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FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Political Culture of Democracy in Honduras and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity

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2012

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
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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call “LAPOP Central,” first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
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Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
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and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project,
and
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We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the *AmericasBarometer* began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the *AmericasBarometer*. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The “Marginalization in the Americas Conference” was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we

had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the www.americasbarometer.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the *AmericasBarometer Insights Report No. 73*, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and

requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample.¹ Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.²

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the AmericasBarometer project.

¹ The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

² All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		 
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Caribbean	
Belize	
Dominican Republic	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  <p><i>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</i></p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> </div>
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Suriname	
Trinidad & Tobago	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		CIPPEC ^{PP}
Bolivia		
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador	 	
Paraguay		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Uruguay		
Venezuela		



Canada and United States			
Canada	 UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL	 YORK UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE.	 THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY	 MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES	 PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina 

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We also owe special thanks to Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes of the CCP at the Universidad de Costa Rica, who designed the EQ Mobile software for smartphones. Jeisson provided tireless, round-the-clock user support over the course of many months of questionnaire preparation and field work. In addition, his eagle eye caught important questionnaire design issues on a number of occasions.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contract and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration, performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K.

Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
Summer 2012

Executive Summary

This round of the AmericasBarometer addresses the gap that exists in terms of opportunities and resources available to citizens throughout the region such as the impact discrimination has on participation in the political system and on different democratic attitudes.

Although inequality has decreased in Honduras, traditionally recognized as one of the countries in the region with high levels of poverty, economic inequality continues to persist to the point of influencing social inequalities. As is demonstrated in this report, the level of human development in Honduras is considerably reduced because of the persistent inequality.

It can be seen in Honduras that an equality of opportunities does not exist among those respondents who are older, have darker skin tones, reside in rural areas or have lower levels of education. Furthermore, the analyses included in this study reinforce the idea that the education level of one's mother determines opportunities such as education level and income. With respect to the latter, and contrary to other countries in Latin America, gender is not a determinant of income level among those respondents who reported being employed at the time of the interview.

One issue that this report addresses are attitudes toward discrimination and support for policies that might help overcome inequalities. For this, attitudes vary greatly, depending on the subject. Honduras has relatively low levels of agreement with the idea that men should have preference in the labor market. In contrast, Honduras is one of the top countries, after Paraguay, where citizens believe in the benefit of affirmative action in terms of racial quotas for education. However, Honduras, along with the United States and Haiti, has a low average level of agreement that the State should play a role in reducing economic inequality.

Another topic that is analyzed are the effects of discrimination on political legitimacy and participation. We find that education level and wealth, objective measures of inequality, have an impact on internal efficacy. However, Honduras is the country with the third lowest average level of internal efficacy after Brazil and Paraguay. Likewise, Honduras is also one of the countries with the lowest average levels of external efficacy. At the same time, after Trinidad & Tobago, Brazil, and Costa Rica, Honduras holds very low levels of perceptions of the representativeness of political parties. People with darker skin tones have less belief in the representativeness of parties. Wealth marginalization decreases protest participation; the wealthier protest more than the poor after controlling for education level and political interest. With respect to community participation, Honduras is one of the countries with the highest levels of participation in the Americas. However, those who do not have any formal education or did not complete a primary-level education tend to participate less in the community than those who obtained a university-level education.

Chapter Four analyzes the relationship between discrimination, corruption, and crime. Of the 26 countries included in the AmericasBarometer study, Honduras is among the ten countries with the highest levels of corruption perception. The perception of corruption in Honduras has increased significantly since the AmericasBarometer started measuring the phenomenon in 2004. Just as with perceptions of corruption, in terms of actual corruption victimization, Honduras is among the countries of the Americas with the highest levels.

Despite being one of the most violent countries in the world, according to various sources, Honduras has average levels of perceived insecurity lower than those perceived in less violent countries, and much lower than its neighbor El Salvador. Levels of crime victimization increased significantly between 2004 and 2006, and then decreased in 2008. Since the 2008 round, levels of victimization have again increased, slightly in 2010 and significantly in 2012. In spite of the increase in levels of crime, we observe reductions in the level of perception of insecurity since 2008. It seems that there is a disconnect between perception and experience in Honduras that may be very interesting to explore.

Chapter Five analyzes levels of political legitimacy and tolerance while examining the determinants that explain such levels. Perhaps this is the chapter with the most worrying news. The results presented in this report indicate that education level, corruption victimization and both perceptions of insecurity and corruption are all significant negative determinants on support for the political system. We also discover that Honduras is the country with the lowest average level of political system support among the 26 countries included; 20 points less than those countries with the highest average levels. Between 2010 and 2012, political system support has decreased by almost 20 points. Furthermore, Honduras has a low level of political tolerance for civil rights in the Americas. The results we present here show a dramatic reduction in political tolerance between 2010 and 2012. Honduras has the lowest percentage of citizens in the Americas with the combination of high tolerance and high system support. Between 2010 and 2012, the level of system support and political tolerance has plummeted in Honduras by almost 20%.

With respect to trust in the country's institutions, the Evangelical and Catholic Churches receive the highest levels of trust, followed at a distance by the military. None of the State institutions receive average levels of trust that exceed the midpoint on the 0 to 100 point scale. Honduras has the lowest average level of support for democracy among all the countries that make up the AmericasBarometer.

In terms of the local level, 13.5% of Hondurans interviewed report attending municipal meetings. The levels of participation in municipal meetings has decreased since 2006, but increased in 2012, even though the level continues to be lower than what was observed in 2006. Only 9.6% of Hondurans petitioned the municipality. Of those who submitted a request, 65.4% report that the municipality did not resolve their problem. In general, evaluations of local government are relatively positive. The evaluation of local governments has remained stable since 2004.

Approval of the job of the president and satisfaction with the services provided by local governments are significant factors in explaining changes in support for the political system. As satisfaction with local services increases, so does political system support.

Chapter Seven analyzes electoral behaviors and attitudes toward Honduran political parties. As can be seen, half of those interviewed in 2012 report not having voted in the 2009 elections. Only 39.2% of those interviewed identify with a political party, the rest do not identify with any party. Of those who do identify, 88.2% identify with one of the two traditional parties, *el Partido Nacional* or *el Partido Liberal*. Party identification has been decreasing since 2008. Party dealignment and low levels of system legitimacy that we observe, are reflective of the percentage of citizens who would not vote if

there were elections; more than 50% of Hondurans report that they would not vote if the elections had been held during the week they were interviewed.¹

The results presented in Chapter Eight show the significant deterioration in levels of system support and support for democracy, and a slight decrease in the satisfaction with the functioning of democracy since the political crisis in 2009. Hondurans do not support the removal of the president of the Republic by either Congress or the Supreme Court even when he has violated the law. Only a minority of Hondurans believe that return of Manuel Zelaya to the country increased levels of democracy in Honduras.

Data from the AmericasBarometer show that while average levels of citizen trust in the central government is at 36.5 points on the 0 to 100 point scale, trust in municipalities is 46.6 points. Our statistical model shows that trust in local government is the most important factor in explaining political tolerance and support for democracy in Honduras. Additionally, trust in the municipality is the second most important factor, after trust in the national government for explaining system support.

Finally, the report suggests that the second most important factor in strengthening democratic values in Honduran society is satisfaction with services provided by the municipality. In Honduras, citizens are, on average, more satisfied with local services than they are with the job performance of President Porfirio Lobo. We observe that as satisfaction with local services increases, so too does system support and tolerance toward individuals who disagree with the form of government.

¹ It is important to note that the results of party identification do not include data for the new parties that had not yet been legalized when the survey was conducted. The new parties are: *el Frente Amplio Político Electoral en Resistencia* (FAPER), *El Partido Anticorrupción* (PAC), *el Partido Libertad y Refundación* (LIBRE), *el Partido Alianza Patriótica* (ALIANZA PATRIÓTICA).



Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.

**Part I:
Equality of Opportunities and
Democracy in the Americas**

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

With Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. The life-chances that individuals have are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often conditioned and either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.¹ More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.²

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.³ Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime (Fajnzylber et al. 2002).⁴

Inequality is not just a social or economic problem, but it is also a fundamentally *political* one, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows

¹ Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

² López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

³ De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank.

⁴ Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Loayza, Norman. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

that inequality creates public discontent,⁵ fosters political instability and violence,⁶ and decreases trust in democracy.⁷ LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic “glue” that holds together democratic societies.⁸ Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of “perfect” equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime.⁹ However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers’ educational attainment alone.¹⁰ Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in Haiti and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the region. After assessing objective

⁵ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*

⁶ Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti, 1996. “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” *European Economic Review* 40: 1203-1228; Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 425-52.

⁷ Uslander, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. “Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement.” *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.

⁸ Córdova, Abby B. 2008. “Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

⁹ Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who *perceives* that they have been discriminated against? Moreover, we examine what citizens think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

This section explores previous research on inequality in Haiti and in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure 1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.¹¹ The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.




Figure 1. Gini Index by World Region

Figure 2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.¹² As we can see, levels of inequality are, on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean.

¹¹ See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562.

¹² The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0




Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure 3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world, by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).¹³ The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and at the top percentile of the global income distribution. Inequality in Haiti exceeds that even in Brazil and is the highest in the Americas, at 59.5 (measured in 2001).¹⁴

represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000.

¹³ Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3865.

¹⁴ World Bank Indicators. < <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>> (accessed July 18, 2012).




Figure 3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution

However, levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.¹⁵ In Figure 4 we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).

Inequality has long been an issue for Haiti. Available data consistently place Haiti among the 10 most unequal countries. As we described above, in 2001 the World Bank reported a Gini coefficient of 59.5, compared to 54.4 for Honduras and 60.1 in Brazil for the same year. While inequalities have been improving in these two countries over the past decades, there are no reasons to believe that Haitian inequalities have improved over the same period. On the contrary, the political turmoil that the country endured and the repeated natural disasters it had to suffer have certainly contributed to maintain inequalities at the level observed in 2001.

¹⁵ López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.




Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas

How will inequality continue to evolve over the next decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since the changes in inequality are arguably attributable to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.¹⁶ Given the past and current political and economic difficulties experienced by Haiti, and the ongoing global economic recession, the prospects for improving inequalities in the country are rather limited, at least in the short-run. The enthusiasm with which donor countries have made financial commitments to the reconstruction of the country in the aftermath of the January 2011 earthquake has not fully been met by concrete actions. Reconstruction efforts have been slow to start and only part of the promised funds has arrived.¹⁷

Economic inequality goes hand in hand with pronounced social inequalities in the Americas. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).¹⁸ Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which “discounts” each dimension of the HDI based on a country’s level of inequality. Figure 5 demonstrates the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute

¹⁶ Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

¹⁷ Farmer, Paul. “5 Lessons From Haiti’s Disaster.” *Foreign Policy*, December 2010; Sontag, Deborah. “Years After Haiti Quake, Safe Housing Is Dream for Multitudes.” *The New York Times*, August 15, 2012.

¹⁸ The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index running from 0 to 1, and measuring a country’s average achievement in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and income (standard of living). Calculations are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).



and relative terms, the gap in Latin America and the Caribbean between the average HDI and the average IHDI is the largest in the world.




Figure 5. Human Development Index Adjusted for Inequality in Six Regions of the World

Figure 6 presents the total loss in human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this measure, the Latin American and Caribbean region has lost 26% of its human development potential because of persistent inequality. As one of the most unequal countries of the region, Honduras has lost 32% of its human development potential, a much higher loss than the regional average, and similar to the average found in sub-Saharan Africa.




Figure 6. Overall Loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality

However, the HDI and IHDI measures mask important differences in the levels of human development within the country. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the Human Development Index for the Honduran municipalities that are included in the AmericasBarometer sample. As can be seen below, Honduras has large variation in the Human Development Index at the municipal level; while there are municipalities with an mid-level average human development score of 0.56, there are also municipalities considered to be highly developed with a human development score of 0.794.

Table 1. Municipal Human Development Index in Honduras

Media	Desviación Estándar	Mínimo	Máximo
0.6976424	0.0625559	0.56	0.794

Figure 7 allows one to discern differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with advantaged (light green bar) and disadvantaged (dark green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.¹⁹ For example, the graph shows that a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica has a probability of completing sixth grade on time that register at just over 80%, while his/her peer with an advantaged background is only slightly more likely (the probability is close to 90%) to complete sixth grade on time. By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have lowest probabilities of achievement. At the same time, most countries of Central and South America stand out as highly unequal. This is the case for Honduras as well, not far from Peru, where the probability of children from disadvantaged families complete the sixth grade at a rate of only 15% in comparison to the higher probabilities of almost 90% of students from advantaged families finishing on time.

¹⁹ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.




Figure 7. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas

III. Equality of Social and Economic Opportunities in Honduras: A Perspective from the AmericasBarometer

In the previous section we presented a short review of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. However, it is now fitting to ask who are the most affected by inequality and what do citizens of the Americas think regarding the equality and inequality of opportunity in the region. Some of the questions included in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer allow us to evaluate to what point certain measures of opportunity such as income level and education vary according to race, gender, and the family type of the respondent. We also evaluate respondents' opinions to understand who thinks they have been discriminated against, the degree to which they feel these inequalities are natural or undesirable, and what public policies they would approve to rectify such inequalities.

Research on discrimination in the Americas seeks to document the extent to which people with the same skills and the same education, but are members of different social groups, are paid in an

unequal manner or if they have different employment opportunities.²⁰ Such discrimination can occur because of negative attitudes toward the discriminated group or because of what is called “statistical discrimination”, that is, employers conclude that the members of certain marginalized groups have inferior desirable skill levels or human capital. These studies on discrimination indicate that, in general, women are paid less than men with similar characteristics, especially women belonging to ethnic groups and marginalized races.²¹ However, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggest that some forms of discrimination manifested in the labor market may be less than what is commonly thought in many Latin American countries.²²

The first social division that we examine in this study is that which exists between men and women. According to experts on gender inequality in the Americas, although a gap still exists, inequality in participation in the labor force is beginning to diminish.²³ The region has also experienced a growing inequality between the genders in terms of class composition.²⁴ Furthermore, the distance in the levels of education attained by the genders has decreased considerably.²⁵ According to the majority of studies, there is a tendency toward the reduction of gender discrimination.

Next, we examine divisions between racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities in the region continue to experience both economic and social inequalities, particularly in terms of salary and types of occupation and employment.²⁶ This type of discrimination tends to be more present in regions with lower levels of socioeconomic development. Furthermore, discrimination by race or ethnicity is more common than gender discrimination in the

²⁰ Para una reseña de la literatura, véase Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, y Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

²¹ Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. “Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil.” *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. “Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil.” *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. “The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach.” *Económica* L (1-2).

²² Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza y Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. “Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile.” En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong y Andrea Moro. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, y Urzúa. 2009b. “An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile.” En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía y Rajiv Sethi. 2009. “Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study.” En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan y Máximo Torero. 2009. “Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru.” En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

²³ Abramo, Laís y María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. “Women’s Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America.” *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

²⁴ Hite, Amy Bellone, y Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 “Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure.” *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

²⁵ Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, y Claudia C. Piras. 2007. “The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean.” SSRN eLibrary (April).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

²⁶ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

Americas.²⁷ However, because of the lack of quality data, it is difficult to measure with precision discrimination by race and ethnicity.²⁸

Finally, we examine the manner in which family type and social class influence social and economic opportunities in the Americas. For many years, differences between social classes have been considered a strong motivator for inequality in Latin America and other parts of the continent; more so than race or gender. Recent studies, many of which were cited in the previous paragraph, have shown the importance of these factors in the opportunities available to citizens. However, the statistical analysis suggests that family origin continues to be the strongest social characteristic that affects access to opportunities in the Americas.²⁹

We begin the analysis of the 2012 AmericasBarometer by examining what Honduran citizens from diverse racial groups, both genders and social class, as well as those who live in urban areas versus rural ones, said about their economic and social resources. The questionnaire used by the AmericasBarometer in 2010 and 2012 includes various questions that allow us to establish to which social groups respondents belong. We evaluate the racial and ethnic groups of the respondents in various ways.³⁰ The question **ETID** simply asks respondents to identify themselves as white, mulatto, mestizo, or black. Additionally, beginning with the 2010 AmericasBarometer, and thanks to the support of Professor Ed Telles of Princeton University, we use an innovative color palette.³¹ At the end of each interview, the interviewer is asked to discretely evaluate the skin color of the respondent's face on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) according to the color palette (see Figure 6). The 2010 data corresponding to the **COLORR** variables helped us in understanding the different experiences of citizens of various groups in the region (see, for example, the Special Reports presented in Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to the continued support of Professor Telles, we were able to use the color palette for the 2012 round.³²

²⁷ Branton, Regina P., y Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

²⁸ Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²⁹ See, e.g., Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, y Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* (73). Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³⁰ The complete text of all questions of the questionnaire can be found in Annex C.

³¹ Telles, Edward, y Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid*.

³² En 2012, a skin color palette was used in 24 countries, with the exception of the United States and Canada. The skin color palette was used in 23 countries in 2010, excluding Haiti.



Figure 8. Skin color Palette Used in the AmericasBarometer

The 2012 questionnaire also includes questions about the social and economic resources of the respondents. As has been done in previous surveys, we include questions on education levels, family income, and household goods (for example, if the respondent has potable water in his or her home, flat-screen television, or vehicles). This last group of questions, known as the **R series**, is used to create an index of household wealth with five quintals, which is standardized by urban and rural areas for each country.³³

New questions regarding social and economic resources were also included in the 2012 round. For the first time, we asked those respondents who reported having a job at the time of the interview about their personal income (**Q10G**). Question **GEN10** examines income inequality within the home between married respondents or those who live with a partner.

³³ This variable is labeled as **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 dataset. For more information on this variable, see: Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators". *AmericasBarometer Insights* (6). Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
- (2) You earn less than your spouse;
- (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
- (4) You earn more than your spouse;
- (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
- (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP

In addition to the measurement of household wealth, the 2012 AmericasBarometer also includes various questions related to family origin. Question **ED2** asks about the education level of the respondent's mother. Furthermore, social class self-identification is measured with question **MOV1**, which asked respondents to identify the social class to which they belong—upper class, upper-middle class, middle class, lower-middle class, or lower class.³⁴

Finally, we included for all countries two new questions originally developed by the LAPOP team in Mexico with Yale University about food insecurity: **FS2** and **FS8**.³⁵ Together, these measures allow us to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in all the countries of the region.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.					
	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99

First, through the use of linear regression analysis,³⁶ we examine how gender, race, age, and urban-rural status affect education level in Honduras. Figure 9 shows that age, race, and area of residence are all good predictors of education level. More specifically, age has a negative relationship with education—in general, the older the respondent is, the lower the level of education attained. For example, the results show that respondents in the age range of “66 years or older” hold a level of education significantly lower than those in the 18-25 year old age range. At the same time, for those with darker skin tones, levels of education tend to be lower. Finally, area of residence has a positive impact, that is people who live in urban areas have higher levels of education.

³⁴ Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José and Rosario Queirolo. Forthcoming. Class Perceptions in Latin America. The cases of Colombia and Uruguay. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³⁵ These questions were asked to half of the sample for each country, that is, only half of the respondents received these questions.

³⁶ To facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed along the vertical axis. The dots represent the impact of the variable and the bars represent the confidence intervals. When the bars do not cross the vertical “0” line, said variable is statistically significant. This means that we can be confident that there exists a relationship between the independent and dependent variables that is not random. For more information on interpreting the figures, see page xxxi.




Figure 9. Determinants of Education Level in Honduras

Finally, we examine the ways in which family type or family origin affects education levels in Honduras. Item **ED2**, which measures family origins is not included in the multivariate regression model because it was only asked of half of the sample.³⁷ Conducting the analysis using just half the sample would reduce the inferential capacity related to the effects of the other variables. However, Figure 10 presents the years of education attained by the respondent (y-axis) according to the level of education of his or her mother (x-axis) showing a positive relationship between a mother’s education level and that of the respondent. This difference is most stark when examining the differences between those respondents whose mothers have a high level of education and those whose mothers did not finish primary school. This finding reinforces the explanation that an individual’s access to opportunities are conditioned by the social and economic position of his or her parents.

³⁷ In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many of the new questions were asked only to half the sample in order to maximize space in the questionnaire.




Figure 10. Level of Education of the Mother as a Determinant of Education Level for the Respondent in Honduras

We should now ask if the same factors that are related to the education level of the respondent are also related to income level. How does income vary by age, race, gender, urban-rural residence, and family origin in Honduras? Figure 11 shows, through linear regression analysis, the determinants of personal income for those respondents who reported being employed at the time of the interview.³⁸ Different from other countries in Latin America, gender does not have a significant relationship with the income levels of Hondurans. As can be seen in the figure, age, education and area of residence are clear determinants of personal income, with education level being the strongest among them.

³⁸ Income (both Q10NEW: family income, Q10G: personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, each category corresponds to a higher range of income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.




Figure 11. Determinants of Personal Income in Honduras for those Respondents that are Employed

As we explain above, item **GEN10** asks married respondents or those who live with a partner about their personal income compared to that of their partner. Figure 12 presents the differences in income only between the men and women who reported being employed. In general terms, we can see that women receive less personal income than do men. That is, 48.4% of men report earning more than their spouse.




Figure 12. Income of the Respondent in Comparison to That of Their Partner in Honduras, for Those Who are Employed



Figure 13 presents personal income distributions for those who work by age, education level, and area of residence. A more detailed look at the results shows how education level has a positive impact on personal income, most notably among those respondents with a university-level education.




Figure 13. Personal Income in Honduras by Area of Residence, Education Level, and Age, for Those Who are Employed

Finally, we examine the extent to which family history affects personal income in Honduras. Consistent with results presented above, Figure 14 shows that the education level of the respondent's mother positively affects the personal income of the respondent.




Figure 14. Education Level of Mother as Determinant for Personal Income in Honduras, for Those Who are Employed

It can be said that the most basic resource for any citizen is food. If, as we have seen, personal income is not distributed equally in Honduras, can we expect food to be distributed equally? Figure 15 presents the results of a linear regression analysis seeking to understand the determinants of food insecurity. We sum the responses to questions **FS2** and **FS8** to create an index from 0 to 2. The higher values reflect a higher level of food insecurity.³⁹ As can be seen below, those with darker skin tones have, on average, higher levels of food insecurity. At the same time, we show in Figure 16 that compared to 18 to 25 year old Hondurans, citizens falling into the 46 to 55 year old age range are significantly more likely to have food insecurities.

³⁹ Remember that all these questions were asked to half of the respondents.




Figure 15. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Honduras




Figure 16. Age and Food Insecurity in Honduras

Who Reports being Discriminated Against?

Another way of examining social and economic discrimination is from the point of view of the victim. In 17 countries of the Americas, respondents were asked if they perceived having been a victim of discrimination. The series of questions, used for the first time in the 2008 round, was slightly modified and incorporated as optional items for each country during 2012:

Now, changing the subject, and thinking about your experiences in the past year , have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?					
	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98	

Figure 17 shows the percentage of citizens that report having been victims of discrimination in the workplace in countries where question **DIS3** was asked. As can be seen, Trinidad and Tobago, along with Haiti are the countries in the Americas that report the highest levels of discrimination in the workplace, or when respondents are looking for work. In Honduras, 10.9% of the population reports having been discriminated against in the workplace or in school. This result suggests that discrimination is still relatively high in Honduras, especially when compared to the low levels of Venezuela.




Figure 17. Self-Reported Discrimination in the Americas

Figure 18 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis examining the determinants of discrimination victimization in the workplace as reported by respondents in Honduras. As can be seen, self-reported discrimination in the workplace is not related to one's area of residence nor with skin color. This suggests that the perception of discrimination is not necessarily related with more objective measures of discrimination.⁴⁰ In contrast to findings from other studies, women are less likely to be discriminated against in the workplace in Honduras.

⁴⁰ Ñopo, et al. 2009. *Ibid.*




Figure 18. Determinants of Self-Reported Discrimination Victimization in the Workplace in Honduras

Public Opinion toward Racial and Gender Inequalities

Previous sections of this chapter have demonstrated that economic and social resources are not distributed equally among Honduran citizens in groups defined by gender, race, urban/rural status, and family history. However, we have not clearly outlined the reasons why such inequalities persist. In particular, we still have not examined the ways in which we can attribute the differences in the socioeconomic results to social norms or to discriminatory attitudes that exist in society. The 2012 AmericasBarometer included in its surveys various questions to evaluate the manner in which economic inequalities are related to general attitudes with respect to the roles of men and women in the economy and with respect to the economic achievements of different racial groups.

First, we examine relative social norms to the work performance of men compared to that of women. Many studies suggest that throughout the Americas there exists the attitude that the role of men and women in the labor force is different.⁴¹ In 2012, we asked respondents, on a scale from 1 to 7 if they agreed with, or not, the following statement:

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

⁴¹ Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented at the Conference *Marginalization in the Americas*, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



Figure 19 presents the average level of agreement with this idea in the Americas. Responses were recoded onto a scale from 0 to 100 to facilitate with its comparison to other variables. The Dominican Republic is the country in which there exists the highest average level of agreement with the statement that men should have preference in the labor market. In contrast to the United States and Canada, Honduras finds itself among the middle group of countries that accepts this idea, below the Dominican Republic where male priority in the labor market is most accepted.




Figure 19. Agreement that Men Should have Preference in the Labor Market in the Americas

The average level of agreement with this assertion does not allow us to examine the differences between the responses of Hondurans. Figure 20 presents the responses in more detail by returning to the original 1 to 7 scale. As can be seen below, 30% of Hondurans strongly disagree with the statement that men should have priority when looking for work. However, 15% of those surveyed report being very much in agreement with the statement.




Figure 20. Agreement that Men should have Preference in the Labor Market in Honduras

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also asked citizens in the Americas about their perception of reasons why there exist racial and ethnic inequalities. For this round, we asked the following question throughout all the countries of the Americas.⁴²

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?
 [Read alternatives, just one answer]
 (1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
 (3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 21 shows that the percentage of respondents that reported being in agreement that poverty is due to the “culture” of “people of darker skin tone”. As can be see, Guatemala is the country that leads the list, followed by Trinidad & Tobago, the Dominican Republic, and Peru. In contrast, Uruguay is where the smallest percentage of respondents report being in agreement that people of darker skin complexion are poorer than the rest of the population because of their culture. In Honduras, close to 20% of respondents reported being in agreement with this statement.

⁴² Only asked to half of the sample.




Figure 21. Percentage in Agreement that Poverty is Caused by “Culture”

IV. Public Opinion toward Common Proposals of Public Policy

What actions, if any, should governments in the Americas take with respect to the broad social and economic inequalities that citizens face? Answering this question goes beyond the scope of this report, and would require us to take positions in normative and implicit ideological debates which are of more concern to Honduran citizens than to the authors of this report. However, here we discuss in broad terms some of the most common public policy proposals and present the levels of public opinion toward them.

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked citizens their opinions of the role of the state in reducing inequality. Question **ROS4** seeks to understand if respondents agree with, or not, on the 1 to 7 scale, the following statement:

ROS4. The Honduran government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Answers to this question show, in abstract terms that citizens agree that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that governments should try to resolve. Here, we present the average level of agreement with this statement for each country of the region. As is done throughout this report, responses are recoded onto a 0 (“very much in disagreement”) to 100 (“very much in agreement”) scale. The average level of support for Hondurans exceeds 65 points on the 0 to 100 scale; comparatively speaking, Honduras finds itself close to the United States, where the average level of agreement with the statement fails to reach 50 points.




Figure 22. Average Level of Agreement that the State should Reduce Inequality in the Americas

Conditional Cash Transfers and Public Assistance Programs

In the past two decades, many of the region's governments have transformed their social assistance programs, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programs and keeping their children in school.⁴³ The most well-known and largest of these programs include *Oportunidades* in Mexico, *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, *Familias en Acción* in Colombia, and the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* in Argentina. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also widely expanded non-conditional social assistance programs. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America are seen as being effective strategies toward assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region. In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, "CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the groups and weight of children, especially among the smallest."⁴⁴ However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programs depends, in large part, on how such programs are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policy-makers to develop well-planned and effective programs.⁴⁵ These social assistance and CCT programs are widely attributed to help reduce inequality and poverty in some of the region's most historically unequal contexts.

In 2012, the AmericasBarometer measured levels of participation in public assistance and CCT programs in the region with a new question:

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

The levels of participation in social assistance and CCT programs vary significantly throughout the region. Figure 23 presents the percentage of respondents in each country of the region that reported someone in their household receives public assistance. Generally, few citizens of the countries of the Americas reported receiving public assistance. With the exception of Bolivia, where more than half reported receiving help from their government. As can be seen, Honduras is the last country listed, only 5% of those interviewed reported receiving public assistance. With this, we can confirm in comparison with the rest of the countries of the region, that in Honduras there do not exist many assistance programs of the style of, for example, *Bolsa Família* in Brazil.

⁴³ Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. "New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. "Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁴⁴ Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. "Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490.

⁴⁵ Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. "Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean." Social Protection Working Paper #0605. The World Bank.




Figure 23. Participation in Public Assistance Programs in the Americas

The 2012 AmericasBarometer offers us the opportunity to evaluate the opinions of citizens regarding CCT and other public assistance programs. Although the survey does not directly ask about *support* of such programs, question **CCT3** asks about attitudes toward those who receive this type of assistance.⁴⁶

CCT3. Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

Originally, the answers were coded onto a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 represents “very much in disagreement” and 7 “very much in agreement.” Figure 24 presents levels of agreement with this

⁴⁶ A divided sample of respondents answered this question.



statement in the Americas. The answers are recoded onto a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparison with other public opinion questions.




Figure 24. Average Levels of Belief that those Who Participate in Public Assistance Programs are Lazy in the Americas

At the top of the list is Argentina, where the average level of agreement among those interviewed with this statement is 63.7. However, Honduras is not very far from the top with an average level of agreement at about the midpoint, 50.2.

Affirmative Action

Another possible public policy solution that has awoken the interests of some areas in Latin America is affirmative action. Although the United States has a decades-long history with affirmative action, in Latin America it is a recent phenomenon and only has been seriously considered as a policy option in some countries with large percentages of African descendants.⁴⁷

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, a question was asked regarding support for affirmative action in each country in the region. The question **RAC2A**, put forward to half of the respondents in each country, asked the extent to which they were in agreement or disagreement with the following statement, on a scale from 1 to 7:

RAC2A. Universities should reserve space for students with darker skin tone, even though it will exclude other students. To what point do you agree or disagree?

Figure 25 examines support for affirmative action in the Americas. The responses were recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale to facilitate comparison with other public opinion questions. The figure shows that Honduras falls into the second spot among the other countries included, just behind Paraguay and at the same level as Argentina. Honduran citizens strongly support affirmative action in reserving space at universities for students of color. In contrast, and surprisingly, it is the United State where citizens are least in agreement with affirmative action even though it has been the country with the longest historical tradition in utilizing such policies.

⁴⁷ For more information on support for affirmative action in Brazil, see Smith, Erica Amy. 2010. "Who Supports Affirmative Action in Brazil?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* ,49. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion (LAPOP).




Figure 25. Support for Affirmative Action in the Americas

V. Conclusion

The large differences in life circumstances and in opportunities available to citizens of the Americas constitutes one of the more serious political, social, and economic problems for the governments of the region. Although inequality has recently diminished in many countries throughout the Americas that have historically had high levels of inequality, we have noticed that important differences in opportunities and access to available resources for citizens depends on their characteristics and where these characteristics fall within the social space of the country

In the first part of this chapter, we examined the magnitude of economic and social inequality in the Americas and reviewed data and other objective measures from previous research on inequality in Honduras. Although inequality has decreased somewhat in Honduras, traditionally recognized as one of the most unequal countries of the region, economic inequality continues to persist to the point of influencing social inequalities. As was seen above, the level of human development is significantly decreased because of persistent inequalities. The presence of inequality of opportunities is shown in academic studies that demonstrate the low probability among children of disadvantaged families in completing the sixth grade on time compared with children from advantaged families.

Who are those most affected by social and economic inequality in Honduras? In its 2012 round, the AmericasBarometer evaluated the extent to which opportunities such as income level and education vary by race, gender, level of wealth, and type of family to which the respondent belongs. In Honduras, we find that there does not exist an equality of opportunity among older respondents, those with darker skin color, and those who do not live in rural areas—all of whom have, on average, a lower level of education. At the same time, the analyses in this chapter reinforce the finding that the education level of one's mother determines opportunities in terms of education and income. With respect to this last point, and different from other countries in Latin America, gender is not a determinant of income level among those respondents who reported being employed at the time of the interview. However, when we examine income differences between men and women with a question asking about personal income compared with one's spouse or partner, we find that women receive less than men.

The AmericasBarometer also examined citizens' opinions in Honduras regarding inequality of opportunities in the region. We asked whether the respondent had been discriminated against and whether he or she felt that inequality was a natural phenomenon. For example, Honduras is one of the countries of the region with the highest percentage of citizens that believe that men should have preference in the labor market. This finding coincides with results from the chapter that—contrary to what was expected—women are less discriminated against than men in the workplace and when seeking employment.

With respect to the approval of public policies to rectify inequalities, Honduras is one of the first countries, after Paraguay, where there exists a high percentage of citizen who are in agreement with affirmative action in the case of racial quotas in education. However, this high level of approval is not found in other possible solutions. Honduras, along with the United States and Haiti, hold low levels of belief that the State should reduce inequality, in comparison with other countries in the Americas. This could, in part, explain why Honduras is one of the countries with fewest amount of citizens who report receiving public assistance.

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.¹ This measure of skin tone provides an arguably more objective measure of skin color than a question asking for individuals' racial identification.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.

Differences in Educational Achievement by Skin Tone in the Americas



95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.


Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.¹ While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.

As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.



¹The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.¹ The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.


The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

With Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to politics, examining how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. Chapter Two is thus divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits significant attention given its pertinence to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that might exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Perhaps beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.¹ An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.² Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.³

¹ Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

² Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

³ Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

Uneven voter turnout certainly has some concerning implications for the representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies. Unfortunately, biased turnout also seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al. (1995), not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting are actually *more* biased against certain groups.⁴ For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.⁵ Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation exist not only along lines of class or wealth, but also along gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.⁶ Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.⁷ Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labor.⁸ Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women are strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.⁹

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences

⁴ In the US, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

⁵ Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

⁶ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation Among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218..

⁷ Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 156-173.

⁸ Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730

⁹ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.

across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.¹⁰ In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.¹¹ Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous *women*, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.¹²

Unequal participation has very real consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day, it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's (2003) cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.¹³ In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g. education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more even processes of development.¹⁴

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.¹⁵ Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by which participation and representation go hand in hand.¹⁶ Thus, the effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

¹⁰ Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid.* Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. *Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States.* *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

¹¹ Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123-1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹² Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

¹³ Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129-2155

¹⁴ See also Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age.* Princeton University Press.

¹⁵ Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

¹⁶ Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section we intend to measure how unequal political participation is in the Americas using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. Although data from previous studies indicate the existence of considerable disparities between different social groups, this analysis begins with an open mind with respect to inequality of participation in the Americas. Especially given the lack of empirical evidence on this subject for Latin America and the Caribbean up to this point, it could be that participation rates are relatively equal between different socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

Electoral Participation

This chapter first examines inequalities in electoral participation in Honduras and throughout the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured with the question **VB2**. In those countries with parliamentary systems, the question is modified to ask about the most recent general elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential election in 2009?
(1) Yes, I voted (2) No, I did not vote (88) NS (98) NR

Figure 26 presents electoral participation by gender in the Americas. The figure clearly shows two things: in the first place there exist large inequalities in electoral participation within many countries of the Americas. While participation in Peru and Uruguay is among the highest in the region; it is the lowest in Honduras. It is important to note that in some countries in the region, voting is compulsory while in others, it is voluntary. These institutional differences certainly contribute in part to explaining the national variation in voter turnout in Honduras, where although voting is technically compulsory, there are no sanctions or consequences for not doing so. On the contrary, the consequences for not turning out to vote in Peru, Uruguay and Ecuador are among the harshest in the region.¹⁷ Second, the data from the 26 countries included in the AmericasBarometer show that participation rates between men and women are similar in all countries, including Honduras. It is worth noting that it is in the United States where men turn out to vote at higher rates than women; this difference is statistically significant.¹⁸

¹⁷ Arturo Maldonado. 2011. "Compulsory voting and the Decision to Vote" *AmericasBarometer Insights* (63). Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁸ It is worth mentioning that the United States is an anomaly in Figure 26 where men report higher rates of voting (86.8%) than women (77.65). There exist two anomalies. First, in the last elections in the United States, more women than men voted (66% and 62%, respectively), and second, levels of turnout in the survey were much higher than in reality, by about 18%. The overreporting is not unusual in recent presidential elections in the US. See the US Census Bureau's report, "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports," from 20 July 2009, <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html>, consultado el 21 de Julio de 2012, and the article by Allyson L. Holbrook and Jon A. Krosnick, "Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique," from February 2009, <http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf>, accessed 21 July 2012.




Figure 26. Gender and Electoral Participation in the Americas

We will now examine in more detail the inequalities of electoral participation in Honduras. Figure 27 presents the distribution of electoral participation by gender, wealth levels, education levels, and education levels of the respondent’s mother. These factors do not have statistically significant relationships with electoral participation among Hondurans.




Figure 27. Sociodemographic Factors and Voting in Honduras

Beyond Electoral Participation

Electoral participation is not everything. Certainly there exist infinite ways in which citizens can involve themselves in the democratic system beyond just voting in elections. The participation of different groups in other types of activities may or may not follow the same trends observed in electoral participation. The AmericasBarometer includes various questions that seek to understand citizen participation in political activities outside of voting. Among other issues, these questions examine how and with what frequency citizens communicate with their representatives and if they participate in certain community organizations. By analyzing whether groups differ in their participation in these political activities we can begin to obtain a general perspective of influence, or lack thereof of some sectors of society in the political process.

For many years, AmericasBarometer by LAPOP has included a series of questions that examines the frequency with which citizens participate in different community groups. In addition, in 2012, questions asking respondents whether they held leadership roles in these groups were also included. The questions pertaining to this subject are found in the **CP** series and are the following:



I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them... (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them... (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them... (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

After each question, to those respondents who reported having participated at least once or twice a year, interviewers then asked (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]

How do citizens in the Americas participate in community groups? Figure 28 examines this question. The right side of the figure presents the levels of community participation for each country in the Americas. Community participation is calculated as the average of responses to questions CP6, CP7, and CP8, adjusted onto a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 indicates never having participated in any group and 100 representing frequent participation in all groups. The left side of the figure presents the percentages of respondents for each country that report being leaders of a group.

On the one hand, community participation in Honduras is among the highest in the region, after Haiti, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. On the other hand, in Honduras, less than one in 10 people self-identify as a community leader. It is important to mention that Haiti is the country in the region with both the highest levels of community participation and with the highest proportion of citizens being community leaders; this contrasts with countries such as Argentina which appears on the bottom of both figures.




Figure 28. Community Participation in the Americas

Figures 29 and 30 examine the results of Honduras in more detail, showing the average levels of citizen participation by different sociodemographic characteristics. With respect to community participation, we can see that women participate more than men, a difference that is statistically significant. Similarly, it is notable that those who have no formal education or who did not complete primary levels of education tend to participate less in the community than those who attained a university-level education. However, a citizen’s placement on the wealth index does not serve as a determinant in predicting community participation among those interviewed; the same is true for the level of education of the respondent’s mother.

In contrast, the roles in leadership among respondents appears to be positively related with the mother’s education level. This suggests that people who view themselves as community leaders are those whose mother attained a university-level education compared with those whose mother received no formal education or attained a high school-level education. Furthermore, we can see that the level of education attained by the respondent has a direct relationship with holding a leadership role; respondents who hold a university-level of education have a higher probability of considering themselves as community leaders.




Figure 29. Sociodemographic Factors and Community Participation in Honduras




Figure 30. Sociodemographic Factors and Percentage of People with Community Leadership Role in Honduras

In addition to exercising their right to vote, many citizens also participate in activities related to political campaigns. Questions **PP1** and **PP2** are meant to measure citizen participation in these types of activities.

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**
 (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA

PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006?
 (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 31 shows levels of participation in activities related to political campaigns in the Americas. The left-hand side of the figure presents the percentage of citizens reporting having tried to persuade others either “frequently” or “occasionally”. The right side presents the percentage that reported having worked for a political campaign. With respect to persuasion, the United States is the country with the largest proportion reported having done so in the Americas; close to half of the citizenry claims to have tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. Honduras is, again, one of the countries with the lowest percentages in the Americas; only 12.1% of its citizens tried to convince others. Turning now to working for a candidate or party during the last election, as can be seen in the figure below, Suriname and Haiti lead the list of countries for this activity. In both of these countries, close to 18% of those interviewed worked for parties or candidates during the last election. Chile is the last country on the list where only two of every 10 citizens reported having worked for a candidate or political campaign.




Figure 31. Participation in Political Campaigns in the Americas

Next, we analyze the results of Honduras in more detail. In Figure 32, those instances where respondents reported trying to persuade either “frequently” or “every once in a while” were recoded as positive. As can be seen, there does not appear to be any relationship between sociodemographic factors such as education level, gender, or the level of wealth of the respondent and his or her propensity to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate.




Figure 32. Sociodemographic Factors and Persuading Others in Honduras

In Figure 33, we present the percentage of respondents from different groups that reported have worked for a political party or the campaign of a candidate during the most recent election. From a more detailed view, we can see that both level of wealth and level of education are positively related with participation in political campaigns. That is, those who belong to the highest wealth quintal and have university-level education participate more in political campaigns.




Figure 33. Sociodemographic Factors and Participation in Political Campaigns in Honduras

The previous analysis shows the existence of some inequalities in participation by gender. Notwithstanding, it is probable that the participation indexes vary according to the position of women in the labor market and in the family.¹⁹ Figure 32 presents the levels of participation by gender, and in the case of women, according to their status in the family and in the labor market. With a more detailed look at the data, we can see that the status of women in the family and in the labor market influences important differences with respect to men. That is, married women without personal income participate more in the community than men. However, men have a higher tendency of being leaders than women without a personal income; this difference is not statistically significant.

¹⁹ See, for example, Iverson, Torben and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.




Figure 34. Role of Gender on Participation in Honduras

These results do not tell us much about the relationship between race and participation in Honduras. Figure 35 presents the levels of each form of participation by skin color. In general, we see that the most frequent type of participation among Hondurans is political participation through voting in the last elections, followed by community participation, and finally working for parties or candidates. With that said, we can now see in detail the difference between skin color and participation; respondents whose skin complexion falls into the 9th and 11th positions tend to identify themselves as community leaders at higher rates than others although they do not work for parties or candidates. Finally, we can conclude independent of skin color, the different types of participation are not very volatile.




Figure 35. Skin Color and Participation in Honduras

III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

To what extent does the majority, or society in general, support equality of opportunity for minority groups? Support for equality of opportunity has important consequences. Citizens who believe that the woman’s place is in the home or that members of certain groups are not good political leaders are less likely to tolerate the participation of these groups in public life or to vote for candidates from said groups. In this section we review the results of various questions that seek to quantify the extent of discrimination against certain populations.

It should be mentioned that it is likely that responses to these question are victim to what studies of public opinion have labeled “social desirability bias,” that is, it is less likely that citizens show open support toward discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudices are considered a social taboo.²⁰ In other words, although in private some respondents may harbor discriminatory attitudes, when asked for a survey, they give the non-discriminatory, “socially desirable” response in order to avoid judgment by the interviewer. As a result, the levels of support for discriminatory attitudes in the report, based on these questions are probably lower than what exist in reality.

²⁰ Recent work on Latin America examine the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when dealing with the subject of vote buying through survey experiments (see, for example Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad K., de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio, y David W Nickerson. 2012. Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217).

Public Opinion toward Women Leadership

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included three questions to measure attitudes toward women in political leadership positions, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.²¹ The questions are the following:

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?			
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree	(4) Strongly disagree
(88) DK	(98) DA		
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?			
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) Both the same	
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A	
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?			
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) It does not matter	
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A	

Figure 36 shows the level of agreement by citizens for each country that men are better political leaders than women. As a point of reference, we see that Uruguay and Brazil are the countries that appear, on average, to having attitudes most favorable toward women in political leadership positions. On the other extreme, the citizens of Guyana and the Dominican Republic are those who express the highest levels of agreement that men are better political leaders than are women. Honduras finds itself toward the upper-middle with an average level of agreement of almost 38 points.

²¹ VB51 and VB52 were asked to a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.




Figure 36. Belief that Men are Better Political Leader than Women in the Americas

Public Opinion toward Leadership by Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked respondents about their attitudes toward people with darker skin tones holding political leadership positions, **VB53**.²²

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.
VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
 [Interviewer: “dark skin” refers to blacks, indigenous, “non-whites” in general]
 (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

²² Asked only to a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.



Figure 37 shows average levels of agreement with the statement for each of the countries of the Americas. Responses were recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale. As can be seen, Honduras falls toward the top of the list with a high level of agreement that people with darker skin tones are not good leaders. This value is not statistically significant from those of Chile and Bolivia, the two countries that fall above Honduras. On the contrary, Uruguayans hold the lowest level of agreement with this type of prejudice.




Figure 37. Belief that Politicians of Darker Skin Complexion are not Good Leaders in the Americas

Public Opinion toward the Political Participation of Homosexuals

As was the case in 2010, the 2012 AmericasBarometer includes the question **D5** which asks about attitudes toward homosexuals seeking public office.

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

Figure 38 shows the levels of agreement among citizens of the countries of the Americas with the statement that homosexuals be able to compete for public office. As point of reference, we can see that Canada and Uruguay are the countries where, on average, citizens hold the most favorable attitudes towards homosexuals in public leadership. On the other extreme, the citizens of Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana are those who express the most disagreement with this statement. Honduras finds itself above those countries with low tolerance toward homosexuals seeking public positions, with an average level of agreement of 24 points.




Figure 38. Support for Homosexuals being able to Seek Public Office in the Americas

Public Opinion toward the Political Participation of Disabled People

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question asking if people with disabilities should be able to compete for public positions.²³

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office?

Figure 39 presents the level of approval for people with physical disabilities being allowed to seek public positions. If we compare the high levels of approval in the United States and Uruguay, Honduras has a relatively low approval level with an average of 53.6 points with statistically significant differences in most countries. Haiti is the country with highest level of disagreement with this idea.




Figure 39. Support for People with Disabilities being able to Seek Public Office in the Americas

²³ Asked only to a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

IV. Public Opinion toward Common Public Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, at least with some indicators related to political participation, there exist important differences in the levels of participation between men and women, between distinct racial groups, and different social classes. However, if these results are reason for worry, there are also reasons to feel optimistic because the democracies have achieved many advances in terms of political equality. Furthermore, the differences do not exist in all places, that is, we could learn from countries where inequality is not as profound. Below, and based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys, we examine public opinion toward various potential solutions commonly used to reduce inequality in political participation.

Gender Quotas

A possible solution to the problem of inequality in participation and representation among women is the adoption of gender quotas that have been considered as an effective way of incorporating women into politics.²⁴ The general idea is that when more members of marginalized groups see people like them on the electoral ballot and in public positions, they will become more motivated to participate in politics. In Latin America, various countries have adopted gender quotas through laws that require that women occupy a certain percentage of seats in national legislative bodies. Unfortunately, as can be seen in Box 5, the evidence that gender quotas reduce inequality in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer includes question **GEN6** that allows us to measure the support of gender quotas throughout the Americas.²⁵

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

Figure 40 shows support of the adoption of gender quotas in the countries of the Americas. El Salvador is the country with the highest level of support for gender quotas for candidate lists of political parties. Honduras falls into an intermediate-low position on the list of countries with a level of support of 61.7 points; a figure that is statistically different from Brazil, Canada, and Trinidad & Tobago, countries with the lowest average levels of support.

²⁴ Desposato, Scott W. and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." <http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf>.

²⁵ Asked to a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.




Figure 40. Support for Gender Quotas in the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another possible solution to reduce inequality in political participation, that has received much attention in the literature, is compulsory voting.²⁶ While almost half of all countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have some type of compulsory voting law, the ways in which these laws are carried out varies considerably between one country and another. Costa Rica, for example, established a law that is almost never applied, while in Peru, not voting can limit access to certain public services.²⁷ One could expect that in countries where many people exercise their right to vote, electoral participation will be more equal. Unfortunately, recent research, such as that which appears in the report in Box 6,

²⁶ Lijphardt, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid.*

²⁷ Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

suggests that compulsory voting has not had the expected impact in terms of reducing inequality in electoral participation.

Reducing Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps obviously, one could think that the reduction of socioeconomic inequality and poverty could be sufficient to close the gap of political participation between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation throughout the hemisphere is the social class to which citizens belong. Furthermore, while participation of women in the labor market has a strong positive effect on political participation, socioeconomic status and education level may override any effect of gender or race in levels of participation.²⁸

At the aggregate level, academics have determined that political participation is less in places where there are high levels of economic inequality, which has particular relevance in Latin America, the most unequal region of the world.²⁹ Although the relationship between socioeconomic status differs enormously between different political contexts,³⁰ material wealth and education produce a positive impact in political participation in almost all democracies. In fact, it seems that economic development not only helps in reducing economic inequalities, but also inequalities in participation.

V. Conclusion

Despite the reduction of inequality in the last decades, this chapter has shown that in the Americas there continues to exist inequalities in certain important aspects of political participation. However, in relation with electoral participation, we did not find significant differences between men and women, between different education levels, wealth, or the education level of the mother of the respondent. It is important to emphasize that of all forms of political participation, electoral participation is the most frequent among respondents.

Honduras is one of the countries with the highest levels of community participation in the Americas. If we examine with more detail between social groups, we observe that social inequalities negatively affect the level of community participation among Hondurans. That is, those who do not have formal education or did not finish primary school tend to participate less in the community compared to those who hold a university-level education. At the same time, leadership roles among respondents appear to have a positive relationship with the education level attained by respondents' mothers. Alternatively, economic inequality also has an effect on distinct forms of participation. For example, Hondurans who belong to the highest wealth quintal and have university-level education participate more in political campaigns.

Finally, with respect to public opinion relative to the participation of disadvantaged groups in politics and in public positions, we can affirm that citizens of Honduras do not approve of, in general and in comparison with the rest of the countries of the Americas, political leadership of people with

²⁸ Iversen and Rosenbluth. 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid.*; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid*.

²⁹ Uslaner and Brown. 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working Paper.

³⁰ Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.



dark skin, the seeking of public positions by homosexuals, nor of people with disabilities; and they do not believe that women are better political leaders than men.


Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.¹ In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?

The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.



¹ To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.


Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Participation

This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwandt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php>.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women’s group meetings.¹

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas for the election of the party officials in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation.² The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials;



in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

¹ The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women’s group meetings, CP20.

² In 2014, there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.

Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.


Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

With Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

As we have seen, economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas are willing to report social and political attitudes that disfavor the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perceptions of their political systems and the democratic regime? Are there further consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.¹ Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.² On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect what is often called "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Some citizens have had previous contact with politicians, or their close friends and family members may have done so. These citizens may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences, whether favorable or unfavorable, with specific politicians.³ If politicians actually treat some groups better than others, citizens who have contact with politicians will draw conclusions from their own experiences,

¹ Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

² Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³ Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

leading to an association between group membership and external efficacy.⁴ In addition, citizens with a sense of collective identity – those who perceive that their fate is linked to that of the group– may well base their judgments of political leaders’ receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics, more generally.⁵

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.⁶ Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders’ ineffectiveness. This could lower evaluations of incumbents’ performance and what is often called “specific political support”: support for the particular people in office.⁷ When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing “diffuse support,” or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the 2010 AmericasBarometer found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.⁸

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.⁹ However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.¹⁰

⁴ For evidence on police officers differentially targeting citizens based on perceived social class, see Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheendar Venkataramani. 2010. “Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America.” *Latin American Research Review* 45 (1): 76-97.

⁵ Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. “An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality.” *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

⁶ Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. “Politics as a Vocation.” In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁷ Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

⁸ Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

⁹ Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. “Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?” *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

¹⁰ Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America.” Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. “The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination,” *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.



Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.¹¹ However, discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.¹²

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary (2000), on the one hand, finds little linkage between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other hand, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.¹³ And scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as “important rallying cries” during democratization,¹⁴ and raise “the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action.”¹⁵ It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.¹⁶

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes toward the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such more general attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

¹¹ Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

¹² Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹³ Cleary, Matthew. 2000. “Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women’s Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

¹⁵ Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

¹⁶ Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

II. Inequality, Efficacy and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included questions that seek to evaluate citizen perceptions regarding both internal and external efficacy, that is, questions on the representativeness of political parties. The following questions form part of the core series of questions in the AmericasBarometer (the first measures external efficacy and the second, internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Both questions are coded on a 1 to 7 scale; 1 signifies “very much in disagreement” and 7 signifies “very much in agreement.” Furthermore, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked participants to respond to question **EPP3** on a 1 (“none”) to 7 (“a lot”) scale. The three questions were recoded onto the 0 to 100 scale for the analyses discussed in this chapter.¹⁷

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

The questions that evaluate group characteristics and equality of opportunities are explored in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. The questions include measures of gender, skin color, household wealth, gender inequalities in the household, self-reported discrimination victimization in government offices, public places, and in the workplace.

We begin with an analysis examining the determinants of internal efficacy, **EFF2**, throughout the countries of the Americas. The analysis shows that there exists no impact of self-reported discrimination on internal efficacy. On the contrary, objective measures of inequality, such as level of wealth, do have an impact in that those who are considered more wealthy have a higher level of internal efficacy.

¹⁷ Asked to a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.




Figure 41. Internal Efficacy in the Americas

How do social inequalities and experiences with discrimination affect internal efficacy? Figure 42, through linear regression analysis, shows the association between internal efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences. The results show that personal experience with discrimination does not have an effect on internal efficacy. At the same time, sources of inequality such as wealth level, race, and gender also do not have an effect when we control for other factors. Education is a source of inequality and, as we would expect, the higher educated have higher levels of internal efficacy. Finally, as we would expect, those who report having more interest in politics also report having a better comprehension of the political issues of the country.




Figure 42. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Honduras

Figure 43 shows, in more detail, how sociodemographic and personal characteristics relate with self-reported levels of comprehension of the political system of Honduras. When we observe these relationships in more detail we find that those who belong to the highest wealth quintal and those who have a university-level education report understanding political issues better compared to those who do not have the same level of wealth or education; these differences are statistically significant. On the contrary, there does not exist a difference between those who reside in rural areas and cities. Interest in politics has an important relationship with internal efficacy, that is, we can see a statistically significant difference between those who report having a lot of interest in politics compared to those who have no interest in the subject.




Figure 43. Factors Associated with Political Efficacy in Honduras

Below, we examine two variables that measure citizens attitudes toward the belief that the political system listens and represents them. Variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** are described in the beginning of this chapter. Figure 44 shows the distribution of the two variables throughout the countries of the Americas. The figures show important variation in the levels of external efficacy and representativeness perceived by citizens of the Americas. It should be emphasized that no country of the region exceeds the mid-point of 50; this signifies that in all countries, levels of external efficacy and perceptions of representativeness are low. Honduras finds itself in the second-to-last position, only above Costa Rica in terms of external efficacy. Furthermore, the representativeness of political parties perceived by Hondurans is just above that of Costa Rica, Brazil, and Trinidad & Tobago.




Figure 44. External Efficacy and Belief in the Representativeness of Political Parties in the Americas

Who in Honduras believes that Honduran political leaders are interested in what people like them think and who agrees with the idea that political parties represent them? In Figure 45 and 46, we use linear regression analyses to examine the personal characteristics and experiences that lead citizens to report high levels of external efficacy and to hold positive perceptions toward the representativeness of political parties. According to these results, contrary to what was expected, discrimination victimization in government offices is correlated with a higher level of external efficacy. On the other hand, people with darker skin tones have lower levels of external efficacy. Finally, education has a positive effect on efficacy, that is, those having higher levels of education tend to feel that government leaders are interested in what people like them think.

Unfortunately, given that the questions measuring experiences with discrimination were only asked to half the sample, and those dealing with representativeness to the other half, it was not possible to determine the effect of these experiences on representativeness. Of those included in the analysis, only two variables have an effect on representativeness: skin color and political interest. As is presented below, people with darker skin tones hold less belief in the representativeness of the parties. On the other hand, and although the effect of the relationship is tenuous (the confidence intervals ends right on the horizontal line representing 0), people with higher levels of interest in politics and higher levels of education tend to report higher beliefs in the representativeness of the parties.




Figure 45. Determinants of External Efficacy in Honduras




Figure 46. Determinants of the Belief in the Representativeness of Political Parties in Honduras

To better understand the factors associated with these two attitudes, in Figure 47 and Figure 48, we examine more deeply the relevance of some of these variables as depicted in the results from the linear regression analysis explaining internal efficacy and perceptions of representativeness of political parties. Figure 47 allows us to see the important impact that discrimination and education have on external efficacy. Those who have been discriminated against and the more highly educated have higher average values of external efficacy.




Figure 47. Factors Associated with External Efficacy in Honduras




Figure 48. Factors Associated with the Representativeness of Political Parties in Honduras

III. System Support and Support for Democracy

Experiences with marginalization and discrimination that an individual suffers can also affect their more abstract political attitudes. As was discussed previously, discrimination can be a failing of the political system, and might decrease support for the system in general. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer we analyze the general attitudes of citizens, the most important being political system support and support for democracy in abstract terms. Chapter Five describes in detail how these attitudes are measured and variation throughout time within Honduras. In this section, we examine how personal characteristics and experiences with discrimination affect these important attitudes for democratic stability.

Figure 49 presents the results of a linear regression analysis that examines the characteristics and reported experiences of the respondents to help establish their levels of political support in Honduras. As is expected, Hondurans have less support in the system when they have been victimized by discrimination. At the same time, citizens who have the most system support are those who are older, approve of the job of the president, and who place themselves toward the right on the ideological spectrum.




Figure 49. Determinants of Political System Support in Honduras

In order to offer a deeper evaluation of the factors that influence political system support, in Figure 50 we present the relationships of personal characteristics and experiences with system support.

As can be seen, respondents 66 years old and older report higher levels of system support than younger citizens, those between 18 and 25 years old. Similarly, those who consider the work of the president to be very good and those who place themselves toward the right on the ideological spectrum show higher levels of system support. Finally, those who have not been discriminated against have higher system support; a difference that is statistically significant with those who have experienced some sort of discrimination (different from that which occurs in government offices).




Figure 50. Factors Associated with Political System Support in Honduras

Having experienced marginalization and discrimination can affect, in abstract terms, support for democracy. We conduct a linear regression analysis to determine if the personal characteristics discussed above are associated with the belief that “democracy, even with its problems, is better than any other system of government.” Different types of marginalization have different effects on support for democracy. Ethnic characteristics have a positive effect on support for democracy, that is mulatos and those who self-identify as black have higher levels of support for democracy than those who self-identify as white. On the contrary, women have less support for democracy than men although homemakers support democracy more than those who are not. Similarly, the poor and the less educated, groups that can be considered marginalized, hold lower levels of support for democracy compared to the wealthier and more educated. Finally, people falling onto the right side of the political spectrum and older citizens have higher support for democracy.




Figure 51. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Honduras

Figure 52 examines, with more detail, the variables that have been identified as important in the regression analysis above. In the first place, we can see that the effect of age is not homogenous. However, the effect of ideology is more pronounced; support by those who fall on the right is 24 points higher than those on the left. Finally, we can see that more advantaged groups (the wealthier and more educated) also hold important differences in terms of levels of support for democracy compared with more marginalized groups. There exists a difference of about 18 points between the most educated and the least, and a 13 point difference between those in the highest wealth quintal and those in the lowest.




Figure 52. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy in Honduras

IV. Protest Participation

Finally, as was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, marginalization and discrimination can motivate some groups, at least those who are highly politicized, to form social movements and participate in political protests. Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that at least in some countries in the Americas, the act of protest has become a “normalized” method of political protest: “individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest.”¹⁸ The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked respondents a series of questions regarding their participation in political protests, the most important of these is **PROT3**.

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 53 presents the levels of protest participation in various countries of the Americas. The level of protest participation in Honduras (6.4%) is close to, but significantly different from the Latin American average (7.8%).

¹⁸ Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. “The Normalization of Protest in Latin America.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 53. Protest Participation in the Americas

Who protests in Honduras? Figure 54 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis to determine the effect of marginalization and discrimination on protest participation in Honduras. Few factors explain protest participation. Those who self-identify with the left tend to participate more in protests than those who identify with the right. Similarly, the wealthier and those who live in large cities or in the capital are more likely to have participated in protest. Neither skin color nor gender are predictors of protest participation.




Figure 54. Determinants of Protest Participation in the Americas

Figure 55 illustrates how protest participation is related to a series of variables presented in Figure 55. We find that living in Tegucigalpa substantially increased the probability of participating in protests in comparison to living in rural areas. This result is not very surprising given that protests in the capital have a larger impact and are closer to the central government. We can see that income marginalization decreases protest participation, the wealthier protest more than the poor, as is demonstrated in the differences between those who belong to the highest wealth quintal and those in the lowest quintal. Finally, we see a significantly different level in protest participation between those on the ideological left and the rest of the spectrum.




Figure 55. Factors Associated with Protest Participation in Honduras

V. Conclusion

Different forms of discrimination and marginalization have different effects on various types of system legitimacy and participation. First, the high level of income inequality has an important impact on protest participation, support for democracy, and system support. This wealth effect is especially important in the context of a country with an income distribution that is highly unequal.

After having examined group characteristics and the equality of opportunities in the previous chapter, including gender, skin color, wealth and education levels, and self-reported discrimination victimization, this section focused on examining the relationship between experiences with marginalization and citizens' perceptions of internal and external efficacy. First, levels of education and wealth, objective measures of inequality, have an impact on internal efficacy. That is, the most educated Hondurans have higher levels of efficacy. Political interest has a positive impact on the abilities of Hondurans to understand the political system of their country. At the same time, we can conclude that social inequalities affect the perceptions of citizens regarding their own abilities. It is important to emphasize that Honduras has the third lowest level of internal efficacy, just above Brazil and Paraguay.

With respect to other forms of involvement such as the belief that governments are interested in what the people think, Honduras is among the lowest in terms of external efficacy, just above Costa Rica. At the same time, aside from Trinidad & Tobago, Brazil and Costa Rica, Honduras has a very

low level in terms of perceptions of representativeness of the political parties. It should be noted that people with darker skin color hold lower levels of belief that parties are representative. In contrast, respondents with higher levels of education tend to report higher levels of perception of the representativeness of parties.

As can be seen, experiences with marginalization can affect attitudes toward the political system, and in general, toward democracy. In this chapter, we analyzed how personal characteristics and experiences with discrimination affect citizen support for the political system and democracy. In effect, the system support by Hondurans is related to experiences of discrimination. Furthermore, citizens who hold the highest levels of political system support are those who approve of the work of the president, are older, and who self-identify on the right of the political spectrum. Alternatively, different situations of marginalization have different effects on support for democracy. Ethnic marginalization has a positive effect on support for democracy, that is, mulatos and blacks have higher levels of support for democracy than whites. However, women have less support for democracy than men, even though homemakers have higher levels of support for democracy. At the same time, the poorer and less educated, both marginalized groups, have less support for democracy than the wealthy and educated.

These economic and social inequalities do not only affect perceptions related to the political system and democratic regime, but also affect the political participation of Hondurans. We can conclude that income marginalization decreases protest participation and interest in politics. Finally, we see a large difference between the left and the rest of the ideological spectrum in terms of their participation in protests.


Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?¹

The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.



¹ For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support



This box reviews findings from the paper “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America,” by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.¹ The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.² Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

Experiences with Discrimination in Eight Countries



Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP, 2010

¹ The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

² The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information


This box reviews findings from the 2012 report “Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results,” by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.


The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.¹ As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

Average support for democracy, by year and survey



Percentage who have received information about candidates, by gender and year



Source: Baseline and Follow-Up Surveys

¹ This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.”

**Part II:
Governance, Political Engagement, and
Civil Society in the Americas**

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime and Democracy

With Mollie Cohen and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

High crime rates and persistent public sector corruption are two of the largest challenges facing many countries in the Americas today. Since the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, the study of corruption and implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices have been on the rise.¹ Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, obviously was commonplace under previous authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas; however, given widespread media censorship and the great personal risk for those who chose to report on corruption, it was impossible to determine just how much corruption existed and in what public spheres was it more common.

Studies from the field of economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. There is, then, growing understanding in academia of the corrosive effects that corruption has on economies as well as of the challenges corruption creates for democratic governance, particularly the egalitarian administration of justice.²

At the level of public opinion, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and political actors of their country, and these effects hold across the region.³ However, others show that such opinions do not spill over into attitudes towards democracy more generally.⁴ Some scholars even suggest that corruption can at times simply lead to citizen withdrawal from politics, or even *help* specific governments maintain

¹ See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

² Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

³ Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

⁴ Canache, Damarys, and Michael E Allison. 2005. "Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (3): 91-111.

public support.⁵ Some have also suggested that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the importance of perceptions of corruption. Two recent studies, both using AmericasBarometer data, have indicated that perceiving higher rates of corruption is linked to lower levels of trust in key state institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.⁶ However, having experienced corruption is not particularly strongly linked to high perceptions of corruption, and for that reason LAPOP normally prefers to use both data on actual corruption victimization as well as data on corruption perceptions.

Crime is another serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were estimated at 15.5 per 100,000 citizens by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2011, more than double the global homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000, and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).⁷ While South America has been following the worldwide trend downward in homicide, rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been on the upswing.

Given this context of extremely high crime, it is imperative that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and the fear associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to comprehend how crime victimization might affect citizen support for the political system and perhaps even democracy, since it is that system that can be blamed for not delivering citizen security.⁸ Moreover, citizens might become less trusting, and potentially less tolerant, of their fellow citizens if they fear or have experienced crime, thus eroding social capital and leading to lower support for civil liberties and liberal institutions. Crime victimization could even lead citizens to seek to emigrate to other countries.⁹ Fear of or experience with crime might also lead to decreased support for and faith in certain key political institutions, particularly the police, but also the judiciary.¹⁰

As with corruption, it is unclear whether an individual's perception of crime or actual crime victimization is more important in shaping her attitudes towards the democratic system. Even in places

⁵ Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, and Jorge I Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

⁶ Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

⁷ Global Study on Homicide. 2011. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html>

⁸ Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C.; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*.

⁹ Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 64. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁰ Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3).

where crime rates are high compared to global figures, the probability that an individual will be murdered or become the victim of a serious crime, fortunately, remains quite low in most countries, even though in some Central American countries the rate is disturbingly high. However, individuals might read about violent crimes in the newspaper, see images on the television, or know people who have become the victims of such crimes. The fear of becoming a victim, which is possible for anyone regardless of past experience with crime, might have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a crime victim.

This chapter seeks to understand the extent of corruption and crime in the Americas and to clarify how corruption and crime affect democratic attitudes and feelings about the rule of law across the region.

II. Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, which are deployed in the AmericasBarometer surveys. Following initial tests in Nicaragua in 1996¹¹, these items have been refined and improved. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking such questions as: “Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions).¹² This series has two particular strengths. First, it allows us to determine in which social settings corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to construct a corruption scale, distinguishing between those who have experienced corruption in only one setting and those who have been victimized in more than one setting. We assume that with corruption, as with crime, multiple victimizations are likely to make a difference.

¹¹ Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. Washington, D.C., Casals and Associates, and Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-up Study*. Washington, D.C., Casals and Associates.

¹² Question **EXC20**, on bribery by military officials, was introduced for the first time in 2012.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

Another item that taps perceptions of rather than experiences with corruption is also included in the questionnaire. The question reads as follows:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

We rescale this variable from 0-100, where 0 represents a perception that corruption is very uncommon, and 100 a perception that corruption is very common.

Perceptions of Corruption

Figure 56 shows that citizens tend to perceive high levels of corruption in the Americas. The countries that have the highest reported levels of corruption perception are Colombia and Trinidad & Tobago with average levels of corruption perception of 80 points on the 0 to 100 scale. The lowest average level belongs to Suriname at 38.8 points. In the case of Honduras, we observe a relatively high level of corruption perception with an average of 76.7. Honduras is one of the countries with the highest levels of corruption perception.




Figure 56. Perception of Corruption in the Americas

Similar to other indicators in this report, we present the changes in corruption perception throughout time. Figure 57 shows the average levels of corruption perception in Honduras during those years for which there is information.




Figure 57. Perception of Corruption Across Time in Honduras

We can see that the perception of corruption increased significantly between 2010 and 2012. The levels of corruption perceived by the population returned to levels similar to those before the political crisis of 2009. Corruption perception in Honduras has increased significantly since the AmericasBarometer started measuring it in 2004.

It is important to point out that high levels of corruption perception do not always correspond to high (or rising) levels of corruption. It is entirely possible that given efforts by the government to increase campaigns of public understanding regarding corruption, the attention by the media given to anticorruption efforts could increase citizen perceptions of corruption. It is possible that even though levels of corruption perception are high, actual corruption victimization could be low. In the next section we analyze the respondents' experiences with corruption.

Corruption Victimization

This section analyzes the extent to which citizens in the Americas have been victimized by corruption. With this in mind, Figure 58 presents the percentage of respondents that reported having been asked to pay a bribe in at least one place in the last year.




Figure 58. Percentage of Corruption Victimization in the Americas

Figure 58 reveals large amounts of variation in the levels of corruption between the different countries of the regions. Haitians report the highest level of corruption victimization in the hemisphere; 67% reported having been victim to at least one instance of bribe-seeking in the past year. At the same time, 25.8% of Hondurans report having been asked to pay a bribe. Although well below those countries who lead the list such as Haiti, Bolivia, and Ecuador, Honduras finds itself among the 10 countries with the highest rates of victimization. In Honduras, one of every four citizens reports having been a victim of corruption. Honduras is among the highest in terms of perceptions of corruption and corruption victimization.

Some citizens were asked to pay a bribe in more than one place, while others in only one place or not at all. Below, we evaluate the number of instances in which citizens reported having been victims of corruption in Honduras in 2012. This information appears in Figure 59. We can see that 74.2% reported not experiencing corruption in the past 12 months, 16.2% have experienced in only one

instance, and 5.7% report having been victims in two instances. Only 3.9% reported having been victimized more than two times.




Figure 59. Number of Instance of Being Victimized by Corruption in Honduras

How have the levels of corruption victimization in Honduras varied over time?




Figure 60. Percentage Victimized by Corruption Across Time in Honduras

Figure 60 presents the percentage of citizens who reported any type of corruption victimization for each year. We see a significant increase between 2010 and 2012. In the most recent round of the AmericasBarometer, one in four Hondurans report having been victim to bribe-seeking. This represents almost a 10 percentage point increase since 2010. The results show that between 2004 and 2010 there were not significant differences in the levels of corruption victimization; an average of one in every six citizens reported being victimized by corruption. However, the results of the 2012 round indicate a significant relapse in the levels of corruption. This increase might explain some of the negative results that we observed in this report regarding the legitimacy of the political system and support for stable democracy.

Who is Most Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

With the objective of having a better understanding of corruption victimization, we calculate a logistic regression model to identify the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that are positively and negatively associated with corruption. Figure 61 presents the results of said regression. The results of logistic regression analysis show that levels of wealth, age, gender and size of place of residence are the variables that have the largest impact on corruption victimization.




Figure 61. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Honduras

In order to better understand the independent impact of a variable on the probability of a person being a victim of corruption, we present the bivariate relationships in Figure 62.




Figure 62. Demographic Factors and Corruption Victimization in Honduras

The results indicate that people who live in the national capital (the metropolitan area of Tegucigalpa), are wealthier, men, and younger citizens, express higher levels of corruption victimization. More than half of the respondents that live in Tegucigalpa report having been asked to pay at least one bribe. People who live in the national capital have a higher probability of having contact with institutions of the State and for that reason, a higher probability of being asked to pay a bribe. Individuals falling into the highest wealth quintile have levels of corruption victimization 16 percentage points higher than the poorest individuals. It is clear that the wealthier are subject to bribe-seeking with a higher frequency because of their ability to pay, and perhaps willingness to speed-up or streamline their interactions with government through bribe paying. Here, we can observe a tendency of not only being asked to pay a bribe, but also offering a bribe. Finally, men have levels of corruption victimization 10 percentage points higher than women.

III. Perception of Insecurity and Crime Victimization

The AmericasBarometer seeks to measure levels of perception of insecurity among citizens by asking the following question:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?

(1) Very safe	(2) Somewhat safe	(3) Somewhat unsafe
(4) Very unsafe	(88) DK	(98) DA

Given that a large proportion of criminal acts occur in urban zones, especially in national capitals, we decided to present the data on crime for the capital cities of the 24 countries of the sample (not including the United States and Canada because of sample construction).

Continuing with the AmericasBarometer standard, the answers were recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale where the highest values signify a higher perception of insecurity. Figure 63 shows the results for the capital cities. Mexico City and Lima are the capitals where citizens express the highest levels of insecurity. Tegucigalpa, in spite of being one of the most violent capitals in the world,¹³ has levels of insecurity lower than less violent capitals, and is situated below San Salvador which is also one of the most violent capitals in the world.




Figure 63. Perception of Insecurity in National Capitals Across the Americas

¹³ In 2010, Honduras had the highest homicide rates in the region, with 82.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. (see: Meyer, Peter J. & Clare Ribando Seelke. 2012. *Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, February 21).

Figure 64 shows the changes across time for levels of perception of insecurity in Honduras by using data from previous AmericasBarometer surveys that asked the same question to respondents. In spite of an increase in crime level, we observe a reduction in levels of perception of insecurity since 2008. Although there was a slight reduction between 2010 and 2012, the difference is not statistically significant.




Figure 64. Perception of Insecurity Across Time in Honduras

In which regions of the country¹⁴ are perceptions of insecurity the highest? In Figure 65, we examine this question.

¹⁴ Central A (Francisco Morazán); Central B (Comayagua /La Paz); Norte A (Cortés); Norte B (Yoro/Atlántida/Colón); Norte C (Islas de la Bahía); Occidental (Ocotepeque / Copán / Santa Bárbara); Oriental A (Olancho y El Paraíso); Oriental B (Gracias a Dios); Sur (Choluteca y Valle).




Figure 65. Perception of Insecurity in Honduran Regions

We observe that region Oriental B, the department of *Gracias a Dios*, expresses the highest levels of perception of insecurity. However, because of the wide confidence intervals, our confidence in the average of this region is low since the number of respondents is lower in comparison with the rest of the region. In reality, statistically speaking, there is no difference between the region Oriental B and the majority of other regions.

What can explain the reduction in the perception of insecurity in spite of the increase of crime in the country? A possible reason is reflected in the changes in principal problems of the country identified by Hondurans. In Figure 66 we can see that between 2008 and 2010 the economic crisis dominated the perceptions of Hondurans as the most serious problem facing the country. The political crisis of 2009 and the political and institutional problems that were the root of the crisis are what received most mentions in 2012. Therefore, despite the elevated levels of crime, political and economic problems are those that were emphasized with most frequency by Hondurans. We think that this distribution of problems can explain why levels of perception of insecurity has decreased and is below countries with lower levels of violence.




Figure 66. Most Important Problem Facing the Country Across Time

IV. Crime Victimization

How do we compare the perception of insecurity among citizens with insecurity? Since 2010, the AmericasBarometer has included a series of questions to measure crime victimization:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK
 (98) DA [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?[Read options]
 (1) In your home
 (2) In this neighborhood
 (3) In this municipality
 (4) In another municipality
 (5) In another country
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

Figure 67 combines the answers to questions **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR** for the capital cities. The figure shows that Quito (Ecuador) and Tegucigalpa are the cities with the highest levels of

both personal and household crime victimization. It is important to note, however, that the survey was only administered to adults who were considered to be of age; for this reason, it is possible that victimization of minors is not always reported given that relatives are not always present when it occurs. Also, we must remember that respondents self-identify as crime victims. In some contexts, certain criminal acts (especially those perpetrated against marginalized groups) may become normalized and are therefore not reported with the same frequency with which they occur.




Figure 67. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Americas

In comparison with other capital cities in the Americas, Tegucigalpa is one of the two most frequent cities in terms of crime victimization. In Tegucigalpa, 36.5% of respondents report having been victims of crime in the past year and 41.2% say that someone in their family has been a crime victim.

Figure 68 shows the place where most of the perpetrated crimes took place according to respondents throughout Honduras. Thirty-two percent report having been a victim in a different municipality from which they live. Twenty-eight percent were crime victims in the neighborhood or community in which they live and 25% in the municipality where they reside. Only 13.2% were victims of a crime inside their home.




Figure 68. Location of Most Recent Act of Crime in Which Respondent was Victim in Honduras

In which regions of Honduras do the most criminal acts occur? Figure 69 shows the regional patterns of crime. The regions with the highest levels of victimization are the most populated, Central A and Norte A, where the largest urban areas of the country area located, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula.




Figure 69. Crime Victimization by Region in Honduras

Finally, it could be of interest to understand the ways in which personal experiences with crime have changed over time. Figure 70 shows the trends in self-reported crime victimization in Honduras between 2004 and 2012. We must point out, however, that in 2010 LAPOP changed the formulation of the questions that measure crime victimization. Between 2004 and 2008, LAPOP used the question **VIC1** which asked: “Have you been a victim of some type of crime in the past 12 months? In 2010 and 2012 this question was substituted for **VIC1EXT**, which gives more details regarding the criminal acts that might have occurred. This modification was done in an effort to increase the validity of the responses.¹⁵

¹⁵ The change in question wording may explain the increase in levels of victimization reported between 2008 and 2010.




Figure 70. Crime Victimization Across Time in Honduras

The levels of crime victimization increased significantly between 2004 and 2006, and then decreased in 2008. Since the 2008 round, the levels of victimization have increased, slightly in 2010 and significantly in 2012. Although part of this increase can be attributed to the change in the question used to measure this variable, we believe that given the increase in levels of violence in Honduras, this increase in victimization is also a reflection of the general increase of crime in the country.

Who Are the Most Likely to be Crime Victims?

Figure 71 presents the results of the logistic regression model that seeks to explain who is most likely to be a crime victim in Honduras. In this, and all other figures related to the regression, all the variables have been standardized. Similar to the rest of the graphics presenting regression results, the coefficients that measure the effect of each variable are indicated with points, and the confidence intervals with horizontal lines that extend to the right and the left of each point. If the confidence interval does not cross the central line at the 0.0 point, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at the $p < 0.05$ level). Those coefficients whose confidence intervals fall completely to the right of the zero line indicate a net positive effect on the dependent variable. On the other hand, a coefficient whose confidence interval falls to the left of the zero line indicates a net negative effect that is statistically significant.




Figure 71. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Honduras

To better understand the effect of each independent variable on crime victimization in Honduras, Figure 72 presents the bivariate relationship between each of the independent variables that are significant in the logistic regression and crime victimization in Honduras. Crime victimization increases significantly when education level and size of place of residence of the respondent increases. Citizens with a high school or university-level education who reside in Tegucigalpa report being crime victims with higher frequency.




Figure 72. Sociodemographic Factors and Household Crime Victimization in Honduras

V. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity, and Corruption on Political System Support

What are the effects of high levels of crime and corruption victimization, as well as the perception of widespread corruption or insecurity on legitimacy in Honduras? To determine this, we conduct a multivariate linear regression that calculates the impact that victimization and perceptions of crime and corruption have on support for the legitimacy of the political system. Figure 73 shows the impact of perception and experiences with crime and insecurity on system support.¹⁶ The results indicate that the level of education, corruption victimization and the perception of corruption and insecurity are significant determinants of system support.

¹⁶ System support is calculated as the average of responses to these five questions: B1 (the perception that the courts guarantee a fair trial); B2 (respect for the institutions of the country); B3 (belief that the fundamental rights of citizens are protected); B4 (pride of living under the political system of the country); y B6 (belief that individuals should support the political system of the country). The variable related to these questions is recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale. For more information, see Chapter 5.




Figure 73. Determinants of Political System Support in Honduras

Figure 74 digs deeper into the effects of the independent variables on system support and presents the bivariate relationships between system support and the perception and experiences with crime and corruption. We observe that people who have been crime victims or who perceive high levels of corruption express less system support. Also, people who perceive more insecurity express less political system support.




Figure 74. Crime, Corruption and System Support in Honduras

VI. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

This section examines the subject of support for the rule of law in the Americas. Rule of law is normally conceptualized as the universal application of laws of the State, or the supposition that no group is above the law.¹⁷ Previous LAPOP studies have found a large variation in the opinions related with the ability of citizens of the Americas to accept that the police can violate the law to capture criminals. In accordance with the threat hypothesis, those who perceive that the level of crime is high and those who have been crime victims will be more likely to accept violations of the rule of law.¹⁸ To measure support for the rule of law, the AmericasBarometer uses an item that captures the extent to which respondents believe that the authorities should respect the laws while they seek to combat crime.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
 (1) Should always abide by the law
 (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 75 shows the percentage of citizens in 2012 in the Americas that expressed support for the rule of law compared to those who believe that the police and other authorities can, on occasion,

¹⁷ See, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.

¹⁸ Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

act above the law. The highest level of support of the rule of law is found in Jamaica (74.9%) while the lowest level is in Bolivia (53.3%). Honduras is in the seventeenth place with 61.3% of respondents expressing support for the rule of law. Although this percentage represents a majority of Hondurans, it places Honduras below a majority of the other countries included in the survey.




Figure 75. Percentage of Support for Rule of Law in the Americas

Figure 76 shows the levels of support for the rule of law across time in Honduras. Between 2004 and 2006 there was a significant decrease in support for the rule of law. This trend changed in 2006 and since then we observe an increase in support for the rule of law. The results from 2012 suggest that the levels of support for the rule of law have returned to the levels of 2004.




Figure 76. Percentage Supporting Rule of Law over Time in Honduras

Finally, this section concludes with an analysis of the determinants of support for the rule of law in Honduras. Figure 77 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis that seeks to identify these factors. The results indicate that the statistically significant factors include the total level of crime victimization (any type of victim in the home), the perception of insecurity, the size of place of residence, ideology, skin color, and interpersonal trust.




Figure 77. Determinants of Support for Rule of Law in Honduras

Figure 78 shows, with more detail, some of the independent variables related with the support for the rule of law. The perception of insecurity significantly decreases support for the rule of law. Also, we can observe that skin color affects support for the rule of law in that people with darker skin tones express less support for the rule of law than lighter skinned people. This is a subject that we explore in more depth in Chapter Three. Citizens with higher levels of interpersonal trust express higher levels of support for the rule of law, and people who have not been affected by crime also express higher levels of support. Finally, we observe a slight increase in support for the rule of law among people who self-identify as rightest on the ideological scale, and who live in large cities and the national capital.




Figure 78. Factors Related to Support for Rule of Law in Honduras

VII. Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the magnitude and the impact of crime and corruption victimization as well as the perceptions of insecurity and corruption on the support for the political system and the rule of law in Honduras. In the case of Honduras, we observe a relatively high level of perception of corruption with an average of 76.7, which situates Honduras among the 10 countries with the highest levels of perceptions of corruption. Also, the perception of corruption in Honduras has significantly increased since the AmericasBarometer began measuring the phenomenon in 2004. In both the

perceptions of corruption and in the levels of actual corruption victimization, Honduras finds itself among the groups of countries with the highest values for both measures.

The results of the logistic regression analysis demonstrate that wealth level, age, gender, and size of place of residence are the variable that have the most impact on corruption victimization. Tegucigalpa has lower levels of perceived insecurity than other less violent capital cities. Notwithstanding, Tegucigalpa is the second capital of the Americas, after Quito, with the highest levels of crime victimization. When we observe the data for the entire country, the levels of crime victimization increase significantly between 2004 and 2006, and decreased in 2008. Since the 2008 round, the levels of victimization have increased, slightly in 2010 and significantly in 2012. In spite of the increase in the levels of crime, we observe a reduction in the levels of perceptions of insecurity since 2008. This can be explained by the evolution of problems that most worry Hondurans. However, following the political crisis of 2009, institutional and political problems are the most mentioned in 2012. Given this, in spite of the elevated levels of crime, the political and economic problem are the ones that stand out most for the majority of Hondurans.

Finally, we have seen how the results suggests that education level, corruption victimization and the perceptions of insecurity and corruption are significant determinants of system support. The total level of crime victimization (any type of victimization in the household), the perception of insecurity, the size of place of residence, ideology, skin color, and interpersonal trust are all significant determinants explaining the changes support for the rule of law.

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,¹ others have shown that citizen attitudes and values play a key role, highlighting legitimacy as key for democratic consolidation.² Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions, central to the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.³

In LAPOP studies using AmericasBarometer data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Further, “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.⁴ While specific support can be measured by questions addressing the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract object represented by the political system and the political offices themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP’s measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central for democratic survival.⁵ This chapter examines political legitimacy and tolerance across the Americas, seeking to understand what factors explain variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians’ proximity to citizens’ policy preferences have an important effect on citizens’ attitudes about the political system.⁶ Institutional variables have also been

¹ Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942 *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial; Przeworski Adam. 1999. “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” in Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, y Jose Antonio Cheibub. eds. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P.1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

² Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A.2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America”. *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³ See also Almond, Gabriel Abraham y Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

⁴ Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America.” *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29.

⁵ Booth and Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

⁶ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart Ronald, 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230. Przeworski Adam et al., 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al., 2008. “Income and Democracy,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 (May): 808-842; Peter Kotzian. 2011. “Public support for liberal democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1): 23 -41. Geoffrey Evans and

shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, systems that incorporate features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.⁷

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.⁸ In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.⁹

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."¹⁰ Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.¹¹ Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perceptions of high levels of threat,¹² authoritarian personality,¹³ and religion.¹⁴ At the

Stephen Whitefield. 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4: 485-514.

⁷ Anderson, Christopher. 2007. *Losers' consent: elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

⁸ Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 20. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 2. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 36. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁹ Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 4: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?, *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁰ Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," 5.

¹¹ Gibson, James L.. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L. 2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L. 1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 : 819-850; Gibson, James L. 1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599.

¹² Marcus George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. y Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huddy, Leonie et al. 2005. "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3: 593-608; Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 : 959-978.

macro-level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.¹⁵ Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.¹⁶ LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.¹⁷

Research by Golebiouwska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.¹⁸ It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic consolidation. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. The ways in which tolerance and political legitimacy are expected to affect stable democracy, according to LAPOP previous studies, are summarized in **Error! Reference source not found.2**. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 2. Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

¹³ Altemeyer Bob. 2007. *The Authoritarians*.

¹⁴ Postic, Robert K. 2007. *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity*; Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*. John Wiley & Sons Inc.

¹⁵ Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁶ Peffley, Mark and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257.

¹⁷ Lodola, Germán, and Margarita Corral. 2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁸ Golebiouwska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiouwska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

Note that this conceptualization has found empirical support. With data from the AmericasBarometer 2008, Booth and Seligson found serious signs of the possibility of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.¹⁹

II. Support for the Political System

The system support index by LAPOP is calculated using the average of the responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Honduras?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Honduras?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Honduras?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Honduras?

In accordance with the AmericasBarometer standard, the index is rescaled onto a 0 to 100 scale in which 0 signifies “very little support” for the political system, and 100 represents “a lot of support.”

How Does Political System Support Vary Across the Americas?

Figure 79 presents the levels of political support from the 2012 study. The countries with the highest level of system support are Belize and Suriname with an average of 61 on the 0 to 100 scale. Honduras is the country with the least amount of system support, 20 points less than the countries with the highest levels of support.

¹⁹ Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. See also, Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. *The Honduran Catharsis. AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 79. Political System Support in the Americas

Political system support is usually higher in some of the individual dimensions of the index than in others. Figure 80 presents the levels of each of the five components of system support for Honduras. All five component have averages below the scale's midpoint. That is, the levels of support of the five components are negative. The measure which receives the most support is the question regarding whether the courts guarantee fair trials.




Figure 80. Components of Political System Support in Honduras

Figure 81 shows that between 2010 and 2012 political system support decreased significantly, by almost 20 points. It seems that in 2010 the Honduran political system enjoyed a honeymoon period following the elections of November 2009 and the conclusion of the political crisis. In the past two years the political debate between the followers and opponents of deposed President Zelaya, the increase in the perception of corruption and the inherent weaknesses of the country's political institutions have contributed to a stark decrease in political system support.




Figure 81. Political System System Support over Time in Honduras

III. Political Tolerance

The second component the AmericasBarometer uses to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. This index is comprised of the following four questions from the questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Haitian form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]:

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Haitian form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As is the case for all indexes used by the AmericasBarometer, it is calculated from the average of the responses of each person for the four questions above. The resulting variable is then recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale where 0 represents “very little tolerance” and 100 signifies “very high tolerance.”




Figure 82. Political Tolerance in the Americas

The United States is the country that expresses the highest level of political tolerance. In comparison, Honduras has the lowest level of political tolerance in the Americas with an average of 36.6 on the 0 to 100 scales. This level of tolerance is significantly less than what is found in the other countries that are part of the AmericasBarometer.

Figure 83 presents the average levels of each of the four components of tolerance for Honduras. The component that receives the highest support is the question about the right to demonstrate peacefully. The average level of support on the 0 to 100 scale is 52.4, which is a positive level and statistically higher than the rest of the components.




Figure 83. Components of Political Tolerance in Honduras

How has political tolerance varied over time in Honduras? Figure 84 shows the average levels of political tolerance in Honduras for each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. We can see a dramatic reduction in political tolerance between 2010 and 2012. The reduction between 2004 and 2012 is more than 20 points. These results are alarming for the political culture of democracy in Honduras. Honduran society expresses levels of political tolerance that may negatively affect the democratic stability of this Central American country.




Figure 84. Political Tolerance over Time in Honduras

Which factors affect the levels of political tolerance in Honduras? Figure 85 develops a linear regression model to respond to this question.




Figure 85. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Honduras

Figure 86 explores the results from Figure 85, showing the variables of most theoretical interest and of most importance for the analysis. The citizens who most frequently attend religious services express higher levels of political tolerance. The results also reflect that people with higher levels of support for democracy express higher levels of tolerance. People with darker skin complexion tend to express less political tolerance. Finally, we see that the effect of perception of insecurity forms a “V”, that is, those who are situated in both extremes, very secure and very insecure, express higher levels of political tolerance.




Figure 86. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in Honduras

IV. Democratic Stability

As was discussed in the introduction of this chapter, both system support and political tolerance are vital for democratic stability. Figure 87 shows the extent to which citizens in the America have this combination of attitudes. The lowest number of citizens with high tolerance and high levels of system support is found in Honduras. Only 7.2% of those interviewed are considered to fall into the “stable democracy” cell. These results are truly alarming in that they represent a significant deterioration in the presence of attitudes that are supportive of a stable democracy.




Figure 87. Attitudes Conducive to a Stable Democracy in the Americas

How has the percentage of citizens in Honduras with the most favorable attitudes towards stable democracy varied over time? Figure 88 presents the percentage of citizens that express high levels of system support and high tolerance since 2004. Between 2010 and 2012 the level of high system support and political tolerance has plummeted in Honduras with a reduction of almost 20 percent.




Figure 88. Attitudes of Stable Democracy Across Time in Honduras

How have the different categories that form the relationship between system support and political tolerance varied over time? Figure 89 shows a significant increase in the category of democracy at risk. Of those Hondurans interviewed in 2012, 55% fall into the category of low political tolerance and low system support; a situation that implies attitudes corresponding with democratic instability. We can also see a significant reduction between those respondents who expressed corresponding attitudes with stable democracy, only 7.2% of Hondurans hold this opinion.




Figure 89. Distribution of Categories on the Relationship between Political Tolerance and System Support

What factors influence whether Hondurans hold attitudes conducive to stable democracy? Figure 90 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis. We observe that the level of education, the perception of one’s family economic situation, ideology, and the perception of insecurity are all important factors in determining high levels of system support and high tolerance.




Figure 90. Determinants of Stable Democracy in Honduras

To obtain a deeper understanding of the determinants of political system support, we created Figure 91 which presents the bivariate relationships between system support and the most important variables from the regression analysis. We can see from the figure that those who have higher levels of education express higher levels of attitudes compatible with stable democracy. People with the best and worse family economic situations express the lowest levels of system support and political tolerance. People who express high levels of support are those who report not having many problems with the economic situations, but are not in the worst situation; that is they can be classified as being lower-middle class. People whose ideologies fall toward the right on the scale have a higher probability of holding the combination of high tolerance and high system support. Finally, people who feel both the most and least secure, that is, those who fall into the two extremes of perception of insecurity, express attitudes conducive to stable democracy.




Figure 91. Factors Associated with Attitudes of Stable Democracy in Honduras

V. The Legitimacy of other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do Hondurans support the principle social and political institutions? The 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer asked respondents about their attitudes toward many specific institutions, in addition to asking general questions regarding political system support. A scale of 1 to 7 was used to measure support where 1 signifies “none” and 7 “a lot.”

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Court?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress
B18. To what extent do you trust the Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical Church?
B19. To what extent do you trust the <i>Tribunal Superior de Cuentas</i> ?
B46 [b45]. To what extent do you trust the National Council of Anticorruption?

Figure 92 presents the level of support for each of these institutions. As has become customary in this report, we recode the responses onto a 0 to 100 scale. The results show that the Evangelical and Catholic Churches receive the highest levels of support, followed by the military. No state institutions receives levels of trust above the scale’s midpoint, which indicates that the majority do not express trust in these institutions. The institution that receives the least level of trust is the National Police.




Figure 92. Trust in Institutions in Honduras

How do these results compare with those of previous years in Honduras? Figure 93 presents results since 2004. The results indicate that all the institutions, except for the elections, have decreased in terms of levels of trust.




Figure 93. Trust in the Institutions in Honduras by Year

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in an abstract sense is also considered to be a requisite for democratic consolidation. The AmericasBarometer measures support for democracy by asking respondents their opinions regarding a modified quote from Winston Churchill,²⁰ through a question inspired by a study conducted by Rose and Mishler on the topic.²¹ The answers to the question **ING4** are coded using a seven point scale; 1 signifies “very much in disagreement” and 7 “very much in agreement.”

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 94 shows the average levels of agreement with this statement for the countries of the Americas. The countries with the highest level of support for democracy are Uruguay, Argentina, and Venezuela. Honduras has a low level of support for democracy in comparison with the other countries included in the AmericasBarometer. However, it is important to emphasize that the mean support is above the midpoint on the scale (52.6) for Honduras.

²⁰ Churchill’s quote referenced democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the rest.”

²¹ Rose, Richard and William Mishler. 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.




Figure 94. Support for Democracy in the Americas

How has support for democracy changed in recent years in Honduras? Figure 95 shows the perspective of the changes in support for democracy since 2004. While there is support for democracy in Honduras, the levels have decreased significantly since 2004 and especially since 2010. There is no doubt that since the political crisis of 2009, there has been deterioration in the opinions that support and lead to a stable democracy. In later chapters we explore the impact of the crisis on political culture of democracy in Honduras, however, there is no doubt that the political situation has deteriorated significantly since 2010.




Figure 95. Support for Democracy Across Time in Honduras

VII. Conclusion

This chapter examined political system support and its relationship with political tolerance. Additionally, we examined the levels of trust in State institutions and support for democracy. This chapter demonstrates the difficulties that face the political culture of democracy in Honduras. As we know, the country suffered a devastating political crisis in 2009. The roots of this crisis, different political issues related to system representativeness, institutional weakness, violence, and corruption have affected the institutional strength of the State and the regime's political stability. These problems are reflected in these results.

Honduras is the country with lowest levels of political system support, 20 points lower than in countries with the highest levels in the survey. Between 2010 and 2012, political system support has decreased by almost 20 points. Honduras has the lowest level of political tolerance in the Americas. The results that were presented here show a dramatic reduction in political tolerance between 2010 and 2012. The least amount of citizens in the Americas with high tolerance and high levels of support for the system are found in Honduras. Only 7.2% of respondents fall into the "stable democracy" cell. Between 2010 and 2012, the level of high system support and high political tolerance has plummeted in Honduras, with an almost 20% decrease. Education level, perception of family economic situation, ideology, and perception of insecurity are all important factors in determining high system support and high tolerance. The Evangelical and Catholic Churches receive trust levels that exceed the midpoint on the 0 to 100 point scale. Honduras has the lowest level of support for democracy compared with the other countries that make up the AmericasBarometer.

Chapter Six: Local Government

With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views about local government and their orientations towards democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies across countries and works in different ways in different political systems. In some places citizens only have contact with local authorities and do not have access to levels above that. Some local authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy, while others have more. Moreover, local governance takes place in more democratic ways in some places than in others. Thus, the extent to which local government is efficient and democratic may shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole.

Decentralization has been taking place to varying degrees among developing countries, and is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ This process happened simultaneously as the "third wave" of democratization took place in the hemisphere.² Citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced the strengthening of local governments, but also saw the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views. Some authors argue that local politics has generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.³ Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.⁴ Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.⁵

However, others argue that local politics do not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan

¹ Rondinelli, Dennis, Nellis, John, and Cheema, Shabbir. 1983. *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.

² Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

³ Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2004. Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

⁴ Akain, Nobuo & Sakata, Masayo. 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

⁵ Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.⁶ Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.⁷ Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.⁸

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.⁹ Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.¹⁰ Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities.¹¹ Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.¹² Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.¹³ So, if decentralization may contribute to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of system support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.¹⁴

⁶ Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

⁷ Willis, Eliza, Garman, Christopher, and Haggard, Stephen. 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7-56.

⁸ Galiani, Sebastian, Gertler, Paul, and Schargrodsky, Ernesto. 2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andres.

⁹ Hiskey, Jonathan, Seligson, Mitchell. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88.

¹⁰ Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

¹¹ West, Karleen. 2011. *The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. Papers from the AmericasBarometer*. Vanderbilt University.

¹² Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹³ Hayek, Friedrich. 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519-530.

¹⁴ West, *ibid*; p. 4.

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.¹⁵ Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.¹⁶ West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.¹⁷ In this chapter we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region

In the next section of this chapter we will examine to what extent citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*. We compare to what extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through such institutional channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the one from 2010. We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, focusing especially on the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizens' participation in local politics. Last, we assess the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments, and we focus on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and system support.

Previous works using the AmericasBarometer surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such as education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.¹⁸ Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.¹⁹ In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.²⁰ Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.²¹

¹⁵ West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. 2009. "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.

¹⁶ Patterson, Amy. 2002. "The Impact of Senegal's Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

¹⁷ West, *ibid*.

¹⁸ Montalvo, Daniel. 2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁹ Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

²⁰ Montalvo, Daniel. 2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

²¹ Montalvo, Daniel (2010). "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

II. Participation at the Local Level

The 2012 AmericasBarometer includes a series of questions to evaluate citizen commitment to the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Municipal Meeting Attendance

Figure 96 presents the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas that reported having attended a municipal meeting during the past year. Of the Hondurans interviewed, 13.5% stated that they had attended a municipal meeting. This is compared with 21.5% in Haiti, the country with the highest level of municipal meeting attendance.




Figure 96. Participation in Municipal Meetings in the Americas

How has citizen participation in municipal meetings changed in recent years? Figure 97 shows the levels of local participation since 2004. The levels of municipal meeting participation have decreased since 2006, however, it increased in 2012; although the levels continue to be lower than those observed in 2006.




Figure 97. Participation in Municipal Meetings Across Time in Honduras

Petitioning the Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to not only examine who attends municipal meetings, but also who petitions their local governments. Figure 98 analyzes the responses to question NP2 and presents the percentage of citizens in the Americas who have made a solicitation or petition to an official of a local government agency in the last year. Only 9.6% of Hondurans have made a solicitation to the municipality. The country with the highest level of people that solicited their local government was Haiti with 21.3%.




Figure 98. Petitioning Local Government in the Americas

How has the practice of petitioning local governments changed across time? Figure 99 examines the percentage of citizens who have made such petitions since 2004. The percentage of Hondurans that solicited help from the municipality increased between 2010 and 2012, although the level is less than what we observed at the beginning of the AmericasBarometer.




Figure 99. Petitioning Local Governments Across Time in Honduras

Finally, the AmericasBarometer also asked respondents if their petitions or requests were resolved. It is important to note that this question was only asked to those citizens who reported having made a demand or petition to their local government. The responses may provide important insight into the quality of municipal services, at least from the point of view of the citizen. Figure 100 presents the responses to question **MUNI10** in Honduras. Of those to whom the question was asked, 65.4% report that the municipality did not resolve their problem. The other 34.6% report that their problem was resolved. The relatively small number of Hondurans whose problem was resolved suggest a local system lacking the capacity to deal with community problems.




Figure 100. Resolution of Petitions to Local Governments in Honduras

What are the determinants of demand-making on local governments? Figure 101 presents the results from a logistic regression model examining which factors might affect demand-making on local governments in Honduras. The most important factors are level of education and municipal meeting attendance. People with higher levels of education and those who have attended meetings are those who make demands upon their local governments.




Figure 101. Determinants of Petitioning Local Governments in Honduras

Figure 102 presents bivariate relationships between demand-making on local government and the various important variables included in the logistic regression analysis. People who attended municipal meetings solicited local governments at a level of 30 percentage points more than people who never attended local meetings. The request for help from the municipality more than doubles between people without any formal education and those with university-level education.




Figure 102. Factors Associated with Petitioning Local Governments in Honduras

III. Satisfaction and Trust in Local Government

The AmericasBarometer also asked various questions regarding citizen satisfaction and trust in their local government. The first question appears in various rounds of the survey.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer



The 2012 round in Honduras asks three new questions to determine the level of satisfaction with various services that are traditionally provided by national governments with the support of local governments.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA

The final question, which has been used in many of the previous rounds, evaluates trust in local government. Citizens respond to the question on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 meaning “none” and 7 “a lot.”

B32. To what extent do you trust in your municipality?

Satisfaction with Local Services

Figure 103 presents the average level of citizen satisfaction with local services in the Americas derived from the responses to question **SGL1**. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, the responses were recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale where 0 represents the lowest level of satisfaction and 100 represents the highest level of satisfaction. Honduras finds itself in the middle of the surveyed countries with a satisfaction level of 51.9 on the 0 to 100 scale. The countries with the highest levels of satisfaction are Canada and Argentina, with 59.5 and 59.1 points, respectively. The level in Honduras compares favorably in relation to those countries and reflects a positive level of evaluation of services offered by local governments.




Figure 103. Satisfaction with Local Services in the Americas

Figure 104 presents more information on the extent to which citizens feel satisfied or unsatisfied with their local governments in Honduras. An estimated 47% express that services are “fair” or neither good nor bad. Another 21.3% report that services are either bad or very bad. In general, the evaluation of local governments is relatively positive.




Figure 104. Evaluation of Local Services in Honduras

How has satisfaction with local government services changed in recent years? Figure 105 presents the trends with respect to satisfaction since 2004. The evaluations of local governments have remained stable since 2004. In 2008 there was a decrease, but it then returned to previous levels in 2010 and the differences between 2010 and 2012 are not statistically significant. It is important to point out the difference between the evaluation of municipal services and the evaluation of the political system in general. The work of local governments is evaluated much more positively than that of the central government.




Figure 105. Evaluation of Local Services Across Time in Honduras

Satisfaction with Health Services, Education and Roadways

It is possible that citizens evaluate the provision of some services more positively than others. The following three figures show levels of satisfaction with the state of the roadways and schools along with health services in the Americas.²² Figure 106 shows the satisfaction with streets and roadways, according to the responses of question SD2NEW2. As is standard for this report, the responses have been recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale where 0 is very little satisfaction and 100 is very high satisfaction. Ecuador and Panama are the countries with the highest levels of satisfaction with roadways. The country with the lowest level of satisfaction is Jamaica. In Honduras, the evaluation is 49.3 points on the 0 to 100 scale and is located in the center of the group of countries included in the AmericasBarometer.




Figure 106. Satisfaction with Roadways in the Americas

²² In the case of Honduras, these services are primarily the responsibility of the national government.



Figure 107 presents the level of satisfaction with public schools in accordance with responses to question **SD3NEW2**. Better evaluated schools are found in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Panama. The worst schools are found in Haiti and Chile. Schools in Honduras received an average score of 53.7 points on the 0 to 100 scale, which represents a relatively positive evaluation.




Figure 107. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Americas

Finally, Figure 108 examines satisfaction with public health services according to question **SD6NEW2**. The public health systems in Costa Rica, Panama, and Ecuador receive the highest levels of satisfaction; Brazil and Trinidad & Tobago receive the lowest. Honduras has an average level of satisfaction with public health services of 53.7 points, a relatively high level in comparison with other countries.

The results that we presented regarding specific services represent a relatively high level of satisfaction, especially if we remember the low levels of trust in the political system.




Figure 108. Satisfaction with Health Services in the Americas

Trust in Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer did not only ask citizens if they felt satisfied with their local governments, but also if they trusted in those governments. The responses to this question may give a perspective toward certain abstract attitudes regarding local governments that come from previous times. Figure 109 presents the average levels of trust in local governments throughout the Americas. The highest level of trust is found in El Salvador, Venezuela, and Chile. The lowest levels are in Peru and Haiti. Local government in Honduras receives a trust level of 46.6 points on the 0 to 100 scale.



This measure represents a relatively negative level of trust, even though it is favorable in comparison with the national government and other State institutions (see Chapter Five).




Figure 109. Trust in Local Government in the Americas

Local governments in Honduras are directly responsible for services such as trash collection, the administration of markets and the provision of water and sewage. The 2012 survey included questions regarding the perception of whether these services had improved or not. The questions are presented below.

I am now going to ask you questions regarding certain municipal services. I am going to ask that for each one of them that you tell me if it has improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse in the last two years. [After each service, ask: has it improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse?]						
HONMUN32. Trash Collection	(1) It has improved	(2) It has remained the same	(3) It has gotten worse	[DO NOT READ] (4) This Service is Not Available	(88) NS	(98) NR
HONMUN33. Administration of Market	(1) It has improved	(2) It has remained the same	(3) It has gotten worse	[DO NOT READ] (4) This Service is Not Available	(88) NS	(98) NR
HONMUN36. Water and Sewage	(1) It has improved	(2) It has remained the same	(3) It has gotten worse	[DO NOT READ] (4) This Service is Not Available	(88) NS	(98) NR

Figure 110 shows that 33.9% of Hondurans think that trash collection has remained the same in the past two years. Another 23.1% report that it has improved and 32.5% say that it is not offered in their municipality.




Figure 110. Trash Collection

Figure 111 shows the results for the administration of markets. We observe that 27.4% of respondents report that the service has remained the same. Only 10.1% say that the administration of markets has improved in the past two year. An estimated 53% of Hondurans report that this service is not available in their municipality.




Figure 111. Administration of Markets

Figure 112 shows the opinions for the provision of water and sewage. Here we see that 43.9% of Hondurans think that this service is the same as it was two years ago. Another 22.8% report that water and sewage service has improved.




Figure 112. Water and Sewage

IV. The Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support

As was argued at the beginning of this chapter, many citizens do not have contact with any level of government, except for their local government. Given this, perceptions of local governments might affect the formation of attitudes toward the political system in general. Figure 113 presents a linear regression model to determine whether satisfaction with local services is associated with political system support, while controlling for other factors that might affect system support.

Approval of the work of the president and evaluation of services provided by local government are statistically significant factors in explaining change in political system support. The more satisfaction with local government services, the higher the level of political system support.




Figure 113. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant for Political System Support in Honduras

Figure 114 presents the bivariate relationship between satisfaction with local services and political system support. We observe that people who perceive that local services are good or very good express levels of political system support two times higher than those who think the contrary. Therefore, we can affirm that the perception of local services has an important impact on political system support in general. This result shows the significant effect that the local situation has on evaluations of the national system.




Figure 114. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in Honduras

Finally, the AmericasBarometer survey asked about opinions regarding the responsibilities and resources between the municipal and national governments.

LGL2A. Taking into account existing public services in the country, who should be given *more responsibilities*? [Read options]:

- (1) Much more to the central government
 - (2) Some more to the central government
 - (3) The same amount to the central government and to the municipality
 - (4) Some more to the municipality
 - (5) Much more to the central government
- (88) NS (98) NR

LGL2B. And taking into account the existing economic resources in the country, who should *administer more money*? [Read options]

- (1) Much more to the central government
 - (2) Some more to the central government
 - (3) The same amount to the central government and to the municipality
 - (4) Some more to the municipality
 - (5) Much more to the central government
- (88) NS (98) NR

LGL3. Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the municipality in order for it to provide better municipal services or do you not think it is worth it to pay more taxes to the municipality?

- (1) Willing to pay more taxes
 - (2) It is not worth it to pay more taxes
- (88) NS (98) NR




Figure 115. Who Should have More Responsibility for Public Services?

Figure 115 shows that 43.8% of Hondurans think that the national government should assume more responsibility with respect to public services. In spite of local governments receiving higher levels of trust than national governments, only 5.9% of Hondurans want to give a lot more responsibility to local governments in terms of public services.




Figure 116. Who Should Administer more Money?

Figure 116 shows that 37.6% of Hondurans believe that the central government should administer much more money for public services. Only 11.5% believe that local governments should administer a lot more money. Also, 30.6% believe that the municipal and central governments should administer the same amount of money.

Finally, Figure 117 shows that 70.2% of Honduras do not believe that more taxes should be given to the municipality.




Figure 117. More Taxes to the Municipality

V. Conclusion

This chapter examined evaluations of local governments. Decentralization has been a topic of interest for academics and policy-makers looking to deepen political participation and democratization of public institutions. Of those Hondurans interviewed, 13.5% report having attended municipal meetings. The levels of participation in municipal meetings reduced since 2006, but increased in 2012; although the levels remain below those which were found in 2006. Only 9.6% of Hondurans have petitioned the municipality. The percentage of Hondurans that put forth a request for help increased between 2010 and 2012, although the level is lower than what we observed in the beginning of the AmericasBarometer. Furthermore, 65.4% of those who requested assistance from the municipality report that the problem was not resolved. Citizens with higher levels of education and those who attended municipal meetings are the ones who make more demands on local governments. Honduras finds itself in the center among the other countries regarding satisfaction with local services with a score of 51.9 points on the 0 to 100 scale. In general, the evaluation of local governments is relatively positive. The evaluations of local governments have remained stable since 2004. The results that we

present regarding specific services represent a relatively high level of satisfaction, especially if we remember the low levels of trust in the political system. An important number of Hondurans believe that water and sewage services and trash collection have not changed in the past two years. Approval of the work of the president and evaluations of services provided by local governments are statistically significant factors in explaining changes in political system support. More satisfaction with local government services results in higher levels of political system support. Finally, in spite of relatively high levels of trust toward local governments, Hondurans prefer more responsibility and money be given to the central government. An estimated 70% of Hondurans do not want to pay more taxes to the municipality.

**Part III:
Beyond Equality of Opportunities**

Chapter Seven: Elections, Partisanship and Electoral Behavior

I. Introduction

Although parties were not necessarily seen as inevitable, let alone desirable institutions when they first emerged, they are now firmly rooted in contemporary democracy. Political parties serve a key link between the State and civil society through structuring participation and political competition. They are vital for the recruitment of political leaders, in developing programs that serve as the foundation for government policies, as counterweights to existing governments and are the primary institutions for political socialization.

The origins of the two traditional political parties in Honduras date back to the end of the 19th century, the Liberal Party (*el Partido Liberal*) in 1891 and the National Party (*el Partido Nacional*) in 1902. In 1957, political parties were officially recognized as public institutions in the constitution. The parties were structured based on clientelistic relationships with the electorate and patrimonial with the State, without much ideological or programmatic differences between the parties. Edelberto Torres Rivas, referring to the origins and development of the parties, says: “They’re twin forces, from the same oligarchic core, only differentiated by regional or commercial loyalties.... Power resided in the banana enclave; still in the 1930s, the liberals were financed by the United Fruit Co. and the nationals by the Cuyamel Fruit Co. which lead William Krehm to call it the “banana republic.” What happened was a fight for power of the state, which from 1980 became an agreement among the elites: a bipartisan presidential alternation with the distribution of patronage positions and roles.”¹

The elections of April 1980 resulted in a National Constitutional Assembly that produced a new Political Constitution and prepared the Electoral Law that served as a foundation for the presidential elections in November 1981, where the Liberal Party and its candidate Roberto Suazo Córdova (1982-1986) were victorious. Since the four years of Suazo Córdova, the country has gone through seven other presidential elections: 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2009; each resulting in an equal number of distinct presidents from the two traditional parties. Figure 118 presents the results of the presidential elections of Honduras since 1981. The Liberal Party has won five and the National Party won three of the eight elections that have taken place since the transition to a democratic system.

¹ Torres Rivas, Edelberto. 2010. “Las democracias malas de Centroamérica”, *Revista Nueva Sociedad* N°226, abril, 59.




Figure 118. Results of Presidential Elections (1981-2009)

Prior to the elections of 2013, a number of new parties were legalized. The Anticorruption Party (*el Partido Anticorrupción – PAC*) led by television host and engineer Salvador Nasralla; the Freedom and Reorganization Party (*el Partido Libertad y Refundación – LIBRE*) whose candidate for the presidency is the country’s former first lady, Xiomara Castro; the Patriotic Alliance Party (*el Partido Alianza Patriótica*) led by retired general Romeo Vásquez Velásquez; and Broad Political Electoral Resistance Front (*el Frente Amplio Político Electoral en Resistencia – FAPER*) whose candidate is a human rights leader, Andrés Pavón. In total, there are nine new political parties that have been approved to compete in the next primary and general elections. Until 2012, the National Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian Democrat (*La Democracia Cristiana – DC*), the Innovation and Unity Party (*el Partido Innovación y Unidad – PINU*), and the Democratic Unification (*Unificación Democrática – UD*) were the only political parties that existed in Honduras. It is important to note that this chapter does not have data for the new parties given that at the time the survey was carried out, these parties had not yet obtained legal status.

II. Electoral Participation and its Determinants

The AmericasBarometer survey includes various questions seeking to explore the political attitudes and electoral behavior of Hondurans. In this section we examine these questions, and as was done in previous reports, with the intention of learning more about the participation of Honduras in the electoral process.

VB1. Do you have an identity card?
 (1) Yes (2) No (3) In process (88) NS (98) NR

Figure 119 shows that 92.8% of those interviewed have an identification card.




Figure 119. Do You Have an Identity Card?

The second question examines electoral participation for the 2009 elections. Elections to select a new president, three presidential-designates (vice-presidents), 128 member of the National Congress, and hundreds of mayors took place on November 29, 2009.

VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections of 2009?
 (1) Yes, voted [**Continue**]
 (2) No, did not vote [**Skip VB10**]
 (88) NS [**Skip VB10**] (98) NR [**Skip VB10**]

We see in Figure 120 that almost half of those interviewed in 2012 report not having voted in the 2009 elections. This result reflects very closely to that reported by the Honduran Electoral Tribunal whose figure shows a participation rate of 49.9%.²

² See: <http://www.tse.hn/web/index.html>.




Figure 120. Did You Vote in the 2009 Presidential Elections?

What factors might explain electoral participation in 2009? For this analysis we conduct a logistic regression. In Figure 121, we can see that age, size of place of residence and sympathizing with a political party are statistically significant factors in determining whether a respondent voted in the 2009 elections.




Figure 121. Determinants of Electoral Participation in 2009

Figure 122 shows the relationship between age, party sympathizing, and size of place of residence with electoral participation in 2009. In short, 72.1% of citizens who express sympathy for a political party participated in the elections compared to only 37.5% of those who do not identify with any political party. The participation rate of those who live in rural areas is almost double that of those who live in urban areas. Finally, it should not be surprising that those citizens between 18 and 25 years old are those who report the lowest levels of electoral participation. Although it is true that many young people falling into this age bracket would not have been old enough to vote in 2009; in general, younger citizens show less interest in politics and have lower levels of electoral participation than the rest of the population.




Figure 122. Having Voted in the 2009 Elections by Age, Place of Residence, and Political Party Identification

III. Party Misalignment

As we noted before, the political party system in Honduras has historically been a two-party system with two large parties, who traditionally alternated power before and after the transition to democracy. Since the political crisis of 2009, there have been signs that the system is changing. In this section we analyze these changes. The AmericasBarometer asks about party identification.

VB10. At this time do you identify with a political party?
 (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Skip to HONVB11A]** (88) NS **[Skip to HONVB11A]**
 (98) NR **[Skip to HONVB11A]**

VB11. With which political party do you identify? **[Do Not Read the List]**
 (401) Partido Nacional
 (402) Partido Liberal
 (403) Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras (PDCH)
 (404) Partido Innovación y Unidad (PINU-SD)
 (405) Unificación Democrática (UD)
 (77) Other (88) NS (98) NR (99) N/A

Figure 123 shows that 39.2% of those interviewed identify with a political party, the rest do not identify.




Figure 123. At this Time, do You Identify with a Political Party?

Figure 124 indicates that 88.2% of those who sympathize with a party (the 39.2% presented above) identify with one of the two traditional parties, the National Party or the Liberal Party. Another 11.4% of respondents fall into the “other” category in terms of party identification. Unfortunately when the survey was carried out, the new parties did not achieved legal status yet.




Figure 124. With Which Party do you Identify? Honduras, 2012

To what extent has party identification changed since the crisis of 2009? Figure 125 shows that political party identification has decreased since 2008. In that year, 48.7% of respondents to the AmericasBarometer reported identifying with a political party. This percentage decreased to 43.7% in 2010 and to 39.2% in 2012. Clearly, there is a party dealignment in Honduras.




Figure 125. Party Identification Across Time

What factors determine political party identification? Figure 126 shows the results of a logistic regression.




Figure 126. Determinants of Party Identification

The significant factors related to political party identification include the areas where the citizen lives, political interest, and having voted. Those who live in urban areas identify less with political parties. Citizens who voted in the last elections and who have higher levels of interest in politics identify more with political parties. Below, in Figure 127 we can see the relationships between these factors and party identification.




Figure 127: Political Party Identification by Political Interest, Place of Residence, and Having Voted in the Last Elections

Citizens who live in rural areas report higher levels of party identification than those who reside in urban areas. Political interest is positively correlated with party identification; those who express lower levels of interest also tend to identify at lower rates with political parties in Honduras. Finally, we see that those who voted in the past elections identify with political parties at a rate of 30 points higher than those who did not vote.

How would the electoral participation of Hondurans look if the elections took place during the week in which the respondent was surveyed? Figure 128 presents results that suggest a significant increase in the percentage of citizens who feel alienated from the party system and whose intention would be to not vote; more than 50% of Hondurans report that they would not vote if the elections were held this week. We also note a significant decrease in the number of Hondurans who would vote for the party of the current president and a slight increase among those who would vote for another party.




Figure 128. If This Week were the Next Presidential Elections, What Would You Do?

IV. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the electoral behavior and attitudes toward political parties in Honduras since the 2009 crisis. Historically, the traditional parties in Honduras created clientelistic-type relationships with the electorate and patrimonial relationships with the State without having large ideological or programmatic differences between them. The Liberal Party has won five and the National Party three of the eight elections that have taken place since the transition to a democratic system.

Half of those interviewed in 2012 reported not having voted in the 2009 elections. Age, size of place of residence and party identification are statistically significant factors in determining whether the respondent voted in the 2009 elections.

Only 39.2% of those interviewed identified with a political party, the rest did not. Of those, 88.2% identify with one of the two traditional parties, the National Party or the Liberal Party. Political party identification has decreased since 2008; in that year, 48.7% of respondents of the AmericasBarometer reported identifying with a political party. This percentage decreased to 43.7% in 2012 and 39.2% in 2012. One significant factor in determining whether a person identified with a political party includes where the citizen lives, with people living in rural areas expressing higher rates of identification. Voting in the last election and political interest are also significant factors. The misalignment of parties and low levels of system legitimacy that we have observed in previous chapters is reflected in the percentage of citizens whose intention is to not vote, in the case of having elections; more than 50% of Hondurans report that they would not vote if the elections had been during the week that they were interviewed.

Chapter Eight: Beyond the Crisis: Legitimacy and Democracy in Honduras

I. Introduction

The events that began the political crisis that consumed Honduras during the second half of 2009 and caused important ruptures in the international community, began on the morning of June 28 of that year. At 5:00 in the morning, troops from the Honduran military entered the private residence of President Manuel Zelaya, who was arrested, driven to the Hernán Acosta Mejía air base, south of Tegucigalpa and transferred to Costa Rica on a military plane.¹

The Honduran Armed Forces justified the expulsion of President Zelaya under the argument that on June 26 the Supreme Court of Justice ordered his capture for the supposed responsibility of crimes against “the form of government, treason against the homeland, abuse of authority² and the usurpation of functions harmful to public administration and the State of Honduras.”³

On September 21, 2009, Zelaya returned to Honduras unbeknownst to authorities in the Micheletti government and took refuge in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. Following a round of conversations and with the support of the OAS and the United States, Zelaya and Micheletti signed an agreement on October 20, 2009. The Tegucigalpa-San José Agreement sought to (1) form a government of national unity and reconciliation; (2) renounce any intention of reforming permanent sections of the Honduran Constitution; (3) recognize the November elections under international observation; (4) transfer of oversight of the Armed Forces (that traditionally assisted in electoral logistics) to the Supreme Electoral Court a month before elections; (5) put forth a vote in the National Congress – keeping in mind the opinion of the Supreme Court of Justice – regarding the return of Zelaya to the presidency; (6) create a verification commission to guarantee that the conditions of the agreement were carried out, and a truth commission to investigate the events before, during, and after June 28; and (7) obtain international recognition of Honduras and to eliminate all sanctions against the country. The agreement also established a calendar for its application: the transfer of the agreement to

¹ “Mel llega a Costa Rica”, *La Tribuna*, June 28, 2009; “Tensión en Honduras”, *BBC mundo*, June 28, 2009; “Manuel Zelaya: aún estoy en ropa de dormir”, *El País* (Spain), June 28, 2009.

² Article 2 of the Honduran constitution establishes: “La soberanía corresponde al pueblo del cual emanan todos los poderes del Estado que se ejercen por representación. La suplantación de la soberanía popular y la usurpación de los poderes constituidos se tipifican como delitos de traición a la Patria. La responsabilidad en estos casos es imprescriptible y podrá ser deducida de oficio o a petición de cualquier ciudadano”. Article 328, number 3 of the Honduran Penal Code says: “Delinquen contra la Forma de Gobierno y serán sancionados con reclusión de seis (6) a doce (12) años, quienes ejecutaren actos directamente encaminados a conseguir por la fuerza, o fuera de las vías legales: 3. Despojar en todo o en parte al Congreso Nacional, al Poder Ejecutivo o a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las prerrogativas y facultades que les atribuye la Constitución”.

³ Article 349 of the Penal Code establishes: “Será castigado con reclusión de tres (3) a seis (6) años e inhabilitación especial por el doble del tiempo que dure la reclusión el funcionario o empleado público que: 1. Se niegue a dar el debido cumplimiento a órdenes, sentencias, providencias, resoluciones, acuerdos o decretos dictados por las autoridades judiciales o administrativas dentro de los límites de sus respectivas competencias y con las formalidades legales”. Finally, the article 354 says: “El funcionario o empleado público que usurpe funciones propias de otro cargo será sancionado con reclusión de dos (2) a cinco (5) años, más multa de cinco mil (L 5.000) a diez mil (L10.000) lempiras e inhabilitación especial por el doble del tiempo que dure la reclusión”.

Congress for its consideration of returning Zelaya to office should have taken place on October 30, 2009, the verification commission was formed on November 2, the national unity government should have taken office on November 5, and the trust commission was planned for the first half of 2010.⁴

Ex-President Zelaya finally returned to Honduras on May 28, 2011. Since his return, ex-President Zelaya has mobilized his supporters for the 2013 elections, forming his own party, the Party of Freedom and Reorganization (*el Partido de Libertad y Refundación – LIBRE*). In July 2012, the party named the ex-president’s wife, Xiomara Castro de Zelaya as its candidate for the presidency.

II. Opinion on the Effects of the Return of President Zelaya

The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked the following question to measure the reaction to the return of ex-President Zelaya to Honduras. Figure 129 shows that 26.1% of Hondurans interviewed at the beginning of 2012 think that the return of the ex-president contributed to the country being more democratic. Another 34% think that it made Honduras less democratic, and 40% think that it did not have an effect.




Figure 129. Contribution of Zelaya’s Return to Democracy in Honduras

⁴ “El próximo jueves debe estar formado el gobierno de unidad,” *El Tiempo* (Honduras), October 30, 2009.



III. Relationship between the President, National Congress and Supreme Court of Justice

The following questions seek to measure the extent to which Hondurans believe that the judicial or legislative branches should be able to remove the president when his actions go against the constitution.

HONJC17. Do you believe that it is justifiable for the Supreme Court of Justice to remove the president if he disobey the courts or laws?	(1) Yes it is justified	(2) No it is not justified	(88) NS	(98) NR
HONJC18. Do you believe that it is justifiable for the National Congress to remove the president if he disobeys the courts or laws?	(1) Yes it is justified	(2) No it is not justified	(88) NS	(98) NR




Figure 130. The Supreme Court of Justice of the National Congress Should be Able to Remove the President When He Disobeys the Court or Laws

Figure 130 shows that more the two-thirds of the Honduran population in 2012 does not agree that the National Congress or the Supreme Court of Justice should be able to remove a president who disobeys the law or the courts.

IV. Democratic Values Rooted in the Crisis

Since the 2004 survey, the AmericasBarometer has asked about justification for a *coup d'état* under certain circumstances. The following questions measure this phenomenon.

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military to take power by a *coup d'état* (military coup). In your opinion would a coup by the police be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]**

JC1. When there is high unemployment.	(1) A take-over by the military would be justified	(2) A take-over by military would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A take-over by military would be justified	(2) A take-over by the military would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A take-over by the military would be justified	(2) A take-over by the military would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA

The responses to these questions were summed to create a scale of support for *coup d'états* that goes from “0” which signifies no support to “100” which signifies complete support. Below the results of this measure are presented since 2004. Figure 131 shows a dramatic reduction in the support for a *coup d'état* after the 2009 political crisis. In 2008 a majority of Hondurans believed that a *coup d'état* could be justified, this number decreased to an average of 34 points on the 0 to 100 scale in 2012. It is evident that the results of the crisis have dramatically changed the opinions of Hondurans regarding *coup d'états* and the possibility of removing a president, even when his removal is for illegal behavior.




Figure 131. Support for *Coup d'état* Over Time in Honduras



What results did the crisis have on support for the political system and support for democracy? We observe that in both cases, the crisis and the political events stemming from it during the past two years have had very negative effects. Figure 132 reveals that political system support⁵ decreased significantly between 2010 and 2012. After increasing considerably following the crisis and during the “honeymoon” period of President Lobo; in 2012 it decreased almost 20 points, falling back to levels similar to those seen before the crisis.




Figure 132. System Support in 2008, 2010, and 2012

Figure 133 shows that support for democracy as the best political system remains above 50 points but has decreased since 2010. We see in Chapter V that Hondurans express the lowest level of support for democracy among the countries that make up the 2012 AmericasBarometer.

⁵ See Chapter Five for an explanation of this variable.




Figure 133: Support for Democracy, 2008, 2010, and 2012




Figure 134. Satisfaction with Democracy

Figure 134 shows a significant reduction in satisfaction with democracy even though it remains just on the positive side with an average of 50.7 on the 0 to 100 scale. It is important to point out that the average level of satisfaction with democracy in 2012 remains higher than in 2008, before the crisis.

V. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the origins of the political crisis suffered by Honduras in 2009 and examined its consequences on democratic values. The results show a significant deterioration in support for the political system and support for democracy, and a slight reduction in satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Honduras. We also observe that Hondurans do not support the removal of the president of the Republic by Congress or the Supreme Court even when he has violated the law. Finally, Hondurans express doubts on the democratic impact of the return of ex-President Zelaya to the country. Only a minority believe that his return to the country increased democracy in Honduras.

Chapter Nine: Can Political Culture of Democracy be Reconstructed from the Local Level?

By Daniel Montalvo

I. Introduction

The data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer analyzed in this report presents evidence of a new weakness of political culture of democracy in Honduras. Following a democratic failure in 2009, correctly alerted by Booth and Seligson through their triply dissatisfaction index;¹ Honduras appeared to enter 2010 in a stage of recuperation in each of the three key dimensions of political legitimacy: (a) support for national institutions, (b) support for democracy and (c) evaluations of the economic performance of the government. Notwithstanding, the indicators obtained in this most recent round of surveys show a panorama of little encouragement: not only do we find that Honduras is last among all 26 countries included in the AmericasBarometer on the tolerance and support for the system scales (with only 7.2 percentage points), but also the average of these indicators are the lowest that have been reported since we started our work in this Central American country in 2004. These findings invite us to reflect deeply on the future of stability of Honduran democracy.

In the final chapter of this report, we explore the possibility of reconstructing the democratic values of tolerance and system support from the local level. Why from the local level? In spite of the existence of innumerable factors that directly or indirectly influence levels of political legitimacy in a democratic system, various studies and sub-national experiences have put forward convincing evidence that citizens' perceptions and behaviors with respect to the national-level are formed in large part through the relationships with local governments. After all, the average citizen has much more contact with their local government than with the central government in their daily life. Municipalities are the first public institutions to respond to various aspects of everyday life, despite the fact that the role of local governments varies widely from country to country. In some States, local governments are responsible for public education, sanitation and citizen security, while in others these role are under the purview central government.

It was no exaggeration when former Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, Thomas Phillip "Tip" O'Neil, coined the famous phrase, "all politics is local" referring to the idea that the legitimacy of a politician is directly related with her abilities to understand and have influence on her constituents at the local level. However, beyond political discourse, the empirical evidence shows the existence of a real possibility to consolidate various aspects of democratic culture through citizen empowerment and State decentralization.

Studies that recognize the benefits of State decentralization began in vigor with the beginning of the third wave of democratization in Latin America in the 70s and 80s.² During these decades, many economists and political scientists advocated for a decentralized model with the objective of reforming

¹ Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Democracy and Political Support in Eight Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

² Fox, Jonathan. 1994 "Latin America's Emerging Local Politics." *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 2: 105-16.

the political and economic institutional realities that had been characterized by dictatorships during that period of time. Based on the Neo-Federalist movement in the United States during the 1960s, Latin American Governments began to rapidly transform the engrained centralized institutions that had lost legitimacy, became corrupt and had been in charge of the systematic violation of human rights and the impoverishment of the population.³ These evils, which according to Véliz were direct results of the centralist traditions installed during colonization,⁴ should have been rectified through the political, administrative and fiscal decentralization of the State.

What are the main arguments for believing that State decentralization can positively affect democratization within a society? More specifically, how might decentralization and sub-national governments promote democratic values such as tolerance and system support among citizens? Before discussing the theories that speak to these questions, it is first necessary to define more narrowly the concept of decentralization that will be used throughout this chapter. We understand State decentralization to be the transfer of power from higher levels to lower levels of government. This transfer can generally occur in three ways: (a) *political*, where local authorities are elected by the citizenry in place of being appointed or designated by the central government, (b) *fiscal*, where the central governments transfer economic resources to the municipality, but also gives municipalities the ability to impose taxes within its territories, and (c) *administrative*, where local governments have the abilities to develop and administer their own public policies instead of only complying with those of the central government.⁵

Theories in defense of decentralization, which are based in large part on the *principle of subsidiarity*,⁶ identify at least three elements that can positively affect the political culture of democracy: (a) an increase in the efficiency of the distribution of public goods and, as a consequence, higher trust and satisfaction with the public sphere, (b) a higher level of citizen participation, and (c) an increase in transparency and, as a consequence, less corruption. In this chapter, we will evaluate the possible impact of these three elements on political tolerance and support for the system. Below we will develop the theoretical mechanisms through which these elements might contribute to Honduran democracy.

It is well known that decentralization and local government try, by principle, to bring government closer to the people. With the exception of those citizens who live in the national capital, the majority of individuals in a country live far away from the central government. This makes it difficult for the central government to recognize and attend to the particular needs of each territory as well as for the citizens to go long distances to solicit services and participate in the public decision-

³ Furniss, Norman. 1974. "The Practical Significance of Decentralization." *Journal of Politics*: 958-82.

⁴ Véliz, Claudio. 1980. *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁵ A lot of literature on decentralization distinguishes the transfer of power from the national to the sub-national levels in three spheres: (1) transfer from the central government to the local governments (municipality), (2) transfer from the central government to the intermediate-level of government (department, region, and/or province), and (3) decentralization from the intermediate-level of government to the local government. To simplify the analysis and for space, in this chapter we will examine that between the central government and local government, excluding for the moment the intermediate-level government. In addition to the practical effects, the selection of the municipality and central government as units of analysis is common in the study of unitary states given that intermediary government tend to have less relevance in politics and the economy in comparison with that of federal states (as is the case in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, but not Honduras).

⁶ The principle of subsidiarity suggests that state action should limit those instances in which civil society is not capable of solving its own problems. For a more detailed definition of the principle, see www.rae.es.

making process. It is because of this the decentralization would increase the efficiency of public goods and services and would, furthermore, allow individuals to take part in the decisions that affect their community.

With respect to the increase in efficiency, the literature on decentralization from the point of view of economics argues that while the market allows individuals' needs to be noticed and satisfied with private goods, the provision of public goods responds to aggregated preferences in place of individuals, creating a problem of efficiency.⁷ Because of this, in areas where the distribution of public goods does not satisfy individual preferences, discontent with the State and its institutions should become more widespread. This problem of efficiency could be mitigated if an important number of public goods were administered locally.⁸ In this case, the citizens would be able to "vote with their feet"; that is, they could move to a community that better responds to both their political and economic preferences.⁹

If these arguments were correct then we would expect to find a higher level of satisfaction with public services in more decentralized contexts. At the same time a plausible hypothesis could be that individuals find higher satisfaction in the goods and services provided by the local government in comparison with those provided by the central government because, as was mentioned before, local governments are able to identify and satisfy, more efficiently, the aggregated needs of the citizenry. In other words, decentralization might help Hondurans in better evaluating government performance.

However, theories very rarely survive reality. It may be premature to accept without fear of mistake that an empowered local government is more efficient in satisfying the needs of communities than is the central government. A study conducted by Professor Tullia Falleti shows that many times central governments prefer to first decentralize administrative responsibility and then the fiscal resources.¹⁰ This results in an increase in the expectations of the citizenry with respect to local government performance that cannot be met because sub-national governments lack the necessary resources to administer such policies and programs.¹¹ It is because of this that a process of administrative decentralization without being accompanied by adequate fiscal and political dimensions may put democracy at risk instead of strengthening it.¹²

In terms of citizen contact with public institutions, we would expect decentralization to generate the possibility that individuals would directly petition their municipalities and that they would be permitted to participate in open council meetings or municipal sessions. This direct contact with State institutions would be a bit more complicated in more centralized systems simply because many people live long distances from the capital. In other words, decentralization would contribute to democracy solidifying citizen participation in formal activities of local government. Why?

⁷ Samuelson, Paul. 1954. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." *Review of Economics and Statistics* XXXVI, no. 4 .

⁸ Tiebout, Charles. 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." *Journal of Political Economy* 64, no. 5.

⁹ Hirschman, Albert. 1970. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

¹⁰ Falleti, Tullia G. 2005. "A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review*, no. 3 (9): 327-346.

¹¹ One of the clearest examples of decentralization of education if the required resources are accompanied is Argentina during the Military Junta of the 1980s.

¹² Hiskey, Jonathan, and Mitchell Seligson. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, no. 4 : 25.

The literature on democracy and citizen participation is well developed in political science. The seminal work of Almond and Verba in the 1960s suggests that citizen participation in local government activities, political parties and civic organizations is an indispensable element of “civic virtue.”¹³ Civic virtue, according to these authors, is nothing more than a type of political culture characterized by the acceptance of State authority and the belief in an active role in citizens’ public duties. In other words, civic virtue has much in common with what we call “political culture of democracy.”

Through refinement of these concepts, Putnam establishes a causal mechanism between citizen participation and support for democracy in his classic work, *Making Democracy Work*.¹⁴ In general terms, Putnam suggests that when individuals participate in spaces of collective interest, the conformation of social networks solidifies the creation of mechanisms of consensus and dissent that lead to higher levels of tolerance toward individuals who do not think the same. At the same time, the construction of these social networks leads to the formation of new institutions that could increase levels of legitimacy in the system given that those individuals have already constructed with their own hands the principle elements of their life and their collective behavior. This, according to defenders of citizen participation would be more complicated to achieve if the regulations and norms were placed on the citizens from diverse functions of the State at the central level.

What was discussed above leads us to think that decentralization could help to reconstruct Honduran democracy starting with citizen participation within the local government. However, some work also shows mixed effects of the conformation of social networks. Armony warns, for example, that as interaction between individuals increases, there are higher possibilities of generating resentment among individuals if their positions regarding collective issues are irreconcilable. As a result, Armony argues that the link between civic involvement and democracy is not necessarily positive and is largely unknown.¹⁵ Other warnings come from group theory that explains that while interaction can strengthen social cohesion within a group, this same interaction can strengthen animosity between groups perceived to be different.

The final element analyzed in this study, which engages the idea that decentralization strengthens the political culture of democracy, is the supposed increase in transparency. As has already been discussed, decentralization brings government closer to the people and this allows the citizenry to have more control over the use and distribution of public goods. Furthermore, it is possible that individuals would also have closer control over their local public officials in more decentralized contexts. Many times local public officials are neighbors, and citizens are better able to notice if, for example, these authorities use public goods for private benefit. As a result, citizens would be better able to award political parties who act in accordance with their expectations through reelection or punish those who do not by removing them from office.

However, the relationship between decentralization and the decrease of corruption is not very clear either, and the empirical evidence shows, at best, mixed results. Certain studies provide evidence

¹³ Almond, Gabriel, and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁴ Putnam, Robert D. 1994. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁵ Armony, Ariel. 2004. *The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

that in some cases, fiscally empowered sub-national governments tend to use their resources to achieve clientelistic goals with the objective of ensuring their political survival.¹⁶ These goals generally present themselves in two ways: (a) through a direct exchange of goods for votes, and/or (b) through the provision of “work for the boys.”¹⁷ Furthermore, the theory is inconclusive in that one can imagine that if decentralization is not accompanied by specific public policies, corruption could be transferred from the national to local level along with political, fiscal, and administrative responsibilities.

In the following sections of this chapter we will evaluate empirically the theories developed in this introductory section. We will begin with a comparative study between the local and national levels using historical, cross-sectional data of citizen demand-making on local and central governments in Honduras, trust and satisfaction with government performance, and corruption victimization at both levels of the State. Next, we will evaluate the impact of these elements and support for decentralization on tolerance, support for the system and citizens’ democratic preferences. To achieve this, we employ multivariate and multilevel models that allow use to simulate the most precise reality of Honduran politics. Finally, we evaluate the results to see if we are able to reconstruct democracy from the local level.

The most relevant findings from this study show that there exists a statistically significant relationship that is positive and robust between trust in local government and satisfaction with municipal services on the one hand, and Honduran democratic values on the other. Specifically, we find that as citizens’ trust in local government increases, support for democracy, political tolerance and system support also increase. At the same time, an increase in satisfaction with services provided by the municipality translates into an increase in political tolerance and system support. These results will be analyzed more deeply in the next section of this chapter.

II. Local Government vs. Central Government: Which Level Elicits Higher Levels of Legitimacy Among Hondurans?

In the previous section we presented a theoretical framework which allows us to measure the impact of decentralization and local politics on tolerance, support for the system, and the preference for democracy over other forms of governments. In this section we will begin with a comparative study of institutional legitimacy at both the local and national levels of government. This comparative analysis uses both historical and cross-sectional data. That is, the data collected by the AmericasBarometer allows us to understand in a given time and space attitudes toward local government versus the central government in Honduras. The issues that we will analyze below are: (a) demand-making on different levels of government, (b) the evaluation and approval of the work of local governments and the president, (c) corruption victimization by the municipality specifically, and the public sector more generally, and (d) trust in local institutions versus national institutions.

¹⁶ Treisman, Daniel. 2006. "Fiscal Decentralization, Governance, and Economic Performance: A Reconsideration." *Economics and Politics* 18, no. 2 : 219-35.

¹⁷ Prud'homme, Remy. 1995. "On The Dangers of Decentralization." *World Bank Research Observer* 10, no. 2 : 201-20.

(a) Demand-Making

To what level of government do citizens make more demands or present more requests in Honduras? In order to respond to this question we included throughout various years and countries the following questions:

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.				
In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...? [Read the options and mark the response]	Yes	No	DK	DA
CP2. A member of Congress?	1	2	88	98
CP4A. A local public official or local government for example, a mayor, municipal council, or councilman	1	2	88	98
CP4. Any ministry or minister, state agency or public agency or institution	1	2	88	98

The AmericasBarometer data that we present in Figure 135 shows us a number of important results. First, it is interesting to note that the percentage of individuals that petitioned the local government in 2012 is exactly double the percentage that petitioned a ministry, public institution, or other State office (9.8% vs. 4.9% of citizens, respectively). This suggests that in fact, it is at the local level where Hondurans have higher levels of direct contact with the government.

However, it should also be noted that the amount of petitions made by citizens has decreased significantly between 2004 and 2012, primarily at the local level. While 15.8% of citizens made some sort of demand to the local government in 2004, only 9.8% did so in 2012. This reflects an important decreasing tendency in the number of petitions presented by Honduran citizens to their municipality. On the contrary, the number of petitions made to the central governments shows a somewhat irregular tendency; comparing the data for 2004 and 2008, the percentage of individuals who made some sort of transaction at this level of government decreased from 6.4% to 2.5%. However, the percentage shows a significant increase to 4.9% in 2012.

How does the level of government petitioning in Honduras compare with levels in the other countries analyzed by LAPOP? Figure 135 also shows, on the right-hand side, citizens' petitions to both municipalities and the central government in Honduras is quite low when compared with other countries.

In both cases, Honduras finds itself among the three countries with the lowest levels of petitioning the government, in comparison to the other 26 countries included in the study. In the case of petitioning the local government, Honduras (9.8%), Panama (8.8%) and Costa Rica (7.8%) are the countries with the lowest percentage of citizens making demands upon their municipality. It is important to remember that in Figure 135, the gray error bars overlapping mean that we do not have sufficient statistical evidence to determine which of these three countries is actually the lowest. In any case, Central American countries, with the exception of Guatemala and El Salvador, put forward few petitions toward the municipality in a comparative perspective. On the contrary, the countries with the highest levels of citizen demand-making toward the municipality are Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti, at 22.6%, 22.4%, and 20.9%, respectively. The regional mean, adjusted for the design effects of the sample, is 13.9%.




Figure 135. Petitioning the Governments in Honduras from a Historical and Comparative Perspective

Finally, the countries with the lowest levels of citizen petitions to the central government are Brazil, Paraguay, and Honduras with percentages of 5.1, 4.9, and 4.7, respectively. Again, we cannot conclude statistically which of these countries has the lowest percentage of citizens petitioning the national government as shown by the overlapping confidence intervals. On the other side of the

spectrum, we find the United States is well above the regional average of 9.3% with 26.4% of the population petitioning the national government in 2012. It is important to keep in mind that U.S. citizens have a strong tradition of close contact with their elected representatives, especially in the legislative branch, to whom they frequently send petitions through mail and receive high rates of responses. The other countries with high levels of demand-making to the national government are Jamaica (18.1%) and Trinidad & Tobago (17.9%).

(b) Evaluation and Approval of the Work of the Municipality and of the President

After studying the contact that Hondurans have with different levels of government, we ask ourselves, who is doing a better job, the municipality or the president? To answer this, we examine the following questions:

<p>SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? [Read options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA</p>
<p>M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA</p>

The AmericasBarometer data presented in Figure 136 show that on a recoded 0 to 100 point scale where 0 signifies “very bad” and 100 “very good,” Hondurans in 2012 evaluate more positively the performance of the local government in comparison to the work of the president (51.9 vs. 45.1 points, respectively).¹⁸ In general, the evaluation of the performance of the municipality has been above presidential approval, with the exception of 2010.

With that said, it is worth reemphasizing that in that year the AmericasBarometer data collection took place was very closely to the January 27 elections, where Porfirio Lobo put forward an important message of democratic reconstruction in Honduras. We hypothesize that this “honeymoon” period might be generating a certain level of “noise” in the data regarding presidential approval in 2010. For the other questions, the evaluations of both the services provided by the municipality as well as the president’s job approval have shown to be stable across time.

¹⁸ Given that the 2012 round does not include a specific variable to measure the job performance of mayors, in this chapter we use the evaluation of the municipality to be able to make multilevel comparisons.




Figure 136. Evaluation of the Municipality and Approval of the President in Honduras from a Historical and Comparative Perspective

From a comparative perspective, our data suggest that when evaluating the different levels of government in Honduras, the local level is generally more highly regarded. On the one hand, citizen evaluation of the services provided by Honduran municipalities at 51.9 points is very close to the regional average (50.6 points). On the other, come time to evaluate the performance of the president, we find that Honduras, along with the United States, has the lowest evaluation of the job of the chief

executive among the 26 countries included in the AmericasBarometer. Specifically, on the 0 to 100 scale, President Lobo receives an average of 45.1 points while President Obama registers at 44.7 points. These evaluations are very much below the averages for presidents such as Rafael Correa in Ecuador (68.3 points) and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (67.3 points).

(c) Corruption Victimization in the Municipality versus the Public Sector

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98

The data collected for each of the questions above suggest that in fact, there exists a lower percentage in Honduras of individual-level corruption victimization at the local level compared to the public sector, in general. The results illustrated in Figure 137 show that while 4.6% of Hondurans have been victimized by corruption in the municipality, 7.1% reported that a public employee requested a bribe from them.




Figure 137. Corruption Victimization in the Municipality and by Public Officials in Honduras from a Historical and Comparative Perspective

With respect to this comparative analysis on corruption, two points should be made. First, the level of corruption victimization in the municipalities reflected in Figure 137 corresponds with a recoding of the variable that includes *all individuals* and not just those who completed transactions

with the local government. That is why we see a different percentage of victimization than what was reported in the chapter on corruption in this report. This recoding was done in order to allow us to compare municipal corruption with corruption by public officials. The questions regarding public officials did not have any filter as shown in the battery presented above.

Second, when respondents answered the question on corruption by public employees, this could also include municipal officials. It is for this reason that we should be careful when making comparisons between these two variables. However, a definitive conclusion that can be made with statistical confidence is that corruption at both the municipal level and by public employees in general has increased significantly between 2006 and 2012, from 1.9% to 4.6% of citizens being victimized in municipalities and from 3.9% to 7.1% of citizens being asked to pay bribes by public officials.

(d) Trust in the Municipality vs. the National Government

The final comparisons of this section correspond to general evaluations of trust. What level of government elicits the most trust among Hondurans? To respond to this question, we examine the following items:

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. [Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
None						A Lot	Doesn't Know	No Response
B14. To what extent do you trust in the central government								
B32. To what point do you trust in your municipality?								




Figure 138. Trust in the Municipality vs. the Central Government in Honduras from a Historical and Comparative Perspective

The results illustrated in Figure 138 show that on the recoded 0 to 100 scale where 0 signifies “no trust” and 100 “a lot of trust,” Hondurans report having more trust in the municipality than in the national government in 2012 (46.6 vs. 36.5 points, respectively). However, neither of these evaluations

exceed the midpoint of 50, which makes us believe in the existence of a widespread tendency toward mistrust regardless of the level of government. Additionally, both evaluations have decreased over time, with the expectation of 2010 which was the best year, in historical terms, with respect to the legitimacy of these two institutions (with a score of 56.9 points for municipal government, and 60.2 points for the national government).

In comparison with the other countries included in the AmericasBarometer, the levels of trust among Hondurans for municipalities is below the regional average of 50.12 points. The countries with the highest levels of trust in local governments are El Salvador, Venezuela, and Chile with 60.9, 59.4, and 58.4 points, respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, we find Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, and Haiti, where average citizen trust in municipalities is 41.9, 41.2, and 36.0 points on the 0 to 100 scale. Finally, Honduras holds the lowest average level of trust in the national government among the five countries where the question was asked in 2012 (the other four countries are: El Salvador with 58.2 points, Colombia with 54.5 points, Guatemala with 50.8 points, and finally Bolivia with 47.2 points).

In this section we have presented the results of some comparisons based on the theory that positively connects local government with political legitimacy. In general terms we find that there exists a tendency among Hondurans to better evaluate the local over the national. This suggests to us the possibility of being able to reconstruct Honduran political legitimacy through decentralization of the State. However, the regional comparison done in this section indicates that in spite of the existence of higher evaluations of municipalities within the country, in general, these municipal evaluations are lower than those of citizens in other countries. With this consideration in mind, in the next section of this chapter we analyze how local and national government evaluations affect democratic values in Honduras.

III. The Effects of Honduran Local Politics on Democratic Values

As we saw in the theoretical section of this chapter, State decentralization, if taken in its appropriate form, suggests a process of public sector reengineering that could improve the efficiency of public resource distribution, could solidify citizen participation, and increase transparency while decreasing corruption. The comparative analysis presented in the previous section corroborates the presumption that local government is more highly evaluated than the national government in the specific case of Honduras. However, it remains to be seen if such evaluations of local government affect more significantly Hondurans' democratic values than those of the national government.

In this section we analyze the impact of citizen evaluations of local government and national government on tolerance, system support, and preferences for democracy over other systems of government. To this effect, we propose three multivariate and multilevel models that we believe allow us to capture in the best way the possibility of reconstructing Honduran democracy from the local level. These models are multivariate in that they allow us to explore the effect of each one of our three theoretical independent variables of interest, while holding the values of the other variables constant. The models are multilevel in that they allow us to account for the effects of municipal factors on individual-level outcomes or in other words, we are able to model the possible effect of context that the municipality of residency of those Hondurans selected for our study have on individual-level democratic values.

The three dependent variables selected for this chapter are: (a) *The tolerance index*, which is a continuous variable constructed from combining items from the “D” series (support for the right to vote, participation in public demonstrations, the right to seek public office, and freedom of expression for those who oppose the government in general), (b) *The index for system support*, which is also a continuous variable created by combining questions from the “B” series (belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial, respect for institutions, belief that basic rights are protected, pride of living under the Honduran political system, and belief that one should support the Honduran political system), and (c) *Churchillian democracy*, also a continuous variable that measures the level of support for the idea that although democracy may have its problems, it is still the best form of government.¹⁹

The individual variables in our models are sub-divided into three categories: (a) *Theoretical variables*, which are all the variables analyzed in the previous section (demand-making on local government and State offices, evaluations of local government and presidential job approval, corruption victimization in the municipality and by public officials, and trust in local government and the national government), (b) *Control variables*, the standard socioeconomic and demographic variables (sex, age, education level, wealth quintals, and area of residence of the respondent), and (c) *Municipal-level variables*, which are those that allow us to measure the contextual effect of individual responses. These variables are: 1) the municipal Human Development Index (mHDI), 2) the proportion of votes obtained by President Porfirio Lobo in the municipality, 3) the political identification of the mayor and the president (that is, if both belong, or not, to the same political party).

The individual-level data come from the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer. The municipal-level data come from various sources. First, the mHDI comes from the United National Development Programme (UNDP). Second, the proportion of votes obtained by the president and the political identification of the mayor and president come from the Supreme Electoral Court of Honduras. Below we present the results of the three models proposed in this chapter.

(a) Reconstruction of Honduran System Support from the Local Level

How do the independent variables selected for this study affect system support in Honduras? In Figure 139 we illustrate those factors that have statistically significant impacts and those that do not. As explained in previous chapters, the coefficients of the independent variables are represented by a dot and the bars on both side of the dot show the margin of error. When the error bars cross the vertical line, we do not have sufficient evidence to conclude the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables (for example, wealth and level of system support). However, if the error bars do not cross the vertical “0” line and the estimated coefficient falls to the right or left of it, then we can conclude with a 95% level of confidence that the independent variable affects the dependent variable, system support, either positively or negatively. The coefficients are standardized which allows us to visually differentiate which significant factors have larger effects on democratic values.

¹⁹ For more information on the construction of these indices, see Chapter Five of this report.




Figure 139. Factors of Local and Central Politics that Affect System Support in Honduras in 2012

As can be seen in Figure 139, the variable most related with support for the system is trust in the central government. The statistical correlation between these two variables is positive, significant, and robust suggesting that as confidence in the central government increases, so too will the support that Hondurans lend to the system.




Figure 140. Factors of Local and Central Politics that Significantly Affect the Estimated Values of System Support in Honduras in 2012

The top-right quadrant of Figure 140 shows that, on average, individuals who have a lot of trust in the government have levels of system support almost three times that of those who have no trust in

the national government (70.4 points vs. 23.5 points, respectively on our 0 to 100 scale). This result is consistent with the findings of other LAPOP studies that find that trust in national government is a determining factor for the legitimacy of political institutions in general. Another important variable, yet less influential, is trust in the municipality. As trust in local government increases, so too does support for the system. The top-left quadrant of Figure 140 shows that average levels of system support increase from 28.1 to 52.2 points on the 0 to 100 scale; as citizens go from having no trust to a lot of trust in their local governments. These findings suggest that in spite of trust in the municipality influencing political legitimacy in general, trust in the central government is, without a doubt, the most important factor in recuperating system support.

The two other variables that contribute positively to legitimacy are the approval of the work of the president and satisfaction with services provided by the municipality. The lower quadrants of Figure 140 show that system support can improve by 20 to 25 points when citizens increase their satisfaction with municipal services on the one hand, and when their approval of the work of the president increases on the other. This improvement would occur if the change goes from “very bad” to “very good” in both cases. In spite of this, no other variable included in the analysis has an impact as powerful on legitimacy as trust in the central government. In the specific case of system support, none of the contextual (municipal) variables included in this study provide an effect. In this next section we investigate whether these findings hold in the case of tolerance.

(b) Reconstruction of Political Tolerance in Honduras from the Local Level

What does our second model tell us about the possibility of reconstructing political tolerance in Honduras from the local level? Figure 141 presents the factors that significantly affect the levels of tolerance held by Hondurans toward those who talk bad about government, not only the current administration, but the government in general. In terms of control variables, we can see that the possession of material goods, education level, and age are factors that positively affect tolerance. In other words, those who are wealthier, more educated and older tend to be more tolerant toward those who do not think the same. However, the weight of these variables in comparison to the theoretical variables is relatively minor.

Of the theoretical variables, in this model, that which has the most weight is trust in local government. However, the effect of this variable is almost the same level of effect that trust in the central government has on the dependent variable. In both cases, as trust increases so too does tolerance among Hondurans.




Figure 141. Factors of Local and Central Politics that Affect Political Tolerance in Honduras in 2012

The impact of both trust in the municipality and the central government on the estimated values of tolerance is shown in the upper quadrant of Figure 142. As can be seen, tolerance can improve up to about 15 points on the 0 to 100 scale, when trust in local and national government goes from none to a lot. In the same figure, but in the lower quadrants, we can see the impact that presidential approval and satisfaction with services provided by the municipality have on political tolerance.

In the first place, those who evaluate the provision of local service very positively have an average level of tolerance of 42.6 points on the 0 to 100 scale, while for those who rate the services as very bad have an average level of political tolerance of just 29.1 points. In the second place, there exists a negative effect for approval of the work of President Lobo and political tolerance. This result can be seen in the lower-right quadrant of Figure 142. In other words, those who approve of the work of the current president tend to be less tolerant toward allowing those who oppose the government to be able to exercise their political rights. However, this effect is not as forceful when compared to effects of the trust and satisfaction with local government variables.





Figure 142. Factors of Local and Central Politics that Significantly Affect Estimated Values of Political Tolerance in Honduras in Honduras in 2012



(c) Reconstruction of Support for Democracy in Honduras from the Local Level

A variable that presents an intriguing effect is corruption victimization in the municipality. Those who report having been asked to pay a bribe to complete a transaction such as for a permit or license in the municipality hold higher levels of political tolerance than those who have not experienced corruption in the municipality in the past year. This could be because of, in general, those who “allow” themselves to be victimized by corruption could be more tolerant with those who are against the government than those who do not accept corruption as an option. In recent work, Regina Bateson also finds a counterintuitive relationship that suggests that victims of crime worldwide participate more in political issues.²⁰

In the third and final model we explore the possibility of recuperating the idea that democracy, in spite of this problem, is the best system of government. In Figure 143 we show the results of the model. The statistical analysis indicates with a 95% level of confidence that both material wealth, measured through the possession of goods, and education, are the two socioeconomic factors that have a significant impact on support for democracy. Specifically, as wealth increases and education levels among Hondurans improve, holding the other factors constant, support for the idea that democracy is the best political system also increases.




Figure 143. Factors of Local and Central Politics that Affect Support for Democracy in Honduras in 2012

²⁰ Bateson, Regina. 2012. "Crime Victimization and Political Participation." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 106, 3, . Pp 570-587.

With respect to the theoretical variables, the most important statistically significant impact comes from trust in local government. The relationship between this variable and support for democracy is positive and robust. This means that as trust in local government increases among Hondurans, the value of democracy also increase. This result is illustrated in the left side of Figure 144. The average value of support for democracy for those who have no trust in the municipality is 40 points while those who trust in local government a lot have an average value of 65 points; that is, there exists a 25 point range in support for democracy among these individuals.




Figure 144. Factors of Local and Central Politics that Significantly Affect the Estimated Values of Support for Democracy in Honduras in 2012

Although less important in statistical terms (with a range of 20 points), trust in national government also contributes positively to Churchillian democracy. This result can be seen on the right side of Figure 144. Two additional factors have a significant relationship with support for democracy: corruption victimization by public employees and the human development index of the municipalities. In both cases the correlation is negative. This means that those who have been asked to pay a bribe to a public employee show less support for democracy that those who have not. At the same time, those who reside in municipalities with higher levels of human development (in terms of education, health and income) tend to have less support for democracy. This last result is difficult to interpret and may be important to look deeper into the context of these municipalities to understand why they have less support for democracy.

IV. Discussion of Results and Conclusions

Throughout this chapter, we have formulated theoretical arguments regarding the possibility of reconstructing Honduran political culture from the local level and have tested them through empirical analysis. The fundamental hypothesis of this chapter was constructed from the literature on decentralization and local governments. In general terms, we argue that a well-planned decentralized state can increase the efficiency of distribution of public goods which will produce a higher level of citizen satisfaction, resulting in higher participation in public life through the generation of local spaces to present petitions, and increase in transparency and decrease in corruption. These “improvements” of public life contribute in a significant way to the strengthening of Honduran democratic values.

In many cases, this is what the empirical evidence suggested. Perhaps the most important factor in Honduras is trust in local government. AmericasBarometer data suggest that while average citizen trust in the central government is 36.5 points on the 0 to 100 scale, the average levels of trust in municipalities is 46.6 points. In spite of these levels being relatively low in comparison with those found in the majority of other countries included in the LAPOP study, our statistical model shows that trust in local government is the most important factor in determining political tolerance and support for democracy in Honduras. Additionally, trust in the municipality is also the second most important factor, after trust in national government, in explaining support for the system. In other words, if one wants to reconstruct the political culture of democracy in Honduras, it is very important to return to the perceptions of trust that citizens hold toward their respective municipality.

How can trust in the municipality be increased? Without a doubt, additional research is needed to answer this question adequately. However, preliminary statistical analyses suggest that those individuals who take part in municipal life through attending municipal meeting or open council sessions tend to trust more in local government. This finding is consistent with the theory of “civic virtue” developed by Almond and Verba and discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Other preliminary results suggest that those who live in urban areas trust less in municipalities than those who live in rural areas.

The second important factor in strengthening democratic values in Honduran society is satisfaction with services provided by the municipality. Obviously this is not an issue completely removed from trust; preliminary studies suggest that a satisfied citizen is a citizen that trusts in her local government. In Honduras, citizens are, on average, more satisfied with local services than with the job performance of President Porfirio Lobo. Also in comparative terms, satisfaction with local services is the only indicator in this study that is close to the regional average, while the others fall well below this average. With respect to democratic values, we find that as satisfaction with local services increases, so too does support for the system and tolerance toward individuals who are in disagreement with the current form of government. It is important to remember that both system support and tolerance are two very important factors for democratic stability in Honduras, as was demonstrated by Booth and Seligson when they discovered conditions that could lead to a *coup d'état*, as happened in Honduras in 2009.

Other factors examined in this chapter regarding the local realities were corruption and the completion of transaction, both at the municipal level. These factors did show conclusive statistical evidence as was found in trust and satisfaction with local government. Additionally, corruption

appeared to be positively related with tolerance. This peculiar finding could be because those individuals who have been exposed to corruption (both as victims and perpetrators) might have higher tolerance for this social phenomenon as well as other types of less negative phenomenon such as political opposition to the government.

The findings presented here do not purport to suggest that decentralization and local government are the panacea for the political crisis in Honduras. Indeed, we find that the most important factor in increasing political system support is trust in national government. This variable is also that which has the most statistical relevance in explaining political legitimacy of the state. However, another factor of the central government that is important to keep in mind is the approval of President Porfirio Lobo. As approval of the work of the president increases, tolerance toward those who think differently tends to decrease. This is probably due to the fact that in a system where presidential approval is relatively low (see the comparative figure), the group in favor of the current government feels threatened from those who are opposed and this may also be amplified by memories of the *coup* in 2009.

In total, this chapter has identified important elements that could contribute to the recuperation and strengthening of democracy in Honduras from the local level. Trust in local governments and satisfaction with local services appear to be key to this effect. For this reason, an administrative decentralization program accompanied with public funds may help to return legitimacy to the Honduran state which it has been systematically losing for year. However, this decentralization should be carried out while taking into account the dangers that this reform could have if local conditions are not adequate. That is, if the local government is, for example authoritarian, the efforts to improve democracy may actually result in the opposite.

Appendices



Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Enero, 2012

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a al azar para participar en un estudio de opinión pública. Vengo por encargo de la Universidad de Vanderbilt. El proyecto está financiado por la AID de los Estados Unidos. La entrevista durará unos 45 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Honduras

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas. Usted no recibirá pago alguno por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le ocasionará gastos.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse **Borge y Asociados**, al teléfono 265 6860 ó 378 3932 con la Sra. Mara Miranda. El número IRB del estudio es 110627.

¿Desea Participar?



Appendix B. Sample Design

Sample Design for the 2012 AmericasBarometer Survey in Honduras

I. Universe, Population, Unit of Observation

Universe: The survey provides national of adults of voting age concentrated in the nine standard principal regions of the country: region Norte A, Norte B, Norte C, Oriental A, Oriental B, Sur, Central A, Central B, Occidental. In the past, these were the strata (ESTRATOPRI) for Honduras and they will continue to be in 2012. The universe is composed of adults (18 years and older) who live in the urban and rural areas of the 298 municipalities registered in the 2001 Honduran census.¹

Population: The survey is designed to gather information from a nationally representative sample of population of voting-age adults. Only non-institutionalized adults are eligible to participate. Therefore, the sample excludes people in in-patient psychiatric facilities, hospitals, police academies, military quarters and those in the country's prisons.

Unit of Observation: The study includes subject regarding not only the individual, but also to other members of the household. That is, the statistical unite of observation is that household. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, some respondents live in dwellings that can be shared with other households. For this reason, it is more convenient to consider that dwelling as the final unit of analysis. Additionally, the household is an easily identifiable unit in the filed with relative permanency over time, a characteristic that allows us to consider it as the final unit of selection.

II. Sample Frame

The sample covers 100% of the eligible population in Honduras. This means that each eligible person in the country has an equal and known opportunity of being included in the survey sample. This also implies that no particular ethnic group or geographic areas will be excluded from the sample framework.

The sample design uses as the sampling frame the list of municipalities, localities, census segments, and maps of Honduras from the 2001 census implemented by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* (INE – National Institute of Statistics).

Honduras is divided into 18 departments and subdivided into 298 municipalities. Inside each municipality, the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* created census segments, and within those, the constituent dwellings.

¹ *Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Honduras.*

Per the 2001 data, Honduras has a total of 3,093,262 voting-age adults. Of these, 56% live in urban areas and the other 44% live in areas that are categorized as rural. Table 1 shows the distribution of the 18 years and older population by department and urban and rural areas.

Region	Department	Urban	Rural	Total
Central A	Francisco Morazán	299626	88006	387632
Central B	Comayagua	86973	86173	173146
Central B	La Paz	16942	40888	57830
Norte A	Cortes	516154	152056	668210
Norte B	Atlántida	135406	50673	186079
Norte B	Colon	64307	53914	118221
Norte B	Yoro	206034	136974	343008
Norte C	Islas de la Bahía	4397	7624	12021
Occidental	Copan	63989	99167	163156
Occidental	Intibuca	13949	40228	54177
Occidental	Lempira	7010	82335	89345
Occidental	Ocotepeque	10265	41528	51793
Occidental	Santa Bárbara	78742	122840	201582
Oriental A	El Paraíso	57901	87665	145566
Oriental A	Olancho	61760	90787	152547
Oriental B	Gracias a Dios	4596	13080	17676
Sur	Choluteca	68720	111828	180548
Sur	Valle	40368	50357	90725
	General Total	1737139	1356123	3093262

III. Sampling Method

The sampling method chosen takes into consideration a series of elements pre-established by LAPOP. The following requirements for the design of the sample were determined by LAPOP Central beforehand:

- (a) Obtain representative samples for the following study strata:

Size of the Municipalities

1. Municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants
2. Municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants
3. Municipalities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants

Strata for the First Stage

1. Central A
2. Central B
3. Norte A

4. Norte B
5. Norte C
6. Occidental
7. Oriental A
8. Oriental B
9. Sur

Strata for the second stage:

1. Urban Area
2. Rural Area

- (b) Calculate the sampling errors corresponding to these strata.
- (c) Minimize travel time in survey operations.
- (d) Optimal allocation that would allow a reasonable set of trade-offs between budget, sample size, and level of precision of the results.
- (e) Use the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available.
- (f) Expectation of between 24 and 32 interviews by Primary sampling unit (PSU) or municipality, allowing a multi-level analysis
- (g) Final sampling unit of 6 interviews in urban and rural areas

On the basis of these requirements, the method that is used in Haiti corresponds to a **stratified multi-stage cluster sampling**. The sample will be stratified based on three factors:

- 1) Size of the Municipalities
- 2) Region: region Central A, Central B, Norte A, Norte B, Norte C, Occidental, Oriental A, Oriental B and Sur.
- 3) Level of Urbanization: Urban/Rural Areas

The stratified sampling ensures a greater reliability in our sample by reducing the variance of the estimates. Stratification improves the quality of estimates, with the sole condition that the whole sample unit belongs to only one stratum, and the strata in combination cover the total population. Stratification also enables us to ensure the inclusion in the sample of the most important geographic regions in the country and sample dispersion.

The survey design for Honduras follows a multi-stage process as shown in the table 2 below:

- 1) The first stage, which corresponds to the selection of primary sampling units (PSUs), involves the selection of municipalities within each of the strata defined above with probability proportional to the voting age adult population (PPS) of the country. Each PSU consists of 24 interviews.

Strata	Size of Municipalities, Regions, Level of Urbanization
Primary Sampling Unit (PSU)	Municipalities
Secondary Sampling Unit (SSU)	Census segments or Enumeration areas
Tertiary Sampling Unit (TSU)	Blocks or Manzanas
Quaternary Unit (EU)	Household
Final Unit	Respondent

- 2) The second stage of the sample design consists of the selection of census segments or enumeration areas within each PSU using PPS.
- 3) In the third stage blocks or “manzanas” within the census segments are selected.
- 4) In the fourth stage, clusters of households are randomly selected within each PSU. A total of 6 interviews are to be carried out in each sampling point in both rural and urban areas. Sampling points represent clusters of interviews, and the clusters are kept relatively small in order not to increase the “design effect” of the sample, but are also designed to reduce transportation costs by allowing some concentration in a given geographic point.
- 5) Finally, in the fifth stage of the sample design, a quota sample by gender and age is employed for selecting *a single respondent in each household*. The objective of the quota sample is to ensure that the distribution of individuals by sex and age in the survey matches the country’s official population statistics or those reported by the Census Bureau. Fully random selection within the household would have required extensive recalls, thus dramatically increasing costs with no assurances that a correct balance by gender and age would be thus achieved.

IV. Estratificación

Stratification is the process by which the population is divided into subgroups. Sampling is then conducted separately in each subgroup. Stratification allows subgroups of interest to be included in the sample whereas in a non-stratified sample some may have been left out due to the random nature of the selection process. In an extreme case, samples that are not stratified can, by chance, exclude the nation’s capital or largest city. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample. It reduces the sampling error. In a stratified sample, the sampling error depends on population variance *within* strata and not *between* them.

Since sampling is conducted separately in each stratum, it is desirable and important to ensure that there are a sufficient number of people in each subgroup to allow meaningful analysis.

The Honduras sample is stratified by population size of the municipalities, regions (region Central A, Central B, Norte A, Norte B, Norte C, Occidental, Oriental A, Oriental B and Sur) and level of urbanization (urban, rural). Table 3 displays the distribution of the interviews within each region by level of urbanization size of the municipalities for Honduras.

Region	Level of Urbanization		
	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
Central A	156	36	192
Central B	60	72	132
Norte A	246	90	336
Norte B	198	156	354
Norte C	6	18	24
Occidental	96	264	360
Oriental A	48	96	144
Oriental B	6	18	24
Sur	48	114	162
Total	864	864	1,728

	Large Municipalities (More than 100,000 inhabitants)	Medium-Sized Municipalities (Between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants)	Small Municipalities (Less than 25,000 Inhabitants)	Total
Central A	144	0	48	192
Central B	0	54	78	132
Norte A	192	120	24	336
Norte B	120	96	138	354
Norte C	0	0	24	24
Occidental	0	78	282	360
Oriental A	0	54	90	144
Oriental B	0	0	24	24
Sur	0	66	96	162
Total	456	468	804	1,728

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Honduras 2012, Versión # 10.0.2.1 IRB Approval:110627

 USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE	 FOPRIDEH Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras	
 Latin American Public Opinion Project LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina	 AmericasBarometer Barómetro de las Américas by LAPOP www.AmericasBarometer.org	 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

El Barómetro de las Américas: Honduras, 2012

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PAIS. País:					04
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____					
ESTRATOPRI.					
(401) Central A (Francisco Morazán)		(402) Central B (Comayagua /La Paz)			
(403) Norte A (Cortés)		(404) Norte B (Yoro/Atlántida/Colón)			
(405) Norte C (Islas de la Bahía)					_ _ _
(406) Occidental (Ocotepeque/Copán/Santa Bárbara/ Lempira/ Intibucá)					
(407) Oriental A (Olancho y El Paraíso)		(408) Oriental B (Gracias a Dios)			
(409) Sur (Choluteca y Valle)					
ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad: (1) Grande (más de 100,000)					
(2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 y 100,000)		(3) Pequeña (menos de 25,000)			_
UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					_ _ _
PROV. Departamento: _____					4 _ _
MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____					4 _ _
HONDISTRITO. DISTRITO: _____					_ _
HONSEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL: _____					_ _ _
HONSEC. Sector: _____					_ _ _
CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral): _____					_ _
[El cluster debe de tener 6 entrevistas]					
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					_ _
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:					
(1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana)		(2) Ciudad grande	(3) Ciudad mediana		_
(4) Ciudad pequeña		(5) Área rural			
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español					_
Hora de inicio: _____:_____					_ _ _ _
FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ Mes: _____ año: 2012					_ _ _ _

¿Vive usted en esta casa?

Si → continúe

No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista

¿Es usted ciudadano hondureño o residente permanente de Honduras?

Si → continúe

No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista

¿Tiene por lo menos 18 años?

Si → continúe

No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista

ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA

Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género : (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a)

(4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98
INAP	99		

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica **del país**? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala

(5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses ? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR
CP2. ¿A algún diputado del Congreso?	1	2	88	98
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, municipalidad/corporación municipal?	1	2	88	98
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del Estado?	1	2	88	98

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1] (98) No responde [Pase a SGL1]
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR

LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿a quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades ? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más al gobierno central (2) Algo más al gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad (4) Algo más a la municipalidad (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad (88) NS (98) NR
LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país, ¿quién debería administrar más dinero ? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más el gobierno central (2) Algo más el gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad (4) Algo más la municipalidad (5) Mucho más la municipalidad (88) NS (98) NR

LGL3. Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar los impuestos al municipio? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (88) NS (98) NR
HONMUN30. En su opinión, quién debería ser el responsable de proveer (dar) los servicios de salud para la gente de esta comunidad ¿el gobierno central o la municipalidad? (1) El gobierno central (2) La municipalidad (88) NS (98) NR

HONMUNI31. ¿Y quién debería ser el responsable de proveer (dar) educación para la gente de esta comunidad? [Leer alternativas]	(1) El gobierno central	(2) La municipalidad	(88) NS	(98) NR
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Ahora le voy a preguntar sobre ciertos servicios municipales. Le voy a pedir que para cada uno de ellos me diga si ha mejorado, ha seguido igual o ha empeorado en los últimos dos años. [Luego de cada servicio, pregunte: ha mejorado, ha seguido igual, o ha empeorado?]

HONMUN32. Recolección de basura	(1) Ha mejorado	(2) Ha seguido igual	(3) Ha empeorado	[NO LEER] (4) No se presta el servicio	(88) NS	(98) NR
HONMUN33. Administración de los mercados	(1) Ha mejorado	(2) Ha seguido igual	(3) Ha empeorado	[NO LEER] (4) No se presta el servicio	(88) NS	(98) NR
HONMUN36. Agua y alcantarillado	(1) Ha mejorado	(2) Ha seguido igual	(3) Ha empeorado	[NO LEER] (4) No se presta el servicio	(88) NS	(98) NR

HONMUN37. ¿La alcaldía del municipio en donde usted vive informa a los ciudadanos sobre la forma en que invierte los recursos de la municipalidad?	(1) Sí [Siga]	(2) No [Pase a CP5]	(88) NS [Pase a CP5]	(98) NR [Pase a CP5]
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Dígame por favor, ¿de cuáles de las siguientes maneras esta municipalidad suele informar a los ciudadanos sobre su gestión y la utilización de recursos?

HONMUN38. Mediante cabildos abiertos	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP
HONMUN39. Sesiones abiertas de la corporación	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP
HONMUN40. Publicación en algún medio de prensa o radio	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP
HONMUN41. Reunión con el alcalde municipal o delegado municipal	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP
HONMUN42. Rótulo fijo o murales	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98



Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	Asistente/ Miembro	Líder/ Directivo	NS	NR	INAP
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP7]			88	98	
CP6L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP8]			88	98	
CP7L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP9]			88	98	
CP8L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	99
CP21. ¿Reuniones de grupos deportivos o recreativos?	1	2	3	4			88	98	
HONCP22. ¿Reuniones de grupos de seguridad?	1	2	3	4			88	98	

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR	
MIL6. Ahora, cambiando de tema, ¿qué tan orgulloso(a) está de las Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras? [Leer las opciones] (1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a) (2) Muy orgulloso(a) (3) Algo orgulloso(a) (4) Nada orgulloso(a) (5) O no le importa? (88) NS (98) NR	
MIL5. ¿Qué tan orgulloso(a) se siente de ser hondureño cuando escucha el himno nacional? [Leer las opciones] (1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a) (2) Muy orgulloso(a) (3) Algo orgulloso(a) (4) Nada orgulloso(a) (5) O no le importa? (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS 88	NR 98
Izquierda										Derecha	

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?
 (1) Sí ha participado [Siga] (2) No ha participado [Pase a PROT6]
 (88) NS [Pase a PROT6] (98) NR [Pase a PROT6]

PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses?
 _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

PROT7. Y ¿en los últimos doce meses, ha participado en el bloqueo de alguna calle o espacio público como forma de protesta?
 (1) Sí, ha participado (2) No ha participado
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

PROT6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha firmado alguna petición?
 (1) Sí ha firmado (2) No ha firmado
 (88) NS (98) NR

PROT8. En los últimos doce meses, usted leyó o compartió información política por alguna red social de la web como Twitter, Facebook u Orkut?
 (1) Sí, ha hecho (2) No ha hecho
 (88) NS (98) NR

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? [Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso Nacional y gobierne sin Congreso Nacional?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]	
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa, ladrones se metieron a la casa mientras no había nadie (10) Extorsión o chantaje (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	
VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincencial del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas] (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Vive solo)	

ARM2. Si usted pudiera, ¿tendría un arma de fuego para su protección? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
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Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...					
	SÍ	No	NS	NR	INAP
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o colonia por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “caserío” o “comunidad”]	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	

VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	
VIC45. En los últimos doce meses, ¿ha cambiado de trabajo por temor a la delincuencia? [Si no trabaja marque 99]	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP

Voy a leerle una serie de frases que se oyen en la calle o en los medios de comunicación cuando se habla de formas para combatir la delincuencia. Me gustaría que usted me dijera si está muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con cada una de ellas. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia...

	Muy de acuerdo	Algo de acuerdo	Algo en desacuerdo	Muy en desacuerdo	NS	NR
VIC101. Es crear programas de prevención. Está usted: [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)
VIC102. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es hacer leyes más duras	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)
VIC103. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es contratar seguridad privada.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)

A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de las reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería o no la aprobaría ni la entendería.

	Aprobaría	No aprobaría pero entendería	No aprobaría ni entendería	NS	NR
VOL207. Suponga que para corregirlo y educarlo un padre le pega a su hijo cada vez que este le desobedece. ¿Usted aprobaría que el padre le pegue a su hijo, ó no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL206. Suponga que un hombre le pega a su esposa porque ésta le ha sido infiel con otro hombre. ¿Usted aprobaría que el hombre le pegue a su esposa, ó no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien que le ha violado a un/a hija/o. ¿Usted aprobaría que mate al violador, ó no aprobaría que lo mate pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL203. Si hay una persona que mantiene asustada a su comunidad y alguien lo mata. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a esa persona que mantiene asustada a la comunidad, ó no aprobaría que lo maten pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL204. Si un grupo de personas comienzan a hacer limpiezas sociales, es decir, matar gente que algunos consideran indeseable. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a gente considerada indeseable, ó no aprobaría que la maten pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)

	Aprobaría	No aprobaría pero entendería	No aprobaría ni entendería	NS	NR
VOL205. Si la policía tortura a un delincuente para conseguir información sobre un grupo de crimen organizado muy peligroso. ¿Usted aprobaría que la policía torture a un delincuente, ó no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR					
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR					
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR					
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas o maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR					
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía en este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) La policía protege a la gente frente a la delincuencia, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) [No leer] Ninguna, o ambas (88) NS (98) NR					
AOJ20. Y pensando en su seguridad y la de su familia, ¿usted se siente más seguro(a), igual de seguro(a), o menos seguro(a) que hace cinco años? (1) Más seguro(a) (2) Igual de seguro(a) (3) Menos seguro(a) (88) NS (98)NR					
AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad? [Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta] (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas/maras (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delincuentes comunes (7) [NO LEER] Otros (8) [NO LEER] Ninguno (88) NS (98) NR					
AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes? (1) Implementar medidas de prevención (2) Aumentar los castigos en contra de los delincuentes (3) [No leer] Ambas (88) NS (98) NR					

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						Mucho	No sabe	No responde

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Honduras garantizan un juicio justo? <i>(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)</i>	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Honduras?	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político hondureño?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político hondureño?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político hondureño?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser hondureño(a)?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Central?	
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ministerio Público?	
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Superior de Cuentas?	
B46 [b45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción?	
HONB51. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Comisionado de los Derechos Humanos?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7] NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	
N16. Y ahora hablando de su municipalidad, ¿hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno municipal actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES		Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR 99 = INAP
[LAS PREGUNTAS EPP1 Y EPP3 SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]		
Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta, NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO		
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos hondureños representan bien a sus votantes? (99) INAP		
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted? (99) INAP		

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7] NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
MIL1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas hondureñas están bien entrenadas y organizadas?	
MIL2. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras han hecho un buen trabajo cuando han ayudado a enfrentar desastres naturales?	
B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas hondureñas respetan los derechos humanos de los hondureños hoy en día?	

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados del Congreso hondureño están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR	
HONM3. Hablando de la Corte Suprema y pensando en todos los magistrados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los magistrados de la Corte están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98) NR	

SD2NEW2. Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	
SD3NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de las escuelas públicas? [Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	
SD6NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? [Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. **Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		NS	NR

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones	
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.

NS = 88, NR = 98

ROS1. El Estado hondureño, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS2. El Estado hondureño, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS3. El Estado hondureño, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado hondureño debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado hondureño, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
MIL7. Las Fuerzas Armadas deben participar en el combate del crimen y de la violencia en Honduras. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS CCT3 – RAC2A SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

CCT3. Cambiando de tema... Algunas personas dicen que la gente que recibe ayuda de los programas sociales del gobierno es ociosa. ¿Hasta qué punto usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP	
GEN1. Cambiando de tema de nuevo, se dice que cuando no hay suficientes trabajos, los hombres deben tener más derecho a los trabajos que las mujeres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP	
Ahora quisiera saber hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con algunas medidas que le voy a mencionar. Quisiera que usted responda pensando en lo que cree que se debería hacer sin importar si se están aplicando o no actualmente. [Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR]	
GEN6. El Estado debe exigir que los partidos políticos reserven algunos espacios para mujeres en sus listas de candidatos, aunque tengan que dejar fuera a algunos hombres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP	
RAC2A. Las universidades deberían reservar cupos para los alumnos de piel más oscura, aunque tengan que excluir a otros alumnos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP	
[Encuestador: piel más oscura refiere a negros, indígenas, no blancos en general]	

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES	
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (W14A-PN5) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]	
W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando pelagra la salud de la madre?	
(1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
PN4. Cambiando de tema, en general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Honduras?	
(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Honduras es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?	
(1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “D”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 NS	98 NR	
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente					

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Honduras. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Honduras, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	
D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Honduras. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5 Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (D6-D8) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse? (99) INAP	
D7. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que se permita que las personas con discapacidad física se postulen para cargos públicos? (99) INAP	
D8. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que el Estado tenga el derecho de prohibir que los periódicos publiquen noticias que le puedan producir daño político ? (99) INAP	

[Recoger tarjeta “D”]

DEM2. Ahora cambiando de tema, con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR	
HONJC17. ¿Cree usted que se justifica que la Corte Suprema de Justicia remueva o quite al presidente si éste desobedece las cortes o las leyes? (1) Sí se justifica (2) No se justifica (88) NS (98) NR	
HONJC18. ¿Cree usted que se justifica que el Congreso Nacional remueva o quite al presidente si éste desobedece las cortes o las leyes? (1) Sí se justifica (2) No se justifica (88) NS (98) NR	
HONPN6. En su opinión, ¿el retorno del Ex Presidente José Manuel “Mel” Zelaya al país contribuyó para que Honduras sea más democrática, menos democrática, o igual de democrática? (1) Mas democrática (2) Menos democrática (3) Igual de democrática (88) NS (98) NR	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en los últimos 12 meses?				88	98
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida?				88	98



	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado una mordida?				88	98
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99			88	98
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	99			88	98
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en este último año?	99			88	98
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99			88	98
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida en la escuela o colegio?	99			88	98
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?				88	98
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR					
EXC7MIL. Teniendo en cuenta su propia experiencia o lo que ha escuchado, la corrupción en las Fuerzas Armadas está... [Leer opciones] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada o (4) Nada generalizada? (88) NS (98) NR					

CUESTIONARIOS PARES					
[LAS PREGUNTAS DIS2 – DIS5 SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]					
Y ahora, cambiando de tema y pensando en sus experiencias en el último año , ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado/a, o sea, tratado peor que a otras personas, en los siguientes lugares?					
	Sí	No	NS	NR	INAP
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno [juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. En el trabajo o la escuela o cuando ha buscado trabajo	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. En lugares públicos, como en la calle, la plaza, tiendas o el mercado?	1	2	88	98	99

VB1. ¿Tiene tarjeta de identidad?
 (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas **elecciones presidenciales** de 2009? **[EN PAÍSES CON DOS VUELTAS SE PREGUNTA POR LA PRIMERA VUELTA]**
 (1) Sí votó **[Siga]**
 (2) No votó **[Pasar a VB10]**
 (88) NS **[Pasar a VB10]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VB10]**

VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? **[NO LEER LISTA]**
 (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto)
 (401) Felícito Avila (DC)
 (402) César Ham (UD)
 (403) Bernard Martínez (PINU)
 (404) Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa (Partido Nacional)
 (405) Carlos H. Reyes (Independiente Popular)
 (406) Elvin Santos (Partido Liberal)
 (77) Otro
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP (No votó)

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?
 (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a HONVB11A]** (88) NS **[Pase a HONVB11A]**
 (98) NR **[Pase a HONVB11A]**

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO LEER LISTA]**
 (401) Partido Nacional
 (402) Partido Liberal
 (403) Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras (PDCH)
 (404) Partido Innovación y Unidad (PINU-SD)
 (405) Unificación Democrática (UD)
 (77) Otro
 (88) NS
 (98) NR (99) INAP

HONVB11A. ¿En los últimos doce meses, contribuyó usted con su firma para la inscripción de un nuevo partido político? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?
 (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? **[Leer opciones]**
 (1) No votaría
 (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente
 (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno
 (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía
 (88) NS (98) NR

<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otros para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? (1) Sí trabajó</p> <p>(2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR</p>
<p>VB50. Algunos dicen que en general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo</p> <p>(3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR</p>

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES [LAS PREGUNTAS VB51-RAC1CA SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]	
<p>VB51. ¿Quién cree usted que sería más corrupto como político: un hombre, una mujer, o ambos por igual?</p> <p>(1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) Ambos por igual</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>VB52. Y si le toca a un político o a una política manejar la economía nacional, ¿quién va a hacer el mejor trabajo; un hombre, una mujer o no importa?</p> <p>(1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) No importa</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Ahora vamos a hablar sobre la raza o color de piel de los políticos.</p>	
<p>VB53. Algunos dicen que, en general, las personas de piel oscura no son buenos líderes políticos. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?</p> <p>[Encuestador: “piel oscura” refiere a negros, indígenas, “no blancos” en general]</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo</p> <p>(3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	
<p>RAC1CA. Según varios estudios, las personas de piel oscura son más pobres que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? [LEER ALTERNATIVAS, SÓLO UNA RESPUESTA]</p> <p>(1) Por su cultura, o (2) Porque han sido tratadas de manera injusta</p> <p>(3) [No leer] Otra respuesta</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES [EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (AB1-AB5) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]	
<p>Cambiando de tema y hablando de las cualidades que los niños deben tener, le voy a mencionar varias características y quisiera que me diga cuál es más importante para un niño o niña:</p>	
<p>AB1. (1) Independencia; o (2) Respeto a los mayores</p> <p>(3) [No leer] Ambos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>AB2. (1) Obediencia, o (2) Autosuficiencia (valerse por sí mismo)</p> <p>(3) [No leer] Ambos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>AB5. (1) Creatividad; o (2) Disciplina</p> <p>(3) [No leer] Ambos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS SNW1A – SNW1B SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]

SNW1A. ¿Usted conoce personalmente a algún funcionario electo o a alguna persona que fue candidato en las últimas elecciones nacionales, departamentales o locales?

- (1) Sí (2) No **[Pasar a SEG3]** (88) NS **[Pasar a SEG3]**
 (98) NR **[Pasar a SEG3]** (99) INAP

SNW1B. ¿Y ese cargo es a nivel local, a nivel departamental, o a nivel nacional?

- (1) Local (2) Departamental (3) Nacional
 (4) Candidatos en más de un nivel (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (SEG3 – SOCO9) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]

Ahora vamos a hablar nuevamente de su barrio o comunidad.

SEG3. Comparando la situación actual de esta comunidad con la de hace 12 meses, ¿cree usted que los vecinos de **[NOMBRE DEL BARRIO]** colaboran más, lo mismo, o menos para resolver los problemas de la comunidad?

- (1) Colaboran más
 (2) Colaboran lo mismo
 (3) Colaboran menos
 (4) **[No leer]** No colaboran nada
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

PROB1. ¿Cuál cree que es problema más importante que afecta actualmente a los jóvenes de **[NOMBRE DEL BARRIO]**? **[Leer opciones]**

- (1) La falta de oportunidades para acceder a empleos
 (2) La delincuencia/el pandillaje y la violencia
 (3) El consumo excesivo de alcohol y drogas
 (4) La falta de educación o capacitación para trabajar
 (5) La falta de motivación de los jóvenes
 (6) Los embarazos no deseados
 (7) **[No leer]** Otras
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Ahora, le voy a leer algunas frases acerca de cosas que las personas en **[NOMBRE DEL BARRIO]** pueden o no hacer. Para cada una de estas frases, por favor dígame si usted está muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo. **[Repita después de cada pregunta “muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Muy de acuerdo	De acuerdo	En desacuerdo	Muy en desacuerdo	NS	NR	INAP
SOCO1. La primera frase dice...cuando hay un problema en [NOMBRE DEL BARRIO] , los vecinos suelen organizarse para tratar de resolverlo. ¿Usted diría que está muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo con esta frase?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
SOCO3. La gente de [NOMBRE DEL BARRIO] está dispuesta a ayudar a sus vecinos. ¿Usted diría que está muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo con esta frase?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES							
	Muy de acuerdo	De acuerdo	En desacuerdo	Muy en desacuerdo	NS	NR	INAP
SOCO9. Y ahora hablando de [NOMBRE DEL BARRIO], ¿hasta qué punto diría que los vecinos de [NOMBRE DEL BARRIO] están organizados para prevenir la delincuencia y la violencia. ¿Usted diría que está muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo con esta frase?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES	
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (HONHE1 – HONHE5) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]	
HONHE1. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, necesitó algún tipo de atención médica para usted o para alguno de sus hijos(as) o familiares menores de 12 años? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a MIL10A] (88) NS [Pase a MIL10A] (98) NR [Pase a MIL10A] (99) INAP	
HONHE2. ¿La última vez que esto ocurrió ¿usted o sus familiares buscaron atención médica? (1) Sí [Pase a HONHE4] (2) No [Pase a HONHE3] (88) NS [Pase a MIL10A] (98) NR [Pase a MIL10A] (99) INAP	
HONHE3. ¿Por qué razón no buscó atención médica? [No leer, marcar la primera que diga] (1) Distancia/tiempo lugar de consulta (2) Enfermedad leve / automedicación (3) Falta de confianza (4) Cree que atención es mala (5) Larga espera para atención (6) No hay medicamentos (7) Falta de dinero / tiempo (8) Costo de la atención (9) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP [En cualquier caso pase a MIL10A]	
HONHE4. ¿Dónde recibió atención médica o tratamiento? (01) Hospital Público (02) Centro de salud (incluye clínicas maternas y de niños) (03) Instituto Hondureño de Seguridad Social (IHSS) (04) Centro comunitario (05) Clínica u Hospital Privado (06) Clínica de iglesia u ONG (07) Clínica de médico particular o privado (08) Farmacia (09) Comunidad (Comadrona, Curandero, Sobadora, etc.) (10) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
HONHE5. En términos generales, ¿cómo calificaría la atención recibida? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL10A – MIL10E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en **los gobiernos** de varios países. Cuando hablamos de “China” en esta entrevista, estamos hablando de China continental, la República Popular de China, y no de la isla Taiwán. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	NR	INAP
MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10B. El de Rusia. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10C. Irán. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10D. Israel. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10E. Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL11A – MIL11E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]

Ahora me gustaría preguntarle sobre las relaciones en general de nuestro país con otras naciones del mundo. Cuando usted piensa en las relaciones de nuestro país con **China**, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?

	Más cercana	Más o menos igual	Más lejana	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	NR	INAP
MIL11A. China	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11B. Y la relación de nuestro país con Rusia, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11C. Y con Irán, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES						
	Más cercana	Más o menos igual	Más lejana	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	NR	INAP
MIL11D. Con Israel, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11E. Finalmente, con Estados Unidos, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99

Pasando a otro tema...

CCT1NEW. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual en dinero o en productos por parte del gobierno? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total
[Usar Table a continuación para el código]

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o
Ninguno	0					
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15			
NS	88					
NR	98					

Además de los centros educativos primarios, secundarios o universitarios, en Honduras hay otros sistemas educativos donde la gente puede completar sus estudios. Podría decirme si conoce o ha escuchado hablar de los siguientes sistemas y si algún miembro de su hogar recibió educación en estos sistemas?

Sistema de Educación a Distancia (ISEMED)	¿Escuchó hablar o conoce?	¿Usted o algún miembro del hogar estudió a través de?			
		Sí	No	NS	NR
EDUX1A.	1 0 88 98	EDUX1B.	1 0 88 98		
Educatodos	EDUX2A.	1 0 88 98	EDUX2B.	1 0 88 98	
IHER (Instituto Hondureño de Educación por Radio)	EDUX3A.	1 0 88 98	EDUX3B.	1 0 88 98	

		¿Escuchó hablar o conoce?					¿Usted o algún miembro del hogar estudió a través de?			
		Sí	No	NS	NR		Sí	No	NS	NR
PRALEBAH (Programa de Alfabetización y Educación Básica de Jóvenes y Adultos de Honduras)	EDUX4A	1	0	88	98	EDUX4B.	1	0	88	98
Programas de capacitación técnica / laboral (como INFOP, por ejemplo)	EDUX5A.	1	0	88	98	EDUX5B.	1	0	88	98
Otros	EDUX6A.	1	0	88	98	EDUX6B.	1	0	88	98

EDU1. ¿Cuántos niños entre 6 y 17 años viven en esta casa? _____

(00) Ninguno [**Pase a ED2 o Q2D-Y, según corresponda**]

(NS = 888, NR = 988) [**Pase a ED2 o Q2D-Y, según corresponda**]

EDU2. ¿Cuántos de estos [Número de niños en EDU1] niños entre 6 y 17 años estudian o van a la escuela actualmente? _____

(00) Ninguno [**Pase a ED2 o Q2D-Y, según corresponda**]

(NS = 888, NR = 988, INAP = 999)

Está usted de acuerdo o no con las siguientes afirmaciones con respecto a la educación del niño/de los niños que viven en su casa:

	Sí	No	NS	NR	INAP
EDU4A. El/la niño(a) está seguro(a) en la escuela (o colegio)	1	0	88	98	99
EDU4B. La escuela (o colegio) del/de la niño(a) se mantiene limpia	1	0	88	98	99
EDU4C. La disciplina se cumple de manera justa en la escuela (o colegio) del niño(a)	1	0	88	98	99
EDU4D. Los maestros siempre dictan sus clases y cumplen los horarios y calendarios escolares	1	0	88	98	99
EDU4E. La escuela (o colegio) trata de que los padres de familia estén bien informados y participen en la orientación de la escuela (o colegio)	1	0	88	98	99

EDU5. Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, ¿está usted satisfecho(a) con la escuela o colegio donde estudia(n) el/los niño(s) que viven en su casa?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS ED2 Y MOV1 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? [NO LEER OPCIONES]

(00) Ninguno

(01) Primaria incompleta

(02) Primaria completa

(03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto

(04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo

(05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta

(06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa

(07) Universitaria incompleta

(08) Universitaria completa

(88) NS

(98) NR

(99) INAP

**MOV1.** ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? **[LEER OPCIONES]**

- (1) Alta (2) Media alta (3) Media (4) Media baja (5) Baja
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Q2D-Y. ¿En qué día, mes y año nació usted? **[Si se niega a decir el día y mes, pedir solo el año o preguntar edad y calcular luego el año.]**

Día: _____ Mes (01 = Enero): _____ Año: _____
 (Para Q2D y Q2M: 88 = NS y 98 = NR)
 (Para Q2Y: 8888 = NS y 9888 = NR)

||Q2D
Día
 |_|_|Q2M
Mes
 |_|_|_|Q2Y
año

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]**

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

- (01) Católico
 (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discipulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).
 (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'í).
 (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)
 (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).
 (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).
 (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).
 (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)
 (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)
 (12) Testigos de Jehová (88) NS (98) NR

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes
 (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR

Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante o (4) Nada importante
 (88) NS (98) NR

MIL8. ¿Usted o su pareja o algún hijo suyo actualmente está en servicio en las Fuerzas Armadas o ha servido alguna vez en las Fuerzas Armadas?

- (1) Sí, actualmente sirviendo (2) Servía en el pasado (3) Nunca ha servido
 (88) NS (98) NR

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Trabajando? **[Siga]**
 (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]**
 (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**
 (4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**
 (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**
 (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**
 (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**
 (88) NS **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (98) NR **[Pase a Q10NEW]**

<p>OCUPIA. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “F”]

<p>Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de L. 920 (02) Entre L. 920 – L. 1.830 (03) Entre L. 1.831 – L. 2.750 (04) Entre L. 2.751 - L. 3.670 (05) Entre L. 3.671 – L. 4.580 (06) Entre L. 4.581 – L. 5.500 (07) Entre L. 5.501 – L. 7.320 (08) Entre L. 7.321 – L. 8.250 (09) Entre L. 8. 251 – L. 9.630 (10) Entre L. 9.631 – L. 11.000 (11) Entre L. 11.001 - L. 12.380 (12) Entre L. 12.381 – L. 15.130 (13) Entre L. 15.131 – L. 17.880 (14) Entre L. 17.881 – L. 20.630 (15) Entre L. 20.631 – L. 24.75 (16) Más de L. 24.750 (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>[PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]</p> <p>Q10G. ¿Y cuánto dinero usted personalmente gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? [Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de L. 920 (02) Entre L. 920 – L. 1.830 (03) Entre L. 1.831 – L. 2.750 (04) Entre L. 2.751 - L. 3.670 (05) Entre L. 3.671 – L. 4.580 (06) Entre L. 4.581 – L. 5.500 (07) Entre L. 5.501 – L. 7.320 (08) Entre L. 7.321 – L. 8.250 (09) Entre L. 8. 251 – L. 9.630 (10) Entre L. 9.631 – L. 11.000 (11) Entre L. 11.001 - L. 12.380 (12) Entre L. 12.381 – L. 15.130 (13) Entre L. 15.131 – L. 17.880 (14) Entre L. 17.881 – L. 20.630 (15) Entre L. 20.631 – L. 24.750 (16) Más de L. 24.750 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)</p>	
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[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p>	
<p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones] (1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[FS2 Y FS8 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas relacionadas con la alimentación.

	No	Sí	NS	NR	INAP
FS2. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿en su hogar se quedaron sin alimentos?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez, ¿usted o algún adulto en su hogar solo comió una vez al día o dejó de comer todo un día?	0	1	88	98	99

<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [Leer alternativas] (1) Soltero [Pasar a Q12C] (2) Casado [Siga] (3) Unión libre (acompañado) [Siga] (4) Divorciado [Pasar a Q12C] (5) Separado [Pasar a Q12C] (6) Viudo [Pasar a Q12C] (88) NS [Pasar a Q12C] (98) NR [Pasar a Q12C]</p>	
<p>GEN10. Pensando solo en usted y su pareja y en los salarios que ganan, ¿cuál de las siguientes frases describe mejor sus salarios? [Leer opciones] (1) Usted no gana nada y su pareja gana todo; (2) Usted gana menos que su pareja; (3) Usted gana más o menos lo mismo que su pareja; (4) Usted gana más que su pareja; (5) Usted gana todos los ingresos y su pareja no gana nada. (6) [NO LEER] Ningún ingreso salarial (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00 = ninguno → Pasar a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12B. ¿Cuántos hijos menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)</p>	
<p>ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-hondureña, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza o trigueña (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] (401) Castellano/Español (402) Lenca (403) Garífuna (406) Misquito (407) Xicaque (408) Paya (404) Otro (nativo) (405) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR</p>
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<p>WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p>

<p>Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente... G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? [Leer opciones] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>				
	Correcto	Incorrecto	No Sabe	No Responde
<p>G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América? [NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]</p>	1	2	88	98
<p>G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Honduras? [NO LEER: 4 años]</p>	1	2	88	98
<p>G17. ¿Cuántos diputados tiene el Congreso Nacional? [ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]</p>	Número: _____		8888	9888

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos	(3) Tres o más
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R15. Computadora	(0) No [Ir a R16]	(1) Sí
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No (1) Sí	(99) INAP
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí
R26. ¿Está conectada a la red de saneamiento/desagüe/drenaje?	(0) No	(1) Sí

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.



COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado]	_ _
(97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) <i>únicamente</i> , si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]	
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____	_ _ _
TI. Duración de la entrevista [<i>minutos, ver página # 1</i> _____]	
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	_ _ _
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____	_ _


Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
 Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:


[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
 [No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta A






Tarjeta B




Tarjeta C





Tarjeta D



Tarjeta F

- (00) Ningún ingreso**
- (01) Menos de L. 920**
- (02) Entre L. 920 – L. 1.830**
- (03) Entre L. 1.831 – L. 2.750**
- (04) Entre L. 2.751 - L. 3.670**
- (05) Entre L. 3.671 – L. 4.580**
- (06) Entre L. 4.581 – L. 5.500**
- (07) Entre L. 5.501 – L. 7.320**
- (08) Entre L. 7.321 – L. 8.250**
- (09) Entre L. 8. 251 – L. 9.630**
- (10) Entre L. 9.631 – L. 11.000**
- (11) Entre L. 11.001 - L. 12.380**
- (12) Entre L. 12.381 – L. 15.130**
- (13) Entre L. 15.131 – L. 17.880**
- (14) Entre L. 17.881 – L. 20.630**
- (15) Entre L. 20.631 – L. 24.750**
- (16) Más de L. 24.750**



Paleta de Colores





Appendix D. Regression Tables

Figure 9. Determinants of Education Level in Honduras

Determinants	Level of Education
Urban/rural	0.197*** (0.0285)
Female	0.0164 (0.0198)
Skin color	-0.0831*** (0.0270)
26-35 years or older	0.0223 (0.0261)
36-45 years or older	-0.0197 (0.0285)
46-55 years or older	-0.157*** (0.0257)
56-65 years or older	-0.202*** (0.0238)
Constant	-0.0151 (0.0276)
Observations	1,698
R-squared	0.111

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 11. Determinants of Personal Income in Honduras, for Respondents who are Employed

Determinants	Personal Income
Urban/rural	0.158*** (0.0393)
Education	0.346*** (0.0415)
Female	-0.0624* (0.0330)
Skin color	-0.0440 (0.0364)
26-35 years or older	0.148*** (0.0394)
36-45 years or older	0.149*** (0.0408)
46-55 years or older	0.113*** (0.0433)
56-65 years or older	0.136*** (0.0380)
66 years or older	0.0503 (0.0498)
Constant	-0.0675* (0.0391)
Observations	755
R-squared	0.201

Figure 15. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Honduras

Determinants	Food Insecurity
Urban/rural	-0.0598* (0.0358)
Female	0.0506 (0.0331)
Skin color	0.0980*** (0.0354)
26-35 years or older	0.000865 (0.0354)
36-45 years or older	0.0282 (0.0378)
46-55 years or older	0.0854** (0.0411)
56-65 years or older	0.0495 (0.0348)
66 years or older	0.0671 (0.0461)
Constant	-0.0291 (0.0361)
Observations	853
R-squared	0.027

Figure 18. Determinants of Self-Reported Discrimination Victimization in the Workplace in Honduras

Determinants	Discrimination in Place of Work
Urban/rural	0.153 (0.119)
Female	-0.364*** (0.115)
Skin color	0.171 (0.134)
26-35 years or older	0.128 (0.125)
36-45 years or older	-0.161 (0.133)
46-55 years or older	-0.410** (0.184)
56-65 years or older	-0.00813 (0.126)
66 years or older	-0.150 (0.145)
Constant	-2.199*** (0.122)
Observations	826

Figure 42. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Honduras

Determinants	Internal Efficacy
Urban/rural	0.00658 (0.0379)
Female	0.0396 (0.0446)
Female Homemaker	0.0238 (0.0417)
Age	0.0360 (0.0391)
Education Level	0.227*** (0.0491)
Wealth Level	0.0804* (0.0413)
Political Interest	0.154*** (0.0382)
Other Discrimination	-0.0273 (0.0488)
Discrimination in Government Offices	-0.0470 (0.0469)
Political Knowledge Index	-0.0911** (0.0364)
Constant	-0.0477 (0.0348)
Observations	727
R-squared	0.082

Figure 45. Determinants of External Efficacy in Honduras

Determinants	External Efficacy
Urban/rural	-0.0618 (0.0413)
Female	-0.0383 (0.0471)
Female Homemaker	0.0106 (0.0419)
Age	0.0710* (0.0422)
Education Level	0.145*** (0.0455)
Wealth Level	-0.00339 (0.0397)
Skin color	-0.138** (0.0577)
Discrimination in Government Offices	0.110** (0.0479)
Mestizo	0.0726 (0.0489)
Indigenous	0.0342 (0.0497)
Black	0.0666 (0.0554)
Mulato	-0.0126 (0.0328)
Political Interest	0.0462 (0.0406)
Constant	0.0397 (0.0415)
Observations	758
R-squared	0.038



Figure 46. Determinants of the Belief in the Representativeness of Political Parties in Honduras

Determinants	Belief in the Representativeness of Political Parties
Urban/rural	-0.0515 (0.0397)
Female	-0.0168 (0.0469)
Female Homemaker	0.0569 (0.0545)
Age	0.0483 (0.0381)
Education Level	0.0477 (0.0402)
Wealth Level	-0.0157 (0.0390)
Skin color	-0.173*** (0.0361)
Political Interest	0.0761** (0.0378)
Constant	0.0112 (0.0371)
Observations	804
R-squared	0.039

Figure 49. Determinants of Political System Support in Honduras

Determinants	Political System Support
Urban/rural	-0.0494 (0.0396)
Female	-0.00935 (0.0463)
Female Homemaker	-0.0124 (0.0379)
Age	0.129*** (0.0415)
Education Level	0.0468 (0.0414)
Wealth Level	0.0295 (0.0405)
Political Interest	0.0157 (0.0424)
Mestizo	-0.00265 (0.0377)
Indigenous	0.00773 (0.0491)
Black	0.0678* (0.0391)
Mulato	-0.0214 (0.0434)
Discrimination in Government Offices	0.0571 (0.0483)
Other Discrimination	-0.161*** (0.0429)
Ideology	0.209*** (0.0422)
Approval of the Work of the President	0.189*** (0.0478)
Constant	0.00973 (0.0421)
Observations	591
R-squared	0.178



Figure 51. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Honduras

Determinants	Support for Democracy
Urban/rural	-0.0337 (0.0296)
Female	-0.0752** (0.0296)
Female Homemaker	0.0956*** (0.0353)
Age	0.0791** (0.0365)
Education Level	0.144*** (0.0368)
Wealth Level	0.0859** (0.0347)
Political Interest	0.0512* (0.0309)
Mestizo	-0.0182 (0.0310)
Indigenous	0.0434 (0.0387)
Black	0.0642** (0.0253)
Mulato	0.0866*** (0.0220)
Ideology	0.208*** (0.0317)
Constant	0.0148 (0.0286)
Observations	1,196
R-squared	0.109

Figure 54. Determinants of Protest Participation Honduras

Determinants	Protest Participation
Urban/rural	0.435*** (0.118)
Female	-0.160 (0.126)
Female Homemaker	0.840 (0.132)
Age	-0.0669 (0.127)
Education Level	-0.0375 (0.140)
Wealth Level	0.266** (0.120)
Political Interest	0.0798 (0.118)
Skin color	-0.0575 (0.123)
Ideology	-0.464*** (0.135)
Constant	-2.778*** (0.133)
Observations	1,265

Figure 54. Determinants of Corruption Victimization

Determinants	Corruption Victimization Coefficients
Level of Education	0.013 (0.16)
Size of Place of Residence	0.547* (7.79)
Age	-0.166* (-2.33)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.026 (-0.33)
Female	-0.300* (-5.13)
Wealth Quintiles	0.271* (3.29)
Skin color	-0.117 (-1.85)
Constant	-1.227* (-17.28)
F	17.46
N. of cases	1,666
* p<0.05	

Figure 71. Determinants of Crime Victimization

Determinants	Crime Victimization
	Coefficients
Level of Education	0.416* (5.51)
Size of Place of Residence	0.398* (5.55)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.034 (-0.43)
Female	-0.116 (-1.75)
Wealth Quintiles	0.068 (0.82)
Skin color	0.035 (0.50)
Constant	-1.626* (-20.17)
F	12.88
N. of cases	1654
* p<0.05	

Figure 73. Determinants of System Support

Determinants	System Support
	Coefficients
Level of Education	0.098* (3.53)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.027 (-0.88)
Skin color	-0.015 (-0.58)
Female	0.033 (1.76)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.107* (-3.38)
Crime Victimization	-0.034 (-1.32)
Perception of Corruption	-0.123* (-4.45)
Corruption Victimization	-0.072* (-3.01)
Constant	0.012 (0.44)
R-squared	0.047
N. of cases	1476
* p<0.05	

Figure 77. Determinants Support for Rule of Law

Determinants	Support for Rule of Law
	Coefficients
Corruption Victimization	-0.085 (-1.35)
Level of Education	0.016 (0.22)
Size of Place of Residence	0.172* (2.22)
Skin color	-0.192* (-3.41)
Female	0.075 (1.41)
Interpersonal Trust	0.187* (2.91)
Ideology	0.173* (2.57)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.062 (-0.82)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.141* (-2.15)
Crime Victimization	0.124 (1.48)
Any type of household crime victim	-0.358* (-4.08)
Constant	0.478* (7.23)
F	6.73
N. of cases	1216
* p<0.05	

Figure 95. Determinants of Political Tolerance

Determinants	Political Tolerance
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.002 (0.05)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	-0.057 (-1.68)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.103* (-3.08)
Crime Victimization	0.036 (1.33)
Frequency of Church Attendance	0.172* (5.01)
Importance of Religion	-0.070* (-2.02)
Ideology	0.043 (1.28)
Support for Democracy	0.233* (6.44)
Level of Education	0.055 (1.58)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.011 (-0.33)
Skin color	-0.112* (-4.11)
Female	-0.016 (-0.63)
Constant	0.017 (0.57)
R-squared	0.129
Number de Observations	1094
* p<0.05	

Figure 90. Determinants for Support for Stable Democracy

Determinants	Support for Stable Democracy
Crime Victimization	-0.056 (-0.47)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.454* (-3.03)
Corruption Victimization	-0.027 (-0.21)
Perception of Corruption	0.154 (1.16)
Ideology	0.346* (2.81)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.576* (-3.80)
Female	-0.002 (-0.02)
Wealth Quintiles	0.264 (1.76)
Size of Place of Residence	0.166 (1.22)
Approval of the Work of the President	0.258* (2.02)
Political Interest	0.091 (0.81)
Level of Education	0.469* (3.23)
Constant	-2.933* (-17.62)
F	3.61
N. of cases	1104
* p<0.05	

Figure 101. Determinants of Demand-Making on Local Governments in Honduras

Determinants	Demand-Making on Local Government
Trust in Local Government	0.150 (1.49)
Attended a Municipal Meeting	0.759* (11.47)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.046 (-0.40)
Level of Education	0.311* (2.70)
Female	-0.012 (-0.15)
Age	-0.001 (-0.01)
Wealth Quintiles	0.041 (0.36)
Size of Place of Residence	0.176 (1.71)
Constant	-2.676* (-20.46)
F	17.04
N. of cases	1598
* p<0.05	

Figure 113. Satisfaction with Local Services as Determinant for Political System Support in Honduras

Determinants	System Support (Impact of Local Services)
Evaluation of Services Provided by Local Government	0.179* (6.14)
Approval of the Work of the President	0.263* (9.16)
Political Interest	-0.004 (-0.15)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.067* (-2.16)
Level of Education	0.048 (1.60)
Female	0.006 (0.31)
Age	0.090* (2.93)
Wealth Quintiles	0.040 (1.40)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.056 (-1.93)
Constant	-0.001 (-0.04)
R-squared	0.131
N. of cases	1549
* p<0.05	

Figure 121. Determinants Electoral Participation in 2009

Determinants	Percentage that Voted in Last Election
Urban	-0.577* (-6.55)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.113 (-1.14)
Age	0.529* (5.25)
What was the last year of education that you completed?	0.134 (1.38)
Female	0.053 (0.64)
Political Interest	0.108 (1.35)
Skin color	-0.144 (-1.44)
Political Party Identification	0.477* (5.02)
Constant	0.024 (0.26)
F	12.92
N. of cases	731
* p<0.05	

Figure 126. Determinants of Political Party Identification

Determinants	Political Party Identification
Urban	-0.537* (-5.68)
Wealth Quintiles	0.147 (1.37)
Age	0.101 (1.04)
What was the last year of education that you completed?	-0.158 (-1.49)
Female	0.081 (1.01)
Political Interest	0.394* (5.02)
Percentage that Voted in Last Elections	0.511* (5.11)
Constant	-0.640* (-6.74)
F	14.69
N. of cases	733
* p<0.05	

Results of Multilevel Regression from Chapter 9

Factors of Local and Central Politics	System Support	Political Tolerance	Support for Democracy
Municipal Human Development Index	-0.016	-0.098	-0,076 ***
Proportion that Voted for the President in the Municipality	0.041	0.051	-0.018
Mayor and President are of the Same Party	0.07	-0.085	0.026
Trust in Local Government	0,166 ***	0,138 ***	0,191 ***
Trust in National Government	0,49 ***	0,116 ***	0,105 ***
Asked for Assistance from a Local Official	-0.003	0.018	-0.024
Asked for Assistance from the State	0.008	0.033	-0.013
Evaluation of Municipal Services	0,087 ***	0,07 ***	-0.018
Approval of the Work of the President	0,088 ***	-0,081 ***	0.004
Corruption in the Municipality	-0.016	0,057 ***	-0.022
Public Employee Asked for a Bribe	-0.026	-0.008	-0,062 ***
Female	0.18	-0.006	-0.001
Age	0.327	0,07 ***	0.03
Level of Education	0.024	0,06 ***	0,092 ***
Wealth Quintiles	0.008	0,056 ***	0,112 ***
Urban Area	0.002	-0.017	0.028
Constant	-0.022	-0.042	0.005
var(_cons)	0.042	0.09	0.004
	0.013	0.026	0.008
var (residual)	0.542	0.86	0.906
	-0.02	0.032	0.034
***p<0.5			

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, nonpartisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life. The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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