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The internet offers tremendous opportunities for violent extremists across the ideological spectrum and at a global level. In addition to propaganda, digital technologies have transformed the dynamics of radical mobilisation, recruitment... more
The internet offers tremendous opportunities for violent extremists across the ideological spectrum and at a global level. In addition to propaganda, digital technologies have transformed the dynamics of radical mobilisation, recruitment and participation.
Even though the jihadist threat has seemingly declined in the West, the danger exists of the internet being an environment where radical messages can survive and even prosper. Against this background, this ISPI report investigates the current landscape of jihadist online communication, including original empirical analysis. Specific attention is also placed on potential measures and initiatives to address the threat of online violent extremism.
The volume aims to present important points for reflection on the phenomenon in the West (including Italy) and beyond.
The Ukrainian crisis has caused important repercussions at the international level, including the influx of thousands of voluntary fighters from abroad. According to recent estimates, from 2014 until the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine,... more
The Ukrainian crisis has caused important repercussions at the international level, including the influx of thousands of voluntary fighters from abroad. According to recent estimates, from 2014 until the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, approximately 1,000 Westerners travelled to the disputed region of the Donbas (Eastern Ukraine), on both sides of the conflict (Ukrainian forces and Russia-supported "separatist" militias). This article intends to offer an original contribution to the empirical study of the mobilization of Western fighters in the Donbas, by taking into account, for the first time, the national case of Italy (one of the countries most affected by the phenomenon in the West). In particular, based on detailed primary and secondary sources, the paper examines in depth a relatively large Italian network of pro-separatist fighters and direct supporters, including far-right militants, and analyzes their profiles and mobilization dynamics, drawing upon the literature on social movements and contentious politics.
The secret is essential for terrorists. Aware of their position of political and military inferiority towards their adversary, terrorists typically have no choice but to operate clandestinely, emerging from the shadows to carry out acts... more
The secret is essential for terrorists. Aware of their position of political and military inferiority towards their adversary, terrorists typically have no choice but to operate clandestinely, emerging from the shadows to carry out acts of violence in order to attract attention. However, the social organisation of the secret has not been the subject of a thorough reflection in the literature on political terrorism. Following Simmel’s classic investigation into secrecy and secret societies, this article intends to shed light on “external secrecy”, understood as the social practice of intentionally hiding information and knowledge from external actors that do not belong to the terrorist organisation. The paper explores how external secrecy takes the form of a sort of barrier system that can be crossed by individuals and can be built and removed by organisations. It also examines how external security in terrorist organisations can produce both opportunities for deliberate deception and risks of undesired manipulation by external actors. Finally, the article focuses on the inherent trade-off between the need for external secrecy and the quest for visibility in terrorist organisations. Overall, this discussion suggests the opportunity to develop a research programme on the management of secrecy in terrorism.
On 3 February 2018, in the town of Macerata, an Italian citizen with far-right sympathies deliberately fired several shots from his car at nine African immigrants, injuring six. The article argues that this shooting can be considered an... more
On 3 February 2018, in the town of Macerata, an Italian citizen with far-right sympathies deliberately fired several shots from his car at nine African immigrants, injuring six. The article argues that this shooting can be considered an act of lone-actor terrorism, an anomaly in the Italian context. Based on the social science literature on this subject, the paper analyses the profile of the shooter and the dynamics of the attack. Moreover, adopting a relational perspective to radicalisation, it examines the attacker's interactions: on the one hand, he was in contact with different political organisations that could represent 'echo chambers' for the tacit validation or even the justification and amplification of radical beliefs, including on the relation between immigration and security; on the other hand, he was not subject to their discipline and social control. This peripheral social position helps explain this case of lone-actor terrorism, in a national context where far-right mobilisation and violence have historically assumed collective forms.
Novel COVID-19 is having far-reaching consequences worldwide. Security and security management are not immune from this influence. Building on the scientific literature, this article explores the mixed impact of this unexpected... more
Novel COVID-19 is having far-reaching consequences worldwide. Security and security management are not immune from this influence. Building on the scientific literature, this article explores the mixed impact of this unexpected macro-level phenomenon and its consequences on violent extremism and terrorism in the West, in the short and in the medium to long term. The paper looks at the influence on extremist beliefs and attitudes and, moreover, it examines the effects on extremist behaviors, with an emphasis on terrorist activities, drawing on a model of terrorist attack cycle. The COVID-19 pandemic can be interpreted as a global natural experiment that offers insight into causal processes, in the interplay among societal, group, and individual factors.
In the vast literature on terrorism the choice of weapons has received relatively limited attention, despite the importance and visibility of this topic. Building on the literature on innovation in terrorism, the article first proposes a... more
In the vast literature on terrorism the choice of weapons has received relatively limited attention, despite the importance and visibility of this topic. Building on the literature on innovation in terrorism, the article first proposes a multi-level analytical framework that helps study terrorist weapon selection. It then investigates the use of weapons in jihadist attacks in Europe from 2014, with the rise of the so-called Islamic State, until 2020, based on an original database. The empirical analysis shows that the two traditional types of weapon of modern terrorism, firearms and explosives, were largely replaced by more primitive tools like melee weapons. In fact, in recent years jihadist terrorists in Europe have become less technologically advanced. Based on the original analytical framework, the article examines the reasons of this evolution, paying special attention to the use of the most common type of weapon in the database, bladed weapons, and the most lethal type, firearms.
The secret and its social organisation are of course vital for terrorists. In particular, members of terrorist organisations usually have to deal with complex processes to conceal information from outside actors (external security) but... more
The secret and its social organisation are of course vital for terrorists. In particular, members of terrorist organisations usually have to deal with complex processes to conceal information from outside actors (external security) but also from other members (internal security). However, scholars have paid relatively little attention to this dark side from an analytical and theoretical standpoint. The practice of secrecy in terrorism deserves particular attention at the 'meso' level of analysis, related to organisations; unlike most ordinary organisations, terrorist organisations have to manage particularly demanding trade-offs due to their clandestine nature. This analytical contribution aims to explore how internal secrecy within terrorist organisations affects two crucial organisational dimensions - internal communication, and coordination and control. In doing so, it also critically assesses two well-developed asymmetric information approaches, signalling theory and agency theory, showing that these analytical frameworks could shed new light on the study of secrecy management in terrorist organisations, provided that they are disconnected from a reductionist assumption of individual behaviour as invariably utilitarian and atomistic. In addition, drawing upon Simmel's classic interpretation of 'secret societies', the article argues that a fruitful interpretation of internal secrecy in terrorist organisations should include the critical role played by social trust.
Over the last few years, Italy has occupied a relatively marginal position with respect to the jihadist threat. Nonetheless, the propaganda of the Islamic State mentions Italy and the bordering Vatican with a seemingly disproportionate... more
Over the last few years, Italy has occupied a relatively marginal position with respect to the jihadist threat. Nonetheless, the propaganda of the Islamic State mentions Italy and the bordering Vatican with a seemingly disproportionate frequency. This article presents an in-depth analysis of all textual references in Dabiq and Rumiyah, the flagship magazines of this sophisticated jihadist organization. Overall, several mentions concern "Rome," intended as a symbol for the West and Christianity and with a number of other meanings. However, there is no lack of potentially worrying references to Italy, Italians, the Vatican, and the Pope.
In recent years, jihadist-inspired armed groups and individuals have planned and, in some cases, actually carried out terrorist attacks in the West using various types of firearms - some of them with severe consequences. After presenting... more
In recent years, jihadist-inspired armed groups and individuals have planned and, in some cases, actually carried out terrorist attacks in the West using various types of firearms - some of them with severe consequences. After presenting an overview of the literature available on the subject, this article focuses on organizational-level terrorist weapon selection and, in particular, it addresses the issue of the acquisition and use of firearms for jihadist attacks in the West, on the basis of original data.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 represented a crucial event in international politics. They took the world’s only superpower by surprise. How was it possible? Why did the US formidable intelligence system fail to prevent that... more
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 represented a crucial event in international politics. They took the world’s only superpower by surprise. How was it possible? Why did the US formidable intelligence system fail to prevent that catastrophe?
Today a large empirical record is available on al-Qaida’s surprise attacks and the US response (in particular, from the work of the “9/11 Commission”) and allows us to interpret and evaluate those events, fraught with major consequences.
This article investigates the causes of that resounding intelligence failure. The text refers to three complementary classes of factors: cognitive/psychological, organizational, and political. First, it examines cognitive and psychological factors and biases such as the «signal to noise ratio» problem, «crying wolf syndrome», «groupthink», wishful thinking and overconfidence. Second, it pays attention to organizational complexity and fragmentation, problems of cooperation and coordination, inter- and intra-organizational conflicts, and bureaucratic pathologies, with an emphasis on the role of the CIA and the FBI. Third, it looks at the responsibility of political decision-makers, by examining the problems arising from overcrowded political agendas, competing political priorities, and processes of intelligence «politicization». Finally, it focuses on the particular nature of the security threat posed by transnational terrorism.
In recent years, thousands of radical citizens and residents from Europe have joined the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) in Syria and Iraq. Unlike other European countries, Italy has traditionally been characterised by the prevalence of... more
In recent years, thousands of radical citizens and residents from Europe have joined the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) in Syria and Iraq. Unlike other European countries, Italy has traditionally been characterised by the prevalence of individual pathways of radicalisation over group mechanisms. Nevertheless, recent cases show interesting indications of the increasing role of small groups based on pre-existing personal relationships (family and friendship ties). This kind of bond can be particularly salient for IS, a jihadist “proto-state”, which needs not only ‘foreign fighters’ but also new ‘citizens’ of different sexes and ages, including entire families.
Abstract - Negli ultimi anni la minaccia del terrorismo, specialmente di matrice jihadista, si è fatta pressante anche in Europa. Sotto questo profilo, nemmeno l’Italia può considerarsi un paese “a rischio zero” e deve quindi predisporre... more
Abstract -
Negli ultimi anni la minaccia del terrorismo, specialmente di matrice jihadista, si è fatta pressante anche in Europa. Sotto questo profilo, nemmeno l’Italia può considerarsi un paese “a rischio zero” e deve quindi predisporre misure adeguate per fronteggiare la minaccia. Questo fatto stimola una riflessione sul ruolo che il sistema di Protezione civile (PC) potrebbe assumere di fronte al rischio terrorismo. È del tutto evidente che la PC non è chiamata a operare in prima linea. Anche all’interno del sistema di sicurezza civile italiano, disastri antropici come il terrorismo e il rilascio intenzionale di agenti nucleari, biologici, chimici e radiologici (NBCR) ricadono innanzitutto sotto la competenza della Difesa civile. Nondimeno anche la PC, forte delle sue capacità e delle esperienze maturate sul campo, potrebbe offrire un contributo rilevante in caso di attacchi terroristici, per quanto sempre entro i limiti dei suoi compiti e delle sue competenze. Rimane da definire in che cosa possa consistere effettivamente tale contributo nel contesto attuale. Di fronte a una questione che non ha ancora ricevuto una risposta univoca, appare utile avanzare alcune considerazioni preliminari. Innanzitutto, è chiaro che eventi gravi come quelli di tipo terroristico devono essere gestiti dalle istituzioni ai massimi livelli di competenza, per evitare problemi di coordinamento e trarre il massimo beneficio dalle risorse e capacità disponibili. In questo contesto, l’intervento della PC deve essere richiesto dalle autorità competenti e non può che seguire le direttive da queste impartite, proprio per assicurare il massimo livello di coordinamento e sinergia.
Il ruolo della Protezione Civile potrebbe collocarsi prevalentemente nelle fasi della gestione del post-emergenza e, se possibile, della prevenzione. A seconda delle circostanze, la PC potrebbe essere coinvolta per svolgere una gamma di compiti specifici, come il salvataggio, lo sgombero e l’assistenza degli scampati dall’evento; il presidio degli spazi e il diradamento e sfollamento dei presenti; l’assistenza di supporto alle forze in prima linea; l’aiuto alla messa in sicurezza di edifici danneggiati. Di particolare interesse potrebbe essere la partecipazione attiva al processo di comunicazione dell’emergenza, grazie alla presenza capillare sul territorio che la PC può vantare. Queste attività di intervento presentano elementi diversi da quelli che caratterizzano l’operato tradizionale della PC e per questa ragione richiedono una formazione adeguata e mirata.
In conclusione, appare evidente che il tema del coinvolgimento della PC nell’ambito di disastri causati da attacchi terroristici merita attenzione, specialmente nella presente fase storica.
This ICCT Research Paper examines the current extent of Italy's Sunni jihadists in Syria. Italy presents interesting particularities, including a relatively small number of foreign fighters compared to other European countries (around one... more
This ICCT Research Paper examines the current extent of Italy's Sunni jihadists in Syria. Italy presents interesting particularities, including a relatively small number of foreign fighters compared to other European countries (around one hundred, and only a small minority with Italian passports, according to recent estimates), the scant presence of domestic recruitment networks operating within the country and the prevalence of individual pathways of radicalisation over group mechanisms. However, the Italian case has not been extensively investigated. This exploratory paper, based on a case study-driven approach, first examines the scale of the problem and then focuses on the individual cases of four Italian nationals who differ in terms of both sex and origin. It also takes into account the different reactions of their families.
This article explores the current extent of Italy's Sunni jihadists in Syria and Iraq. The country presents interesting particularities, including a relatively small number of foreign fighters compared to other European countries (not... more
This article explores the current extent of Italy's Sunni jihadists in Syria and Iraq. The country presents interesting particularities, including a relatively small number of foreign fighters compared to other European countries (not more than 90 individuals, and only a dozen with Italian passports). However, the Italian case has not been extensively investigated. This article first examines the scale of the problem and then focuses on the cases of three Italian nationals who left for Syria: a convert who died in combat in the Aleppo area in 2013, a second-generation immigrant who joined the ranks of the Islamic State (IS) and a muhajira ("emigrant") who, as a woman, has not been allowed to take combat roles in the self-proclaimed "caliphate".

Keywords: Terrorism; radicalisation; jihadism; foreign fighters; muhajirin; Islamic State; Italy
Since the mid-1980s, Italian insurrectionary anarchists have been responsible for dozens of attacks both within Italy and abroad. For more than a decade, the prevailing tactics were small-scale acts of vandalism, sabotage and arson.... more
Since the mid-1980s, Italian insurrectionary anarchists have been responsible for dozens of attacks both within Italy and abroad. For more than a decade, the prevailing tactics were small-scale acts of vandalism, sabotage and arson. However, since the late 1990s, insurrectionary anarchist militants have increasingly used more dangerous methods such as bombings and assaults. Today, insurrectionary anarchist violence is generally regarded as the most dangerous form of domestic non-jihadist terrorism in Italy. Furthermore, in many respects, Italy represents the birthplace of a threat that has spread in many countries. The paper aims to examine the rise of insurrectionary anarchist terrorism in Italy, a neglected topic in the literature. The text focuses on four aspects. First, it traces the ideological roots of this extremist tendency. Second, it examines the escalation of violence in the twenty-first century, paying particular attention to the most important entity, the Informal Anarchist Federation, FAI, a loose network that emerged in 2003. The discussion is based on an original data set of 50 acts of violence claimed by the Italian FAI from 2003 to 2014. Third, it explores the peculiar organisational structure of the FAI. Finally, it analyses the repertoire of action and the strategies of target selection.


Keywords:  terrorism; insurrectionary anarchism; Italy; Informal Anarchist Federation; letter bombs
The Italian Five Star Movement (FSM) is one of the most interesting political phenomena in contemporary Europe. On one hand, this populist anti-establishment party has expressed a critical, albeit ambiguous, position on the European Union... more
The Italian Five Star Movement (FSM) is one of the most interesting political phenomena in contemporary Europe. On one hand, this populist anti-establishment party has expressed a critical, albeit ambiguous, position on the European Union and the euro. In particular, the FSM’s euroscepticism became apparent during the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections. On the other hand, analysis of the voting behaviour in the EP shows that the Movement differs from the ‘hard’ eurosceptic UKIP, its main ally in the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) grouping, and is often closer to the pro-EU parties, in particular the Green group. Overall, the FSM’s euroscepticism is more strategic than ideological.
Terrorist groups operate under conditions of secrecy. The secret represents both a constraint and an opportunity. Surprisingly, scholars have paid little attention to the study of the organisation of secrecy in terrorism. This article... more
Terrorist groups operate under conditions of secrecy. The secret represents both a constraint and an opportunity. Surprisingly, scholars have paid little attention to the study of the organisation of secrecy in terrorism. This article aims to explore this relevant subject. It is divided into four sections. Following Simmel's classic remarks, the first section shows that terrorist groups can be interpreted as forms of secret society. The second section examines the effect of secrecy on the internal organisation of terrorist groups, with particular reference to the management of organisational dilemmas. The third section analyses the secrecy/visibility trade-off. The conclusion outlines some distinctive characteristics of terrorist groups compared to other forms of secret societies, such as secret services and crime enterprises.
L’offensiva senza precedenti lanciata contro Israele da Hamas e altri gruppi armati attivi nella Striscia di Gaza il 7 ottobre 2023 e la successiva controffensiva militare di Israele sollevano interrogativi sull’impatto che il conflitto... more
L’offensiva senza precedenti lanciata contro Israele da Hamas e altri gruppi armati attivi nella Striscia di Gaza il 7 ottobre 2023 e la successiva controffensiva militare di Israele sollevano interrogativi sull’impatto che il conflitto in Medio Oriente potrebbe avere in termini di rischio terrorismo, anche in Europa. A confermare apparentemente le preoccupazioni a questo riguardo, appena pochi dopo l’offensiva a sorpresa guidata da Hamas si sono registrati due attacchi letali di matrice jihadista, esplicitamente ispirati alla causa del cosiddetto Stato Islamico o Daish: un accoltellamento in una scuola della cittadina francese di Arras il 13 ottobre 2023 e una sparatoria a Bruxelles il 16 ottobre.
Il capitolo si pone l’obiettivo di indagare i potenziali effetti del conflitto in Medio Oriente sulla minaccia jihadista in Europa, sulla base delle informazioni attualmente disponibili. Il testo è organizzato in tre parti. La prima delinea l’attuale stato del jihadismo in Europa, con l’obiettivo di presentare concisamente le condizioni e dinamiche che il conflitto e i suoi effetti potrebbero mutare. La seconda parte esamina la salienza della questione palestinese per la causa jihadista, sottolineando anche somiglianze e differenze tra i gruppi radicali palestinesi e le organizzazioni del jihadismo globale. Sulla base di queste considerazioni, la terza parte si sofferma sul possibile impatto del conflitto sul terrorismo e la radicalizzazione jihadista in Europa, nel breve e nel medio-lungo periodo.
This chapter examines the jihadist mobilization which has affected European countries from 2014 onwards, with an emphasis on terrorist attacks. The text is divided into four main sections: the first examines the relevant issue of foreign... more
This chapter examines the jihadist mobilization which has affected
European countries from 2014 onwards, with an emphasis on terrorist
attacks. The text is divided into four main sections: the first examines the relevant issue of foreign terrorist fighters, the second and third sections analyze, respectively, the characteristics of terrorist attacks and the profiles of terrorist attackers, based on original data, while the fourth section explores the evolution of terrorist plots, with an eye on future scenarios.
This chapter aims to concisely examine the current relationship between violent extremism and the tools offered by digital communication technologies, particularly the Web. As is well-known, the internet has become a crucial environment... more
This chapter aims to concisely examine the current relationship between violent extremism and the tools offered by digital communication technologies, particularly the Web.
As is well-known, the internet has become a crucial environment for violent extremism and for terrorism across the ideological spectrum.
The Web can perform different functions in this field. This chapter presents and discusses six areas of application, in decreasing order of proximity to the actual
use of violence: 1) cyberattacks; 2) dissemination of operational instructions; 3) hacking and “doxing”; 4) recruitment and terrorist “virtual entrepreneurship”; 5) propaganda; 6) financing.
This chapter examines the narratives of radical Islamists and other extremely violent groups. In particular, the focus is on groups that rely, partially or exclusively, on terrorism to achieve their political ends. Terrorism can be seen... more
This chapter examines the narratives of radical Islamists and other extremely violent groups. In particular, the focus is on groups that rely, partially or exclusively, on terrorism to achieve their political ends. Terrorism can be seen as a combination of violence and communication. Narratives are often a crucial part of this communication activity. A useful perspective to approach this question is represented by framing theory. This well-established and sophisticated perspective has been widely used to study, in particular, social movements. However, it can also be fruitfully applied to the analysis of terrorist organizations and militants. A key element in this line of research is the distinction of three "core framing tasks" : "diagnostic" framing (concerning the problem), "prognostic" framing (concerning the solution), and "motivational" framing (concerning the " call to arms "). On the basis of this tripartition, the work explores the narrative of the so-called Islamic State (IS), the more influential and dangerous terrorist organisation of our age.
Italy has a long history of struggle against terrorism. At least since the mid-1970s, it has developed a national counterterrorism (CT) strategy, combining a range of different tactics and tools. Over the decades Italy has had to respond... more
Italy has a long history of struggle against terrorism. At least since the mid-1970s, it has developed a national counterterrorism (CT) strategy, combining a range of different tactics and tools. Over the decades Italy has had to respond to many forms of violence: ethno-nationalist, right-wing, left-wing, anarchist, and jihadist. It is worth noting that right-wing, left-wing, and anarchist terrorism represented an indigenous phenomenon, even if many of these armed groups had significant connections abroad. On the contrary, ethno-nationalistic terrorism in the 1960s was perceived as inspired and supported by foreign forces, and jihadist terrorism is now a transnational threat.
This chapter outlines the evolution of Italy’s CT policy, from a social
science perspective. It distinguishes two major phases. In the first phase (from the 1960s to the 1980s), during the time of the so-called First Republic at the national level and the Cold War at the international level, the country dealt with separatist violent incidents and, above all, with a long and intense campaign of right-wing and left-wing terrorism, during the Anni di piombo (Years of Lead). In the second phase (from the 1990s to the present day), at the time of the Second Republic and in the post-Cold War era, Italy has had to face new challenges, especially from jihadist extremism.
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History, European History, Sociology, Social Movements, Criminal Justice, and 91 more
Italy is a crucial epicenter of insurrectionary anarchism, a transnational extremist tendency that promotes “self-organized” illegal and violent actions, even against people. In particular, over the last two decades, dozens of acts of... more
Italy is a crucial epicenter of insurrectionary anarchism, a transnational extremist tendency that promotes “self-organized” illegal and violent actions, even against people. In particular, over the last two decades, dozens of acts of violence, including letter bombs, homemade bombs, and shootings, have been claimed under the banner of the Informal Anarchist Federation (Federazione Anarchica Informale, FAI), a loosely connected network that has also fostered relationships with likeminded groups abroad. The Italian counterterrorism system has successfully addressed this threat with aggressive rules, measures, and practices, that, in part, derive directly or indirectly from the long fight against the Mafia. However, today Italian authorities face a new challenge, posed by the case of Alfredo Cospito, an influential exponent of the FAI network who started an indefinite hunger strike in prison in October 2022. The handling of the Cospito affair highlights the complex political, legal, and ethical dilemmas that liberal democracies have to address in combating terrorism.
This report analyzes the jihadist terrorist attacks that were successfully executed in North America and Europe between June 29, 2014 (the date of the self-proclamation of the Islamic State’s "caliphate") and September 11, 2022, based on... more
This report analyzes the jihadist terrorist attacks that were successfully executed in North America and Europe between June 29, 2014 (the date of the self-proclamation of the Islamic State’s "caliphate") and September 11, 2022, based on a original dataset.
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is causing deaths all over the world, upsetting society, the economy, and politics, changing our lives. At this level of intensity, it is destined to reach and arguably replace terrorism in the position... more
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is causing deaths all over the world, upsetting society, the economy, and politics, changing our lives.
At this level of intensity, it is destined to reach and arguably replace terrorism in the position of great fear of our time, especially during a phase of apparent decline of jihadism, at least in the West.
It can then be useful to compare these two risks and fears, terrorism and the coronavirus.
Negli ultimi anni, l’Italia non è stata colpita da attacchi terroristici di matrice jihadista, né ha sperimentato gli elevati livelli di radicalizzazione di alcuni dei suoi vicini europei. Significativamente, il numero di foreign fighters... more
Negli ultimi anni, l’Italia non è stata colpita da attacchi terroristici di matrice jihadista, né ha sperimentato gli elevati livelli di radicalizzazione di alcuni dei suoi vicini europei. Significativamente, il numero di foreign fighters che hanno abbandonato il territorio italiano per unirsi allo Stato Islamico o ad altri gruppi jihadisti – circa 130 individui – è molto più basso se comparato ai numeri della Francia, della Germania, del Regno Unito, ma anche di paesi più piccoli come l’Austria o il Belgio.
Questo quadro di relativa quiete, tuttavia, presenta un’importante eccezione, riguardante la propaganda dello Stato Islamico, che menziona l’Italia e, in particolare, Roma con una frequenza che può apparire sproporzionata.
Analizzando i contenuti ufficiali in lingua inglese pubblicati dallo Stato Islamico a partire dalla proclamazione del “Califfato” (nel giugno del 2014), il presente studio di carattere esplorativo ha contato 432 riferimenti all’Italia, al Vaticano e a Roma. La città è frequentemente citata, con diverse accezioni, anche nella propaganda in lingua araba. L’analisi dei riferimenti individuati mostra che, a parte alcune eccezioni significative, lo Stato Islamico riserva particolare attenzione all’Italia perché si riferisce a Roma come simbolo dell’Occidente e della Cristianità. La maggior parte delle menzioni, infatti, riprende fonti islamiche secondarie che affermano che il Giorno del Giudizio giungerà soltanto quando i musulmani combatteranno i “Romani”, e profetizzano la loro conquista di “Roma” (originariamente sulla base di un riferimento storico al confronto secolare tra le forze musulmane e i “Romani” d’Oriente - ovvero i Bizantini - in epoca medievale).
A ogni modo, la posizione centrale che la capitale italiana occupa nei messaggi jihadisti – anche in senso figurato – è un fenomeno allarmante, poiché può essere interpretata dai seguaci dello Stato Islamico come un’esortazione a compiere attacchi nella Città Eterna o, più in generale, in Italia.
Italy’s experience with jihadism presents some interesting peculiarities. At first glance, there are several overlapping reasons to consider the country as a major hub of jihadist mobilization and target for terrorist attacks. Yet,... more
Italy’s experience with jihadism presents some interesting peculiarities.  At first glance, there are several overlapping reasons to consider the country as a major hub of jihadist mobilization and target for terrorist attacks. Yet, somewhat counterintuitively, Italy has not faced a particularly intense challenge from jihadist terrorism. Levels of  domestic radicalization are, by any account, significantly lower than in most other European and Western countries.
Overall, Italy has a diverse jihadist scene that resembles that of other European countries, but which is substantially smaller in size and less sophisticated. Nonetheless, over the course of the past 12 months, various incidents have increased Italian counterterrorism authorities’ concerns, as they reveal Italian links to foreign attacks and growth in the homegrown scene. Italian authorities have developed skills and legal tools that are useful in confronting jihadist terrorism. These
repressive tactics, however, have not been accompanied by an equally  robust preventive approach. Unlike most Western  countries, in  fact, Italy has not yet developed any systematic program or strategy aimed towards counter-radicalization or de-radicalization.
Il gruppo armato noto con la sigla di ISIS in inglese (o Da'ish in arabo) si è imposto all’attenzione della comunità internazionale e dell’opinione pubblica, specialmente dopo le conquiste territoriali dell’ultimo anno. Nel giugno del... more
Il gruppo armato noto con la sigla di ISIS in inglese (o Da'ish in arabo) si è imposto all’attenzione della comunità internazionale e dell’opinione pubblica, specialmente dopo le conquiste territoriali dell’ultimo anno.
Nel giugno del 2014 questa organizzazione di ispirazione salafita-jihadista ha proclamato unilateralmente l’instaurazione del «califfato» e ha mutato il proprio nome in «Stato Islamico».
Da'ish non è il primo gruppo armato, anche di matrice jihadista, che si serve massicciamente di vari mezzi di comunicazione moderni, compresi i social media, ma lo fa con un livello di sofisticatezza e professionalità senza precedenti. Infatti questa organizzazione ha orchestrato una complessa e sofisticata campagna di propaganda di portata globale, che si rivolge a pubblici differenti, ricorrendo a vari canali e piattaforme. Tale attività costituisce evidentemente un aspetto fondamentale del conflitto in cui è impegnata e serve diversi scopi: legittimare la propria autorità; reclutare militanti e fiancheggiatori e motivare i simpatizzanti; intimidire e condizionare i nemici.
Il presente studio, dopo aver esaminato il ‘brand’ del cosiddetto «Stato islamico», indaga i principali strumenti di propaganda utilizzati da questa organizzazione: i discorsi ufficiali, le riviste, i video, le comunicazioni sui social media, la controinformazione di ispirazione ‘giornalistica’ e gli altri mezzi.
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The figure of the suicide bomber is peculiar and enigmatic. Unfortunately, we have little empirical evidence to investigate the motivations of people who are willing to sacrifice their life in order to kill others. Most scholars agree... more
The figure of the suicide bomber is peculiar and enigmatic. Unfortunately, we have little empirical evidence to investigate the motivations of people who are willing to sacrifice their life in order to kill others. Most scholars agree with the idea that there is not a typical profile. Suicide bombers present different motivations. This paper explores the complex galaxy of suicide bombers’ motivations, drawing on the scientific literature on this topic. Three types of individual motivations can be analytically distinguished: interests, values and affects.
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Examining the case study of one Italian woman who travelled to Syria, Dr. Marone sheds light on some of the particularities concerning Italy's jihadists, including the relevance of foreign recruitment networks operating within the country... more
Examining the case study of one Italian woman who travelled to Syria, Dr. Marone sheds light on some of the particularities concerning Italy's jihadists, including the relevance of foreign recruitment networks operating within the country and the prevalence of individual pathways of radicalisation over group mechanisms.
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Research Interests:
Sociology, Social Sciences, Terrorism, Violence, International Terrorism, and 58 more
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ABSTRACT In the vast literature on terrorism the choice of weapons has received relatively limited attention, despite the importance and visibility of this topic. Building on the literature on innovation in terrorism, the article first... more
ABSTRACT In the vast literature on terrorism the choice of weapons has received relatively limited attention, despite the importance and visibility of this topic. Building on the literature on innovation in terrorism, the article first proposes a multi-level analytical framework that helps study terrorist weapon selection. It then investigates the use of weapons in jihadist attacks in Europe from 2014, with the rise of the so-called Islamic State, until 2020, based on an original database. The empirical analysis shows that the two traditional types of weapon of modern terrorism, firearms and explosives, were largely replaced by more primitive tools like melee weapons. In fact, in recent years jihadist terrorists in Europe have become less technologically advanced. Based on the original analytical framework, the article examines the reasons of this evolution, paying special attention to the use of the most common type of weapon in the database, bladed weapons, and the most lethal type, firearms.
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