Contractualism

La emergencia del iusnaturalismo moderno. La gran dicotomía. El Estado de Naturaleza. Variaciones y debates. Thomas Hobbes: un nuevo tipo de pacto social. El Leviatán. John Locke y la afirmación de la libertad. Segundo tratado sobre el gobierno civil. Locke frente a Hobbes.

Age rationing is a central issue in the health care priority-setting literature, but it has become ever more salient in the light of the Covid-19 outbreak, where health authorities in several countries have given higher priority to younger over older patients. But how is age rationing different under outbreak circumstances than under normal circumstances, and what does this difference imply for ethical theories? This is the topic of this paper. The paper argues that outbreaks such as that of Covid-19 involve special circumstances that changes how age should influence our prioritization decisions, and that while this shift in circumstances poses a problem for consequentialist views such as utilitarianism and age-weighted consequentialism, contractualism is better equipped to cope with it. The paper then offers a contractualist prudential account of age rationing under outbreak circumstances.

Sostendré la tesis de que en ciertos casos debe ser permitido e incluso obligatorio el derecho a morir dignamente en los niños, niñas y adolescentes. Reafirmaré, lo que la Corte Constitucional en Colombia mantiene, esto es, la obligatoriedad de la eutanasia en ciertos casos. Quiero argumentar que hay una justificación del derecho a morir dignamente de los adolescentes siempre que puedan lograr configurar un sentido para su vida cuando estén sometidos a intensos sufrimientos, sean pacientes terminales y no haya esperanza de tratamiento. Para ello, expondré algunas razones filosóficas que subyacen a esta discusión con algunas ideas sobre el contractualismo moral de Tugendhat y sobre la cuestión del sentido de la vida y de la muerte en el mismo autor.

O contratualismo é definido como um programa de pesquisa no sentido lakatosiano, que se caracteriza como um conjunto de teorias, tanto clássicas quanto modernas, surgido no século XVII com Thomas Hobbes, ao qual se seguiram, Locke, Rousseau e Kant (clássicos)
e, no século XX, com Gauthier, Nozick, Buchanan e Rawls (modernos), dentre outros. Todas as teorias do programa adotam um núcleo teórico comum, onde fundam o Estado em um contrato social celebrado entre indivíduos racionais, autointeressados, livres e iguais. O programa de pesquisa contratualista conta, outrossim, com um conjunto de instrumentos – modelos, representações e hipóteses auxiliares – para resolver problemas, e que variam entre as teorias do programa.

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar cómo la presencia de dos ideas en el pensamiento político de muchos filósofos modernos y contemporáneos, ha producido como efecto un desplazamiento del concepto de ciudadano como categoría filosófico política. Tales ideas son, por un lado, la de concebir al sujeto político como una entidad colectiva y, por otro lado, la idea de concebir el ámbito de lo político como conflicto. La propuesta de este trabajo consiste en un llamado a la reflexión en torno a la importancia del concepto de ciudadanía como categoría político filosófica que, aun hoy, puede ayudarnos a interpretar el escenario político, e incitar la reflexión filosófica.

En el presente artículo científico, se realiza una investigación y análisis de                las explicaciones contractualistas de la formación de la sociedad, tema fundamental para la comprensión del mundo y la superación de la falsa dicotomía entre individuo y sociedad, que es el tema por excelencia del que preocupa actualmente la sociología e históricamente la filosofía.

En esta revisión, abordamos las perspectivas utilitaristas de Thomas Hobbes y los postulados liberales de Jean-Jaques Rousseau, finalmente nos hemos propuesto analizar sus aplicaciones y usos en el discurso hegemónico que legitima la existencia del estado y las explicaciones de la conformación de la sociedad.

Unveräußerliche Rechte kann man nicht freiwillig aufgeben oder übertragen. Nicht nur Grundrechte können unveräußerlich sein. Unser Rechtssystem schränkt auf unterschiedliche Weisen die Verfügung über gewisse Rechte ein. Weshalb darf aber ein Träger eines solchen Rechts nicht darüber verfügen? Handelt es sich dabei nicht um eine ungerechtfertigte Einschränkung der Vertragsfreiheit oder der möglichen Einwilligung?

This paper distinguishes three levels for the application of impartiality: (1) in the application of first-order moral rules, (2) impartial benevolence (conceived along consequentialist lines) as a first-order moral rule, and (3) the impartial assessment of first-order moral rules. The paper argues that impartiality is always appropriate in the application of *good* moral rules and that, other things being equal, if moral rules are impartially justified, that is a mark in favour of them. The paper also argues that impartial benevolence at the first-order level is only sometimes appropriate, since often a partial concern for ourselves can be permitted and sometimes a partial concern for others to whom we stand in certain special relations is required.

This paper presents a new argument for thinking of traditional ethical theories as methods that can be used in first-order ethics. It begins from outlining how ethical theories, such as consequentialism and contractualism, are flexible frameworks in which different versions of these theories can be formulated to correspond to different first-order ethical views. The paper then argues that, as a result, the traditional ethical theories cannot be evaluated in terms of their truth or correctness. Instead, I will suggest that these theories should be understood as providing different kind of ways of thinking about difficult moral problems. I then recommend a certain form of pragmatic pluralism - it may well be that different moral problems are better approached through different ethical theories.

Se elucidará, desde los planteamientos filosóficos de Hobbes, la afirmación de la feminista Carole Pateman, a saber, que Hobbes constituye una excepción a lo que ella denominó " contrato sexual " en la corriente contractualista clásica. En unas líneas generales se explicará qué es el contrato sexual, para abordar la excepción del Malmesburiense a este contrato sexual, mostrando cómo los hombres y mujeres son iguales en su planteamiento filosófico, y seguidamente recreando y explicando la hipótesis de Pateman respecto de la exclusión del pacto original, aportando fundamentación textual hobbesiana. Se concluirá con una reflexión de la afirmación de Pateman desde el planteamiento de Bobbio y Bovero.

It will be elucidated, from Hobbes' philosophical statements, Carole Pateman's assertion, namely, that Hobbes is an exception to what she has denominated " sexual contract " within the classic contractualism. On basic lines, it will be explained what it is the sexual contract, to aboard on the Malmesburian's exception of this sexual contract, showing how men and women are equal on his philosophical statement, and subsequently to recreate and explain Pateman's hypothesis about women exclusion from the original pact, providing hobbesian textual basis. It will be concluded with a reflection on Pateman's asseveration from Bobbio and Bovero's statements.

Kurz vor der Jahrtausendwende gelang Thomas Donaldson und Thomas D. Dunfee mit „Ties that Bind“, einen Ansatz der Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik zu entwickeln, der den Eindruck einer neuen Stoßrichtung erweckte. Mit der Anwendung kontraktualistischer Methodik bei der „Integrated Social Contract Theory“ sollten drei Probleme der Wirtschaftsethik gelöst werden. Erstens fehlte modernen Konzepten der Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik, wie zum Beispiel dem Stakeholder-Ansatz, eine normative Legitimationsbasis, die ihr eigener Ansatz liefern sollte.  Zweitens böten klassisch-ethische Schulen wie der Kantianismus oder die Gerechtigkeitstheorie von Rawls keine Antworten auf komplexe Einzelfragen des wirtschaftlichen Handelns.  Dies führe zum dritten Problem, dass nämlich keine kulturtolerante, sondern nur eine vermeintlich objektiv orientierte Betrachtung möglich sei.  Beide Problemstellungen sollte Donaldsons und Dunfees Ansatz auflösen und dabei sowohl empirisch als auch normativ sein.  Dazu sollte das Konzept den Entscheidungsträgern der Wirtschaft eine allgemein anwendbare Entscheidungsbasis bieten, da diese zu den wichtigsten Verantwortungsträgern der modernen Welt gehörten.
Diese Herangehensweise stieß auf „offene Ohren“ in der Managementtheorie der Vereinigten Staaten und prägt dort bis heute die Managementlehre.
In diesem Aufsatz wird der Ansatz von Donaldson und Dunfee vorgestellt und kritisch betrachtet.

In The Trouble with Terror, Tamar Meisels argues that liberal democracies should adopt a Hobbesean standpoint on the relationship of liberty to security where dire emergencies (e.g., violent terrorism) are concerned, and a Lockean one on such normal security problems as violent crime. A key premise in her argument is the claim—which she attributes to both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke—that security is a necessary condition for liberty; and, from thence, she infers that security always has priority over liberty. My paper contests, first, that the classical contractualists do not and cannot take this view; and, second, that, if they did, their positions (and, therefore, Meisels’ own) would be seriously confused.

At common law, the law has always recognized that a contract must be entered into voluntarily and that a person who entered into a contract as a result of threats against the person would not be bound by the contract. The concept of economic duress is of recent origin where the courts have started to acknowledge that threats against goods can be just as compelling as threats against the person. Alongside, to redress the narrow doctrine of duress at law, the equitable doctrine of undue influence was developed. However, both duress and undue influence still remain unclear and unresolved and a clearer exposition of the principles governing these two doctrines is needed. This project will critically examine the doctrines of duress and undue influence.

This paper has used psychoanalysis as a psychological basis in the analysis of criminal behavior. The methodology used for this paper was based on the bibliographical research within the science-testing model and the study thought to explore the dinamics under which the psychological bases of criminal behavior were established.

Una escueta visión histórica de la filosofía política analizada desde el punto de vista de la teoría del derecho y de la sociedad, nos permite ver cómo ha ido desarrollándose, desde Ockham, y actualmente hasta filósofos liberales como Rawls, una concepción de la justicia fundada en el hecho contractual, dispositivo mediante el cual se establece un determinado orden en la sociedad, basado en una noción artificial (construida) de la justicia.  Hobbes se constituye en el momento clave del giro copernicano de la cuestión, con su idea convencional de justicia.  Luego el utilitarista Hume elabora las llamadas “circunstancias de la justicia”, también convencionales, al igual que su teoría artificial de la justicia, ideas que influyen sobre Rawls, dos siglos más tarde.
El contractualismo explica y justifica el fundamento y la posibilidad de la sociedad a partir de un pacto entre sus miembros.  Fue desarrollado en toda su expresión en la Modernidad, por Hobbes Locke y Rousseau, si bien tuvo sus precedentes en los sofistas griegos y más tarde en Ockham.  Los motivos que condicionaron en la Modernidad el desarrollo de la teoría del contrato fueron la secularización de la sociedad, que ya había comenzado a gestarse en el medioevo y una concepción atomista y mecanicista de la sociedad.  Puede afirmarse que sobre el contractualismo moderno se perciben influencias no puramente políticas provenientes del nominalismo de Ockham.
La teoría política de Hobbes, acorde con el espíritu moderno, cientificista y mecanicista, produce un corte epistemológico en la historia de la filosofía social y política, pues a partir de ella el poder no estará más fundado en el derecho divino, ni en ningún otro factor extraterrenal, sino en un pacto entre seres humanos libres, artificialmente asociados entre sí.  Esta concepción de Hobbes acerca del origen de la sociedad y del Estado se opone tanto a la clásica (Aristóteles), que sostenía que “el hombre es un animal político”, como así también a toda la tradición del derecho natural (Santo Tomás de Aquino), derechos que no son negados, sino traducidos positivamente, efectivizados a través del contrato social.  Podemos hablar de una afirmación de la secularización, a partir de Hobbes, de la teoría social y política.
Hasta mediados del siglo XX, los estudios dedicados a metaética constituyeron la preocupación más marcada por parte de la corriente analítica en esta área, dejando de lado los problemas sustanciales, juzgados por entonces como carentes de sentido.  Rawls, aún siendo heredero de esta corriente filosófica, impulsa un nuevo desarrollo, retornando al carácter sustantivo de la ética, pero haciéndolo desde un framework cuya base política será la democracia liberal, su metodología el contractualismo y el contenido, un constructivismo pretendidamente exento de supuestos metafísicos, influenciado por su herencia kantiana, aunque con fuertes connotaciones individualistas hobbesianas.  Con estos elementos, Rawls diseña una teoría de la justicia cuya máxima pretensión es la de ser imparcial, teoría mediante la cual intenta refutar a las dos corrientes éticas predominantes en su tiempo: el utilitarismo y el intuicionismo.  A esto sumará su intención manifiesta de que una sociedad, para estar bien ordenada, será aquella en la cual prevalezca el derecho (Right) por encima del bien (Good).  Sólo entonces será posible, según el filósofo harvardiano, la existencia de una sociedad pluralista, donde puedan cumplirse los fines de la democracia liberal, lo cual no significará otra cosa, sin más, que la introducción del bien liberal en su pretendida aséptica teoría imparcial de la justicia.
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This dissertation analyses the capacity of contractualism and natural law to justify environmental intergenerational duties.


For three decades, climate change has been a major political concern. As a fundamental threat to environmental sustainability, climate change is believed to threaten the long-term welfare of humankind. It thus seems imperative to affirm long-term duties regarding future people’s environment. Furthermore, contractualism and natural law are two important moral theories in contemporary political life. While the former seems influential among political liberals, natural law seems more appealing to political conservatives. It is thus of interest how both of these theories can be used to argue for environmental intergenerational duties. Yet, natural law has been particularly understudied in this regard.


The point of departure of the study is the so-called non-identity problem, formulated by Derek Parfit. As concerns future generations, what we do not only affects the quality of people’s lives, but also who will come to exist. If future people come to exist as a consequence of how we live our lives, including the choice of living unsustainably, a degraded environment will be worse for no one. For so-called person-affecting theory, such as contractualism, non-identity seems to imply that there is nothing morally objectionable about leaving future people with an unsustainable environment.


First, the dissertation demonstrates recent attempts in contractualism, in the vein of John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon, to solve the non-identity problem on person-affecting terms. It is shown that these attempts either fail to affirm environmental intergenerational duties or implicitly abandon a person-affecting view.


Second, the dissertation explores a natural law approach to the non-identity problem, employing a recent account of natural law suggested by John Finnis. While natural law can be considered of import in contemporary political decision-making, it has hardly ever been used to ground environmental intergenerational duties. This dissertation shows how an impersonal application of natural law could be used in attempts to circumvent the non-identity problem, i.e. to affirm environmental intergenerational duties, and treats possible objections to such an account. It is argued that the requirement to consider so-called basic values, also in cases when no individual would be worse off by one’s act, should render it at least morally objectionable to leave future generations with an unsustainable environment.


Third, a new kind of objection to environmental intergenerational duties is discussed in depth. The objection applies to theories that, although they may accept an impersonal view in morals, subscribe to a person-affecting restriction in politics. On some interpretations, this limited restriction can be ascribed to both contractualism and natural law. This may imply a specifically institutional non-identity problem. It conveys the possibly paralysing conclusion that, even if there are environmental intergenerational duties in a moral sense, we are not permitted to use political institutions to enforce them.


Again, contractualism is used to demonstrate the possible difficulties in overcoming this kind of problem. With regard to natural law, the dissertation explores how the use of institutions could be justified impersonally by reference to the common good and the idea of intergenerational community. In this view, experiences that link us to previous generations justify institutional responsibility for the future.

The article is a plea for ethicists to regard probability as one of their most important concerns. It outlines a series of topics of central importance in ethical theory in which probability is implicated, often in a surprisingly deep way, and lists a number of open problems. Topics covered include: interpretations of probability in ethical contexts; the evaluative and normative significance of risk or uncertainty; uses and abuses of expected utility theory; veils of ignorance; Harsanyi's aggregation theorem; population size problems; equality; fairness; giving priority to the worse off; continuity; incommensurability; nonexpected utility theory; evaluative measurement; aggregation; causal and evidential decision theory; act consequentialism; rule consequentialism; and deontology.

What level and kind of protection against relative misfortune should our community provide, and how should it distribute the costs of provision amongst its members? According to the answer this paper explores, within bounds we shall later discuss, the willingness of fairly situated individuals to pay for protection against the risk of misfortune plays an essential, though limited, role in answering these questions. We call this approach fair insurance. Our aim is to identify the appeal of this position compared to its rivals and to outline an amended variant of the most familiar version of the view. We then explain how that variant survives several influential objections that some have thought decisive. We conclude by showing that the fair insurance approach can contribute to recent debates about how best to develop a contractualist account of distributive decision-making in the face of risk.

O texto foi produzido em 2013, publicado em 2014, e conta com os resultados parciais da pesquisa de doutoramento, então em desenvolvimento.

Resumo: Após a Restauração de dezembro de 1640, o tema do governo por conselhos superiores (ou tribunais) era recorrente na gestão da monarquia portuguesa. A partir de algumas advertências e consultas, este artigo refaz parte dessa discussão. Ele tem por propósito não apenas evidenciar a importância do governo por conselhos na monarquia portuguesa, mas também vincular este modo de deliberação à ideia de monarquia pactuada. O período escolhido refere-se aos anos seguintes à Restauração.
Palavras-chave Restauração, monarquia portuguesa; conselhos; contratualismo.


"The cornerstone of this building": the government by councils in the restored Portuguese monarchy After the Restoration of december 1640, the theme of government by the councils (or courts) was recurrent in the administration of the Portuguese monarchy. Therefore, it has become a matter of great debate in the literature. The main purpose of this article is to show the importance of government by councils in the Portuguese monarchy and to link this model of deliberation to the idea of agreed monarchy. The studied period were the years following December's Restoration.
Keywords Restoration, Portuguese monarchy; councils; contractualism. "A pedra fundamental deste edifício": o governo por conselhos na monarquia portuguesa do pós-Restauração

By problematizing the ascendant academic tendency to isolate 'different' problems of social political thought from each other, the paper intends to critically examine John Locke's political liberalism with possible references to the systematic philosophy of mind and thought he developed in his famous opus, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It basically seeks out the traces of a certain ambiguity concerning the epistemological foundation of the nexuses of Locke's political philosophy which vary within the main themes that incrementally proceed from a particular natural law doctrine and bring to completion with the naturalization of unlimited capital accumulation. As an endeavour to uncover the epistemological relevance of Lockean political liberalism, the paper digs out the deadlocks and inner contradictions arising from the liberal strategies of moral reasoning that happen to naturalize private property, as well as a perpetuated form of bourgeoisie ethics based on the class-based formulation of rights and duties. The deadlocks and contradictions are predicated largely on two grounds: The first is his empiricist stance that substitutes the 'universal' moral law of nature (acquired by human reason) with the basic tenets of the individualist morality immanent to market society. The second is, on the other hand, the 'universalization' of a certain type of class reasoning which no longer provides empirical room for social transformation and political novelty.

The Calculus of Consent: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy is a ground-breaking work in democratic theory. We argue that it is of continued relevance today, due both to its methodological innovations and its use of those innovative techniques to solve the fundamental problem of democratic justification. In Calculus, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock fuse economic methods, political theory and the normative project of showing how democratic institutions of a particular sort can be justified contractually, creating a unique form of democratic contractualism that came to be known as “Constitutional Political Economy” and the more general research program of “Public Choice Theory.” Although these pioneering techniques have been integrated into mainstream political theory, the interest of their normative project has not been similarly appreciated.

Metaethics is often dominated by both realist views according to which moral claims are made true by either non-natural or natural properties and by non-cognitivist views according to which these claims express desire-like attitudes. It is sometimes suggested that constructivism is a fourth alternative, but it has remained opaque just how it differs from the other views. To solve this problem, this article first describes a clear constructivist theory based on Crispin Wright’s anti-realism. It then outlines an argumentative strategy that can be used to argue against constructivist views about practical reasons. The rest of the article explains how the outlined constructivist metaethical framework, reasons, and contractualism in normative ethics can still be used to create a new viable metaethical constructivist position about right and wrong.

Safe-by-Design (SBD) philosophies are a series of design approaches that aim to incorporate human values into the early phases of technological design to direct the path of innovation into beneficial directions. The difficulty and necessity of directing advantageous futures of transformative technologies through the application and adoption of value-based design approaches are apparent, however, the questions of whose values are taken up are of critical importance. SBD philosophies typically aim to enrol the relevant stakeholders that may be affected by the emergence of such a technology. Nonetheless, regardless of which design approach is adopted, all the stakeholders that are enrolled are human stakeholders who propose human values. Contemporary scholarship on metahumanisms, particularly those on posthumanism, have decentered the human from its traditionally privileged position among other forms of life. Persuasive arguments have been forwarded that the humanist position is not nor never has been tenable, and as such scholarship has begun to provide a more encompassing ontology to the investigation of nonhuman values. As such, given the transformative nature that future technologies may pose on the earth and its many assemblages, not all the relevant stakeholders (i.e., nonhuman animals) are taken into the value-investigations of these design approaches. This research project aims to accomplish two primary objectives: (1) propose an argument that a posthuman ethics in the design of technologies is sound and thus warranted and, (2) how can existent SBD approaches begin to envision principled and methodological ways of incorporating nonhuman values into design. To do this, this MRP will provide a rudimentary outline of what constitutes SBD approaches. A unique design approach – Value Sensitive Design (VSD) – is taken up as an illustrative example given that it, among the other SBD frameworks, most clearly illustrates a principled approach to the integration of values in design.

In most of the introductions to Rawls and contemporary contractarianism, Rawls is seen as the representative of Kantian contractarianism. He is understood as inheriting a contractarian tradition that can be traced back to Kant and which has inspired followers such as Barry and Scanlon. This paper argues that the label does not fit Rawls. While a Kantian contractarian would presuppose a monistic conception of practical reason, Rawls is a hybrid contractarian who presupposes a dual conception. I shall first argue that the way in which a contractarian model is labeled is determined by its conception of practical reason. Then I show that Rawls and Kantian contractarians assume different conceptions of practical reason, and therefore should be seen as belonging to two strands of thought. I further argue that, although Rawls acknowledges his intellectual affiliation with Kant, he cannot be considered a Kantian contractarian in the commonly understood way. In his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Rawls interprets Kant as endorsing a hybrid contractarian model that is similar to his. By understanding Rawls as a hybrid contractarian and not confusing his philosophical project with that of Kantian contractarians, Rawls's contribution to the history of contractarianism can be better evaluated.

Acest articol are în vedere investigarea ideologiei individualismului modern, în cheia interpretării lui Louis Dumont, din Eseu asupra individualismului, ca proces al constituirii categorizării sinelui, urmând ipoteza de lucru propusă de André Celtel. Teza cercetării mele este aceea că diferitele paradigme ale ideologiei individualismului modern avansate de către Dumont pot fi asumate nu doar ca forme ale unor „categorii ale sinelui”, ci şi ca paradigme complementare de gândire a modernităţii, prin consecinţele pe care le reflectă asupra statutului individului în societate. Prima parte a articolului explorează genealogia modernităţii ca proces complementar genezei individualismului modern. Observând îndeaproape raţiunile preferinţei lui Dumont pentru a enunţa originile acestuia din urmă prin termenul de „geneză”, originalitatea cercetării mele constă, la acest nivel, în derivarea a patru modele ale tensiunilor modernităţii inspirate din două paradigme ale individualismului, determinate de ceea ce Dumont numeşte „individul-în-afara-lumii”, respectiv „individul-în-lume”: modelul genezei comunitare, modelul anahoretic al constituirii de sine ca geneză a individualismului, modelul complementarităţii ierarhice şi modelul axiologic al construcţiei sociale. Partea a doua a articolului surprinde diferite categorii ale sineităţii ca forme ale individualismului modern, aprofundând relaţia dintre trei noţiuni problematice ale discursului lui Dumont: sine, subiect, individ. Voi propune două modele alternative ale sineității: sinele individual, respectiv sinele comunitar, inspirate din distincţia metodologică dintre individualism şi holism. Astfel, categoriile sineităţii vor fi distinse, în consecinţă, prin recurs la următoarele conţinuturi: universitas, societas, ordinatio ad unum sau sinele autoritar, concilierea, autonomia (ca uniformitate şi dezacord) şi atomizarea, prin asociaţionism şi contractualism.

STUDII DE TEORIA CATEGORIILOR, volumul VIII, 2016
Editura Academiei Române, Bucureşti, 2015
Coordonatori: Alexandru Surdu, Sergiu Bălan, Mihai Popa
ISBN 978-973-27-1877-3

Bajo el rótulo de “contractualismo” se agrupan diversas teorías que sostienen que la obligatoriedad de las normas descansa en el consentimiento de quienes están vinculados por ellas. No obstante, esta caracterización general obvia diferencias cruciales entre las distintas teorías contractualistas. Se analizan diversas tipologías para iluminar dichas diferencias y alcanzar una caracterización más exacta del contractualismo. Se concluye que la distinción entre consentimiento hipotético e ideal, al que recurren algunas versiones, torna imposible la formulación de una definición unívoca de contractualismo.

This chapter deals with psychological egoism, act ethical egoism, moral self/other asymmetry and the prerogative to give one’s own good less weight than the good of others when one is deciding what to do, rule ethical egoism, rational egoism, agent-relative partiality, agent-neutral partiality, degrees of permissible partiality, impartiality in the application of rules, Bernard Gert’s account of impartial treatment, and agent-neutral impartiality in the justification of rules, including utilitarian, Golden Rule, and contractualist forms of impartial justification. The chapter closes by outlining the reasons that utilitarian and contractualist foundational impartiality might allow and even require forms of agent-relative partiality in day-to-day decision making.

Abstract: Nell’ampia letteratura che, nel corso degli ultimi decenni, ha esplorato a fondo le pieghe degli scritti bobbiani, affiora soltanto a tratti un’indagine sistematica dei rapporti del filosofo torinese con i classici del pensiero filosofico-politico e filosofico-giuridico moderno. Il presente contributo suggerisce l’esigenza di una nuova attenzione in tal senso: in particolare, esso muove da una ricognizione analitica dei sei lavori raccolti nel volume "Da Hobbes a Marx. Saggi di storia della filosofia", nel quale Bobbio raccolse ricerche concepite nell’arco di quindici anni di insegnamento universitario e di cui nel 2015 ricorrerà il cinquantenario. È in quelle pagine, infatti, che il filosofo torinese, in un’Italia appena uscita dal conflitto mondiale e alla ricerca della propria identità politico-culturale dopo l’esperienza del Fascismo, guardò retrospettivamente alle origini contraddittorie della modernità mappandone, proprio come un cartografo, elementi di continuità e rottura – in primo luogo, l’oscillazione tra il primato del diritto naturale, da una parte, e l’egemonia dello jus positum, dall’altra. Proprio questa profonda (e mai appagata) ricerca di senso circa le ragioni della crisi culturale del proprio tempo ispira il confronto di Bobbio con «le due grandi concezioni mondane della storia» – il giusnaturalismo e lo storicismo dialettico – che a suo avviso innervano lo sviluppo tutt’altro che lineare della modernità e che, di riflesso, orientano il suo confronto con il pensiero di Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Hegel e Marx attraverso le acquisizioni della più recente storiografia filosofica italiana e internazionale di quegli anni.

Table of contents:
1. Bobbio e i moderni: testi e contesti
2. Giusnaturalismo e storicismo dialettico: i due volti della modernità
3. Il pensiero giuridico hobbesiano sotto processo: un 'cavallo di Troia' nella cittadella giusnaturalistica?
4. Dal giusnaturalismo impuro di Hobbes a quello pienamente moderno di Locke
5. Da Locke a Kant: la costruzione della libertà dei moderni
6. Dai giusnaturalismi allo storicismo dialettico: la modernità figlia di Hegel e Marx
7. Considerazioni conclusive

This is a chapter on contractualism for Ethical Theory in Global Perspective, edited by Michael Hemmingsen (SUNY Press). The chapter (i) outlines contractualism as an ethical theory, (ii) explains how it differs from classical utilitarianism, (iii) explores the differences between ex post and ex ante contractualism, and (iv) finally looks at two traditional objections to the view.