Phenomenological Sociology

Alfred Schutz’s sociology has the potential to capture the complex interplay of familiarity and strangeness in the everyday life of contemporary societies. However, his analyses of the arrival of a stranger in a group, put together in his well-known essay “The Stranger”, run into difficulties calling for a critical reconstruction. A reading of his background theses on social typification and knowledge by acquaintance brings to light limitations to the ideal type of the migrant, which expresses a primacy of the external relation to strangeness. This approach to the problem of belonging overstates the conformity of practices and routines in the group receiving the stranger on his territory. An awareness of internal alterity opens the discussion to the latent strangeness within the We and the Ego through a fresh take on tools provided by social phenomenology.

Individual psychology was a precursor to the emergence of numerous social and interpersonal approaches to psychology and pedagogy. The child’s education is never left to fate, genetics, or environment. At the same time, Adler did believe that the child’s social situation has the strongest effect on the outset of development. Responsibility falls on the educator to appeal to the creative power or “free artistic creation” of the pupil. Individual psychology stresses the idea that a child only really
becomes a full-fledged student within an interpersonal field characterized by community feeling.

Teaching is a complex work that demands highly specialized skills and knowledge to impact students’ learning.  The well-being of society depends upon students who will carry the responsibility for the future growth. In achieving this goal, UAE vision 2021 prioritizes education and the development of human capital, in the form of teachers, particularly as they are the key agents in the country's efforts to establish the knowledge-based economy. During educational reform, the quality, the contribution, and the satisfaction of the academic staff become determinant factors for the reform sustainability.

As a complex phenomenon, job satisfaction (JS) factors itself prominently in the development of any educational organizations as it can lead to both positive and negative results (Spector 1997). Work productivity and performance, students’ attainment, organizational commitment and the overall productivity of the organization are influenced by JS.   

While there is a plethora of Western research to validate the impact of external and internal factors on teacher’s job satisfaction and organizational commitment, studies exploring job satisfaction from teachers’ perspectives and with employing phenomenological research are still emerging in UAE.

This book offers a theoretical investigation into the general problem of reality as a multiplicity of ‘finite provinces of meaning’, as developed in the work of Alfred Schutz. A critical introduction to Schutz’s sociology of multiple realities as well as a sympathetic re-reading and reconstruction of his project, Experiencing Multiple Realities traces the genesis and implications of this concept in Schutz’s writings before presenting an analysis of various ways in which it can shed light on major sociological problems, such as social action, social time, social space, identity, or narrativity.

Table of Contents:

Preface

Acknowledgements

List of abbreviations

Introduction: realities just ‘real enough’

1. Theory and story: in-between encounters

2. Schutz’s methodological journey

3. The Schutzian FPM model

4. Revisiting the Provinces

5. The life of the provinces

6. Methods of experience

7. Experience as discourse

8. Ancient FPM portals: painted screens

Conclusion

Index

We have two ways of knowing. Our mind knows forms, things, both subtle and gross. Faces, hands, buildings, trees, math formulas, mind knows subject and the mind knows otherness. The mind knows dualities, the mind knows me and you, us and them, and this and that. Mind knows time, mind knows the past, the present and the sense of the future. The mind knows things and entities, the mind knows beings, infinite numbers of beings and things. The mind knows difference. The mind thinks conceptually, feels affectively, imagines through imagery, the mind has sense and the mind has memory. The mind knows dualistically.

In the present paper, I intend to systematically revisit Thomas Luckmann’s account of the relation between phenomenology and sociology and to assess its strengths and weaknesses in terms of constructive criticism. In order to achieve this aim, I will proceed in three steps. First (1), I will reconstruct the Luckmannian approach by means of an exhaustive analysis of his programmatic texts. Second (2), I will identify its strengths and merits. And finally (3), I will discuss its shortcomings and try to correct them in two ways, namely, by bringing Luckmann into a dialogue with other sociological-theoretical and phenomenological accounts, and by counteracting some of his problematic claims with alternative insights contained in his own work.

This work is a critical introduction to Alfred Schutz’s sociology of the multiple reality and an enterprise that seeks to reassess and reconstruct the Schutzian project. In the first part of the study, I inquire into Schutz’s biographical con- text that surrounds the germination of this conception and I analyse the main texts of Schutz where he has dealt directly with ‘finite provinces of meaning.’ On the basis of this analysis, I suggest and discuss, in Part II, several solutions to the shortcomings of the theoretical system that Schutz drew upon the sociological problem of multiple reality. Specifically, I discuss problems related to the struc- ture, the dynamics, and the interrelationing of finite provinces of meaning as well as the way they relate to the questions of narrativity, experience, space, time, and identity.

"Radical Research explores the view that research is not a neutral tool to be employed without bias in the search for truth. Rather the radical roots of research are to be seen in the focus on freedom and emancipation from blind allegiance to tradition, ‘common sense’, religion, or powerful individuals and organisations.

Radical Research introduces and draws upon leading contemporary debates and data gathered from a diversity of funded projects in; health, education, police training, youth and community, schools, business, and the use of information technology.

This book presents a radical view of research in a way that enables both beginner and the experienced professional researcher to explore its approaches in the formation of their own views and practices. It progressively leads the reader from discussions of case studies to critical explorations of the philosophical and methodological concepts, theories and arguments that are central to contemporary debates. In essence, this book shows how to design, develop and write radical research under conditions where ‘normal’ research rules apply and it offers a ground-breaking and proven alternative to traditional research techniques."

The book deals with manifestations and relics of magical thinking in the narrative folklore of Cieszyn Silesia (Teschen Silesia, Těšín Silesia). The point of departure is a phenomenological and social constructivist approach to human cognition. The author follows the cognitive dimensions of pre-modern folklore and popular texts in general. They are conventional in the sense that they are repeated in many variants inside one communicative group. Habituation based on more or less accurate reproduction of stereotypes (and corresponding experiences), motives, action scenarios, rationalizations, and motivations, is the source of relatively stable world image. The key concept developed in the book is redefined categorization understood as the simplification and stabilization of too complex and changing reality through shared narratives.

Las colaboraciones reunidas en este libro se concentran en el problema de la aplicación de la disciplina fenomenológica al análisis de distintas formas de estructuración social como el poder, la desigualdad y la exclusión social. Las argumentaciones toman un nuevo camino, rechazando el reproche de "olvido del poder" (Machtvergessenheit) que se le formula a la fenomenología y demostrando la potencia específica de la disciplina para su estudio. En este sentido, se ofrecen distintas perspectivas fenomenológicas que demuestran que el análisis del poder requiere, por un lado, enfocar en la subjetividad del individuo, pues allí reside la condición de posibilidad de la constitución subjetiva del poder que está basada en la estructura del mundo de la vida del actor individual. Y, del mismo modo, demuestran el carácter objetivo ineludible del fenómeno del poder que puede iluminarse partiendo de la reflexión fenomenológica. El repertorio de textos que presentamos propone una perspectiva original y fructífera que, esperamos, aliente al lector a la reflexión y a la discusión acerca del fenómeno del poder desde la perspectiva fenomenológica, abriendo también el diálogo a otras tradiciones interpretativas que puedan enriquecer el debate acerca de un tema de tanta centralidad para las ciencias sociales.

Aim of this work is to illustrate the comparison of Alfred Schütz with Husserlian phenomenology and his attempt to solve the question of intersubjectivity. In this regard, it will be shown how the solution proposed by Schütz, consisting in considering intersubjectivity not as a mere phenomenological question but as a fundamental category of human existence, allows the exit from solipsism, on which the thought of Husserl had run aground, and the foundation of a phenomenological sociology.

The present paper constitutes an attempt to articulate, systematize, and further develop the implicit traces of a phenomenological critical theory that, according to Michael Barber's reading, are to be found in Schutz's thought. It is my contention that a good way to achieve this aim is by reading Schutz against the background of novel, phenomenologically and hermeneutically informed accounts of Critical Theory in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, such as Hartmut Rosa's. In order to achieve the stated objective, I will proceed in four steps. First (1), I will briefly reconstruct the mostly negative reception of phenomenology, the interpretive social sciences, and Schutz by both the Frankfurt School and contemporary critical social theory. Second (2), I will present Barber's alternative reading of Schutzian phenomenology as entailing an implicit ethics and a rudimentary critical theory based thereon. Third (3), I will sketch out Rosa's formal model of Critical Theory as an heuristic means for articulating Schutz's unspoken social-critical insights. Finally (4), establishing a dialogue between Barber's reading of Schutz and Rosa's account, I will provide a preliminary articulation of Schutz's rudimentary critical theory.

Although the understanding of social ontology has been the subject of intense debate among constructivists in the discipline of International Relations the prevailing view drawn from these debates tends to equate social ontology with an intersubjective ontology. This stand, which is prominent among the constructivists adopting an interpretive epistemology, obstructs the conceptualization of the objective aspect of social ontology which is independent of intersubjective meanings. This article aims to rethink the social ontology understanding prevalent among the constructivists. This article argues that social ontology cannot be reduced to an intersubjective ontology. The article, based on the insights provided by scientific realism, suggests that the prevalent social ontology understanding in IR is derived from the interpretive epistemological concerns of constructivism and that the conceptualization of the objective aspect of social reality would remain inadequate in case we equate social ontology with intersubjective meanings. Specifically, it is argued that if we try to reduce social structure into the level of practices constituted by intersubjective meanings, we are forced to reduce the significance of social conditions into the significance of norms, rules or discourses. On the other hand, a proper conceptualization of social relations in international relations like hierarchy and dependency, which cannot be reduced to intersubjective meanings, requires considering the objective dimension of social reality.

Alfred Schutz tends to be falsely considered as an illustrious representative of social ontological individualism. In this paper, I seek to correct this flawed interpretation of his work by means of a revisitation of his criticism of what I – taking up a Marxian term – call the “robinsonades“ intrinsic to Husserl’s 5th Cartesian Meditation. It is my contention that the systematic reconstruction of this classical criticism makes it possible to lay bare Schutz’s actual ontological account, namely: social ontological intersubjectivism.

This article examines the material culture of migration, focusing on migrants’ house-making projects in their countries of birth. In particular, it examines the houses built or refurbished by Albanians in their home-country, which is no longer their place of permanent residence. This is a widespread phenomenon in Albania, but it is also a frequently appearing practice amongst other international migrants. Why do migrants living outside their home-countries build houses there even though they do not plan to return? I seek to answer this question in the case of Albania by focusing empirically on the process of constructing these houses, rather than merely on the material entity of the house
as such. I propose that such ‘house-making’ by Albanian migrants is not only a simple house-building process; it also ensures a constant dwelling and dynamic ‘proxy’ presence for
migrants in their community of origin. These ethnographic observations have further significance for the anthropological study of both houses and international migration.

This article examines the material culture of migration, focusing on migrants’ house-making projects in their countries of birth. In particular, it examines the houses built or refurbished by Albanians in their home-country, which is no longer their place of permanent residence. This is a widespread phenomenon in Albania, but it is also a frequently appearing practice amongst other international migrants. Why do migrants living outside their home-countries build houses there even though they do not plan to return? I seek to answer this question in the case of Albania by focusing empirically on the process of constructing these houses, rather than merely on the material entity of the house
as such. I propose that such ‘house-making’ by Albanian migrants is not only a simple house-building process; it also ensures a constant dwelling and dynamic ‘proxy’ presence for
migrants in their community of origin. These ethnographic observations have further significance for the anthropological study of both houses and international migration.

Resumen: En este artículo me propongo reconstruir sistemáticamente los lineamientos principales de la novedosa teoría crítica desarrollada por Hartmut Rosa: la sociología de las relaciones con el mundo. Para ello, procedo en tres pasos. En primer lugar (1), expongo el modo en que el autor concibe las tareas contemporáneas de una Teoría Crítica de la Sociedad en la tradición de la Escuela de Frankfurt. En segundo término (2), doy cuenta del carácter fenomenológico de su abordaje y examino la oposición conceptual sobre la que el mismo se basa, a saber, aquella entre resonancia y alienación. Finalmente (3), analizo la tesis según la cual la lógica (tardo)moderna de la aceleración social produce sistemáticamente relaciones alienadas con el mundo.

Abstract: In this paper, I intend to systematically reconstruct the main lines of Hartmut Rosa's novel version of Critical Theory, namely, the "Sociology of the Relationships to the World". In order to do so, I will proceed in three steps. First (1) I will sketch out his account of the tasks and features of a contemporary Critical Theory of Society in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. Second (2), I will show the phenomenological nature of his approach and examine the conceptual opposition on which it rests, namely, that between "resonance" and "alienation". Finally (3), Í will analyze his claim that the logic of "social acceleration" and the principle of "dynamic stabilization" typical of (late-)modern societies systematically produce alienated relationships to the world.

The present paper aims to provide a contribution to the self-clarification of social scientists with regard to the using and abusing of the concept of "lifeworld" [Lebenswelt] and its surrogates. With this aim, the author adopts a dual approach which draws upon the one used by the late Husserl in Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaft und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, namely: the combination of genealogical reflections on the origins and historic itinerary of the concept with phenomenological descriptions of the "thing itself". More precisely, the present article tries to systematically reconstruct Edmund Husserl"s phenomenological "proto-foundation" [Urstiftung] and Alfred Schutz"s "reprise" of the Lebenswelt.

The aim of this article is to clarify the position of language in sociological theory, analyzing the discourses of a sociological phenomenologist of the so-called “meaning school,” notably Thomas Luckmann. Since the mid-1960s, a field called “sociology of language” has emerged as an attempt to focus on linguistic heterogeneity in society and deal with social problems such as discrimination and disparity in terms of language. In contrast, sociological theories represented by Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge conceived language to be the “social a priori” that is intersubjectively shared among people. This idea replaced the problem of understanding subjective meaning in Max Weber’s interpretative sociology with linguistic meaning. Language was regarded not as a problem but as a solution to the problem. In this sense, the view on language in sociological theory should not be called “sociology of language” but rather “linguistic sociology.”
        While Talcott Parsons believed that a normative value of religion is shared in society, Luckmann pointed out that religion became privatized with the rapid industrialization after the war. Thus, for Luckmann, language assumed the role of religion: people are born into their own linguistic community, not religious community. In this way, the “shared” among people that sociological theory presumes shifted from religion to language.
        However, the sharing of language was actually a product of national society, correlated to the change in the employee structure and the rise in educational standards. Hence, we are unable to naively admire common language as the life-worldly foundation. Especially in today’s global society, language is causing problems such as linguistic conflicts to reemerge. The sharing of language therefore cannot be presupposed. What we genuinely share is rather the situation that we share nothing.

Today, men and women mostly work and socialize together, and arranged marriages are no longer the norm. However, in Islamic societies, there is no consensus about how to position women and cross-gender relationships in the public space. Thus, cross-gender relations in the public space have started to create many practical and identity related uncertainties for the Muslim community in general. Therefore, I would focus on the "lovership" practices of young men who have grown up in Muslim families. These practices are revelatory of wider issues concerning the relations between men and women in Muslim societies, the relationship of Islam to secular practice, and conflicts between the religious values and secular desires. In general, people of similar habitus are expected to locate close to one another in space. However, this study shows that at Boğaziçi University (formerly Robert College) in İstanbul, men and women from Muslim families, who are expected to meet and fall in love, find this harder than expected. Indeed, there is no proper Islamic concept of the "lovership" or male-female friendship. Moreover, an Islamic habitus creates uncertainties by removing the distinctions between friendship and lovership in order to regulate (block) relations between men and women. Two common strategies for Muslim men therefore often involve imitating (mimicry) the secular imagination of the "lovership" and dating non-Muslim or highly secularized women. Based on more than 30 interviews and more than 50 surveys, male expectations for an ideal relationship have changed significantly. For men, the issue of virginity is no longer considered a problem, whereas hijab-wearing is. In addition to that, young women have started to stop wearing headscarf intensively. Should we think of these issues as a secularization, or as a new kind of masculinity? I would argue that the hijab is considered undesirable because it limits ability to be mobile in social and physical sense. Young Muslim men (I call them "cultural smugglers") try to govern these uncertainties by making Islam and their culture more convertible. I will argue that they discursively relocate their practices, bending the social norms, transferring new practices or abandoning current practices. Due to increase in social and physical mobility, my research reveals people trying to minimize the costs of cultural adaptation; reduce the cost of sustainability and reproduction of their culture.

The aim of this paper is to systematically analyze Schutz's phenomenological account of the typicality and habituality of everyday cognitive experience, and to identify the Husserlian leitmotifs that inform it. In order to do so, I will proceed in three steps. First (1), I will briefly present the main lines of Schutz " s theoretical project; second (2), I will scrutinize his Husserlian account of typification as a passive sort of interpretation; and finally (3), I will examine his –also Husserl-inspired– analysis of the structure and genesis of the habitualized stock of knowledge at hand.

The lucidity of awareness is experienced directly through the doorway of our subjectivity as our own innermost awareness. As we gaze into our own interiority we can experience the unfolding of the manifestation of this field of radiance and this lucidity of awareness. The invisible field of luminous knowingness becomes experientially visible. Lucidity of Phenomena Experientially visible means seeing the flashes of light, sensing light, experiencing the presence of the radiance within us and beyond us. Experiencing the presence of the radiance means feeling the luminous experience of the light and the energy of the light in everything and anything, in anyone and everyone. As we experience the visibility of luminous knowingness within us as us, we are empowered to experience the manifestation of the lucidity within the appearance of all phenomena. Lucidity is not only within us but within all phenomena, all appearance has lucidity and all appearance is lucidity. All phenomena are the manifestation of primordial radiance. When we are experiencing the radiance of phenomenon, our inner light is meeting the outer light, and thus there is only one indivisible light. In truth there is only primordial luminous radiance that is manifesting our mind, our body and our innermost awareness, as well as the infinitely vast universal context of phenomena that we are placed within in time and in space. Our capacity to experience the radiance of the field of awareness within our own embodied subjectivity opens for us the ability to gaze into the subjectivity of all phenomena. By gazing into our own subjectivity there arises this intersubjective gaze that is direct and inside to inside. This intersubjective gaze allows us to experience the luminous openness of all phenomena and context. This intersubjective gaze opens the innermost openness of all phenomena. Subjectivity is the openness of our being to Being itself within all beings.

In this paper, I intend to show the relevance of Schutz’s account of interpersonal understanding within the context of the contemporary social cognition debate. Currently, the research on the nature of everyday interpersonal understanding is taking place almost exclusively within the fi eld of interdisciplinary cognitive science. Generally speaking, since the mid-nineties the so-called social cognition debate is dominated by two opposed theoretical outlooks which diverge concerning the ultimate mechanisms responsible for our understanding of Others, namely the theory-theory of mind (TT) and the simulation theory (ST). Yet, in the last couple of years, there is a phenomenological turn taking place in this debate. Thinkers like Zahavi, Gallagher and Overgaard, among others, return to classical phenomenological accounts of empathy—like those of Husserl, Stein, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty—to propose an alternative theoretical outlook on intersubjective understanding, namely the direct perception theory (DPT). However, this recuperation of classical phenomenological approaches to intersubjective comprehension is, to some extent, incomplete. Indeed, DPT supporters tend to neglect the valuable contributions that Schutz made to the study of this problem. This is quite curious, not only because Schutz’s phenomenological theory of interpersonal understanding agrees, to some degree, with the main thesis of the direct perception theory, but also because it contains insights that may be helpful to formulate a more solid and self-clarified version of it.

In this paper, I intend to show the relevance of Schutz’s account of interpersonal understanding within the context of the contemporary social cognition debate. Currently, the research on the nature of everyday interpersonal understanding is taking place almost exclusively within the fi eld of interdisciplinary cognitive science. Generally speaking, since the mid-nineties the so-called social cognition debate is dominated by two opposed theoretical outlooks which diverge concerning the ultimate mechanisms responsible for our understanding of Others, namely the theory-theory of mind (TT) and the simulation theory (ST). Yet, in the last couple of years, there is a phenomenological turn taking place in this debate. Thinkers like Zahavi, Gallagher and Overgaard, among others, return to classical phenomenological accounts of empathy—like those of Husserl, Stein, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty—to propose an alternative theoretical outlook on intersubjective understanding, namely the direct perception theory (DPT). However, this recuperation of classical phenomenological approaches to intersubjective comprehension is, to some extent, incomplete. Indeed, DPT supporters tend to neglect the valuable contributions that Schutz made to the study of this problem. This is quite curious, not only because Schutz’s phenomenological theory of interpersonal understanding agrees, to some degree, with the main thesis of the direct perception theory, but also because it contains insights that may be helpful to formulate a more solid and self-clarified version of it.

This paper is a description of collaborative research that was done together with students during the class “Contemplative Sociology. Experiencing Self, No-Self and the Lifeworld.” The goal of the research was to introduce the students to the contemplative methods that could be used to research lived experiences and the vision of the lifeworld through contemplation of the mind, bodily sensations, and emotions. A project was started on experiencing the cemetery space. The space for experiencing was chosen to sensitize the students to concerns (such as death, religious holidays, everyday life, suffering, etc.) that could be investigated from the first-person perspective by using contemplation as an alternative to survey-sociological methods, psychological methods and ethnography. The students learned the contemplative techniques of meditation, body awareness, self- observation, and self-description to face their concerns, including the ultimate ones. However, the main concern was the role of the mind, body and emotions in cognition and creating the mood.

En este articulo me propongo reconstruir sistematicamente los lineamientos principales de la novedosa teoria critica desarrollada por Hartmut Rosa: la sociologia de las relaciones con el mundo. Para ello, procedo en tres pasos. En primer lugar (1), expongo el modo en que el autor concibe las tareas contemporaneas de una Teoria Critica de la Sociedad en la tradicion de la Escuela de Frankfurt. En segundo termino (2), doy cuenta del caracter fenomenologico de su abordaje y examino la oposicion conceptual sobre la que el mismo se basa, a saber, aquella entre resonancia y alienacion. Finalmente (3), analizo la tesis segun la cual la logica (tardo)moderna de la aceleracion social produce sistematicamente relaciones alienadas con el mundo. Palabras clave: Resonancia, Alienacion, Fenomenologia, Teoria Critica, Hartmut Rosa. A Phenomenological Critical Theory? Resonance, Alienation, and Critique of Society in Hartmut Rosa's Thought Abstract In this paper, I intend to systematically reco...

This draft paper is a phenomenological, critical and ontological examination of the idea of terrorism and the notion of a terrorist act. The paper looks at the ideological foundations of terrorism, and the presentation of terrorism and terrorist acts in media and communication in language and discourse. More particularly, there is a specific examination of the ontology and phenomenology of the term through four lenses: terrorism as performance, terrorism as ritual embodiment, terrorism as a double-sided experiential phenomenon, and terrorism as political discourse linked to power. There is also emphasis on terrorism as reflecting a clash of worldviews and value systems throughout the paper. The paper also discusses radicalisation and deradicalisation.

Phenomenology is one of the most influential philosophical traditions of the twentieth century and has significantly shaped contemporary anthropological and social theory. This entry shows the various ways in which phenomenology has contributed to contemporary anthropology.  In so doing, it also shows that a better understanding of the phenomenological tradition and what it offers social and historical analysis could further contribute to the development of anthropology as a discipline increasingly concerned with the relational interconnection between humans, nonhumans, and the worlds they variously share.  This is done by focusing on phenomenology’s emphasis on ‘conditions of experience,’ and how such conditions shape what and how it is to be human in any situated context.  In particular, the entry emphasizes the conditions of being-in-the-world, embodiment, and radical otherness, and shows how each of these have been utilized by phenomenological anthropologists in their analyses of socio-cultural life.  Furthermore, the entry stresses that phenomenology has always been a critical endeavor.  Historically, this was so in terms of the rethinking of the some of the most fundamental concepts of the so-called Western tradition.  More recently, this critical aspect has focused on the ways in which such conditions of experience as race, class, gender, among others, significantly shape the range of possibilities for any experience whatsoever.

A fin de paliar el estado deficitario de la literatura secundaria en español sobre Alfred Schutz, este artículo se propone reconstruir sistemáticamente su concepción sobre la tipicalidad y habitualidad de la experiencia cognitiva cotidiana. Para esto se procede en tres pasos. Primero, se presentan los lineamientos fundamentales del proyecto teórico de Schutz; en segundo término, se escruta su concepción husserliana de la “tipificación” como un proceso de interpretación pasiva y, finalmente,
se examina su análisis de la estructura y génesis del “acervo de conocimiento a mano”. La reconstrucción aquí realizada, más que ser
una mera contribución a la historia de las ideas sociológicas, debe leerse como un aporte a la fundamentación teórica de la investigación actual
en el campo de las ciencias sociales.