

Online Appendix for:  
Candidate Choice without Party Labels: New Insights from  
Conjoint Survey Experiments

June 5, 2017

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**A Sample Demographics**

Table A.1: Demographic Characteristics of Experimental Samples

Respondent Race					
	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	
mTurk	0.787	0.066	0.045	0.102	
YouGov	0.670	0.116	0.142	0.071	

Respondent Gender		
	Female	Male
mTurk	0.455	0.545
YouGov	0.518	0.482

Respondent Ideology				
	Liberal	Conservative	Moderate	Other
mTurk	0.444	0.232	0.273	0.051
YouGov	0.204	0.354	0.351	0.091

Respondent Party Identification			
	Democrat	Independent	Republican
mTurk	0.581	0.164	0.254
YouGov	0.385	0.270	0.346

Respondent Education					
	Less than high school	High School / GED	Some College	Four-Year College	Graduate School
mTurk	0.005	0.092	0.359	0.403	0.141
YouGov	0.121	0.306	0.318	0.164	0.091

Respondent Age					
	18 to 29	30 to 39	40 to 49	50 to 59	60 or over
mTurk	0.459	0.274	0.122	0.093	0.051
YouGov	0.209	0.163	0.150	0.149	0.328

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Cell entries are sample proportions.  
 YouGov entries calculated using sample weights.  
 MTurk N: 1,204; YouGov N: 1,200.


## B Generalizability

In this section, we explore the extent to which the experimental results obtained on MTurk generalize to the U.S. adult population. Whether or not a causal effect estimate from one study generalizes to another (real or hypothetical) study depends on the similarities in the subjects, treatments, contexts, and outcome measures of each study (Cronbach et al., 1982; Coppock and Green, 2015). In our case, the treatments (candidate attributes), contexts (online survey), and outcome measures (candidate preference) were held constant by design. The experimental feature that might undermine our ability to generalize from the MTurk study to other populations is the plain fact that the MTurk sample differs in many ways from the national population.

The crucial question, then, concerns treatment effect heterogeneity. Do subjects on MTurk weigh the experimentally-manipulated candidate attributes differently from others? Conducting the same study on each platform allows us to answer this question directly. We will compare the coefficients in Equations 1 and 2 across samples. Effectively, the data for this comparison are the coefficients presented in the first two columns of Figures C.2 and C.3. A first cut at assessing generalizability is the Pearson correlation between the coefficients estimated from each sample, which is estimated to be 0.95. This correlation is extraordinarily high, despite being attenuated by measurement error. The Spearman (rank-order) correlation is also quite high, at 0.80.

The coefficient estimates themselves are plotted in Figure B.1, with the MTurk estimates on the horizontal axis and the YouGov estimates on the vertical axis. Coefficients from the nonpartisan elections are plotted with open points, while the partisan coefficients are filled. The plot shows two bivariate regression lines, one for the partisan elections and a second for the nonpartisan elections. The slopes for partisan and nonpartisan elections barely differ, indicating that both sets of results appear to generalize. Finally, the figure emphasizes our main finding. The effects of political experience (shown in the shaded gray box) are stronger in nonpartisan elections than in partisan elections. This finding obtains in both samples.

Figure B.1: Comparison of MTurk and YouGov Estimates



## C Mechanisms

In the main text, we suggested that a principle mechanism by which nonpartisan elections change who voters prefer is the additional weight that voters may give to candidate competence when the party label is absent. In this appendix, we further explore this possibility as well as the alternative mechanisms of perceived ideology and satisficing.

### C.1 Perceived Candidate Competence

In Figures 6 and 7 of the main text, we reported estimates of the heterogeneous effects of treatment by part on the “competence” dependent variable. This question asked respondents: “On a scale from 0 to 100, how competent do you think these candidates would be as mayor?” In this section, we report the average (not broken down by party) effects of treatment. These figures are analogous to figures 1 and 2 from the main text. The results are very similar, but we present them here for completeness. On MTurk and YouGov, subjects rate politically experienced candidates as more competent. In both studies, this effect is stronger in nonpartisan elections, though these differences are only statistically significant on MTurk. This analysis provides additional credence to the notion that voters prefer more experienced candidates in nonpartisan elections because they view them as more competent. Again, we do not view this analysis as ruling out other possible mechanisms, one of which we will explore in the next section.

Figure C.2: Mechanical Turk Main Analysis  
 Dependent Variable: Competence





Figure C.3: YouGov Main Analysis  
 Dependent Variable: Competence



In addition to vote choice and competence, we also asked respondents to rate how likely each candidate would be to implement specific policies or objectives. Subjects were randomly asked “How likely do you think each candidate would be to [keep taxes low / balance the budget?]” Response options ranged from 1 (Very unlikely) to 7 (Very likely). For the purpose of this analysis, we will pool responses to these valence questions as an alternative measure of competence. We think that, regardless of party, respondents would give higher values to candidates they view as more competent on these issues.

Figures C.4 and C.5 present the results of our analysis using the valence performance measure as the dependent variable and splitting the sample based on respondents’ partisanship. As we might expect, respondents view candidates of their own party as more likely to balance the budget or reduce crime. Both Democratic and Republican respondents (in both studies) rate those with more political and career experience higher on these issues. If we turn to the difference panels, we see some suggestive evidence that the political and career attributes are given better scores in nonpartisan elections than in partisan elections. Some differences by respondent partisanship emerge in the YouGov sample in line with our previous results: Republicans appear to give career experience greater weight in nonpartisan elections and Democrats give greater weight to political experience in nonpartisan elections.

## C.2 Perceived Candidate Ideology

As noted above and in the main text, we think that there are likely a large number of mechanisms by which nonpartisan electoral rules influence vote choice. Perceptions of candidate competence is one; perceptions of their ideology is another. To gain insight into this question, we asked respondents to predict how each candidate would handle one relatively conservative policy option and one relatively liberal policy option. The questions were randomly chosen from two possibilities in each category as shown in Table C.2. We rescale and combine these policy questions to create an index of perceived candidate ideology where lower values are more liberal and higher values are more conservative.

Table C.2: Policy Questions

How likely do you think each candidate would be to...	
Liberal	manage growth to protect the environment?
	manage growth to ensure access to affordable housing?
Conservative	keep taxes low?
	keep taxes low without compromising municipal services?

Response options range from 1 (Very unlikely) to 7 (Very likely).



Figure C.4: Mechanical Turk Heterogeneous Effects Analysis  
 Dependent Variable: Valence Issues





Figure C.5: YouGov Heterogeneous Effects Analysis  
 Dependent Variable: Valence Issues



Figures C.6 and C.7 report the results of an analysis of our perceived candidate ideology index. These results indicate that occupation in particular influences respondents’ evaluations of how likely a candidate is to implement conservative or liberal policies. Relative to educators, respondents of both parties rate business owners and executives as especially likely to produce conservative policies. The “Difference” column of facets in each figure provide some evidence that this inference is more pronounced in nonpartisan elections, at least for Democrats.

We note that race, gender, and age also seem to influence respondents’ assessments. For example, Democrats view older candidates as more conservative on policy while Republicans view nonwhite candidates and women as more liberal. Although Democrats do place more weight on age in nonpartisan elections, we find few systematic differences to suggest that most of these attributes are more consequential in nonpartisan contexts. Perhaps surprisingly, political experience had little to no effect on perceptions of candidate ideology, suggesting that perhaps perceived ideology is not the main mechanism behind the political experience effects we observed for the main dependent variable.

### C.3 Satisficing

In the main text, we showed that in nonpartisan elections, voters weigh the political experience of candidates more heavily. However, our experimental design leaves open an alternative explanation: the smaller coefficients on the political experience attributes in the partisan elections may be an artifact of *satisficing*. Bansak et al. (2017) describe a “satisficing/masking tradeoff” in conjoint experiments. Masking occurs when subjects use the revealed candidate attributes to infer something about an unrevealed attribute. Satisficing occurs when subjects fail to incorporate all the available information to them, and instead make their decision based on some subset of the available attributes. All else equal, increasing the number of attributes alleviates the masking problem but exacerbates the satisficing problem.

In our application, subjects evaluate candidates on five attributes in the nonpartisan elections and on six attributes in the partisan elections. We are concerned that the significant interaction effect we find for the political experience variables may be due to the mechanical relationship with the number of attributes.

To show that satisficing is *not* the driver of this interaction effect, we need to exploit a situation in which the number of attributes stays constant, but we vary whether the election is “partisan” or not. Our experiment provides such a situation. In some elections, the party of the two candidates is different, but in others, the candidates are from the same party. If our claim that in the absence of party cues, voters rely on political experience more heavily is correct, then we should see more weight being given to political experience when the two candidates are from the same party than when they are from different parties.

Satisficing is thought to occur because subjects have to expend more cognitive energy to process

Figure C.6: Mechanical Turk Heterogeneous Effects Analysis  
 Dependent Variable: Perceived Candidate Ideology Index (Higher Values More Conservative)





Figure C.7: YouGov Heterogeneous Effects Analysis (Partisan Issues)  
 Dependent Variable: Perceived Candidate Ideology Index (Higher Values More Conservative)



each additional attribute. While it is true that we are exploiting a situation in which the number of attributes stays constant, we do note that comparing two attributes that are the same may be less cognitively taxing than comparing two attributes that are different. If this process is dominant, then our approach here will not fully rule out satisficing.

Figures C.8 and C.9 show our results, for the MTurk and YouGov samples, respectively. On MTurk, we observe a statistically significant interaction: the effects for the political experience attribute are stronger when candidates are from the same party. On YouGov, the effect of political experience does not vary across the two types of elections. We conclude from these analyses that while satisficing remains a concern, there is some evidence that the greater weight placed on political experience in “nonpartisan” contests occurs in these elections as well.

Figure C.8: Mechanical Turk Partisan Choice





Figure C.9: YouGov Partisan Choice



## D Regression tables corresponding to all figures

Table D.3: Mechanical Turk Main Analysis (corresponds to Figure 2)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Republican		-0.19 (0.02)*	
Democrat		-0.07 (0.02)*	
Representative in Congress	0.25 (0.02)*	0.16 (0.02)*	0.09 (0.03)*
Mayor	0.32 (0.02)*	0.20 (0.02)*	0.12 (0.03)*
State Legislator	0.25 (0.02)*	0.16 (0.02)*	0.09 (0.03)*
City Council Member	0.23 (0.02)*	0.14 (0.02)*	0.09 (0.03)*
Attorney	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
Business Executive	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
Small Business Owner	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Police Officer	-0.05 (0.02)*	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)
Asian	0.05 (0.02)*	0.00 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Black	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
Hispanic	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
65	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
55	0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)*	-0.02 (0.03)
45	0.05 (0.02)*	0.04 (0.02)*	0.01 (0.03)
Male	-0.05 (0.01)*	-0.03 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.02)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05



Table D.4: YouGov Main Analysis (corresponds to Figure 3)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Republican		-0.11 (0.03)*	
Democrat		-0.06 (0.02)*	
Representative in Congress	0.22 (0.03)*	0.11 (0.03)*	0.11 (0.04)*
Mayor	0.25 (0.03)*	0.15 (0.03)*	0.10 (0.05)*
State Legislator	0.18 (0.03)*	0.11 (0.03)*	0.07 (0.05)
City Council Member	0.21 (0.03)*	0.13 (0.04)*	0.09 (0.05)
School Board President	0.12 (0.03)*	0.09 (0.04)*	0.04 (0.05)
Attorney	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.03)*	0.09 (0.05)
Business Executive	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
Small Business Owner	0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.09 (0.05)
Police Officer	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)
Electrician	-0.10 (0.03)*	-0.09 (0.03)*	-0.00 (0.05)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom	-0.11 (0.03)*	-0.11 (0.03)*	0.00 (0.05)
Asian	-0.06 (0.03)*	0.01 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)
Black	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Hispanic	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
65	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.03)*	0.01 (0.04)
55	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)
45	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Male	-0.04 (0.02)*	-0.04 (0.02)*	0.01 (0.03)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05

Table D.5: Mechanical Turk Heterogeneous Effects Analysis (corresponds to Figure 4)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Democrats			
Republican		-0.29 (0.02)*	
Democrat		0.04 (0.02)	
Representative in Congress	0.30 (0.03)*	0.14 (0.03)*	0.16 (0.04)*
Mayor	0.35 (0.02)*	0.18 (0.02)*	0.16 (0.03)*
State Legislator	0.29 (0.03)*	0.18 (0.02)*	0.11 (0.03)*
City Council Member	0.24 (0.03)*	0.14 (0.03)*	0.09 (0.04)*
Attorney	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
Business Executive	-0.08 (0.03)*	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Small Business Owner	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
Police Officer	-0.11 (0.03)*	-0.05 (0.03)*	-0.06 (0.04)
Asian	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Black	0.06 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Hispanic	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)
65	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)
55	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)
45	0.05 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.02)*	0.00 (0.03)
Male	-0.08 (0.02)*	-0.03 (0.02)*	-0.05 (0.02)*
Republicans			
Republican		0.09 (0.03)*	
Democrat		-0.23 (0.03)*	
Representative in Congress	0.17 (0.04)*	0.21 (0.04)*	-0.04 (0.06)
Mayor	0.23 (0.04)*	0.26 (0.04)*	-0.03 (0.05)
State Legislator	0.14 (0.04)*	0.16 (0.04)*	-0.01 (0.06)
City Council Member	0.19 (0.04)*	0.15 (0.04)*	0.04 (0.05)
Attorney	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)
Business Executive	0.08 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)
Small Business Owner	0.12 (0.04)*	0.11 (0.04)*	0.01 (0.06)
Police Officer	0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)
Asian	0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
Black	-0.10 (0.04)*	0.01 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.05)*
Hispanic	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.05)
65	-0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.03)*	-0.09 (0.05)
55	-0.00 (0.04)	0.10 (0.04)*	-0.10 (0.05)*
45	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)
Male	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05

Table D.6: YouGov Heterogeneous Effects Analysis (corresponds to Figure 5)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Democrats			
Republican		-0.30 (0.02)*	
Democrat		0.08 (0.02)*	
Representative in Congress	0.23 (0.03)*	0.09 (0.03)*	0.14 (0.05)*
Mayor	0.29 (0.04)*	0.13 (0.03)*	0.16 (0.05)*
State Legislator	0.19 (0.04)*	0.08 (0.03)*	0.11 (0.05)*
City Council Member	0.21 (0.03)*	0.17 (0.03)*	0.05 (0.04)
School Board President	0.15 (0.03)*	0.09 (0.03)*	0.06 (0.05)
Attorney	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.04)*	0.03 (0.05)
Business Executive	-0.15 (0.04)*	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.05)*
Small Business Owner	-0.11 (0.04)*	-0.07 (0.03)*	-0.04 (0.05)
Police Officer	-0.13 (0.04)*	-0.09 (0.03)*	-0.05 (0.05)
Electrician	-0.19 (0.04)*	-0.11 (0.04)*	-0.08 (0.05)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom	-0.21 (0.04)*	-0.13 (0.04)*	-0.07 (0.05)
Asian	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Black	0.09 (0.03)*	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
Hispanic	0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)
65	-0.06 (0.03)*	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)
55	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
45	-0.02 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)*	-0.09 (0.04)*
Male	-0.11 (0.02)*	-0.05 (0.02)*	-0.06 (0.03)*
Republicans			
Republican		0.11 (0.03)*	
Democrat		-0.21 (0.03)*	
Representative in Congress	0.22 (0.04)*	0.17 (0.04)*	0.05 (0.05)
Mayor	0.22 (0.04)*	0.21 (0.04)*	0.01 (0.05)
State Legislator	0.22 (0.04)*	0.17 (0.04)*	0.04 (0.05)
City Council Member	0.15 (0.04)*	0.15 (0.04)*	-0.00 (0.05)
School Board President	0.11 (0.04)*	0.12 (0.04)*	-0.01 (0.05)
Attorney	0.08 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.13 (0.06)*
Business Executive	0.18 (0.04)*	0.10 (0.04)*	0.08 (0.06)
Small Business Owner	0.24 (0.04)*	0.00 (0.04)	0.23 (0.06)*
Police Officer	0.18 (0.04)*	-0.01 (0.04)	0.19 (0.06)*
Electrician	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.04)*	0.09 (0.06)
Asian	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.03)*	0.02 (0.04)
Black	-0.07 (0.03)*	-0.13 (0.03)*	0.06 (0.04)
Hispanic	-0.09 (0.03)*	-0.11 (0.03)*	0.01 (0.04)
65	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
55	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
45	0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)
Male	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05

Table D.7: Mechanical Turk Competence Analysis (corresponds to Figure 6)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Democrats			
Republican		-6.40 (0.78)*	
Democrat		1.89 (0.73)*	
Representative in Congress	12.53 (1.08)*	8.31 (1.09)*	4.22 (1.52)*
Mayor	13.37 (1.04)*	7.82 (1.14)*	5.55 (1.48)*
State Legislator	10.21 (1.03)*	7.57 (1.06)*	2.63 (1.46)
City Council Member	9.85 (1.06)*	7.33 (1.05)*	2.52 (1.48)
Attorney	1.14 (1.06)	-0.40 (0.99)	1.53 (1.41)
Business Executive	-1.57 (1.07)	-1.10 (0.97)	-0.47 (1.41)
Small Business Owner	-0.97 (1.03)	0.66 (0.96)	-1.63 (1.41)
Police Officer	-2.27 (1.18)	-2.11 (1.00)*	-0.16 (1.49)
Asian	0.57 (0.91)	2.53 (0.85)*	-1.96 (1.20)
Black	-0.55 (0.85)	2.49 (0.89)*	-3.04 (1.20)*
Hispanic	-0.85 (0.93)	1.90 (0.85)*	-2.75 (1.19)*
65	1.57 (0.84)	1.23 (0.86)	0.34 (1.17)
55	1.16 (0.88)	1.86 (0.84)*	-0.69 (1.20)
45	1.49 (0.87)	1.04 (0.86)	0.45 (1.22)
Male	-0.64 (0.59)	-0.09 (0.62)	-0.55 (0.85)
Republicans			
Republican		3.32 (1.21)*	
Democrat		-8.03 (1.53)*	
Representative in Congress	12.27 (1.67)*	9.29 (1.85)*	2.98 (2.38)
Mayor	12.76 (1.64)*	8.02 (1.86)*	4.74 (2.30)*
State Legislator	8.57 (1.83)*	7.73 (1.79)*	0.85 (2.52)
City Council Member	10.24 (1.66)*	6.93 (1.80)*	3.31 (2.49)
Attorney	2.13 (1.59)	2.31 (1.58)	-0.18 (2.17)
Business Executive	4.89 (1.74)*	0.55 (1.70)	4.34 (2.32)
Small Business Owner	3.71 (1.62)*	3.20 (1.44)*	0.51 (2.20)
Police Officer	3.28 (1.54)*	0.45 (1.40)	2.83 (2.17)
Asian	-1.47 (1.30)	-1.77 (1.49)	0.30 (1.80)
Black	-4.54 (1.33)*	-1.37 (1.35)	-3.17 (1.86)
Hispanic	-3.91 (1.38)*	-0.83 (1.25)	-3.09 (1.79)
65	-1.91 (1.36)	-0.15 (1.43)	-1.76 (2.07)
55	0.19 (1.40)	1.39 (1.37)	-1.20 (1.98)
45	0.65 (1.40)	1.39 (1.58)	-0.75 (2.12)
Male	1.01 (1.07)	0.92 (0.87)	0.09 (1.37)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05

Table D.8: YouGov Competence Analysis (corresponds to Figure 7)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Democrats			
Republican		-10.67 (1.32)*	
Democrat		2.79 (1.03)*	
Representative in Congress	10.73 (1.70)*	7.12 (1.74)*	3.60 (2.33)
Mayor	12.51 (1.97)*	6.65 (1.77)*	5.86 (2.42)*
State Legislator	11.41 (1.69)*	6.22 (1.67)*	5.19 (2.25)*
City Council Member	11.38 (1.85)*	8.13 (1.63)*	3.25 (2.37)
School Board President	10.05 (1.61)*	5.42 (1.63)*	4.63 (2.17)*
Attorney	-1.25 (1.67)	-0.46 (1.53)	-0.80 (2.26)
Business Executive	-2.38 (1.57)	-0.62 (1.57)	-1.76 (2.14)
Small Business Owner	-3.41 (1.58)*	-0.31 (1.63)	-3.09 (2.25)
Police Officer	-3.86 (1.67)*	-1.82 (1.67)	-2.05 (2.39)
Electrician	-5.63 (1.70)*	-1.38 (1.76)	-4.25 (2.36)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom	-7.00 (1.67)*	-5.98 (1.76)*	-1.02 (2.43)
Asian	0.57 (1.29)	2.01 (1.31)	-1.45 (1.74)
Black	0.59 (1.40)	1.40 (1.31)	-0.81 (1.77)
Hispanic	0.83 (1.32)	0.79 (1.27)	0.04 (1.77)
65	-0.53 (1.21)	-1.92 (1.25)	1.39 (1.74)
55	0.17 (1.21)	0.29 (1.34)	-0.12 (1.79)
45	-0.32 (1.17)	0.24 (1.28)	-0.56 (1.69)
Male	-2.23 (0.95)*	-1.72 (0.92)	-0.51 (1.33)
Republicans			
Republican		5.02 (1.18)*	
Democrat		-9.85 (1.40)*	
Representative in Congress	9.33 (1.84)*	10.31 (2.23)*	-0.99 (2.82)
Mayor	8.06 (1.85)*	8.99 (2.11)*	-0.93 (2.67)
State Legislator	9.12 (2.00)*	7.74 (2.12)*	1.38 (3.08)
City Council Member	7.51 (1.97)*	8.68 (1.95)*	-1.17 (2.65)
School Board President	6.33 (1.76)*	5.92 (2.06)*	0.41 (2.77)
Attorney	0.24 (2.25)	-0.48 (1.91)	0.72 (2.86)
Business Executive	3.91 (1.88)*	3.73 (1.97)	0.18 (2.76)
Small Business Owner	3.56 (1.95)	6.82 (2.07)*	-3.26 (2.73)
Police Officer	4.11 (1.98)*	4.17 (2.12)*	-0.06 (2.97)
Electrician	-2.31 (2.04)	2.93 (1.96)	-5.24 (2.77)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom	-3.89 (2.00)	-1.13 (2.11)	-2.75 (2.81)
Asian	-2.27 (1.37)	0.07 (1.40)	-2.34 (1.96)
Black	-4.27 (1.47)*	-1.67 (1.49)	-2.60 (2.00)
Hispanic	-1.78 (1.60)	-2.57 (1.59)	0.79 (2.11)
65	-0.98 (1.44)	0.88 (1.55)	-1.85 (2.14)
55	-0.13 (1.43)	0.45 (1.60)	-0.58 (2.19)
45	-0.02 (1.37)	-0.85 (1.46)	0.83 (2.11)
Male	2.48 (1.04)*	1.61 (1.15)	0.87 (1.51)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05

Table D.9: Mechanical Turk Valence Analysis (corresponds to Figure C.4)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Democrats			
Republican		-0.32 (0.06)*	
Democrat		0.08 (0.05)	
Representative in Congress	0.13 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	0.02 (0.10)
Mayor	0.28 (0.07)*	0.13 (0.07)	0.15 (0.10)
State Legislator	0.21 (0.07)*	0.17 (0.07)*	0.04 (0.09)
City Council Member	0.16 (0.07)*	0.21 (0.07)*	-0.05 (0.09)
Attorney	0.18 (0.07)*	0.11 (0.06)	0.07 (0.09)
Business Executive	0.13 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.18 (0.10)
Small Business Owner	0.13 (0.06)*	0.10 (0.06)	0.04 (0.09)
Police Officer	0.47 (0.07)*	0.26 (0.07)*	0.21 (0.10)*
Asian	0.08 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.05 (0.08)
Black	-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.09)
Hispanic	0.00 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.08)
65	0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.08)
55	0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.02 (0.08)
45	0.04 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.08)
Male	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.04)*	0.07 (0.06)
Republicans			
Republican		0.26 (0.08)*	
Democrat		-0.76 (0.10)*	
Representative in Congress	0.27 (0.11)*	0.17 (0.10)	0.10 (0.15)
Mayor	0.36 (0.10)*	0.14 (0.11)	0.22 (0.15)
State Legislator	0.28 (0.11)*	0.15 (0.11)	0.12 (0.16)
City Council Member	0.14 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)	0.07 (0.15)
Attorney	0.21 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.18 (0.15)
Business Executive	0.40 (0.11)*	-0.01 (0.12)	0.41 (0.16)*
Small Business Owner	0.35 (0.11)*	0.22 (0.10)*	0.13 (0.14)
Police Officer	0.67 (0.11)*	0.34 (0.11)*	0.32 (0.14)*
Asian	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.20 (0.08)*	0.17 (0.12)
Black	-0.24 (0.09)*	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.13)
Hispanic	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.11)
65	-0.10 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.13)
55	0.03 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.13)
45	0.02 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.14)
Male	-0.00 (0.08)	0.18 (0.07)*	-0.18 (0.10)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05

Table D.10: YouGov Valence Analysis (corresponds to Figure C.5)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Democrats			
Republican		-0.52 (0.07)*	
Democrat		0.12 (0.07)	
Representative in Congress	0.17 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.07 (0.14)
Mayor	0.30 (0.10)*	-0.09 (0.09)	0.39 (0.13)*
State Legislator	0.34 (0.09)*	0.11 (0.09)	0.23 (0.12)
City Council Member	0.33 (0.08)*	0.14 (0.09)	0.19 (0.12)
School Board President	0.25 (0.08)*	0.06 (0.10)	0.19 (0.13)
Attorney	0.15 (0.09)	0.00 (0.09)	0.14 (0.13)
Business Executive	0.02 (0.10)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.14)
Small Business Owner	-0.01 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.15)
Police Officer	0.18 (0.10)	0.17 (0.09)	0.01 (0.13)
Electrician	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.14)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	0.09 (0.14)
Asian	0.04 (0.08)	0.12 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.10)
Black	0.10 (0.07)	0.19 (0.07)*	-0.08 (0.10)
Hispanic	-0.00 (0.08)	0.20 (0.07)*	-0.20 (0.10)
65	0.03 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.12 (0.10)
55	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.10)
45	-0.00 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.04 (0.10)
Male	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)
Republicans			
Republican		0.27 (0.08)*	
Democrat		-0.69 (0.09)*	
Representative in Congress	0.14 (0.10)	0.16 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.16)
Mayor	-0.05 (0.10)	0.23 (0.12)*	-0.28 (0.16)
State Legislator	0.03 (0.10)	0.10 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.16)
City Council Member	-0.00 (0.10)	0.18 (0.11)	-0.19 (0.15)
School Board President	0.06 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.11)	0.07 (0.15)
Attorney	0.36 (0.12)*	0.05 (0.12)	0.30 (0.16)
Business Executive	0.50 (0.11)*	0.09 (0.12)	0.41 (0.17)*
Small Business Owner	0.56 (0.12)*	0.34 (0.12)*	0.22 (0.17)
Police Officer	0.81 (0.13)*	0.49 (0.13)*	0.32 (0.18)
Electrician	0.27 (0.12)*	0.11 (0.12)	0.16 (0.16)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom	0.33 (0.12)*	0.11 (0.11)	0.22 (0.16)
Asian	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.12)
Black	-0.28 (0.09)*	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.19 (0.13)
Hispanic	-0.21 (0.09)*	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.13)
65	-0.15 (0.08)	0.10 (0.10)	-0.25 (0.13)
55	-0.10 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.19 (0.13)
45	-0.01 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.12)
Male	0.12 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	0.08 (0.10)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05

Table D.11: Mechanical Turk Perceived Ideology Analysis (corresponds to Figure C.6)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Democrats			
Republican		0.46 (0.07)*	
Democrat		-0.23 (0.06)*	
Representative in Congress	0.15 (0.07)*	-0.00 (0.08)	0.15 (0.11)
Mayor	0.24 (0.07)*	0.10 (0.07)	0.13 (0.10)
State Legislator	0.16 (0.07)*	0.11 (0.08)	0.06 (0.10)
City Council Member	0.13 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)
Attorney	0.27 (0.07)*	0.20 (0.07)*	0.07 (0.10)
Business Executive	0.62 (0.08)*	0.38 (0.08)*	0.24 (0.11)*
Small Business Owner	0.67 (0.08)*	0.42 (0.08)*	0.25 (0.11)*
Police Officer	0.40 (0.07)*	0.28 (0.08)*	0.12 (0.10)
Asian	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.08)
Black	-0.13 (0.06)*	-0.17 (0.07)*	0.04 (0.09)
Hispanic	-0.14 (0.06)*	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.09)
65	0.18 (0.06)*	-0.02 (0.07)	0.21 (0.09)*
55	0.16 (0.06)*	-0.03 (0.06)	0.19 (0.09)*
45	0.12 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.16 (0.09)
Male	0.10 (0.05)*	0.19 (0.05)*	-0.09 (0.07)
Republicans			
Republican		0.50 (0.10)*	
Democrat		-0.77 (0.12)*	
Representative in Congress	-0.08 (0.11)	0.17 (0.12)	-0.24 (0.17)
Mayor	0.07 (0.12)	0.12 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.16)
State Legislator	-0.09 (0.10)	0.15 (0.12)	-0.24 (0.16)
City Council Member	-0.02 (0.11)	0.10 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.16)
Attorney	0.27 (0.12)*	0.07 (0.12)	0.21 (0.16)
Business Executive	0.53 (0.13)*	0.19 (0.12)	0.34 (0.17)*
Small Business Owner	0.62 (0.13)*	0.51 (0.12)*	0.11 (0.17)
Police Officer	0.30 (0.11)*	0.10 (0.13)	0.20 (0.18)
Asian	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.11)	0.03 (0.14)
Black	-0.39 (0.11)*	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.22 (0.15)
Hispanic	-0.19 (0.10)*	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.15)
65	0.05 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.11)	0.12 (0.15)
55	-0.01 (0.10)	0.11 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.15)
45	0.17 (0.10)	0.15 (0.11)	0.02 (0.16)
Male	0.17 (0.08)*	0.08 (0.07)	0.09 (0.10)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05



Table D.12: YouGov Perceived Ideology Analysis (corresponds to Figure C.7)

	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Difference
Democrats			
Republican		0.26 (0.09)*	
Democrat		-0.21 (0.07)*	
Representative in Congress	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.14)
Mayor	-0.03 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.13)
State Legislator	0.03 (0.09)	0.14 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.13)
City Council Member	-0.09 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.13)
School Board President	-0.05 (0.08)	0.11 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.13)
Attorney	0.02 (0.10)	0.05 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.15)
Business Executive	0.44 (0.10)*	0.02 (0.10)	0.42 (0.14)*
Small Business Owner	0.34 (0.09)*	0.03 (0.11)	0.30 (0.15)*
Police Officer	0.12 (0.09)	0.14 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.13)
Electrician	0.08 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.13 (0.14)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom	0.09 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.10)	0.25 (0.14)
Asian	-0.07 (0.08)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.11)
Black	-0.06 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.10)
Hispanic	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.07)*	0.02 (0.10)
65	0.21 (0.07)*	-0.03 (0.08)	0.24 (0.10)*
55	0.13 (0.07)*	-0.06 (0.08)	0.19 (0.11)
45	0.11 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)	0.07 (0.10)
Male	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.07)
Republicans			
Republican		0.27 (0.09)*	
Democrat		-0.75 (0.09)*	
Representative in Congress	-0.19 (0.12)	0.03 (0.12)	-0.22 (0.17)
Mayor	-0.03 (0.10)	0.14 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.14)
State Legislator	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.16)
City Council Member	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.06 (0.15)
School Board President	-0.10 (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.16)
Attorney	0.07 (0.10)	0.05 (0.13)	0.02 (0.16)
Business Executive	0.48 (0.13)*	0.34 (0.14)*	0.14 (0.18)
Small Business Owner	0.63 (0.13)*	0.36 (0.12)*	0.26 (0.17)
Police Officer	0.37 (0.12)*	0.25 (0.13)*	0.12 (0.17)
Electrician	0.27 (0.13)*	0.29 (0.13)*	-0.01 (0.18)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom	0.10 (0.12)	0.17 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.18)
Asian	-0.11 (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)	-0.24 (0.12)*
Black	-0.37 (0.10)*	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.22 (0.14)
Hispanic	-0.16 (0.08)*	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.12)
65	0.07 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.08 (0.13)
55	0.04 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	0.01 (0.12)
45	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.04 (0.12)
Male	0.14 (0.06)*	-0.03 (0.07)	0.17 (0.09)

Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05

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