Russian-Ukrainian Relations

Th e article compares three Russian-Ukrainian wars which took place respectively
through 1917–1918, 1919–1920 and since February 2014. In all these wars,
Ukrainian troops fought for independence, but the diversity of Ukraine allowed
Soviet Russia and the Russian Federation to establish a number of power centres
which played at Ukrainian loyalties – be it to Russia at the imperial level, the
Ukrainian Soviet Republic at the national level or a number of smaller people’s
republics at the local level, with the aim of preventing the establishment of unity
among Ukrainians.

Even though Russia will most likely remain the largest gas exporter to Europe for the foreseeable future, it is clear that Gazprom can no longer retain its monopoly over much of the European gas market that had heretofore allowed it to impose its will and dictate terms to Central and Eastern European customers. With the cost of the Nord Stream Two and TurkStream projects totaling almost $20 billion, it also remains questionable whether Putin’s current gas strategies will ever prove profitable for Russia.

In the shadow of the Russo-Ukrainian war of 2014, the tale of Ivan Mazepa and both Moscow and Ukraine’s perspectives then and now should act as a reminder of the constant cycle of Russian demonization of those who rebel, and Ukraine’s near-religion to rebellious counter culture that continues to this day.

At the beginning of 2019, Russia was quite confident it would be able to either redirect its gas transit to the EU away from Ukraine before the expiration of the transit contract or renew the deal on Moscow’s own terms. But despite Gazprom’s (i.e., the Kremlin’s) transit diversification strategy, the new five-year deal shows that the Ukrainian transit corridor still remains of paramount importance for Russia

Using leaked emails attributed to covert political actors, this study explores the Kremlin's comprehensive influence operations (active measures) to thwart Ukraine's aspirations to join the European Union. These efforts were launched by Putin as early as the beginning of 2013 to avoid losing Ukraine as part of his Eurasian integration project. In Ukraine, however, pro-Russian political forces were weak, clandestinely suppressed by President Viktor Yanukovych and his party. Moscow's major efforts, including the Rus Baptism anniversary, trade sanctions, and "Medvedchuk project" failed to turn the tide; some even backfired, consolidating support for the European project among the Ukrainian elite and public. Although Putin interrupted the signing of the EU Association Agreement by taking advantage of Yanukovych's personal weakness, he became increasingly frustrated with the Ukrainian president, who "sacrifices Russia's strategic interests" and sought to become an "all-Ukrainian national leader" resistant to Russian pressures. Russian policy was at an impasse, without any viable instruments to restrict the westward drift of Ukraine, making the situation totally different from that of 2004. These observations allow us to construct a nuanced interpretation of Russian behaviors in late 2013 and early 2014, which suggest a possible review of and change to their Ukraine policy. The Crimea operation comes to be seen as a well-considered and proactive move to compensate for the failed influence operations and achieve a strategic goal: keeping Ukraine in Russia's orbit.

This article deals with the Ukrainian-Russian encounters in the field of school history education in 1990s-2010s. The theme investigates the context of the state-and nation-building processes in both countries. Three major topics are considered: history education and textbooks as a tool of civic education and citizenship building, the problem of unification and homogenization of the representations of the past in the light of citizen education, the attempts of Russia to promote a common vision of the past with neighbors, and Ukrainian responses. The major theme ends with the highlights from the most recent developments in the field of school history curriculum and textbooks in both countries in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and war of 2014-2021.

In an age where nothing seems clear-cut it is wonderful to have a hero and an even clearer villain. Putin is the new Hitler, an obsessive maniac with no respect for human life. The Ukrainians, by contrast, remind us of our parents and grandparents and their pluck during World War II, when Britain stood alone. But, of course, nothing is ever quite so simple. So, at this stage in the war, what is the balance of the good, the bad and the ugly?

The visual reconstruction of shooting at Maidan protesters and journalists demonstrates that Maidan protesters were shot by snipers in the Hotel Ukraina and other Maidan-controlled buildings during the Maidan massacre in Ukraine on February 20, 2014. The bullet holes identified in government forensic expert reports, videos, and photos from directions of the Maidan-controlled buildings are in the area, height, and directions that match the shooting of the protesters.  The forensic examination reports by government investigators, videos and photos by journalists suggest that journalists from ABC (Australia), ARD TV (Germany) twice, Associate Press, BBC, Sky News, and RT in the Hotel Ukraina rooms facing Maidan were shot at from the Maidan-controlled areas. The visual reconstruction and the same data along with videos and media reports by journalists from these media suggest that ABC News (US) and TVP (Poland) journalists in the Hotel Ukraina were most likely shot at by snipers from the Maidan-controlled Bank Arkada. They suggest that a Ruptly reporter in the Hotel Ukraina was hit by a ricochet from a direction of a Berkut barricade. Russian journalists in other three locations of the Hotel Ukraina were shot at by Maidan snipers and/or by Berkut and Omega, which shot at snipers at the Hotel Ukraina.               

The visual reconstruction based on similar data shows that the Berkut police and Omega were generally shooting above protesters at the second and higher floors of the Hotel Ukraina and in electric poles, a flower box, and trees. Synchronized videos show that Maidan protesters in the massacre zone were in a blind spot below the line of Berkut police fire from behind a truck.             

This is an online appendix H of papers presented at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Boston and the “Regimes and Societies in Conflict: Eastern Europe and Russia since 1956” conference by the Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University and the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies in Uppsala in 2018.

Hai-Nyzhnyk P., Chupriy L., Fihurnyi Y., Krasnodemska I., Chyrkov O. (2018). Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine: ethnonational dimension and civilizational confrontation. Saarbrucken (Germany): LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. 229 p.

The expert-analytical study analyzes the preconditions, course and contemporary socio-political consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, which has signs of not only direct and covert, but also inter-state conflict and even civilizational confrontation.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

Current military-civil administration in eastern Ukrainian frontline districts need to be kept in place and partially reformed. Should the Donets Basin return to Ukrainian control, they could provide institutional templates for a temporary special regime within the currently occupied territories.

З 1 по 10 березня 1919-го у Харкові та Москві відбулося три важливих для України зібрання, активну участь у яких взяли Микола Скрипник та Християн Раковський.
Спочатку відкрився ІІІ з'їзд КП(б)У (1-6 березня), потім установчий (перший) конгрес ІІІ Інтернаціоналу (2-6 березня) і, нарешті, ІІІ Всеукраїнський з'їзд рад (6-10 березня). Діяли обидва діячі доволі злагоджено.

This chapter seeks to assess Western and Russian influence on the collapse of Viktor Yanukovych’s regime. Drawing on the works of Levitsky and Way and Tolstrup, the chapter explains why during the 2014 crisis Yanukovych was able to withstand Western and domestic pressure much longer than Leonid Kuchma did in 2004, and why he was eventually toppled. I argue that Yanukovych’s ability to prolong his stay in power was circumscribed by three specific factors: his concentration of power, Russian backing and miscalculated Western threats to impose sanctions. His downfall, however, was ultimately determined from within the state.
The chapter contributes to the theory of hybrid regimes by extending the concept of linkage and leverage to non-democracies; it also offers an empirical measure of Russian anti-democratic influence on Ukraine.

On the Shoulders of Grandmothers can easily be enjoyed by academic as well as nonacademic audience as the life stories hold the core of the book. At the same time, the book is not a simple discussion of the struggles and aspirations of Ukrainian grandmothers but rather a valuable source of riveting insights into the everyday life, and the changing moral and gender order, in the post-Soviet period. The clarity of Solari’s writing and the reflexive account of her dilemmas as a researcher makes the transnational, comparative data engaging and fluent. This work should be included in the shelves of various disciplines such as Gender and Women Studies, Global/ization Studies, and Transnational migration studies as well as Area Studies.

Starodub A. V. Jurisdictional policy of the Russian Orthodox Church during 1917 –  1921: Ukrainian aspect. Manuscript.
Thesis for a Candidate’s degree on Speciality 07.00.02. – World History. M.S.Hrushevs’ky Institute of the Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyjiv, 1999.
The thesis to be defended concerns the study of Russian Orthodox Church’s jurisdictional policy in the period of Civil War and the National Revolutions and its Ukrainian aspect in particular. A number of factors that influenced the formation of general principles of Russian Orthodox Church’s jurisdictional policy in the entire Russian Empire are analysed in this paper, which’s complied of original archive sources, most of which are first involved into scientific use. An attempt has been made to reconstruct a number of cases related to the problem of Orthodox Church’s status in the Ukraine as it been taken up at the All-Russian of 1917–1918 and All-Ukrainian of 1918 Sobors (Church Counsils).
Special attention has been paid to the specific of the “Ukrainian policy’s” evolution of ROC in the common Orthodox context. The degree of Ukrainian jurisdictional contradictions’ influences onto national-orthodox movements in North America, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia was estimated here. The issue of probabile recognition of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine as autocephalic is studied here on the background of the redistribution of influence centres in the world of Orthodoxy after break-up of Russian Empire and in the context of contradictions between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Key words: Russian Orthodox Church, Sobor (Church Counsil), jurisdiction, autocephaly, autonomy, national-orthodox movement, inter-orthodoxy relations.

Гай-Нижник П. «Самостійна» УСРР: хронологія виникнення маріонеткової псевдодержави та її «добровільного» вступу до СРСР // Україна Incognita: веб-додаток до всеукраїнської газети «День». – 2011. – 27 грудня [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: http://incognita.day.kiev.ua/xronologiya-viniknennya-marionetkovoyi-psevdoderzhavi.htm

Ukraine is an outsider in terms of political values and standards of governance. Transparency, efficiency and accountability, rubber-stamped in official papers and declarations, are superseded by other standards: informal networks, patronage, and a patron-client system are what truly shape the performance of state institutions, making them serve the interests of the elected rather than the electors. The article traces the rise of Viktor Yanukovych to the Presidential office through extensive use of these informal patterns and formation of a vertikal of his own, laying preconditions for his fall.

What are the origins of the armed conflict that has been raging in eastern Ukraine since 2014? Which role did Russia play in the emergence and escalation of the originally unarmed confrontation, in the Donets Basin (Donbas), after the victory of the Euromaidan revolution? When, how and to what degree exactly did Moscow get involved? Which relative weight did local sources of the conflict compared to the impact of foreign factors, i.e. the Kremlin’s covert actions in Ukraine? These and similar questions are not only academic topics hotly debated in Ukraine and the West. The way one answers them has also far-reaching implications for Western thinking, policies and diplomacy with regard to Russia and Ukraine today and tomorrow. Since 2014, an array of new evidence and research has emerged that helps clarifying the picture.

Nach dem dramatischen Durchbruch bei Popasna hat sich der russische Vormarsch in der Provinz Luhansk verlangsamt. Die ukrainische Armeeführung hat Verstärkungen in das Krisengebiet entsandt, aber von einer Entspannung der Lage kann keine Rede sein.
1. Die Opfer des Luftkriegs
2. Der Stillstand um Charkiw und Isium
3. Der Kampf um Lyman
4. Der geplante Kessel um Siewierodonezk
5. Russische Geländegwinne um Popasna
6. Die Begradigung bei Switlodarsk
7. Russische Fortschritte bei Awdijiwka
8. Der Partisanenkrieg im Süden
9. Verstreute Nachrichten von der Küstenregion
10. Die Seeblockade gegen den Weizenexport
11. Die vagen Ziele der Russen
12. Die Leiden der Zivilbevölkerung

В книзі проаналізовані закономірності Російської революції, яка почалася з повалення самодержавства в березні (лютому за ст. ст.) 1917 р. і завершилася розгоном Установчих зборів у січні 1918 р. Показано, що головною рушійною силою революції на всіх етапах були органи революційної самодіяльності народних низів – ради робітничих і солдатських депутатів, які добивались виходу з війни та експропріації власності поміщиків та буржуазії. Проаналізована підступна стратегія В. Леніна, який привласненням радянських гасел («Фабрики – робітникам!», «Землю – селянам!» і «Мир – народам!») спромігся перетворити свою партію на масову, витіснити з рад конкуруючі політичні сили і здійснити один за одним два державні перевороти – відсторонення від влади коаліції партій цензової та соціалістичної демократій і розгін обраних на демократичних виборах депутатів Установчих зборів. Це дозволило вождю більшовиків укласти сепаратний мир з кайзерівською Німеччиною та її союзниками, після чого під облудною пропагандою «світлого майбутнього для всього людства» в Росії і в поневоленій нею Україні розгорнулася експропріація існуючої партії більшовиків її вождями, експропріація держави – цією партією і, нарешті, експропріація суспільства державою-комуною, як назвав В. Ленін утворювану ним державу.

В монографии на основе архивных и опубликованных источников восстановлены основные аспекты деятельности таврических гражданских губернаторов первой половины XIX в. Это первая в историографии попытка комплексного рассмотрения процесса инкорпорации Тавриды в состав Российской империи. Представлен новый взгляд на особенности социально-экономического развития региона в рассматриваемый период.
Книга адресована историкам, краеведам, всем интересующимся проблемами местного государственного управления, а также историей Таврической губернии.

C’est la question que se posent de plus en plus d’observateurs dont l’un des plus écoutés est Andreas Umland, docteur en philosophie et spécialiste de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale. Sa série d’ouvrages « Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society » qu’il a publiée chez l’éditeur Ibidem (Stuttgart) en qualité d’expert auprès de l’Institut Ukrainien de Kiev, font de lui un commentateur éclairé des relations entre la Russie et l’Ukraine sur le sujet le plus sensible qui oppose les deux pays, en l’occurrence l’annexion de la Crimée. Une offensive russe que le président Vladimir Poutine légitime en l’assimilant à la réunification de l’Allemagne. Selon Andreas Umland, ces deux événements ne soutiennent pas la comparaison. Il en a expliqué les raisons dans une tribune publiée récemment par le magazine « Focus » que la plateforme d’informations indépendantes de langue allemande « ukraine-nachrichten » a jugé utile de relayer.

Le prince de Kiev Iaroslav le Sage (978-1054) ne pouvait pas imaginer la folie fratricide de ses lointains descendants en 2022. Il est aujourd'hui convoqué par la Russie comme l'Ukraine qui revendiquent son État, la Rous, comme source exclusive de leur légitimité historique. La guerre des récits historiques a précédé celle du champ de bataille… Depuis l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique, la Russie et l'Ukraine ont forgé des récits antagonistes de l'histoire. Néo-impérialiste dans un cas, nationaliste dans l'autre, ils ont alimenté un contentieux qu'utilise aujourd'hui Moscou pour justifier son agression. Ces relectures du passé se rejoignent cependant sur un point : le rejet de l'héritage communiste.

As tensions on the Russian-Ukrainian border grew, the difference between the two main Orthodox churches in Ukraine became clearer. While the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) spoke straightforwardly about the prospect of the Russian invasion and urged believers to protect their Homeland, the leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) remained silent up until recently. Several UOC-MP public figures and media outlets repeatedly dismissed the prospect of invasion as "hysteria" and accused the OCU of spreading panic in the interest of the West.

As a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its “hybrid war” in the Donbas, the present-day nonproliferation regime, with its exceptional treatment of the permanent Security Council members, could in the future, paradoxically, encourage rather than stem the construction or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

The conflict in Ukraine has altered the geopolitical configuration in Eurasia. The very beginning of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine’s internal affairs became the starting point of major geopolitical shifts in the region and in the world. Ukraine and later Syria became “points of no
return” – of Russia’s policy course transformation into a policy of essentially different quality, possibly with regard to the Central Asian region, too. The conflict began to de-escalate only about six months ago; however, the consequences of the Ukraine conflict still continue to
unfold in time and space.
Those consequences have affected all the Central Asian countries, but, especially, Kazakhstan, Russia’s geographical neighbor, with a strong division of public opinion, which was fraught with numerous dangers.
The principal consequences of the Ukraine conflict for Central Asia and Kazakhstan can be classified and described as follows...

The end of the “Cold War”, and thus the collapse of the Soviet Union caused, against predictions, further tensions, conflicts and disintegration. The most powerful countries, such as the USA, Russia, China, India, as well as international organizations (NATO, EU) started to create their own, new international order. The key to the future of Ukraine and its possible accession to NATO will be the actions to be undertaken by the Servant of the People, which has the majority in the Ukrainian Parliament, headed by President Volodymyr Zelensky. Nowadays, Ukraine’s territory is a stem of discord and the main reason for the destabilization of security in Central and Eastern Europe.

Підсумовуючи усе вищесказане, варто наголосити, що основним чинником модернізаційних процесів 1920-1930-х років був усе-таки зовнішній. Тому, враховуючи методологічні напрацювання російських істориків та їх практичні досягнення в дослідженні на основі концепції соціальної історії, потрібно підкреслити і сучасні політичні мотиви в їх діяльності. Вони спонукають науковців Росії відмовитися від негативного сприйняття сталінської моделі соціалізму. Категорична відмова визнати наявність тоталітаризму та перехід до “серединної” позиції у висвітленні історії 192О-1930-х рр. представників “об'єктивістського напрямку” може стати лише проміжним кроком у поверненні до традиційних імперських цінностей, месіанської ідеї та намагання нав'язувати російський досвід іншим державам світу. Адже теорія тоталітаризму відхиляється принципово, а не як єдино можлива у поясненні історії 1920 -193О-х рр. Така позиція може призвести в майбутньому до пояснення “народності” сталінського режиму та прогресивності примусової колективізації, масових репресій, голодомору тощо. Про певний рух у цьому напрямку свідчить проаналізований нами посібник для вузів під ред. А. Соколова. На “круглому столі” представників різних наукових закладів Росії він отримав загальне схвалення.

Ukrayna’daki 2019 Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinin irdelendiği bu özet-analizde, ilk olarak, seçimlerin gerçekleştiği ekonomik, toplumsal ve siyasal bağlamın anlaşılması için bunlarla ilgili olarak betimleyici olan bazı veriler sunulacaktır. Bunu takiben, 21 Nisan’daki ikinci tur seçimde yarışan görevdeki cumhurbaşkanı Petro Poroshenko ve seçilen cumhurbaşkanı Volodymyr Zelesnkiy’nin seçim propagandalarının esasını oluşturan tutum, söylem ve temalar incelenecektir. Bu inceleme, Ukraynalı seçmenin gerçek gündeminin ne olduğunun anlaşılmasını sağlayacaktır. Üçüncü olarak ise, seçim süreci ve sonunda ortaya çıkan ve EuroMaidan-sonrası Ukrayna’daki toplumsal ve siyasi dinamikleri gösteren sekiz olgudan bahsedilecektir. 

Özet-analizin ikinci bölümünde ise, cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerini takip eden kısa vadeli süreçte Ukrayna’da yaşanacağı anlaşılan önemli siyasal süreçlerden bahsedilecek ve son olarak Ukrayna ile alakalı uluslararası politikaya dair bazı gözlem ve tahminler okuyucuya sunulacaktır.

What the world is now witnessing in Ukraine is the cumulative effect of history and memory in the lives of the people of the region—and this book helps readers to understand those subjects. Centered in Kharkiv, a Russian-speaking city in eastern Ukraine, this is an oral history of a group of military colonels, their families, and their contemporaries, covering their lives from the 1960s through the post-Soviet transition. During this period, these military families went from comfortable economic circumstances, professional prestige, and political influence to destitution and disgrace in the 1990s. Based on the 3,000+ pages of Westrate’s interview transcripts and supplemented with materials gleaned from unprecedented access to personal, family, and institutional archives, this book investigates how families endured shifting social, cultural, and political realities. By analyzing the lives of individuals in context, Westrate provides insights from the grassroots level. He reveals how ideological, professional, gender, religious, ethnic, and national imperatives—as developed and transmitted by elites—were internalized, transformed, or rejected by the rank and file. In the process, he shows what those experiences have to offer the study of Soviet, post-Soviet, and transnational history. This study bridges the new boundaries created by the collapse of the USSR and examines the foundations of conflict in twenty-first century Ukraine.

analytical psychologist from Moscow talks about his thoughts about the traumatic collective processes in Russia and the world, about living in the wake of an injury of his participation in group-analytic conference in Potsdam, dedicated to Ukrainian-Russian-German understanding and common history of our nations.

Institutional and legal framework of cooperation between Ukraine and neighbouring countries was created in early 1990s. By now, many of the instruments are outdated and should be revised to face the challenges of geopolitical transformations in the
region and political processes within the states.
Although Ukraine has concluded cooperation agreements with all the neighbouring
states, many sensitive issues still remain on the bilateral agenda. The spectrum ranges from border demarcation and national minorities to national and energy security.
Ten different neighbours – Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Turkey – different challenges; ten young authors – different views, but a common view on the need for comprehensive approach.

Ukrainian politicians commonly say that the language issue only comes up during election campaigns, but then these same politicians have also come to blows in the parliament over this issue. This suggests that deep-seated and unresolved concerns lie at the heart of the language issue. To appreciate these we need to look at who actually uses which language, and the different cultural and political agendas behind one’s choice of language.

SSCB’nin 1991’de dağılmasıyla beraber pek çok devlet bağımsızlığını ilan etmiştir. Her ne kadar coğrafi bağımsızlıklarını elde etseler de eski kızıl devletlerin o tarihten bu yana siyasi olarak Rusya Federasyonu’na (RF) bağlılıkları devam edegelmiştir. Ukrayna Cumhuriyeti de siyasi bağımsızlığını kazanabilmek adına yoğun çaba harcamışsa da RF’nun himayesinden kurtulabilmeyi uzun yıllar başaramamıştır. 2004 yılına kadar Ukrayna idaresini elinde tutan Moskova yanlısı Kuçma iktidarının, bu süre zarfında ciddi ekonomik ve demokratik buhranlar yaşayan Ukrayna’da etkisi giderek zayıflamıştır. 2004 resmi seçimlerini Moskova yanlısı Yanukoviç kazansa bile renkli devrimlerin domino taşlarından biri olan Turuncu Devrim gerçekleşerek, AB yanlısı Yuşçenko yenilenen seçimleri kazanmıştır. Böylece Ukrayna, Rusya ve AB arasında belirgin olarak tarihinde ilk kez AB tarafını seçmiştir. Buna bağlı olarak perde arakasında devam eden Batı ve Rusya arasındaki II. Soğuk Savaş, Güney Osetya’dan Ukrayna’ya sıçramıştır. AB’nin Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasının bariz tezahürü olarak eski Doğu Bloğu devletlerinin AB’ye katılması, Rusya’nın Yakın Çevre Doktrinin sahada aktifleşmesine sebebiyet vermiştir. Özellikle 2007’de AB tarafından açıklanan Doğu Ortaklığı belgesi Rusya’yı alarma geçirerek kendisi için batı sınırı (Україна) olarak kabul ettiği Ukrayna’ya sahada müdahale hakkını kazandırmıştır. Rusya, Yevromaydan (Євромайдан) olayları sonrasında sahada belirgin ölçüde ağırlığını hissettirmiş, fiilen sıcak çatışmada yer alarak Ukrayna özelinde diğer eski Sovyet ülkelerine de adeta sopasını göstermiştir. RF, Yeşil adamlar (зелёные челове́чки) olarak nitelendirilen “Rus milisleri aktif olarak hem Kırım’da hem de Doğu Ukrayna’da desteklemiştir. Bu çalışma, RF’nin Kırım işgali öncesi Ukrayna Cumhuriyeti ile olan ilişkilerini inceleyecektir. Bununla beraber Batı ülkeleri ve Türkiye’nin Kırım’ın ilhakı ve Doğu Ukrayna’daki sıcak çatışmalar sonrası aldığı ekonomik ve diplomatik reaksiyonlar da çalışmanın konusunu oluşturacaktır.