Kant

This paper relates reason to the operation of an unconscious natural teleology. Human beings, as children of Nature, are born with the natural instinct for selfishness, and this leads them into the state of war. However, this war drives human beings to develop the intelligence that Nature has also endowed them with. Eventually, human beings become sufficiently intelligent to leave the state of war by building a civil society to enable the orderly exercise of their freedom, thus creating the foundation for the flowering of culture. However, a civil peace and freedom that is established within the confines of a single state is vulnerable to the predation of competing states in a condition of international war. Therefore, according to natural teleology, humankind will extend the peaceful union of warring individuals in the social sphere to a peaceful union of warring states in the international sphere. This development is initiated by Nature and Nature’s endowment.

This paper argues that, for Kant, human history is the work of Nature. Humankind is a product of nature, and is endowed with the power to realize the highest good.
Nature’s two-way mediation between phenomena and noumema proceeds thus: Nature creates living beings in the phenomenal world by bringing down the supersensible Ideas, and one species amongst those living beings have the intelligence to apprehend the noumenal world. The moral and aesthetic life of human beings is a link in the creative cycle of natural teleology which Kant calls the Providence of Mother Nature in his Idea of a Universal History.

The argument of the first Discours is governed by the antithesis between the ‘original’ nature of man on the one hand and the corruption of modern civilisation on the other; this antithesis is developed in terms of a contrast between the freedom implied by true being and the enslavement and estrangement which is the human condition in the modern world. Rousseau is concerned not so much with historical details as with the moral theme which allows him to separate the original elements of man’s being from the artificial elements added by the process of civilisation. By ‘original’ Rousseau means ‘what belongs incontestably to man’. Rousseau is therefore concerned to distinguish the essential and authentic as given by true original being from the accidental and artificial elements added by civilisation.

My argument is that while the dual categories of immanence and transcendence are often used in historical scholarship today as if they were universally valid, their actual use in this form cannot be traced back further than Kant. As a binary the terms become popular from the 1830s, partly in connection with ideological debates about the the future of religion. I reconstruct this development and then go on to show how they have been received by historical theologians and other scholars of ancient thought.

In Hegel’s idea there are three main constituent step to establish a state which are family, civil society and state. People first become together in a family, and then they build a civil society, and finally they establish a state. Hegel attached a step to these stages which is existence of civil society, but in this issue the most important part of the differences between Hegel and Thomas is about what people can do when the state act wrong for people. In Thomas’s theory, when the government makes something that community disagrees, community can only pray for the government to find the God’s true way, but for Hegel, the state can’t do anything wrong, because the state is already coming from the society to supply the common benefits and the state takes it as the community’s duty. The source of this differences is about why they made law. For Thomas, people made the law and set up rules because of the God’s wishes. It is apparent that religion, law and other social institutions can be positive for Hegel in that they are maintained by force or manipulation. In short, these institutions are no longer genuine , so for Hegel, people establish law to ensure their common benefits.

Resumo: Este artigo defende a tese de que a passagem da metafísica dogmática à transcendental pela Crítica da razão pura de Kant, paralela à necessidade de delinear os contornos dos limites epistêmicos do sujeito cognoscente, faz que a própria filosofia transcendental possa ser compreendida como certa metafísica pós-metafísica. Esta mudança metodológica é o que permite a Kant tematizar a ideia de Deus como uma máxima lógica exigida pela constituição interna da subjetividade transcendental; o argumento não é suficiente para garantir seja uma prova da existência de Deus, seja do contrário, mas certamente estabelece esta ideia da razão como condição metafísica ineliminável de todo o conhecimento possível. Palavras-chave: Metafísica; Deus; Kant.

This work sits at the tail end of a progression of studies into theology, mysticism and philosophy which reaches its apex here philosophically. It builds off of the understanding of the (shared) foundations of theological, mystical and philosophical knowledge from antiquity that we explore in Theology Reconsidered and Homo Mysticus that have supported the development of advanced societies throughout human history, and conjoins this knowledge with more modern conceptions of the world as reflected in scientific disciplines such as Physics, Psychology, and Biology to establish a new system of metaphysics, a postmodern system of metaphysics, which accounts for philosophical skepticism as well as physical materialism and has both a psychological as well as physical element to it – the world as it appears and the world as it is in Kantian terms.

In creating this model, we first illustrate the deficiencies of the prevailing metaphysical paradigm, one that reflects a deep-seated belief in the ontological supremacy of “objective reality”, and find the source of these deficiencies, point them out and then make some adjustments to the underlying system (Kantian metaphysics primarily) such that its misguided conclusions are both brought to light and at the same time corrected. In so doing we in effect root our system of metaphysics, the Metaphysics of Awareness, directly into the Western philosophical tradition.

Along the way we directly address some of the more pressing postmodern concerns regarding how society is structured and how knowledge is acquired and gained more generally. This journey takes us from the rationalist and empiricist pre–Enlightenment Era philosophical positions, deep into Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where the very foundations of reason are analyzed in painstaking detail and the world as it truly is is relegated to the domain of (mere) speculation, whereas the world as it appears becomes the means by which we can understand the world definitively, scientifically.

This work analyzes the postmodern condition from a metaphysical perspective and looks to understand the intellectual building blocks out of which it was constructed and in so doing shed light on its flaws, imbalances really, that have led us to such precarious times where the foundations of everything are questioned and everything is about power (Nietzsche, Foucault). We follow the development of these ideas from Kant through Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud, and then analyze these positions with respect to other dominant philosophical systems both from Western antiquity (Hellenic and Judeo-Christian) and Eastern antiquity (Indian and Chinese philosophy) to illustrate the imbalances of the postmodern philosophical position and through which we can construct a more (post) modern conception of metaphysics which fits the current scientific data.

What we arrive at is a metaphysical paradigm which reflects the very core of our psychological being, and also reflects the very core of being itself, a system which corrects at least some of the metaphysical distortions upon which postmodern philosophy is based, and provides us with the intellectual building blocks for us as individuals to better understand our place in the world and for us as a collective to better understand our place within Nature and ultimately the universe.

Abstract
Tanto Kant como Husserl fundamentan su filosofía en la distinción entre las cosas tal como son en sí mismas y el fenómeno. Pero mientras que en Kant esta distinción reposa en las facultades respectivas y en la función mediadora de la imaginación, para Husserl ella es una función del proceso de percepción mismo. En cuanto a la cosa en sí, cuyo principal sentido es en Kant el de noúmeno o ente inteligible, para Husserl es primeramente el ideal de la dación adecuada de una realidad particular de la cosa. El artículo desarrollará la reformulación crítica de Husserl tomando como eje los diferentes significados de la cosa en sí en ambos autores.
Palabras clave: Husserl, Kant, cosa en sí, fenómeno, constitución, ideas, idealización
The relevance of the distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself for phenomenology - The different meanings of the thing-in-itself in Kant and Husserl
Abstract
Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophies both ground on the distinction between the things in themselves and the phenomenon. While for Kant, this distinction rests in the respective faculties and the mediating function of imagination, for Husserl it is a function of the perceptual process itself. Concerning the thing in itself, its main sense for Kant is that of noumenon or intelligible being, while for Husserl it ismainly the ideal of the adequate givenness of a particular reality of the thing. This contribution aims at developping Husserl’s critical reformulation of Kant’s thing in itself by analysing its different senses and interpretations at both authors. Keywords: Husserl, Kant, thing in itself, phenomenon, constitution, ideas, idealisation

Resumo: O sumo bem, tal qual apresentado na CRPr, consiste na união da moralidade com a felicidade. Como esta ligação não pode ser assegurada necessariamente pelo próprio homem durante a sua finita e imperfeita existência, resta que se existe uma síntese; a mesma apenas pode ser elucidada em um suposto juízo sintético a priori que possa unir a vida terrena virtuosa com a felicidade post mortem que é o que parece exigir uma síntese desta natureza (CRPr, A 215). Frente a esta questão, defendemos que há boas razões para sustentar que o sumo bem é um objeto necessário da razão prática pura com base no pressuposto metafísico da constituição peculiar da faculdade de apetição de seres racionais finitos sem comprometer, com isso, o caráter de universalidade desta pretensão. O artigo culmina apontando alguns pontos de vista de aproximação da figura do sumo bem deixando claro que não há uma prova cabal; mas a fecundidade de um conjunto de perspectivas teóricas e práticas que permitem uma série de aproximações desse conceito até o ponto em que, por razões bem fundamentadas, não parece mais razoável sustentá-lo apenas como um ideal meramente dialético. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento. Dignidade de ser feliz. Filosofia da religião. Kant. Sumo bem.
Abstract: The Highest Good, as shown in the CPR, consists in the union of morality with happiness. How this link cannot necessarily be ensured by the man himself during his finiteness and imperfect existence, remains that if there is a synthesis, it can only be clarified in a supposed a priori synthetic judgment that is able to link the virtuous.

In this paper I argue, first, that Kant's technical definition of purposiveness in § 10 of the third Critique is designed to abstract from all forward-looking considerations (teleological, intentional, normative, etc.) that accompany the conventional understanding of the term. Kant seeks to establish a strictly backward-looking, etiological conception of purposiveness in order to capture the causal link connecting artifacts with their concepts. I argue, second, that he succeeds. Kant's etiological conception of purposiveness neither collapses into mere mechanism, nor smuggles normative considerations in through the backdoor. I frame my discussion by critically engaging Hannah Ginsborg's reading of § 10 – a leading representative of normative interpretations of Kant's notion of purposiveness.

I propose a set of distinctions that demarcate the structure
that I consider appropriate for the examination of the thesis
of conceptual incompatibility between authority and autonomy.
I begin with an analysis of the standard conception of authority,
i.e., the practical difference thesis (correlativism). I distinguish two versions: the epistemic and the voluntarist. Then I offer an analysis of two conceptions of moral autonomy: self-legislation and self-judgment. I conclude by remarking that we should distinguish two different versions of the conceptual incompatibility thesis: a) The conflict is unsolvable because autonomy requires that we always be the authors of the rules we have to obey while the authority claims that her will is the source of such standards. b) The conflict is unsolvable
because autonomy requires that we always act based on our
own moral judgment on what categorical reasons should guide our actions while the authority pretends that we have to give up acting as that judgment requires.

ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO MORAL THEORY, FIFTH EDITION provides a comprehensive yet clear introduction to the main traditions in ethical thought, including virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology. Additionally, the book presents a conceptual framework of ethical pluralism to help readers understand the relationship among various theories. Lawrence Hinman, one of the most respected and accomplished professionals in ethics and philosophy education today, presents a text that gives readers plentiful opportunities to explore ethical theory and their own responses to them, using fascinating features such as the "Ethical Inventory" sections that appear at the beginning and the end of the text. End-of-chapter discussion questions, and the use of current issues and movies help students retain what they've learn and truly comprehend the subject matter

Cet ouvrage se donne pour tâche d’examiner les discours les plus emblématiques produits par la philosophie moderne au sujet de la peine de mort. Assumant d’emblée le point de vue abolitionniste, notre intention n’est nullement de « peser le pour et le contre », mais de poser la question suivante : dans quelle mesure est-il possible de fonder rationnellement le refus catégorique de la peine capitale ? À cet égard, le détour par l’histoire de la philosophie nous montre à quel point la raison est avant tout divisée contre elle-même. En effet, au terme d'un travail visant à mettre à l’épreuve la cohérence interne des partisans de la peine de mort (Locke, Kant, Stuart Mill), ainsi que de ses adversaires (Beccaria, Bentham), il nous est apparu impossible de conclure à un simple défaut de rationalité de la part des uns ou des autres. Ce que l'on constate au contraire, c'est que chaque démonstration se déploie à partir d'un certain nombre de principes éthiques indémontrables. Bien plus, chaque grand courant de la philosophie pénale est susceptible de donner lieu à des prises de position radicalement opposées. Mais pour peu que l'on se refuse à concevoir un abîme insurmontable entre la raison d'une part, et la sensibilité d'autre part, la philosophie morale peut bénéficier d'une approche dans laquelle le raisonnement et « le cœur » se complètent, au lieu de constituer une alternative. À cet égard, c'est dans l'œuvre de Jean-Jacques Rousseau qu’il nous a semblé possible de repérer les éléments permettant de fonder au mieux l’abolition.

Źródło: Paweł Tarasiewicz, „Kultura” i „cywilizacja” – próba korelacji, „Roczniki Kulturoznawcze” 2 (2011), s. 71-88 [ISSN 2082-8578] ● Celem artykułu jest próba uporządkowania stanowisk wobec relacji zachodzących między terminami kultura i cywilizacja. Pierwsza jego część dotyczy historii obu wyrażeń do momentu ich spotkania, natomiast druga – typologii ich wzajemnych odniesień.

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

Three main questions face theology in and around Kant's philosophy: (1) Does Kant's philosophy leave room for meaningful theological discourse? (2) If so, where is this room and what is the nature of the theology that fills it? (3) Given the relationship between such theology and Kant's philosophy, is it desirable to be both a theologian and a Kantian? The bulk of this essay is devoted to the first and second questions by reference to the transcendental theology Kant develops in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. The third question is briefly addressed in my concluding comments by highlighting the questions we are left with if my account of Kantian theology is accurate.

Die sog. Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik hat in den letzten Jahren überraschend wenig Aufmerksamkeit in der Kantforschung erfahren. Das beginnt sich erst langsam zu ändern, bedingt vor allem durch das Wiedereinsetzen eines allgemeinen Interesses an Metaphysik, aber auch durch die Wiederentdeckung der Einsicht, dass die kantische Philosophie nicht nur ihren Ursprung in der nach-wolffschen Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts hat, sondern dass Kant mit seinen Fragestellungen insgesamt dieser philosophischen Strömung sehr viel näher bleibt, als die bislang eher auf die empiristische Tradition hin ausgelegten Interpretationsansätze bemerkt haben. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes thematisieren den metaphysischen Ursprung und die metaphysische Stoßrichtung der kantischen Philosophie. Das geschieht vor allem im Ausgang von und mit Blick auf die kantische Preisschrift, die eine besondere Stellung in Kants Werk einnimmt. Ausgehend von dieser Schrift wird einerseits ein Blick zurück auf die Entwicklung der kritischen Philosophie sowie deren Architektonik in Abgrenzung zur rationalistischen Schulphilosophie geworfen und andererseits ein Blick nach vorn zur vermeintlich nachkritischen Revision der Systematik im Opus postumum.

Euthanasiais a serious problem in the end of
life cares. Many peoples want the end of life, without the pain and suffering,
and are not burdensome for their family members; besides these people, many
doctors try to prepare for them the comfortable and quiet death. Many countries
are attempting to legitimize this practice and in many countries is now being
done legally. Of course, there are very serious opponents. Among the Reviews of
the medical, legal, ethical and etc., ethical analysis of Euthanasiais a very important. This paper tries to review
Euthanasia in terms of reason-based Deontologism, According to some of the most
importantprinciples
of Kantian ethics.In this
study,it has shown thatonlytwo kindsofeuthanasiacould be allowedbased on these principles