Magdalena Holy-Luczaj

In this paper, Heidegger's lifelong interest in usable things is combined with his critique of aesthetics and environmental reading of his works to build the framework for reexamining his notion of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) as the category which environmental aesthetics can employ to reconceptualize our aesthetic judgment of everyday artifacts and how, by doing so, that contributes to reducing the ecologically harmful effects of consumerism. To this end, I draw upon the ambiguous position of usable artifacts in Heidegger's philosophy. I shall unpack this ambiguity by explaining that it mirrors tensions in Heidegger's idea of truth as inherently agonistic disclosure. I argue that although everyday artifacts-as opposed to artworks-are situated closer to the pole of hiddenness, they can participate aesthetically in revealing being. Elucidating this requires reappropriating Heidegger's concept of being 'authentic' as being 'one's own' (eigen). I show that applying the category of (Heideggerian) authenticity to everyday artifacts should consist in unfolding their ontological uniqueness, which is irrespective of their ontic replicability. Finally, I develop an understanding of authenticity by exploring environmental-aesthetical implications of some of Heidegger's remarks on things related to their susceptibility to changes.

This paper discusses the gap in Martin Heidegger's ontology pertaining to the transformative affectivity arising in the interactions between beings, particularly how this affectivity is responsible for changes in those beings. It thus explores the possibility of bridging this gap by including an additional dimension of being. For this purpose, it draws upon Aristotle's concept of affecting/being affected (On Generation and Corruption, Book I), which aims to explain the origin of alteration in beings. The Aristotelian juxtaposition of action and passion serves as a backdrop for the incorporation of the concept of "shapeability" into Heidegger's ontology. This involves a dimension of revealing being related to the active and passive aspects of beings' capacity to shape and be shaped by others. Investigating the idea of shapeability, I shall argue, can shed some new light on the multidimensionality of how being is disclosed.

No one can take the other's dying away from him, " as Martin Heidegger famously claimed, but what he was significantly silent about was that beings, both human and non-human, can mutually contribute to each other's death. By focusing on the interrelatedness of deaths, this paper presents a reversal of the Heideggerian perspective on the relation between Dasein's mineness and "being-toward-death. " Drawing upon the structural meaning of death, which consists in the fact that no one can replace me in that I will die, I show that the phenomenon of contributing-toward-the-death-of-others individuates Dasein as well. This will allow us to reread the threat of the They in the context of the Anthropocene, elucidating the non-transferable character of my share in others' death. Finally, the paper aims to deepen our understanding of the change in the character of death which has been brought about by technology in the Anthropocene.

Heidegger's ontology can still be a resource for new trends in environmental ethics (e.g. postnatural environmentalism), if we draw upon his less frequently discussed concepts such as kinship of the physis and techne, or 'proper use,' which enables entities to manifest their identity. The Anthropocene condition prompts us, however, to reexamine the relationship between the act of using properly and that of using up, as laid out in Heidegger's ontology. This will help to address the wider problem of whether beings in Heidegger can affect each other, mutually shaping each other's identity, or peculiarity. I shall argue that Heidegger's concept of being lacks the dimensions of shaping and being shaped by others. However, it is possible to revise his concepts of fundamental structures of being, such as temporality and worldliness, thereby creating the structure of shapeability of being, which would not be limited to human beings. This, in turn, can help elucidate one of the key dilemmas of the Anthropocene related to setting the boundary between footprint and harm.

This paper enhances postnatural environmentalism (represented by Steven Vogel) by highlighting and incorporating selected concepts from Martin Heidegger's ontology. In particular, I examine Heidegger's detailed analysis of the affinity between phusis and techne, the critique of " replaceability " , the problem of " proper use " , and his earlier concept of a tool structure. This analysis is aimed at grounding the metaphysical and ethical significance of technical artifacts. It shows that Heidegger can support postnatural environmentalism's claim that artifacts shouldn't be jettisoned by environmental thinking because that leads to reckless treatment of them. Exploration of these issues also contributes to environmental interpretations of Heidegger's philosophical legacy, which were limited to natural beings.

In the paper, I argue that deep ecologists did not take full advantage of the potential of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy to support the foundational assumptions of deep ecology. They have overlooked Heidegger’s attempt to reject the idea of the great chain of being (reinforcing his critique of metaphysics as “ontotheology”), which is essential for the concept of ecospherical egalitarianism. In considering the notion of “ecospherical egalitarianism,” I shall recognize Heidegger’s ontology as an “ontological egalitarianism.” Finally, I will show that Heidegger’s project seems to be even more universal than deep ecology since Heidegger is concerned with artifacts as well as natural entities.

ABSTRACT: The paper aims to elucidate how Heidegger's ontology enables us to address the question of wrongdoing-which goes beyond the simple binarism of metaphysics and ethics in terms of exceeding the possibilities of a given being, which causes its essential deformation. The problem of ontological difference is of key significance in this regard, because deterioration of the condition of a being has to concern its ontological dimension and not only the ontic one. Moreover, according to Heidegger, such a change is not merely a lack, which leads to establishing a non-private concept of harm.

Czy ontologia Martina Heideggera ma swoje dopełnienie w postaci ontyki? To pytanie można sformułować również następująco: czy Heideggerowska koncepcja bycia łączy się z określonym ujęciem bytu? W artykule pokażę, że można uznać je za zbliżone do reizmu Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, który zakładał, że byt to rzecz. Odpowiedź dlaczego tak jest, pozwoli-jak postaram się uzasadnić-odsłonić pewne ukryte założenia dotyczące rozumienia bycia przez Heideggera.

The paper reflects on the implications of Heidegger’s philosophy for postnatural environmentalisms. The analysis of his later ideas of “proper use” and the affinity between phusis and techne, as well as a re-examination of the earlier concept of a tool structure aims, first, to ground the metaphysical and ethical significance of built environment and artifacts, and second, to revisit environmental interpretations of Heidegger’s philosophical legacy.

This paper seeks to establish positive environmental ethics of artifacts as unique individuals embedded in the network of functionality, deserving of care and respect. Such a perspective is integrated with postnatural environmentalism and ecofeminist frameworks. By offering a new conceptualization of artifacts, it aims to transform the patterns of how humans deal with artifacts, and thereby limit consumerism, which should contribute to achieving proenvironmental goals.

The transgressive ontological character of hybrids-entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects-calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of "moral considerability" and related to it the idea of "intrinsic value" understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of "functional value", which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being's identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability.

Environmental philosophy always presents detailed distinctions concerning the kinds of natural beings that can be granted moral considerability, when discussing this issue. In contrast, artifacts, which are excluded from the scope of moral considerability, are treated as one homogenous category. This seems problematic. An attempt to introduce certain distinctions in this regard – by looking into dissimilarities between physical and digital artifacts – can change our thinking about artifacts in ethical terms, or more precisely, in environmentally ethical terms.

The paper aims to identify and explain the absence of eco-phenomenological perspective in Polish philosophy. Eco-phenomenology, which emerged as the specialized area of phenomenological movement in the 1980s, explores relations between human beings and nature. The lack of it in Poland, as the paper argues, is not only due to the specific political situation, but primarily because of the great impact of Jozef Tischner's "philosophy of drama, " which has strongly anthropocentric implications.

HUMANISTYKA I PRZYRODOZNAWSTWO 23 Olsztyn 2017

S t r e s z c z e n i e
W Myśląc jak mall Steven Vogel krytykuje różne nurty w filozofii środo-wiskowej za wykluczenie rzeczy użytko-wych z zakresu jej zainteresowania jako metafizycznie i etycznie mało znaczących bytów. Postnaturalny enwironmentalizm zaproponowany przez Vogela przeciwsta-wia się tej tendencji i wzywa do przemy-ślenia metafizycznej i etycznej kondycji artefaktów. W artykule rekonstruuję argumentację Vogela, wskazując główne problemy, jakie wiążą się z uznaniem rzeczy użytkowych za metafizycznie i ety-cznie podrzędne. K e y w o r d s: Vogel, postnatural envi-ronmentalism, artifacts, ethical extensio-nism. A b s t r a c t In Thinking Like a Mall, Steven Vogel criticizes various trends in environmental philosophy for excluding artifacts from the scope of their interest as metaphysically and ethically insignificant beings. Vogel's postnatural environmen-talism opposes this tendency and calls for revisiting the metaphysical and ethical status of artifacts. The article reconstructs Vogels's argumentation and indicates main problems which are related to recognizing usable things as metaphysically and ethically inferior.

The paper analyzes differences between Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO) and Jane Bennett’s new materialism as two possible nonanthropocentric ontologies. It also shows how their dissimilarity replicates the differences between Kazimierz Twardowski’s ontology whose OOO recognizes as its forerunner, and reism developed by his student Tadeusz Kotarbinski, who can be regarded as a predecessor of new materialism.