Pavlina Hubkova

International soft law as a concept encompasses a large number of diverse international acts that are not legally binding but still are capable of producing legal effects. For national courts, international soft law presents a foreign element because it is adopted beyond the state and it defies the traditional binary concept of law, according to which legal norms are binding, otherwise they are not law. Nevertheless, this foreign element finds its way into the decision-making of Czech administrative courts. The article maps how and in which situations the administrative courts work with the concept of soft law and what consequences they draw from soft law.

Under the principle of sincere cooperation, EU law requires from the Member States to do whatever is necessary to effectively implement and enforce EU law. While having the obligation to reach that goal, the Member States are left with a certain autonomy: institutional, administrative, and procedural. However, with more and more requirements and specifications coming from EU law itself, the autonomy seems to be more and more limited. Arguably, the shrinking of the space of administrative autonomy is apparent in the field of banking and finance. The discretion of the national competent authorities is constrained not only by binding rules of EU law, but also by the acts and activities of the European Supervisory Authorities. Although these agencies do not have competences to create legally binding rules, they have a power to influence the conduct of national administrative authorities and their law enforcement through "soft rulemaking". At the same time, however, the soft rulemaking of the ESAs has an empowering effect on national authorities. First, national authorities participate in the process of soft rulemaking. Second, ESA soft law gives them powerful tools, which they can use within their supervisory tasks at the national level.

The complexity and the dynamic evolution of global finance require forms of transnational regulation that do not rely solely on traditional lawmaking and call for the participation of actors at multiple levels. One of the examples of these forms is regulation through legally non-binding guidelines and recommendations produced by the European Supervisory Authorities and enforced by national authorities. Even if these soft law acts cannot be considered as law in the traditional sense, their real impact is very much law-like. The only distinction from traditional legal acts seems to be the non-mandatory wording and the lack of direct enforceability or judicial control. Otherwise, these acts replicate the aesthetics of law. This article argues that the entire transnational administrative practice, which consists of soft rulemaking and the effective enforcement of such rules, is powerful because it successfully mimics law-making and law enforcement procedures.

The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) are empowered, by their founding regulations, to adopt guidelines and recommendations "with a view to establishing consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices within the ESFS, and to ensuring the common, uniform and consistent application of Union law". These acts can be considered genuine EU soft law since they lack the binding legal force. However, they remain perfectly non-binding only at the EU level and in the relation between the ESAs and the national competent authorities (NCAs). Although the NCAs have a duty "to make every effort to comply" with such soft law, they keep a certain leeway to decide whether they eventually comply or not. Nonetheless, the situation is different in case of financial institutions under their supervision. Formally, the EU regulations attribute to them also only a duty "to make every effort to comply". However, once the NCA decides to comply and effectively enforces the compliance from financial institutions, the latter have a very limited, or even no leeway to decide about the compliance. Within the complex regulatory system, the NCA metamorphosis from a normtaker into an effective norm-enforcer who is capable to determine what effects the ESA soft law have at the national level. This paper focuses on the life of ESA soft law in the Czech Republic. It examines the role and power of the Czech NCA (the Czech National Bank, CNB) in the light of the legislative framework and other domestic binding legal rules. It takes into consideration the real enforcement strategy and practices of the CNB to show that, in the hands of the CNB, ESA guidelines and recommendations become acts, which produce binding legal effects upon financial institutions. Based on this observation, the paper raises questions about the proper control of ESA soft law and potential remedies.

ABSTRACT
The Covid-19 pandemic gave rise to a wave of adoption of soft law at EU level. As a regula-tory tool, soft law is associated with greater efficiency, because it can be adopted without the necessity to respect complex procedural rules. In addition, it is not binding and it leaves it to its addressees to adapt according to their needs and possibilities. On the other hand, it raises questions about legitimacy, competences and control. The paper identifies the problematic aspects of EU soft law and explains why the current crisis represents an opportunity to address them.
ABSTRACT IN ORIGINAL LANGUAGE
Pandemie COVID-19 vyvolala na úrovni Evropské unie vlnu přijímání nejrůznějších aktů charakteru soft law. Jako regulační nástroj je soft law spojeno s větší efektivitou, protože ke svému přijetí nepotřebuje složité postupy podle daných procesních pravidel. Navíc není závazné a nechává na adresátech, aby se přizpůsobili dle svých potřeb a možností. Na druhou stranu vzbuzuje otázky týkající se legitimity, kompetencí a kontroly. Příspěvek identifikuje, v čem spočívají problematické aspekty spojené s unijním soft law, a vysvětluje, proč současná krize představuje příležitost, jak se s nimi vypořádat.

In the judgment in case BT v Balgarska Narodna Banka, the Court of Justice of the EU declared, for the first time, invalid a part of a legally non-binding EU act - a recommendation adopted by the European Banking Authority and addressed to the Bulgarian National Bank. It also confirmed that the referring court deciding upon damages has a duty to take such a recommendation into consideration. Moreover, the individuals in the national proceedings should have a right to rely upon the content of the recommendation even if they are not addressees of such an act. However, when assessed in more detail, the case points out to several interesting aspects related to EU soft law that have not been properly discussed yet.

Evropské orgány dohledu jakožto unijní agentury, na něž byly delegovány úkoly v oblasti finanční regulace, mají pravomoc vydávat obecné pokyny a doporučení, tedy akty charakteru soft law. Z unijního pohledu jde o akty bez právní závaznosti. Avšak v českém kontextu a především díky jejich vynucování ze strany České národní banky se tyto akty stávají prakticky závaznými pro své hlavní adresáty, kterými jsou finanční instituce. To dobře ukazuje, jak v EU funguje víceúrovňová regulace a její prosazování, a navíc otevírá otázky týkající se kontroly a případného soudního přezkumu unijního soft law.

Soukromé vymáhání evropského soutěžního práva: obrana „passing-on” a nároky na náhradu škody nepřímých odběratelů. In: ŠTĚPÁNKOVÁ, Kateřina (ed.). Právo v podnikání vybraných členských států Evropské Unie – sborník příspěvků k VIII. ročníku mezinárodní vědecké konference. Praha, 04.11.2016. Praha : TROAS, 2016, s. 429–442. ISBN 978-80-88055-01-3.

Soudní dvůr EU již od svého přelomového rozsudku ve věci Courage a Crehan (C-453/99) konstantě opakuje, že komu byla způsobena škoda porušením evropských soutěžních pravidel, má právo na její plnou kompenzaci. Nároky poškozených a procesní pravidla pro jejich uplatnění nyní upravuje nová směrnice č. 2014/104/EU. Ta zavádí mimo jiné pravidlo na obranu žalovaných – tzv. " passing-on defence " , podle něhož žalovaní mohou brojit proti nárokům přímých odběratelů, pokud prokážou, že přímí odběratelé přenesli protisoutěžní navýšení ceny na své vlastní zákazníky. Tento koncept se dále odráží v posílení pozice nepřímých odběratelů. Směrnice zavádí vyvratitelnou domněnku, že na ně navýšení ceny bylo přesunuto; žalovaný pak musí prokázat, že k přesunutí nedošlo. Předkládaný příspěvek analyzuje koncept " passing-on defence " ve světle snahy zajistit účinnost evropského práva, plnou kompenzaci škody a blahobyt spotřebitele. Přináší komparativní pohled na dosavadní rozhodovací praxi a doktrinální debatu v USA a nastiňuje možná úskalí při uplatňování daného konceptu v unijním právu.

Abstract: Since its seminal ruling in Courage and Crehan (C-453/1999), the Court of Justice of the EU constantly repeats that any individual can claim full compensation for the harm caused by an infringement of European competition provisions. The claims of injured parties and procedural rules for their enforcement are now stipulated by the new Directive 2014/104/EU. It sets, among others, a rule of so-called passing-on defence; an injurer may invoke passing-on by proving that the purchasers passed the anticompetitive overcharge on their own customers. This concept is then reflected in the increase in the position of indirect purchasers. The Directive implements a rebuttable presumption that the overcharge was passed on them; the defendant has to prove the opposite. This paper analyses the concept of passing-on defence in the light of the aim to ensure effectiveness of EU law, full compensation and consumer welfare. It brings a comparative view on the decision-making and on the doctrinal debate in the USA and outlines potential problems with the implementation of this concept in EU law. Klíčová slova: soutěžní právo, náhrada škody, Soudní dvůr EU, směrnice 2014/104/EU, obrana " passing-on " , nároky nepřímých odběratelů, komparace

Současná informační společnost je závislá na nových technologiích. Inovace v technologických oblastech jsou zcela zásadním hybatelem vývoje společnosti. Je proto úkolem práva, aby chránila ty, kteří do inovací investují, čímž přispívají k technologickému rozvoji, ekonomickému růstu a posílení blahobytu spotřebitelů. Tento úkol zajišťují předpisy na ochranu duševního vlastnictví. Jejich existence motivuje vývojáře k inovativním aktivitám, jelikož jim garantuje, že investice do výzkumu a vývoje se jim vrátí. Právo však nechrání pouze jednotlivé investory, kteří jsou držiteli práv duševního vlastnictví, ale musí se dívat na společnost jako celek, musí zajistit funkčnost trhů a v dlouhodobém horizontu podmínky pro výzkum, vývoj a výrobu dalších subjektů na trhu. Proti potenciálně škodlivému zneužívání práv duševního vlastnictví proto vystupuje právo soutěžní, které se snaží zajistit, aby příliš silná ochrana duševního vlastnictví neměla negativní vliv na fungování trhů, spotřebitelský blahobyt a další inovační snahy ostatních subjektů. V Evropské unii můžeme příklad střetu mezi ochranou duševního vlastnictví a ochranou hospodářské soutěže vidět v oblasti sporů o patenty na standardizovanou technologii (dále také jen " PST ") 1. Z praktického pohledu v těchto sporech jde o významné obchodní zájmy a vysoké finanční částky. Řešení těchto sporů se navíc blízce dotýká i otázky základních práv, konkrétně práva na soudní ochranu a spravedlivý proces.

Základní ekonomické svobody tvoří pilíř evropské integrace a evropské právo jim poskytuje velmi širokou ochranu. Současná EU však zároveň zdůrazňuje respektování humanity a základních lidských práv. Problém nastává, pokud se ekonomické svobody dostanou do konfliktu s lidskými právy. Evropský soudní dvůr tento konflikt řeší různými způsoby. Na základě rozboru techniky argumentace v určitých typech sporů lze dojít k závěru, že přístup Evropského soudního dvora (ESD) je nekonzistentní. Zároveň ale není možné ESD nutit, aby používal pouze jeden standardizovaný způsob řešení konfliktu. Podle toho, jaké je výchozí nastavení vztahu mezi soupeřícími hodnotami, je třeba vybrat adekvátní test, který bude toto nastavení reflektovat.
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Fundamental economic freedoms are the pillars of European integration and are under EU law's protection. However, the European Union currently focuses also on the concepts of respect to humanity and fundamental human rights. A problem may arise when economic freedoms conflict with human rights. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) resolves such conflicts by diverging methods. An analysis of the methods of reasoning shows that the approach of the ECJ is inconsistent. At the same time, it is not possible to insist on the ECJ to use only one standardised method for resolving conflicts. According to the initial setting of the relation between the conflicting values, it is necessary to choose an adequate test which will reflect that initial setting.

MONTI, Giorgio (ed.). EU law and interest on damages for infringements of competition law : a comparative report. EUI LAW; 2016/11.

This long working paper (EUI interest study) explores the differences between national legal systems and assesses whether they are EU law compliant when it comes to the calculation of interest on damages resulting from antitrust infringements. The first chapter of the working paper addresses three issues: the principles that emerge from the case law of the CJEU when assessing the compliance of national rules in damages actions; the principles that emerge from EU legislation and the case law of the CJEU when considering the notion of interest payments; an assessment, based on the EU law system, of thirteen member state approaches to interest. The subsequent chapters are national reports which form the basis for the assessment to be found in chapter 1. We note that many legal systems require some reconsideration of the national approach to interest to ensure that claimants are afforded full compensation. This study comes at a time when the 28 EU member States are in the process of implementing Directive 2014/104/EU, without however being very specific on the calculation of interest. In presenting the specific features of thirteen national regimes, this working document provides guidance to all interested parties on the scope of interest as fundamental part of the EU right to full compensation. It might prove especially useful to judges in cases that call for the application of foreign laws to damages claims. This EUI interest study has been initiated and supported by CDC Cartel Damage Claims Consulting SCRL, Brussels with the aim to extend the study to the legal systems of all other EU Member States. It seeks to raise awareness of the substantial differences and potentially significant consequences thereof for the right to full compensation of damages following infringements of competition law.

Hubková, Pavlína. Formování silného postavení Evropského soudního dvora – vnitřní a vnější faktory. European Offroads of Social Science. 2013. č. 2, ISSN 2336-2219.

Summary:
The European Court of Justice was established as an institution with the aim to safeguard the rule of law in the EU and to guarantee the process of integration. However, from the initial role of a guardian, the ECJ got into a more powerful position; it is capable to complete ideas drawn on the political level, or even to cross politically set borders. The question is how the ECJ got such a strong position in the framework of the EU institutions. This article is based on an assumption that the position of the ECJ has been formed by a combination of several factors which may be marginal individually but together they create and reinforce the unique position of this judicial institution. The article offers an enumeration and an analysis of possible factors which have played an important role. The examined factors are divided into internal factors which are connected to the formal role of the ECJ, its competences and its style of the work, and next to them, external factors stemming from the surroundings of the ECJ and the behaviour of actors which the ECJ is in contact with.

HUBKOVÁ, Pavlína. Interpretace mnohojazyčného práva EU. European Offroads of Social Science. 2014. č. 2, s. 3--12. ISSN 2336-2219.

There are 24 official and working languages in the current EU in which all legislative documents must be published. All languages are equal. Regarding different semantic structures of each language, legal-cultural differences or even mistakes in translation, it may occur that the sense of some provisions, rules or terms differs among language versions of the same text. Within this context, it is necessary to know how to interpret EU law which has 24 language versions and is based on the assumption that all versions are identical and must be interpreted and applied in the same way. This article shows the rules created by the European Court of Justice within its decision-making practice, which should serve to overcome problems stemming from the multilingualism of EU law in order to find the very sense of  the provision at hand and, at the same time, to keep the formal equality of all European languages.

Competition law is intrinsically connected with economics and economic theory. This thesis tries to find out how economics is reflected in case law of the Court of Justice of the EU in competition cases. It discusses the role of economics in European competition law and in legal reasoning, and it examines limits and constraints of this role. Besides this, the thesis takes into consideration the role of the CJEU and some aspects of its work which may have influence on the perception of economics. The core of the thesis lies in the assessment of the practice of the CJEU. It focuses on the field of abuse of dominance and examines how the CJEU works with economic arguments, how its approach differs from economic theory and in which way the approach has developed over time.

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/34406

Competition law is a field of law which is firmly connected to economics and economic thinking. Economics, as a scientific discipline which examines human behavior in the environment of scarce resources, shows to us negative effects of monopoly-like situations on one hand and advantages of unrestrained competition on the other hand. As such, economics explains to us better why we need competition policy and competition rules. If we accept a premise that economics serves as a source of knowledge for creating competition rules, then we also have to admit that interpreting and applying such rules inevitably involves a kind of economic thinking.
Since courts are the ultimate interpreters of competition law, it is vital to know whether and how judges “think economically”. It is hard to assess or measure the sole “thinking”.  Judges communicate their economic knowledge through legal reasoning.  Therefore we have to look into the product of their reasoning – into a judgment which is a reflection of legal and even economic thinking. In other words, if we want to assess or criticize the way how courts work with economics, we have to examine their case law and to assess all economic arguments (individually and in their entirety).
The attempt to assess the quality of economic reasoning of courts raises several questions: How does economics in judgments look like? Which arguments may be labeled as economic arguments? In which forms and shapes does economics appear in competition judgments? How are the economic arguments constructed? What are they based on? Where did they come from? What about their adequacy and legitimacy? Etc.
The paper looks for answers to these questions. It focuses on competition case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ultimate interpreter of European competition law) and attempts to conceptualize the ways how economics penetrates its legal reasoning.

The chapter is based on the premise that economics may present epistemic difficulties for judges. It offers to conceptualize situations where judges may or have to apply economic thinking. The chapter focuses on four model categories where judges intentionally or unintentionally use economic considerations and economic arguments, or where there is a place for an economic consideration to be employed: issue of procedural economy and efficient management in everyday decision-making, abstract economic reasoning in explicitly economic fields of law, economic analysis of facts, and awareness of different economic theories that may have an impact on the judicial decision-making.