Mikhail Molchanov

International political economy and global politics at large are increasingly driven by struggles over control of energy resources. The energy reserves of the Central Asia-Caspian region are fast becoming a focal point for these struggles. The exploration and development of oil and gas deposits can be realized in a variety of ways, some of which promote security and sustainability, while others open the gates for potential intrastate and interstate conflicts. Productivity growth and sustainable development can only be achieved on the basis of international cooperation that requires everyone to follow certain mutually agreeable "rules of the game." These rules, and the institutions that support them, should ideally form the backbone of an international governance structure that will promote not only peace and development, but also technological progress and social stability. This study demonstrates a connection between international politicaleconomic cooperation, on the one hand, and technological growth and social advancement of the region, on the other hand. It offers an analysis of the potential consequences of a cooperative regime for technological progress in the energy sector of the Central Asia-Caspian region. It shows that establishment of a cooperative energy regime in the region will lead to a technological breakthrough, as manifested by
significant productivity growth, decreased unit cost of energy,
and technological advancements in the energy sector itself and
across the economy.

Ukraine's war against Donbass separatists is based on the discursive construction of an enemy and is much helped by demonization of the opponent. Ethnicization of the essentially political and economic differences between Ukraine’s regions makes compromise difficult to reach. The invocation by the Ukrainian politicians and diplomats of the identity markers of a savage, beastly outgroup, a “scum”, “subhumans,” “bastards,” when referring to the separatists, cannot but confirm the worst worries of those who might still be leaning to the idea of devolution and power sharing. The threats of legal punishment and status marginalization propel continued resistance.

Ukraine's development since proclamation of independence in 1991 has been driven by a strategy of geopolitical oscillations between two 'vectors': the Eu-ropean Union (EU) and Russia. The government that came to power as a result of the Maidan revolution of 2014 followed the western advice to treat the two 'vectors' as mutually incompatible. Petro Poroshenko's pro-European stance following the 2014 'Maidan revolution' has led to decisions that are driving Ukraine away from Russia. Ukraine's celebrated (and much criticized) multivectorism has finally given way to a one-sided orientation on the West. However, economic downturn and higher inflation, coupled with the European Union's refusal to entertain Ukraine's EU membership bid, have raised doubts about the usefulness of alienating Russia for the purpose of closer European Union integration. Until the violent ouster of President Yanukovych, Ukraine still had some space for tactical manoeuvring to benefit from the development of trade relations with Russia and the EU simultaneously. Now this possibility has been foreclosed for the foreseeable future. There has been no good reason for such a turn of events beyond geopolitical, cold war reasoning of the West that has historically viewed Russia as an enemy. One particular specimen of the cold war guard that has preserved this Russophobic attitude intact since the last days of World War II is Ukrainian diaspora in the West. The chapter examines the causes behind the collapse of Ukraine's multivectorism and the transformation of what could be mutually compatible projects of the European and Eurasian regional integration into a contestation for regional predominance, with Ukraine becoming a victim in a tug-of-war between Russia and the West. A split country The need to balance between regional and global and between the old and new centres of power in the world imposes special demands on foreign policies of newly independent states. Often, they attempt to go beyond the politics of alliances and toward its opposite — the politics of the impartial and even engagement of foreign partners. For more than twenty years, Ukraine attempted just that, seeking to build mutually beneficial relationships with all partners, east and west, north and south. It was assumed that such an even engagement should also cover the country's relationships with regional trade blocs, particularly those that sit right on its borders and take the largest shares of its foreign trade.

Eurasian regionalism is a politically steered process of economic and normative integration of several postcommunist states that span the Eurasian continent from Belarus to China. It represents a reaction to economic challenges and security dilemmas of the global age. A search for regional solutions to key national concerns parallels similar developments elsewhere. Since self-reliance is not a viable strategy for the global age, most late developers today require regional affiliations to no lesser extent than memberships in various global clubs. Modeling regional integration in Eurasia on the example of the European Union (EU) presents unique challenges that former Soviet states are not yet prepared to meet. An example of the ASEAN and the process of East Asian community building, which has been actively promoted by Japan, may serve as better signposts for the development of regionalism in Eurasia.

The paper seeks to establish political and cultural causes behind relative success or failure of several successive regional integration organizations (RIOs) in Eurasia, and finds that East Asian integration processes, not the EU, should serve as an appropriate comparator for the post-Soviet states. While all of them were motivated by an idea to create a regional community that would either consciously emulate the European Union or provide an alternative model of regional integration, mechanic adaptation of the external patterns of regional integration to the post-Soviet, post-hegemonic contexts proved impossible. The case studies presented in the paper are generated with the explicit purpose to shed new light on the factors promoting or, alternatively, impeding translation of the existing models of regional integration into the specific contexts of the postcommunist transitions. The paper’s methodology is informed by the new regionalism approach (NRA), which sees regional integration as a contemporary strategy of development that economically vulnerable states deploy to ward off predatory tendencies of neoliberal globalization.

This is an analysis of an ideological shift of Gennady Zyuganov's CPRF, which moved the party sideways from the Soviet Communist Party's tradition of proletarian internationalism and in the direction of Russian ethno-cultural nationalism and more or less open embrace of authoritarianism as the proper type of regime for Russia and the Russians.

At the APEC summit in 2012 Russia announced a “new track” in economic diplomacy to accelerate its integration with Asia Pacific. Russia’s pivoting toward Asia proceeds in parallel to the creation of the Eurasian Union it wants to lead. Russia’s support of new regionalism in Eurasia and Asia Pacific is as much about identity as it is about political economy. For Russia, the Eurasian project is a way to return to the ranks of the world’s leading powers. Critics perceive these efforts as neo-hegemonist in nature. I disagree with such assessment.

Russia’s cooperation with ASEAN is called forth to support its foreign policy priorities, which dictate more active engagement with Asia Pacific. Partnership with ASEAN is necessary for economic, political, and strategic reasons. However, the ingrained culture of geopolitical posturing and a thin basis for economic cooperation stalls further development of the ASEAN-Russia ties. The paper ends with the discussion of identity-related factors that hamper cooperation. I argue that most of these factors stem from the trauma of postimperial adjustment, which breeds Russia’s preoccupation with sovereignty, securitization of foreign policy and the perception of regionalism as a power projection instrument.
Keywords: Eurasian regional integration; Russia; foreign policy; ASEAN

The issue of energy security is being reviewed from a standpoint of geopolitics. I argue that geopolitics is inescapably related to the question of energy security for a simple reason: the contradiction between the universal character of energy demand and the nation-state’s exclusive right of management of natural resources located within its realm. I start with a discussion of the earlier historical antecedents of geopolitics of natural resources and the imperialist struggle for oil at the beginning of the twentieth century. The article follows with an overview of the oil crises of the seventies, which ended the era of the oligopolistic domination of the market by a few western companies, and instituted the second oil regime, much more dependent on stability of the producing countries. I then discuss the impact of globalization and the return of geopolitics that followed mass disillusionment with the neoliberal project of the nineties. The last section represents a case study that focuses on present struggles over the control of energy resources in Central Asia, Russia and Eurasia. As Russia reasserts state-capitalist controls over the energy production and trade across the territory of the former Soviet Union, its energy policies and relations with neighbors and trading partners alike bear direct relevance to the discussion of energy security in both regional and global contexts.

This paper looks at various political and economic initiatives that together constitute the evolving Eurasian Union project, which brings together Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with smaller Central Asian states. It attempts to build a theoretical framework for the conceptual mapping of changes in the regional order in the post-Soviet Central Asia, while examining the evolution of the regional integration process there and the impact that the relations between Russia and China may have on this process..

Constructivism and social identity theory provide a useful point of departure for the analysis of regionalist aspirations of the postcommunist countries of the former Soviet Union. In many cases, these aspirations remain in the realm of rhetorics. The coveted or presumed regional affiliation drives foreign policies and external branding of the state. It also importantly affects the state's identity. Identity construction in the region has emphasized the irreconcilably dualistic nature of such categories as "European" versus "Eurasian," thus driving European countries of the former Soviet Union to break their ties to Russia. Seeking eventual affiliation with the European Union, Russia's closest ally, Ukraine, had spearheaded an openly anti-Russian GUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) alliance. However, regional affiliation with other EU hopefuls proved unstable, in no small part because the GUAM's construction of identity in explicit opposition to...

Russia's foreign policy under Putin and now Medvedev's leadership is taking a decisively Asian turn. However, Eurasia is the theatre where the resurgent Russia encounters an increasingly powerful China. Sometimes their interests are parallel, and sometimes they are at odds. Cooperation for the sake of joint co-management of the region may be an area where the Chinese and Russian interests coincide. The Chinese quest for energy resources and the opposing visions of what energy security in Eurasia means can define an area of potential tensions. Regionalization is called upon to mitigate these tensions. Eurasian regionalism is a politically steered process of integration of several postcommunist states with widely varying degrees of global presence and exposure. Part of its impetus has been provided by the European experience of regional integration, which is envied by countries as different as Russia and Kazakhstan. Several attempts to institutionalize regional groupings on th...

Includes bibliographical references (p. [279]-288) and index. Ukraine's foreign and security policy : theoretical and comparative perspectives / Jennifer D.P. Moroney -- The limits of realism : Ukrainian policy toward the CIS / Victor Chudowsky -- Constructivist theory and Ukrainian foreign policy / Paul J. D'Anieri -- Ukraine's foreign policy on Europe's periphery : globalization, transnationalism, and the frontier / Jennifer D.P. Moroney -- Security, democracy, and "civil democratic control" of armed forces in Ukraine / James Sherr -- Civil-military relations in a sovereign Ukraine : contributing or detracting from the security of a new nation? / Stacy R. Closson -- Defining a Ukrainian foreign policy identity : business interests and geopolitics in the formulation of Ukrainian foreign policy 1994-1999 / Tor Bukkvoll -- The Polish-Ukrainian interstate model for cooperation and integration : regional relations in a theoretical context / Joshua B. Spero -- ...

This paper describes the fight of transnational civic networks to influence business development strategies and counter the threats to environmental and labor rights posed by the construction and exploitation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in Transcaucasia. I start by discussing the role of civil society in the global struggle for sustainable development. I then present a brief overview of the geopolitical significance of the Transcaucasian-Caspian region in today's oil and gas markets. The case study looks at how the actions of international and domestic NGOs influenced the BTC's main shareholder and operator-company, British Petroleum (BP), as well as host countries' governments, to switch to more environmentally cognizant and socially responsive practices. I discuss internationalization of civil society networks in response to the looming environmental crisis in the region, using the BTC case as an illustration. The paper concludes by generalizing from ...

Reviews: 'This is a comprehensive, rich and thoughtful guide to the diverse perspectives on political leadership. It will be essential reading for all who are interested in the historical, cultural, ethical, and policy facets of this crucial topic.' Joseph S. Nye Jr, Harvard University, USA and author of The Powers to Lead 'This is destined to become the standard text in political leadership for the forseeable future. It combines erudite scholarship with a wide diversity of theories and arenas of concern. It makes a significant contribution to the general leadership literature, it's a treat for all leadership scholars, and it's a must for all libraries.' Keith Grint, University of Warwick, UK

SUBVERSIVE INSTITUTIONS The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State From 1989 to 1992, all of the socialist dictatorships in Europe (including the Soviet Union) collapsed, as did the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia ...

Ukraine's development since proclamation of independence in 1991 has been driven by a strategy of geopolitical oscillations between two " vectors " : the European Union (EU) and Russia. The government that came to power as a result of the Maidan revolution of 2014 followed the western advice to treat the two " vectors " as mutually incompatible. Petro Poroshenko's pro-European stance following the 2014 " Maidan revolution " has led to decisions that are driving Ukraine away from Russia. Ukraine's celebrated (and much criticized) multivectorism has finally given way to a one-sided orientation on the West. However, economic downturn and higher inflation, coupled with the European Union's refusal to entertain Ukraine's EU membership bid, have raised doubts about the usefulness of alienating Russia for the purpose of closer European Union integration. Until the violent ouster of President Yanukovych, Ukraine still had some space for tactical manoeuvring to benefit from the development of trade relations with Russia and the EU simultaneously. Now this possibility has been foreclosed for the foreseeable future. There has been no good reason for such a turn of events beyond geopolitical, cold war reasoning of the West that has historically viewed Russia as an enemy. One particular specimen of the cold war guard that has preserved this Russophobic attitude intact since the last days of World War II is Ukrainian diaspora in the West. The chapter examines the causes behind the collapse of Ukraine's multivectorism and the transformation of what could be mutually compatible projects of the European and Eurasian regional integration into a contestation for regional predominance, with Ukraine becoming a victim in a tug-of-war between Russia and the West.

Emerging regional entities in Eurasia – from the CIS to the SCO to the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan – have met with varying degrees of success. While all of them were motivated by an idea to create a regional community that would either consciously emulate the European Union or provide an alternative model of regionalism, true regional integration proved difficult to achieve.

Regionalism may provide a shell for strategic interaction among states, and regional institutions are sometimes formed as a means of balancing power of a locally dominant state or resolving contradictions between two of such regionally dominant states. Regionalisms in Eurasia reflect power distribution in the region and the policies of the regionally dominant states, Russia and China. These regionalisms do compete, in spite of all the rhetoric about the mutual complementarity of interests.

Russia’s advances in the region are based on willingness and capacity to provide political, financial, and military assistance to local elites, as well as by Moscow's indifference toward the type of governing regimes there. China brings in an enormous economic and financial potential and an equal readiness to support authoritarian rulers. It seems that the concrete structure of an emerging regional order is being negotiated and renegotiated anew. Multiplication of regional "spokes" and the lack of an undisputed regional "hub" may bode well for regional institutionalization, seen as a power sharing mechanism. Alternatively, competing regionalisms in Eurasia may stall further integration and precipitate backsliding to bilateralism and preferential trade and security agreements.

With China’s acquisition of two export pipelines in the region, Russia’s role of a middle man for energy exports from Central Asia has been irrevocably undermined. Only proactive region building may help to salvage vestiges of former Russian influence. Moscow’s relative success in the region so far has been determined by its willingness and capacity to provide political, financial, and military assistance to local elites, and by indifference toward the type of governing regimes there. Yet, China is also willing to turn a blind eye to the lack of democracy in countries such as Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. The struggle with China's growing influence in Central Asia resulted in reluctant acceptance of the inevitable: the future regional order will be determined in close consultations between Moscow and Beijing. Regional institutionalization appeared as the best means available for regional power sharing.

The article discusses Ukraine's "orange revolution" of 2004 as an unsuccessful attempt at democratization. Ukraine's ethnic politics, political corruption and institutional path dependency are being singled out as primary factors responsible for the failure of democratic reforms.

This chapter looks at the experience of both formal and informal regionalization in Eurasia, focussing on the post-Soviet states and the Eurasian Economic Union in particular. Regional integration in this part of the world does not follow in the footsteps of the West. By taking a defensive stance toward neoliberal globalization practices and ideologies, new regionalism in Eurasia blazes its own path of development. Resuscitation of mutually beneficial ties of the late Soviet era and the state-guided developmentalism of a market variety are two defining features of this phenomenon. Regional integration of states is a tool to advance their political and economic fortunes. Specifically, interstate regionalism, i.e., the close cooperation and integration of several states that belong to the same political-geographic community, advances the trade and well-being of the participant nations, promotes international and national security and facilitates the so-called four freedoms of movement across the national borders: the movement of goods and services, finances, labour and business entrepreneurs. Interstate regionalism may also be seen as the newest manifestation of traditional politics of alliances. It has a discernible geopolitical underpinning and clearly serves to enhance the international clout of a regionally leading state.

Russia’s fate in the Trump era of world politics will centrally depend on Moscow’s relationship with Beijing, and the ability to make the best use of Russia’s participation in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative. There are several important aspects to this relationship. The chapter explores the role of Sino-Russian cooperation in the development of energy resources in Central Asia and the implicit tensions between two regional integration projects: one driven by China and another – by Russia. I argue that the potential for genuine regional cooperation exists and depends largely on role distribution in the China-Russia leadership tandem. The shape of the Eurasian region will be largely determined through evolution of the Sino-Russian relationship and the concrete shape that SCO takes in the forthcoming years.

The seeming intractability of the conflict in East Ukraine can be explained by more than one factor. The paper argues that this war is based on the discursive construction of an enemy and much helped by demonization of the opponent. Ethnicization of political and economic differences between Ukraine’s regions makes compromise more difficult to reach. The invocation by the Ukrainian side of the identity markers of a savage, beastly outgroup, a “scum”, “subhumans,” “bastards,” when referring to the Donbass separatists, cannot but confirm the worst worries of those who might still be leaning to the idea of devolution and power sharing. The threats of legal punishment  propel continued resistance.

The author reaches a conclusion that an attempt to build a new Ukrainian nation by vilifying its Russophone constituents will fail. Political mobilization against the “Russian aggression” can be, at best, a temporary solution to the problem of the country’s unity. While the war against Donbass separatists consolidated Ukraine’s political nation, it has also demonstrated that the pro-Russian activists do not fit in there. It is still possible that meaningful devolution will help to heal Ukraine’s ethno-regional wounds. However, to assure such an outcome, Kiev and the West both need to stop molding an enemy figure out of Russia and Ukraine’s own Russian citizens.

Published in S. Smyth & C. Opitz (Eds.), Negotiating Linguistic, Cultural and Social Identities in the Post-Soviet World (pp. 87-108). Oxford, UK, Bern, etc.: Peter Lang, 2013.

The Chapter analyzes difficulties associated with the academic analysis, socio-political and everyday connotations of Russian national identity, focusing on transformations and challenges it has faced since the end of the Soviet Union. It problematizes Russian national identity as the creation of political and cultural elites, which often failed to engage the masses in a corresponding movement of national revival. The perspective adopted is that of historical phenomenology: Russian national identity is perceived as a dynamic construct shaped by a diachronic historical perspective on the one hand, and a synchronic geopolitical perspective on the other. The Chapter presents a descriptive case study to address the question of what exactly are the main components of Russian national identity and how they structure ethno-national perceptions at the elite and mass levels of society. The conclusions focus on the underdevelopment and amorphousness of the Russian national character, and explain why it has been problematic to situate Russian national identity in an unambiguously defined state-bearing nation or ethnicity.

At the APEC summit in 2012 Russia announced a “new track” in economic diplomacy to accelerate its integration with Asia Pacific. Russia’s pivoting toward Asia proceeds in parallel to the creation of the Eurasian Union it wants to lead. Russia’s support of new regionalism in Eurasia and Asia Pacific is as much about identity as it is about political economy. For Russia, the Eurasian project is a way to return to the ranks of the world’s leading powers. Critics perceive these efforts as neo-hegemonist in nature. I disagree with such assessment.

Russia’s cooperation with ASEAN is called forth to support its foreign policy priorities, which dictate more active engagement with Asia Pacific. Partnership with ASEAN is necessary for economic, political, and strategic reasons. However, the ingrained culture of geopolitical posturing and a thin basis for economic cooperation stalls further development of the ASEAN-Russia ties. The paper ends with the discussion of identity-related factors that hamper cooperation. I argue that most of these factors stem from the trauma of postimperial adjustment, which breeds Russia’s preoccupation with sovereignty, securitization of foreign policy and the perception of regionalism as a power projection instrument.

Keywords: Eurasian regional integration; Russia; foreign policy; ASEAN

The fate of Eurasian regionalism depends on major actors’ ability to disentangle political economy from geopolitics. The whole project was originally devised as a developmental tool. It had acquired some features of alliance when the sieged fortress mentality took root in the Kremlin. Regionalism in Eurasia is called upon to provide a cushion against the potentially devastating effects of the current crisis of global capitalism. The main concern of the participating actors is the prevention of backsliding into the world’s periphery and maintaining political and economic independence, not to confront or provoke the West in any way.