OPEN ACCESS CIVITAS Revista de Ciências Sociais Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Sociais Civitas 22: 1-10, jan.-dez. 2022 e-ISSN: 1984-7289 ISSN-L: 1519-6089 http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-7289.2022.1.41208 ATUALIDADE POLÍTICA DA TEORIA CRÍTICA Towards a phenomenological contribution for social criticism: a critique of the normative conceptions of the lifeworld in Habermas Por uma contribuição fenomenológica para a crítica social: uma crítica das concepções normativas do mundo da vida em Habermas Hacia un aporte fenomenológico de la crítica social: una crítica de las concepciones normativas del mundo de la vida en Habermas Fabrício Pontin1 orcid.org/0000-0002-3984-1849 fabricio.pontin@unilasalle.edu.br Received: 28 jul. 2021. Approved: 21 out. 2021. Published: 16 maio 2022. Abstract: This article will attempt to show how Habermas turns away from a critical-phenomenological perspective and towards an analytic and pragmatic understanding of language and society. I want to point out that there is minimal phenomenology in Habermas’ appropriation of the concept of Lebenswelt. I concede that Habermas provides us with a fascinating re-assessment of some classical elements in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, but in his “Critique of Functionalist Reason,” he seems to abandon most of the methodological elements that would allow us to call his own method “phenomenological.” Keywords: Transcendental Intersubjectivity. Phenomenology. Critical Theory. Lifeworld. Resumo: Este artigo tentará mostrar como Habermas se afasta de uma perspectiva crítico-fenomenológica para uma compreensão analítica e pragmática da linguagem e da sociedade. Saliento que os elementos fenomenológicos são quase inteiramente abandonados na apropriação do conceito de Lebenswelt por Habermas. Admito que Habermas nos fornece uma reavaliação fascinante de alguns elementos clássicos da filosofia de Edmund Husserl, mas em sua “Crítica da razão funcionalista”, parece abandonar a maioria dos elementos metodológicos que nos permitiriam chamar seu método de “fenomenológico”. Palavras-chave: Intersubjetividade transcendental. Fenomenologia. Teoria critica. Mundo da vida. Resumen: Este artículo intentará mostrar cómo Habermas se aleja de una perspectiva crítico-fenomenológica hacia una comprensión analítica y pragmática del lenguaje y la sociedad. Quiero señalar que hay una fenomenología mínima en el chorro de Habermas del concepto de Lebenswelt. Admito que Habermas nos proporciona una reevaluación fascinante de algunos elementos clásicos de la filosofía de Edmund Husserl, pero en su “Crítica de la razón funcionalista” parece abandonar la mayoría de los elementos metodológicos que nos permitirían llamar su propio método “ fenomenológico “. Palabras clave: Intersubjetividad trascendental. Fenomenología. Teoría crítica. Mundo vivido. Habermas seems to see phenomenology as a philosophy of consciousness that is operative on the “lifeworld paradigm.” This perspective motivates Habermas to see system-theory, as developed in the social Artigo está licenciado sob forma de uma licença sciences, as an heir to the reflections in Schutz and Husserl (Habermas Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional. 1 Universidade LaSalle (Unilasalle), Canoas, RS, Brasil. 2/10 Civitas 22: 1-10, jan.-dez. 2022 1984, 128). In this, Habermas seems to want to is decidedly and consciously moving in direct take Schutz further than the descriptive inten- contradiction to a phenomenological approach, tions of interpretative sociology, insisting on the and if he is correct about the consequences of possibility of consensus as a guiding principle taking a transcendental approach to reason, we for sociological reflection: social interaction pre- indeed have absolutely no reason to continue supposes that individuals are in consensus about to attempt a phenomenological perspective on the meaning-like structures of the world and the social sciences. value-like expressions of language. This element But Habermas seems to be mistaken for in Habermas is in tension with a phenomenologi- supposing that a transcendental approach in cal account of social action, but at the heart of an phenomenology necessarily implies a de-ratio- epistemological aspect of political liberalism: the nalization of the meaning and truth, as well as a question of language and discourse as a leading narrow and outdated psychological subjectivism. clue to the constitution of society and politics. Habermas follows Tugendhat’s interpretation of The re-framing of the project of modernity as the question of self-consciousness in phenom- the attempt to secure some universal perspective enology (Tudendhat 1986), concluding that a to the constitution of meaning and its relation phenomenological position will ultimately lead to the institution of rights allows Habermas to to a de-rationalized notion of truth and to the develop the idea of communicative action and impossibility of a shared, linguistic lifeworld which communicative reason as a response to what is allows communicative action to take precedence identified as the de-rationalization of the concept over other forms of instrumental action. In what of truth and meaning in post-structuralism, and, follows, I hope to show that this reading is not to some extent, in phenomenology. This issue is fair to the intersubjective nature of the lifeworld tackled quite early in Habermas’ oeuvre, but it and its territorial character. takes decisive shape in his Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, and acquires final density in the Theory of Communicative Action. Such process of de-rationalization motivates Habermas to move away from his roots at both the Frankfurt School and in Husserlian phenomenology. Habermas focuses on the development of communicative reason as a tool for positive homogeny. I have coined this term to describe the form in which reason has an a priori potential to elucidate the primordial structure of social reality. In this sense, Habermas offers an alternative to some dilemmas within Husserl’s diagnosis of a crisis within modern sciences (Husserl 1970): he follows Husserl up until the diagnosis of a problem of confusing an instrumental interest as a universal guideline for conduct, but he does not follow Husserl’s option for a transcendentally constituted lifeworld, focusing instead on an a priori structure for language which will inform any communicative practices. In doing so, Habermas From absolute meaning to communicative reason: Habermas’ normative phenomenology Habermas does not simply disregard Husserl in his Theory of Communicative Action. To be sure, the understanding of the social world as a dimension of the Lebenswelt still echoes Husserl (Husserl 1970; 1975). However, the methodological assumptions that characterize a phenomenological method are dropped by Habermas, and this abandonment of the method is connected to the assumption that ordinary language philosophy is in a better position than phenomenology to deal with issues of language and communicative praxis in general (Habermas 1984, 396–397).2 Tugendhat’s influence is of particular interest here, as Habermas seems to subscribe to his critique of Husserl’s philosophy. Habermas reconstitutes the Weberian understanding of reason and meaning in terms of communication, reframing the 2 As we will see, the theories of consciousness that Tugendhat has reformulated in “semantic terms” include a Husserlian analysis of the lifeworld, and specially the Husserlian account of givenness and subjectivity. Fabrício Pontin Towards a phenomenological contribution for social criticism 3/10 discourse on reason and rationality accordingly op the conditions in which we could exercise (Habermas 1984, 50). our speech abilities. From the epistemological Further, I hope to stress, first, what are the point of view, Habermas holds that we should normative elements of Habermas understanding no longer privilege consciousness as a clue to of society, second, how Habermas strategically intersubjectivity. Instead, the focus of an analy- uses these normative elements in order to im- sis of intersubjectivity should be a philosophy plement a determined notion of the lifeworld of language and a philosophy of language that as a paradigm for social action, and finally, the allows us to understand the predicative nature consequences of such approach in a phenom- of speech acts (Habermas 1984, 343). enological perspective. Habermas intends to overcome something that If, in Weber (1994), culture is connected to he perceives as a limitation in Schutz, that is, the preferences that are conscious and effectively “culturalistic concept of the lifeworld” (Habermas preferred by individuals within society, in Schutz 1987, 138–139). In this instance, Habermas drops (2011), culture is connected to contingencies and the phenomenological idea of the lifeworld in disordered elements affecting individuals within favor of a predicative understanding of normativity those societies. Indeed, there is action oriented and society in the articulation of discursive prac- towards meaning, but in this perspective this sort tices (the so-called subsystemic colonization of of action does not constitute the social construc- the lifeworld; Habermas 1984, 219) with normative tion of reality, whereas, in Weber (1949), action (Habermas 1987, 61), a priori, criteria, and condi- towards meaning is the subject of social reality. tions for discourse - the idea of communicative Still, reason in Weber (1980) is a regional phe- reason (Habermas 1987, 64).3 nomenon. Particular societies have particular con- Habermas suggests that a communicative ceptions of what stands as reasonable and how it approach to the lifeworld might solve some of stands so. The constitution of what is and what is the paradoxes within interpretative sociology, not acceptable within social circles and the move- particularly the problems connected with moral ment from the social institution of preferences and political relativism. This suggestion is the into a system of rights is a historical contingency context in which a normatively guided interaction that should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. surfaces as a medium for social relations. Such During the 1960s, Habermas still follows Weber, medium stresses that individuals in a determined though through an Adornian inspiration, as he society can only communicate with each other writes on the connection between reason and if they agree to the terms they are using to refer interest. He adopts the Frankfurtian language of to the external world. instrumental reason and seems to be comfortable This agreement concerning the structure of as an heir to the tradition of German Marxists. the external world is a function of orienting dis- In the early 1970s, however, Habermas starts to cursive practices rationally: because Habermas abandon elements of his former Marxist analysis takes the linguistic turn as a departure point and of social reality, suggesting the necessity to drop accepts the central presuppositions of an ordinary a transcendental and pre-predicative analysis of understanding of language, he can then stress language, association, and subjectivity in order that because we can reach an agreement on the to enter the discussion on the social construction terms we use to refer to objects, we have reason to of values and institutions, as if a phenomenolog- orient our language towards this agreement. We ical account of socio-political philosophy were have reasons to build up a system of references implausible (Habermas 1984, 2). and rules for interaction. The stage is then set for Habermas to devel- Is this to say that Habermas super-impos- Note the description of the elements of how speech acts can operate in a communicative-like patterns if and only if certain components of speech are integrated. 3 4/10 Civitas 22: 1-10, jan.-dez. 2022 es one form of meaning constitution as deter- assertion. minant over other forms? In a way, asking this Rationality is then a function of communicative question puts us outside the epistemological reason, which is made effective according to the terms Habermas is presupposing. For Haber- verifiability of any given assertion (its truth-char- mas, it does not make much sense to speak of acter), the institutional motivation for individuals a plural form of meaning constitution: because to act responsibly (a State-based notion of mutual language is structured ordinarily, and given the identification and solidarity), and the moral de- opportunity to do so, we will organize language velopment of individuals (Habermas calls this the towards mutual understanding, the cultural stock “responsibility of the adult personality” (Habermas of knowledge which is acquired in a contingent 1987, 141), I would instead call it the pedagogical form (dependent on socialization, geography, etc) cherishment of communicative competences). has a necessary structure. The interpretation of Habermas is describing a process of mutual nour- the cultural stock of knowledge, which is made ishment between system and lifeworld, where by every individual, every time any expression we have, on the one hand, the codified, estab- of any sort of preference is uttered, reproduces lished, means for social relations stratified within the necessity of communicative reason: even a systemic order, and a sub-systemic, cultural when individuals instrumentally use language in set of possibilities that inform the constitution of an attempt to miscommunicate something, the a system. Societies will organize these relations communicative-linguistic background of reason between system and lifeworld according to their remains. Thus, meaning constitution is under- heritage and history. And yet, are we satisfied stood within the parameters of the necessity of with a description of the processes of meaning communicative reason. constitution in different social realities? Within the These are the methodological and epistemo- parameters of communicative reason, we must, logical presuppositions that allow Habermas to again, recognize the limitations of this question. state the communicative structure of subjectivity, In Habermas, the plurality of reasonable concep- or better yet, the communicative structure of an tions of meaning is only conceivable within the intersubjective lifeworld. However, Habermas parameters of the necessary orientation towards would have betrayed his Kantian tendencies meaning and understanding peculiar to a pred- had he trusted that the individuals would use icative understanding of language. communicative reason by fiat. Individuals are As a true heir of the illuminist tradition, Haber- competent to develop communicative praxis, but mas wants to stress a humanistic approach in these competences must be nurtured within a which the development of specific speech prac- legitimate and regulated social order, a system. tices will lead to the construction of an increas- Here we have a process of historical construc- ingly rational and fair society. However, this means tion for how individuals may fulfill their commu- that we ought to take some steps to construct nicative competences. This process means, in the basis on which such a society will operate. short, that individuals need to be motivated to Of course, the same privileged position that the act towards mutual understanding. On the one philosopher has as one that can operate within hand, the interpretation of a given social action the demands of rationality now becomes an depends on the social framework in which such obligation towards society as a whole: Habermas action is occurring. On the other hand, and this is expects that the institutional framework of a so- the peculiar element in Habermas’ proposition, ciety ought to be organized and framed in order communicative reason reproduces a movement to implement the steps that will lead individuals within the constitution of a cosmopolitan history toward communicative praxis. in Kant (2009): societies will become more rational It seems that Habermas sees the project of as they adopt the necessity of a specific form of enlightenment as one of positive homogeneity. Fabrício Pontin Towards a phenomenological contribution for social criticism 5/10 Indeed, Habermas never uses this term, so I must would call Wertrationalität). Nevertheless, if the clarify what I mean by this. I want to stress here orientation towards understanding, even in an that the notion of communicative action turns absolute form, was dependent on the typification the division between primary and secondary of the rational within a determined familiar context socialization into more than just a process of in Weber (1954;2005), in Habermas, the typification estrangement of different traditions and historical of the rational is given within universally shared mutual recognition. Instead, Habermas wants to linguistic capabilities. point that in time these heterogeneous forms of Habermas will thus develop a wide role for communicative praxis that constitute different political philosophy. In fact, the project that Haber- systems of legitimation ought to be turned into mas begins in his “linguistic turn” after 1976 and more homogenous praxis. the publication of Was heißt Universalpragmatik? There is space for diversity of idioms and be- (Habermas 1982)4 is an ambitious declaration of liefs in this conception of communicative action. purpose, one that supposes that any account of What I mean by positive homogeneity is that the political must also account for the structure of Habermas indicates that the nature of rationality knowledge, language, and morals. For Habermas, inbuilt within language presses us to state the political philosophy understood as an isolated language of human rights as the guide for legiti- field that can stand freely, without the support of mate sorts of systems, and these legitimate sorts a coherent and dependent theory of knowledge of systems will, in their turn, inform what are the and language, is incoherent. Habermas points that acceptable praxis that will lead us to commu- Rawls himself was unable to do so, as his own nicative action. In that sense, it is acceptable to attempt to give an account of a “freestanding” have a plurality of assertions and beliefs, as we political liberalism supposes a heavy epistemo- think in terms of plans of life, religion, or sexuality. logical baggage (Habermas 1995, 131). However, the legitimacy of these praxes (which For example, Habermas sees the consider- is, in Habermasian language, their rationality) is ations on rational choice from the standpoint of connected to the necessary normative character exchange of goods and priority as limited and of communicative reason. shortsighted. Partially, this is a result of the in- In that sense, communicative reason informs fluence of system-sociology, particularly Talcott and frames the rational construction of legitimate Parsons. In his Structure of Social Action, Parsons social order, and social choices within this social provides an outstanding review of political econ- order will be more rational as the procedures that omy, which he sees as a theory of action, more are taken as legitimate within the system inform specifically, a theory of individual action. Political individual and group practices. economy is concerned with how singular indi- As read by Habermas, the project of moder- viduals can make singular choices according to nity is to implement equality in a legitimately particular viewpoints. Logical, or rational, action built systemic order. Equality here is understood then refers to a system of means aiming at a not in terms of economic equality or equality of determined end that can be described in terms opportunity, but in broader terms. Habermas of goods, and, from a political standpoint, it will understands equality in linguistic and pragmat- exchange interests to fulfill their particular ends. ic terms in which individuals are equal insofar In that sense, I exchange a good “x” for “y,” trusting they share a disposition towards rationally and that “y” may finally lead me to my pursued end. predicatively organizing their discourse towards Obviously, I also negotiate and mitigate pref- mutual understanding (in the sense that Weber erences according to availability, as scarcity is There is some debate as to where the “linguistic turn” in Habermas can be located, but his reflections in 1976 are particularly important as they represent a breakaway point from both the notion of Communicative Ethics, in Apel, and the earlier reflections on instrumental reason in Adorno. 4 6/10 Civitas 22: 1-10, jan.-dez. 2022 always a fact in any non-ideal political scenario cative reason, which states a universal norm for (all actual scenarios will be non-ideal). Rational all forms of predication (Habermas 2015, 111). 5 choice would thus presuppose actors that per- However, where Weber (1954) tried to stress form in such model: they will be able to express that norms were constituted regionally and de- references according to a “selective standard pendently on social contexts, that, later, interacted regulating the choice of means” (Parsons 1968, with and would incorporate or resist different ways 252). Such individualistic and economic approach of producing and regarding norms, Habermas for choice will not be enough for a plausible theory places the pragmatic structure of language as an of social choice, in Parsons, because it ignores ever-present norm that regulates and permeates that the system of connections leading means to communicative action and hence characterizes end is not only interpreted in terms of a selective, any sort of rational choice. In that sense, an indi- economic, standard, nor does it operate on the vidual, or a society, will rationally choose a value, level of the individual, alone. In that sense, what in Habermas, when that choice is consistent is generally identified as the strength of political with the universal character of communicative economy (its selective domain of analysis) be- reason. Here, we are back to a Kantian move: comes a burden as the account of a given social the reasonability of any stated preference is only action will be restricted to an aspect of such given recognized when that preference can be univer- action (Parsons 1968, 262). Habermas takes ad- salized according to a form. If in Kant this form vantage of this insight to attack Rawls on meth- is given in terms of a moral consciousness (Kant odological grounds: though he agrees with the 2003), in Habermas (2007), moral consciousness general spirit and conclusions of Rawls’ political becomes the communicative reason. liberalism, particularly as it points to a universal The main point here is that if Habermas is right language of human rights, Habermas (1995, 110) about the structure of language and the necessity stresses that the processes leading to the choice of communicative reason, then the idea of the of values that will take us to a democratic and multiplicity of lifeworlds and meaning-consti- legitimate order cannot be described in terms of tution makes no sense, and even if it did make a “freestanding” doctrine, much less in terms of epistemological sense, we would have to question an economic account of informed exchange of its advantages as a tool for the implementation goods. Instead, they ought to be thought through of socio-political strategies. Habermas points at in terms of an epistemic necessity for specific the predicative structure of language, stressing patterns of discursivity, which, in their turn, will that the notion of pre-predicative language is, move us to specific patterns of choice. at the best-case scenario, best left as the realm Again, I must stress the homogenous character of the mystical. We have no reason to think that of such a hypothesis: Habermas wants to argue language is anything but ordinary and that the that because we share the same linguistic capa- constitution of meaning is connected to transiti- bilities, it is feasible to state that the necessity of vity, which is to say, in short, that the problem of certain forms of making choices will follow. In that truth is only understood in terms of reason, and sense, radically heterogeneous forms of govern- reason is only conceivable in terms of an analysis ment, for example, indicate disastrous strategies of language—for Tugendhat (1982; 2006), this in implementing government. It should then come means an analysis of the internal coherence of as no surprise that Habermas will support efforts sentences, for Habermas, an understanding of to establish a universal system of rights that will the pragmatics of language and speech acts. regulate different forms of assertion: diversity will These are solid and important points to be be possible within the parameters of communi- analyzed. After all, why should we abdicate con- The key passage here is “along with the system of rights, one must also create the language in which a community can understand itself as a voluntary association of free and equal consociates under law.”. 5 Fabrício Pontin Towards a phenomenological contribution for social criticism trol of the processes of meaning constitution? 7/10 (Habermas 1987, 137). Tugendhat is particularly eloquent on this mat- If for Schutz (1967; Schutz e Luckmann 1973) ters, as he convincingly shows how Heidegger’s the phenomenological attitude regarding the disregard for rationality as a guide to social action social constitution of meaning suggested that and preferences might have to lead him to opt for the multiplicity of meaning constitution referred some particularly horrifying policies, policies that to a multiplicity of lifeworlds that were constituted he defended using the very epistemological lan- intersubjectively and somehow passively, Haber- guage that would later ground much of the works mas suggests that we constitute meaning onto on phenomenology and ontology (Tugendhat a linguistically shared lifeworld, one that is not 1986, 217–218). Habermas was equally eloquent divided into differently constituted social reality, in his Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, where but where reality is interpreted successfully if and he makes a persuasive case for his normative only if we follow the parameters of a necessary and abstract conception of a rationally oriented attitude towards reason and mutual understan- lifeworld (Habermas 2007b, 346). ding. Husserl (1970) was right to point at a crisis Habermas is thus able to develop a notion of of legitimation in modern sciences, but he was lifeworld which is not connected to suppositions wrong when he thought the terms of this crisis of a transcendental nature; instead, it is connec- through a transcendental strategy. Moreover, if ted to the attitudes of other actual members of a we take Husserl seriously, consensus regarding community of speakers, which encompasses the the structure of social reality is impossible, and totality of individuals that can fulfill the conditions asserting the validity and normativity of truth of communicative reason – that is, the totality of claims becomes only possible within the para- adult individuals. A lifeworld is hence a totality of meters of a transcendentally posited subjectivity. meaning relations constricted by communicative The communicative position, wherein individuals reason (Habermas 2007b, 358-359), where indivi- can adopt an attitude towards mutual understan- duals and social groups choose preferences and ding, is hence impossible from the standpoint of values, minding that others are actually orienting a phenomenological perspective, at least as far themselves in a similar manner. This will allow as Habermas is concerned (Habermas 2007b). Habermas to defend the feasibility of the cos- Thus, Habermas does not provide a pheno- mopolitan model, which he sees as a fact in the menological account of the lifeworld, nor does European Enlightenment (Habermas 2007b, 360). he offer a misinterpretation of the main points of Nevertheless, does that mean a complete this concept in Husserl, as Dan Zahavi (2001, 191) abandonment of the presupposition of a phe- seems to indicate. Habermas creates his notion of nomenological perspective? Once Habermas the lifeworld as a stage in which communicative trusts language and speech acts as the basis practices may, and ought to, occur. Lifeworld is no of intersubjectivity, he replaces “the primacy longer interpreted as a topologic situation where of intentionality with that of linguistic commu- individuals constitute meaning differently, but as nication and understanding,” (Zahavi 2001, 181) a constrain to the possibilities of world formation which stresses a move away from the primacy and intersubjective practices. Dan Zahavi insists of perception and affection in the constitution of on an interpretation of such formation of the the world, privileging the place of reason and the lifeworld as if Habermas retained a phenomeno- constitution of a stable and homogenic normality. logical conception of consciousness (Zahavi 2001, Habermas cannot find in a phenomenological 188-206), but this is precisely the point in which methodology the elements for the construction a “rejoinder” with a phenomenological tradition of a systemic order of signification, or the con- is impossible: Habermas abandons the model tinuation of knowledge claims, in time, that will of consciousness to focus on the philosophy of lead to a stable, organized, and solidary society language as a clue to intersubjectivity. In that 8/10 Civitas 22: 1-10, jan.-dez. 2022 sense, when Habermas adopts the language of if the description of a given object does justice self-consciousness and self-representation, he is to the materiality of what is described. doing so in the terms developed by Tugendhat, But it seems to me that the central weakness which are incompatible with a transcendental of Habermas’ position is in his comprehension account of the self. of what is the normative level of analysis, that If we accept the terms of a Habermasian re- is, the level in which we constitute and appro- ading, then we will have to accept that a phe- priate something like a stable reference point nomenological reading of social reality leaves (Steinbock 1995). us without any grounds in which to still access Habermas (2015, 159) confesses that the level meaning constitution and moves the interpre- of pragmatic, ethical, and moral issues, and their tation of the processes of legitimation to a spa- reverberation in terms of a systemic organization ce where the validity of forms of legitimation of these issues, is purposed, from the standpoint is understood outside the realm of a universal of communicative reason, as an ought. I have leading clue for their interpretation—which, for suggested throughout this article that Habermas Habermas, will, without doubt, have disastrous resistance to a disordered constitution of the consequences in terms of the sort of policies we lifeworld arises from his conviction that we can will find ourselves accepting, as we will have no and should orient ourselves towards a rationally reason to state their irrational purpose. From the constituted system of values and that we have standpoint of a phenomenological take on a social enough elements to defend a homogenously constitution of reality, what support do we have formed and regulated lifeworld which will provide to state that defending stoning women to death individuals with an institutional framework where because of adultery is absurd and illegitimate? they will be able to fulfill their communicative If we are honest about the implications of a phe- potential. nomenological reading of society, should not we A norm, then, is understood as what a dialo- accept these forms of constitution as regionally gical agreement between parts operating on a constituted optimal interpretations of reality? Ha- legitimately built lifeworld reaches as a stable bermas does not think that the phenomenological reference regarding a determined type. This is take on consciousness allows us to answer these a heavily charged definition, as it presupposes questions while retaining a defense of a particular a determined notion of dialogue, agreement, core of rights that permeate humanity, as a whole, legitimacy, lifeworld, and reference. I suppose I regardless of local contingencies. have already clarified how communicative action will be foundational to each of these notions, Conclusion: towards a phenomenological contribution: the concrete limits of communicative reason It remains to be seen, however, if Habermas is right about phenomenology. I already anticipated some elements that Habermas fails to incorpo- particularly as it informs ethical relations within a lifeworld which in time will constitute the basis of a system of regulation for social action. This is a process of mutual nourishment, but supposes that the normative organization of a system that regulates social relations in a lifeworld is always already informed by a cultural stock of knowle- rate into his account, particularly the structure of dge that is universally shared in the structure of consciousness and passivity, which might suggest language. This process means that we have a limit persistent materiality for reality, which individuals to the organization of social priorities about the react to and incorporate within limits. This same materiality also allows us to point at modes of constitution that will be more or less satisfactory, in terms of the verifiability of the assertion, that is, good, and this limit is given by the structure of language, which frames and orients consensus about what is good. This is not to say that variations on the des- Fabrício Pontin Towards a phenomenological contribution for social criticism 9/10 cription of the good are not possible. As I have obsolete have a peculiar density that the idea of already emphasized, they are possible within communication reason does not seem to acknow- the parameters of communicative reason: in ledge properly. If anything, a phenomenological modern, secularized, societies this is to say that perspective could have helped Habermas realize the normative (systemic) point of view “will regu- the limitations of his ordinary understanding late our common life in the equal interest of all” of representation and communication and the (Habermas 2015, 161). However, this normative is passive and non-cognitive ghosts that haunt only a construction of a process of deliberation our representational, communicative practices. to a certain extent. Had Habermas remained on the level of description of a process of social deliberation as it referred to the historical construction of norms in societies, he would not have gone any further than Weber (1954). Once again, I must stress that this process has an ought-like structure in Habermas. Habermas is in a Platonic position here (Rawls 1992): the philosopher knows how to educate, inform and conduct society towards the normative patterns that are given in nature; he is in a privileged position regarding the knowledge of what society ought to look like and how discursive practices ought to operate. Interestingly, Habermas could have avoided this artificial position had he has not opted for a methodological strategy that allowed him to identify a linguistic structure in consciousness which frames communicative action in any context and that will further shape our judgments about less or more adequate social and epistemic action. This universalistic position in Habermas could, at first, be similar to the universal sociability that we find in Husserl, particularly in the Crisis (Husserl 1970). Still, Husserl’s later account of transcendental subjectivity (Husserl 1991; 2001a) and passivity (Husserl 2001a) allows us to understand the paradoxes in social action, especially as they relate to advanced democracies and their peculiar character and the contradictions within our social realities and encounters. This is not to say that a phenomenological and transcendental perspective would not bring a different set of issues, and certainly, there is much to be said about the limitations of the Husserlian perspective and its peculiar form of nominalism (Husserl, 2001b). Still, normative claims Habermas believes to have rendered phenomenology References Habermas, Jürgen. 1982. Was heißt Universalpragmatik. In Sprachpragmatik Und Philosophie, edited by Karl-Otto Apel, 174-272. Frankfurt Am Main: Suhrkamp. 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Husserl and transcendental intersubjectivity: a response to the linguistic-pragmatic critique. Ohio: Ohio University Press. Fabrício Pontin Doutor em Filosofia na Southern Illinois University, em Carbondael, IL, EUA; mestre em Filosofia pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (Pucrs), em Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil. Professor de Direito e Relações Internacionais e no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação na Universidade LaSalle (Unilasalle), em Canoas, RS, Brasil. Os textos deste artigo foram verificados pela Poá Comunicação e submetidos para validação do autor antes da publicação.