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Mainstream Euroskepticism: Trend or Oxymoron?

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Abstract

This paper asks where Euroskepticism can be found in the party systems of the European Union. The literature suggests that anti-European parties are generally parties of the opposition, on the ideological fringes, or relatively small. A cross-national analysis of party positions confirms that Euroskepticism is primarily a fringe phenomenon, concentrated on the ideological extremes and among opposition parties. The results suggest that the post-Maastricht decline in public support for the EU has not led to a general adoption of Euroskeptic positions by the major governing parties of Europe. Important exceptions to this generalization do, however, exist. Euroskepticism is unusually strong among the center-right parties in the UK, France, and Poland. Given that decisions in the EU are often made by procedures that permit single states, or fairly small coalitions, to block action, any introduction of Euroskepticism into the mainstream of any party system can have serious consequences for the entire union.

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Notes

  1. By combining the prefix ‘euro’ (meaning somehow related to Europe) and the word skepticism (‘an undecided, inquiring state of mind, doubt, uncertainty’ — Webster's Unabridged 1913), we arrive at ‘euroscepticism.’ As a political label, the advantages over ‘Europhobe’ (‘phobia’: an exaggerated usually inexplicable and illogical fear of a particular object, class of objects, or situation’ — Merriam Webster online) are clear. The genesis of euroskepticism can be the object of controversy. While many would follow Flood (2002) in identifying Euroskepticism with British political discourse since the 1990s, there are however other claimants. Hylarides asserts that ‘whoever thinks “euroskepticism” is a British invention, should brush up on his knowledge of European history’ (2001, 225). But in claiming strong anti-integration credentials for the Netherlands, he does not effectively dispute the English origins of the term. Gallic pride notwithstanding, the French variant ‘Euroskeptique’ appeared in dictionaries only in 1992. (Chambers Harrap Publishers website, accessed 10 May 2004 http://www.chambersharrap.co.uk/harrap/centenary/nineties.php) ‘Euroskeptic’ in France faces serious competition from the term ‘souverainiste’ which was already in widespread use in Quebec. The positive stress in souverainist (pro-sovereignty) suggests a somewhat different concept than the aloof ‘skeptic’. But in everyday usage the terms appear interchangeable.

  2. Perhaps the only circumstance where this four-fold matrix is likely to be useful would be during a debate over the restructuring of the current institutions of the EU in order to increase or decrease their supranational character. Given the recent pace of institutional reform, this analytic distinction may deserve closer scrutiny.

  3. One may speculate that some pro-European parties sit in Euroskeptic groups because national rivals (Fine Gael, Italian Liberals) already sit in the ‘correct’ group.

  4. Incumbency is related to Katz and Mair's cartel party model, with a few important distinctions. They consider opposition parties to be part of the cartel if these parties are committed to maintaining the existing party system and norms of political behavior. Parties outside the cartel are trying to change the parameters of the political contest. If opposition parties criticize the government, protest parties criticize both the opposition and government, trying to displace first the opposition, and then the incumbent cabinet. Lacking a good measure of ‘protest-ness’ or cartel membership, I cannot examine this distinction among types of opposition parties.

  5. The indicator of left right ideology has been scaled to range from 0.0 (far left) to 1 (far right).

  6. The sole hard Euroskeptic party in office was the French PCF. France also saw a soft Euroskeptic (Chevenement) in the Jospin cabinet, but Chevenement's MDC is unfortunately not in the expert survey data set.

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  1. Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, 240 Stubbs Hall, Baton Rouge, 70803, LA, USA

    Leonard Ray

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Ray, L. Mainstream Euroskepticism: Trend or Oxymoron?. Acta Polit 42, 153–172 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500189

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