Transcendental Phenomenology

Mothers play a vital function in fostering the early learning opportunities of children, and early learning opportunities are considered to be strong and independent predictors of future academic success. Very few studies, however, have looked into the practices and experiences of mothers in early literacy instruction. Anchored in family literacy theory, emergent literacy theory, and early literacy theory, this qualitative study used transcendental phenomenological design to explore the early literacy practices and experiences of 8 mothers in the southernmost part of Eastern Samar as inputs for future educational intervention. Employing Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen's method of analysis, the in-depth interviews revealed 4 themes: mother's use of strategies, the desire to learn and the need for intervention, goal-setting during early literacy instruction, and outcomes of early literacy instruction. The study concluded that mothers see the significance of early literacy instruction so they struggle to improve the skill. However, since their expertise is so limited, there is a need for educational institutions to help them.

Among the estimated 100,000 Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) working in the United States, a small group of Filipino teachers may have lasting impacts on one of the most important pillars of the nation: its public schools. Thus, it is important to understand the lived experiences of Filipino teachers teaching in Texas. This research aimed to contribute to existing literature that explores the lived experiences and the acculturation process of Filipino teachers. Utilizing a transcendental phenomenological approach, seven such teachers were selected through snowball sampling and were interviewed. The findings of the study showed their shared experiences revolved around four themes: their search for greener pastures, the challenges they faced teaching in the US, the support systems that helped them adapt and acculturate, and their perceived differences between Filipino and US values and culture. While most of the findings correlate with existing literature, the experiences shared about extreme microaggression and the magnitude of the mental health effects it brought upon the participants were surprising findings that add to the reviewed literature.

Objective – The main objective of this study is to explore the meaning of voluntary tax compliance by a person after they are granted tax amnesty. Methodology/Technique – This research is qualitative research and uses a transcendental phenomenology method. Findings – The results show that tax compliance does not automatically increase after a grant of tax amnesty. The reason for this is the fact that taxpayers wish to avoid being tax audited. Tax amnesty is therefore not yet useful in build trust in the tax authority. Tax authorities need to convince the public that tax amnesty creates justice for all taxpayers. The power of the tax authority is useful to strengthen law enforcement measures. Furthermore, fundamental moral and ethical considerations based on internalization, spirituality and religion tend to improve taxpayers' honesty. Novelty – The trust and power of a tax authority that is in line with taxpayers' honesty is fundamental voluntary to tax compliance. The results of this research demonstrate the need for new tax policies to increase voluntary tax compliance.

Objective – The main objective of this study is to explore the meaning of voluntary tax compliance by a person after they are granted tax amnesty. Methodology/Technique – This research is qualitative research and uses a transcendental phenomenology method. Findings – The results show that tax compliance does not automatically increase after a grant of tax amnesty. The reason for this is the fact that taxpayers wish to avoid being tax audited. Tax amnesty is therefore not yet useful in build trust in the tax authority. Tax authorities need to convince the public that tax amnesty creates justice for all taxpayers. The power of the tax authority is useful to strengthen law enforcement measures. Furthermore, fundamental moral and ethical considerations based on internalization, spirituality and religion tend to improve taxpayers' honesty. Novelty – The trust and power of a tax authority that is in line with taxpayers' honesty is fundamental voluntary to tax compliance. The resul...

I argue that there is a confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity inherent to the structure of average everydayness in Being and Time. I support this reading by recasting Heidegger's notion of fallenness in Being and Time in terms of its precursor, ruinance, which he introduces in his 1921-22 lecture course, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research (GA 61). In this lecture course, Heidegger explains that ruinance is constituted by a dual movement of relucence and prestruction: the former, an intentional openness to the world; the latter, a securing that conceals that openness. While this dual movement is not expressed explicitly in these terms in Being and Time, I show that it is nevertheless tacitly operative in the structure of falling and that it grounds the duality of average everydayness. I frame this study around the debate on how Dasein can be authentic despite its fallenness, given that fallenness paradoxically renders Dasein essentially inauthentic.

This paper critically examines the philosophical foundations of Colin Wilson's New Existentialism. I will show how Wilson's writings promoted a phenomenological strategy for understanding states of ecstatic affirmation within so-called 'peak experiences'. Wilson subsequently attempted to use the life affirming insights bestowed by peak states to establish an ontological ground for values to serve as a foundation for his New Existentialism. Because of its psychological focus however, I argue that Wilson's New Existentialism contains an ambivalent framework for establishing ontological categories, which leads his thought into theoretical difficulties. More precisely, Wilson's strategy runs into problems in coherently integrating its explicitly psychological interpretation of Husserl's theory of intentionality within a broader, and philosophically coherent, phenomenological framework. Wilson's psychological reading of Husserl's transcendental reduction, for example, manifests tensions in how it reconciles the empirical basis of acts of transcendence with an essentialist conception of the self as a transcendental ego. The above tensions, I argue, ultimately render the New Existentialism susceptible to criticism from a Husserlian-transcendental perspective. After outlining a Husserlian critique of Wilson's position, I end the paper by suggesting how some of the central insights of the New Existentialism might help to bridge the gap that persists between pure phenomenological description and metaphysics.

While embodiment is crucial for Husserl’s theory of perception and his account of empathy, it is also the beating heart of his transcendental philosophy. For Husserl, there is neither a purely formal transcendental ego, nor pure forms of intuition. Transcendental subjectivity must necessarily be embodied to make (spatially and temporally concordant) experience possible and thereby to guarantee an objective perception of the world and of others. This article will discuss three dimensions of normality and objectivity as embodied space. It will start by introducing the double constitution of the body as both Leib and Körper, which defines the primordial spatiality of embodiment. It will then highlight the general necessity of a sensing and moving body for the constitution of space and for a concordant and optimal disclosure of the world. The third part explains embodiment in terms of concrete subjectivity, hence articulating the relevance of the body for habitually inhabiting the world and for developing a concordant and stable identity. Finally, the role of the body for intersubjective normality and objectivity will be interrogated. Embodiment, as I will argue, must firstly be understood as a general transcendental condition of every possible experience and objectivity. Secondly, it must be understood as a genetic condition of individual (and intersubjective) experience, that is, as concrete a priori. As such, embodiment dictates the experience of individual subjects and corresponds to a habitual style of experience.

Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences | Vol. 2 - 2 - 2021 | 310-316

Este artigo foi lido em um Simpósio sobre Fenomenologia e Existencialismo organizado pela Divisão Oeste da Associação Filosófica Americana para seu Encontro Anual na Universidade de Wisconsin, em Madison, a 30 de abril de 1959. Dois artigos sobre o mesmo tema, de William Earle (Universidade do Noroeste) e Maurice Natanson (Universidade da Carolina do Norte), seguiram-no. [N.T.] A primeira edição impressa deste artigo foi publicada pelo Journal of Philosophy, vol. 57, n. 2 (21. Jan, 1960), pp. 62-74

The transcendental reduction is a fundamental method for Husserl’s phenomenology. More precisely, the transcendental reduction is the phenomenological method leading to transcendental subjectivity and its correlate “the world.” As such, it establishes the field of transcendental phenomenology as a universal science. However, this is a very general understanding which remains rather abstract. ―This thesis is an attempt to understand what it means more concretely. My hypothesis is that there is a constant philosophical telos [τέλος] leading the various transcendental reduction’s expositions, i.e., there is a coherent idea of philosophy motivating the execution of the reduction. Despite all the new attempts to make clear the method, and all the new acquisitions enriching his writings, Husserl keeps the same philosophical ambitions ―those of “universal philosophy.” Over the years, Husserl presented the transcendental reduction in many ways. He referred to these various attempts as “paths” (Wege). The mainstream classification recognizes at least three paths. 1) The Cartesian way 2) The psychological way and 3) The life-world’s way. However, the discussion about the number and validity of the paths is still open. Patricio Perkins has provided a set of criteria to classify the transcendental reduction’s diverse interpretations. I would like to propose a different but compatible criterion. ―What we consider the philosophical relevance of the transcendental being conditions our understanding of the diverse paths’ coherence and the method as such. The additional criterion I am proposing is viable because by understanding the transcendental reduction we deal simultaneously with two issues: 1) The transcendental reduction as the method for disclosing the transcendental field. 2) The transcendental reduction as a method to begin to philosophize. Within this method subsist concrete philosophical ambitions and with them a peculiar idea of what does it mean to philosophize. Making clear the latter requires significant efforts. And yet, our understanding of the transcendental reduction is directly affected by our, vague or thorough, explicit or latent, understanding of (Husserlian) philosophy’s purpose. That said, I will proceed as follows: This thesis has three sections. Firstly, I will present the Cartesian way to the transcendental reduction in Ideas I (1913), stressing the “Epilogue” (1930) and the method’s two simultaneous issues. Secondly, I will elaborate on the psychological path in “The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article” (1927-1928) and “The Amsterdam Lectures (On) Phenomenological Psychology” (1928). I will insist on the universalistic ambitions of the transcendental reduction. Finally, I will address the continuity of Husserl’s philosophical goals in The Crisis of the European Sciences (1934-38). As well, I will consider the problem of Husserlian Cartesianism. I will analyze how critiques against the Cartesian way rest not only on remarks about transcendentality but also on remarks about philosophical aspirations.

Wenn wir Husserls Epoché ernst nehmen und alles Weltlich-Mundane außer Kraft setzten, scheint es, als könnten wir in der transzendentalen Einstellung nicht mehr von uns als Menschen sprechen, da der für Husserl weltliche Term "Mensch" die transzendentale Sphäre mit Mundanem "kontaminieren" würde, was zu einer ungerechtfertigten Überschreitung der Grenzen des durch die Reduktion abgesteckten Gegenstandsbereiches führen würde. Was aber heißt das für das Verhältnis des Menschen (bzw. des mundanen Ich) zu dem in der Epoché in den Blick kommenden transzendentalen Subjekt? Die Frage, mit der sich der Vortrag beschäftigen wird, ist, aus welcher Perspektive Husserls Einsicht, dass das mundane und das transzendentale ego lediglich zwei verschiedene Perspektiven auf ein Identisches sind, erscheinen kann. So scheint diese Erkenntnis weder in der natürlichen noch in der transzendentalen Einstellung zugänglich zu sein, da erstere insofern naiv ist, als sie nichts von dem transzendentalen ego weiß und da, umgekehrt, in letzterer das mundane ego aufgrund der Epoché in Klammern stehen muss. Bezüglich des Verhältnisses von transzendentalem und mundanem Subjekt werde ich die These vertreten, dass es, zum einen, keineswegs so ist, dass das natürliche Ich gar nichts vom transzendentalen ego weiß und dass, zum anderen, Husserls Konzeption der "Selbstmundanisierung" des transzendentalen Subjekts klar macht, dass das mundane Ich in der transzendentalen Einstellung zwar zunächst eingeklammert werden muss, aber nur um dann mit transzendentaler Notwendigkeit zu erscheinen. Insofern die Phänomenologie bezüglich des Verhältnisses von transzendentalem und mundanem Subjekt versucht, immer nur eins vom anderen aus zu verstehen, lässt sie sich als ein im weitesten Sinn hermeneutischer Grenzgang zwischen der Sphäre der Transzendentalität und der Mundanität verstehen, wobei die ursprüngliche Einheit des transzendentalen und empirischen Ich im aktuellen Erlebnis des Einstellungswechsels erscheint.

Heidegger engaged in a number of attempts to reformulate transcendental philosophy, such as in terms of fundamental ontology and world-disclosure in the second half of the 1920s, so as to break with it. An early attempt to disentangle himself from the transcendental tradition can be seen in his early post-war turn toward existence- and life-philosophy and hermeneutics, and also in his so-called “turning” (Kehre) in the mid-1930s. In this chapter I argue that, despite his anti-transcendental gestures and rhetoric, and Husserl’s view that he had betrayed transcendental philosophy for the sake of philosophical anthropology, Heidegger could not consistently abandon or overcome the problematic of transcendental philosophy through his displacement of the constitution of sense and meaning from the subject (Dasein) and its horizon of meaning to the event and openness of being (Sein), as advocates of his later thinking have claimed.

The chapter discusses Quentin Meillassoux's recent interpretation and critique of Heidegger's philosophical position, which he describes as "strong correlationism." It emphasizes the fact that Meillassoux situates Heidegger in the post-Kantian tradition of  transcendental idealism that he defines in terms of a focus on the correlation between being and thinking. It is argued that Meillassoux's "speculative" attempt to overcome the Kantian philosophical framework in the name of absolute contingency should be understood as a further development and dialectical overcoming of its ultimate contemporary form, the Heideggerian philosophy of finitude.

The problem of metaphysics counted as a crucial field for Husserl throughout his entire philosophical career, both as the ultimate science of reality and the discipline of the “highest and ultimate questions” (cf. e.g. Trizio 2019). In my presentation I would like to show, how Husserl’s “transcendental turn” around 1906/07 influenced his metaphysical ambitions. It helped him in a crucial manner to articulate a phenomenologically grounded metaphysics, and in particular it made him possible to elaborate a phenomenologically articulated notion of God. This conception implied a peculiar proof of the existence of God in Husserl, which was never explicitly developed by him, but whose main steps could be clearly found in his writings. The most important elements of this argument could be found in texts that stemmed between 1906 and 1914. The main focus of my presentation will be to reconstruct this argument.
A fundamental feature of his transcendental idealism, that enabled him to create a phenomenologically rearticulated notion of God, was the supposed strong metaphysical connection between consciousness and Being. The cornerstone of this argument is Husserl’s conception according to which “the idea of an actually existing thing prescribes that there should be an actually experiencing consciousness too” (Husserl 2003, p. 77). The next main step of this argument is that the intentional structure of constituting consciousness refers to an infinite horizon of phenomena, in the end, to an actually infinite phenomenal world. The third important part is that – in Husserl’s opinion – the transcendental consciousness could unfold in an objective manner an infinite number of axiological potentialities and realities in the world, which are increasing in their perfection and refers to the ideal of ultimate excellence. The final step is Husserl’s claim, according to which we need an actually infinite mind (God) as a guarantee that the infinite reality – with its axiological aspect – could be constituted and conceived in a coherent and unitary way through the finite forms of subjectivity.

The phenomenon of ‘Knowing’ (Tib. Shes pa; Skt. Jñāna) has a crucial role in Buddhist explanations about the determination of individual realities. According to these explanations particular modes of knowing are connected to specific ways of perceiving and, even, constituting reality. As the ideal state of reality according to Buddhist doctrine is that of an unconditioned liberation, numerous traditions have examined and described the mode of knowing which characterizes such a state. Among these, we find several traditions that related such a mode with a claim concerning the innateness of an unconditioned state. This paper is meant to discuss some of these traditions, mainly ‘The Great Perfection’ (Tib. rDzogs pa chen po), a Tibetan non-dual tradition that asserted a mode of primordial knowing which is present in each moment of awareness. By discussing the intuitive qualities of this mode, we aim to show how an inherent mode of non-dual awareness can be explained through a comprehensive description of the basic aspects of lived experience.

Die Familienähnlichkeiten zwischen kantischer und phänomenologischer Transzendentalphilosophie sind leicht konstatiert. Viel schwieriger ist es allerdings, sie genau in ihrer Übereinstimmung und Verschiedenheit zu benennen. Das Thema der Anschauungsformen bietet dazu eine Gelegenheit, die viele dieser Schwierigkeiten deutlich zu Tage treten lässt. Allgemein gesprochen, handelt es sich um ein gemeinsames Sachfeld, das aber methodisch und aufgrund gewisser begrifflicher Vorentscheidungen verschieden in den Blick kommt. Ich möchte im ersten Teil des Textes zeigen, wie groß die Unterschiede vor allem hinsichtlich der methodischen Zugänge sind, um dann im zweiten Teil die Sachprobleme wieder zueinander zu führen. Dabei beziehe ich mich im ersten Teil hauptsächlich auf Husserl, am Rande auch auf Heidegger, und deren Aufnahme und Kritik von Kants Konzeption der Anschauungsformen. Der zweite Teil setzt sich mit Kants „Widerlegung des Idealismus“ auseinander und liest diese quer mit Husserls Analysen zum inneren Zeitbewusstsein.

The treatment of the question of transcendental idealism mirrors the different self-understandings of phenomenology in the 21st century. While in the context of French phenomenology it has been announced that “idealism is overcome” (Tengelyi) by a phenomenology of meaning-events, in the context of philosophy of mind, Husserl’s philosophy is appreciated as the most thought-out form of a “supervenience-idealism” (Meixner). It is clear that Husserl’s anti-representational theory of intentionality is not to be confused with any other “garden varieties” of idealism, but does that mean that we should better avoid the term altogether (Zahavi) and only talk about “the transcendental”? The paper wants to get clear about this question by sharply contrasting Kant’s transcendental idealism with Husserl’s transcendental idealism. The decisive difference is that for Kant appearance has its ground in something which is absolutely independent of experience, which makes him a “fundamental realist” (Allais) apart from his empirical realism; Husserl, by contrast, who argues that transcendentally reduced consciousness has “no outside” anymore, insists that the “thing in itself” is a “counter-sensical” thought. My thesis is thus that it is a misunderstanding to believe that in phenomenology there is a similar potential for drawing a limit against metaphysics as there is in Kant’s conception of the transcendental. Is such a limitation nevertheless necessary? And is it maybe implied in genetic phenomenology which claims that subjectivity develops in its interaction with the world and other subjects? While I do not agree that phenomenology’s idealistic constellation is tied to a “sovereign subject” and that relocating the constitutional force on other side of the correlation could solve the “problem,” I believe that we have to take seriously the transcendental stakes in phenomenology, which, in the form of a “strong correlationism” (Meillassoux), is still the best line of defense against a naturalization of consciousness, the world and intersubjectivity.

There are three problems with Husserlian transcendental phenomenology: (1) What does it mean to be transcendental? Namely, how different is Husserl's version from Kant's? And is transcendentality necessarily idealistic, subjective (considering what Pradelle (2012) and Schnell (2020) depicted as "beneath subjectivity")? (2) Why is it legitimate to adopt a transcendental stance (instead of naturalism)? Can we provide arguments instead of claims? (3) How should Husserlians continue with transcendentalism in a fruitful and legitimate manner? Whilst restriction on the classical self-reflection renders the anti-anthropological Husserl paradoxically accused of anthropocentrism in biosemiotics, too much methodological freedom results in unexaminable speculations about affecter (Ding an sich, God or Life). This article attempts to offer a unified answer to these questions with a focus on the second one. Two arguments can be reconstructed for Husserlian transcendentalism. The first one is the rejection of mental causation: Were consciousness causally acting upon the world or acted upon by the world, then it should be located within the same objective real space as the object, which means the consciousness itself should be objective. The ridiculous result inconsistent with our experience shows that intentionality is not located within real space-time but encompasses the latter as a part of its intentional correlate-thus it 'transcends' the latter and is transcendental. The second argument is from the irreality of meaning: linguistic form in natural language appears to be more irreal than physical reality, not because it is eidetic, idealised or superimposed upon the latter, but because intentionality is made more explicit than at the empirical level. Hence, we obtain a sense of transcendentality in terms of intentionality, but this definition is not limited to the studies of sense-bestow (Bernet 2015) but includes whatever transcends real space-time in such a manner. If the rejection of mental causation forbids any attempt to reintroduce an affecter of givenness (Loidolt 2015), then one should reduce the talk of spontaneity, receptivity and automaticity to the determining relation between consciousness: whilst spontaneity and receptivity are asymmetrical determinations (contingencies), automaticity is the symmetrical regularity. What Pradelle and Schnell termed "pre-subjective" is in fact neutrally subjective, the middle voice.

Approaches to the naturalization of phenomenology usually understand naturalization as a matter of rendering continuous the methods, epistemologies, and ontologies of phenom-enological and natural scientific inquiry. Presupposed in this statement of the problematic, however, is that there is an original discontinuity, a rupture between phenomenology and the natural sciences that must be remedied. I propose that this way of thinking about the issue is rooted in a simplis-tic understanding of the phenomenological reduction that entails certain assumptions about the subject matter of phenomenology and its relationship to the natural sciences. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty's first work, The Structure of Behavior, presents a radically different approach to the phenomenological reduction, one that traverses the natural sciences and integrates them into phenomenology from the outset. I outline the argument for this position in The Structure of Behavior and then discuss consequences for current methodological issues surrounding the naturalization of phenomenology, focusing on the relationship between empirical sciences of mind, phenomenological psychology, and transcendental phenomenology. This novel exegesis of Merleau-Ponty's view on the reduction offers new insight into his oft-quoted remark that the phenomenological reduction is impossible to complete.

This paper was named European Journal of Philosophy's 2019 Prize Essay in Transcendental Philosophy.

By extending Husserl’s own historico-critical study to include the conceptual mathematics of more contemporary times – specifically category theory and its emphatic development since the second half of the 20th century – this paper claims that the delineation between mathematics and philosophy must be completely revisited. It will be contended that Husserl’s phenomenological work was very much influenced by the discoveries and limitations of the formal mathematics being developed at Göttingen during his tenure there and that, subsequently, the rôle he envisaged for his material a priori science is heavily dependent upon his conception of the definite manifold. Motivating these contentions is the idea of a mathematics which would go beyond the constraints of formal ontology and subsequently achieve coherence with the full sense of transcendental phenomenology. While this final point will be by no means proven within the confines of this paper it is hoped that the very fact of opening up for the possibility of such an idea will act as a supporting argument to the overriding thesis that the relationship between mathematics and phenomenology must be problematised.

This text will appear shortly (spring/summer 2017) in the online Journal “Metodo”
http://www.metodo-rivista.eu/index.php/metodo
as an addendum to the special issue “On the Transcendental”
http://www.metodo-rivista.eu/index.php/metodo/issue/view/11/showToc
The responses of the colleagues I am referring to (Julia Jansen and Vittorio de Palma), will also be published in this addendum.
For the final pagination, please refer to the original online-source at Metodo.

This book offers a broad critical study of Heidegger's lifelong effort to come to terms with the problem of phenomena and the nature of phenomenology: How do we experience beings as meaningful phenomena? What does it mean to phenomenologically describe and explicate our experience of phenomena?

The book is a chronological investigation of how Heidegger's struggle with the problem of phenomena unfolds during the main stages of his philosophical development: from the early Freiburg lecture courses 1919-1923, over the Marburg-period and the publication of Being and Time in 1927, up to his later thinking stretching from the 1930s to the early 1970s. A central theme of the book is the tension between, on the one hand, Heidegger's effort to elaborate Husserl's phenomenological approach by applying it to our pre-theoretical experience of existentially charged phenomena, and, on the other hand, his drive towards a radically historicist form of thinking. Heidegger's main critical engagements with Husserl are examined and assessed along the way.

Besides offering a new comprehensive interpretation of Heidegger's philosophical development, the book critically examines the philosophical power and problems of Heidegger's successive attempts to account for the structure of phenomena and the possibility of phenomenology. In particular, it develops a critique of Heidegger's radical historicism, arguing that it ultimately makes Heidegger unable to account either for the truth of our understanding or for the ethical-existential significance of other persons. The book also contains a chapter which probes the philosophical commitments that motivate Heidegger's political engagement in National Socialism.

Publication date: February 2020
288 Pages

Purchase online:
https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/heidegger-and-the-problem-of-phenomena-9781350086470/

Read a preview:
https://bloomsburycp3.codemantra.com/viewer/5e4c03a352faff00016b0234

In the 1970s the Chilean biologist Francisco Varela developed a systems theory of life as autopoietic, or self-creating, on the formal basis of the mathematician George Spencer-Brown's 1969 book Laws of Form. Although Varela saw the great power and simplicity of Spencer-Brown' s calculus, he appropriated Spencer-Brown's calculus by adding a third law to the original two laws of form. This law makes self-reference explicit, and I'll argue that it is a redundant addition because self-reference is already implied by indication. The addition of this redundancy has the effect of separating the transcendental realm of constitutive operations from the natural realm of effects. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life as ontopoiesis, on the other hand, succeeds in developing a theory of life on the formal ontological basis prepared by Husserl's phenomenology, transcendental logic, and the living tradition of a mathesis universalis. Tymieniecka's phenomenological theory of life is a breakthrough to life's inner workings, and rests on an ontologically robust foundation. By drawing attention to the calculus behind the calculus, I hope to initiate the interpretation of Spencer-Brown's calculus of indications as an important manifestation of the mathesis universalis, and apply the interpretation to the place prepared by Tymieniecka's phenomenology of ontopoiesis.

This paper presents a phenomenological analysis of the argument in The First Discourse of Part 2 of Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination. Specifically, this argument is considered with regard to temporal extension of its logos,  i.e., the succession of logical steps. Contrary to traditional views of Suhrawardī as a Neoplatonizing proponent of the primacy of essence over existence, the steps of his argument convey a much more nuanced picture in which  light  emerges as the main metaphysical principle. First, Suhrawardī explicates full evidentiality in visible light (which is the most patent,  ’aẓhar, from the Arabic root ẓ-h-r = ‘to appear, be [made] manifest’): this light  gives us the world as “this-there”;  and second, as self-evidentiality (ẓuhūru-hu, ‘being obvious to itself by itself’) in the first-person consciousness of the knower.nce  Suhrawardī accesses these modes by reduction(s) which liberate the transcendental character of light.  The correlation in evidential mode of light between the knower and the objects  serves as a ground for the claims of transcendental unity of the self and the world,  and as a condition of possibility for knowledge. A juxtaposition of this approach with the phenomenological philosophy suggests that in Suhrawardī’s analysis, evidentiality of visual light plays a role of a new universal a priori. I show that under the phenomenological reduction, this a priori participates in constitution of ontological validities; and within the transcendental empiricism of the physics of light, this a priori underlies  the construction of causality. Thereby, the Philosophy of Illumination suggests a new horizon of entry into the transcendental phenomenological philosophy. The paper also contains a justification of a phenomenological reading of Suhrawardī’s work, including explanation of the historical reduction.

Tradução do Inglês:

Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trad. (alemão) de F. Kersten (The Hague [u.a.]: Springer, 1982), 51-52.

O 27º parágrafo de Ideias Referentes a uma Fenomenologia Pura e a uma Filosofia Fenomenológica, de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), livro primeiramente publicado em 1913, intitula-se “O Mundo da Atitude Natural: Eu e o Meu Mundo Circundante”. Insere-se no 1º capítulo, “A Posição que Pertence à Atitude Natural e a sua Exclusão”,  da 2ª parte da obra, “As Considerações Fundamentais para a Fenomenologia”.

Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in transcendental philosophy, sparked by debates surrounding the question of the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. However, it is often the case that these debates fail to appreciate the alterations that the notion of " the transcendental " has undergone since Kant first introduced his system of transcendental idealism. The paper intends to critically examine some of these changes, arguing that Husserl's " transcendental turn " , although significantly altering Kant's original conception, remained faithful to the project of transcendentalism and wrought in its wake important resources for Merleau-Ponty's subsequent elaborations. The central part of the paper takes us through three conceptions — from Kant's " transcendentalism of faculties " , through Husserl's " transcendentalism of pure consciousness " , to Merleau-Ponty's " transcendentalism of the flesh " — arguing that they constitute a coherent transcendentalist " thought style ". In the final section , we claim that these progressive alterations in the meaning of the transcendental project can shed light on the debate about the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. We do this by providing a notion of the transcendental that makes room for the " truth of naturalism " , while simultaneously insisting on the necessity of a reverse (and supplementary) movement, namely that of phenomenalizing (" transcendentalizing ") nature.

Phenomenology has largely agreed on conceiving consciousness as an openness and an "outwardness." Only Husserl's "monadology," which alone by its name suggests a certain enclosedness, does not seem to fit into the picture and is consequently neglected or attacked in the literature. In order to gain a fresh view on this difficult piece of Husserl's phenomenology, I read it in terms of what he calls "absolute world-interpretation": an intentional interpretation all the way down. I claim that this is a consequent attitude following from his conception of transcendental intersubjectivity and that it faces no more severe ontological consequences than Merleau-Ponty's version of phenomenology, whose arguments against the transcendental reduction, the hyle, the certainty of the cogito, and the immanence of consciousness I reexamine. Furthermore, I promote an understanding of monadology that does not contradict the outwardness of consciousness but rather views it from the angle of the being-in-one-another of plural consciousnesses.

Starting from two contradictory claims regarding whether realist phenomenologists accepted Husserl’s transcendental reduction, I will try to show that these ones are about two different points of view on Husserl’s idealism. The first one, which I call the epistemological one, refuses transcendental reduction because it limits the phenomenological inquiry; the second one, which I call the ontological one, accepts the reduction for the very opposite reason, but rejects the theory of the pure Ego since it is non-phenomenological. I will show that these two point of view arose in two different period of Husserl’s thought evolution and that they can live together, even though they are irreducible. In doing that I provide a brief history of the idealism-realism controversy, through which I aim at clarifying some crucial points of this history.

The present paper offers a reconstruction of Husserl's understanding of Kant's transcendental philosophy, notably, of the function of the "synthesis of reproduction" in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, based upon a series of 1907-1909 manuscripts now published in Hua VII. After clarifying the wider theoretical framework within which Husserl reads Kant here, the present paper makes the case for holding the distinction between two different forms of rationality (the transcendental rationality and the ontological one), hence their relevant articulation, to be the real issue at the center of Husserl's Auseinandersetzung with the thinker of Königsberg.

In this paper the importance of Husserl’s concepts of the living body and embodiment will be investigated regarding his work of The Crisis. Further on will be shown that Husserl’s concept of embodiment leads to a better understanding of ‘The crisis of the European sciences and, secondly a better understanding of transcendental phenomenology itself’.
In this paper the theme of the animate body forms a centre-point in seeing a key difference between a phenomenological and a scientific methodology.First, I introduce some of Husserl’s concepts. Then Husserl’s concept of the embodiment will be briefly explained in this paper from within his Ideas II. I focus on the distinction between Leib and Körper, double articulation of tactile sensations and kinesthesis. Thirdly, a global view of Husserl’s project in The Crisis and a revision of the concept of embodiment will be given. Finally, given the above, I will explain how exactly Husserl’s concept of embodiment fits his project of The Crisis and how this gives a clearer view of what problem exactly the crisis of the European sciences brings forth and how Husserl himself and transcendental phenomenology try to resolve that.

Entgegenwärtigung bei Husserl und Fink:

In der vorliegenden Abhandlung zielt der Verfasser darauf ab, sozusagen „Nähe und Distanz“ zwischen dem späten Husserl und frühen Fink kurz darzustellen. Hierbei gilt der Begriff „Entgegenwärtigung“ als Leitfaden unserer Analyse. Denn darin sieht man deutlich, wie sich Fink, der noch etwa 25 Jahr alt war, von Husserl auf einer entscheidenden Weise „distanziert“. Während Husserl unter diesem ungewöhlichen Ausdruck das Phänomen der „intentionalen Verweisungen“ in ihrer zeitlich identifizierenden Funktion versteht, stellt Fink die These auf, dass es das ursprüngliche Phänomen gibt, das der „intentionalen Verweisung“ zugrundliegt. Das nennt Fink „Entgegenwärtigung“, die sich als „Zugangsbewußtsein zu den Zeithorizonten“ charakterisieren läßt. Diese „Entgegenwärtigung“ eröffnet als „Zugangsbewußtsein“ die manigfaltigen Zeithorizonten bzw. „Welten“ in ihrer mannigfaltigen Zeitlichkeit, in denen wir leben.

（本論において筆者は、晩年のフッサールの思想と初期フィンクの思想のあいだに認められる、いわば「近さと隔たり」を簡潔に提示することを試みる。この課題の遂行に際して、「脱現在化」という概念が手引きとなる。というのも、この概念の検証を通じて、フィンク―25歳に漸く達しようかという頃のフィンク―とフッサールのある決定的な「隔たり」を明瞭に見て取ることができるからである。フッサールがこの「脱現在化」という聞き馴れない表現でもって、時間的同一化綜合の働きとしての「志向的指示」現象のことを考えているのに対して、フィンクは、このような「志向的指示」を基礎づける根源的な現象というものがあると主張する。そのような根源的な現象のことを「脱現在化」であるとフィンクは呼び、この「脱現在化」とは、「時間地平への接近意識」であると性格づけている。このような「接近意識」としての「脱現在化」は、われわれ自身がそのうちに生きている多様な時間地平あるいは時間的多様性としての「世界」への開けの意識のことである。）

""The aim of the present paper is to shed light on the development of Husserl’s transcendental idealism from a viewpoint of the metaphysics of modality. I shall argue for the claim that relevant texts of Husserl from 1907 to 1920s can be understood as a document of a move from possibilism to actualism, to put it in today’s terminology. This means that Husserl initially holds the possibilist claim that all the possible worlds are ontologically on par with this actual world, but later he comes to regard the actual world as ontologically distinctive.
The reference to the contemporary notions indeed invites a potential danger of mismatching. While debates between possibilism and actualism presuppose realism about the world (or worlds, for some philosophers) and worldly entities, Husserl, at least, never leaves such a presupposition unexamined. Every commentator would agree that what is important for him is to bracket the world(s) and worldly entities and see how they are constituted in consciousness, whatever the phrase “constituted in consciousness” might mean.
Despite such a risk, however, considerations from a modal-metaphysical viewpoint seem to have a considerable relevance. Husserl himself talks about the plurality of worlds when he discusses transcendental idealism (cf. III/1, 100; XXXVI, 52n, 112, 119, 120, 137, 140, 186). Therefore it is quite appropriate to ask about the difference between this actual world and the rest according to him. In fact, such an approach helps us to make better sense of Husserl’s transcendental idealism and its philosophical significance. This is what I hope to show through the discussion summarized as follows:
(1) In the early transcendental idealism established around 1908, Husserl conceives the totality of ideally possible Erlebnisse and their intentional correlates as the field of phenomenological investigations. With the help of this peculiar possibilism, a detailed formulation is to be given to the notion of the constitution in consciousness.
(2) The early transcendental idealism leads Husserl to a difficulty. While he needs the constitutional analysis of the actuality [Wirklichkeit] possessed by this actual world and this-worldly entities, he has to maintain his possibilist framework, in which no distinctive feature is given to them. To conciliate these two contentions, Husserl proposes to analyse the “essence of the ‘actuality’” (III/1, 312) i.e. the essential feature shared by every “possible actual world,” as it were. In pursuing such an analysis later in a manuscript in 1914 or 1915, however, he comes to a very implausible conlusion. Because he explicates the essence of theactuality in terms of the actuality [Aktualität] of embodied experience, he has to hold that necessarily, at least one embodied consious being like humans exists in the world. In contrast, Husserl’s later position in 1920s is no longer fraught with this difficulty, because then he has abandoned his previous possibilism, regarding the actuality as something that only this world and this-worldly entities have.
(3) As a concluding remark, the two positions of Husserl is briefly examined against the backdrop of contemporary debates in the metaphysics of modality.
""

Corrections: P. 2, l. 2: Replace "Siders" by "Sider". P. 11, l. 8-9: Delete ", even if the presence of that tiny piece may provide a physical explanation".
Abstract: Husserl’s conception of the constitution of reality has it that there are layers of reality which are more basic than others, as far as their constitution in consciousness is concerned. The view that reality is structured in such a way that some of its elements depend on other, more fundamental ones is also held by proponents of more recent analytic (meta-)metaphysics, but in connection with a rather dogmatic naturalism. I will begin by explaining Husserl’s conception of constitution. This requires us to go into the motives that led him to “transcendental idealism” to some extent, a position which it may be helpful to compare to (some aspects of) what Hilary Putnam calls internal realism (section 2). It will become clear that as it stands Husserl’s position is not well-argued and less than convincing, but that it can be modified so as to yield a more persuasive view, which can also be used to give substance to (the more plausible aspects of) internal realism. Finally, I will indicate how the claim that Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological analyses provide a non-naïve alternative to today’s naturalistic mainstream meta-metaphysics (to be sketched in section 1) can be substantiated further. To this end, I shall briefly sketch his analysis of the constitution of nature as conceived of in physical (as well as cognitive) science, as developed in the second volume of his work Ideas (Ideas II) (section 3).

Corijn van Mazijk, University of Groningen / KU Leuven - Please cite only from the original version.

Abstract: This paper focuses on the contents of perception in Kant’s first Critique and Husserl’s later writings. Both Kant and Husserl are known for their appeal to synthesis in their transcendental accounts of perceptual experience and objective judgment. Especially regarding Kant, the precise nature of perceptual synthesis has recently been the cause of much debate. Whereas some argue that for Kant perception must have non-conceptual content, others believe he is a conceptualist. After offering an alternative solution to this interpretative problem in Kant’s philosophy, I turn to Husserl’s later theory of perception. My main claims here are that Husserl departs from Kant specifically regarding (i) the sort of synthetic contents that govern affective perception and (ii) the role of conceptual capacities in the contents of attentive perception.