Ukraine's Orange Revolution

Revolution in Orange sketches the multi-faceted background of the 'Orange Revolution' protests during the Kyiv winter of 2004-2005. On the whole, 'Revolution in Orange' is critical and personal, yet at times gushing; it is detailed and well documented yet slightly nostalgic. By contrast, Andrew Wilson's 'Ukraine's Orange Revolution' fully airs the dirty laundry, including transcripts of conspiring election officials as well as someone ('probably' Kuchma) caught on covert recordings.

En este trabajo de investigación queremos exponer como la Unión Europea sirve de instrumento para el progreso de terceros países, que no pertenecen a ella. Este hecho nos sirve como modelo para profundizar en el proceso de integración europea, que sigue la
Unión Europea a través de sus políticas de ayuda a estos países, en especial a Ucrania, que es el país objeto de nuestro estudio. Teniendo en cuenta los acontecimientos que se han desarrollado en este país desde finales del año 2013, cabe destacar como una gran cantidad de ciudadanos ucranianos salió a las calles, para defender su identidad. Este hecho significa la búsqueda de la identidad pérdida, vinculada a la parte occidental de Europa, tras años de pertenencia a la Unión Soviética. Partimos para esta explicación de la independencia de Ucrania en el año 1991, que sin lugar a dudas fue el hecho que dio
comienzo a las relaciones con la Unión Europea. Hay que señalar, como se verán en las páginas de este trabajo, la importancia de los gobiernos y sus ideales en cuanto a la política exterior en cada momento. En esta investigación ponemos en relación ambas cosas, las políticas internas seguidas en Ucrania y a su vez las políticas que sigue la Unión Europea. Todo ello, bajo la sombra de Rusia, que en cada una de las etapas de estas relaciones demuestra sus intereses en Ucrania y su intento por atraerla bajo su órbita.

This paper analyzes changes in regional electoral behavior and attitudes towards separatism and foreign policy orientation in Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan,” which turned into a violent internal conflict and one of the biggest international conflicts involving Western countries and Russia. The research question is whether the regional divisions concerning domestic politics, separatism and foreign orientation have changed significantly in Ukraine since the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 and the “Euromaidan” in 2014. This paper employs comparative and statistical analyses of voting results of the 2012, 2007, 2006, and 2002 parliamentary elections, and the 2014, 2010, and 2004 presidential elections, to examine effects of historical legacies, ethnicity, language, age, and economic factors on regional support for pro-nationalist/pro-Western and pro-Russian/pro-communist political parties and presidential candidates. The study also analyses support for separatism in Crimea and Donbas after the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan.” It uses a brief survey, conducted for this study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in April and May 2014, to examine determinants of pro-separatist attitudes. The paper also employs Razumkov Center and KIIS surveys to analyze changes in 2002-2014 in regional preferences for joining the European Union (EU), NATO, and a union with Russia. The analysis shows that Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” remained divided along regional lines in terms of support for political parties and presidential candidates and attitudes towards joining the EU, NATO, and a Russia-led union. After the “Euromaidan,” such divisions in foreign policy orientation and, to a lesser extent, support for presidential candidates and political parties remained. A significant rise in separatist sentiments helped to fuel separatist takeovers of power in Crimea and Donbas and Russian military intervention in these regions.

Moments of mass mobilization astound us. As a sea of protesters fills the streets, observers scramble to understand this extraordinary political act by 'ordinary' citizens. This study presents a paired comparison of two 'moments' of mass mobilization, in Ukraine and Argentina. The two cases are compared and analyzed on a cross-temporal and an inter- regional basis, thereby offering two critical cases in response to assumptions that the processes and patterns of mobilization, and democratization politics more broadly, are region specific. This study challenges political science's focus on elites and structural factors in the study of political participation during democratization.

The conclusion applies the model of mass-mobilization developed from the two cases to the Arab Spring (Egypt) and EuroZone Sovereign Debt Crisis (Greece) protests. The epilogue assesses the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine in comparative context.

Contents:

PART I

1. Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization

2. Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization


PART II

3. Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920-2004

4. Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920-2001

PART III

5. Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process

6. Context is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process

PART IV

7. The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game

8. The Duty to Protest: Participation of 'Ordinary' People in Mass Mobilization

9. Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements

Epilogue: It Happened Again: The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine

Moments of mass mobilization astound us. As a sea of protesters fills the streets, observers scramble to understand this extraordinary political act by 'ordinary' citizens. This study presents a paired comparison of two 'moments' of mass mobilization, in Ukraine and Argentina. The two cases are compared and analyzed on a cross-temporal and an inter- regional basis, thereby offering two critical cases in response to assumptions that the processes and patterns of mobilization, and democratization politics more broadly, are region specific. This study challenges political science's focus on elites and structural factors in the study of political participation during democratization.

The conclusion applies the model of mass-mobilization developed from the two cases to the Arab Spring (Egypt) and EuroZone Sovereign Debt Crisis (Greece) protests. The epilogue assesses the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine in comparative context.

Contents:

PART I

1. Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization

2. Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization


PART II

3. Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920-2004

4. Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920-2001

PART III

5. Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process

6. Context is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process

PART IV

7. The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game

8. The Duty to Protest: Participation of 'Ordinary' People in Mass Mobilization

9. Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements

Epilogue: It Happened Again: The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine

Comparison of Euromaidan and the Orange Revolution. Findings conclude that although links and similiarities exist, Euromaidan does not represent a second Orange Revolution, therefore dispelling some journalistic attempts to term Euromaidan as the Orange Revlution 2.0.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the bipolar world order and the Cold War ended, the United States (US) tried to build the global order as a master of the world. Everything is opposite in nature, the US and NATO, which it led, felt the need to create a new enemy to fight against. Until the early 2000s, US viewed “terrorism” and “anti-democratic regimes” as enemies. Francis Fukuyama’s End of History, Samuel Hungtington’s theories of the Clash of Civilizations, the 2001 Iraq War, the Afghanistan War emerged in this atmosphere. However, NATO continued to act in accordance its character. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US did not abandon its strategy of containing Russia, the new heir of its old enemy, and its newly emerging partner, China. In 2004, NATO expanded around the former Soviet Union by including countries such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and continued to design the regimes in these countries with the Colorful Revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004. NATO continued its strategy of enlargement and containment of Russia, including Georgia and Ukraine. The fact that NATO did not give up on this strategy also increased Russia’s concerns. Russia started to show his first response to NATO’s aggressions in Georgia in 2008, which gathered itself with Vladimir Putin’s second term in power.

This book aims to uncover and assess changes in the EU's foreign policy towards Ukraine in the times of wide-scale social protests in Kyiv. To accomplish this task, this book enlists and analyses documents, agreements, and treaties which establish the frameworks for EU-Ukraine cooperation. It also identifies the interests of lobbying groups in Brussels. Finally, it describes the impact of the regional balance of powers on EU-Ukraine relations.
This book attempts to specify the nature and structures of drivers behind the EU policy towards Ukraine, as well as uncover the place of human rights in these structures. Based on cases from the Orange Revolution, Tax Maidan, and Euromaidan, the book tests a hypothesis that the wide-scale violations of the right for assembly are enough to downplay the preeminence of the EU's economic objectives. If such violations happen, decision-makers in Brussels switch into the "crisis" management mode on the expense of exploring business opportunities.

The Orange Revolution and the Rose Revolution in Georgia are designed to determine whether the United States is effective or not. All the events that started in 2004 with the Rose Revolution in Georgia and then continued in 2005 with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine were called the color revolution. These Color revolutions, which started in Georgia and Ukraine, have been influential in the Caucasus. The Color revolutions in the former Soviet geography in a row strengthened their claims that NATO and the EU were a product of the expansionism.

Листопадовий студентський страйк 2013 року посідає окреме місце у хронології подій Революції Гідності. У перші дні протесту Євромайдан у більшості регіонів України мав незначну підтримку. У цей час українські студенти об'єдналися зара-ди спільної мети та взяли на себе відповідальність за майбутнє країни. Якщо для багатьох українських громадян старшої генерації підписання угоди про асоціацію було непринциповим, то для молоді ця угода визначала її майбутнє в найближчі місяці та роки. У статті проаналізовано причини та передумови студентського страйку, здійснено спробу дослідити, як він організовувався, функціонував та на-скільки істотно вплинув на подальші події Революції Гідності. Ключові слова: Євромайдан, студенти, страйк, громадянське суспільство, Угода про асоціацію України з Європейським Союзом, Революція Гідності
______________________________________________________________________________________


Since the declaration of independence, one of the main vectors for Ukraine’s foreign policy has been determined as a participation in the pan-European process and European structures. Over the next 22 years, the authorities have consistently pursued steps aimed at bringing Ukraine closer to the EU. However, on November 21, 2013, Prime Minister of Ukraine M. Azarov suspended the process of signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. A peaceful indefinite protest, known as “Euromaidan”, began on the Independence Square in Kyiv as a sign of disagreement with the government’s decision. All civil society advocated the European future for Ukraine, but students were the most active in the early days of the protest.
The November student strike of 2013 holds a special place in the chronology of the events of the Revolution of Dignity. In the early days of the protest, Euromaidan had little support in most regions of Ukraine. It was at this time that Ukrainian students united for the common purpose and took responsibility for the future of the country. While the issue of signing the Association Agreement was not so fundamental for many senior citizens of Ukraine, for young people, the Agreement determined their future in the coming months and years. The author analyses the causes and prerequisites of the student strike, as well as attempts to determine its impact on the subsequent events of the Revolution of Dignity.
A student strike showed that representatives of Generation Y, a new generation of citizens who grew up completely in Ukraine, were significantly different from previous generations.
This generation was the first to realize the risks associated with Ukraine’s deviation from the course on European integration, and therefore it was the first to defend Ukraine’s future.
Although the older generations were initially sceptical of the potential of young people, the Millennials still forced themselves to be taken seriously by the authorities and the opposition.
Some rectors and universities supported the student movement.
Keywords: Euromaidan, students, strike, civil society, Association Agreement with the European Union, Revolution of Dignity

Pomarańczowa Rewolucja przykuła uwagę zarówno polityków, jak i naukowców z całego świata. Nietrudno zauważyć, że oficjalna retoryka polityczna na temat ukraińskich wydarzeń 2004 roku w Rosji i na Zachodzie znacznie się różni. Ale czy takie rozbieżności istnieją między podejściami badaczy rosyjskich i zachodnich do analizy Pomarańczowej Rewolucji? Artykuł ten jest próbą odpowiedzi na to pytanie. Przedstawia on główne rosyjskie i zachodnie koncepcje teoretyczne dotyczące Pomarańczowej Rewolucji oraz porównuje zastosowane metody i paradygmaty.

À l’automne 2004, comme en 2013-2014, l’Ukraine a connu des mouvements de contestation des pouvoirs publics sans précédent. Ils ont chacun fait émerger des formes nouvelles de résistances et de contestations, tout en opérant des ruptures avec certaines pratiques sociales de manifestations politiques ou rassemblements publics issues de l’ère soviétique. Les événements portés par le mouvement Euromaïdan nous ont démontré que les nouvelles formes de résistances aux pouvoirs publics, acquises lors de la révolution orange, ont persisté et évolué. L’expérience de ces deux mouvements de contestation a participé à un processus de changement beaucoup plus large, qu’un simple changement de pouvoir. Ils ont fourni aux Ukrainiens de nouvelles pistes de compréhension de ce qu’est ou pourrait être la démocratie. Chacun des mouvements a eu sa propre logique. Ils ont constitué des étapes où ont émergé de nouvelles pratiques démocratiques. Entre les événements de la révolution orange et ceux d’Euromaïdan, il semble y avoir eu une complexification de l’interprétation de la réalité et des enjeux chez les acteurs sociaux. Pour comprendre le phénomène, nous retiendrons l’expérience de l’histoire et la perception du temps comme outils de construction de réalités subjectives, qui ont pu être utilisées afin de favoriser la mobilisation collective.

I mention a number of effects that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine had on the political regime, official discourse and public opinion of Russia, since 2005. These repercussions, I argue, partly modified the nature of Putin’s political system making it somewhat distinct from traditional autocracy. I label this alteration “paratotalitarian,” in that it was reminiscent of certain features of totalitarian states, yet did not result in a real regime change from authoritarianism to totalitarianism. I also briefly touch upon some worrying developments in Russian public opinion which, under the influence of an upsurge of anti-Western propaganda in the Kremlin-controlled mass media after the Orange Revolution and in connection with the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, became pre-dominantly anti-American by the end of the last decade.

What threatens the property rights of business owners? And what makes these rights secure? This book transcends the conventional diagnosis of the issue in modern developing countries by moving beyond expropriation by the state ruler or by petty bureaucratic corruption. It identifies 'agent predation' as a novel threat type, showing it to be particularly widespread and detrimental. The book also questions the orthodox prescription: institutionalized state commitment cannot secure property rights against agent predation. Instead, this volume argues that business actors can hold the predatory state agents accountable through firm-level alliances with foreign actors, labor, and local communities. Beyond securing ownership, such alliances promote rule of law in a rent-seeking society. Taking Russia and Ukraine between 2000 and 2012 as its empirical focus, the book advances these arguments by drawing on more than 150 qualitative interviews with business owners, policy makers, and bureaucrats, as well as an original large-N survey of firms.

Pavlo ARTYMYSHYN . ORANGE REVOLUTION IN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA
(ON THE PROBLEM OF THE RUSSIAN FACTOR’S AVAILABILITY IN
THE UKRAINE’S 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ).


This paper presents the study of Russian influence on the course of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine as well as of the reaction to it of the Ukrainian political and civil society. It is alleged that this factor took place both during the election campaign of presidential candidates and during the Orange Revolution, including the official visits of Russian politicians to Ukraine and informal speeches at rallies. It is observed that when one of candidates V. Yanukovych was supported by the Russian government, which considered him as the prospective adherent of the pro-Russian policy, at the same time as when V. Yushchenko was supported by representatives of the Russian democratic opposition, in particular by B. Nemtsov and I. Khakamada. It is noticed that when part of Ukrainians, which supported V. Yanukovych, perceived Russia as a potential ally and so-called “defender” of the West in these events, Orange Maidan activists were abused by such both open and hidden Kremlin’s support of one of the candidates and they considered a direct
interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine in these incidents.

Keywords: The Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections, The Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych, Volodymyr Putin, the Russian opposition, the Russian factor, the Ukrainian politicians, public opinion, Ukraine, Russia.

The  author  seeks to  explain  why  Ukrainian  elites were  not  effective  in  reforming a  society.  The  explanation  is  based
on  the  analysis  o f  e lites ’  structure  inherited  from  the USSR.
Communist  nomenclature  dominating in  legislative  and  executive power  during the presidency  o f L.  Kravchuk  and  L.  Kuchma and  rent-seeking political  and economic  groups  (PEG)  became the main obstacle for social and economic reforms.
Fragmented  elites’  structure  remained  intact after „orange  revolution”. However, while „feckless pluralism” prevented  the authoritarian  consolidation in times of L. Kuchma,  after Yushchenko came to power  this flawed pluralism did not trasformed into natural pluralism and became the hindrance to democratization.

Studenckie rewolucje na Ukrainie posiadają swoje długie tradycje. Jedną z nich była „Rewolucja na Trawie". Mimo, że rzadko opisywana w naukowych wydawnictwach, jest jednym z najważniejszych wydarzeń w historii ukraińskich protestów. To bezpośrednio po niej na Ukrainie wybuchła jedna z największych rewolucji społecznych, jakim była „Pomarańczowa Rewolucja”. W artykule została opisana światowa historia protestów studenckich, następnie sumska „Rewolucja na Trawie”. Istotną częścią artykułu, są również częściowe wyniki badań przeprowadzonych na ukraińskich uniwersytetach.

Student revolutions in Ukraine have their long tradition. One of them was “Revolution on the Grass”. Although seldom described in scientific publications, it is one of the most important events in the history of Ukrainian protests. Revolution took place directly before one of the biggest protests: the “Orange Revolution”. The article describes the history of student protests, detailing the “Revolution on the Grass”. An important part of the article are also partial results of research carried out at Ukrainian universities.

1.What could be the reason for Ukraine to experience revolutions so often? What do you think about this topic?
the main reason why we have the revolutions so often is unchanged governing system and people. The collapse of Soviet Union allowed to come to power business elites and some kind of outlaws. That is why people had tried to make their life better and trusted in opposition in 2004. Most people believed that will change the system. But it didn't happen and in 10 years time burned new revolution, where the main role was played by ordinary citizens, who didn't have any trust in opposition anymore and believed they were the ones to change state's governing system.