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Printed in the EU Contents List of Tables ........................................................................................vii List of Figures ..................................................................................... viii Acknowledgments................................................................................ xi Mykhailo Minakov, Georgiy Kasianov, Matthew Rojansky Introduction: From “the Ukraine” to “Ukraine” ............................... 1 Serhiy Kudelia and Georgiy Kasianov Chapter 1 Ukraine’s Political Development after Independence.... 9 Tymofiy Mylovanov and Ilona Sologoub Chapter 2 The Development of Ukraine’s Private Sector .............. 55 Yuliya Yurchenko, Pavlo Kutuev, Maksym Yenin, Hennadii Korzhov Chapter 3 Class Divisions and Social Inequality in Independent Ukraine.................................................................................................. 99 Margarita Balmaceda and Andrian Prokip Chapter 4 The Development of Ukraine’s Energy Sector ............ 141 Diana Dutsyk and Marta Dyczok Chapter 5 Ukraine’s Media: A Field Where Power Is Contested ............................................................................................ 173 Oksana Barshynova and Olena Martynyuk Chapter 6 Ukrainian Art of the Independence Era: Transitions and Aspirations.................................................................................. 211 Tymofii Brik and José Casanova Chapter 7 Thirty Years of Religious Pluralism in Ukraine .......... 253 Oksana Mikheieva and Oxana Shevel Chapter 8 The Development of National Identities in Ukraine .. 289 Mykhailo Minakov and Matthew Rojansky Chapter 9 Democracy in Ukraine .................................................... 327 Contributors ....................................................................................... 365 Index .................................................................................................... 373 List of Tables Table 1.1. Share of voters participating in presidential and parliamentary elections, 1991–2019 (%) Table 2.1. Number of enterprises sold by various methods, 1993– 2005 Table 2.2. Number of enterprises privatized during 1992–2017 Table 2.3. Output and employment structure in Ukraine, 2001– 2018 (%) Table 3.1. Respondents’ opinions on the importance of various factors for getting ahead in life, 2009 Table 3.2. Public assessment of fairness of the difference in income, wealth, and wage formation in Ukraine, 2019 (%) Table 3.3. Ukrainians’ perception of the type of society they live in and the type they want to live in (%) Table 7.1. Percentage of respondents who identify with any religious group, by macroregion, 1992–2018 Table 7.2. Church service attendance during the past week, Ukraine overall, 1994–2018 (%) Table 7.3. Religious (active) communities in Ukraine, 1993–2019 Table 7.4. Results of the fixed effect models, 1992–2018 vii List of Figures Figure 2.1. Exchange rate and the National Bank of Ukraine reserves Figure 2.2. Balance of trust in various institutions in Ukraine Figure 2.3. Share of small and microfirms in total employment by sector, 2017 Figure 2.4. Privatization of apartment units and individual houses in Ukraine, 1993–2005 Figure 2.5. Number of banks operating in Ukraine, by ownership, 1997–June 2019 Figure 3.1. Top 100 companies in Ukraine’s market in 2010, by form of ownership and country where domiciled Figure 3.2. Ukrainian corporate business groups’ ownership of Ukraine’s 45 biggest companies, 2010 Figure 3.3. Gross national income per capita in PPP (current USD), Ukraine, 1990–2018 Figure 3.4. Survey respondents’ self-assessment of their economic position Figure 3. 5. Visualization of social inequality: Types of society Figure 3.6. Responses to the statement “Incomes should be made more equal. We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort,” 2005 and 2011 (%) Figure 3.7. Ukraine’s public attitudes toward significant social stratification (rich-poor, upper-lower strata of society) (%) Figure 3.8. People’s attitudes toward creating equal opportunities for all in Ukraine (%) Figure 4.1. Energy balance of Ukraine, 2017: TPES and final energy consumption Figure 4.2. Total primary energy supply by source in Ukraine, 1990–2016 Figure 4.3. Implementation of European Energy Community obligations and commitments by Ukraine by mid-2020 Figure 7.1. Unemployment and religiosity in Ukraine’s macroregions, 1992–2018 viii  Figure 7.2. Ukrainian language and religiosity in Ukraine’s macroregions, 1992–2018 Figure 8.1. Survey respondents’ nationality distribution according to IS NASU, 1992–2010 (%) Figure 8.2. Self-perception of respondents who declared their nationality to be “Ukrainian” or “Russian,” Lviv, 1994 and 2004 (%) Figure 8.3. Self-perception of respondents who declared their nationality to be “Ukrainian” or “Russian,” Donetsk, 1994 and 2004 (%) Figure 8.4. Hierarchy of identities of residents of Ukraine, 2010 and 2015 (%) Figure 8.5. Which qualities should one have to be a true Ukrainian? Donetsk, 2010 and 2015 (%) Figure 9.1. Political and civic freedoms in Ukraine compared to Belarus and Moldova, 1991–2020  ix Chapter 8 The Development of National Identities in Ukraine Oksana Mikheieva and Oxana Shevel Introduction: Studying Identities in Ukraine and Elsewhere With the fall of the Soviet Union and the formation of fifteen independent states, social and cultural identities, and their change, continuity, and impact on political attitudes and behaviors, emerged as a central area of scholarly inquiry in societies where, until recently, survey research and interviews with ordinary citizens were off-limits. In a notable departure from the Cold War era, when Ukrainian studies were the purview of descriptive area studies, after 1991, Ukraine came to the forefront of identity studies by social scientists. Already in the late Soviet period, vexing and consequential questions had emerged. How significant was Soviet passport ethnicity (natsionalnist) in a Communist political regime? Were selfidentified titular ethnic groups, including Ukrainians, different in some ways—in their political attitudes, social behavior, or otherwise—from other groups (especially from self-identified ethnic Russians), and if so, how and why? Were officially designated Soviet ethnic groups meaningful groups at all if they were heterogeneous and not homogeneous? What forms did this heterogeneity take, and why? Was ethnic conflict between different ethnic groups (particularly between Ukrainians and Russians in the Ukrainian SSR) a distinct possibility? With ethnic conflicts raging in some parts of the Soviet Union already by the late 1980s but not engulfing all 180-plus Soviet nationalities, the potential for conflict between groups with different ethnic identifications was not well understood and in hindsight appears often to have been 289 290 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL overestimated. In the early 1990s, observers were making grave predictions about Ukraine in this regard, as some expected an ethnic conflict similar to the ones in Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Abkhazia to erupt in Crimea.61 Answers to questions about the nature and consequences of ethnic identities in the post-Soviet states were informed by alternative interpretations of Soviet nationality policies. During the Cold War, there were essentially two dominant views. One saw the USSR as a prison of nationalities wherein the Communist state suppressed non-Russian ethnic groups in the name of the (Russianspeaking) Communist project. Implicit in this view was the notion that ethnic identities themselves are fixed and lasting, suppressed but not transformed by the Soviet experience. The other view— ironically, similar to the Soviet state propaganda line—saw ethnic identities as largely obsolete, a vestige of the past that was made irrelevant by Soviet policies of “drawing closer” (sblizhenie) and “merging” (sliianie) different ethnic groups into a single “Soviet people” (sovetskii narod). In line with this view, studying Soviet nationalities was of marginal importance, and the locus of inquiry was to be directed toward the state and party leadership in Moscow. Neither of these views was able to explain the dramatic events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Ethnic differences and ethnic nationalism clearly played a role in the fall of the USSR, and scholars have documented the mobilization of ethnicity as a political force around the collapse of the Soviet Union (Beissinger, 2002). This undermined the second view—that the Communist experience rendered ethnic identities obsolete. At the same time, the strength of nationalist mobilization did not always correspond to the strength of ethnic differences, and the suppressed nationalities view could not explain why was it not the more ethnically, culturally, and linguistically distinct Central Asians but the less distinct Ukrainians who were more secessionist (Hale, 2008). Overall, neither view on the Soviet Union’s ethnic groups and ethnic politics from the Cold War period was equipped to answer questions such as how exactly ethnic identities and ethnic  61 Examples of such predictions are cited in Solchanyk (1998, pp. 539–40). DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 291 mobilization mattered, why ethnic mobilization took the form it did, and why it varied across different regions of the USSR. Difficulties in theorizing the nature and consequences of ethnic identities in the late Soviet and post-Soviet contexts echo challenges in the broader field of identity studies. Today’s social scientists broadly agree that identities are fluid, situational, and evolving. This scholarly consensus on the nature of social identities made constructivism a dominant paradigm in the field of identity studies. Unlike its alternative, primordialism, which sees identity as age-old and enduring (and sees each individual as belonging to only one ethnic group, with fixed group membership passed down through generations), constructivism emphasizes that identities are socially constructed, can and do change, and that individuals may have multiple overlapping and situationally contingent identities, including ethnic identities.62 Constructivism has its own theoretical and methodological challenge, however. If identity is fluid, multifaceted, and subject to change, how best to study such a slippery variable? Can the concept of identity be “too analytically loose” (Abdelal et al., 2006, p. 695) to be useful for explaining the effect of identities on social, political, and economic behavior? With no definitional consensus on the concept of identity, the state of the field of identity studies has been described as “definitional anarchy” (Abdelal et al., 2009, p. 17), and some have called for abandoning the concept altogether in favor of less ambiguous terms (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). In recent years, however, efforts to achieve conceptual clarity in the field of identity studies have yielded important results. Identity scholars have concluded that the debate between primordialists and constructivists is stale and no longer generates  62 Not everyone agrees with the sharp dichotomy between primordialism and constructivism. Hale, for example, posits that many leading primordialists would agree that people can have multiple identity dimensions or that identities are formed by social realities, but that primordialists “merely emphasize the tendencies to group stability and constraints on situational manipulation that are prevalent in many contexts after identities are constructed” (Hale, 2008, p. 15). Chandra likewise emphasizes that constructivism is not, as is often caricatured, a body of work that predicts unconstrained change in ethnic identities but acknowledges there are constraints on ethnic identity change (Chandra, 2012a, p. 19). 292 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL useful insights, and have called instead for advancing the constructivist paradigm (Chandra, 2012c). For this chapter’s focus, ethnonational identities in post-1991 Ukraine, theoretical advances in three areas are particularly noteworthy: the treatment of identity as a measurable variable, the achievement of greater precision of the “ethnicity” concept, and the specification of conditions under which and the mechanisms through which identity can have an impact on sociopolitical attitudes and actions. Clearer conceptualization of identity as a measurable variable is the subject matter of the seminal volume Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists (Abdelal et al., 2009). The contributors propose treating collective identities as having two dimensions: content, which describes the meaning of a collective identity, and contestation, which refers to the degree of agreement/ disagreement among members of the group over the content of a shared identity. With regard to ethnic and national identities, this approach allows identifying and measuring the content of ethnic and national identities in an empirically relevant manner, taking into account within-group differences and disagreements about the content of group identity. An important implication of such an approach is that the content of identity is malleable and situational and ought to be studied as such. For ethnic identity, this means that a different combination of attributes, such as language, religion, customs, and so forth, can make up the content of an ethnic identity in some places but not others. It also means that individuals choosing an ethnic identity can fill it with different content, and that researchers ought to recognize that people can attach different meanings to their identity choices and try to better understand what this process involves. What constitutes the content of a specifically ethnic identity is theorized in another recent edited volume, Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics (Chandra, 2012c). Noting that theorizing about ethnic identity “has an ad hoc quality to it, with scholars attributing to ethnic identity any property that their conclusions require” (Chandra, 2012a, p. 5). Chandra proposes defining ethnic identities “as a subset of categories in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership” (Chandra, 2012b, p. 93). DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 293 The distinction between attribute and category, with attributes qualifying individuals for membership in a category, and a further distinction between “nominal” and “activated” ethnic identities are valuable. Chandra’s framework takes into account that not all descent-based attributes necessarily produce ethnic identities and that all individuals possess a repertoire of nominal ethnic identities from which one or more can be activated. What these nominal identities are, and why and when a particular nominal identity or a combination of identities becomes activated, is context-specific. This chapter shows how in independent Ukraine, for different segments of the population who share certain attributes, different attributes can acquire and lose significance as markers of ethnic identity, and the factors that influence this process. In regard to Ukraine and the post-Soviet space more generally, Chandra’s conceptualization of ethnic identity should be applied with a caveat, given that the post-Soviet context concepts such as etnichnist/etnichna prynalezhnist and natsionalnist/natsionalna identychnist do not neatly align with the English-language terms “ethnicity/ethnic identity” and “nationality/national identity,” respectively. In conventional English usage as well as in the scholarly literature, “nationality” and “national identity” are terms commonly used to reference a group identity constructed on territorial or political criteria (“nationality” is often used conterminously with the term “citizenship”) rather than on descent-based or cultural characteristics. This is germane to the practices prevalent in Western democracies wherein the sense of belonging to a community of presumed descent is captured by the term “ethnicity.” In the post-Soviet context, however, nationalnist and natsionalna identychnist have a distinct ethnic connotation to them. The Soviet practice of assigning each citizen a natsionalnist, determined by the ethnicity of one’s parents, and of recording it in one’s passport infused the concept of natsionalnist with a more biological and thus more ethnic flavor than the term nationality commonly carries in English. At the same time, nationalnist is not fully identical to the term ethnicity, since in the Soviet and postSoviet context another term for ethnic identity exists—etnichnist or etnichna prynalezhnist. While Arel is correct that these latter terms 294 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL are rarely used in public discourse in postcommunist countries (Arel, 2002, p. 811), the term natsionalnist still has elements of both an ethnic and a political identity to it, thus straddling the line between the English terms nationality and ethnicity, rather than being fully coterminous with the term ethnicity. With a fully equivalent term for nationalnist unavailable, this chapter uses the English terms “nationality” and “national identity” to refer to natsionalnist and natsionalna identychnist, respectively. To illuminate the varying substance (content, in Abdelal and co-workers’ terms) of individual identity choices, the chapter pays particular attention to qualitative evidence from in-depth interviews in which individuals got to define what it means for them to self-identify as a Ukrainian or Russian (or other) by natsionalnist or when declaring a particular natsionalna identychnist. Finally, recent identity studies scholarship advances a third theoretical concept relevant to this chapter, the specification of conditions under which and the mechanisms through which ethnic identity may help shape individuals’ sociopolitical attitudes and actions. Hale (2008, p. 14) observes that constructivist scholarship continues to wrestle with what he terms the fundamental question of ethnicity: why and when do individuals think and act in terms of ethnic groups and nations? Incorporating insights from the field of psychology, Hale draws a distinction between the ethnic identification of individuals and group and individual behavior in political settings based on this identification. He argues that at the individual level, ethnic identity is driven by uncertainty reduction, and that this uncertainty reduction precedes the politics of interest and makes pursuit of interest possible. Ethnic identity thus does not inherently prescribe any particular (be it conflictual or cooperative) behavior by ethnic groups and their members. Whether conflict or cooperation will arise depends on a host of other factors and conditions under which groups pursue their interests.63 Conceptually separating (while allowing to relate) the study of ethnic identity and the study of behaviors and outcomes  63 These conclusions are backed by evidence from Ukraine and Uzbekistan from the time of the Soviet collapse in Hale’s study. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 295 informed by these identities affords much-needed flexibility and contextualization in explaining events such as the fall of the USSR or the presence or absence of ethnic violence in the post-Soviet states. According to Hale’s framework, both group collective action and intergroup conflict (or lack thereof) are a function of different groups’ pursuit of their interests under a given set of circumstances. Hale therefore calls for investigating groups’ interests and circumstances to answer questions such as why Ukraine didn’t experience ethnic violence during most of its post-Soviet history, for example, or why the conflict that took place in 2014 didn’t mirror existing ethnic or linguistic divides. The remainder of this chapter looks at the national identity of ordinary people in Ukraine during different time periods in the country’s recent history, starting with the national awakening in the late perestroika era. The Soviet Legacy and Its Impact on National SelfIdentifications in Ukraine The identities of modern Ukrainians cannot be fully understood without considering certain aspects of Soviet nationality policies, as the legacy of these policies remains visible today in both the conservation of “Sovietness” and the denial of it. The first model of the relationship between the Soviet state and the “national periphery” of the former Russian Empire was the korenizatsiya (“rooting”) policy of the 1920s. It expanded the use of national languages, creating opportunities for publishing, education, cultural expression, and the development of media in national languages (Hirsch, 2005; Martin, 2001). However, the key objective of this policy was to create a group of new, ideologically aware, managerial personnel, the loyal intelligentsia that would prepare minority “masses” to integrate in the USSR. Joseph Stalin subsequently abandoned korenizatsiya. Instead, nationality began to play the role of a key marker and a tool used by the state to manage groups of people. This is when the policy of legal fixation of nationality was introduced. From 1932, natsionalnist (meaning ethnicity) was recorded in the passport of every citizen 296 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL and in other official documents. Nationality was ascriptive, attached to a person at birth and inherited from that person’s parents. Traditionally, a child’s nationality would be recorded as that of the father, although in interethnic marriages it was possible to take the mother’s nationality. This created a narrow opportunity for reconfiguring one’s national identity in a more promising way regarding future life and career. Such a decision could be made at the age of sixteen and thereby was a conscious choice. This choice was often influenced by motivations to choose Russian nationality, which at the time ensured belonging to the “first among equals,” and thus is frequently viewed as a component of Soviet assimilation policy, the results of which researchers have documented (Anderson & Silver, 1983). Nationality thus became a clear marker of a person, allowing control over their loyalty. Despite official rhetoric of the national cultures’ free development, national expressions were tightly controlled for their ideological conformity, with only those national expressions deemed sufficiently “socialist in content” permitted by the state, while any “bourgeoisie nationalism” was harshly punished. Nationality often became a criterion for the selection of victims. From the mid-1930s until the late 1950s, the Soviet Union underwent waves of repressions conducted on a national basis (Nikolsky, 2003). Mass deportations of ethnic groups and nations, such as the 1944 mass deportation of the whole Crimean Tatar nation, which was accused wholesale of being Nazi collaborators, and social restrictions for people of certain nationalities, such as restricted access to higher education for young Jewish people, became signs of the times. Therefore, for an average person, there were at least two dimensions of nationality. On the one hand, nationality was the right to belong to a certain community, a feeling of cultural and linguistic closeness, common traditions, and the like. On the other hand, it became a marker that could create stigma and even pose a direct threat to life, and that served as a powerful tool to instill loyalty of social groups. Even as the political regime under Nikita Khrushchev relaxed a bit, nationality remained fixed in official documents. At the same DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 297 time, various decisions were made to “mix” people within the USSR, which was realized through labor mobilization, distribution, and compulsory employment of graduates, and through military service and the promotion of interethnic marriages in other regions and republics of the Soviet Union. With administratively enforced mixing, the Russian language consolidated its status as the “language of international communication.” This is the time when the birth of the “Soviet person” took place (Gudkov, 2009). The 1977 constitution of the USSR legally codified the emergence of the new historical ethnopolitical community of the “Soviet people,” although official promotion of a supraethnic Soviet national identity continued to coexist with institutionalized multiethnicity and ethnic categorization in Soviet passports.64 Another important element of the Soviet project of pressing the coexistence of national cultures was the blurring of the connection between nationality and territory. The Soviet Union declared itself to be a union of fifteen republics, which had their own boundaries. However, these boundaries existed only on the map. Soviet citizens did not face any border-crossing procedures within the country, nor was there any internal republican citizenship like that in other multiethnic socialist federations such as Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. While realizing their “attachment” to a certain republic, people saw themselves in a wider context as inhabitants of a big country that occupied “onesixth of the Earth’s land mass,” as the official documents had it. The policy of mixing people further decoupled nationality and statehood in people’s minds. Blurring the boundaries between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the Byelorussian SSR, and the Ukrainian SSR in particular contributed to the Soviet myth of Kievan Rus’ as the “cradle of brotherly nations” (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) and of the so-called “East Slavic unity” and the specific “East Slavic world.”  64 For an analysis of this dual policy and Soviet state’s inability to eliminate regime of institutionalized ethnicity to advance the “Soviet people” project, see Aktürk (2012, p. 198). 298 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL From Perestroika to the Emergence of the Ukrainian Citizen The Soviet Union’s internal crisis prompted the “parade of sovereignties” in 1988–1991, when multiple republics adopted sovereignty declarations, culminating in the collapse of the USSR and the proclamation of fifteen sovereign states within its former territory. Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) policy had an enormous impact on the politically engaged public. Its Ukrainian version involved not only the new freedom of speech but also the raising of national issues sensitive for the Soviet center. These issues included the language question: the problem of limited teaching in the Ukrainian language in Ukraine’s educational system and the “white spots” (gaps) in Ukraine’s history. It was during glasnost that the public debate on issues that were banned during the Soviet era, such as the Holodomor, political repressions, persecutions, and deportations, began. Overcoming the Soviet “organized oblivion” (Connerton, 1989) led to rethinking the historical past, particularly through the lens of often tragic family stories. While the national revival in the late 1980s was significant, the homogeneity of the “pro-Ukrainian” motivation at the time has been questioned. The centrifugal tendencies were driven not only by national grievances but by socioeconomic interests as well. The 1980s miners’ strikes that took place in the coal-mining regions of Ukraine (Rusnachenko, 1995) were a reaction to unsolved economic and social problems in the industry, the high rate of industrial injury, labor groups’ dependence on administrations, and the nearly complete powerlessness of workers. The Soviet rhetoric of workers’ solidarity ensured miners’ unity, which was further reinforced by the family dynasties in the industry. The economic demands were followed by political slogans that did not emphasize the importance of the national statehood but rather saw the independence of Ukraine as an opportunity to solve local problems without approval from the government in Moscow. The republic’s elites saw significant political opportunities for themselves in the independent country, and there was also an DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 299 emerging entrepreneurial class recognizing opportunities in open markets. Thus, behind the high turnout at the referendum and significant popular support for independence, there was a mix of different interests of both old and new social groups of the former USSR. Because of this heterogeneity of motivations for supporting independence, the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state did not mean the immediate formation of the “Ukrainian citizen.” On the one hand, there was a significant national awakening, a rethinking of history, and gradual state-building with its key symbols and attributes, such as independent administrative structures, national symbols, and an independent economy and monetary system. On the other hand, the 1990s economic crisis that decimated various social groups made people rethink the collapse of the USSR. As Boym has observed, nostalgia often follows revolutionary changes (Boym, 2001), and in the years after independence there emerged a nostalgia phenomenon that, in the mid-2000s, also affected young people born after the collapse of the USSR. The emergence of Ukrainian identity was initially studied through the term “nationality” (natsionalnist). This is how survey questions were formulated, and those questions and answers constitute the quantitative information that is the basis for our interpretations today. Respondents’ answers to questions about their nationality and national identity to a great extent depended on how the questions were worded, however, as well as on the questionnaire design and context. As Hopf has observed, attempting to capture identity from survey research where “survey questions are specified in advance limit[s] the choices subjects have [and] forc[es] subjects to choose identities they may never have even considered in the first place” (Hopf, 2016, p. 12). Furthermore, we cannot know whether individual people ever thought about their identity or even whether it was important for them before the moment a researcher raised the question. Therefore, we don’t know whether the answer we get is a result of long reflection or an immediate reaction of people choosing from a list what they think is the closest to how they see themselves. Is nationality really 300 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL important for interviewees, or is it just a formality that shows they administratively belong to a certain state? Taking into account the complexity of interpreting quantitative data, we examine the key tendencies. The last two censuses conducted in Ukraine, in 1989 and 2001, show that at the beginning of Ukrainian statehood and on its tenth anniversary, the percentage of Ukrainians increased, while the percentage of Russians, the largest ethnic minority in Ukraine, decreased. Thus, in the 1989 census, 72.2 percent of the population self-identified as Ukrainian by nationality and 22.1 percent as Russian; the corresponding figures in the 2001 census were 77.8 percent and 17.3 percent, respectively. Similar tendencies are evident from several surveys, including annual monitoring conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (IS NASU) (Shulha & Vorona, 2010, p. 610) (figure 8.1). DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 301 Figure 8.1. Survey respondents’ nationality according to IS NASU, 1992–2010 (%) 1992 1,1 1994 0,4 3,9 0,0 1998 3 0,0 2000 2,4 0,0 2002 2,8 0,2 2004 3,7 0,0 2005 2,9 0,1 2006 2,3 0,0 2008 1,8 0,1 2010 3,1 0,0 72,3 22,6 4,7 1996 68,9 22,4 5,5 distribution 73,2 22,9 74,8 22,2 76,1 21,4 77,1 19,6 76,6 19,7 79,6 17,4 80,4 17,3 82,1 16 84,7 12,2 Ukrainian Russian Other No response  Source: Data from the annual survey of IS NASU. It is not only outmigration that accounts for the decrease in the number of Russians over time. A part of the population revised their identities (Romaniuk & Gladun, 2015; Stebelsky, 2009). A formal basis for such a revision was the abolition of the nationality indication in Ukrainian passports in 1994, which allowed the average person to construct their own national identity regardless of the previous official records. Indirect evidence of this process is provided by 2001 census data on nationality disaggregated by age. Children (data provided by their parents) and young people who declared their nationality during the perestroika era and in the context of an already 302 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL independent Ukraine were more likely to self-identify as Ukrainian. Ukrainian nationality was chosen by 80–85 percent of respondents in the twenty-four years and younger age group, with the percentage increasing as age decreased. The dynamic of Russian nationality choice showed the opposite trend: the percentage of respondents choosing Russian nationality decreased as the age of the respondents decreased (State Statistical Committee of Ukraine, 2001). This allows the assumption that mostly young people, who do not have a long experience of living with an “attached” nationality, choose “Ukrainian” as a category of both ethnicity and citizenship. However, because of the questions’ wording, it is almost impossible to test this assumption, nor can we ascertain the relationship between respondents’ declared nationality and their subjective feeling of national identity. Shifting the research focus from the language of official sociodemographic indicators to feelings and self-perceptions reveals differences between declared nationality and its interpretation. In the first waves of the survey “Sociological Analysis of Group Identities and Hierarchies of Social Loyalties” (Institute of Sociology, University of Michigan, et al., 1994) there was not only a question about respondents’ “passport” nationality but also questions about their self-perception.65 The questions’ wording was the same in 1994 and 2004. Respondents were first asked, “What is your nationality?” (Q1). Question 2 (Q2) was as follows: “People think about themselves differently in different situations they face. Could you please tell me, with respect to about each term that I will mention, how well it fits your description of yourself: very well, not quite well, not well at all.” Using this scale, respondents had to evaluate to what extent such identities as “Ukrainian,” “Russian,” and “Soviet person” were suitable for them. That was a multiple-choice question. Finally, in question 3  65 This international project was organized by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; the Institute of Historical Research at Franko National University, Lviv; and the Petro Yatsik Research Program of Modern History, Lviv-Donetsk, with surveys conducted in 1994 (n = 821) and 2004 (n = 800). DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 303 (Q3), respondents had to choose one of these options (or “other”) as their main identity. Figures 8.2 and 8.3 compare respondents’ answers to Q1 and Q3. Figure 8. 2. Self-perception of respondents who declared their nationality to be “Ukrainian” or “Russian,” Lviv, 1994 and 2004 (%) 97,2 94,4 52,4 15,3 0,3 2 3,2 1,2 0,8 0,8 Ukrainian,1994 Ukrainian, 2004 48,4 38,6 15,3 17 Russian, 1994 6,5 6,5 Russian, 2004 Self-perception as Ukrainian Self-perception as Russian Self-perception as Soviet person Self-perception as other  Figure 8.3. Self-perception of respondents who declared their nationality to be “Ukrainian” or “Russian,” Donetsk, 1994 and 2004 (%) 75 62,6 46,6 44,5 41,1 44,1 14,7 5,2 2,1 Ukrainian,1994 7,1 13,7 3,1 Ukrainian, 2004 7 15,3 6,5 Russian, 1994 8,4 Russian, 2004 Self-perception as Ukrainian Self-perception as Russian Self-perception as Soviet person Self-perception as other  304 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL As we can see, respondents who in a one-choice question about nationality self-identified as “Ukrainian” or “Russian” in fact combined a feeling of belonging to Ukrainian, Russian, and Soviet people at the same time, although in different proportions. Data disaggregated by time period reveal a movement toward more homogeneous and explicit identities, as well as an increase in the number of respondents identifying themselves as Ukrainian and a decrease in the number identifying as a “Soviet person.” However, it is not always clear how respondents interpret being “Soviet” when identifying themselves in this way. Is it an expression of nostalgia for the Soviet era, reflecting the marginal status of a person not able to get used to the new reality of an independent country and thus living in the Soviet past? The interview evidence presented later in the chapter shows that people may self-identify as Soviet just because they were born or went to school during the Soviet era. Therefore, such an identity is rather formal and does not prevent a person from being successful and well integrated into modern Ukrainian society. In general, we can speak of dynamic processes of ethnonational self-determination of Ukrainian citizens and an ambivalence of declaratory and subjective self-characteristics. This highlights the need to study how average persons construct their ethnicity/nationality, which place ethnic/national occupies in their hierarchy of identities, and how they adapt their identity to a changing society and new realities. What does it mean to identify oneself in a certain way, through a certain concept? Ukrainians’ Identities under Conditions of Crisis and War Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts has often been described in the media as a conflict, with ethnic undertones, between the “Russian world” and the “Ukrainian” political project. Under conditions of war, society seeks greater certainty and forces people not only to demonstrate their loyalty but to prove it in a certain way. For the average person, this creates a complicated and DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 305 uncomfortable situation of forced self-identification in relation to others and the state in quite unambiguous ethnonational terms. Nationality, even though no longer indicated in official documents, becomes an important statement of loyalty. Therefore, it can be assumed that under these conditions, the Russian-Ukrainian war identity underwent serious transformations. The process of transition from peace to war, starting in 2014, pushed the average person to rethink their national identity, to build new distances and criteria for distinguishing between themselves and the others (“us” and “them”), and to reset the boundaries and conditions of interaction. The last two iterations of the survey “Sociological Analysis of Group Identities and Hierarchies of Social Loyalties” (2010 and 2015) provide grounds to think about those shifts. One of the survey questions allowed respondents to choose an unlimited number of identities from the list and to add their own if needed. The result was the hierarchy of key identities shown in figure 8.4 (starting with the most important one): citizen of Ukraine, Ukrainian, resident of my city or town, woman/man. 306 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL Figure 8.4. Hierarchy of identities of residents of Ukraine, 2010 and 2015 (%) 62,2 59,1 52,2 44,3 49,5 45,9 44,7 40,3 40,5 39,2 37,6 23 2010 36,9 34,2 23,7 22,4 19,1 19,3 20,2 18,7 2015 Source: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, et al. (1994), and subsequent data sets compiled by the same project. Note: Survey sample: 2010, n = 2,014; 2015, n = 2,375. Although the set of key identities remained the same between 2010 and 2015, in 2015 we can see such options as “citizen of Ukraine” and “Ukrainian” being chosen less frequently. This decrease is directly related to a significant reconfiguration of identity in the occupied territories (Donetsk remained one of the research locations in 2015). A comparison of the data for different cities shows that while there were some differences between Kyiv and Lviv, within each city there were no significant changes during the time period studied, whereas in Donetsk the changes were drastic. In both Lviv and Kyiv, the options “Ukrainian” and “citizen of Ukraine” were the top two choices in the identity hierarchy in both 2010 and 2015. In Lviv, the choice “Ukrainian” increased slightly from 79.5 percent to 82.1 percent between 2010 and 2015, while the  DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 307 choice “citizen of Ukraine” decreased slightly from 66 percent to 63.9 percent. In Kyiv, the same tendency was observed: 59.3 percent chose “Ukrainian” in 2010 and 66.1 percent in 2015. The “citizen of Ukraine” choice decreased slightly, from 59.3 percent to 55.4 percent. Under wartime conditions, a drastic reconfiguration of the hierarchy of identities occurred in Donetsk: the number of Donetsk residents who chose the identities “citizen of Ukraine” and “Ukrainian” both decreased dramatically (from 51.7 percent in 2010 to 7 percent in 2015 for “citizen of Ukraine,” and from 34.3 percent in 2010 to 15 percent in 2015 for “Ukrainian”). Here we should note that, under the conditions of the Russian occupation, respondents do not feel safe when answering such questions. That is, when survey respondents have doubts about who collects the data and why, their answers do not reflect their real feelings but rather show a compromised self-image they have developed, one that does not contradict their own feelings and at the same time is acceptable in their surroundings. An average Donetsk resident finds a solution in referencing the obvious options, such as gender or the region or city where the respondent lives. In 2015, the top identity choices in Donetsk were, respectively, “woman” (50.6 percent), “resident of the city” (41.9 percent), and “man” (38.4 percent). Gender identities were prominent in 2010 as well, being second (for “woman”) and fourth (for “man”) in the ten-options hierarchy, but if in 2010, “citizen of Ukrainian” was the top choice (chosen by 51.7 percent), in 2015 this option dropped to last place, with just 7 percent choosing this identity option Answers to another question, requiring respondents to evaluate to what extent certain criteria determine a “true Ukrainian,” do not show a similar escape to more neutral options of self-characterization. This question allowed respondents to describe an “abstract” Ukrainian instead of talking directly about  66 Question: “Some people believe that it is important to have the following qualities to be a true Ukrainian. The others say they are not important. In your opinion, to what extent is each of the following factors important for being a true Ukrainian: very important, rather important, rather unimportant, not important at all?” 308 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL themselves. Moreover, in 2015, there was a rise in the number of respondents in Donetsk pointing out that a “true Ukrainian” should be loyal to the state (from 29.7 percent to 38.7 percent) and should speak the Ukrainian language (from 23.8 percent to 30.6 percent). Figure 8.5. Which qualities should one have to be a true Ukrainian? Donetsk, 2010 and 2015 (%) 55,2 52,2 38,7 36,1 29,4 29,7 26,6 22,3 24,4 28,7 30,6 23,8 23,5 16,2 Feel Hold Loyal to Have lived Born in Speak Be Ukrainian Ukrainian Ukrainian in Ukraine Ukraine Ukrainian Orthodox citizenship state entire language lifetime 2010 2015 Note: Sample size: 2010, n = 414; 2015, n = 401. Data generated by the research project “Region, Nation and Beyond. An Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconceptualization of Ukraine” (University of St. Gallen, 2013)67 allow examination of the specifics of the national self-identification of Ukrainians in key periods. The survey was conducted in 2013 (before the Euromaidan and the Russo-Ukrainian war), in 2015 (a time of revolutionary events, war, and the immediate consequences of both), and in 2017. Respondents first had to answer a standard  67 This international project was initiated by the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and funded by the Danyliw Foundation and the Swiss National Foundation (grant no. CR11I1L_135348). There were six iterations, in 2013, 2015, and 2017. Survey sample = 6,000 for each year. Respondents who indicated their nationality as Ukrainian: 2013, n = 4,972; 2015, n = 5,315; 2017, n = 5,309. Respondents who indicated their nationality as Russian: 2013, n = 765; 2015, n = 413; 2017, n = 406.  DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 309 question about their nationality (“What is your nationality?”). Then the survey tapped into people’s self-perceptions, including the ethnic, civic, and mythological grounds for an identity choice: “To what extent do you feel yourself . . . Ukrainian, Russian, a member of the East Slavic community, European?” At the level of self-perception, we see that the same person can feel him- or herself belonging to all of these imagined communities, though in different proportions. However, when we compare 2013 to 2017 data, we find that among those selecting Ukrainian as their nationality, there was a slight increase in those who felt themselves Ukrainian (from 94.5 percent to 95.8 percent) and a substantial decrease in those who felt themselves Russian (from 9.7 percent to 4.5 percent). The percentage of those who felt themselves to be European or belonging to a Slavic community remained largely unchanged from 2013 to 2017, with 35–40 percent declaring this self-perception at both time periods. Respondents who selected Russian as their nationality also demonstrated certain changes in self-identification, with a significant increase in those who felt themselves to be Ukrainian (from 42.7 percent to 55.5 percent) and a significant decrease in those who felt themselves to be Russian (from 83.6 percent to 72.7 percent). The percentage of those who felt themselves to be European also decreased somewhat (from 29.8 percent to 26.1 percent), while the percentage of those who felt themselves to belong to a Slavic community increased (from 44.2 percent to 51.7 percent). In general, we can observe quite stable parameters of national identity (although we cannot know what exactly a person means when they choose a certain nationality, so we don’t know whether an identity choice has primarily ethnic or civic components). A fundamental change in political context in one’s life makes people rethink the spectrum of social groups to which they belong and build new social distances. However, when political and social pressure decreases, the identity of an average person could return to its prior form. 310 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL National Self-Identification of Ukrainian Citizens: Qualitative Lens I: What is your nationality? R: Russian. R: I don’t know, I don’t know. It doesn’t mean anything, like at all, really. . . . I’ve just thought about it now, I even recalled that my nationality on the passport is “Russian.” But in all these polls I’ve always responded “Ukrainian.” That is, I lied. Oh, yes, Russian on the passport. And now they don’t record it. Female, 67, Vinnytsia This exchange perfectly illustrates the ambiguity of national identity and demonstrates that the declaratory identity revealed in response to survey questions does not represent the whole spectrum of possible meanings people may associate with a certain national or ethnic identity. Qualitative methods infuse declaratory identities with depth and details. Our analysis is based on in-depth interviews conducted between 2013 and 2018 (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies [CIUS], 2017–2018; Catholic University of Ukraine, 2014–2015; IDP Ukraine, 2016; University of St. Gallen, 2013, 2016).68 This time period is particularly interesting as it allows examination of how an average person constructs their national identity in Ukrainian  68 IDP Ukraine, representing a research team from the University of Birmingham, University of Oxford, and Ukrainian Catholic University, conducted in-depth and semistructured interviews with internally displaced peoples (IDPs) (n = 104) in Lviv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia oblast, and Mariupol, and with representatives of NGOs, international organizations, central and municipal authorities (n = 25). The Cultural Contact Zones project, initiated in 2016 by the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, includes a subproject on the cultural adaptation of refugees in Ukraine and surrounding countries that conducted sixty-one in-depth interviews. The Catholic University of Ukraine was funded by the British embassy in Ukraine and the Ukrainian Peacekeeping School to carry out seventy in-depth interviews in 2014–2015 as part of the Present Ukrainian Refugees project. The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies in 2017–2018 funded the project Women and War: Everyday Life on the Occupied Territories. Twenty-four in-depth interviews were conducted in non-government-controlled areas, twenty-five in government-controlled areas, and twenty-five of Ukraine IDPs. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 311 society in a time of relative peace, as well as during times of significant social changes, such as the Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea, and the Russian occupation of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. These events were perceived and interpreted ambiguously by both state actors and the general public. Average people were forced to choose between things that before had coexisted in their mind without any conflict. Most of the studies conducted between the 1990s and the Euromaidan in the winter of 2013–2014 demonstrated the ambivalence of Ukrainian society: a combination of “pro-Western” and “pro-Russian” positions, simultaneous positive attitudes toward integration with the EU and with the former USSR republics, and so forth (Golovakha, 1992; Golovakha & Panina, 1994; Golovakha, Panina, & Parakhonska, 2011; Hrytsak, 2011; Riabchuk, 2009). The context of hybrid warfare and Russian aggression demanded clear self-determination that would make it possible to distinguish between “us” and “them.” High expectations and a quite rigid, though situational and not universal, division into “us” and “them” increased the degree of uncertainty and provoked a whole range of reactions, from marking oneself explicitly with certain symbols to hiding one’s views through self-censorship. In the interviews analyzed here, participants were asked whether they thought of themselves in national or ethnic categories. They were then asked to clarify what they meant by belonging to the group which they indicated. Ukrainians’ National Identity on the Eve of the Euromaidan The analysis in this section is based on 116 in-depth interviews conducted in 2013 in thirteen regions (oblasts) of Ukraine (University of St. Gallen, 2013). Starting with participants who described themselves as Ukrainian by nationality, some referred to the set of characteristics that fit the primordial notion of nations and justified their identification as Ukrainians by pointing to common roots, land, ancient traditions, or a special mentality. For example: 312 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL I grew up here, on this holy land, independent land, here. My parents come from here. My mum is a bit from the other side, but she’s Ukrainian, not Polish, Ukrainian. And my father is Ukrainian. We’re all Ukrainian. (Male, 58, Lutsk) Being Ukrainian, it means to me to respect my language, my nationality, my people, my culture, our holidays, our food, our way of life, well, just like for anyone else. (Female, 18, Chernihiv) When describing the “common traditions,” participants demonstrated retention of the colonial clichés from the Russian imperial era that made their way into Soviet models of “Ukrainianness.” These clichés imply that the role of Ukrainians is to entertain and feed, to amuse with their simplicity and attractiveness: Which traditions? Well, for example, firstly, Ukrainian dance, ’cause how do we present our country, we need our own dance, our own cuisine, right, our korovai. Our people know how to do it, to dish it up, well, that’s it, maybe something else. Our sharovary and vinok ,69 the clothing as well. (Female, 55 Chernihiv). In participants’ detailed explanations of their chosen nationality, linking nationality to blood and recognizing its hereditary was not the only explanation participants gave for their choice of nationality. Participants also saw choosing a particular nationality as a rational choice based on belonging to a state. There were also references to situations that respondents considered paradoxical, for example, when two children brought up by the same parents choose different nationalities when applying for passports at age sixteen: R: That’s a whole story how I was choosing my nationality. You must know it, as we were growing up, there were “Soviet people.” I was 16 years old, I had to choose, to fill in the first document, and I was sitting and calculating, really, like what I’d got more of, Russian or Ukrainian [relatives, roots], I was calculating like that. And then the last argument outweighed, I was born in Ukraine. I am Ukrainian. But the most interesting thing is that, after 10 years, my brother and sister, they’re twins, in one mother’s womb, you  69 Sharovary are traditional baggy trousers worn by Ukrainian Cossacks. Vinok is a flower wreath worn around the head by Ukrainian women and girls. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 313 know. They came to me, their elder sister, I am much older, and they asked— I: “—what should we choose?” R: Yes. I told them what I’d calculated, how many and on which side, how I was deciding, and they’ve made their decisions. My sister is Russian, and my brother is Ukrainian. Like this. Female, 52, Kharkiv Attributing to one’s ethnic nationality both ethnic and civic meaning is also documented by Kulyk. He theorizes that formerly self-identified ethnic Russians who transition to a Ukrainian identity make this transition as a civic choice, but once the transition takes place, people embrace the traditional perception of natsionalnist as an ethnocultural category and rationalize their new identity “as a reflection of their inherited (even if for some time neglected) ethnocultural essence” (Kulyk, 2018, p. 11). Natsionalnist answers therefore are likely capturing some combination of ethnic and civic identities, and at different times respondents may be attaching a more or less civic or ethnic meaning to the natsionalnist question. At the same time, it is important to point out that the biggest group of the respondents comprised those who did not inject any meaning into their responses about their nationality. Rather, they indicated nationality according to formal signs (mostly nationality on the passport, or the place of birth). As one respondent put it in her answer to the question, “What does being Ukrainian mean to you?”: It’s what’s written in my passport. . . . Well, there is some pride in ethnicity, but it’s not like I’m really concerned about that, no.” (Female, 31, Lutsk) Another respondent stated that being Ukrainian means “well, because I live here. Or what?” (Male, 50, Lutsk), while another put it succinctly: “Born in Ukraine, Ukrainian then” (Male, 22, Vinnytsia). When a person is not in conflict with their group and is a carrier of a general culture model shared by everyone, they consider their position to be something organic, completely 314 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL obvious, requiring no detailed explanation. In Gellner’s terms, under such circumstances, one’s cultural identity is “like the air [one] breathes, taken for granted” (Gellner, 1983, p. 61). In these interviews, we can observe two ways in which participants who did not inject any particular meaning into their responses about their nationality explained the nationality they indicated. One way, a person considered their nationality as something really obvious and not requiring additional arguments. The other way, nationality was a formality meaning nothing particular for a respondent. As for the participants who indicated their nationality as Russian,70 they tend to justify their response to nationality question more explicitly. They gave extensive descriptions, providing many details and searching for arguments that would validate their identity choice. Participants choosing Russian nationality often emphasized their Ukrainian roots, constructing a connection with their state of residency this way. Although this connection is often quite relative, it becomes an additional argument enabling such self-identification—for instance, through Ukrainian Cossacks, who would call themselves “russkiie”: I am Russian, but I’ve got Ukrainian roots as well, but those who were Cossacks, they would basically call themselves “Russkiie,” some of them. . . . Being Russian means to be Russian, to love your nation, your history, your culture, not to give up, to keep fighting if there are some problems. And, well, to live normally. (Male, 28, Kyiv) Participants also referred to the modern constructs of “civic” nations, which allows incorporating different ethnic groups into national self-identification based on citizenship. In this way, they fit their “Russianness” into the Ukrainian political space:  70 In the Russian language there are two words for Russian nationality, which have different connotations. The first term, rossiiskii, refers to modern Russian statehood and citizenship, while the second term, russkii, is more ethnic. This particular respondent, as well as some others, used the second term (russkii) when talking about his national identity. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 315 R: I was raised with Russian culture, that’s the way things are. We’re all Russian-speaking, well, my grandma would speak Surzhyk71 when her sister visited her, but basically we’re all Russian-speaking. I: You’re all Russian-speaking, right? Ok, I see, Russian culture. R: Yes, it’s rather about culture, but otherwise I’m Ukrainian, of course. I: I see, like you’re Russian, but Ukrainian citizen, right? R: Yes, but Russian ethnicity, I’d say. Male, 43, Kharkiv Contradiction and ambiguity in self-identification manifest in speech constructs, for example when a participant indicated his nationality as Russian and then said that he was “Catholic, unfortunately.” The ambiguity of this participant’s position is also evident from his thinking on how his mother’s nationality turned out to be meaningful for the next generations of their family when he was asked to clarify why the “unfortunately”: Well, I mean, some people just say, “What? Russian and Catholic?” I’ve got Polish roots, my mum’s Polish, and she’s got a great pedigree, and my grandson . . . he knows four generations of his [relatives], and I can say proudly that he knows his grandfathers and great-grandfathers and greatgrandmothers, that is, I believe, it’s what he inherited from his parents. (Male, 50, Odesa) There is also indirect evidence of some discomfort, an intention to avoid speaking about one’s own identity in a country where there is a greater demand for Ukrainian identity. This leads to a version of hide-and-seek, when entire social groups begin to hide the fact of their existence: My nationality is Russian. Today, many do not admit [being Russian], we are considered Ukraine today, but I was born in Russia. (Female, 53, Uzhgorod) Participants who self-identified with other nationalities, except Ukrainian and Russian, mostly constructed their national identity in relation to the state and citizenship. Their own  71 Surzhyk (Ukrainian: ȟȡȞȔȖȘ) is a mix of Ukrainian and Russian languages. 316 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL nationality was not rejected but was embedded in an existing political context. There are also models of identity informed by (un)favorable comparisons between an image of a country of residence and a territory of ethnic origin. For example, a 53-yearold man from Odesa explained his choice of Belarusian identity as follows: There’s a lot of positive things there, but, you know, compared to Ukraine, Belarus is smaller, there’s much less natural resources, but still a stronger economy. And that’s why I am proud of Belarus. Overall, detailed explanations by participants of their nationality choices revealed a multiplicity of possible reasons for choosing a nationality, which stemmed from respondents’ personal and family experiences and from the historical and contemporary circumstances of their lives. A fluidity of identity choices is further illustrated by the fact that some participants even changed their national identity during the course of the interview. Thus a declared nationality alone cannot be a reliable source for evaluating the success or failure of the state’s nation-building policies, nor can it conclusively show an increase or decrease in civic consciousness or provide an explanation of political choice. Ongoing debates as to whether civic identities in Ukraine increased (Haran & Yakovlyev, 2017; Kulyk, 2016; Pop-Eleches & Robertson, 2018) or didn’t (Zhuravlev & Ishchenko, 2020) over time, in particular since the Euromaidan, therefore cannot be conclusively resolved looking at declared identities alone. The Transformation of Identities in the Context of the Euromaidan and the Russian Military Intervention Whether conflict homogenizes and polarizes ethnic identities or, on the other hand, sustains or even reinforces mixed identities remains both understudied and a matter of debate (Sasse & Lackner, 2020a, pp. 359–360). The internal political crisis that resulted in the Euromaidan and subsequent Russian intervention activated the processes of self-determination in Ukrainian society. Qualitative interviews conducted with different groups of participants since 2014 capture key tendencies in the formation of new identity DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 317 constructs by people directly experiencing military conflict and, under the pressure of circumstances, forced to rethink their social positions and self-perceptions. We can see national identity gaining renewed salience for participants who reinvent new selfidentifications, revise previously held identities, and continue to search for meaningful identities that are still fragmented. In the comments of the respondents who experienced the trauma of military conflict and who continued to reside on the occupied territories or became displaced, we see people actively constructing and searching for meaningful identities (Catholic University of Ukraine, 2014–2015; IDP Ukraine, 2016; University of St. Gallen, 2016). Recent studies have shown the identities of people affected by conflict in the Donbas undergoing changes throughout the duration of this conflict (Sasse & Lackner, 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Intense changes under the pressure of extreme circumstances occurred within a short time period, with traumatic events marking a watershed between the past and the present selves. Most of the participants confirmed the significant impact of these events on their self-determination, and emphasized a sudden awareness of their own national identity: When the military actions took place, the meaning and understanding of belonging and nationality strengthened in my family, we began to value our belonging, to respect it more, to be proud of it, to notice and understand we’re Ukrainian. . . . I am Ukrainian, and I am proud of it! I believe that the military actions have helped to strengthen this thought and these feelings. I am Ukrainian not just by passport, but by my thoughts and spirit as well. (Male, 56, Kyiv) However, another group of respondents that also experienced the great impact of external circumstances chose to self-distance from the key national identity models. Surveys conducted in the non-government-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Sasse & Lackner, 2018) show high refusal rate on questions about one’s nationality. This indicates not a refusal to identify oneself in terms of nationality and ethnicity but rather an unwillingness to talk about one’s nationality under the conditions of increased social pressure and a limited range of acceptable identities. 318 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL External context and perceptions of self by others are significant for identity construction during times of conflict and displacement in Ukraine (Sereda, 2020) and can reinforce people’s desire to identify themselves in a certain way. The articulated national identity of “internally displaced person” (IDP) with an emphasis on citizenship was, on the one hand, a recognition of respondents’ own “Ukrainianness,” but on the other hand, it was also a way to express that the government had failed to fulfill its duty. In any case, it denotes the construction of an identity that fits in with the social expectations under the conditions of serious external threat. Residents of the occupied territories are more likely to struggle with questions about their belonging to certain national or ethnic groups: I don’t know, they actually don’t record nationality anymore. My dad’s Ukrainian, mum’s Russian, I don’t know how I should combine it. I speak both Ukrainian and Russian language. (Female, 59, non-governmentcontrolled area) The unrecognized status of the quasi-republics established on the occupied territories, complete with local public administration institutions, makes an ordinary person feel disoriented among at least three territorial/state alternatives--Ukraine, Russia, or their own quasi-statelets. The quasi-republics’ noninclusion into Russia prevents constructing a fully fledged Russian identity; the fact that the territories are not controlled by Ukraine prevents developing a Ukrainian identity; and because the quasi-republics remain unrecognized, local identities are problematic as well. Sasse and Lackner’s (2018, 2020a) recent finding that mixed identities remained—or became even more—important among those most directly affected by the Donbas conflict fits this reality as well. Conclusion The research on identity discussed in this chapter shows that in Ukraine, as well as globally, identity is not fixed and enduring but situational and malleable, that individuals may have multiple overlapping and layered identities, and that different dimensions or manifestations of these identities become salient at a given time DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 319 in a given sociopolitical context. The identities of Ukrainian citizens have been affected by the legacies of Soviet policies, which forced the simultaneous coexistence of an ethnic identity and an all-Soviet one and decoupled ethnic identity from statehood and citizenship. Multidimensional identities were thus born, with ethnicity mixing with “international” conceptions in different proportions. Nationality for the Soviet people was both a matter of pride and a direct threat to life. The mandatory attribution and recording of nationality was an instrument of recognition and management of the people by the state and clearly defined the place of the person in the conditional hierarchy of the Soviet peoples. The Soviet ideological paradigm created a person with malleable identities, enabling personal compromise with the Soviet reality. An average person could retain their identity to the extent that it did not interfere with self-realization and career growth. These compromises with Soviet reality have subsequently manifested in the prevalence of negative identities (Gudkov, 2009), when it is easier for the average person to say who they are not than to explain who they are and to which groups they feel they belong. Quantitative indicators of the ethnic or national identities of the population of Ukraine since 1991 show a noticeable spread of declarative Ukrainian national identity. However, a closer examination of the subjective parameters of this sense of self reveals heterogeneity and ambiguity in these declarations. Some of the respondents reproduce the primordial characteristics of nationality—a shared common ancestral “our” land, a shared history, a shared language or customs. Another group subscribes to the idea of a “political nation” in which the main focus is on citizenship that unites everyone, regardless of ethnic origin, by the shared fate of the state. The boundary between these groups is not fixed. As discussed in the chapter, people may be interpreting in primordial terms identities they have acquired as a result of a civic choice. There is also a third group, comprising respondents for whom nationality is purely formal and means nothing more than a matter of official registration. The construction of an individual’s national identity largely depends on the political context. With an independent state, people 320 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL have the opportunity to construct their own identities in different ways but with reference to the existing political context. Crisis or war mobilizes society, helping rally some groups while increasing pressure on others. This forces people to reconfigure their identity system, to find a way to adapt it to a new context. However, identities adopted under the pressure of circumstances revert back once the pressure decreases. In fact, it is often not so much about changing identity characteristics but about self-censorship: respondents may declare a desired or expected identity, hiding characteristics that do not fit the expected model. Ignoring such self-censorship can be quite dangerous. For example, the hidden Soviet identity of part of the population of Crimea or the Donbas manifested in a critical moment of hybrid war and external aggression. Therefore, despite the growth of declarative Ukrainian national identity, we should be cautious when speaking of the emergence of a political nation in Ukraine at this time. For a large part of the population, declared Ukrainian identity is little more than a situational compromise and a reflection of current reality. Identifying with a specific nationality also does not mean automatic loyalty to the state or its institutions, acceptance of national holidays, or a positive evaluation of defining events in the state’s history. Many studies of the impact of identities on social and political attitudes in Ukraine (and also more broadly) show the ambiguous impact of ethnic and national identities on attitudes and actions. Already by the late Soviet period, it was shown that in Ukraine, the consequences of identities for political attitudes and behavior are anything but straightforward. In the 1990–1991 New Soviet Citizen Survey, for example, in the Ukrainian SSR, those who self-identified as ethnic Ukrainians were found to be at least twice as likely to express separatist views as were other respondents (Hesli, Reisinger, & Miller, 1997). However, Hale’s statistical analysis of the data showed that what caused differences in attitudes was not ethnic identity or ethnic distinctiveness per se but trust that the central Soviet government would not exploit the republic by pursuing economic policies disproportionally DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 321 benefiting ethnic Russians (Hale, 2008, pp. 229–38). More recently, Giuliano has shown how at the start of the conflict in the Donbas, there was a heterogeneity of views on separatism within putative ethnic Russian and ethnic Ukrainian groups, and an unclear link between ethnic identity and political attitudes (Giuliano, 2018). Ambiguous conclusions about the causal importance of particular ethnic identities are not necessarily bad news. On the one hand, these realities make parsimonious theories on the impact of ethnicity on attitudes and behavior, and by extension parsimonious theories of ethnic conflict and cooperation, arguably an unattainable goal. On the other hand, such findings challenge parsimonious but ultimately unconvincing arguments that see ethnic groups as uniform collectivities and multicultural societies as inherently prone to conflict. This results in recognizing the validity of interpretative, ethnographic, and historical methods for studying political (including ethnic) identities (Smith, 2004) and in a search for more precise and theoretically informed measures of ethnic identity aimed at capturing identity’s multidimensional character (Onuch & Hale, 2018). By the same token, conflict theorizing is called to acknowledge the often heterogeneous and fluid nature of ethnic identity when making causal claims about intergroup conflict (Marquardt & Herrera, 2015). Acknowledging the fluidity and impermanence of identity groups (including ethnic groups), investigating how identities vary in content and salience, depending on political and social context, and problematizing causes of ethnic conflict and cooperation in diverse societies may be ultimately the most productive if not the most parsimonious way to advance our understanding of ethnic identities and their impact in Ukraine and elsewhere. Further Reading Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y., Johnston, A. I., & McDermott, R. (2009). Identity as a variable. In R. Abdelal, Y. Herrera, A. I. Johnston, & R. McDermott (Eds.), Measuring identity: A guide for social scientists (pp. 17–32). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond “identity.” Theory and Society, 29(1), 1–47. 322 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL Chandra, K. (Ed.). (2012). Constructivist theories of ethnic politics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Hale, H. (2008). The foundations of ethnic politics: Separatism of states and nations in Eurasia and the world. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Kulyk, V. (2018). Evoliutsiia naukovykh uiavlen' pro etnonatsional'ni identychnosti v postradianskii Ukraini [Evolution of scientific understandings of ethnonational identity in post-Soviet Ukraine]. Naukovi zapysky Instyty politychnykh i etnonatsionalnyk doslidzhenim. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy, 3–4(94–95), 59–73. May, V. (2013). Connecting self to society: Belonging in a changing world. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Onuch, O., & Hale, H. (2018). Capturing ethnicity: The case of Ukraine. Post-Soviet Affairs, 34(2–3), 84–106. Riabchuk, M. (2019). Dolannia ambivalentnosti: Dykhotomia ukrains'koi natsional'noi identychnosti—istorychni prychyny i politychni naslidky. [Conquering ambivalence: The dichotomy of Ukrainian national identity. Historical reasons and political consequences]. Kyiv, Ukraine: Instytut politychnykh i etnonatsionalnyk doslidzhenim. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy. Sereda, V. (2020). “Social distancing” and hierarchies of belonging: The case of displaced population from Donbas and Crimea. Europe-Asia Studies, 72(3), 404–31. References Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y. M., Johnston, A. I., & McDermott, R. (2006). Identity as a variable. Perspectives on Politics, 4(4), 695–711. Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y. M., Johnston, A. I., & McDermott, R. (Eds.). (2009). Measuring identity: A guide for social scientists. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Aktürk, û. (2012). Regimes of ethnicity and nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Anderson, B. A., & Silver, B. D. (1983). Estimating russification of ethnic identity among non-Russians in the USSR. Demography, 20(4), 461–89. Arel, D. (2002). Demography and politics in the first post-Soviet censuses: Mistrusted state, contested identities. Population, 57(6), 801–27. Beissinger, M. (2002). Nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet state. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Boym, S. (2001). The future of nostalgia. New York, NY: Basic Books. Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond “identity.” Theory and Society, 29(1), 1–47. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 323 Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. (2017–2018). Women and war: Everyday life on the occupied territories [Data set], https://sociology.uc u.edu.ua/projects/proekt-zhinka-ta-vijna/. 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Osoblyvosti politychnoi svidomosti: ambivalentnist suspilstva ta osobystosti [Specifics of political consciousness: Ambivalnece of society and of individual]. Politolohichni chytannia, 1, 24–29. Golovakha, E. I., & Panina, N. V. (1994). Sotsialүnoe bezumie: Istoriia, teoriia i sovremennaia praktika. Kyiv, Ukraine: Abris. Golovakha, E. I., Panina, N. V., & Parakhonska, O. (2011). Ukrainian society 1992–2010: Sociological monitoring. Kyiv, Ukraine: IS NASU. Gudkov, L. (2009). Uslovia vosproizvodstva “sovetskogo cheloveka” [Conditions of reproduction of the “Soviet person”]. Vestnik obshchesvennogo mnenia, 2 (100), 8–37. Hale, H. (2008). The foundations of ethnic politics: Separatism of states and nations in Eurasia and the world. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Haran, O., & Yakovlyev, M. (Eds.). (2017). Constructing a political nation: Changes in the attitudes of Ukrainians during the war in the Donbas. Kyiv, Ukraine: Stylos Publishing. Hesli, V. L., Reisinger, W. 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Represyvna diialnist orhaniv derzhavnoi bezpeky SRSR v Ukraini (kinets 1920h–1950i roky). Istoryko-statystychne doslidzhennia. Donetsk, Ukraine: Vydavnystvo DonNU. Onuch, O., & Hale, H. (2018). Capturing ethnicity: The case of Ukraine. Post-Soviet Affairs, 34(2–3), 84–106. Pop-Eleches, G., & Robertson, G. (2018). Identity and political preferences in Ukraine—before and after Euromaidan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 34(2–3), 107–18. Riabchuk, M. (2009). “Postsovietska shyzofreniia” chy “shyzofrynichna postsovietskist”? Yavyshche suspil’noi ambivalentnosti v Ukraini i Bilorusi [“Post-Soviet schizophrenia” or “schizophrenic postsovietness”? The phenomenon of social ambivalence in Ukraine and Belarus]. Ukraina moderna, 4(15), 186–205. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 325 Romaniuk, A., & Gladun, O. (2015). Demographic trends in Ukraine: Past, present and future. Population and Development Review, 41(2), 315–37. Rusnachenko, A. M. (1995). 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Region, nation and beyond: An interdisciplinary and transcultural reconceptualization of Ukraine [Data set], https://www.uaregio.org/en/about/stage-1/ University of St. Gallen. (2016). Cultural contact zones [Data set], http://sociology.ucu.edu.ua/projects/displaced-cultural-spaces/. 326 OKSANA MIKHEIEVA AND OXANA SHEVEL Zhuravlev, O., & Ishchenko, V. (2020). Exclusiveness of civic nationalism: Euromaidan eventful nationalism in Ukraine. Post-Soviet Affairs, 1– 20, doi:10.1080/1060586X.2020.1753460.  Contributors Margarita Balmaceda is professor of diplomacy and international relations at Seton Hall University and an associate at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Her research focuses on the connections between natural resources, international relationships, and political development; her special expertise is in energy politics, steel, and the metallurgical sector in Ukraine, the former USSR, and the EU. Her recent books include The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania Between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), Living the High Life in Minsk: Russian Energy Rents, Domestic Populism and Belarus’ Impending Crisis (Budapest: CEU Press, 2014), and Energy Dependency, Politics and Corruption in the Former Soviet Union (London: Routledge, 2008). Oksana Barshynova, deputy director of the National Art Museum of Ukraine, is an art historian, curator, and researcher studying contemporary art and the history of Ukrainian art in the second half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century. She is codeveloper of the new concept for exhibiting modern and contemporary art at NAMU and the author of many articles on the history of Ukrainian art. Tymofii Brik is assistant professor of policy research at the Kyiv School of Economics, a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at New York University, and a Visiting Vucinich Fellow at the Stanford Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies. He is also an editor at Vox Ukraine and a board member of CEDOS. Tymofii’s paper on religious supply in Ukraine, published in the Sociology of Religion journal, won him an award for “Best young sociologist in Ukraine in 2018.” His recent studies on the sociology of religion appeared as chapters in compilations published by Palgrave Macmillan and Routledge. José Casanova, a world-renowned sociologist of religion, is a senior fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 365 366 FROM “THE UKRAINE” TO UKRAINE and emeritus professor of sociology and theology and religious studies at Georgetown University. From 1987 to 2007 he served as professor of sociology at the New School for Social Research, New York. His book, Public Religions in the Modern World (University of Chicago Press, 1994), has become a modern classic and has been translated into many languages, including Japanese, Arabic, and Turkish. He is also the author of Genealogías de la secularización (Barcelona: Anthropos, 2012), Beyond Secularization (in Ukrainian; Kyiv: Dukh I Litera, 2017), and Global Religious and Secular Dynamics (Brill, 2019); recently, he co-edited The Jesuits and Globalization (Georgetown University Press, 2016) and Islam, Gender and Democracy in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2017). Diana Dutsyk is executive director of the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute and a senior lecturer in the School of Journalism, National University of Kyiv–Mohyla Academy. She has twenty-seven years of professional experience in journalism and has worked as editor-in-chief of a number of print and online media, including Glavred Media LLC, the website PiK Ukraine, the weekly newspaper Bez tsenzury, and the daily newspaper Ukraina Moloda. She has also served as executive director of Detector Media (2014–2017), as a member of the Advisory Board of the Ministry for Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons of Ukraine (2018–2019), and as a member of the Commission on Journalism Ethics (since 2020). Her recent publications include How to Teach Conflict Journalism (Kyiv, 2019), The ABC for Terminology in Armed Conflicts (Kyiv, 2019), and News Literacy (Kyiv, 2017), as well as numerous analytical publications on political influences on Ukrainian mass media, on media monitoring, and on media education. Marta Dyczok is associate professor at the Departments of History and Political Science, Western University; a Fellow at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs; and an adjunct professor at the National University of the Kyiv–Mohyla Academy. Her recent books include Ukraine’s Euromaidan: Broadcasting through CONTRIBUTORS 367 Information Wars with Hromadske Radio (E-IR, 2016), Ukraine Twenty Years after Independence: Assessments, Perspectives, Challenges (Aracne, 2015), and Media, Democracy and Freedom. The PostCommunist Experience (Peter Lang, 2009). Her articles have appeared in Europe-Asia Studies, Demokratizatsiya, and Canadian Slavonic Papers. Georgiy Kasianov is head of the Contemporary History and Politics Department at the Institute of the History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. His main areas of expertise are the history of Ukraine in the nineteenth to twenty-first centuries, the history of ideas and political theories, memory studies, and education policy. He is the author, co-author, editor, or co-editor of more than two dozen books on these topics in Ukraine and abroad. He has studied and taught internationally in Germany, Poland, Lithuania, the United States, Canada, Finland, Switzerland, the UK, Japan, Australia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Finland. His most recent monograph, Memory Crash: Politics of History in and around Ukraine (1980s–2010s), is forthcoming from CEU Press in 2021. Hennadii Korzhov is associate professor in the Department of Sociology, Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, and a fellow of various research institutions in the UK, United States, Germany, Poland, and Ukraine. The author of numerous articles on social transformation in the post-Soviet region and co-author of the book University Teachers: A Sociological Portrait (Kyiv, 2016), Hennadii studies socioeconomic and cultural aspects of the transformation in Eastern Europe, relations between culture and economy, and value attitudes and identity changes in contemporary societies. Serhiy Kudelia is associate professor of political science at Baylor University, where he teaches courses on ethnopolitical conflicts, terrorism, state-building, political regimes, and Russian politics. Earlier he held teaching and research positions at George Washington University, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Toronto, and the National University of Kyiv–Mohyla Academy. His research on Ukrainian politics and the armed conflict in the 368 FROM “THE UKRAINE” TO UKRAINE Donbas has been published in Nationalities Papers, Comparative Politics, and Post-Soviet Affairs. Pavlo Kutuev, professor of sociology and chair of the Sociology Department at Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, is a wellknown sociologist and political scholar who researches modernization, the historical sociology of the developmental state, and the comparative politics of postcommunist states. The author of three books and numerous articles on sociology, comparative politics, and the history of social thought, he has over twenty years of teaching and research experience in Ukraine, the United States, the UK, Austria, and Japan. Olena Martynyuk, a Petro Jacyk Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Ukrainian Studies at the Harriman Institute of Columbia University, is an art historian with an interest in art theory and art philosophy. Her research focuses on Ukrainian and Russian art from the late twentieth century to the present. Previously, she was a Fulbright Junior Research Fellow and a recipient of the Louise Bevier Dissertation Fellowship and Andrew Mellon Travel Research Award. She taught art history classes at Rutgers University and CUNY College of Staten Island, and curated exhibitions at the Zimmerli Art Museum, the Ukrainian Museum, and the Ukrainian Institute of America in New York City. Oksana Mikheieva is professor of sociology at the Ukrainian Catholic University and a member of the International Association for the Humanities and the Ukrainian Sociological Association; she also serves on the editorial board of Ukraina moderna journal. She has over twenty years of research and teaching experience. Author or co-author of five books and many articles, she researches a wide range of areas, including the historical aspects of deviant and delinquent behavior, urban studies, paramilitary motivations, the social integration and adaptation of internally displaced persons, resettlement strategies, and the adaptation of the last wave’s Ukrainian migrants. CONTRIBUTORS 369 Mykhailo Minakov, senior adviser at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, is a philosopher and social scholar working in the areas of political philosophy, political theory, and the history of modernity. Author or co-author of ten books and numerous articles on philosophy, political analysis, and policy studies, he has over twenty years of experience in research and teaching in Ukraine, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. As editor-in-chief, he also runs the peer-reviewed Ideology and Politics Journal and the Kennan Institute blog Focus Ukraine. Tymofiy Mylovanov is president of the Kyiv School of Economics and an associate professor of economics at the University of Pittsburgh. During his professional career, he has taught at European and American universities, including Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn and the University of Pennsylvania. In 2019–2020, Mylovanov was minister of economic development, trade and agriculture of Ukraine. His research interests cover such areas as game theory and contracts, as well as institutional design. His articles on these topics have been published in leading international academic magazines, including Econometrica, the American Economic Review, and the Review of Economic Studies. Andrian Prokip is a senior associate at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and an energy expert at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future. Author of four books and many articles and reports on energy policy, with a focus on sustainability, he has more than ten years’ experience teaching and conducting research in Ukraine and the United States. Matthew Rojansky is director of the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. An expert on U.S. relations with the states of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, he has advised governments, intergovernmental organizations, and major private actors on conflict resolution and efforts to enhance shared security throughout the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region. He is also an 370 FROM “THE UKRAINE” TO UKRAINE adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS and serves as U.S. executive secretary for the Dartmouth Conference, a track two U.S.Russian conflict resolution initiative begun in 1960. Rojansky is frequently interviewed on TV and radio, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Foreign Policy. He holds an A.B. degree from Harvard College and a J.D. from Stanford Law School. Oxana Shevel is associate professor of political science at Tufts University. Her current research projects examine the sources of citizenship policies in postcommunist states, church-state relations in Ukraine, and the origins of the separatist conflict in the Donbas. She is the author of the award-winning book Migration, Refugee Policy, and State Building in Postcommunist Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2011). She has also published numerous scholarly articles and book chapters. She currently serves as president of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies and as vice president of the Association for the Study of Nationalitie. She is also a country expert on Ukraine for the Global Citizenship Observatory, a member of the PONARS Eurasia scholarly network, and an associate at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University. Ilona Sologoub is the CEO of Vox Ukraine. Prior to assuming her current position, she was policy research director at the Kyiv School of Economics. She has multiple publications on economic policy and reforms in Ukraine and more than fifteen years of experience working as an economic analyst in the public and private sectors and for nongovernmental organizations. Maksym Yenin, associate professor of sociology at the Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, is a well-known Ukrainian sociologist researching post-Soviet elites, the ideological transformation of modern societies, higher education reform, the value orientations of Ukrainian youth, and the phenomenon of war in sociopolitical and academic discourse. He is co-author of the book Improving the Ways of Human Capital Development as an CONTRIBUTORS 371 Increasing Factor of Mobilization Potential of Ukraine (Kherson, Ukraine: Helvetica, 2020). Yuliya Yurchenko is senior lecturer in political economy at the Political Economy, Governance, Finance and Accountability Institute and in the International Business and Economics Department, the University of Greenwich (UK). Her research focuses on state/society/capital complexes and transnational class formation, and on the political economy of post-Soviet nations. She is the author of Ukraine and the Empire of Capital: From Marketisation to Armed Conflict (London: Pluto Press, 2018) and many publications in Capital and Class and New Political Economy. She is vice-chair of the Critical Political Economy Research Network Board, cocoordinator of the World Economy working group, IIPPE, and an editor for Capital and Class.