Leonard Finkelman

Recent debates between proponents of the modern evolutionary synthesis (the standard model in evolutionary biology) and those of a possible extended synthesis are a good example of the fascinating tangle among empirical, theoretical, and conceptual or philosophical matters that is the practice of evolutionary biology. In this essay, we briefly discuss two case studies from this debate, highlighting the relevance of philosophical thinking to evolutionary biologists in the hope of spurring further constructive cross-pollination between the two fields.

Philosophy has been a public endeavor since its origins in ancient Greece, India, and China. However, recent years have seen the development of a new type of public philosophy conducted by both academics and non-professionals. The new public philosophy manifests itself in a range of modalities, from the publication of magazines and books for the general public to a variety of initiatives that exploit the power and flexibility of social networks and new media. In this paper we examine the phenomenon of public philosophy in its several facets, and investigate whether and in what sense it is itself a mix of philosophical practice and teaching. We conclude with a number of suggestions to academic colleagues on why and how to foster further growth of public philosophy for the benefit of society at large and of the discipline itself.

The last Tasmanian wolf, a male popularly named "Benjamin," died in captivity in 1936. Thylacinus cynocephalus, the species that Benjamin represented, was soon thereafter declared extinct; however, one may advance the argument that the species was already extinct when the last of Benjamin's conspecifics died, leaving him a member of an extinct species. This raises the "species problem": what, if anything, is a species?

Resolution of the species problem is complicated by the fact that species are considered "fundamental units" of biological theories in at least two senses. Species are units of taxonomy: they are the smallest "real" groups into which organisms can be classified. Species are also units of evolution: they are the entities that change over time due to Natural Selection. Following Darwin, philosophers of biology traditionally argue that these units can only be identified if species are nominal entities.

More recently, paleontologists suggest that species may be "fundamental units" in a third sense: as units of selection in a higher-order process of differential speciation and extinction. Species selection would therefore have a place in a hierarchy of selection processes.

At lower levels of selection, units of selection emerge from former units of evolution due to intrinsic functional integration. If species emerge as units of selection in the same way, then the species that participate in species selection would not be coextensive with units of evolution: since functional integration had broken down within T. cynocephalus, Benjamin would be part of the latter unit, but not the former. Nominal entities are defined by extension, and so—contrary to the received view—species meeting these criteria cannot be nominal entities.

I therefore argue that species must be natural kinds if they emerge as units of selection in a hierarchy of selection processes. Given the simultaneous identity of units of selection, units of evolution, and units of taxonomy, I suggest an application of the Kripke/Putnam model of natural kinds that is consistent with the theory of Natural Selection. I also consider a reading of Darwin's work that demonstrates the viability of this model.

Editors of the journal Cladistics recently argued that parsimony measures should guide the con- struction of evolutionary trees ex hypothesi, prompting a vociferous debate among systematists.  is debate, popularly dubbed “Parsimonygate,” is the latest in a series of disputes over the efficacy of cladistic principles (including parsimony).  The new debate is also an opportunity for palaeontologists to reflect on the conceptual framework of their discipline. Whereas neontologists may have a posteriori reasons for disagreeing with the aforementioned editors, palaeontologists may justify their resistance a priori.

Many of the objections against parsimony are empirical in nature. Trees constructed according to parsimony may suffer from problems such as long-branch attraction or from statistical inconsistency, but if a tree does not demonstrably suffer from these problems then there seems no reason to reject a principle of parsimony. Indeed, many palaeontologists have embraced parsimony-based cladistics over the last several decades. One apparent virtue of this approach is the unification of palaeontology with neontology through a common method of classification.

While there are advantages to conceiving palaeontology as methodologically continuous with neontology, doing so ignores unique methodological and epistemic features of palaeontology. In particular, the goal of palaeontology is not only to elucidate the evolutionary relations between taxa—as in neontology—but also to put those relations in a particular historical context. Palaeontological research therefore requires collation of fossil data with the geological record. Temporal information is therefore indispensable to the palaeontologist.
A posteriori objections raised against the assumption of parsimony highlight that principle’s difficulties in accommodating time-indexed information. In pursuing the answers to distinctively palaeontological questions, then, the assumption of parsimony would put the palaeontologist at a distinctive disadvantage.

The editors of Cladistics may be correct that researchers in other fields may productively assume parsimony until data forces them to abandon that assumption. If palaeontology is to be conceived as something other than a handmaiden to neontological study, however, the palaeontologist has good reason to assume otherwise.

The last thylacine died in captivity in 1936. That individual, named Benjamin by its keepers, was not only the last representative of the species Thylacinus cynocephalus, but also of the genus Thylacinus and the family Thylacinidae. Benjamin might have represented those taxa, but the question of whether or not it was an actual member of the taxa is one that is surprisingly difficult to answer. I argue that operational species concepts in neontological study are ambiguous about Benjamin’s classification because those concepts do not specify clear conditions for predicating extinction upon a taxon. Given that the extinction attributed to T. cynocephalus can be conceived in two ways—either functional or demographic—the same species concept may or may not classify Benjamin within that taxon. By contrast, paleontological practice is unambiguous about Benjamin’s classification: the last representative of a fossil species must be a member of the fossil species. I argue that that conceptual clarity follows from paleontology’s operational commitment to a single extinction concept, i.e., demographic. One of two inferences must follow: either paleontological phylogeny should be recognized as parataxonomic relative to neontological phylogeny or neontological species concepts should take care to specify particular extinction concepts. After weighing the relative merits of the first option, I argue for the latter.

Modern science is humankind's most productive way of understanding the world. Before science could hope to give us hyperloops and space elevators, however, its fundamental structure and conceptual commitments had to be worked out. This course examines that philosophical background of modern science.

The recently-published paper “A specimen-level phylogenetic analysis and taxonomic revision of Diplodocidae (Dinosauria, Sauropoda)" (Tschopp et al 2015) should be considered one of the best works of philosophy in recent memory. I argue for this point by making clear one vital role of philosophy in science.