![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Between 1974 and 2005, a majority of states became democratic for the first time in history. However, a global democratic recession began in 2006 and has persisted – and deepened – over the past 14 years. Not only have average levels of freedom (or democratic quality) been declining globally and in most parts of the world, but the pace of democratic breakdown accelerated and the number of democratic transitions declined, particularly in the past five years. Democratic regression is particularly visible among the G-20 countries and other most populous and geopolitically weighty countries, 19 of which have declined in freedom during the democratic recession, with only two improving. The principal method of democratic regression has been incremental strangulation of democracy by elected (typically populist) executives who gradually eviscerate institutional checks, political opposition, independent media, and other forces of scrutiny and resistance in civil society. Weak and declining rule of law has predisposed regimes to democratic regression, enabling ambitious rulers to hollow out political competition. But international factors have also been crucial, generating common economic and social stresses while lifting the constraints and lowering the risks autocrats face as they inaugurate or accelerate the slide into authoritarianism.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Huntington, The Third Wave.
2 Plattner, Democracy without Borders?, 22.
3 Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?”
4 Huntington, The Third Wave, 92–6.
5 Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy;” Diamond, “Developing Democracy,” 42–9.
6 My annual count of the number of electoral democracies in the world is based on my own research and dataset assessing whether the citizens of a country were able to choose and replace their leaders in free and fair elections, with the minimum accompanying rights of opposition, speech, press, and assembly necessary in order for elections to be free and fair. For further definition on this standard, see Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 24–6, and Elklit and Svensson, “What Makes Elections Free and Fair.”
7 Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 56–87.
8 Levitsky and Way, “The Myth of Democratic Recession.”
9 One of the interesting and little-studied aspects of global democratization is the relationship between size and democracy. While there does not appear to be a general and continuous relationship between population size and democracy, there is a striking distinction between very small states (under one million population) and larger ones. Very small states are much more likely than larger ones to be democracies. The gap is even larger with respect to liberal democracy, and in both respects it has been growing. In 1999, 72% of very small states but only 51% of larger ones were democracies. By 2019, the disparity had grown to 87% and 48% respectively. The disparity was much more dramatic for liberal democracy, 60% of very small states and only 27% of larger states. And that has also grown, to 74% vs. 31% in 2019.
10 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2020.”
11 Rupnik, “Hungary’s Illiberal Turn;” Bankuti, et al., “Disabling the Constitution.”
12 Fomina and Kucharczyk, “Populism and Protest in Poland.”
13 Ganguly, “An Illiberal India?”
14 Shin, “South Korea’s Democratic Decay.”
15 Morgenbesser, “Cambodia’s Transition to Hegemonic Authoritarianism.”
16 Lemière, “The Downfall of Malayia’s Ruling Party.”
17 Wong, “Democracy in Crisis.”
18 Soyinka, “Lessons from Nigeria’s Militarized Experiment,” Obe, “Nigeria’s Emerging Two-Party System?”
19 McCoy and Somer, “A Theory of Pernicious Polarization.”
20 Kenney, Populism and Patronage.
21 For a more detailed overview, see Diamond, Ill Winds, 15–39.
22 Müller, What Is Populism? Galston, Anti-Pluralsim.
23 Diamond, Ill Winds, 64–5.
24 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 608–42; Huntington, The Third Wave; Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 111–6.
25 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad and Critical Mission.
26 Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 136–42.
27 Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment.”
28 Diamond, Squandered Victory.
29 Carothers, “Is the U.S. Giving Up?”
30 Lynch, “After the Arab Spring.”
31 Diamond, “Impact of Economic Crisis.”
32 On the latter point, and the finding for a “cultural backlash” driving the illiberal populist wave, see Norris and Inglehart, Cultural Backlash.
33 Diamond, Ill Winds.
34 National Endowment for Democracy, “Sharp Power”; Walker, “What Is Sharp Power?”
35 Diamond and Schell, China’s Influence and America’s Interests, 5.
36 Schwirtz and Borgia, “How Russia Meddles Abroad.”
37 Pei, “A Play for Global Leadership.”
38 Lim and Bergin, “Inside China’s Propaganda Campaign.”
39 Trofimov, “Europe’s Face-off with China”; Erlanger, “Global Backlash against China.”
40 Diamond, Ill Winds, 141.
41 Diamond, “Democracy vs. the Pandemic.”
42 Shin, “South Korea’s Democratic Decay,” 101.
43 Mourdoukoutas, “Duterte Is Turning Philippines.”
44 Dibbert, “The Rajapaksas Own Sri Lanka.”