453
Views
0
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Research Article

Limits of Activation? Street-Level Responses to the 2015 Refugee Challenge in German Job Centers

ORCID Icon &

Abstract

Frontline workers in host-country state organizations influence refugees’ life chances and social integration. Yet little is known about how the local organizational environment shapes the action orientations of street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). This article explores how German job centers and placement officers have responded to the unprecedented increase in refugee clients following the winter of 2015/16. Our findings suggest that new organizational structures motivate SLBs to interpret rules flexibly and do what works well. This pattern of authorized rule bending is relevant for overcoming the limits of activation and for the inclusion/exclusion of refugees as mediated by state bureaucracy.

Introduction

The arrival of about two and a half million refugees from Syria and other humanitarian crisis regions in 2015 and 2016 constituted a massive challenge for European governments and administrations. In the absence of a comprehensive European approach, migratory pressures led to a variety of political and administrative responses (Trauner, Citation2016). For Germany, the situation was particularly demanding: with more than 1.1 million refugees applying for asylum, the country turned into one of the top five countries in the world hosting refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Citation2017; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Citation2021). This massive influx posed a challenge not only to those agencies responsible for asylum procedures and humanitarian aid (Dittmer & Lorenz, Citation2021). Managing reception and integration processes—a task that would continue for years to come—also involved finding solutions to a range of interconnected problems, including housing, social assistance, and access to the labor market. These responses together with policies already in place affected the refugees differently given that German law differentiates between asylum seekers and legally recognized refugees, two groups whose entitlements and social rights differ greatly. Asylum seekers and those denied asylum are “kept outside the usual framework of welfare regulation” (Liedtke, Citation2022, p. 479) and only enjoy limited labor market access (Crage, Citation2016). Recognized refugees granted protection, who are the focus of this article, enjoy full labor market access. As long as they are unemployed, they are entitled to basic security according to Germany’s Social Code II. Thus, the job centers, which are responsible for providing social assistance, were assigned a key role in the process of integrating this group of refugees (Brücker et al., Citation2020; Knapp et al., Citation2017).

In the job centers, the massive and abrupt influx of refugees produced important consequences for the daily work of street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). For several reasons, one could expect the increase in client numbers to disrupt their work routines and thereby the way activation policies are produced on the ground (Hupe & Hill, Citation2016; Brodkin, Citation2011; Lipsky, Citation1980). First, the situation required rapid organizational adjustment which, in turn, likely modified the SLBs’ framework of action. Second, given the large and unfamiliar group of clients, SLBs were confronted with uncertainties and new demands in their daily work. Third, given the refugees’ claim to protection and their social integration, which was required politically (emphasized by former chancellor Merkel’s claim, ‘We can do it’), the situation might have created a high sense of moral purpose and politicized the role of SLBs.

Much of the SLB literature has explained the coping behavior of SLBs in situations of particular stress and in the field of working with refugees with individual-level factors (James & Julian, Citation2021; Belabas & Gerrits Citation2017b; Gofen et al., Citation2019). The question of how the organizational context affects street-level practice has, to date, not been fully elaborated (Gofen et al., Citation2019; Hupe & Buffat, Citation2014).

Based on qualitative interviews, this study takes a two-level approach to explore how (1) local job center organizations and (2) placement officers have responded to the abrupt change in client structure and respective demands, and how the two levels are intertwined. With this question, we also examine how and whether “public service gaps” (Hupe & Buffat, Citation2014), i.e. situations in which demands exceed resources—not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of substantial expertise in dealing with the new client group—have been successfully prevented.

The aim of this article is twofold: We first try to advance recent SLB research that focuses on the question of how formal and informal working environments and relationships shape street-level practice (Peake & Forsyth, Citation2021; Raaphorst & Loyens, Citation2020; Siciliano, Citation2017). By examining how specialized refugee teams motivate empathetic approaches toward clients at the street level, thereby moving the limits of activation faced in the standard operation procedure, our case study explores the mechanisms through which specific organizational features can shape SLB perceptions and action patterns. Second, we aim to foster a dialog between migration studies and SLB research. We argue that an organizational lens can advance migration research, which, for a long time now, has neglected the question of how state organizations shape migrants’ trajectories (Castles et al., Citation2014; Lang et al., Citation2021). Taking the inherent logics and limits of activation work as a point of departure, we thus take up the claim to de-exceptionalize migrants and migration, and embed migration research in broader theories of social structure (Castles, Citation2010).

The next section briefly reviews the literature on professional frontline work with refugees and coping at the street level, to then present and explicate a heuristic of the inherent logics and limits of activation work. Following the description of methods and data, we describe two organizational responses to the refugee challenge in Germany and present a theory-based and empirically grounded typology of SLB action orientations. The last section summarizes the findings and contributions of this article and draws out implications for the in/exclusion of refugees as mediated by state bureaucracy.

Logics and limits of activation work: An analytical framework

As a rational way of coping with high workload, scant resources, and the need to fulfill institutional criteria, SLBs commonly move away from clients (Lipsky, Citation1980; Tummers et al., Citation2015). In situations of high workload, the work with migrants can be experienced as especially difficult (Schütze & Johansson, Citation2020) leading to the sidelining of clients that pose problems and higher sanctioning rates (Schram et al. Citation2009).

Yet, recent research on professional frontline work with refugees has identified a different action pattern: when refugee clients are perceived as extremely burdened and deserving of support, and when frontline workers such as teachers, integration counselors, or placement officers are critical of relevant state policies or programs, they bend the rules in their clients’ favor. This pattern is presented as an individual decision of frontline workers “beyond the formal task description” (Belabas & Gerrits, Citation2017b, p. 144), which takes place in the shadows despite “neoliberal managerial constraints” (James & Julian, Citation2021, p. 534). The logic of helping clients through rule adjustment or deviation also resonates with patterns mentioned in the broader literature on street-level bureaucracy, such as the “moral carer” (Zacka, Citation2017), or the “citizen-agent” (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, Citation2022). If at all, these patterns are explained with individual-level attributes such as SLBs’ moral disposition, values, or world views (Zacka, Citation2017), or as resulting from interaction with clients and specific perceptions of them (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, Citation2022).

As we know, organizations can powerfully shape street-level practice (Rice, Citation2012; Scott, Citation1997). Yet, as Sandfort has rightly argued, this influence does not only works through “organizational charts, formal procedures, or written rules that staff passively enact” but also through “the collective, daily experience shared by front-line workers” (Sandfort, Citation2000, p. 731).

Relatedly, recent SLB scholarship has focused on the relevance of formal and informal networks and social relationships for street-level practice (Siciliano, Citation2017; Zacka, Citation2017). It has been shown that and how working environments and social dynamics between officials, colleagues and citizens can increase the autonomy of SLBs but also hamper it (Peake & Forsyth, Citation2021; Raaphorst & Loyens, Citation2020). In line with this literature, this article conceives of SLBs as nested within organizational contexts (Gofen et al., Citation2019).

Zooming in on our case, the task of integrating refugees in the German workfare system, we argue that we first need to understand the general logics and limits of activation. , the activation rhombus, summarizes our understanding of the activation process.

Figure 1. The activation rhombus.

Figure 1. The activation rhombus.

We understand activation as a policy to create market-oriented and marketable subjects by promoting employability and the corresponding motivation (Wright, Citation2016; see Hansen, Citation2019, regarding the moral foundation of activation policies). Activation policies are implemented by organizations and the rules, success criteria, management practices, and operational procedures that they have in place. Organizations themselves are complex entities with various intermediate layers of authority. In decentralized systems in particular, the local organizations—job centers, for instance—are often semi-autonomous and act as mediating or buffering instances between the macro level and the street level. They frame and guide the activation efforts of SLBs through formal and informal action prescriptions (see , axis 1-2, solid arrow). As individual cases differ greatly, SLBs are entitled to exercise case-related discretion to integrate their clients into the workforce—be it through support, persuasion, or legal coercion. Thus, placement officers act in a system marked by bounded autonomy and institutional control (Brodkin, Citation2011; Evans, Citation2013). Central to activation work is the activatability of welfare claimants. Based on the standardized assessment of a client’s job readiness and potential barriers to labor market integration, SLBs construct working strategies, including the assignment of support measures and potentially achievable demands regarding participation (see , axis 1-3-2, solid arrow). That said, activation is always oriented toward desired outcomes. Its success is commonly judged according to the prevalent criteria of the implementing organization, that is, measurable indicators of performance and outcomes (see , axis 1-4, solid arrow).

Given that rules and criteria are always ambiguous and “never precise enough to cover the complexities” of every possible decision-making situation (Mahoney & Thelen, Citation2010), SLBs inevitably have to apply their own interpretation in casework. In doing so, they also respond to various accountability regimes (Hupe & Hill, Citation2007) and the related work pressures (Hupe & van der Krogt, Citation2013) emanating from the regulated public-administrative sphere, professional standards as well as societal and client expectations. For this reason and to turn the conceptual thinking into an empirical research agenda, we translate the external view of the activation process—as illustrated by the solid arrows in the activation rhombus—into a structural model of action patterns—visualized by the dotted arrows. Zooming in on the internal views of SLBs, we propose to break them down analytically into three distinct but interrelated dimensions of activation efforts (see ). In doing so, we refine existing comprehensive frameworks to explain street-level practice (e.g. Loyens & Maesschalck, Citation2010; Rice, Citation2012) in the case of activation work, and expand them through a focus on outcomes.

Table 1. Structural model of action patterns at the street level.

  1. The constitutive dimension of SLBs’ activation efforts: In their daily practice of applying abstract rules to concrete cases, SLBs need to interpret the (sometimes uncertain or conflicting) expectations and requirements of the organization and their superiors and define their own role and professional mandate in this context (see , axis 2-1, dotted arrow). This also includes and entails a definition of their own goals on the way toward the labor market integration of clients, their perception and prioritization of problems, and the corresponding general classification schemes in regard to clients.

  2. The substantive dimension of activation efforts: Deriving from the constitutive orientation is the action level, that is, SLBs’ working strategies and routines. These encompass counseling concepts and the use of discretionary powers, guided by different degrees of self-authorization in regard to superiors and by the assessment of clients based on personal encounters (see , axis 2-3, dotted arrow). The nature of fit between a client’s performance and the strategies and categories applied informs moral judgments in everyday practice.

  3. The outcome-related dimension of activation efforts: SLBs might assess the effectiveness of their own work in line with performance or outcome metrics defined by their organization. Yet the way SLBs perceive success or failure can also follow different criteria that emanate from their professional identity. In addition, SLBs might reflect upon their role and work, consider possible unintended consequences, and factor these into their approach (see , axis 2-4, dotted arrow).

Based on the activation rhombus, we now ask what could render activation work vulnerable. What are the external and internal factors that constitute limits to successful activation? One external factor is undoubtedly the regional labor market situation, as low demand for labor likely reduces the opportunity to place welfare claimants in work (Johnson et al., Citation2021). In our case, the labor market situation was generally favorable (Konle-Seidel, Citation2017). However, some structural factors, including the legally imposed residence obligation for refugees or poor transport infrastructure in rural areas, restricted labor market mobility and (may have) hampered activation work (Bonin et al., Citation2021).

Limitations also arise when external and internal factors collide in unforeseen ways. This is the case when a sudden increase in the number of welfare recipients meets insufficient internal resources (quantity). Resulting capacity constraints might jeopardize the institutionalized promise to provide time- and labor-intensive individual support. A further limit to activation can arise when the characteristics (qualities) of the cases change, inter alia due to an increasing diversification in case types and their specific difficulties. This might reduce the suitability of existing tools and resources, ranging from substantive support measures to placement officers’ communicative and case-analytical skills.

In 2015/16, Germany was certainly not completely unprepared. The German Residence Act of 2005 and the Integration Course Ordinance, together with the non-legally binding National Integration Plan of 2007, set important parameters for German integration policies, including mandatory language courses for migrant welfare recipients with little German skills, and measures to support the intercultural opening of state agencies (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, Citation2011; Mushaben Citation2017).

Nevertheless, the sudden and unprecedented rise in the number of refugee clients clearly represented a challenge to German job centers in terms of quantity and quality. It strained the capacities of an already burdened system and challenged operational routines. Placement officers were suddenly confronted with a large, widely unfamiliar, and heterogenous group of clients. Most of the refugees did not speak German upon arrival and were unfamiliar with the German culture and the procedural logics of German state agencies. Many were burdened by experiences of war and flight. Our data suggests that even in big cities with a high share of migrant welfare recipients where one could expect job center staff to be used to working with migrants, the new group of clients was a real challenge (“We realized that we were clueless”, team leader, sampling point C, Bavaria).

Relevant questions in this context are to what extent the classification schemes of SLBs get confused or reinforced, how new ones emerge, and how these are nested in and influenced by organizational adjustments. In addition, as we know, an increased workload can lead SLBs to perceive work with migrants as difficult (Schütze & Johansson, Citation2020). In this case, would such perceptions prompt SLBs to rely on stereotypes, question the legitimacy of refugees as welfare recipients, and sideline or punish those who appear uncooperative (Ratzmann & Sahraoui, Citation2021; Schram et al., Citation2009)? In other words, do tough working conditions lead to an erosion of SLBs’ moral sensibilities, as Zacka (Citation2017) suggests? Or does the greater scope of discretion granted through formal directives or tacit permission generate new forms of practice that work to support the new client group (Brodkin, Citation2021)?

Methods

To explore how local job centers and SLBs coped with the new challenge, this article uses a qualitative case study design (Yin, Citation2017). Following the criteria of maximum variation sampling (Patton, Citation2002), we selected 18 (out of 402) job centers at four regional sampling points that varied in terms of socio-geographic location, labor market situation, and share of refugees among the unemployed (see ).

Table 2. Sample description.

The resulting sample proved to generate a variety of organizational and individual responses suitable for an exploratory study. The article builds on semi-structured qualitative interviews with 45 placement officers, team leaders, and management staff. The research design received prospective approval by the Review Board of the Institute for Employment Research. All interviewees have provided written informed consent to the data being analyzed and published.

In the interviews with frontline officers, we encouraged reflections on practices and routines in working with refugees. The interviews with superiors focused on organizational responses to the refugee challenge, strategic alignment, and task-based recruitment strategies. All interviews were conducted in 2018 and 2019, hence, at a time when SLBs had already gained a wealth of experience in working with refugees. They lasted from 30 to 170 min with an average of 60 min, and were all audio-recorded and fully transcribed.

The transcripts were coded thematically and analyzed comparatively. Following the advice for theory building from cases (Eisenhardt, Citation1989), we constructed the dimensions of action patterns presented in the structural model (see ) through an iterative process. By going back and forth between data and concepts we identified two maximally contrastive ideal types, that is, model pictures representing action patterns “within a specific interaction context” (Lindbekk, Citation1992, p. 290). In Weberian sense, the types are heuristic in nature and serve to conceive of activation efforts as a meaningful practice (Swedberg, Citation2018). Conceived as stylized descriptions of action patterns in specific institutional contexts, the typology is not intended to explain the emergence of the types systematically.

“People are coming, and they are coming now. What do we do?”
Different approaches in the activation work with refugees

Two organizational responses: Standard operation versus special teams

To better equip the burdened administration, new staff was hired in those state agencies involved in the reception of refugees in 2016, including job centers (Creutzburg, Citation2016). The job centers were granted additional funding released from a former labor market program for refugees (Öchsner, Citation2017). Within the Federal Employment Agency, new programs and support measures specifically targeting refugees were introduced as well as specific placement quotas for refugee clients.

Beyond these infrastructural changes that affected all job centers, our data shows two different local responses. Some job centers integrated the refugees into the continuing standard procedure while others underwent organizational restructuring to form expert teams or units. Due to the partial autonomy of the job centers, this did not happen based on an instruction from the head office of the Federal Employment Agency. Instead, each job center was free to choose one model or the other. Interestingly, information on the number of job centers having set up special refugee teams is not available in the head office (nor in previous studies). Our sample reflects both organizational choices: Among the 18 job centers in our sample, 11 (61 per cent) worked with special teams at the time of interviewing, while 7 (39 per cent) did not.

In the standard procedure, the substantive goal is the rapid labor market entry of welfare recipients regardless of personal potential or biography. Procedurally, this is to be achieved through a system of regular visits to the job center, standardized assessments of employability, job assignment, and, if necessary, assignment to mandatory support measures to increase employability. Offering counseling and support to refugees in the standard procedure was motivated by formalist concerns about (un)equal treatment compared to other clients, especially in regions with significant social opposition to receiving refugees and a comparatively strained labor market situation. One superior argued that there would be little acceptance for the special treatment of refugees (sampling point A). In some cases, the existing placement officers were unwilling to work exclusively with refugees:

We talked about the idea of having our own team for refugees, but this was rejected—not by the management, which was more in favor, but by us employees. (Interview with placement officer)

Our data suggests—and this is also confirmed by another study (Bonin et al., Citation2021)—that especially urban job centers with a traditionally high share of migrant welfare recipients took the decision in favor of organizational restructuring. Similarly, the share of refugees among the unemployed and the related salience can be seen as important factors in the establishment and later phasing out of special teams (Bonin et al. Citation2021).

Superiors and team leaders working in special teams acknowledged the specificities of activation work with refugees—which, in their view, required a new approach and justified special treatment for the new client group. Accordingly, the managers of specialized units formulated the expectation that team members should have certain basic attitudes toward refugees. Referring to the fierce public controversy regarding refugee admission, one team leader of a special team explained:

If you have a certain political attitude [against refugees], then my team’s the wrong place for you. […] You really need […] I wouldn’t want to say ‘helper syndrome,’ but you must want to help, otherwise it won’t work. (Interview with leader of a refugee team)

To find suitable staff to work exclusively with refugees, placement officers from within the organization were recruited on a voluntary basis and new staff with various professional backgrounds was hired from the outside. Our data suggests that this recruitment pattern for special teams represents a key difference from the standard procedure, in which established advisors were assigned refugee clients on top of their existing client base. Partly, advisors in special teams worked with less clients compared to their colleagues who did not work with refugees. Yet, this pattern was not found in all job centers with special teams in our sample, which shows that those teams were designed and organized differently.

A similarity among the special teams and an important difference to the standard procedure is the tendency to relax bureaucratic principles in order to accommodate the specificities of refugee clients. Some leaders of special teams stressed that refugee clients could not be approached with the same expectations as other clients, at least not immediately. This perspective motivated additional training for placement officers and sometimes the decision to deviate from the usual procedures, routines, and services:

[The refugees were asking] why the job center now? Why, why, why? […] But it’s an all-round service. And you really have to change the language you use. We found out very quickly that the migration-specific cultural training […] and the fact that we no longer use administrative language make things easier. (Interview with leader of a refugee team)

We expected the different organizational responses to generate different impacts on the micro level and identified two action types of SLBs: the first most likely related to the standard procedure, the second to special teams.

The formalist: Normalization work within administrative limits

The first action type, the formalist, typically works in job centers that have integrated refugees into the standard procedure. Formalists adopt the institutional goals of quick placement in work and rapid termination of welfare receipt as their own action program regarding refugees. For them, success means fast placement, which indicates an externally driven understanding of effectiveness that is primarily oriented toward meeting administrative targets. Consequently, the formalist does not pursue a long-term perspective with biographical foresight in the work with refugees. As one placement officer explained, “we cannot pay attention to sustainability.” Accordingly, formalists do not see the broader issue of social integration of refugees as part of their remit, maintaining the bureaucratic principles of distance and impersonality.

This approach focuses on the integration of refugee clients into the established activation system, that is, their normalization, irrespective of their specific needs and vulnerabilities. They are expected to behave like standard clients. However, as many refugees do not quite fit the pattern and hamper the SLBs’ professional practice (most notably regarding the achievement of placement targets), they can easily turn into a problem for the formalist to cope with. As a result, these advisors perceive them as problematic clients rather than as clients with problems. This becomes most evident where problems in working with refugees are attributed to their recalcitrance, lack of motivation, and refusal to work:

What I always say is that the most important obstacle to placement […] is the language. Then you have education, educational background, and then motivation. If they knew some German, and had education at secondary school level and if they had any motivation, my way of thinking and supporting the refugees would look totally different today. But these three things aren’t given, even with people who’ve taken a language course, some of them for two years. They don’t learn it. Don’t want to. And they know exactly: no German, no work. (Interview with placement officer)

As this quote illustrates, the formalist interprets language acquisition as an overall indicator of a client’s willingness to cooperate. Consequently, quality of language courses or cases of acute impairment of refugees’ learning ability—due to psychological stress, for example—remain largely unconsidered. Language acquisition then becomes the key to distinguishing between the good, employable clients and those who cause problems:

Because if someone can’t adapt or basically has problems getting on, that already shows up in the language course […]. If he gets into trouble there, it’ll be difficult with a job too, but if he gets on well in the language course, I think it’ll work with jobs too. So far, that’s been the case. (Interview with placement officer)

Further, some advisors generalized based on sorting refugees according to their ethnic origin:

Syrians, and in some cases Afghans as well, are very interested in education, and some of them want to learn, too […] and Iranians. They also want to. […] People from Eritrea and Somalia don’t understand our goals at all. (Interview with placement officer)

Such classifications together with the perception of clients as the problem and the narrow focus on quick placement can motivate very selective activation efforts. When working with refugees who are assessed as motivated and job ready, the formalist uses the instruments available and offers individualized support in the hope of a quick placement.

However, these advisors described their room for maneuver in supporting refugees as narrow. One placement officer recalled a situation in which he refused a refugee’s request for a costly support measure. He defended himself as follows:

It’s not enough just to be useful […] That would certainly be useful […] but it doesn’t work that way. (Interview with placement officer)

Refugees who are difficult to work with were discouraged by standardized services that do not meet their needs or were blamed when support measures were not completed successfully. Refugees were then often perceived as stubborn or uncooperative, and were either sidelined or put under pressure with harsh monetary sanctions:

Meanwhile, I’m working with sanctions, and I hope that I can get him with the money. Because at some point he has to realise it doesn’t work the way he thinks it does. Then we have two options: either he does it the way I think and really tries to pull himself together, or he—I don’t know—he moves away. He doesn’t have any other choice. Because if he can’t afford the rent here anymore and has nothing to eat, then… (Interview with placement officer)

For the formalist, the legitimacy of sanctions is unquestioned even though refugees may misunderstand (or not understand) the expectations placed on them or the legal consequences of their behavior. In general, formalists do not focus their counseling practice on raising awareness and explaining complex legal procedures to refugees.

While formalists are basically in line with their superiors and consequently show little self-authorization regarding managerial demands, they face practical problems in daily encounters with refugees which their superiors hardly understand. One placement officer, for instance, complained about the superiors’ lack of knowledge regarding the actual difficulties of working with refugees. In this and other cases, expectations from above regarding the meeting of placement targets coupled with ignorance about what really happens at the street level put SLBs under pressure. A sense of personal failure was particularly pronounced when placement officers were confronted with an unfavorable local labor market that offered few living wage jobs (e.g. sampling point D, Hesse). In this situation, they reported very few successful placements. In contrast, in a positive labor market situation advisors placed refugees quickly but mostly in unskilled jobs (e.g. sampling point C, Bavaria). Both perspectives indicate that success for the formalist largely depends on labor demand as an exogenous limit to activation.

Some of these advisors were aware of the unintended consequences of their actions. They emphasized that the primacy of rapid placement can result in refugees reappearing at the job centers when the labor market situation deteriorates or if the working conditions were poor. Others observed silent opt-outs, that is, refugees who leave the job centers before being placed. As the SLBs barely knew their clients, they speculated as follows:

We also had a relatively large number of drop-outs […] This year it was a matter of filling the support measure [with clients] and suddenly half the people were gone, who then moved to […] who knows where. I don’t know what prompted them to do that. Because they simply left. So it could be that it was fear of the language course or of the support measure. It could also be that they got a job there. (Interview with placement officer)

These placement officers were well aware that placement in poor jobs and opt-outs can lead down a path that offers little chance of sustainable employment. However, not considering this to be part of their mandate, they did not prevent refugee clients from taking such paths:

But our job is to get people into work. And of course we can’t stop them [from taking a bad job] just because we say it will have bad consequences for the clients. I don’t have to do that because then we wouldn’t be able to do our job. (Interview with placement officer)

The mentor: Enabling clients, transcending limits

The second action type, the mentor, typically works in special refugee teams. In contrast to formalists, who primarily regard their refugee clients as unemployed welfare recipients, mentors view them as future citizens. Aware of the social and cultural prerequisites of labor market participation, they conceive of activation as empowering refugees to become self-reliant and capable of orienting themselves in the receiving society. The institutional goal of rapid termination of welfare receipt, therefore, is not a priority. Accordingly, the criteria by which mentors assess the success of their own work go beyond quick entry into employment and the meeting of placement quotas. This approach is supported by one team leader who emphasized:

If they [the refugee clients] find out what they want on their own, we already consider that to be a success, because we can […] build on that. (Interview with leader of a refugee team)

What is characteristic of the mentor is a high degree of problem sensitivity. Advisors were aware of the personal fates and burdens of the refugees, including trauma, difficult housing situations, or social isolation—aspects largely blanked out by the formalist. Advisors also emphasized the need for learning and enculturation on the way toward social integration. The recognition of both problem dimensions—personal fates and burdens as well as cultural distance—promotes a counseling approach oriented toward the specific life situation of each client and focusing on education and development.

Furthermore, mentors understand activation as a process on a level playing field in which clients are seen as self-aware and self-determined. It is about creating the willingness to participate through trust, personal conviction, and motivation. As one placement worker succinctly put it, “When they see that you take them seriously, they get involved.” The following quote illustrates the possible effects of this eye-level approach:

Of course, the timing’s always difficult beforehand [regarding how long an appointment is going to take], because sometimes there’s a problem. Or someone says, “Well, I didn’t pass my language exam because yesterday I found out that a bomb went off at home in my village in Syria”. And then they sit here and even apologize for it. So, maybe that language exam they failed takes second place for now, doesn’t it? You can take it again, and then you can improve on it. But first of all, there’s an issue that has to be dealt with first. (Interview with placement officer)

This quote shows that the mentor is situationally more concerned with the clients’ personal burdens than with formal compliance. It also shows that the client has developed a sense of commitment to the advisor through a relationship of trust. It is a good example of a functioning working alliance and illustrates that the mentor tries to mitigate the client’s feelings of guilt through a compassionate response and willingness to deviate from routines and guidelines, rather than by applying pressure. Finally, the mention of time issues points to a structural problem—the standardized workflow—that all SLBs have to cope with.

Many advisors saw adherence to formal process guidelines, such as regarding the duration of appointments, as a major obstacle in the process of empowering clients. They demonstrated a high degree of self-authorization in regard to managerial and organizational demands:

So, there are guidelines, of course (laughs). I don’t follow them, to be honest, I do it the way I think is right. It’s the result that counts. (Interview with placement officer)

Sometimes, this also meant foregoing activation, even when rules or standard procedure called for it:

Yes, but it [the standard procedure] doesn’t suit the one or the other [client]. And then—I have to be honest, and the bosses know this—I just take the liberty, so to speak. I take the liberty of saying: He’s not going to this training course, he has something else to do at the moment. […] And he’s not pushed into something that he’s not going to do and doesn’t want, and [that] then pulls him down because it’s just not what he needs at the moment. (Interview with placement officer)

The mentor also demonstrates a high degree of linguistic and cultural sensitivity in the counseling process. Many advisors involved cultural mediators in their work to ensure that clients really understand the complex bureaucratic procedures and institutional expectations, such as those embodied in the legally binding action plans, for example. At the same time, these frontline workers were reluctant to impose sanctions on refugee clients if the latter did not fulfill their obligation to cooperate. One advisor, for instance, recalled having withdrawn a sanction when it turned out that hidden trauma had caused resistance and not unwillingness to cooperate, as initially supposed.

The mentor’s activation efforts are characterized by foresight in the placement of refugees regarding their biographies and prospects. In contrast to the formalist, the mentor tries to dissuade refugees from rushing into poor jobs, as this could lead to unstable work biographies. Some team leaders strongly encouraged such a sustainable approach:

So that’s more the goal—that we try to get people into skilled jobs. […] Because, quite honestly, the kitchen assistants, if they actually want to work in the kitchen, we place them so quickly, you couldn’t even count to three. […] But placing them in skilled jobs, that’s the kind of hurdle or burden that I also […] tell my staff: “We have to do that. Keep that in mind.” (Interview with leader of a refugee team)

Similarly, mentors try to identify individual potential, even when clients have no (easily recognizable) professional skills that correspond to German job profiles—again encouraged by their team leaders:

Okay, the profession [of this client] simply doesn’t exist [in Germany]. But he […] can do something. Please see what you can do with this man for three months. Use your contacts with employers, and so on. And that usually leads to something. (Interview with leader of a refugee team)

In that regard, team leaders also highlighted the importance of regular team exchange and described that new counseling techniques appropriate to the requirements of refugees were jointly developed.

The mentors’ perspective on effectiveness is grounded in their understanding of their own role. The aim of promoting the conditions for refugees’ self-determined orientation in Germany extends the target point of activation far beyond job placement. This is evident in the presentation of success ranging from relationship-building with clients, over refugees who have built valuable networks, to refugees’ self-determined identification of work- and life-related goals.

Some advisors also reported numerous placement successes, even with refugees who faced multiple barriers to labor market integration. Others clearly differentiated between the effectiveness of their own approach on the one hand and the difficulties of meeting bureaucratic success criteria on the other, again highlighting the long-term nature of activation work with refugees:

Of course, all that should happen, but it’s very difficult—we still have too many hurdles to overcome before we’re ready to achieve those numbers. (Interview with placement officer)

Discussion and conclusion

The aim of this article was to explore the responses of German job centers to the refugee challenge at the organizational and individual levels. We have identified two types of social action: the formalists, with their bureaucratic understanding of activation work, and the mentors, who adapt to their refugee clients with an approach based on empathy and trust. While the types mirror the state-agent and citizen-agent narrative (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, Citation2022), our findings goes further. They indicate that the two action types are not random but shaped by the respective organizational setting: either the standard procedure or special teams.

The special unit approach proved to be an appropriate response to the refugee challenge, as it can encourage SLBs to search for new ways to support their refugee clients. We find a pattern of authorized rule bending according to which problem-sensitive SLBs feel directly or indirectly authorized to interpret rules flexibly and work for the client. Self-authorization is fostered by problem-sensitive superiors and new organizational structures at the local level that in many ways signal the specificity of activation work with refugees. Authorized rule bending is an expression of professional agency based on in-depth case knowledge and exchange in teams, which is promoted more strongly in specialized units than in the standard procedure.

By showing how local organizational structures that facilitate interactions with refugee clients are positively associated with empathetic approaches toward clients and by highlighting the role of supervisors as mediators of organizational structure, this paper extends recent insights from the international literature on frontline work with refugees that commonly explain rule bending as individual resistance to managerial demands or policy guidelines (Belabas & Gerrits, Citation2017b; Eriksson & Johansson, Citation2022; James & Julian, Citation2021). Moreover, our findings advance SLB research with its growing interest in the question of how formal and informal working environments and relationships can powerfully shape street-level practice (Peake & Forsyth, Citation2021; Raaphorst & Loyens, Citation2020; Siciliano, Citation2017).

Our analytical framework, the activation rhombus, and the derived dimensions of activation efforts (see and ) proved to be promising tools to explore the links between coping mechanisms at the organizational and individual levels. Future research should advance such reflections to increase our understanding of “nested influences, such as individuals in organizations” (Gofen et al., Citation2019, p. 345) in the complex field of social interaction between migrants and the state. Another relevant question emerging from our finding on nested agency is: What structures the structure? It is an important task for further research to understand more systematically what factors at the macro and meso levels have shaped the decision for or against organizational restructuring (e.g., governance processes, historical legacies of regional labor markets, servant leadership characteristics, etc.) in this moment of crisis and such times in the future.

Finally, unpacking the inherent ambiguities of the two configurations (specialized-mentorist and standardized-formalist) leads us to consider the wider implications of our findings for the inclusion/exclusion of refugees as mediated by state bureaucracy. The specialized-mentorist configuration works to overcome the limits of activation and to prevent the emergence of a public service gap by explicitly acknowledging the deservingness of refugees (Jilke & Tummers, Citation2018) and through a language-sensitive approach (Holzinger, Citation2020) while at the same time preparing the preconditions for refugees’ self-determined social positioning in the host society. While inclusionary in nature, this approach risks being too paternalistic at times and may sometimes underestimate the need of some refugees to earn money quickly. This could become particularly problematic in constellations where refugee clients shy away from disappointing their caring mentors (see Whitworth, Citation2016, regarding the contradictions and implications of paternalism in a neoliberal system).

In the standardized-formalist approach, the goal of rapid labor market integration requires refugees to assimilate to the demands of the system quickly. Formal bureaucratic criteria then lead SLBs to distinguish between cooperative (good) and recalcitrant (difficult) clients, and subsequently to the common action pattern of creaming and parking (Kaufman, Citation2020). Following Hupe and Buffat (Citation2014), these advisors have to do “more with the same” as they face an extra workload and new demands. They can easily become frustrated by seemingly unmotivated clients, demanding superiors with little problem sensitivity, and their own awareness of limited success. As indicated by the feedback loops in , their own demotivation can, in turn, reinforce prejudice and negative views of clients (constitutive dimension of activation efforts), lead to lower commitment (substantive dimension), and reduce activation successes even further (outcome-related dimension). While the formal activation targets and the interest of many refugees in getting into work quickly may coincide, the long-term risk of marginalization is high. We can expect opt-outs by disappointed clients, but also revolving-door effects and a group of refugees who become the new long-term unemployed because they are not adequately addressed by the activation system. In addition to the risk of biographical fates and breaks in employment trajectories, the standardized-formalist configuration thus carries the broader risk of reinforcing social exclusion if refugees feel formally labeled and see themselves as outsiders (Borrelli & Bochsler, Citation2020; Schierup et al., Citation2015). Therefore, following up on our findings by examining the manifest and latent effects of early bureaucratic contacts on migrants’ integration trajectories is a promising avenue for future research (Belabas & Gerrits, Citation2017a; Kyriakides et al., Citation2019).

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Uwe Flick, Shahed Naji, Anna Lena Schilling, Kristina Seidelsohn and Thomas Verlage (all Free University Berlin) who were commissioned to conduct parts of the interviews. We are also grateful to all research participants in the job centers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

References

  • Belabas, W., & Gerrits, L. (2017a). Constraints and facilitators for successful integration: How bureaucratic contacts affects migrants’ pathways. International Journal of Social Science Studies, 5(7), 54–65. https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v5i7.2496
  • Belabas, W., & Gerrits, L. (2017b). Going the extra mile? How street-level bureaucrats deal with the integration of immigrants. Social Policy & Administration, 51(1), 133–150. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12184
  • Bonin, H., et al. (2021). Begleitevaluation der arbeitsmarktpolitischen Integrationsmaßnahmen für Geflüchtete: Schlussbericht. (Forschungsbericht 587). Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH.
  • Borrelli, L. M., & Bochsler, Y. (2020). Editorial: Governing the poor – Migration and poverty. Zeitschrift Für Sozialreform, 66(4), 363–385. https://doi.org/10.1515/zsr-2020-0016
  • Brodkin, E. Z. (2011). Policy work: Street-level organizations under new managerialism. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 21(Supplement 2), i253–i277. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq093
  • Brodkin, E. Z. (2021). Street-level organizations at the front lines of crises. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 23(1), 16–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2020.1848352
  • Brücker, H., Kosyakova, Y., & Vallizadeh, E. (2020). Has there been a “refugee crisis”? New insights on the recent refugee arrivals in Germany and their integration prospects. Soziale Welt, 71(1-2), 24–53. https://doi.org/10.5771/0038-6073-2020-1-2-24
  • Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales. (2011). Nationaler Aktionsplan zur Umsetzung des Nationalen Integrationsplans: Abschlussbericht des Dialogforums 3 „Arbeitsmarkt und Erwerbsleben“. https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/a187-nip.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
  • Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. (2017). Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2016: Asyl, Migration und Integration.
  • Castles, S. (2010). Understanding global migration: A social transformation perspective. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(10), 1565–1586. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489381
  • Castles, S., de Haas, H., & Miller, M. J. (2014). The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world. (5th ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Crage, S. (2016). The more things change…Developments in German practices towards asylum seekers and recognised refugees. German Politics, 25(3), 344–365. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2016.1193159
  • Creutzburg, D. (2016). Tausende neue Stellen – öffentlicher Dienst rüstet auf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 11. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/fluechtlingskrise-tausende-neue-stellen-oeffentlicher-dienst-ruestet-auf-14008655.html
  • Dittmer, C., & Lorenz, D. F. (2021). Disaster situation and humanitarian emergency: In-between responses to the refugee crisis in Germany. International Migration, 59(3), 96–112. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12679
  • Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. The Academy of Management Review, 14(4), 532–550. https://doi.org/10.2307/258557
  • Eriksson, E., & Johansson, K. (2022). Street-level bureaucrat in the introduction programme – Client-centred and authority-centred strategies to handle challenging working conditions. Nordic Social Work Research, 12(5), 698–715. https://doi.org/10.1080/2156857X.2020.1869063
  • Evans, T. (2013). Organisational rules and discretion in adult social work. British Journal of Social Work, 43(4), 739–758. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcs008
  • Gofen, A., Sella, S., & Gassner, D. (2019). Levels of analysis in street-level bureaucracy research. In P. Hupe (Ed.), Research handbook on street-level bureaucracy. The ground floor of government in context. (pp. 336–350). Edward Elgar.
  • Hansen, M. P. (2019). The moral economy of activation. Ideas, politics and policies. Policy Press.
  • Holzinger, C. (2020). We don’t worry that much about language’: Street-level bureaucracy in the context of linguistic diversity. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(9), 1792–1808. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1610365
  • Hupe, P. L. & Hill, M. J. (2007). Street-Level Bureaucracy and Public Accountability. Public Administration, 85(2), 279–299. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00650.x
  • Hupe, P. L., & Buffat, A. (2014). A public service gap: Capturing contexts in a comparative approach of street-level bureaucracy. Public Management Review, 16(4), 548–569. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2013.854401
  • Hupe, P. L., & Hill, M. J. (2016). ‘And the rest is implementation.’ Comparing approaches to what happens in policy processes beyond Great Expectations. Public Policy and Administration, 31(2), 103–121. https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076715598828
  • Hupe, P. L., & van der Krogt, T. (2013). Professionals Dealing with Pressures. In M. Noordegraaf and A. Steijn (Eds.), Professionals Under Pressure: The Reconfiguration of Professional Work in Changing Public Services (pp. 55–72). Amsterdam University Press.
  • James, I., & Julian, R. (2021). Policy implementation and refugee settlement: The perceptions and experiences of street-level bureaucrats in Launceston, Tasmania. Journal of Sociology, 57(3), 522–540. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783320931585
  • Jilke, S., & Tummers, L. (2018). Which clients are deserving of help? A theoretical model and experimental test. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 28(2), 226–238. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy002
  • Johnson, M., Martínez Lucio, M., Grimshaw, D., & Watt, L. (2021). Swimming against the tide? Street-level bureaucrats and the limits to inclusive active labour market programmes in the UK. Human Relations, 76(5), 689–714. https://doi.org/10.1177/00187267211045037
  • Kaufman, J. (2020). Intensity, moderation, and the pressures of expectation: Calculation and coercion in the street-level practice of welfare conditionality. Social Policy & Administration, 54(2), 205–218. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12559
  • Konle-Seidel, R. (2017). Strategies and targeted measures to support integration of refugees into the German labour market: Host country discussion paper – Germany. European Commission.
  • Knapp, B., et al. (2017). Beratung und Vermittlung von Flüchtlingen (IAB Research Report No. 5/2017). Institute for Employment Research. https://doku.iab.de/forschungsbericht/2017/fb0517.pdf.
  • Kyriakides, C., McLuhan, A., Anderson, K., & Bajjali, L. (2019). Status eligibilities: The eligibility to exist and authority to act in refugee-host relations. Social Forces, 98(1), 279–302. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soy109
  • Lang, C., Pott, A., & Shinozaki, K. (2021). Organisations and the production of migration and in/exclusion. Comparative Migration Studies, 9(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-021-00274-w
  • Liedtke, M. (2022). National welfare and asylum in Germany. Critical Social Policy, 22(3), 479–497. https://doi.org/10.1177/026101830202200306
  • Lindbekk, T. (1992). The Weberian ideal-type: Development and continuities. Acta Sociologica, 35(4), 285–297. https://doi.org/10.1177/000169939203500402
  • Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: The dilemmas of the individual in public service. Russel Sage Foundation.
  • Loyens, K., & Maesschalck, J. (2010). Toward a theoretical framework for ethical decision making of street-level bureaucracy: Existing models reconsidered. Administration & Society, 42(1), 66–100. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399710362524
  • Mahoney, J., & Thelen, K. (2010). A theory of gradual institutional change. In J. Mahoney and K. Thelen (Eds.), Explaining institutional change: Ambiguity, agency, and power. (pp. 1–37). Cambridge University Press.
  • Maynard-Moody, S. & Musheno, M. (Eds.) (2022). Cops, teachers, counselors: Stories from the front lines of public service (2nd ed.). University of Michigan Press.
  • Mushaben, J. M. (2017). Wir schaffen das! Angela Merkel and the European refugee crisis. German Politics, 26(4), 516–533. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2017.1366988
  • Öchsner, T. (2017). Der große Job-Flop. Süddeutsche Zeitung. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/integration-ein-euro-job-flop-1.3469454
  • Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods. SAGE.
  • Peake, G., & Forsyth, M. (2021). Street-level bureaucrats in a relational state: The case of Bougainville. Public Administration and Development, 42(1), 12–21. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1911
  • Raaphorst, N., & Loyens, K. (2020). From Poker Games to Kitchen Tables: How Social Dynamics Affect Frontline Decision Making. Administration & Society, 52(1), 31–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399718761651
  • Ratzmann, N., & Sahraoui, N. (2021). Conceptualising the role of deservingness in migrants’ access to social services. Social Policy and Society, 20(3), 440–451. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746421000117
  • Rice, D. (2012). Street-level bureaucrats and the welfare state : Toward a micro-institutionalist theory of policy implementation. Administration & Society, 45(9), 1038–1062. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399712451895
  • Sandfort, J. R. (2000). Moving Beyond Discretion and Outcomes: Examining Public Management from the Front Lines of the Welfare System. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10(4), 729–756. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024289
  • Schierup, C., Krifors, K., & Slavnic, Z. (2015). Social exclusion: Migration and social vulnerability. In M. Dahlstedt & A. Neergaard (Eds.), International migration and ethnic relations (pp. 200–226). Routledge.
  • Schram, S. F., Soss, J., Fording, R. C., & Houser, L. (2009). Deciding to discipline: Race, choice, and punishment at the frontlines of welfare reform. American Sociological Review, 74(3), 398–422. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240907400304
  • Schütze, C., & Johansson, H. (2020). The importance of discretion for welfare services to minorities: Examining workload and anti-immigration attitudes. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 79(4), 426–443. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12410
  • Scott, P. G. (1997). Assessing determinants of bureaucratic discretion: An experiment in street-level decision-making. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 7(1), 35–58. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024341
  • Siciliano, M. D. (2017). Professional networks and street-level performance: How public school teachers’ advice networks influence student performance. The American Review of Public Administration, 47(1), 79–101. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074015577110
  • Swedberg, R. (2018). How to use Max Weber’s ideal type in sociological analysis. Journal of Classical Sociology, 18(3), 181–196. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X17743643
  • Trauner, F. (2016). Asylum policy: The EU’s “crises” and the looming policy regime failure. Journal of European Integration, 38(3), 311–325. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2016.1140756
  • Tummers, L. L. G., Bekkers, V. J. J. M., Vink, E., & Musheno, M. (2015). Coping during public service delivery: A conceptualization and systematic review of the literature. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(4), 1099–1126. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muu056
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2021). Refugee data finder. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/
  • Whitworth, A. (2016). Neoliberal paternalism and paradoxical subjects: Confusion and contradiction in UK activation policy. Critical Social Policy, 36(3), 412–431. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018315624442
  • Wright, S. (2016). Conceptualising the active welfare subject: Welfare reform in discourse, policy and lived experience. Policy & Politics, 44(2), 235–252. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557314X13904856745154
  • Yin, R. K. (2017). Case study research and applications: Design and methods (6th ed.). SAGE.
  • Zacka, B. (2017). When the state meets the street: Public service and moral agency. The Belknap Press of Harvard.