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Project, Communications, Policy Consultant.edit
* Publication sponsored by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (www.auswaertiges-amt.de) The long-standing disagreements between NATO and Russia have been left unresolved for decades. In 2014 they finally escalated into an outright... more
* Publication sponsored by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (www.auswaertiges-amt.de)
The long-standing disagreements between NATO and Russia have been left unresolved for decades. In 2014 they finally escalated into an outright confrontation on the European continent, in which most European countries are now involved. Armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, information warfare, along with a military buildup – these developments signalize clearly that European security is in danger today.
If the OSCE is to resolve this crisis, there needs to be more than a high-level dialogue among the OSCE participating States on the future of European security. It could be years before such a dialogue would bring results and a way out of the dangerous confrontation would be found. Until then, this dialogue should be complemented by the OSCE’s work on the ground, through its field operations, targeted at preventing new conflicts similar to that in Ukraine.
This work is particularly needed in the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus where the lines of geopolitical confrontation are drawn today. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – over the fate of these six states a particularly intense struggle has unfolded. While they have been developing closer relations with NATO and the EU, the example of Georgia in 2008 has shown that Russia will oppose the Western influence in its neighbourhood. The more recent example of Ukraine has further demonstrated that the increasing instability in Europe puts even the states without ‘frozen conflicts’ on their territories at risk of an armed conflict that could lead to civil war and partition.
The OSCE and its field operations have been slow to respond strategically to these new challenges. In contrast to the field operations in the Western Balkans, the OSCE operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are much smaller and have lower budgets. Unlike the OSCE field operations in Central Asia, they do not have explicit conflict prevention mandates focusing instead on the resolution of already existing ‘frozen conflicts’. Moreover, in three of the six countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia – there is no OSCE field operations at all.
This chapter will present the evidence of why the risk of new armed conflicts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus is real. It will then argue that the OSCE should respond to the challenge by, firstly, enlarging its field operations in Moldova and Armenia, secondly, re-establishing the field operations in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, and, thirdly, tasking all field operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus with conflict prevention.
The long-standing disagreements between NATO and Russia have been left unresolved for decades. In 2014 they finally escalated into an outright confrontation on the European continent, in which most European countries are now involved. Armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, information warfare, along with a military buildup – these developments signalize clearly that European security is in danger today.
If the OSCE is to resolve this crisis, there needs to be more than a high-level dialogue among the OSCE participating States on the future of European security. It could be years before such a dialogue would bring results and a way out of the dangerous confrontation would be found. Until then, this dialogue should be complemented by the OSCE’s work on the ground, through its field operations, targeted at preventing new conflicts similar to that in Ukraine.
This work is particularly needed in the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus where the lines of geopolitical confrontation are drawn today. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – over the fate of these six states a particularly intense struggle has unfolded. While they have been developing closer relations with NATO and the EU, the example of Georgia in 2008 has shown that Russia will oppose the Western influence in its neighbourhood. The more recent example of Ukraine has further demonstrated that the increasing instability in Europe puts even the states without ‘frozen conflicts’ on their territories at risk of an armed conflict that could lead to civil war and partition.
The OSCE and its field operations have been slow to respond strategically to these new challenges. In contrast to the field operations in the Western Balkans, the OSCE operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are much smaller and have lower budgets. Unlike the OSCE field operations in Central Asia, they do not have explicit conflict prevention mandates focusing instead on the resolution of already existing ‘frozen conflicts’. Moreover, in three of the six countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia – there is no OSCE field operations at all.
This chapter will present the evidence of why the risk of new armed conflicts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus is real. It will then argue that the OSCE should respond to the challenge by, firstly, enlarging its field operations in Moldova and Armenia, secondly, re-establishing the field operations in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, and, thirdly, tasking all field operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus with conflict prevention.
Research Interests:
Eastern European Studies, European Studies, Russian Studies, International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, and 51 moreInternational organizations, International Security, Conflict, Crisis Management (Political Science), Crisis Management, Security Studies, Critical Security Studies, Russian Politics, European Security and Defence Policy, Central Asian Studies, Russian Foreign Policy, European Union, Post-Soviet Studies, Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Management, Russian Studies (in Area Studies) and the Caucasus, Conflict prevention and resolution, Peace Studies, Russia, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding, Central and Eastern Europe, Peacebuilding, Peace and Conflict Resolution, Regional Security, International and Regional Organization, Peacekeeping operations, Human Rights, International Development, Diversity, Training, Capacity Building, Peacebuilding, Corporate Social Responsibility Youth Leadership, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Analysis and Resolution, South Caucasus, US Foreign Policy, US-Russian relations, Geopolitics of South Caucasus, OSCE, NATO-Russian Relations, International Conflict Management, Security and Peace Studies, Politics and International relations, UN peacekeeping operations, Russian Foreign Policy, Caucasus and Central Asia, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Diplomacy and international relations, Conflict and Conflict Management, Relations Internationales, Peace and Conflicts Studies, Conflict and Conflict Resolution, OSCE Ukrainian Chairmanship, Peace and Security In Fragile States, Romanian Chairmanship of OSCE, European Affairs, NATO crisis management, Civilian Crisis Management, and Conflict and Conflict Managmnt
Until the late 15th century, the term “crisis” – from Greek krinein “to decide” – denoted the turning point of a grave illness, a change that leads either to patient’s recovery or death. Today, an international crisis, if not averted, can... more
Until the late 15th century, the term “crisis” – from Greek krinein “to decide” – denoted the turning point of a grave illness, a change that leads either to patient’s recovery or death. Today, an international crisis, if not averted, can result in the death of millions of people.
Since the end of World War II, the UN has played a major role in preventing political disagreements, military accidents, ethnic and religious tensions from turning into large-scale armed conflicts. The OSCE has been one of the key organizations to share this responsibility with the UN, focusing primarily on the European continent. The OSCE’s crisis management capabilities began to grow in the early 1990s. During this process, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and of the Soviet Union triggered an ad hoc creation of OSCE field operations, now a key instrument in the OSCE’s crisis management toolkit. The first long-term OSCE operation – the Observation Mission of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina – commenced in 1992. Soon after, further field operations were established in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Since their creation, OSCE field operations have demonstrated mixed results in their crisis management work. The OSCE Centre in Bishkek was unable to avert the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan. Not only did it turn violent, but also its death toll was higher than in the previous 1990 Kyrgyzstan’s inter-ethnic clashes. Tajikistan, Moldova and FYROM, despite their earlier history of civil and separatist wars, have only experienced minor conflicts in recent years. And many crises were averted from turning violent, not without the contribution made by the OSCE field operations in these three countries. Finally, Ukraine, which had not gone through even a minor armed conflict during its late Soviet and post-independence history, since 2014 has been coping with a crisis that has already taken almost 10,000 lives, and which the OSCE was not able to prevent.
The central research question of this study is: Why have some OSCE field operations been more effective in crisis management than others?
This study aims at providing academic advice that could inform policy and aid in improving the OSCE’s operation and strategy. It, therefore, analyzes the factors that lie firmly in the hands of the OSCE and of its participating States: the mandates of OSCE field operations and the resources at their disposal.
The study is based on document and secondary literature analysis. Where necessary, we requested information from respective OSCE field operations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a brief overview of the current policies and the state of the art in international crisis management in general and the role of OSCE field operations therein in particular. In the second chapter, we present our theoretical model of crisis management success. The third chapter lays out the case selection, research method and design. The fourth chapter is a case study that offers empirical evidence to assess our hypothesis. The final results and the main findings of the study are summarized in the conclusions.
Since the end of World War II, the UN has played a major role in preventing political disagreements, military accidents, ethnic and religious tensions from turning into large-scale armed conflicts. The OSCE has been one of the key organizations to share this responsibility with the UN, focusing primarily on the European continent. The OSCE’s crisis management capabilities began to grow in the early 1990s. During this process, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and of the Soviet Union triggered an ad hoc creation of OSCE field operations, now a key instrument in the OSCE’s crisis management toolkit. The first long-term OSCE operation – the Observation Mission of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina – commenced in 1992. Soon after, further field operations were established in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Since their creation, OSCE field operations have demonstrated mixed results in their crisis management work. The OSCE Centre in Bishkek was unable to avert the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan. Not only did it turn violent, but also its death toll was higher than in the previous 1990 Kyrgyzstan’s inter-ethnic clashes. Tajikistan, Moldova and FYROM, despite their earlier history of civil and separatist wars, have only experienced minor conflicts in recent years. And many crises were averted from turning violent, not without the contribution made by the OSCE field operations in these three countries. Finally, Ukraine, which had not gone through even a minor armed conflict during its late Soviet and post-independence history, since 2014 has been coping with a crisis that has already taken almost 10,000 lives, and which the OSCE was not able to prevent.
The central research question of this study is: Why have some OSCE field operations been more effective in crisis management than others?
This study aims at providing academic advice that could inform policy and aid in improving the OSCE’s operation and strategy. It, therefore, analyzes the factors that lie firmly in the hands of the OSCE and of its participating States: the mandates of OSCE field operations and the resources at their disposal.
The study is based on document and secondary literature analysis. Where necessary, we requested information from respective OSCE field operations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a brief overview of the current policies and the state of the art in international crisis management in general and the role of OSCE field operations therein in particular. In the second chapter, we present our theoretical model of crisis management success. The third chapter lays out the case selection, research method and design. The fourth chapter is a case study that offers empirical evidence to assess our hypothesis. The final results and the main findings of the study are summarized in the conclusions.