Authoritarianism

This research is dealing with  the relationship between authoritarian state-building and ideology in contemporary Russia.  The collapse of the Soviet Union introduced a period of remarkable economic and political changes, but also of a turmoil and uncertainty for many. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russian Federation was a state without official ideology. However, when Putin's attempts to  consolidate the Russian regime along the authoritarian lines, resulted in  harsh Western critique, the need for new sources of legitimation emerged.  To deal with this critique and to thwart the perceived threats of colored revolution in Russia financed and supported by the West, Russian authorities adopted various strategies that combined a political, administrative and intellectual assault on the opposition and Western democratic ideals. An important element of these strategies was an attempt to supply ideological justifications for Russia's undemocratic regime. This attempt included both the de-legitimation of the idea of liberal democracy and the formulation of alternative conception that would legitimize Putin's regime. The latter became known as "sovereign democracy"

How do leaders' idiosyncrasies are developed, and how do these, in turn, impact their political behaviour? This study traces the idiosyncratic behaviour of Presidents Andrew Jackson and Donald Trump. It details four historical traditions-Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian. The study expands upon Jacksonian tradition and sees that how Trump pursued this tradition and how is his political behaviour remained similar to that of Andrew Jackson. Three specific areas in which these variables are determined are personal lives, narcissism and authoritarian behaviour, and populism and corruption. The paper also charts out the ways and means through which Donald Trump's administration is termed as Jacksonian in nature.

While the canonical literature on oil wealth suggests that hydrocarbon windfalls encourage repressive despotism, Kuwait provides a case of an oil-rich autocracy governing instead through popular rentierism-that is, through a broad coalition of social forces, one that furnishes enduring loyalty from below while constraining abuses of state power from above. This paper provides a theoretically guided explanation for this exceptional outcome. I argue that the Kuwaiti regime's coalitional bargains originated in the pre-oil era, when domestic opposition and geopolitical constrictions compelled it to forge new social alliances at the dawn of modern statehood. This inclusionary strategy mediated the subsequent effect of oil rents, which the regime used to institutionalize its mass base with costly material and symbolic side payments. Such popular incorporation bound large constituent classes to the regime's survival, precluding the need for widespread repression. After 50 years, these coalitional bargains have also proven remarkably resilient, as social actors have continued to endorse the autocratic leadership despite economic crisis and wartime defeat.

This chapter explores three anthropological dimensions of the denial of crimes committed during the François Duvalier regime in Haiti (1957 and 1971): the manner in which social obligations created by kinship and social bonds induce conformism, self-censorship, and eventually denial; the disassociation from the victim's suffering, a social phenomenon I call pathophobia; and the animistic dimension of denial, which considers that the victim is wrong in their very essence and thus deserving of their fate.

For decades, Turkish Islamists have failed to attract the votes of large sections of society and remained marginal. As a result of this failure to come to power, and due to domestic and international constraints and windows of opportunities, they have declared that they have jettisoned Islamism. Many Turkish Muslims whose religious disposition was shaped by the pluralistic urban Ottoman experience and small-town Anatolian traditionalism, and by the contesting currents of cosmopolitan pluralism and rural social conservatism, voted in favour of these former Islamists who have become " Muslim Democrats ". This paper elaborates on the genealogy of Turkish Islamists and their political trajectories and argues that when the forces and constraints of domestic and external social, political and economic conditions disappeared and the opportunities derived from being Muslim Democrats no longer existed, the former Islamists easily returned to their original ideology, showing that despite assertions to the contrary their respect for democracy and pluralism had not truly been internalised. This paper also aims to demonstrate that similar to other authoritarian populists, Erdoganists perceive the state and its leader as more important than anything else and as being above everything else, which has culminated in a personality cult and sanctification of the state. As long as Turkey's economy continued to boom, almost everyone was happy that Turkey could readily market the " Muslim Democrats " story to the whole world for a long period as a major success story, or as an " exemplary Muslim country " or " model ". Yet, Middle Eastern elites and Western forces got carried away and learnt the hard way just how naive their view was in perhaps the first great transformation movement of the twenty-first century – the Arab Spring. Likewise, the Turkish Spring turned all too quickly towards autumn and then winter.

This book provides an introduction to political psychology through a focus on European politics and topics. It describes a style of doing political psychology in Europe that has developed out of dialogue with as well as critique of North American approaches. By emphasising the theoretical and methodological diversity of political psychology, the book is intended to contribute to a greater understanding of the strength and utility of the field. • Opens up and extends the study of political psychology to a variety of socio-political contexts and manifestations of political behaviour • Clearly outlines the usefulness and promises of distinctive critical approaches in social and political psychology • Explicitly considers the role of language, communication, identity and social representations in the construction of political meanings. Political Psychology will appeal to upper-level students and scholars who seek to extend their knowledge of the complex relationship between psychology, politics and society.

The most recent transformation of world order is often depicted as a shift from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian era in which international organizations are becoming increasingly independent sites of authority. This internationalization of authority is often considered as an indication of the constitutionalization of the global legal order. However, this article highlights that international organizations can also exercise authority in an authoritarian fashion that violates the same constitutionalist principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law that international organizations are usually expected to promote. It is thus an open question which post-Westphalia we are in fact heading to: a constitutionalized order, an authoritarian order, or a combination of both? Based on a conceptualization of post-Westphalian orders as a two-dimensional continuum linking the ideal-typical end points of constitutionalism and authoritarianism, we analyze the United Nations security s...

Two Systems, Two Countries is an unabashedly heterodox addition to a growing body of critical work on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) suppression of local identity and political freedoms in Hong Kong. What Carrico’s contribution uniquely provides is a penetrating analysis of the various schools of thought that make up the diverse landscape of Hong Kong nationalism.

Why do Muslim-majority countries exhibit high levels of authoritarianism and low levels of socio-economic development in comparison to world averages? Ahmet T. Kuru criticizes explanations which point to Islam as the cause of this disparity, because Muslims were philosophically and socio-economically more developed than Western Europeans between the ninth and twelfth centuries. Nor was Western colonialism the cause: Muslims had already suffered political and socio-economic problems when colonization began. Kuru argues that Muslims had influential thinkers and merchants in their early history, when religious orthodoxy and military rule were prevalent in Europe. However, in the eleventh century, an alliance between orthodox Islamic scholars (the ulema) and military states began to emerge. This alliance gradually hindered intellectual and economic creativity by marginalizing intellectual and bourgeois classes in the Muslim world. This important study links its historical explanation to contemporary politics by showing that, to this day, ulema-state alliance still prevents creativity and competition in Muslim countries.

Hall's insistence on 'authoritarian populism' as a vehicle for generating electoral support for right-wing political projects is particularly important for understanding the consolidation of neo-liberal hegemony in Eastern Europe where politicians have idealized the principle of 'work' as the cornerstone of the new moral economy. In this paper I draw on Hall's conceptualization and my previous research on the rise of political anti-Gypsyism in Hungary to reflect on the ascendance of a new brand of politics to positions of governmental power. I begin by elucidating the political and economic underpinnings of the electorate's radicalization in a rightist direction and then show how the main right-wing party modified its ideological platform and political strategy to harness this energy and take the wind out of the sails of the extremist-racist Jobbik party, which by espousing anti-Gypsyism had successfully established itself as the voice of the abandoned countryside. While Hall interpreted the success of the conservative party in terms of hegemonic ideas of freedom from the state, I show that the electoral success of conservatives turned national-populists in Hungary partially hinged on their offer to transform the neo-liberal state in an anti-egalitarian direction with a view to rewarding 'worthy' citizens. Once in government, national-populists centralized state power to reinforce the positions of the bourgeoisie whose representative felt squeezed 'from above' by cosmopolitan elites and 'from below' by the dangerous classes. I show that contrary to expectations, 'authoritarian statist' politics is difficult to consolidate and begins to threaten liberal rule within the core of 'homogeneous society'. I nevertheless argue that this re-emergent 'extremism of the center' should not (yet) be seen as leading to Fascism, mainly because it does not seek to transcend the class conflict but to reinforce class privileges and safeguard bourgeois class rule. I close my analysis by suggesting that authoritarian statism appear to offer a workable model for advancing rightist hegemony on the EU's semi-periphery.

Bu raporda, akademik literatürün temel tartışma alanlarının penceresinden, yükselen popülizmin içeriği, yükselişinin nedenleri ve en önemlisi siyasal rejime etkileri değerlendirilmektedir. Raporun birinci bölümünde popülistler kısaca tanıtıldıktan sonra, ikinci bölümde popülizm literatürü bu üç başlık altında eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendirilmektedir. Buna ek olarak, ikinci bölümde, literatür üstüne bir gözlemde ve popülizm demokrasi ilişkisi üzerine bir iddiada bulunulmaktadır. Gözlem, popülizm literatüründeki aşırı tanımsal çeşitliliğin daralması ve popülizm çalışan sosyal bilimcilerin popülizmi halk-elitler ayrımına dayalı bir siyaset çerçeveleme biçimi olarak gören tanımlar çevresinde toplanmaya başlamasıdır. İddia ise, iktidardaki popülizmin liberal demokrasinin yarıdemokratik çok sayıda mekanizmasından biri olan seçimleri kutsallaştırarak yalnızlaştırdığı ve bu yolla liberal demokratik rejimi başka bir demokrasi biçimine dönüştürmediği, sadece otoriterleştirdiğidir. Esasen, bu iddia, popülizmin otoriterliğe yol açtığını gösteren kuramsal literatüre, bu otoriter etkinin yolu konusunda bir katkı niteliğindedir. Raporun son bölümündeyse, literatürden çıkan temel fikirler, bulgular ve gözlemler ışığında, iktidardaki ve muhalefetteki popülistlerle mücadelenin zorlukları hakkında yorumlarda bulunulmaktadır.

This report on Cambodia is one of a set of four country case studies designed to study the implications of closing civic space for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The case study was commissioned in response to the wave of legal, administrative, political and informal means to restrict civic space and the activities of civil society actors in countries around the world in the past decade. Based on a literature review and conceptual framework developed for the study (see also Hossain et al 2018), the report documents changing civic space in Cambodia. The country is characterized by a centralised political system where power is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the dominant ruling class. Development policy has prioritized high-growth goals, with documented violations of land, labour and freedom of speech rights in the process. The case study documents the impacts on specific Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) objectives, including no poverty (SDG 1), zero hunger (SDG 2), decent work (SDG 8), gender and economic equality (SDGs 5 and 10) inclusive communities (SDG 11), life on the land (SDG 15).

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

The idea that free trade leads to prosperity is neoliberal propaganda. The idea is based on Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, which was already shown to be wrong by Frank Graham in 1923. This refutation didn’t lead to the theory’s demise, however, because it is an ideology rather than a scientific theory. It is an ideological tool in neocolonial efforts to further exploit the developing world and in neoliberal efforts to dismantle democracy and empower the financial elite.

Since Sisi assumed power, the Egyptian judiciary has served to legitimate and facilitate the authoritarian rule. Other than a feigned opposition against the transfer of two islands - Sanafir and Tiran – to Saudi Arabia in 2016, the Egyptian judiciary has served as a channel through which Sisi presses his oppression.

Under the Bush administration, the US has aggressively promoted democracy in the Middle East and North Africa.  By replacing repressive tyrants with moderate liberals and giving voice to hitherto suppressed social forces, US-backed democratization would drain the swamp of ideological extremism and reduce violent conflict, all while underscoring the role of America as a moral beacon of international enlightenment.  However, as this chapter argues, the project of encouraging Arab democracy faltered under a devastating self-contradiction. Democratization requires that autocratic incumbents surrender their monopolies over executive authority to legal opposition groups ensconced in parliaments and civic institutions. Yet, in the Arab world, this would likely bring into power Islamist groups that evoke fierce hostility toward Washington’s vital strategic interests. An Arab spring of democracy might thus result in a winter of discontent for U.S. policymakers bound by stringent imperatives, such as sponsoring Israeli policies and securing regional oil reserves. Such dissonance has exposed American democracy promotion as an ideological cloak for a darker agenda: paying lip service to gradual reform while quietly sustaining long-standing support for  autocratic allies. The theoretical lesson is stark: observers should expect not the imminent breakdown or even the slow erosion of Arab authoritarianism, but rather its renewed durability in an era of continuing patron-client ties.

In the twenty years that have elapsed since the 1997 Tajik Peace Accord, Tajikistan has faced a number of significant threats, both internally and externally. Despite Tajikistan being the smallest and poorest country in Central Asia , it has managed to weather several storms and avoid a relapse into full violent conflict. This success may be attributed, in part, to President Rahmon’s move towards authoritarianism and his creation of an unobstructed, one-party government. The short-term success of this power consolidation, however, is likely to be undone by its long-term repercussions. As long as Islamist groups continue to find representation and support, their suppression will only create new grievances and undermine Tajikistan’s social cohesion over time. What specific steps will help to reverse this path are uncertain, but it is clear that regional and international actors must play a heavier role in achieving effective change if the Tajikistan government is unwilling to initiate. Finally, the peacebuilding community should re-prioritize Tajikistan as an urgent conflict prevention priority, using a grassroots approach to promote moderate voices, build community resilience, and expand the space for dialogue and non-adversarial approaches across Tajikistan’s various cleavages.

Since the kick-off in 2015 of the last presidential campaign, a climate of fear and intimidation has dominated national life in the United States to a degree rarely seen before, poisoning our politics and reaching into our very relationships with friends, co-workers, and neighbors.
    Confronting Political Intimidation is about how this came to be, how we can see ourselves through it, but also why it is not likely to go away anytime soon.
      At the core of this political history is a larger U.S. public culture of intimidation and bullying in the workplace, media, and political arena that has been building for 30 years. It is not by chance that in 2017 the U.S. inaugurated Donald Trump, an openly authoritarian president who is an abusive CEO, capitalist folk hero, and Internet troll.
    The current harsh environment is a direct challenge to citizens and residents, especially those seeking to engage in progressive activism and party politics now and in the years to come.
      This short book offers a unique guide to the strategies and dynamics of contemporary political intimidation and public bullying: the dangers they present, the snares and traps that envelop their targets, and the lessons to be learned.
      In the end, it’s about shedding light on the dark side of contemporary national life in order to see beyond it.

Net sales proceeds will go to Indviisible National of IndivisbleGuide,com.

Mired in inconsistency, contradiction, and scandal, Donald J. Trump’s presidency appears to be anything but normal. This has prompted a great deal of searching among social scientists and journalists to understand what exactly is behind Trump’s erratic governing style. These narratives center the new normal of American presidential politics on the extreme form of Trump’s narcissistic behavior and his flagrant commitment to ethno-nationalist, authoritarian, and neoliberal practices. However, because these narratives rely on traditional political strategies and theories, they do not fully capture the most novel aspects of the Trump mode of governance. What is “not normal” about President Donald Trump is that his governing style is irreducible to conventional statecraft and political goals because Trump is not just a celebrity/businessman-turned-politician. Rather, Trump the person is inherently tied to Trump the personal brand, and the governing style of President Trump follows the market-oriented logic of personal brands, which is primarily oriented towards maximizing symbolic capital. Rather than position Trump’s governing style as motivated to achieve self-adulation, white supremacy, an authoritarian state, or neoliberal utopia, we reconsider Trump’s governing style as an attempt to capture the attention of the collective consciousness and focus it on Trump as a personal brand.

EL 19 de abril de 2018, para sorpresa de todos, estallaron protestas impulsadas por miles de estudiantes que se manifestaban por una multitud de agravios acumulados. Las movilizaciones rápidamente se transformaron en un rechazo a la forma autoritaria, patrimonial y plutocrática de gobernar por parte de la pareja presidencial. El gobierno respondió con una desproporcionada represión.
La crisis fue inesperada, pero era previsible.

Building on existing studies, this chapter examines cyberpolitics in the world’s largest authoritarian regime, China, and attempts to evaluate the impact of the Internet and social media on the authoritarian rule. Through analysis of cyberactivism and state adaptation in relation to each other, I argue that though the digital technology has empowered Chinese citizens in multiple ways, their general political inactiveness and the pluralization of cyberactivism, exacerbated by state censorship, have prevented regime transition from becoming the shared awareness. Moreover, the Chinese state has adapted far beyond censorship and propaganda. Its attempt to accommodate cyberactivism is also crucial to explain the authoritarian regime’s resilience.

Based on documents recently declassified by the Brazilian Truth Commission, this article investigates the economic and diplomatic relations between Brazil and Chile during the last years of Salvador Allende’s government and the first days of the Chilean military dictatorship. Despite the common sense notion that the United Stated was the one and only supporter of the Chilean September 11, the Brazilian influence was also instrumental to the overthrowing of Allende and to the confirmation of a military dictatorship in Chile. This article looks at two central figures of this process : the Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Roberto Campos, and the Brazilian Ambassador in Santiago, Antonio da Câmara Canto. One of the most influential Brazilian economists, Campos disagreed with the state-based policies that characterized the Brazilian military regime. Instead of nationalization and price control, Campos believed in the strength of the free market and private institutions, a perspective similar to the one implemented by the Chicago Boys in Chile. Câmara Canto’s anti-communist ideas were central to his fight against the Allende regime and support to the dictatorship. These two figures are part of a much larger influence that, 40 years after the Chilean coup, begins to be investigated.

Abstract
It can be said that normal democratic outcomes are those who seek the best interest of the majority, and therefore, they reflect the view of the true majority; and it can be said that extreme democratic outcomes are those who seek the best interest of the minority, and therefore, they reflect the view of the true minority.  From this point of view it can be said that i) normal liberal democracies bring different normal democratic outcomes into competition, where the one with majority votes wins the democratic contest; and that ii) extreme liberal democracies bring normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes into competition, where again the one with majority votes wins the democratic contest. When normal democratic outcomes compete with each other under an independent rule of law system there is true democracy as there is democratic consistency that allows power to alternate between different normal democratic outcome if the result of the democracy process says so; and when a normal democratic outcome competes with an extreme democratic outcome under an independent rule of law system we have temporary democratic authoritarianism if the result of the democratic process says so. 
When we shifted from liberal democracy thinking to extreme liberal democracy thinking as we did in 2016 with the coming of Brexism and Trumpism we needed to shift our thinking from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking as true democracy thinking no longer holds in an authoritarianism based system if we wanted to understand what to expect from an extreme democratic outcome in terms of behavior or understand what to do either to save the democratic model or to prevent the coming of permanent authoritarianism from within. But apparently traditional democracy thinkers missed this 2016 shift in thinking, which may explain the confusion and knowledge gaps that have led people, academics, and politicians to treat extreme democratic outcomes and their expected behavior as if they were normal democratic outcomes when they are not, missing all together the democracy/authoritarian inconsistency at the heart of this new system.  Hence, there is a need to understand the working of true democracy thinking and of temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking in terms of normal and extreme democratic outcome theory in order to be able to point out the main implication of a shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking or vise a versa.  And this raises the following question: How can normal and extreme democratic outcome theory be used to point out the structure of the 2016 shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking and its main implications? Among the goals of this paper is to provide an answer to this question both analytically and graphically.

Resúmen
Se puede decir que los resultados democráticos normales son aquellos que buscan el mejor interés de la mayoría y, por lo tanto, reflejan la opinión de la verdadera mayoría; y se puede decir que los resultados democráticos extremos son aquellos que buscan el mejor interés de la minoría y, por lo tanto, reflejan la visión de la verdadera minoría. Desde este punto de vista se puede decir que i) las democracias liberales normales ponen en competencia diferentes resultados democráticos normales, donde el que tiene la mayoría de votos gana la contienda democrática; y que ii) las democracias liberales extremas traen resultados democráticos normales y resultados democráticos extremos a la competencia, donde nuevamente el que tiene votos mayoritarios gana la contienda democrática.  Cuando los resultados democráticos normales compiten entre sí bajo un sistema de estado de derecho independiente, existe una verdadera democracia, ya que existe una coherencia democrática que permite que el poder alterne entre diferentes resultados democráticos normales si el resultado del proceso democrático así lo dice; y cuando un resultado democrático normal compite con un resultado democrático extremo bajo un sistema de Estado de derecho independiente, tenemos un autoritarismo democrático temporal si el resultado del proceso democrático así lo dice.
Cuando pasamos del pensamiento de la democracia liberal al pensamiento de la democracia liberal extrema, como lo hicimos en 2016 con la llegada del Brexismo y el Trumpismo, necesitábamos cambiar nuestro pensamiento del pensamiento de la democracia verdadera al pensamiento del autoritarismo democrático temporal, ya que el pensamiento de la democracia verdadera no funciona en un sistema basado en autoritarismo  si quisiéramos entender qué esperar de un resultado democrático extremo en términos de comportamiento o entender qué hacer para poder salvar el modelo democrático o para poder prevenir la llegada de un movimiento autoritarismo permanente desde adentro.  Pero aparentemente los pensadores de la democracia tradicional se perdieron este cambio de pensamiento de 2016, lo que puede explicar la confusión y las brechas de conocimiento que han llevado a las personas, académicos y políticos a tratar los resultados democráticos extremos y su comportamiento esperado como si fueran resultados democráticos normales cuando no lo son, perdiendo todos juntos la inconsistencia democracia / autoritarismo la cual es el corazón de este nuevo sistema.  Por lo tanto, es necesario comprender el funcionamiento del pensamiento de la democracia verdadera y el pensamiento del autoritarismo democrático temporal en términos de la teoría del resultado democrático normal y extremo para poder señalar las principales implicaciones de un cambio del pensamiento de la democracia verdadera al pensamiento del autoritarismo democrático temporal o viceversa. Y esto plantea la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cómo se puede utilizar la teoría del resultado democrático normal y extremo para señalar la estructura del cambio en 2016 del pensamiento de la democracia verdadera al pensamiento de autoritarismo democrático temporal y sus principales implicaciones? Uno de los objetivos de este artículo es dar una respuesta a esta pregunta tanto analítica como gráficamente.

This chapter aims at exploring the presence and the salience of authoritarian values among Japanese and European parties by testing speci!c country-level hypotheses that might explain variations of authoritarianism. The research design consists in a quantitative analysis of the content of nearly 3,000 party manifestos in Japan and 37 European countries. On average, no less than 14% of the content of these party manifestos concern authoritarian issues but one can observe important variations across countries. Besides country-level explanations of authoritarian values and a particular focus on the di"erences between Japanese, Eastern European and Western European parties, several control variables related to the (micro) party-level will also be included in our analyses.

American efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East under the Bush administration have floundered.  This article explains why.  First, American policymakers have proven unwilling to sponsor electoral openings that might favor the ascendance of potentially hostile Islamist groups. Second, they have refused to attach negative conditionality to reform demands made to strategic autocratic allies-that is, punishing noncompliance by withdrawing economic aid, military assistance,
and other forms of support. Both obstacles reflect the reality that America's overarching strategic goals, in particular the preservation of Israel's security
and regional hydrocarbon reserves, require a vision of regional stability that unpredictable regime shifts would endanger. Hence today's paradox of why the democratizing intentions of a unilateral superpower -- one with unmatched political and military power -- have been effectively stymied by its smaller, weaker, and poorer authoritarian allies.

Democracy in a post-colonial Africa has not replicated the “Westminster model” that was inoculated upon the continent by its former colonial masters. African democracy, which is flawed mainly in comparison to the West, has posed different characteristics mostly, an extended stay in power by some of its leaders. The emergence of the strong man leader has been a critical point of debate as scholars in the field of comparative politics and government continue to wrestle with the question of how African dictators have maintained a stronghold on power. These extended incumbencies, which are becoming the norm, are best understood if they are analyzed using the theoretical frameworks of; cooptation, coercion, repression, colonial legacies, and elements of foreign direct investment/ influence. To put democracy and dictatorship in conversation, this paper examines Libya’s Muammar Gadhafi, whose rule discombobulated the young nation. Gadhafi’s reign, in its nativity, was a harbinger for hopes of democracy in Africa as it promised participation of all citizens; however, relations soured throughout what was an egregious 42-year presidency.

Wie arbeiten undemokratische Regime? Die Autoren geben einen Überblick über totalitäre und autoritäre Regimen (sowie Mischformen) und stellen anhand Fallstudien die Funktionsweise derartiger Regime dar.
Die Autoren diskutieren unterschiedliche Hintergründe, Ideologien und Mentalitäten in modernen undemokratischen Regimen. Dabei dienen spezifische Länder als Beispiele für die zuvor eingeführten theoretischen Konzepte. Das Buch ist in acht Hauptkapitel eingeteilt. Im ersten Kapitel geht es um terminologische Probleme in Bezug auf undemokratische Formen der Regierung. In den folgenden Kapiteln wird die Theorie totalitärer und autoritärer Regime dargestellt. Das vierte Kapitel behandelt andere Formen undemokratischer Regime, die nicht der klassischen Zweiteilung von Totalitarismus vs. Autoritarismus entsprechen. Im sechsten Kapitel werden auf der Grundlage der politischen Psychologie Aspekte der autoritären Persönlichkeit und des politischen Führungsverhaltens untersucht. Die letzten beiden Kapitel beschäftigen sich mit den praktischen Fragen der Funktionsweise von undemokratischen Regimen.

Tracing the political development of the Chechen Republic since its secessionist movement in the 1990s, this essay illustrates that the Islamic republic has been gradually pacified and stabilized by unpeaceful means: Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM) and subcontracting authoritarian governance to the de facto autonomous ruler Ramzan Kadyrov. Building on concepts by Max Weber, Immanuel Kant, and Johan Galtung, this essay acknowledges that the notions of stability and peace concern two dimensions: 1. federal Moscow-Chechnya relations, 2. Chechnya’s internal balance. Though both dimensions evidently stabilized on a basis of coercion (especially by the use of regional networks and the blood feud system by pro-Kremlin Kadyrov), the emerging institutional framework exposes sources of instability, as it depends on individual relationships. Democratic innovations would even pose a threat to this established stability. Additionally, social integration of Chechnya into the Federation might be hampered by ethnic nationalism and xenophobia in Russian society. On the Chechen side, a ‘Russian’ identity is fragile. The collective memory still remembers Russian repressions vividly. Quantitative figures suggest pacification alongside the negative definition of peace. However, the case of Chechnya indicates that positive definitions (e.g. by Galtung) cannot be measured dichotomously; structural violence characterizes Chechen society, but, at the same time, a certain form of social integration took place.

The article explores the conditions under which incumbent leaders in initially competitive political systems manage to offset democratic resistance and establish an authoritarian regime. Autocratisationthe transition from a competitive political system to a regime dominated by a single political forceis a challenging effort for an incumbent and involves interventions in three 'arenas' to achieve a) public legitimation, b) institutional reforms increasing political repression and c) mass-scale co-optation. Focusing on Slovakia and Belarus in the 1990s, where autocratisation efforts failed and succeeded respectively, the article finds that cooptation plays a catalytic role in helping the incumbent pass institutional reforms and escalate repression without risking de-legitimation. In Belarus, co-optation engulfed society and the economy whereas, in Slovakia, a socioeconomic environment with greater autonomy from government limited the scope for co-optation. The Slovak opposition was able to find the resources and supporters necessary to fight back against the incumbent.