Presenta una relectura de la Historia natural de Buffon a la luz de los conceptos de reversibilidad e irreversibilidad temporal. El objetivo es determinar hasta qué punto Buffon introduce en dicha obra una concepción transformista de las formas naturales. A tales efectos, se analizan los puntos principales de la historia natural clásica y de la doctrina de los gérmenes preformados. Posteriormente, se considera el uso de la variable temporal que realizaba Buffon. Se demuestra, a partir de este examen, que pese a su rechazo de la teoría preformista y del sistema escolar de clasificación, Buffon continúa utilizando categorías que remiten a una matriz temporal de carácter reversible.

Resumen Según Buffon, la diferencia entre las capacidades cognitivas del hombre y las de los demás animales no podía ser explicada por causas naturales. La constatación de esas diferencias obligaba a aceptar que el Creador había dotado al hombre de un alma inmaterial que no tenía parangón en los animales. Aquí se pretende mostrar que esa claudicación del naturalismo buffoniano no responde a un presupuesto teológico, sino a la imposibilidad de compatibilizar esa supuesta heterogeneidad existente entre las facultades cognitivas animales y humanas con la explicación materialista del origen de las especies que Buffon fue delineando a lo largo de sus escritos. Si se piensa al hombre como algo excepcional, su origen también tendrá que ser entendido como algo milagroso.

According to Buffon, the difference between man's cognitive abilities and those of other animals could not be attributed to natural causes. Noting these differences necessarily meant accepting that the Creator had endowed man with an immaterial soul that was unparalleled among animals. This article seeks to show that Buffon's abandonment of naturalism was not the result of a theological premise but of the impossibility of reconciling the presumed heterogeneity between animal and human cognitive faculties with the materialist explanation of the origin of species that Buffon outlined in the course of his writings. If man is assumed to be an exceptional being, the origin of the human race must also be seen as miraculous.

According to Buffon, the difference between man's cognitive abilities and those of other animals could not be attributed to natural causes. Noting these differences necessarily meant accepting that the Creator had endowed man with an immaterial soul that was unparalleled among animals. This article seeks to show that Buffon's abandonment of naturalism was not the result of a theological premise but of the impossibility of reconciling the presumed heterogeneity between animal and human cognitive faculties with the materialist explanation of the origin of species that Buffon outlined in the course of his writings. If man is assumed to be an exceptional being, the origin of the human race must also be seen as miraculous.

In this paper, we reflect on the connection between the notions of organism and organisation, with a specific interest in how this bears upon the issue of the reality of the organism (or in contrast the status of these notions as constructs, whether heuristic or otherwise scientifically useful). We do this by presenting the case of Buffon, who developed complex views about the relation between the notions of " organised " and " organic " matter. We argue that, contrary to what some interpreters have suggested, these notions are not orthogonal in his thought. Also, we argue that Buffon has a view in which organisation is not just ubiquitous, but basic and fundamental in nature, and hence also fully natural. We suggest that he can hold this view because of his anti-mathematicism. Buffon's case is interesting, in our view, because he can regard organisation, and organisms, as perfectly natural, and can admit their reality without invoking problematic supernaturalist views, and because he allows organisation and the organismal to come in kinds and degrees. Thus, his view tries to do justice to two cautionary notes for the debate on the reality of the organism: the need for a commitment to a broadly naturalist perspective, and the need to acknowledge the interesting features of organisms through which we make sense of them.

This article analyses the conditions of formation of the concept of “race” in natural history in the middle of the XVIIIth century. Relying on the method of historical epistemology to avoid some of the aporia raised by the traditional historiography of “racism”, it focuses on the specifities of the concept of “race” in contrast to others (“variety”, “species”…) and tries to answer the following questions: to what extent the concept of “race” was integrated in natural history’s discourses before the middle of the XVIIIth century? To which kind of concepts and problems was it linked and to which style of reasoning did it pertain? To which conditions could it enter natural history and develop in it? The article answers that “race” pertained to a genealogical style of reasoning which was largely extraneous to natural history before the middle of the XVIIIth century. Natural history was rather dominated by another style of reasoning, logical and classificatory, which principles and concepts defined strong obstacles to the development of a concept of “race”. To understand how the concept of “race” developed in natural history, one has to understand how the genealogical style of reasoning entered natural history and modified the very principles of classification that organized it. I try to establish that it is through Buffon and some of the main authors of the “monogenist” tradition that the most fundamental conditions for the integration of a genealogical style of reasoning and the development of a concept of “race” are met. To put it clearly, in contrast to many scholars’ analysis and following some intuitions of P.R Sloan, I argue that Buffon in particular, and monogenism in general, were decisive in the integration and development of the concept of “race” in natural history.