-
Diego Marconi taught the Philosophy of Language at the University of Torino (Italy) until 2017. He also taught course... moreDiego Marconi taught the Philosophy of Language at the University of Torino (Italy) until 2017. He also taught courses at several European universities. Most of his work is on Wittgenstein, Hegel's dialectic, and the semantics of natural Language (Lexical Competence, MIT Press 1997). edit
-
Nicholas Rescher edit
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Da qualche secolo siamo abituati ad associare la mente al cervello, la massa gelatinosa contenuta nella scatola cranica. Alcuni dicono che la mente è un insieme di funzionalità che, in teoria, potrebbero essere realizzate anche da altri... more
Da qualche secolo siamo abituati ad associare la mente al cervello, la massa gelatinosa contenuta nella scatola cranica. Alcuni dicono che la mente è un insieme di funzionalità che, in teoria, potrebbero essere realizzate anche da altri supporti materiali, ma che di fatto, nella specie umana, sono realizzate dal cervello (o tutt'al più dal sistema nervoso centrale); altri dicono che la mente,
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
I suggest that one important reason why "fake news" are not resisted is the crisis of deference to experts, which, in turn, is justified in the name of "epistemic democracy", the belief that all... more
I suggest that one important reason why "fake news" are not resisted is the crisis of deference to experts, which, in turn, is justified in the name of "epistemic democracy", the belief that all opinions have the same epistemic value. I quote philosophical pronouncements that tend to support epistemic democracy.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
An analysis of Putnam's article of 1975 and related discussions.
Research Interests:
... La storia della sua «soggettività vissuta» (Di Francesco 2004) non cambia, la mente estesa appartiene al medesimo soggetto d'esperienza; la ... Nemmeno gli esem-pi di Oliverio (2005) calzano perché la mente estesa non è... more
... La storia della sua «soggettività vissuta» (Di Francesco 2004) non cambia, la mente estesa appartiene al medesimo soggetto d'esperienza; la ... Nemmeno gli esem-pi di Oliverio (2005) calzano perché la mente estesa non è avulsa dal cervello studiato dalla psicobiologia. ...
Research Interests:
The Dog Schema is the translation of the Italian text Lo schema del cane, originally published in Rivista di Estetica in 1998. The text presents the debate among the philosophers Umberto Eco, Maurizio Ferraris, and Diego Marconi... more
The Dog Schema is the translation of the Italian text Lo schema del cane, originally published in Rivista di Estetica in 1998. The text presents the debate among the philosophers Umberto Eco, Maurizio Ferraris, and Diego Marconi concerning the dog schema. The debate develops through a reflection on Kantian schematism and conceptual applications, showing three different points of view on the subject.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
In many respects, this essay is a touchstone for the other papers in the book. While presenting and specifying the characteristics, potential and limitations of Montague grammar, it analyses a number of significant differences between a... more
In many respects, this essay is a touchstone for the other papers in the book. While presenting and specifying the characteristics, potential and limitations of Montague grammar, it analyses a number of significant differences between a formal and a cognitive semantics. It therefore deals which many of the issues that have been given alternative treatment in cognitive semantics (structure, syntax and semantics, the compositionality of meaning, competence, and so on). Marconi’s main thesis, in fact, is that Montague semantics is not a theory of meaning for natural language (see also Langacker’s contribution), but a particular, or even complete, theory of an idealization of inferential competence. The essay clarifies in particular the different relationships between semantics and syntax in formal and cognitive semantics, explaining how a Montague grammar is a theory of the semantic effects of composition and how, consequently, it affects meaning.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
An argument against the suggestion (initially put forth by D.Chalmers and A.Clark) that the mind extends beyond the brain and even beyond the body.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
I argue for an intuitive distinction between comprehension and interpretation, and against the claim that every comprehension is an interpretation.
Research Interests:
Remnants of Verificationism - Some Wittgensteinian scholars have claimed that, after his transitional stage (1929-1932), Wittgenstein renounced all forms of verificationism. Others hold that remnants of verificationism can be found even... more
Remnants of Verificationism - Some Wittgensteinian scholars have claimed that, after his transitional stage (1929-1932), Wittgenstein renounced all forms of verificationism. Others hold that remnants of verificationism can be found even in the later Wittgenstein’s reflection, although the verificationist theory of meaning as such is no longer maintained. In support of the latter view I try to show that the discussion of the relation between thought and language in the Investigations (§§ 316-362) is partly based on verificationist assumptions.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The presentation of the para doxes... which was made in the uni versal language, has led many persons to assert that the universal language is inconsistent. So it is, if carelessly used, and carelessness would be expected to cause trouble... more
The presentation of the para doxes... which was made in the uni versal language, has led many persons to assert that the universal language is inconsistent. So it is, if carelessly used, and carelessness would be expected to cause trouble in any kind of activity. H. Curry, 1963
Research Interests:
There are two prevalent accounts of semantic normativity: the prescriptive account, which can be found in some of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and the regularity account, which may have been Sellars’s view and is nowadays defended by some... more
There are two prevalent accounts of semantic normativity: the prescriptive account, which can be found in some of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and the regularity account, which may have been Sellars’s view and is nowadays defended by some antinormativists. On the former account, meanings are norms that govern the use of words; on the latter, they are regularities of use which, in themselves, do not engender any prescriptions. I argue that only the prescriptive view can account for certain platitudes about meaning, which motivate the very idea of semantic normativity. After some preliminary clarifications about the form that alleged semantic norms should take in order to be prima facie plausible, I argue—against some antinormativists—that whatever normativity is involved in the meaning of words cannot be brought back to a general norm of truth as distinct from specifically semantic norms, for semantic norms already involve a norm of truth (or truthfulness, depending on how they are phrased). Next, I examine what I take to be the strongest objection to semantic normativity, namely the identification of meaning with use: as use is just a bunch of facts, it cannot be attributed any normative import. Nowadays, this view has been defended by Paul Horwich. After criticizing Horwich’s claim that meaning, though not normative in itself, has unmediated normative implications, I propose a different view of the relation between use and meaning, on which meaning is not quite identical with use but (in most cases) is grounded on use. I propose as a model the idea of a hyperconformist social system: a system in which customs, and only customs, generate norms. I suggest that language is such a system, and describe two reasons why it is plausible for language to work like that. Finally, I analyze statements of meaning (“w means such-and-such”) on the model of Ruth Millikan “pushmi-pullyu” representations, i.e. as having both descriptive and normative import. I point out that, however, there are exceptions to meaning’s being grounded on use, as there are cases in which semantic norms are dictated by authorities of several kinds. Lastly, I briefly discuss the suggestion that meaning supervenes on use, showing that, aside from its inherent difficulties, it does not explain why meaning would supervene on use.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Philosophy and Dialectica
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Psychology and Philosophy
Research Interests:
First part of a Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1979. Why any account of Hegel's dialectic must explain the generation of contradictions (I), Survey of the literature (II), An analysis of Hegel's Language in the Science of logic... more
First part of a Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1979. Why any account of Hegel's dialectic must explain the generation of contradictions (I), Survey of the literature (II), An analysis of Hegel's Language in the Science of logic (III).
Research Interests:
Chapters IV-VI of a Ph.D. Thesis on Hegel, University of Pittsburgh, 1979. Generation of dialectical contradictions (IV), the Aufheben (V), Assumptions implicit in the proposed reconstruction (VI).
Research Interests:
To be published in Grazer Philosophische Studien.