Authoritarian regimes

While the canonical literature on oil wealth suggests that hydrocarbon windfalls encourage repressive despotism, Kuwait provides a case of an oil-rich autocracy governing instead through popular rentierism-that is, through a broad coalition of social forces, one that furnishes enduring loyalty from below while constraining abuses of state power from above. This paper provides a theoretically guided explanation for this exceptional outcome. I argue that the Kuwaiti regime's coalitional bargains originated in the pre-oil era, when domestic opposition and geopolitical constrictions compelled it to forge new social alliances at the dawn of modern statehood. This inclusionary strategy mediated the subsequent effect of oil rents, which the regime used to institutionalize its mass base with costly material and symbolic side payments. Such popular incorporation bound large constituent classes to the regime's survival, precluding the need for widespread repression. After 50 years, these coalitional bargains have also proven remarkably resilient, as social actors have continued to endorse the autocratic leadership despite economic crisis and wartime defeat.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

Under the Bush administration, the US has aggressively promoted democracy in the Middle East and North Africa.  By replacing repressive tyrants with moderate liberals and giving voice to hitherto suppressed social forces, US-backed democratization would drain the swamp of ideological extremism and reduce violent conflict, all while underscoring the role of America as a moral beacon of international enlightenment.  However, as this chapter argues, the project of encouraging Arab democracy faltered under a devastating self-contradiction. Democratization requires that autocratic incumbents surrender their monopolies over executive authority to legal opposition groups ensconced in parliaments and civic institutions. Yet, in the Arab world, this would likely bring into power Islamist groups that evoke fierce hostility toward Washington’s vital strategic interests. An Arab spring of democracy might thus result in a winter of discontent for U.S. policymakers bound by stringent imperatives, such as sponsoring Israeli policies and securing regional oil reserves. Such dissonance has exposed American democracy promotion as an ideological cloak for a darker agenda: paying lip service to gradual reform while quietly sustaining long-standing support for  autocratic allies. The theoretical lesson is stark: observers should expect not the imminent breakdown or even the slow erosion of Arab authoritarianism, but rather its renewed durability in an era of continuing patron-client ties.

American efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East under the Bush administration have floundered.  This article explains why.  First, American policymakers have proven unwilling to sponsor electoral openings that might favor the ascendance of potentially hostile Islamist groups. Second, they have refused to attach negative conditionality to reform demands made to strategic autocratic allies-that is, punishing noncompliance by withdrawing economic aid, military assistance,
and other forms of support. Both obstacles reflect the reality that America's overarching strategic goals, in particular the preservation of Israel's security
and regional hydrocarbon reserves, require a vision of regional stability that unpredictable regime shifts would endanger. Hence today's paradox of why the democratizing intentions of a unilateral superpower -- one with unmatched political and military power -- have been effectively stymied by its smaller, weaker, and poorer authoritarian allies.

Tracing the political development of the Chechen Republic since its secessionist movement in the 1990s, this essay illustrates that the Islamic republic has been gradually pacified and stabilized by unpeaceful means: Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM) and subcontracting authoritarian governance to the de facto autonomous ruler Ramzan Kadyrov. Building on concepts by Max Weber, Immanuel Kant, and Johan Galtung, this essay acknowledges that the notions of stability and peace concern two dimensions: 1. federal Moscow-Chechnya relations, 2. Chechnya’s internal balance. Though both dimensions evidently stabilized on a basis of coercion (especially by the use of regional networks and the blood feud system by pro-Kremlin Kadyrov), the emerging institutional framework exposes sources of instability, as it depends on individual relationships. Democratic innovations would even pose a threat to this established stability. Additionally, social integration of Chechnya into the Federation might be hampered by ethnic nationalism and xenophobia in Russian society. On the Chechen side, a ‘Russian’ identity is fragile. The collective memory still remembers Russian repressions vividly. Quantitative figures suggest pacification alongside the negative definition of peace. However, the case of Chechnya indicates that positive definitions (e.g. by Galtung) cannot be measured dichotomously; structural violence characterizes Chechen society, but, at the same time, a certain form of social integration took place.

This chapter analyses constitutional amendments in the Russian Federation (1993–2014). We show that in the phase of constitution-making a problematic path was adopted when the El'cin administration promoted a basic law advantaging the executive. The praxis of constitutional amendment in the Russian Federation is discussed in three dimensions: First, concerning amendments to Art. 65, which regulates the structure of the federal republic; second, concerning changes to the structure or principles of the constitutional system; third, concerning de facto constitutional amendments through ordinary laws. In particular, a combination of amendments of the second and third dimensions substantially centralized the constitutional regime over the past 20 years, moving it toward an authoritarian state order. The Russian praxis of constitutional amendment is here classified as authoritarian constitutionalism.

This book presents an innovative model linking insights from democratization, development and conflict studies to explain personalist behavior and their violent transitions.

Based on multiple case studies from Sub Saharan Africa, the author maps and predicts regime transitions, presenting examples of how states can avoid such vicious circles of conflict and tyranny. By integrating decades of specialist literature from various subfields of political science, the book models personalist behavior, its impact on the states they govern, and their future transitions. By systematizing regime behavior (coup-proofing, gatekeeping, repression and hoarding), the model identifies the mechanics on how personalist regimes establish vicious circles of personalism and explains how exactly they end up again in authoritarianism or in new personalist tyrannies after their demise, and so seldom transition to democracy.

This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of African politics, democratization and democratic consolidation, authoritarian rule and more broadly to political science, comparative politics, area studies, political leadership, peace and conflict studies and development studies.

This article explores the growing environmental activism of nondemocratic regional organizations (NDROs) by investigating the case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), addressing the following questions: What explains the emergence of environmental regionalism in the SCO? What are its characteristics and e ects? We show that China has acted as the driver of environmental regionalism in the SCO-whose members rank among the world's top CO 2 emitters-providing positive incentives for the establishment of regional environmental institutions and fostering member states' green energy transition through the top-down deployment of Chinese nancial institutions and construction companies. In so doing, China has sought to consolidate its regional leadership in Eurasia, while promoting its economic statecraft and its bid for global environmental leadership.

This article aims to contribute to the understanding of the intelligence democratization process in new democracies comparing three South American countries: Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina. With a background of authoritarian legacies(‘political police’style intelligence agencies controlled by the military) under particular political circumstances and changing strategic environments, these countries experienced disparate trajectories, prescriptions, and outcomes in their efforts to reform their intelligence communities. Drawing on new institutionalism, historical moments and relevant events shaping the dynamics of intelligence democratization are highlighted for each case, depicting failures and successes, and identifying drivers of change.

This article takes a closer look at the internal evolution of the North Korean political system and how it has been subjugated to the personalist regime of the Kim family. The author argues that North Korea should no longer be perceived as a totalitarian regime since it is now a fully entrenched personal regime in the first place. The author investigates how this process of personalization took place in the institutional, ideological and mobilizational dimensions of the DPRK as well as the influence on its international relations (gatekeeping). Based on these insights the author provides some scenarios for endogenous transitions from this regime type and how hereditary succession and personalism affect its survival strategies..

Since his ascension in 1999, King Abdullah II has halted Jordan’s decade-long experiment with political liberalization. However, the new royal incumbent has preserved authoritarian power not through highly visible tools of domination, such as widespread coercion and institutional closure, but rather softer instruments of legal manipulation. Through selective economic reforms, new civil society regulations, and hollow pluralism initiatives, Abdullah’s regime has tightened its control over political opposition while foreclosing the possibility of mass unrest. As a result, ten years after the Hashemite monarchy received its new king, the prospects for democratic change in Jordan remain exceedingly low.

Zgodnie z rozporządzeniami polskiego Ministerstwa Edukacji i Nauki od 1 stycznia 2022 roku obowiązuje niższa subwencja na naukę języka niemieckiego dla uczniów mniejszości niemieckiej. Dlatego, począwszy od kolejnego roku szkolnego, czyli od 1 września 2022 roku zostanie zmniejszona liczba godzin szkolnych (45 minut) przeznaczonych na te zajęcia z obecnych trzech do jednej w tygodniu.

Oczywiście to jawna dyskryminacja, bowiem takiego obniżenia subwencji oraz liczby godzin nauki języka mniejszościowego nie zastosowano względem innych uznanych w Polsce mniejszości narodowych czy etnicznych. Dlaczego wzięto właśnie mniejszość niemiecką „na celownik”? Po pierwsze, to numerycznie największa uznana mniejszość we współczesnej Polsce. Po drugie, przez ostatnie trzy dekady po upadku komunizmu, przywódcy i parlamentarzyści mniejszości niemieckiej lojalnie wspierali działania wszystkich polskich rządów (w tym i PiSu), nawet jeśli skutkowało to naruszeniem najważniejszych interesów kulturowo-etnicznych polskich Niemców. Po trzecie, w pełnej zgodzie z polskim interesem narodowo-etnicznym, liderzy mniejszości niemieckiej wspierali i wciąż wspierają nieuznawanie największej mniejszości, czyli Ślązaków. I to pomimo ścisłych związków rodzinno-społecznych pomiędzy górnośląskimi Niemcami a Ślązakami. Paradoksalnie, nie niemiecki, a właśnie śląszczyzna stanowi język dnia codziennego Niemców w Górnym Śląsku.

Jednobrzmiące protesty obecnych liderów mniejszości niemieckiej,[2] jak i ich poprzedników[3] oraz przedstawicieli RFN[4] są spóźnione o co najmniej 30 lat. Jak jest tak źle, to dlaczego wcześniej nikt nie reagował? Przecież elity mniejszości niemieckiej oraz władze RFN powinny sobie jasno zdawać sprawę, iż na poziomie ideologii rządy postkomunistycznej Polski kierują się zasadami polskiego nacjonalizmu etnicznojęzykowego wypracowanego przez Romana Dmowskiego na przełomie XIX i XX stulecia. To właśnie jego zwolennicy w międzywojennej Polsce przeprowadzili przymusową asymilację mniejszości na niwie edukacji.

In this article, I study the relationship of the Justice and Development Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) populism-in-power and democracy, from a comparative and historical perspective, and based on a critical engagement with the populism literature. I begin by highlighting the political institutional expression of the populist political vision (to reflect the popular will in power), which prioritizes competitive elections among a variety of modern democratic institutions and mechanisms. Based on this perspective, I outline a particular populist route to competitive (or electoral) authoritarianism: when in power, because populists exalt elections and undermine existing liberal democratic mechanisms that bridge people to power, they deprive citizens of the power to hold rulers accountable. I then trace the lineage of the populist political imagination in Turkey, demonstrating the continuities and discontinuities between the Democrat Party's (Demokrat Parti, DP) and the AKP's conceptions of the people and democracy. I argue that despite these parties' differences on the level of the politicization of cultural divisions, there is a crucial continuity: the equalization of democracy with an exalted elected executive branch. Finally, I concentrate on the impact of the AKP's populism-in-power on the Turkish political regime. I argue that because the AKP came to power in a defective democracy (with extra-democratic checks on elected rulers and prone to concentration of power), by 2011, the party managed to reframe Turkish political institutions according to its right-wing populist vision of democracy, an authoritarian regime with competitive elections.

Turkey is a prime example of the growing importance of diaspora related policies in countries with emerging power status. Based on reports, observations, and interviews with Turkish and Kosovar citizens in Pristina in February 2019, this article examines how Turkey since 2002
has created societal influence in Kosovo—a new and insecure country with which Turkey established relations since its inception—by using, among other things, the Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) for its diaspora policies. Looking at how the inclusive and repressive tactics of Turkish diaspora-building feed into each other, I argue that Ankara has expanded the boundaries of the Turkish state’s reach by harnessing religion (Islam) in addition to existing ethnic bonds (Turkishness), thereby allowing Turkey to create a diaspora out of a much larger group of people including non-Turkish Muslims. As a result, certain segments among the Sunni-Muslim Albanians in Kosovo have developed close relations with Turkey that may be employed when needed to police elements of the diaspora that are seen as oppositional. While
Turkey’s “domestic abroad” has expanded considerably due to the initial inclusive outreach, it has also become more fragmented, more contested, and more unruly, delivering continuously diminishing returns in terms of regime security at home. Although the repression of disloyal diaspora members by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is aimed at stabilizing rule at home, it creates divisions in the diaspora and risks Turkey’s relations with the countries in which it asserts its authority.

Focusing exclusively on external forces risks producing an over-generalized account of a ubiquitous neoliberalism, which insufficiently accounts for the profusion of local variegations that currently comprise the neoliberal project as a series of articulations with existing political economic circumstances. Although neoliberal economics were initially promoted in the global south through the auspices of structural adjustment programs designed by the International Financial Institutions, powerful global south elites were only too happy to oblige. Neoliberalism frequently reveals opportunities for well-connected government officials to informally control market and material rewards, allowing them to easily line their own pockets. It is in this sense of the local appropriation of neoliberal ideas that scholars must go beyond conceiving of ‘neoliberalism-in-general’ as a singular and fully realized policy regime, ideological form, or regulatory framework, and work towards conceiving a plurality of ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’ with particular characteristics arising from mutable geohistorical outcomes that are embedded within national, regional, and local process of market-driven socio-spatial transformation. What constitutes ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism in Cambodia as distinctly Cambodian is the ways in which the patronage system has allowed local elites to co-opt, transform, and (re)articulate neoliberal reforms through a framework that ‘asset strips’ public resources, thereby increasing peoples’ exposure to corruption, coercion, and violence. It is to such an 'articulation agenda' that this article attends, as in seeking to provide a more nuanced reading to recent work on neoliberalism in Cambodia by outlining some of its salient characteristics, I reveal a more empirical basis to theorizations of ‘articulated neoliberalism’.

The late 2010s have seen the unprecedented rise of Russian rap culture on YouTube. This study delves into the unexplored area of the relationship between rap music, politics, and the Internet audience in Russia. It focuses on the analysis of the production of the most popular rap videos—their narratives, power relations, and socio-political themes, as well as the prevailing patterns in the discussion on socio-political issues by the YouTube audience. The study brings three contributions that identify the power relations in the Russian society that manifest in the field of rap music. First, the Russian-speaking users demonstrate a high level of criticality toward the pro-Kremlin rap music on YouTube and challenge the lies of propaganda rap. Second, pro-government rappers follow the Soviet authoritarian ethos and praise belonging to the collective of elites, while liberal ones adhere to the individual responsibility. Third, we demonstrate the prevalence of patriarchal gender values, including macho politics and unquestioned sexism, which are representative of gender politics in the country. This article proves the importance of socio-political commentary on YouTube and points to the rap videos as the popular hubs for the socio-political debates. Users flow to rap videos and utilize the comment section to have their say on the political context and power relations rather than the music, to engage with others, and to contribute to the emerging collective debate. The comment sections on these rap videos have a unique value for the Russian users who exploit them as the negotiation space in the void of other platforms for social dialogue in Russia.

While much of the English School has focused on liberal aspects of solidarism, forms of “illiberal solidarism” in contemporary international society remain underexplored. Drawing on archival material and elite interviews conducted in Central Asia in the period 2013–2019, this paper advances the claim that the Central Asian elites have developed the institution of authoritarianism in their region through the mechanisms of mimicry/emulation and praise/blame. By looking at specific discourses and practices over the last two decades, the paper discusses how the Central Asian governments have been using the new elements of the “democratic transition” in combination with the traditional legitimation offered by diplomatic recognition to secure authoritarian regimes in the democratic age, to create authoritarian state-centric solidarity in the region, and to make “avtoritet” and “stabil'nost'” fundamental pillars of the Central Asian regional order. The paper contributes to the English School literature by providing an initial account of illiberal solidarism and by showing how authoritarianism can potentially be an institution of specific regional international societies; to the authoritarian diffusion literature by demonstrating that authoritarianism can have a deontic component alongside considerations of domestic survival; and to the broader norm diffusion literature by focusing on the spread of illiberal values.

To cite:
Poljarevic, Emin (2009), "Egypt, Revolution of 1952," International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest (Immanuel Ness et al eds.), Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 1076–1079.


The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 was staged during the night of July 22 to the 23, 1952. This bloodless overthrow of the Egyptian govern- ment and King Farouk marked the end of direct British influence in state affairs and the begin- ning of a new era in Egyptian history. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918 –70), the leader of the “Free Officers,” justified the army’s overthrow of civilian government by referring to the Urabi revolution that took place 70 years earlier. The revolution of 1919 was another episode in Egyptian history that greatly changed the course of history leading up to the 1952 revolution. Other significant historical elements include the con- tinuous opposition to British influence, the volatility of liberal politics, the growth of national mass movements, the deteriorated economic situ- ation, and the king’s continuous involvement in affairs of the government.

Caspian Energy Politics analyses the role of oil and gas in the development of the three main petroleum exporters in the Caspian region – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – and how energy resources influence interactions with Russia and China. Due to volatile commodity prices and competition for the resources in and around the Caspian Sea, the governments of these petroleum-exporters face a series of difficult decisions. These governments have sought to balance short-term incentives to spend oil revenues as a means to maintain power against the need for a long-term strategy for managing these assets, choices which have further implications for how these countries align themselves internationally. By illuminating important linkages between domestic and international dynamics in these states, the book provides a fresh perspective on energy politics and the impact of petroleum on the development of the Caspian petroleum producers. Expert contributors from Central Asia and the South Caucasus and international scholars provide context-specific insights into the incentives affecting decision-makers that can provide a foundation for strategies to help the countries in the region overcome the negative effects of reliance on oil and gas. As such, the book will be a valuable tool for business actors seeking to understand the role of Chinese and Russian companies in the region, as well as local and international policymakers and non-governmental organizations.

Проведено теоретико-методологічний та емпіричний розгляд політичних режимів сучасності, а також історії становлення та сучасного стану розвитку кількісних та якісних методів типологізації та порівняльного вимірювання політичних режимів сучасності. Окреслено і структуровано економічні та політичні свободи у контексті політичних режимів сучасності. Проаналізовано різновиди та концепти демократії (демократизації) та автократії/автократизації. Простежено параметри оцінювання ефективності та якості демократії і демократизації. Означено сутність і типологію субнаціональних політичних режимів. Розкрито параметри порівняльного аналізу трансформації/транзиту політичних режимів сучасності. Визначено економетричні атрибути різних типів політичних режимів сучасності.

W temacie wiodącym numeru (i w pedeefie):
Bartłomiej Zdaniuk: Kształtowanie się reżimów autorytarnych w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej okresu międzywojennego: analiza porównawcza
Błażej Poboży: Rządy sanacji w Polsce jako modelowy przykład reżimu autorytarnego
Mariusz Włodarczyk: Frankizm i salazaryzm – autorytaryzmy Półwyspu Iberyjskiego
Piotr Załęski: Specyfika państwa realnego socjalizmu
Adam Szymański: Od autorytaryzmu do demokracji – ewolucja reżimu politycznego Republiki Turcji
Agnieszka Syliwoniuk: Autorytaryzm w państwach arabskich
Anna Maria Dyner: Czy Rosja i Białoruś to państwa autorytarne?

This text deals with specific situation of the existence of the paralel armies – standard army
artesh and Revolutionary Guards - within the Islamic republic of Iran. It is nothing unusual and it is
possible to find many examples of two paralel armies model in history, whether they support each
other, or more often compete. Nevertheless the position of Revolutionary Guards in Iran is so strong,
that many experts talk about the transformation of Iranian political system to classical rule of military
junta by Revolutionary Guards.

Resumo: Neste livro analisam-se diferentes repertórios de atuação do Estado Novo no campo das obras públicas, da arquitetura ao urbanismo, passando pela intervenção em monumentos nacionais. Congregando vinte autores de distintas gerações e formações, pretende-se oferecer um ponto de situação, ainda que sempre parcelar e provisório, do conhecimento sobre os múltiplos programas desenvolvidos durante o regime, os quais tiveram, a diversas escalas, consequências na organização do espaço e do território português. Potenciar a sua leitura integrada constitui um dos principais objetivos deste volume. Em segundo lugar, visa-se evidenciar, acolhendo como vantajosa a existência de múltiplos posicionamentos analíticos, os denominadores comuns e os territórios de dissenso, os diferentes referentes teóricos e metodologias mobilizadas para compreender este objeto de estudo multifacetado. Rejeitando possíveis leituras unívocas, a materialização deste retrato poliédrico da historiografia nacional procura, antes, contribuir para (re)imaginar um horizonte de investigação, idealmente transdisciplinar, comparativo e colaborativo.

Synopsis:
This book analyses different repertories of the Estado Novo's performance in the field of public works, from architecture to urbanism, including the conservation and restoration of built heritage. It brings together twenty authors from different generations and backgrounds. Without claiming to be exhaustive, it presents the current state of knowledge on the multiple programs developed during the regime, which had, at various scales, consequences in the organization of the Portuguese territory and landscape. One of the main goals of this volume is to enhance an integrated reading of these programs. Secondly, it aims to highlight, by embracing the existence of multiple analytical positions as an advantage, the common denominators and areas of dissent, the different theoretical references and methodologies mobilized to understand this multifaceted object of study. Rather than pursuing univocal readings, this multifaceted portrait of national historiography seeks to contribute to (re)imagine a research horizon, ideally transdisciplinary, comparative, and collaborative.

Bu bölümde siyasal rejim tipleri tartışılmaktadır. İlk olarak, demokratik olmayan rejim sınıflandırmaları, daha sonra demokratik rejim tanımları, en son olarak da bu iki rejim tipinin arasında kalan karma rejimler (seçimli/rekabetçi otoriterlik, hibrid rejimler ve sorunlu demokrasiler) incelenmektedir. Bölümün asıl amacı rejim tanımlarına açıklık getirmek olsa da, farklı rejim tanımlarının karşılaştırmalı siyaset araştırmalarının sonuçlarını nasıl etkilediği de yazının bütünleştirici teması olarak önemli bir yer tutmaktadır.

This study sought to determine the influence of authoritarian leadership on social, economic and political development. To do so, it adopted a comparative study design, comparing the development of the Republic of Singapore under authoritarian leadership, and the development of the Republic of Zambia under authoritarian leadership. It sought to answer the questions: Why and how does authoritarian leadership influence development differently in Singapore compared to Zambia? The research used the modernization theory as the background of the research. It adopted the case study method for its research methodology and employed the descriptive method of analysis. It used purely secondary data sources in the research. From the findings it is noted that authoritarian leadership can either lead to the development of an economy or the underdevelopment of an economy. This is realized through the analysis of the authoritarian leadership style exhibited by Lee Kuan Yew  in Singapore and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia during their leadership tenures. The paper recommends that it is important for leaders to know their leadership styles so as to use the styles effectively in building their economies; and heads of state summits should be held to deal with issues of governance and development, most specifically authoritarian leadership and development. This is to help states still under authoritarian leadership to thrive within their contexts.

A travers ce mémoire, il sera question de présenter les effets de la désinformation sur la vitalité du débat public en ligne. Nous verrons dans un premier temps que si la désinformation prospère, c’est avant tout parce que l’écosystème informationnel en ligne lui est favorable. Puis, nous passerons en revue les mesures législatives que les États ont engagées pour tenter d’éradiquer ce phénomène. Enfin, nous tenterons de définir le rôle du journaliste face à ce chaos informationnel qui le dépasse. Le journaliste à l’ère de la « post-vérité » doit restaurer la confiance du public tout en apportant des solutions concrètes pour limiter l’effet dévastateur des fausses informations. A l’issue de ce travail de recherche, nous évoquerons des solutions plus à même de contrer ce chaos informationnel, à savoir l’effort de fact-checking et le travail d’éducation aux médias qui se présentent comme des moyens plus viables sur le long terme. Au lieu de se concentrer en amont sur le blocage de la diffusion des milliers de messages désinformants qui circulent sur le web chaque jour, il s’avère que la solution plus efficace serait de munir les internautes des outils de vérification des sources de l’information. Autrement dit, il vaut mieux « muscler » l’esprit critique des citoyens plutôt que combattre par la censure des flux informationnels dont la diffusion est difficilement contrôlable. C’est pourquoi j’ai décidé de réaliser un entretien  avec Fabienne Bruere, journaliste de l’AFP et secrétaire de l’association Entre les lignes dédiée à l’éducation aux médias dans plusieurs établissements scolaires de France. Son témoignage sera recoupé et disséminé au sein de ce mémoire pour compléter, illustrer et susciter le débat contradictoire autour de la question du rôle du journaliste à l’ère de la désinformation.

This glossary, by no means exhaustive,  presents potted histories of keywords and phenomena that are evocative of the Marcos era (1965-1986) in the Philippines. Terms in bold font have their own entries.
Forthcoming in Iyra Buenrostro-Cabbab, Mary Grace Concepcion, JPaul S. Manzanilla, and Ruel V. Pagunsan, eds., "Remembering Martial Law"

How do authoritarian regimes remain in power? Focusing on the case of Belarus where he lived for more than five years, the author highlights several mechanisms of assent to tyranny, beyond the regime’s ability to control and repress, which should not be underestimated. The book immerses the reader in the depths of the Belarusian countryside, at the heart of this authoritarian regime. The analysis describes sometimes epic characters, their family history, their sufferings and their joys, their secrets and their hopes. It sheds light on the reasons why part of the population supports Lukashenko, and takes a fresh look at the functioning of the last dictatorship in Europe.

--The Securitate lost the battle to save the communist regime of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu in December 1989…but they won the war for how December 1989 is remembered. 

Nothing is better or more bitter proof of this claim than the subject of this chapter:  the 501-page Indictment in the Revolution File of 5 April 2019 drawn up by military prosecutors.  The Indictment charges long time communist party apparatchik and former President of Romania Ion Iliescu (1990-1996; 2000-2004) and others, including former Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican Voiculescu (1990-1991), with “crimes against humanity” for, according to the Indictment, the “862 deaths and 2,150 injuries” (p. 456) that occurred after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled Bucharest by helicopter at midday on 22 December 1989. These officials and high-ranking military officers are accused of creating a “terrorist diversion” against non-existent Ceausescu loyalists during the period 22-31 December 1989 in order to legitimize their seizure of power and cover up the military’s role in the bloodshed that preceded Ceausescu’s ouster on 22 December 1989, the period of 16-22 December 1989. Nestor Ratesh once referred to this narrative as the “operetta war” theory ; it could also be termed “regime change” by “false flag” or “diversionary war”  theory, for it claims not as that theory does that powerholders go to war to divert attention from other issues, but that the first act of those who seized power, the act that brought them to power, was the creation of a diversionary war, in this case a false one.

The claim that the details and arguments of the former Securitate permeate and even inspire the Indictment in the Revolution File may strike some readers as outlandish. Afterall, haven’t the announcements of the Military Prosecutorial Section (SPM) been well received by domestic and international media since the file was reopened in late 2016? Has the work of the SPM in the Revolution File not been praised by Romania’s liberal, anti-communist, pro-West intelligentsia at home and abroad? Has it not been welcomed by the head of the most visible association of revolutionaries, the 21 December Association? Indeed, all of these are true, the work of the SPM has been praised and defended by Gabriel Liiceanu and Horia Roman-Patapievici, and no less than the Chair of the Presidential Commission to Analyze the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, Professor Vladimir Tismaneanu, whose Final Report was the basis for President Traian Basescu’s condemnation of the communist regime and the Securitate as “illegitimate and criminal” on 18 December 2006, considers that Ion Iliescu and the others are finally receiving real justice.

The literature on authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has emerged, in the past two decades, as if in a Hegelian dance between democracy and authoritarianism. 1 In the 1990s, scholars accepted the broad assumptions of the 'democratic-transition paradigm'-developed in studies on Southern and Eastern Europe, and particularly on Latin America-to search for the prospects, and later the setbacks, of democratic change in the region. In the past decade, scholars responded by criticizing assumptions borrowed from the 'transition paradigm' and demanded analytical inquiries into what was empirically present, rather than into the absence of a phenomenon, that is, democracy. The authoritarian regime literature therefore searched for the sources of regime stability, rather than the prospects of systemic change. Based on the uprisings that brushed aside the authoritarian rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, and other revolts challenging autocrats in Bahrain and Syria, it is tempting to revive the debate on the prospects of democratic change and proclaim the 'fourth wave' of democratic transition. This chapter demands a more cautious perspective at a time when dynamic developments are still unfolding. Broader conceptual frameworks appear to be inapt to fully grasp the political earthquake that shook the authoritarian regimes in the MENA region.

Для своих почитателей Лаврентий Павлович Берия является венцом советской эпохи, для своих ненавистников – ее исчадием. Отношение к Берии определяется отношением к СССР. Для тех, кто обращаются к феномену Берии, огромному и многогранному в общественном сознании, в нем много личного, интимного, уникального, но все же, Берия – прежде всего, социально-политическое явление, символ советского социализма. Жизнь Берии проходила во взаимовлиянии с другими ключевыми персонами эпохи, но никто из них не действовала независимо от тех социальных сил, которые подлинно творили историю. Свой выбор сделали Ленин, Троцкий, Сталин, - главные творцы ранней советской истории, - а также Зиновьев, Каменев, Бухарин, Рыков, - ее «на языцех» гранды. Берия был среди тех политиков его поколения, кто сделал свой выбор в самом начале пути, осознанно и целеустремленно. В этом заключен потенциал его профессионального и политического успеха,  и это-же определило те его поступки, которые кажутся отталкивающими сегодня.
Волею Провидения и собственными усилиями Берия оказался в самом эпицентре советской истории 1920-х – 1930-х годов. Изучение его биографии позволяет увидеть ее совсем иначе, чем привычные сегодня стереотипы, которые навязывают читателю как популярная, так и академическая историография. Многочисленные биографии Берии пестрят термином «социализм», никак не определяя этот общественный строй. Между тем именно через жизнь Берии становится понятной его суть, обретают свое лицо и свое место как социалистические классы, так и их социальные противники, - «антисоветский класс», - стремившиеся к разрушению социализма. Биография Берии показывает принципы и механизм политики при социализме, которая не является ни партийно-фракционной, ни клановой, а классовой.

On August 9, 2020, presidential elections were held in Belarus. Despite blatant electoral fraud and procedural violations, the official results declared Aleksandr Lukashenka reelected for a sixth term. While in the past, even the most obviously fraudulent election results have been followed by an atmosphere of resigned acceptance, this time countless Belarusians took to the streets to contest the results. What made this election different? This analysis of current affairs looks at the 2020 events through the lens of authoritarian consolidation theory, suggesting the unprecedented political mobilization was enabled by erosion in the three pillars of authoritarian stability: repression, cooptation, and legitimation. A majority of the population had been accepting the political status quo out of fear, for social and monetary security provided in exchange for loyalty, or a general understanding that there were no alternatives. Lukashenka did not realize this had largely changed. Nine months later, the foundation of the authoritarian regime is in an even worse shape. The regime's reliance on repression further counteracts the legitimacy of the system. As a result, it seems it will be difficult for the authorities to re-consolidate authoritarianism, at least in the near future, no matter how the 'revolution' unfolds.