John Stuart Mill

In this article, I suggest and support a utilitarian
approach to business ethics. Utilitarianism is already
widely used as a business ethic approach, although it is
not well developed in the literature. Utilitarianism provides
a guiding framework of decision making rooted in
social benefit which helps direct business toward more
ethical behavior. It is the basis for much of our discussion
regarding the failures of Enron, Worldcom, and even
the subprime mess and Wall Street Meltdown. In short,
the negative social consequences are constantly referred
to as proof of the wrongness of these actions and events,
and the positive social consequences of bailouts and
other plans are used as ethical support for those plans to
right the wrongs.
I believe the main cause of the neglect of the utilitarian
approach is because of misguided criticisms. Here, I
defend utilitarianism as a basis for business ethics
against many criticisms found in the business ethics
literature, showing that a business ethics approach
relying on John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism supports
principles like justice, is not biased against the minority,
and is more reasonable than other views such as a
Kantian view when dealing with workers and making
other decisions in business. I also explain utilitarian
moral motivation and use satisficing theory to attempt to
defend utilitarian business ethics from questions raised
regarding utilitarian calculus.

John Stuart Mill’in, “bir cinsiyetin diğerine olan tabiiyeti” üzerine, eşi Harriet Taylor Mill ile birlikte geliştirdiği düşüncelerin bir ürünü olan ve eşinin ölümünden sonra kızı Helen Taylor’ın desteğiyle tamamladığı Kadınların Köleleştirilmesi (The Subjection of Women), yazarın Özgürlük Üstüne (On Liberty) (1859) adlı eserinden on yıl sonra yayımlanmıştır. Kadınların Köleleştirilmesi, yayımlandığı tarihsel bağlam içinde, Avrupa’nın tüm geleneksel siyasi, hukuki, ekonomik ve ahlaki sistemi için hakaret dolu bir saldırı olarak görülmesine yol açacak kadar radikal savlara sahipti. Yine de, XXI. yüzyılın dünyası açısından yazarın üzerinde durduğu meselelerde kadınların yasal haklarının IXX. yüzyıla kıyasla genel olarak iyileştirilmiş olması, elimizdeki metni eskimiş (archaic) kılmaz. Tam tersine, kadınların erkeklere olan tabiiyetinin, doğrudan “zor yasası”ndan (law of force) kaynaklanıyor olmasından hareketle modern dünyanın temel nitelikleri için o ilkeyi tarihsel bir çelişki olarak tahlil eden bu metin, yalnızca siyasal felsefenin iç tartışmaları için bir kaynak olmakla kalmaz; aynı zamanda, “kadın meselesi” hakkında kaleme alınmış ilk metinlerden biri olma niteliğinin yanında, günümüzün temel birçok meselesi hakkında hassas bir Aydınlanmacı felsefe sunar; fakat elimizdeki metin, yazarın siyasal felsefesinin sahip olduğu tüm hassaslığına rağmen, sonuna kadar eleştiriye açıktır. Zira yazar, ait olduğu dönemin ve toplumsal sınıfın önyargı ve çıkarlarından azade değildir. Mill’in, Hıristiyan ahlakının eleştirisi konusundaki sessizliği, açıktan benimsenen oryantalist bir bakış açısıyla geçiştirilir. Benzer bir şekilde, “faydacılık” ilkesi ile beraber Aydınlanmacı siyasal felsefenin “ilerlemeci” tarihsel bakış açısı, metnin tüm kuramsal yapısını oluşturur. Diğer taraftan, Mill’in “kadınların özgürleştirilmesi” projesi, yalnızca “mülkiyet sahibi sınıfları” kapsıyor gözükmektedir.

An advocate must be aware of the mental environment of the judge, particularly the appellate judge.  Their quiet presence has not impeded the use of labels, including judicial attitude as well as a whole subset of ideological labels such as conservative, liberal, activist, restraintist, interpretivist, noninterpretivist, positivist, and with a pejorative ring, biased.

Such bents of mind are the pylons around which the persuasive course must be raced.  After the judge masters the facts and distills the relevant legal principles from a case, something must push him toward a decision.  In the great percentage of cases, the process of assimilating facts and principles points unerringly to one outcome.  However, in a small percentage of cases consensus cannot be readily attained.  In these cases, the holding may be influenced one way or another by the attitude of the judges.  Fortunately, the advocate can acquire the necessary sensitivity to these attitudes through episodic ventures to a court of appeals.

This article focuses on the relationship between morality and law through the debate between William Whewell (1794-1866) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), two important moral philosophers of 19th century Britain. Whewell belongs to a tradition maintaining that the basic moral principles can be known intuitively through an inherent faculty such as moral sense or conscience. In the meantime, Whewell argues that the process of knowing these basic principles intuitively is not an irrational process and that the reason is active throughout the whole process of knowing. In this context, the reason is the most basic concept of Whewell's system. In Whewell's system, the will of God is the highest/ultimate good. Relatedly, action in accordance with the will of God is morally right action. On the other hand, utilitarianism, to which Mill belongs, is a moral theory that determines the greatest happiness of the highest number of people as the criterion for morally right action. This theory does not include any metaphysical and theological elements, which argues that morality should be based on experience and introspection. Utilitarianism rejects the claim that there are basic moral principles that can be intuitively known. This approach of utilitarianism makes these two theories natural opponents of each other. One of the topics of the Whewell-Mill debate is the juncture of morality and law. In this context, Whewell's views on the moral-law relationship, Mill's criticism of Whewell on this issue and Whewell's responses to Mill constitute the subject of the article. The main purpose of this study, in which the comparative method is adopted, is to gain new perspectives on the relationship between morality and law. When we focus on the Whewell-Mill debate, we see that Whewell deals with the moral-law relationship on the basis of the concept of right, while Mill deals with the concept of justice. According to Whewell, it is impossible to talk about morality unless there are rights determined by law. In this regard, justice basically means compliance with the law. Like Whewell, Mill accepts that justice is not static but dynamic, and argues that only the utility can determine what just is. Mill objects to Whewell's views on three main criticial points. These are; according to Mill, Whewell first makes law the basis of morality by claiming that it is not possible to talk about morality where there are no laws. Whewell, objecting to this criticism of Mill, states that he does not make law the basis of morality; he says that he needs law to put moral principles into the practice. The second criticism of Mill is that Whewell makes laws the criterion of moral righteousness, which narrows morality down to rights and therefore to law compliance. Whewell objects to Mill, saying that moral rightness is much broader concept than legal rightness. For him, obedience to the law is only part of moral righteousness. Mill’s last criticism is that Whewell made obedience to the law a moral duty, even if it is not just. In Whewell's system, obedience to laws confirming slavery is made a moral duty. Whewell, on the other hand, admits that laws may be immoral from time to time, but states that obedience to these laws is more reasonable than disobeying them; because the problems that will arise from non-compliance with the laws are much greater. What needs to be done is to make sure that more just laws are legislated. However, according to Whewell, legislation is the duty of the jurist, not the moralist. These criticisms made by Mill against Whewell are actually criticisms that is related Mill's own system. Mill neither himself can give satisfactory answers to these criticisms. In conclusion, in the polemic between Whewell and Mill, it is possible to find other different answers of both thinkers regarding the relationship between morality and law. However, it cannot be said that these answers completely solved the problems stated above.

O tema que vamos abordar é se alguns imigrantes podem ser aceites em certos países
enquanto outros não o são, ou se todos devem ter esse direito.
Atualmente, esta questão é cada vez mais frequente nas nossas vidas e no nosso dia-adia, visto que a situação de vários países tem vindo a piorar e a sua população procura melhores
condições de vida noutros países que os possam ajudar, nomeadamente a encontrar um refúgio
da guerra decorrente nos seus países de origem.
Grande parte dos países da Europa rejeita a entrada de imigrantes e refugiados no seu
território e, por isso, eles tentam, muitas vezes, sair do seu país e entrar noutro de forma ilegal,
como, por exemplo, em botes com números excessivos de pessoas, acabando por pôr em risco a
vida de muitos, que acabam por perder a vida ao longo do caminho.
Desde a sua criação, a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) tentou trabalhar de
forma a poder proteger os refugiados de todo o Mundo. Infelizmente, ninguém escolhe ser
refugiado e os mesmos precisam de algumas necessidades básicas, tais como comida, roupa e
uma casa.
Diversos países ainda ficam bastante reticentes quanto à raça, religião, nacionalidade ou
à pertença a um certo grupo social. Como tal, temos o exemplo dos Estados Unidos da América,
em que o ex-presidente Donald Trump queria expulsar todos os imigrantes mexicanos e, até
mesmo, construir um muro. Além disso, temos a controvérsia entre aceitar imigrantes
muçulmanos ou não, devido ao seu estilo de vida diferente.
Esta questão está bastante relacionada com os Direitos Humanos, pois, segundo John
Stuart Mill, devemos agir de forma a promover a maior felicidade global, o que não está de
acordo com a Declaração Universal dos Direitos do Homem (DUDH).

Liberalismos: rasgos comunes.
Liberalismo y liberalismos.
El radicalismo republicano de Thomas Paine.
El utilitarismo de Jeremy Bentham.
El compromiso radical de James Mill.
La apertura liberal de John Stuart Mill.
Las dos libertades de Benjamin Constant.
El Estado constitucional de Derecho liberal: el legado.

The article examines Edward Linley Sambourne’s cartoon series ‘Mr. Punch’s Designs After Nature’ which appeared in Punch from the late 1860s onwards. The images show women morphing into animals and birds, or wearing them as exaggerated forms of decoration. Some of the cartoons explicitly satirise specific fashion trends or silhouettes, whilst others poke fun at fashion generally. The author’s focus is on the iconography of ‘Mr. Punch’s Designs After Nature’, the real 1860s and 1870s fashions giving rise to these images' creation, as well as the visual and textual tradition of satire within which Sambourne’s cartoons can be situated. The article pays particular attention to the re-evaluation of the relationship between human and non-human in the light of Darwin’s ideas, and to the gender-related aspects of Sambourne’s zoomorphic images.

რეფერატი განიხილავს მეცხრამეტე საუკუნის ლიბერალი მოაზროვნის, ჯონ სტიუარტ
მილის შემოთავაზებულ კონცეპციას - ზიანის პრინციპს. ნაშრომში განხილულია ზიანის
პრინციპის რაობა, გამონაკლისი შემთხვევები და თითოეული განხილულია
მაგალითების საფუძველზე. რეფერატი ასევე პასუხობს რამდენიმე მნიშვნელოვან
კითხვას ტერმინებთან მიმართებაში და ცდილობს მოახდინოს მათი დიფერენციაცია.
რეფერატის ბოლოს შემოთავაზებულია მილის „თავისუფლების შესახებ“-ის კრიტიკა
სხვადასხვა ფილოსოფოსებისა და პოლიტიკოსების მიერ და კომენტარების სახით
შეფასებულია მათი ვალიდურობა.
საკვანძო სიტყვები: ზიანის პრინციპი, თავისუფლების შესახებ, ჯონ სტიუარტ მილი,
უტილიტარიანიზმი, სარგებლის პრინციპი, ნეგატიური თავისუფლება

In this paper, I will try to establish what sets Mill's and Whewell's theories of induction apart and argue that it is not the frequently supposed distinction between inductivism (Mill) and hypothetic-deductivism (Whewell) about the scientific method. First, I will analyze their disagreement about the role and nature of concepts in induction. Whewell argued that in scientific discovery, e.g., when Kepler discovered his law of planetary motion, a new concept, in Kepler's case that of an ellipse, is provided by the mind and then "superinduced" upon empirical facts. In contrast to this, Mill argued that the concept of an ellipse was present in the facts themselves, therefore nothing new was added by the mind. In other words, what Whewell calls "colligation of facts" and understands as a crucial part of his theory of induction, Mill dismisses as a mere description of observed facts. I will show that the argument about colligation of facts ends in a disagreement about their underlying epistemological views. Given their different epistemological commitments, the two authors respective theories have different emphasis. Mill’s theory is a theory of inductive inference – he hopes to provide a rigorous, logically sound, method of verification of generalizations. Whewell, on the other hand, thinks about induction as a method of scientific practice and thus puts emphasis both on the discovery of an appropriate concept (or a theory) and on its verification. Rather than accepting that Mill is an inductivist and Whewell a deductivist about scientific method, I will argue that they differ in their understanding of philosophy of science, its scope and aims.

Susan Haack, “Epistemology: Who Needs It?”

Abstract: This reflection on the real-world relevance of epistemological ideas begins with the thought that all of us—when we wonder what to make of newspaper reports of supposed medical breakthroughs, of failures of military intelligence, etc., etc.—call, implicitly or explicitly, on epistemology; and shows how an understanding of, e.g., the differences between genuine inquiry and advocacy research, the nature of wishful and fearful thinking, and the material character of the relevance and its bearing on what relevant evidence we may be missing, can illuminate the ways in which inquiry can go wrong and evidence can mislead us.

If this paper interests you, you might also want to look at "Credulity and Circumspection" (in press), "The Embedded Epistemologist"  (2012), and "Justice, Truth, and Proof" (in press).

POWERPOINTS TO ACCOMPANY THIS PAPER ARE AVAILABLE IN THE SECTION LABELED “SELECTED PRESENTATIONS” BELOW (UNDER “MORE”). A LINK TO A YOUTUBE VIDEO OF HAACK GIVING THIS PRESENTATION CAN BE FOUND UNDER “LINKS” IN THAT SECTION

1. Quote/Unquote Philosophers like other people often have a weakness for quiz-shows. And like the crew in the Hunting of the Snark, they are all of them fond of quotations 1 . So I begin with a quotation and a question. The quotation comes from a famous o indeed a ‘superstar’ o text. But which text? Which famous writer indicted these lines? The purpose of the universal jargon was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of logical empiricism, but to make other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when the universal jargon had been adopted for all and the metaphysically infected terminology forgotten, a metaphysical thought o that is a thought diverging from what logical empiricism regarded as genuinely thinkable o should be literally unthinkable, at least in so far as thought is dependent on words. Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that a log...

This paper examines the legal treatment of hate speech in Canadian
society through the lens of John Stuart Mill’s Theory of Liberty. In doing so, the core aspects of Mills theory will be teased out so his response to hate speech in modern liberal societies may be better understood. The central argument set out is that hate speech is a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but such a violation is saved through application of Mill’s “Harm Principle”. Even with this application, the paper argues ought to be a balance of rights. It will be concluded that Canadian Supreme Court interpretations of the Charter, and for a large part the Charter’s drafting itself, lend themselves to be reminiscent of Mill’s theory of harm.

O presente capítulo tem como objetivo apresentar a introdução histórica da noção de intencionalidade, tal como ela se deu no âmbito da investigação filosófica e científica acerca da Etologia, ou seja, da ciência da formação do caráter. Nossa estratégia argumentativa consistirá em sustentar que John Stuart Mill, em sua obra Lógica das ciências morais, e Franz Brentano, em sua obra Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico, acordaram explicitamente que a Psicologia seria a ciência das leis elementares da mente e a Etologia seria a ciência que corresponderia à arte da educação no sentido mais amplo. Mill, por exemplo, afirmou que as leis de formação do caráter seriam leis deduzidas a partir das leis gerais da mente. Por sua vez, Brentano afirmou, citando explicitamente as tarefas delineadas por Mill, que a Psicologia também teria a tarefa de se tornar o fundamento científico de uma teoria da educação, tanto para o indivíduo como para a sociedade. Assim, se a similaridade entre os trabalhos de ambos os filósofos é evidente e declarada textualmente, cabe perguntar pelas diferenças e especificidades existentes entre eles. Portanto, trataremos, num primeiro momento, de especificar os pontos convergentes das duas teorias e, num segundo momento, sustentar que a diferença fundamental entre as Psicologias de Mill e Brentano estava no fato de que a tese de Brentano não reconhecia o pressuposto milliano fundamental, a saber, o pressuposto de que a relação causal entre fenômenos psíquicos deveria ser o objeto de estudo da Psicologia, a partir do qual as leis psíquicas seriam estabelecidas. Nossa análise mostrará que, para Brentano, o fenômeno psíquico seria, enquanto objeto de estudo da Psicologia, a própria relação fundamental, caracterizada por sua natureza intencional, a qual ofereceria os fundamentos para a cientificidade da Psicologia ao garantir a evidência de suas leis. A consequência desta tese brentaniana implicaria, portanto, que a fundamentação da Etologia também decorreria da investigação da natureza intencional dos fenômenos psíquicos.

A synopsis of John Stuart Mill's awareness of the work of Mary Wollstonecraft and the similarities and differences between their respective  approaches to defending the rights of women. Prepared for the "Interlocutors" section of THE WOLLSTONECRAFTIAN MIND (2019).

Abstention is itself an object of ongoing definitional and political debates. The chapter examines some attempts to re-signify it and argues against the depoliticisation of the abstaining citizenship. It considers recent views about practicing citizenship through voting that update the claim that universal turnout has become a dispensable principle whereas abstentions, no matter how qualified they may be, should be discounted as irrelevant. In particular, Jason Brennan’s epistocratic arguments about the moral duties and legal constraints relating to our practice of voting are examined. These arguments use the political analogy of the doctor-patient relationship profusely and work with a conception of abstention at four levels: abstention as a personal choice, as a moral responsibility, as a duty legally enforceable, and as an obligation decided by lot. The contrast with John Stuart Mill’s proposals of encompassing the epistocratic arrangements in a wider democratic framework helps to highlight the postdemocratic ambivalences and the disguised paternalism behind Brennan’s rejection of massive voting and electoral democracy and his defence of compulsory abstention and restricted suffrage.
Based on a deliberative understanding of abstention, the chapter questions the assumption in Brennan’s successive proposals, but also in some advocates of the ‘mini-publics approach’, that there is no significant loss in overlooking the political valence of qualified abstention. The defenders of selective deliberation also share the view that a functioning democracy deserves citizens’ efforts beyond voting by default and aspire to counteract the widespread condoning of citizens’ political ignorance and misuse of voting. Moreover, these self-declared agnostics about mass participation could approve a vast majority of citizens as abstainers who blindly transfer their authorization to a few representative ones. This chapter claims alternatively that reasonable and conscientious abstainers might be loyal citizens that decide to be heard or to exit and that, instead of praising the trends to misrecognize, exploit and detract from the abstentions, the political agents and political theorist alike would do better to deal with the stream of warning signals these citizens are sending.

Key words: Jason Brennan, John Stuart Mill, abstention, deliberation, epistocracy, voting.

This chapter executes a reading of the character of Walter White / Heisenberg ('Breaking Bad') through John Stuart Mill's 'On Liberty'.  This chapter pays attention to issues related to Mill's harm principle, freedom, individuality, individual sovereignty, individual spontaneity, collective mediocrity, authority, the tyranny of the majority, legislated morality, justice, and punishment.

Este material que você está prestes a ler foi elaborado de acordo com as exigências do Estágio Curricular Supervisionado IV, componente curricular obrigatório do meu curso, Filosofia. Neste estágio, o objetivo foi produzir um material didático adequado à prática de estágio realizada no Estágio Curricular Supervisionado III, ocorrido em 2018/1, na E.E.B. Marechal Bormann, com os terceiros anos do período matutino, turmas 301 e 302, sob supervisão do professor titular Diego Binotto. Neste período, que compreendeu cerca de 10 h/a com cada turma, pude trabalhar os temas de ética (ou moral, como queiram) presentes neste material. À época, contudo, este material ainda não havia sido elaborado, tendo eu desenvolvido minhas aulas sem o auxílio de material algum. Agora, tendo eu elaborado um material que consideraria o ideal para disponibilizar aos alunos com quem trabalhei, deixo-o disponível a todos aqueles que queiram trabalhar tais temas na ordem e formato que eu mesmo trabalhei. Reconheço que, devido ao fato de eu não ser especialista em nenhum dos temas trabalhados, talvez existam alguns equívocos nas interpretações, sobretudo quando trato das filosofias de Immanuel Kant e John Stuart Mill. Entretanto, peço ao leitor que atente ao objetivo principal deste material que, dividido em duas unidades, visa fornecer algumas ferramentas (tanto conceituais quanto históricas) para que o leitor possa realizar por conta própria uma reflexão ética, sem ter que ficar o tempo todo recorrendo a terceiros para decidir o que é o melhor ou o mais correto a se fazer.

Medical ethics is the study of ethics in the context of modern medical practices, medical personnel, technologies, and institutions. The study of medical ethics is indispensable for training ethically informed professionals in a variety of medical fields. • In this course we will utilize a case-study approach in order to explore the personal, historical, legal, economic, and political dimensions of medical ethical issues. • Lectures will be given on normative ethical theory and Rawlsian, Marxist, and Libertarian theories of justice in order to facilitate informed discussion. Collaborative learning and class participation will be of vital importance in this class.

El objetivo del artículo es identificar y precisar los argumentos con los cuales John Stuart Mill construye su crítica a la pedantocracia, entendida como uno de los rostros con los cuales se presenta el despotismo en las sociedades “modernas” y “civilizadas”. El término “pedantocracia” fue acuñado por Mill a comienzos de la década de 1840 para referirse a un peligro que, en su opinión, pocos percibían. Como ocurre con otras ideas-eje de su pensamiento, su reflexión sobre esta problemática se articula en torno al diálogo mantenido con pensadores provenientes del liberalismo continental (Tocqueville), del socialismo saint simoniano (d’ Eichthal y Duveyrier), del positivismo (Comte) y de las filas románticas inglesas (Coleridge). Asimismo, es reflejo de su recepción de las obras de Platón y del renovado interés que suscitó la democracia ateniense a mediados del siglo XIX gracias a las obras de G. Grote. Recuperar las contribuciones de Mill sobre la naturaleza y las implicancias de esta particular forma de despotismo, la pedantocracia, nos permite no solamente calibrar sus credenciales democráticas, sino también llamar la atención respecto de uno de los presupuestos sobre los cuales se levanta su elogio al gobierno representativo: la necesidad del antagonismo como garantía de un orden político libre.

Cet ouvrage se donne pour tâche d’examiner les discours les plus emblématiques produits par la philosophie moderne au sujet de la peine de mort. Assumant d’emblée le point de vue abolitionniste, notre intention n’est nullement de « peser le pour et le contre », mais de poser la question suivante : dans quelle mesure est-il possible de fonder rationnellement le refus catégorique de la peine capitale ? À cet égard, le détour par l’histoire de la philosophie nous montre à quel point la raison est avant tout divisée contre elle-même. En effet, au terme d'un travail visant à mettre à l’épreuve la cohérence interne des partisans de la peine de mort (Locke, Kant, Stuart Mill), ainsi que de ses adversaires (Beccaria, Bentham), il nous est apparu impossible de conclure à un simple défaut de rationalité de la part des uns ou des autres. Ce que l'on constate au contraire, c'est que chaque démonstration se déploie à partir d'un certain nombre de principes éthiques indémontrables. Bien plus, chaque grand courant de la philosophie pénale est susceptible de donner lieu à des prises de position radicalement opposées. Mais pour peu que l'on se refuse à concevoir un abîme insurmontable entre la raison d'une part, et la sensibilité d'autre part, la philosophie morale peut bénéficier d'une approche dans laquelle le raisonnement et « le cœur » se complètent, au lieu de constituer une alternative. À cet égard, c'est dans l'œuvre de Jean-Jacques Rousseau qu’il nous a semblé possible de repérer les éléments permettant de fonder au mieux l’abolition.

This dissertation deals with the problem of cultural rights from the viewpoint of the liberal utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. It intends to include the author‘s political philosophy in the debates that have been held in recent decades between liberals and communitarians starting from the approach of the philosophical problem of identity. To this end, we try to undo common misconceptions and provide an integrated reading of Mill's philosophy based on careful analysis of his writings, aided by his most eminent interpreters. We attempt to demonstrate that it is based on a previous fundamental adhesion to utilitarianism, as well as from a particular position regarding the access to the truth, that arise the liberal convictions and the centrality of autonomy in his doctrine. Given these premises, we could find that the Millian state, exempting the assumption on the neutrality of public sphere derived from the liberal contractarian doctrine usually professed, reveals itself theoretically compatible with the task of guaranteeing cultural rights. Whilst Mill‘s broad view regarding goods that contribute to happiness is capable of dragging culture into the hedonistic calculus, which affects the measurement of utility over general happiness, his defense of autonomy and diversity seems to justify a special attention to social context which maximize the expression of individuality.

Nudging is a form of soft paternalism whereby governments manipulate the choice architectures of citizens to steer them toward desired outcomes (including eating better, voting more often, being less aggressive and violent, being more compassionate, living healthier, and leading more fulfilling lives). From the perspective of social activists (includ-ing moral entrepreneurs of various stripes), public health officials , social marketers, and government actors, the more subtle forms of nudging help mitigate populist backlash against nanny states which are viewed as overly aggressive and instrusive in mandating by force of law that citizens do what's best for them or face repurcussions. In his latest book, Cass Sunstein examines both the pros and cons of the use of behavioral economics by governments to nudge sometimes reluctant publics to pursue goals and establish lifestyles which experts believe will maximize life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

In what follows, we are concerned to present the main features of socialism, both as a critique of capitalism, and as a proposal for its replacement. Our focus is predominantly on literature written within a philosophical idiom, focusing in particular on philosophical writing on socialism produced during the past forty-or-so years. Furthermore, our discussion concentrates on the normative contrast between socialism and capitalism as economic systems. Both socialism and capitalism grant workers legal control of their labor power, but socialism, unlike capitalism, requires that the bulk of the means of production workers use to yield goods and services be under the effective control of workers themselves, rather than in the hands of the members of a different, capitalist class under whose direction they must toil. As we will explain below, this contrast has been articulated further in different ways, and socialists have not only made distinctive claims regarding economic organization but also regarding the processes of transformation fulfilling them and the principles and ideals orienting their justification (including, as we will see, certain understandings of freedom, equality, solidarity, and democracy).

O trabalho tem como principais objetivos explicar em que consiste o construtivismo representativo e explicitar suas credenciais democráticas, oferecendo, assim, uma ressalva àqueles que o repudiam por considerá-lo uma forma de representação não-democrática. Argumenta-se, primeiro, que o construtivismo se opõe à representação descritiva, cujos três pressupostos básicos são delineados a partir dos trabalhos de Franklin Rudolf Ankersmit, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin e Stuart Hall. Feito isto, mostra-se na seção três de que maneira cada um dos pressupostos do descritivismo é questionado pelo construtivismo, cujas principais características são enumeradas com a ajuda de construtivistas contemporâneos como Ernesto Laclau. Em seguida, na seção quatro, examina-se a teoria democrática milliana a fim de corroborar a tese de que John Stuart Mill defendia o construtivismo representativo. Na seção cinco, destaca-se que o filósofo esposava o construtivismo não apenas na teoria como também na prática. Com efeito, a advocacy de Mill em defesa do sufrágio feminino na Câmara dos Comuns, em 1866, oferece um exemplo empírico do poder mobilizador do construtivismo representativo. O estudo desse exemplo concreto do construtivismo nos ajuda a identificar as duas grandes características que diferenciam o construtivismo democrático do fascismo. O artigo conclui que a filosofia e a prática políticas de Mill nos permitem compreender o que torna o construtivismo representativo democrático.

Utilitarianism, the theory that one should do what will bring about the greatest happiness for the many, is an excellent ethical theory to guide mangers. Thoughtful management practices could benefit everyone—not just the shareholders, employees and the managers, but society as a whole. Management directed by utilitarian ethics keeps focused on long term consequences, and here we will see that it provides a basis for ethics which can apply to all, while providing a basis for meaningful work and teamwork rooted in justice and fairness, respect for individuals and freedom, and the rights of minority groups. Mill's utilitarianism claims that industrious commerce and fair competition in a well administered free market economy will clearly bring benefits indispensable to society's progress.

Scanlan (1958), in J.S. Mill and the Definition of Freedom, states that Mill was of the view that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent ‘harm to others’…his own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant”; which underlines the importance Mill attached to the freedom and desires of individuals. Insomuch as the individual in question doesn’t do anything that affects others, he/she is virtually free to do as he pleases, regardless of how perilous (even to himself) or “immoral” his actions may be. The only exception to which one’s preferences could be questioned or scrutinized by ethical or legal standards is “in actions harmful to others” (Mill, 1869: ch2). Mill’s view of freedom is one that can be described as “positive” or “descriptive”. Scanlan (1958) supports the notion that “the term freedom has no value connotations”(p196) because for one to be able to establish how free an individual is in a situation, it is vital to have knowledge of said individual’s desires as well as how he would choose to act on them. Defining ‘Freedom’ as acting based on desire, makes Mill’s definition quite similar to that of Hobbes and Locke. Especially bearing in mind that they don’t place any constrictions on desire; moral or not.

This is a defense of John Stuart Mill’s proof of the principle of utility in the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism. The proof is notorious as a fallacious attempt by a prominent philosopher, who ought not to have made the elementary mistakes he is supposed to have made. This book shows that he did not. The aim is not to glorify utilitarianism, in a full sweep, as the best normative ethical theory, or even to vindicate, on a more specific level, Mill’s universalistic ethical hedonism as the best form of utilitarianism. The book is concerned only with Mill’s utilitarianism and primarily with his proof of the principle of utility. The purpose is to show that Mill proceeds intelligibly and systematically in pursuing a well-defined project in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism and that he successfully defends what he sets out to establish in his proof of the principle of utility.