Abstract
This article analyzes the impact of a mixed electoral system on the party system in the Italian case. A review of the two main qualitative dimensions, time and actors, suggests that the electoral reform of 1993 had no impact on party fragmentation and entailed a weak tendency toward electoral – not party – bipolarization. The real consequences are more complex and ambiguous. The actual impact is the following: new electoral rules bring about anticipated elite reactions; these and subsequent experiences provide a specific institutional learning; the rules and consequent growth of competition open the way to electoral bipolarization; reduced fragmentation and consequent party bipolarization do not follow automatically – though not strongly encouraged by the rules, these also contrast with the increased salience of centre parties. Differently from the declared (and undeclared, but apparent) purposes of the reform, the party system remained basically similar to the previous one of polarized pluralism. This has been the principal unintended consequence of an unfortunate reform.