virus early.  Due to its length I've only posted some excerpts, so follow the link to read it in its entirety.  I'll have a brief postscript after the break.


How CDC is monitoring influenza data among people to better understand the current avian influenza A (H5N1) situation
Español | Other Languages Print

Updated April 24, 2024
Weekly Snapshot for Week Ending April 13, 2024

CDC influenza (flu) surveillance systems show no indicators of unusual influenza activity in people, including avian influenza A(H5N1).

This page provides information on how CDC systems that monitor national, state, and local level influenza data are being used during the current avian influenza A(H5N1) situation 
  • Influenza virus and illness activity are monitored year-round through a collaborative effort between CDC and many partners, including state, local, and territorial health departments; public health and clinical laboratories; clinics; and emergency departments.
  • Human cases of novel influenza, which are human infections with non-human influenza A viruses that are different from currently spreading seasonal human influenza viruses, are nationally notifiable. Every identified case is investigated and reported to CDC.
  • CDC is actively looking at multiple flu indicators during the current situation to monitor for influenza A(H5N1) viruses, including looking for spread of the virus to, or among people, in jurisdictions where the virus has been identified in people or animals.

Monitoring for Novel Influenza A Virus Infections among People, including Influenza A(H5N1)

Rapid detection and reporting of human infections with novel influenza A viruses, including influenza A(H5N1), is important to facilitate prompt awareness and an effective public health response. For confirmed cases, the reporting jurisdiction completes a case report form, which is submitted to CDC. The information includes patient demographics, symptoms, the clinical course of illness, and exposure history. The reporting jurisdiction for influenza A(H5N1) cases reported in 2024 are summarized below.



Public Health Laboratory Reporting


Public health laboratories use CDC’s diagnostic tools to detect both seasonal influenza viruses and novel influenza A viruses including influenza A(H5N1). These diagnostic tools are used at more than 100 public health laboratories in all 50 U.S. states. The results of tests performed by these public health laboratories nationwide are summarized below.


Systems Used to Monitor Influenza Activity
Influenza activity is monitored year-round using multiple systems. These systems are used for monitoring seasonal influenza and, because influenza viruses are constantly changing in small, and occasionally more significant ways, these systems are also useful for monitoring signals and trends from novel influenza virus infections. Some examples are provided below.

Monitoring for Changes in Tests Positive for Influenza in Clinical Settings


Approximately 300 clinical laboratories located throughout all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of Columbia report the results of clinical testing for influenza through either the U.S. WHO Collaborating Laboratories System or the National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS). The results of tests performed by clinical laboratories nationwide are summarized below.
While these laboratories don’t test specifically for influenza A(H5N1) virus, by tracking the percentage of specimens tested that are positive for influenza A viruses, we can monitor for unusual increases in influenza activity that may be an early sign of spread of novel influenza A viruses, including H5N1.

          (Continue . . .) 


While there is currently no indication of community spread of H5N1 anywhere in the world, the reality is there are many regions of the globe where low-level transmission could go unnoticed for quite some time.  

Even in places with more advanced surveillance capabilities - like the United States, the UK, and Europe - early detection of limited community spread might require a bit of luck. 

A reminder than anything we say about the current threat posed by H5N1, COVIDH5N6,  MERS-CoV, or any other pandemic threat must be tempered by the knowledge that we are always working with incomplete information. 

Sunday, April 21, 2024

A Slight Case Of Deja Flu



History Doesn't Repeat Itself, but It Often Rhymes” – Mark Twain.

#18,018

While the recent spillover of HPAI H5N1 into dairy cows in at least 8 states, and the discovery of `high concentrations' of the virus in raw milk, has been called unprecedented, it isn't that far afield from the events of a decade ago, when the MERS coronavirus was found to be endemic in Arabian camels, and shed in camel's milk and urine. 

WHO Update On MERS-CoV Transmission Risks From Animals To Humans

Eurosurveillance: MERS-CoV Antibodies & RNA In Camel’s Milk – Qatar 

CIDRAP: More Evidence for Camel-to-Human MERS-CoV Transmission

Despite an abundance of scientific evidence linking camels to the carriage and likely spread of the MERS virus (see here, here, & here) the Saudi Ministry of Agriculture spent months either evading or denying the issue (see Saudi MOA Spokesman: Camel Link Unproven, MERS-CoV Is MOH Problem).

Finally, in May of 2014 the Saudi Ministry Of Agriculture Issued Warnings On Camels, urging breeders and owners to limit their contact with camels, and to use PPEs (masks, gloves, protective clothing) when in close contact with their animals.

At first, this news was not well received (see Saudi Camel Owners Threaten Over MERS `Slander’) and many people (locals and tourists) continued to defiantly expose themselves to camels (rides and `kissing') and to camel products (meat, milk, urine, etc.) without taking recommended precautions.


The good news is, despite thousands of infections and hundreds of deaths (see chart above)  MERS-CoV never did acquire full transmissibility between humans.  Most outbreaks were household or nosocomial, although a few superspreader events did occur. 

Had MERS-CoV evolved to be as easily spread as COVID, the results would likely have been far different. 

While today we are dealing with an avian influenza virus, not a coronavirus, the similarities are striking.  Both viruses were thought unlikely to infect their respective intermediate hosts (cows and camels), and both were found to shed the virus via milk and other fluids (see USDA statement below). 

Has USDA confirmed at this point that cow-to-cow transmission is a factor

Yes, although it is unclear exactly how virus is being moved around. We know that the virus is shed in milk at high concentrations; therefore, anything that comes in contact with unpasteurized milk, spilled milk, etc. may spread the virus. Biosecurity is always extremely important, including movement of humans, other animals, vehicles, and other objects (like milking equipment) or materials that may physically carry virus.  

Although the outbreak in dairy cows has only been reported in 32 herds across 8 states so far, it is likely that some spillovers have not been documented.  Testing is voluntary, and is normally limited to dairy cattle.

While no other countries have reported similar outbreaks, if H5N1 can spillover to cows here, it can probably happen in other regions of the world as well. 

As we saw in Saudi Arabia with the continued consumption of raw camel's milk, there is a strong `raw milk' movement in the United States, with the following 2017 study published in the EID Journal suggesting that > 3% of the population regularly drinks unpasteurized milk. 


Solenne Costard , Luis Espejo, Huybert Groenendaal, and Francisco J. Zagmutt

Abstract

The growing popularity of unpasteurized milk in the United States raises public health concerns. We estimated outbreak-related illnesses and hospitalizations caused by the consumption of cow’s milk and cheese contaminated with Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp., Listeria monocytogenes, and Campylobacter spp. using a model relying on publicly available outbreak data.
In the United States, outbreaks associated with dairy consumption cause, on average, 760 illnesses/year and 22 hospitalizations/year, mostly from Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter spp. Unpasteurized milk, consumed by only 3.2% of the population, and cheese, consumed by only 1.6% of the population, caused 96% of illnesses caused by contaminated dairy products.
Unpasteurized dairy products thus cause 840 (95% CrI 611–1,158) times more illnesses and 45 (95% CrI 34–59) times more hospitalizations than pasteurized products. As consumption of unpasteurized dairy products grows, illnesses will increase steadily; a doubling in the consumption of unpasteurized milk or cheese could increase outbreak-related illnesses by 96%.

While heavily discouraged by most public health agencies (see CDC's Fast Facts: Why Is Raw Milk Unsafe?there are enough loopholes in state laws that most American can buy raw milk if they want it. 

Milk pasteurization rules in Europe are much stricter than in the United States, with most milk subjected to ultra-high temperature (UHT) pasteurization, which makes it shelf stable.  

In many other countries, however, the consumption of `raw milk' is much higher than in the US. The USDA reported in 2019:

In Mexico, half of all fluid milk goes into the processing industry for the production of yogurt, cheeses, and other products. Between 40-45 percent of consumption is of fluid drinkable milk, such as pasteurized, ultra-high temperature processed (UHT), bottled, or packaged milk. Unpasteurized, raw milk accounts for between 5-10 percent of consumption.

Beyond that, accurate estimates of the consumption of raw milk around the globe are hard to come by. But it is safe to say in that in some countries, that number is likely to greatly exceed 10%. 

There are still a great many unknowns when it comes to HPAI's spillover into cattle, including:

  • Whether the spillover of H5N1 to cows is currently limited to the B3.13 genotype found in Midwestern birds.
  • Whether non-dairy cattle are being sub-clinically infected, and if so, what the risks to public health that might pose
  • Whether standard pasteurization (as opposed to UHT) completely inactivates the virus in milk
  • Whether other milk producing animals (e.g. goats, camels, buffaloes, etc.) carry the same risk of infection as dairy cows
  • How long the virus is shed by these various milk producing species
  • And perhaps most importantly, what is the range of illness experienced by humans who consume infected milk, and can they transmit it on to others via the respiratory route?

Hopefully we'll get the answers to these, and other pressing questions, sooner rather than later.

With luck, cattle may prove to be a `dead-end' host for avian flu  - and this outbreak can be contained by the USDA/FDA and the dairy industry - but the stakes would go up considerably if we started seeing evidence of similar spillovers in other parts of the world.

Or even more ominously, if we started seeing the virus turn up in domestic pigs. A year ago, the ECDC/EFSA Avian Influenza Overview December 2022 – March 2023 warned:

The additional reports of transmission events to and potentially between mammals, e.g. mink, sea lion, seals, foxes and other carnivores as well as seroepidemiological evidence of transmission to wild boar and domestic pigs, associated with evolutionary processes including mammalian adaptation are of concern and need to be closely followed up.

While it is always possible that there is some genetic barrier that prevents HPAI H5N1 from sparking a human pandemic, over the past 3 years the virus has greatly expanded its mammalian host range.  

And that is no small concern.

Stay tuned.


Friday, April 19, 2024

WHO Report: Proposed Terminology For Pathogens That Transmit Through The Air


 #18,015

Although we've seen similar debates with other outbreaks, during the opening months of the COVID pandemic there was much disagreement (see COVID-19: The Airborne Division) over whether SARS-CoV-2 was an `airborne' virus, and what levels of personal protections (masks/gowns/gloves/eye protection) were appropriate for medical workers and for the public. 

Six months into the crisis, 200+ scientists from around the world signed an open letter to the WHO, urging them to reconsider their stance on the airborne spread of the virus.

It is Time to Address Airborne Transmission of COVID-19

Lidia Morawska, Donald K Milton
Clinical Infectious Diseases, ciaa939, https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciaa939

While the CDC had recommended `airborne precautions' for health care workers (when possible) since the beginning of this epidemic (see J. Infect. Dis.: Airborne or Droplet Precautions For COVID-19?), their guidance on how the virus spread in the community focused more on large droplet (short-range and short-lived) spread of the virus and contaminated fomites, rather than on aerosols.

Hence early messaging discouraging the use of face masks for the public (partially reversed on Apr. 4th, 2000).

Even as late as August of 2020, the debate raged on (see BMJ Editorial: Airborne Transmission of Covid-19) and the following month the CDC posted - then retracted 72 hours later - Updated Guidance On Airborne & Asymptomatic Spread Of COVID-19

A large part of the problem was semantics.  Scientists and policy makers couldn't agree on what constituted `airborne' transmission, resulting in mixed and confused messaging. 

While today it is widely accepted that COVID is highly transmissible via the respiratory route (see EID Journal: Probable Aerosol Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through Floors and Walls of Quarantine Hotel, Taiwan, 2021), we can't afford to go through this same protracted debate with every new pathogen. 

Although it has taken 4 years and countless committee meetings, yesterday WHO released a 52-page report on redefining the terminology that describes pathogens that transmit through the air

First the press release from the WHO, followed by a link and a few brief excerpts from the document.  

Leading health agencies outline updated terminology for pathogens that transmit through the air
18 April 2024
News release
Reading time: 3 min (692 words)
 
Following consultation with public health agencies and experts, the World Health Organization (WHO) publishes a global technical consultation report introducing updated terminology for pathogens that transmit through the air. The pathogens covered include those that cause respiratory infections, e.g. COVID-19, influenza, measles, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and tuberculosis, among others.

The publication, entitled “Global technical consultation report on proposed terminology for pathogens that transmit through the air, is the result of an extensive, multi-year, collaborative effort and reflects shared agreement on terminology between WHO, experts and four major public health agencies: Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention; Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; and United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. This agreement underlines the collective commitment of public health agencies to move forward together on this matter.

The wide-ranging consultation was conducted in multiple steps in 2021-2023 and addressed a lack of common terminology to describe the transmission of pathogens through the air across scientific disciplines. The challenge became particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic as experts from various sectors were required to provide scientific and policy guidance. Varying terminologies highlighted gaps in common understanding and contributed to challenges in public communication and efforts to curb the transmission of the pathogen.

“Together with a very diverse range of leading public health agencies and experts across multiple disciplines, we are pleased to have been able to address this complex and timely issue and reach a consensus,” said Dr Jeremy Farrar, WHO Chief Scientist. “The agreed terminology for pathogens that transmit through the air will help set a new path for research agendas and implementation of public health interventions to identify, communicate and respond to existing and new pathogens.”

The extensive consultation resulted in the introduction of the following common descriptors to characterize the transmission of pathogens through the air (under typical circumstances):

Individuals infected with a respiratory pathogen can generate and expel infectious particles containing the pathogen, through their mouth or nose by breathing, talking, singing, spitting, coughing or sneezing. These particles should be described with the term ‘infectious respiratory particles’ or IRPs.
IRPs exist on a continuous spectrum of sizes, and no single cut off points should be applied to distinguish smaller from larger particles. This facilitates moving away from the dichotomy of previously used terms: ‘aerosols’ (generally smaller particles) and ‘droplets’ (generally larger particles).

The descriptor ‘through the air’ can be used in a general way to characterize an infectious disease where the main mode of transmission involves the pathogen travelling through the air or being suspended in the air. Under the umbrella of ‘through the air transmission’, two descriptors can be used:

1. Airborne transmission or inhalation, for cases when IRPs are expelled into the air and inhaled by another person. Airborne transmission or inhalation can occur at a short or long distance from the infectious person and distance depends on various factors (airflow, humidity, temperature, ventilation etc). IRPs can theoretically enter the body at any point along the human respiratory tract, but preferred sites of entry may be pathogen-specific.

2. Direct deposition, for cases when IRPs are expelled into the air from an infectious person, and are then directly deposited on the exposed mouth, nose or eyes of another person nearby, then entering the human respiratory system and potentially causing infection.

“This global technical consultation process was a concerted effort of many influential and experienced experts,” said Dr Gagandeep Kang, Christian Medical College, Vellore, India who is a Co-Chair of the WHO Technical Working Group. “Reaching consensus on these terminologies bringing stakeholders in an unprecedented way was no small feat.
Completing this consultation gives us a new opportunity and starting point to move forward with a better understanding and agreed principles for diseases that transmit through the air,” added Dr Yuguo Li from the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR (China), who also co-chaired the Technical Working Group.

This consultation was the first phase of global scientific discussions led by WHO. Next steps include further technical and multidisciplinary research and exploration of the wider implementation implications of the updated descriptors.

The WHO overview, and a link to the PDF follows:

Overview

Terminology used to describe the transmission of pathogens through the air varies across scientific disciplines, organizations and the general public. While this has been the case for decades, during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the terms ‘airborne’, ‘airborne transmission’ and ‘aerosol transmission’ were used in different ways by stakeholders in different scientific disciplines, which may have contributed to misleading information and confusion about how pathogens are transmitted in human populations.

This global technical consultation report brings together viewpoints from experts spanning a range of disciplines with the key objective of seeking consensus regarding the terminology used to describe the transmission of pathogens through the air that can potentially cause infection in humans.

This consultation aimed to identify terminology that could be understood and accepted by different technical disciplines. The agreed process was to develop a consensus document that could be endorsed by global agencies and entities. Despite the complex discussions and challenges, significant progress was made during the consultation process, particularly the consensus on a set of descriptors to describe how pathogens are transmitted through the air and the related modes of transmission. WHO recognizes the important areas where consensus was not achieved and will continue to address these areas in follow-up consultations.

From the report, we get the following graphical summary. 




The WHO also adds the following caveat about the immediate practical implications of these changes. 

There is NO suggestion from this consultative process that to mitigate the risk of short range airborne transmission full ‘airborne precautions’1 (as they are currently known) should be used in all settings, for all pathogens, and by persons with any infection and disease risk levels where this mode of transmission is known or suspected (126).

But conversely, some situations will require ‘airborne precautions’. This would clearly be inappropriate within a riskbased infection prevention approach where the balance of risks, including disease incidence, severity, individual and population immunity and many other factors, need to be considered, inclusive of legal, logistic, operational and financial consequences that have global implications regarding equity and access. 


While these changes should help streamline the conversation, we'll have to wait to see what practical effect they will have on the issuance of guidance on infection protection against novel disease threats going forward.  


Saturday, March 16, 2024

Mpox Update From The CDC, A New Preprint On Transmission & Reports of Spread In Republic of Congo

#17,951

Although the declared global health emergency over the international spread of a new clade (IIb) of Mpox (formerly Monkeypox) was ended after only 10 months in the spring of 2023, we continue to see sporadic infections around the globe, while the more dangerous clade I mpox virus continues to rage (>12,000 cases in 2023) in the DRC,. 

Four months ago, the WHO Reported the 1st Confirmed Cluster Of Sexually Transmitted MPXV Clade 1 in the DRCwarning that `The risk of mpox further spreading to neighbouring countries and worldwide appears to be significant.'

Last week we looked at a report in Eurosurveillance: Ongoing Mpox Outbreak in South Kivu Province, DRC Associated With a Novel Clade I Sub-lineage, which contained the first genomic analysis of samples from a previously unaffected region of the DRC. 

This study revealed a novel clade I sub-linage had emerged - most likely from a zoonotic introduction - with changes that may render current CDC tests unreliable.

Over the past 48 hours there have been media reports from the DRC's neighbor, the Republic of Congo, of an outbreak of Mpox recorded in several regions not previously affected (see Republic of Congo reports its first mpox virus cases in several regions). 

Since I can find no confirmation on their Health Ministry website, we may have to wait for a WHO update. But spread beyond the DRC was one of the risks mentioned last November. 

Meanwhile, we've a new preprint on the medRxiv server, which further confirms last year's finding of (primarily heterosexual) sexual transmission of Mpox clade I in the DRC. 

Epidemiology, clinical characteristics, and transmission patterns of a novel Mpox (Monkeypox) outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): an observational, cross-sectional cohort study
Leandre Murhula Masirika, Jean Claude Udahemuka, Pacifique Ndishimye, Gustavo Sganzerla Martinez, Patricia Kelvin, Maliyamungu Bubala Nadine, Bilembo Kitwanda Steeven, Franklin Kumbana Mweshi, Léandre Mutimbwa Mambo, Bas B. Oude Munnink, Justin Bengehya Mbiribindi, Freddy Belesi Siangoli, Trudie Lang, Jean M. Malekani, Frank M. Aarestrup, Marion Koopmans, Leonard Schuele, Jean Pierre Musabvimana, Brigitte Umutoni, Ali Toloue, Benjamin Hewins, Mansi Dutt, Anuj Kumar, Alyson A. Kelvin, Jean-Paul Kabemba Lukusa, Christian Gortazar, David J Kelvin, Luis Flores
doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2024.03.05.24303395

Preview PDF

Summary (abstract)


Background 

In August 2023, an outbreak of mpox was reported in the eastern part, South Kivu Province, of Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this study, we aimed to investigate the origin of this outbreak and to assess how monkeypox virus spread among humans in the city of Kamituga.

Methods 

We performed an observational cohort study by recruiting hospitalized patients with mpox-like symptoms. Furthermore, we compared structured, de-identified case report forms and interviews were conducted to determine the possible origins and modes of transmission of the mpox outbreak. We describe the clinical characteristics and epidemiology observed in reported infections.

Findings 

During the study period (24 September 2023 to 29 January 2024), 164 patients were admitted to the Kamituga hospital, 51 individuals were enrolled in the study and interviewed, and 37 (73%) of 51 individuals received a molecularly confirmed mpox diagnosis. 

The median age for males was 24 years (IQR 18-30; range 14-36) and 19 years for females (IQR 17-21; range 1-59). The cohort was comprised of 47 (92%) of 51 individuals who identified as heterosexual, and two (4%) of 51 as bisexual, with 31 (61%) of 51 individuals sexually active with more than one partner within the last six months. 

The direct transmission routes are unknown; however, it is expected that the majority of infections were transmitted via occupational exposures. Out of the 51 individuals, 24 (47%) were professional sex workers (PSWs), while five (10%) were gold miners, 6 (12%) were students, and four (8%) were farmers; the remaining individual occupations were unknown. 

The most common symptoms associated with clinical mpox diagnosis were fever, which was described in 38 (75%) of 51 individuals, and rash, which was described in 45 (88%) of 51 individuals. Among those with a rash, 21 (41%) of 51 individuals experienced oral lesions, and 32 (63%) of 51 presented anogenital lesions. Mpox viral DNA was detected by qPCR from vaginal, penile, and oral swabs in 37 (73%) of 51 enrolled individuals. Two deaths were reported.

Interpretation 

In this observational cohort study, mpox virus infection caused symptoms in a wide age range of participants with most cases presenting in sexually active individuals. Symptoms included fever, cough, lymphadenopathy, sore throat, chills, headache, back pain, muscle pain, vomiting, nausea, conjunctivitis, and rash (oral and anogenital). Heterosexual partners dominated human-to-human contact transmission suggesting that heterosexual close contact is the main form of transmission in this outbreak. Furthermore, Professional Sex Workers (PSWs) were the dominant occupation among infected individuals, indicating that PSWs and clients may be at higher risk for developing mpox virus infections.

The changing epidemiology and genetic evolution of mpox clade I in central Africa has sparked a number of risks assessments over the past few months, including:

There have been no cases of the type of mpox spreading in DRC reported in the United States at this time. The risk to the general public in the U.S. from the type of mpox circulating in the DRC is low.

But that assessment could change. Which is why the CDC continues to update their Mpox web page , adding the following guidance yesterday (March 15th).


Signs and Symptoms March 15, 2024

Mpox in Animals and Pets March 15, 2024

About Mpox March 15, 2024

During the decade leading up to Mpox clade IIb's world tour (Spring 2022), we saw repeated warnings that the virus was evolving into a more transmissible disease threat (see 2016's EID Journal:Extended H-2-H Transmission during a Monkeypox Outbreak).

A 2020 report, published by the Bulletin of the World Health Organization, warned that our waning immunity to smallpox put society at greater risks of seeing Monkeypox epidemics (see WHO: Modelling Human-to-Human Transmission of Monkeypox).

And in early 2023, in EID Journal: Monkeypox Virus Evolution before 2022 Outbreak, researchers suggested that` . . . the most likely scenario is that there has been silent and undetected circulation of MPXV, possibly including multiple non–MPXV-endemic countries outside Africa, since the 2017–2018 outbreak.'

While there are no guarantees that Clade I Mpox will follow suit, similar warning signs are there. Just as they are for novel or avian flu, Lassa Fever, Nipah, MERS-CoV, and an increasing array of other emerging infectious diseases.

A reminder that nature is nothing, if not persistent.