Adriano N . de Brito

I discuss here the concept of sustainable development through the analyses of three positions: the naive optimism, which bet on the development without due attention to its costs; the teleological moralism, oriented to humanism, which advocates a different type of development, but loses contact with the concrete mechanisms of reproduction of life; and the ecological fundamentalism, which sacralize nature. Considering these positions, I outline a naturalistic approach, which should adjust the unbalanced expectations of those three positions to a more sensible view. The approach has an evolutionary bias concerning the analysis of man and history.

In this paper I want to analyse the main elements of socialism and liberalism under the perspective of morality. I intend to show that besides the economic analysis and the historic scientificism the moral program of these schools of thought is a privileged key to understand the bifurcation with which the social movements have been faced along the political confrontation, which took place in the last century and a half. In order to develop this idea, I choose the theme of ethics in politics as a guiding line in the investigation. To the analysis of the grounds of morality in each of these theoretical positions I gave to the notion of value a central role in the inquiry and I resort to some main figures of modern philosophy, particularly to Kant an the empirical moral philosophy o Hume. In the last part of the paper, value is taken as the ground for a discussion of the relationship between ethics and politics within the scope of the debate confronting socialism and liberalism. Key wo...

In contemporary philosophy of language one can distinguish two main approaches on the reference of singular terms to objects: the descriptive theory (of Fregean orientation) and the causal theory (of Millean orientation). Disregarding the way both theories and their variants explain the use of proper nouns in a linguistic community, the reference of singular terms to objects is explained by them respectively either by the mediation of descriptions or by the negation of any mediation to make the reference. This paper briefly describes these two theoretical approaches and explores their commitments with a theory of object. It discusses the role played by the interpretation of the relation of identity in the choice of a theory of object and particularly in the adoption of an essentialist one. At the end it outlines an application of the developed argument to terms for natural species. Key words: proper nouns, reference, identity, essence, necessity.Na filosofia da linguagem contemporân...

Offering a engaging and accessible portrait of the current state of the field, A Companion to Naturaslim shows students how to think about the relation between Philosophy and Science, and why is both essencial and fascinating to do so. All the authors in this collection reconsider the core questions in Philosophical Naturalism in light of the challenges raised in Contemporary Philosophy. They explore how philosophical questions are connected to vigorous current debates - including complex questions about metaphysics, semantics, religion, intentionality, pragmatism, reductionism, ontology, metaethics, mind, science, belief and delusion, among others – showing how these issues, and philosopher’s attempts to answer them, matter in the Philosophy. In this sense, this collection is also compelling and illuminating reading for philosophers, philosophy students, and anyone interested in Naturalism and their place in current discussions.

The general thesis 1 want to defend in this paper is the following: the knowledge by acquaintance with an indeterminate object is not sufficient to guarantee the naming of this object because the acquaintance with it is not sufficient to guarantee neither its identification nor its future reidentification. If I am right in defending this thesis, then it should be accepted that the reference made by demonstratives depends on primitive elements with predicative function. Now, if this point about demonstratives (which Russell called logical proper names) could be established with some plausibility, important supports for the rigid designation's thesis about proper names would be lost. In this case, a moderate descriptivistic theory of proper names could be vindicated. I am interested on this last consequence of my argumentation but I will not develop it here. What I intend to do is to reconstruct the Russell's theory of names, specially his theory of the logical proper mimes, t...

Este artigo tem como tema central o problema do fundamento das distincoes morais, conforme proposto por David Hume na obra Investigacoes sobre os principios da moral e, mais especificamente, o problema da motivacao moral, tomando como foco o papel que as emocoes e a empatia tem no comportamento em sociedade de animais de vida social complexa. No que tange a essa questao, a importância dada aos afetos pela tese humeana sera relacionada com a teoria evolucionista. A fim de ilustrar esse ponto, vamos utilizar o comportamento social de lobos ( Canis lupus ) como estudo de caso. O texto consiste, portanto, em uma apresentacao comparativa, a partir de uma perspectiva humeana e evolucionista, de como o aparato afetivo natural de mamiferos sociais, neste caso homens e lobos, opera de modo a inclinar os membros dessas especies a aprovar ou censurar comportamentos socialmente relevantes.

In this paper, it is my intention to show that the origin of the idea of the absolute value of a good will can also be linked to an alternative interpretation of the fact of reason. The Faktum, which Kant posits as the basis for the groundwork of the necessary validity of the moral law, has been given conflicting interpretations in terms of whether the capacity required to recognize his evidence, as a proof of that validity, concerns the understanding or sensitivity. On the one hand, the emphasis placed on understanding obscures the practical validity of the law, in terms of its imposition as a moral obligation. On the other hand, the emphasis on sensitivity nullifies the law’s legitimacy in terms of common sense, and neglects its deductive origin. The alternative view, which I intend to outline, does not go to either of these extremes, but follows the intuition of Allison (1990). His interpretation of the fact of reason is based on the assumption that the exhibition of morality is in itself sufficient grounds for its validity (cf. Allison, 1990, p.238). This interpretation corresponds to Kant’s position that a deduction of the moral law is not only unnecessary, but impossible. Notwithstanding the reservations which have been expressed concerning Allison’s point of view, what I wish to defend here differs from his concept, in that the notions of will and value are placed at the centre of the description of moral experience, with freedom as a secondary consideration. Indeed, whilst Allison is interested in presenting and justifying Kant’s doctrine of freedom, my intention is to make sense of the fact of reason independently of its linkage to the question of the deduction of freedom in Kant’s work. My justification for this decoupling is integrated with the strategy for the description of morality, in the sense that I place less emphasis on freedom than on will and value in my explanation of the phenomenon of the fact of reason.

In contemporary philosophy of language one can distinguish two main approaches on the reference of singular terms to objects: the descriptive theory (of Fregean orientation) and the causal theory (of Millean orientation). Disregarding the way both theories and their variants explain the use of proper nouns in a linguistic community, the reference of singular terms to objects is explained by them respectively either by the mediation of descriptions or by the negation of any mediation to make the reference. This paper briefly describes these two theoretical approaches and explores their commitments with a theory of object. It discusses the role played by the interpretation of the relation of identity in the choice of a theory of object and particularly in the adoption of an essentialist one. At the end it outlines an application of the developed argument to terms for natural species. Key words: proper nouns, reference, identity, essence, necessity.

In this paper I want to analyse the main elements of socialism and liberalism under the perspective of morality. I intend to show that besides the economic analysis and the historic scientificism the moral program of these schools of thought is a privileged key to understand the bifurcation with which the social movements have been faced along the political confrontation, which took place in the last century and a half. In order to develop this idea, I choose the theme of ethics in politics as a guiding line in the investigation. To the analysis of the grounds of morality in each of these theoretical positions I gave to the notion of value a central role in the inquiry and I resort to some main figures of modern philosophy, particularly to Kant an the empirical moral philosophy o Hume. In the last part of the paper, value is taken as the ground for a discussion of the relationship between ethics and politics within the scope of the debate confronting socialism and liberalism. Key wo...

SUMMARY: In this paper I discuss Tugendhat's moral philosophy by focusing on his conception of moral justification and the role sentiments play in it. In order to understand, and to criticize, the relationship between reasons and sentiments in Tugendhat's moral philosophy, the correlation between judgment and affection is scrutinized. Furthermore, I argue that as far as the innermost structure of morality is concerned individuals have far less autonomy to accept or reject any moral system than Tugendhat is prepared to admit.

In this paper, I intend to outline a moral concept which could be the bases for an immanent theory of values which is sustained by the economy of feelings involved in the moral confrontation characteristic of the social life of animals possessing a complex nervous system, as is particularly the case with certain species of mammals, including homo sapiens. What gives a moral dimension to these feelings is the way in which they interfere with and determine the mutual behaviour of individuals within a group, and it is through this process that values are devised, sustained and transmitted. The route I will take is as follows: I will begin by discussing the problem of normativity, on the basis of an updating of the naturalist fallacy by way of the genetic fallacy, and from the point of view of a theory of value. This means that I will not approach the issue directly via the problem of duty, but by showing that it is connected to, and better understood within, a perspective of value. The...

To walk between extremes is a subtle art, whose grace and delicateness can be easily misunderstood by those who love extremes. Those who love art, however, might to think they love it because of the extremes in it, and not because of the subtle harmony and balance the artist found among them. For us, one of the most appealing notes of Susan Haack’s philosophy has always been its search for equilibrium. A way to seal between Scylla and Charybdis in every theme she laid her keen mind over. An ability to be a moderate even among moderates. In this tribute we would like to address two of those themes which are tightly interwoven and represents well the beautiful effort to balance and put down to earth, through a pragmatic instinct, excesses metaphysicians are prone to commit. The two themes are naturalism and realism. As for naturalism, there seems to be something odd about being a philosopher and a naturalist, since if science can give an account of every aspect of the world, then what...

O texto reconstroi as bases teleologico-morais para a constituicao da moderna ciencia da historia. A chave dessa reconstrucao e o escrutinio da ideia kantiana de plano da natureza, ideia que e investigada nas obras de Adam Smith, Hegel e Marx. Para criticar essa ideia, argui-se o pensamento de Fukuyama e defende-se que a ligacao entre democracia e economia liberal e melhor explicada pela natural inclinacao humana para a simetria do que pela nocao de reconhecimento. O argumento e que o projeto de Fukuyama nao encontra amparo na selecao da especie, ao passo que o desejo por simetria sim. A essa abordagem subjazem as teses de que feita a critica a teleologia moral, a historia tem de ser compativel com a evolucao, e de que a naturalizacao da historia implica numa naturalizacao da moral.

"Resumo: O texto reconstrói as bases teleológico-morais para a consti- tuição da moderna ciência da história. A chave dessa reconstrução é o escrutínio da idéia kantiana de plano da natureza, idéia que é investi- gada nas obras de Adam Smith, Hegel e Marx. Para criticar essa idéia, argui-se o pensamento de Fukuyama e defende-se que a ligação entre democracia e economia liberal é melhor explicada pela natural inclina- ção humana para a simetria do que pela noção de reconhecimento. O argumento é que o projeto de Fukuyama não encontra amparo na sele- ção da espécie, ao passo que o desejo por simetria sim. A essa aborda- gem subjazem as teses de que feita a crítica à teleologia moral, a história tem de ser compatível com a evolução, e de que a naturalização da his- tória implica numa naturalização da moral. Palavras-chave: teleologia – moral naturalizada – plano da natureza – teoria da história – evolucionismo."

In this paper, I intend to outline a moral concept which could be the bases for an immanent theory of values which is sustained by the economy of feelings involved in the moral confrontation characteristic of the social life of animals possessing a complex nervous system, as is particularly the case with certain species of mammals, including homo sapiens. What gives a moral dimension to these feelings is the way in which they interfere with and determine the mutual behaviour of individuals within a group, and it is through this process that values are devised, sustained and transmitted. The route I will take is as follows: I will begin by discussing the problem of normativity, on the basis of an updating of the naturalist fallacy by way of the genetic fallacy, and from the point of view of a theory of value. This means that I will not approach the issue directly via the problem of duty, but by showing that it is connected to, and better understood within, a perspective of value. The choice in a moral theory of the measure of what is good in it has fundamental implications for the concept of duty, which is at the heart of of any discussion concerning normativity. This connection shall be clarified. I will then dispute the thesis that the individual (in the civil and legal sense attributed to the term by the Enlightenment) is an adequate starting-point for practical philosophy, and criticise the limits which tradition has placed on what can be considered moral whilst, by the same token, criticising classical contractualist concepts of morality which has been the bases for the majority of moral approaches in contemporary philosophy including for naturalistic ones.
Keywords: moral naturalism, concept of morality, theory of value, contractualism, moral preferences, moral feelings.

ABSTRACT: What I intend to defend on this text is that an empiricist position concern moral is compatible, in some extension, with a pretension that moral judgements are intersubjectively valid. As I see, this pretension must be based on the naturalisation of the moral’s grounds. To defend this point I analyse Hume’s philosophy of moral as he presents it at his An enquiry concerning the principles of morals. On what concerns Hume’s masterpiece my interest is to make explicit the empirical character of both: his method of investigations, and the moral’s principles he found.

Resumo: O texto reconstrói as bases teleológico-morais para a consti- tuição da moderna ciência da história. A chave dessa reconstrução é o escrutínio da idéia kantiana de plano da natureza, idéia que é investi- gada nas obras de Adam Smith, Hegel e Marx. Para criticar essa idéia, argui-se o pensamento de Fukuyama e defende-se que a ligação entre democracia e economia liberal é melhor explicada pela natural inclina- ção humana para a simetria do que pela noção de reconhecimento. O argumento é que o projeto de Fukuyama não encontra amparo na sele- ção da espécie, ao passo que o desejo por simetria sim. A essa aborda- gem subjazem as teses de que feita a crítica à teleologia moral, a história tem de ser compatível com a evolução, e de que a naturalização da his- tória implica numa naturalização da moral.
Palavras-chave: teleologia – moral naturalizada – plano da natureza – teoria da história – evolucionismo.

On the validity of moral judgments: an empiricist approach

Abstract

To naturalize moral principles means to derive from what characterizes us as species the causes of our action as moral subjects. This theoretical procedure, if radical enough, has some embarrassing consequences: the weakening of the concept of liberty — in favour of moral determinism — and, for the same reasons, the weakening of the objective validity our moral judgments, be they justifications or evaluations. In fact, if our moral actions are determined under natural causes, either we are not free, and moral is a superfluous system of judgments, since they can not determine our actions, or liberty ¬— and with it all moral judgments —¬ belongs to other realm than the natural one, what is precisely what the thesis of naturalization of moral denies. I pretend to present three points: first, a more detailed exposition of the naturalistic position concerning moral; second, some Humean arguments in favour of that position; and third, an explanation of how, in context of the naturalization of moral, it is possible to understand freedom and the validity o moral judgments. The aim of this last topic is double: To show the meaning and the relevance of moral systems for human beings, assuming that system has natural principles, and to offer counter-arguments to the Kantian tradition, which defends a somehow metaphysical view of liberty.

Key words: Hume, Kant, naturalization of moral, empiricism, compatibilism, moral judgments.

In this paper, it is my intention to show that the origin of the idea of the absolute value of a good will can also be linked to an alternative interpretation of the fact of reason. The Faktum, which Kant posits as the basis for the groundwork of the necessary validity of the moral law, has been given conflicting interpretations in terms of whether the capacity required to recognize his evidence, as a proof of that validity, concerns the understanding or sensitivity.  On the one hand, the emphasis placed on understanding obscures the practical validity of the law, in terms of its imposition as a moral obligation.  On the other hand, the emphasis on sensitivity nullifies the law’s legitimacy in terms of common sense, and neglects its deductive origin.  The alternative view, which I intend to outline, does not go to either of these extremes, but follows the intuition of Allison (1990). His interpretation of the fact of reason is based on the assumption that the exhibition of morality is in itself sufficient grounds for its validity (cf. Allison, 1990, p.238).  This interpretation corresponds to Kant’s position that a deduction of the moral law is not only unnecessary, but impossible.  Notwithstanding the reservations which have been expressed concerning Allison’s point of view, what I wish to defend here differs from his concept, in that the notions of will and value are placed at the centre of the description of moral experience, with freedom as a secondary consideration.  Indeed, whilst Allison is interested in presenting and justifying Kant’s doctrine of freedom, my intention is to make sense of the fact of reason independently of its linkage to the question of the deduction of freedom in Kant’s work.  My justification for this decoupling is integrated with the strategy for the description of morality, in the sense that I place less emphasis on freedom than on will and value in my explanation of the phenomenon of the fact of reason.

The text is a defense, inspired by Hume, of the naturalization of moral values, specifically of the universality and the equality. I take the position of Tugendhat regarding the relation between affections and moral judgments as starting point to establish the central problem of naturalization in morality, which is, the naturalization of values. I show, then, that the assumption of an asymmetry between affection and reason, in favor of the latter, is the characteristic note of the Kantian moral tradition, whose core is an antinaturalistic theory of value. I argue, after that, in favor of Hume’s moral naturalism, but I point out its limitations in clarifying moral distinctions regarding artificial virtues. Finally, I conclude presenting a naturalized analysis of the universalism and the egalitarianism based in the asymmetry between guilt and indignation.
Keywords: naturalization of moral values, universalism, egalitarianism, moral sentiments, guilt, indignation.

ABSTRACT: In this paper I want to analyse the main elements of socialism and liberalism under the perspective of morality. I intend to show that besides the economic analysis and the historic scientificism the moral program of these schools of thought is a privileged key to understand the bifurcation with which the social movements have been faced along the political confrontation, which took place in the last century and a half. In order to develop this idea, I choose the theme of ethics in politics as a guiding line in the investigation. To the analysis of the grounds of morality in each of these theoretical positions I gave to the notion of value a central role in the inquiry and I resort to some main figures of modern philosophy, particularly to Kant an the empirical moral philosophy o Hume. In the last part of the paper, value is taken as the ground for a discussion of the relationship between ethics and politics within the scope of the debate confronting socialism and liberalism.
Key words: socialism, liberalism, ethics, politics and value.

The general thesis I  want to defend in this paper is the following: the knowledge by acquaintance with an indeterminate object is not sufficient to guarantee the naming of this object because the acquaintance with it is not sufficient to guarantee neither its identification nor its future reidenti- fication. If I am right in defending this thesis, then it should be accepted that the reference made by demonstrcttives depends on primitive elements with predicative function. Now, if this point about demonstratives (which Russell called logical proper names) could be established with some plau- sibility, important supports for the rigid designation's thesis about proper names would be lost. In this case, a moderate descriptivistic theory of proper names could be vindicated. 1 arn interested on this last conse- quence of my argumentatian but I will not develop it here. What I intend to do is to reconstruct the Russell's theory of rumes, specially his theory of the logical proper mimes, to discuss the distinction between naming and describing and than to argue against the referential privilege of demonstra- tives.

This article aims to discuss some arguments against the acceptance of the naturalistic fallacy. It intends to demonstrate that some aspects, which seem to be correct in the argumentation of those who refuse that fallacy, are, despite their pertinence in some points, fundamentally imprecise. In order to reach this outcome, the fallacy is reformulated in terms of the refusal of the implication between "being" and "the will". Therefore, it intends to clarify the relations - and their absence - between truth and morality as well as enable defense of a moral naturalism disengaged from the existence of moral facts. This text is divided into five parts. In the first one, I show the naturalistic fallacy according to Moore; in the second part, a distinction between Moore's and Hume's formulations of the naturalistic fallacy is elaborated; in the third part, I do not just present some objections to the interdiction of the passage from "is" to "ought", but also formulate some responses to them; in the fourth part, the interdiction problem between "is" and "ought" is retrieved and an alternative solution via the will is suggested for it; finally, in the fifth part, some conclusions are drawn about moral naturalism and moral realism.

Keywords: Naturalistic fallacy, Moral naturalism, Moral realism, "Is-ought" problem

If evolutionism and its epistemic bases are to be taken seriously in practical philosophy, then morality must be explained in terms of natural bases. A central question of a naturalized eth-ics is whether moral values can be grounded in the natural traits and behaviors of the human species. In this paper I intend to answer this question positively. My point is that moral values are in general grounded in the natural traits of human beings, which can be traced to the way individuals behave in groups. An exhaustive proof of that assertion demands, of course, more than I can offer in this paper. I can, nevertheless, offer a part of what I think is necessary for that proof and with it a better understanding of the way it may work. Thus I will be concerned here with revising, in favour of naturalism, the traditional concept of morality under which moral values are usualy viewed, and with just two of the paramount values of contemporary ethics, namely: universalism and egalitarianism, which I will use as examples of the way moral values can be explained in terms of human traits. My hypothesis is that they can be understood and their authority explained on the basis of how humans are naturally disposed to behave in groups. If I succeed in doing this, then the claim for a program for naturalizing val-ues will have been vindicated.

The key concept connecting moral values with human behavior in groups is that of “moral sentiments”, which are sentiments associated with moral evaluations. I will consider especial-ly indignation, guilt and shame in order to explain those two values. I will also treat morality as a system of reciprocal demands within which individuals are already contained, and in which features such as universality and equality are a constituent part of the system, since they are inherent to the way individuals react to moral affections. Both the connection be-tween judgment and sentiment and the assumed concept of morality must be explained and revised against the traditional stance. I will dedicate the first three sections of this paper to these concepts. The last section will deal with the challenge of expounding the natural bases for universalism and egalitarianism.

SUMMARY: In this paper I discuss Tugendhat’s moral philosophy by focusing on his conception of moral justification and the role sentiments play in it. In order to understand, and to criticize, the relationship between reasons and sentiments in Tugendhat’s moral philosophy, the correlation between judgment and affection is scrutinized. Furthermore, I argue that as far as the innermost structure of morality is concerned individuals have far less autonomy to accept or reject any moral system than Tugendhat is prepared to admit.
KEY WORDS: autonomy, structure of morality, moral justification, moral sentiments