Philosophy

During the last decades there has been an ongoing ethical debate about vegetarianism. This debate has attracted several philosophers, theologicians and others. The purpose of this paper is to provide an account of the moral basis of vegetarianism. Generally speaking, there ...

There is no doubt that Spinoza values what he calls living under the guidance of reason, and that he somehow equates such a life with happiness. What is less clear is exactly how he conceives of such a life, and thus how he conceives of human happiness. According to Arne Naess's interpretation of Spinoza, the virtuous and free person will prefer the life of action, and happiness is best realised through living an active life “in the world”. Other scholars, however, have interpreted Spinoza as suggesting that the maximally free person will prefer a life of contemplation “outside the world”. In this paper, I address Naess's relationship with this aspect of Spinoza's practical philosophy, and propose my own interpretation of Spinoza where happiness, or living under the guidance of reason, consists in a combination of activity and contemplation.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the question of whether we have a duty to forgive those who repent and apologize for the wrong they have done. I shall argue that we have a pro tanto duty to forgive repentant wrongdoers, and I shall propose and consider the norm of forgiveness. This norm states that if a wrongdoer repents and apologizes to a victim, then the victim has a duty to forgive the wrongdoer, other things being equal. That someone has a pro tanto duty to forgive a repentant wrongdoer means that he or she ought to forgive unless other considerations outweigh the norm of forgiveness. Furthermore, a distinction is made between what are termed ‘general considerations’ and ‘case‐relative considerations’, and it is argued that only after all the relevant considerations have been examined can it be determined whether there is a duty to forgive, all things considered.

List of papers Paper 1 Gamlund, E. The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 18 (5) 651-671 (2010) DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2010. 528602 Paper 2 Gamlund, E. Supererogatory Forgiveness. INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 53 (6) 540-564 (2010) DOI: 10.1080/0020174X. 2010.526320 Denne avhandlingen tar for seg noen sentrale problemstillinger knyttet til tilgivelsens etikk.

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I discuss some central ethical aspects of self-forgiveness. A first comparison is made between interpersonal forgiveness and self-forgiveness. It would seem that self-forgiveness follows much of the same structure as interpersonal forgiveness, although with some exceptions. One noticeable difference is that with self-forgiveness, the forgiver and forgiven is one and the same person. The main ethical question discussed is when self-forgiveness is morally permissible. I argue that self-forgiveness is only morally permissible when the wrongdoer acknowledges wrongdoing and display genuine repentance. He must also, insofar as possible, ask the victim for forgiveness before contemplating self-forgiveness.