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Abstract
Recent transformations in the politics of security in Turkey have been linked by many scholars to a global trend defined by a rapidly developing neoliberal security state form. The 15 July 2016 coup attempt, however, seems to disrupt the convergence of the Turkish case with the global politics of neoliberal (in)security. This paper revisits the neoliberal security state debate and argues that the radical scope of the legal, administrative and coercive changes enacted in the Turkish state signals a transition to a more ‘exceptional’ paradigm of security. To this end, the paper adopts the conception of ‘regime security’ and investigates how the AKP government policies have contributed to a party-oriented security paradigm bolstered by executive centralisation.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Cemal Burak Tansel and Pınar Bedirhanoğlu for their valuable comments on an earlier draft.
Notes
1. See Yeldan (Citation2008); Birdal (Citation2013); Ozden (Citation2014); Bedirhanoğlu (Citation2009); Çelik (Citation2015).
2. For contributions to these discussions, see, inter alia, Aydın-Düzgit & Keyman (Citation2013); Özbudun (Citation2015); Arbatlı (Citation2014); Taş (Citation2015); Somel (Citation2015); Somer (Citation2016b); Esen & Gümüşçü (Citation2016); Oğuz (Citation2016); Berksoy (Citation2017).
3. See Hallsworth & Lea (Citation2011); Giroux (Citation2006); Cox, Levine & Newman (Citation2009); Bigo & Tsoukala (Citation2008).
4. For a general discussion of weak states and security, see Thomas (Citation1987); Azar & Moon (Citation1988); Korany, Noble & Brynen (Citation1993); Ayoob (Citation1995).
5. It is important to note that, before 2006, the democratic impetus provided by the EU candidacy was strong in Turkey and the AKP’s ostensibly reformist policies were extensively supported by different segments of the society. After 2006–2007, however, we see an increasing determination among the AKP leaders to eliminate their Kemalist opponents, especially within the military and judiciary. This orientation reached its peak during the closure case opened against the party in 2008, after which the elimination of the Kemalist forces through the coup plot investigations gained pace.
6. Established in 1983 after the 1980 military coup, the State Security Courts were tasked with dealing with the politically charged cases of ‘crimes against the state’ and became the main mechanism of the enduring military tutelage in Turkish politics. In 1999, they were reformed through the removal of the military judges, but the operational framework of the court remained intact. The EU Commission’s Progress Reports recommended that the powers and responsibilities of these courts be brought in line with EU standards and consequently, they were abolished in 2004. The Special Authority Courts were established in the same year and effectively took over the cases that were once tried by the State Security Courts.
7. The Gezi events began as a peaceful demonstration by environmentalist groups who demanded the withdrawal of a renovation project in Istanbul in late May 2013. The disproportionate use of violence by the police fuelled huge rallies against the government in more than 70 cities all over Turkey and the protests turned into a movement against the government’s increasing authoritarian tendencies.
8. An important turning point in this period was the attempt by the Gülenist prosecuters in December 2012 to remove the head of the National Intelligence Organisation (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı – MİT), who was and still is one of the closest figures to President Erdoğan. The relations between the two groups significantly deteriorated after this incident.
9. While the 4+4+4 system of elementary education raised the school leaving age, it has been criticised for playing an instrumental role in decreasing schooling rates among girls in rural areas and promoting religious boarding schools (Eğitim-Sen Citation2016).
10. The alcohol regulation passed in 2013 just before the Gezi events, prohibited retail sales between 10 pm and 6am, banned all alcohol advertising and promotion, and stopped new shops and bars from opening within 100 metres of schools and mosques. This regulation was criticised on the ground that it constituted an intervention in individual freedoms.
11. The new authority given to these special courts to rule on internet/broadcast bans was extremely important for the government. After the corruption investigations, several tape recordings and documents were shared online as evidence of illegal activities performed by AKP politicians and their family members. After the passing of this law, the government was able to make swift decisions on internet and broadcast bans, and effectively restricted the public’s right to obtain news.
12. The Kobanî events took place in October 2014, while the three-year-long peace talks (2012–2015) between the government and the Kurdish political movemen (the ‘Solution Process’) was underway. The degree of violence which occurred at this time seriously undermined trust between the parties and paved the way for the failure of the process. The Solution Process was started by the government with the aim of redirecting Kurdish political activism from separationism to democratic integration. Among the various reasons for the project’s failure, the main one was the lack of transparency and limited involvement of civil and political actors. The process was conducted in the form of secret talks and did not facilitate the development of a genuine democratic deliberation.