Scientific methodology

Both science and technology education have a commitment to teaching process; investigations or scientific method in science, design in technology, and problem solving in both areas. The separate debates in science and technology education reveal different curricular emphases in processes and content, reflecting different goals, and pedagogic and educational research traditions. This paper explores these differences and argues that each curriculum area can learn from the other. Despite the interest in processes, problem solving remains neglected in each area, particularly with respect to empirical accounts of student problem-solving activities and the supporting pedagogy. This paper draws on the situated learning and social constructivist literature to provide insights into problem solving in technology education. The research reported here, gives accounts of the problem-solving strategies of English secondary school students. These strategies represent their responses to technology activities and the learning environment created by teachers.

Karl Popper’s conception of methodology and its relationship to epistemology is examined, and found wanting. Popper argues that positivist criteria of demarcation fail because they are attempts to discover a difference in the natures of empirical science and metaphysics. His alternative to naturalism is that a plausible criterion of demarcation is a proposal for an agreement, or convention. But this conventionalism about methodology is misplaced. Methodological rules are conventions, but which methodological rules are followed by scientists it is not itself a matter of convention. This casts doubt upon the status of Popper’s famous criterion of demarcation.

It will be shown that at least four foundational concepts of Cultural Historical Activity Theory were previously formulated by Hegel, viz., (1) the unit of analysis as a key concept for analytic-synthetic cognition, (2) the centrality of artifact-mediated actions, (3) the definitive distinction between goal and motive in activities, and (4) the distinction between a true concept and a pseudoconcept.

The French physicist Jean Baptiste Perrin is widely credited with providing the conclusive argument for atomism. The most well-known part of Perrin's argument is his description of thirteen different procedures for determining Avogadro's number (N)-the number of atoms, ions, and molecules contained in a gram-atom, gram-ion, and gram-mole of a substance, respectively. Because of its success in ending the atomism debates, Perrin's argument has been the focus of much philosophical interest. The various philosophers, however, have reached different conclusions, not only about the argument's general rationale but also the role that the multiple determination of N played in it. This paper emphasizes the historical development of Perrin's experimental work in order to understand the role that the multiple determination of molecular magnitudes played in his argument for molecular reality. It argues that Perrin used the multiple determination strategy to put forward an exceptionally strong no-coincidence argument to argue for both the correctness of the values for the molecular magnitudes determined and the validity of the auxiliary assumptions upon which the different determinations were based. The historicist approach further allows the identification of the elements responsible for the epistemic strength of the no-coincidence argument.

In this monograph, Steffen Ducheyne provides a historically detailed and systematically rich explication of Newton’s methodology. Throughout the pages of this book, it will be shown that Newton developed a complex natural-philosophical methodology which encompasses procedures to minimize inductive risk during the process of theory formation and which, thereby, surpasses a standard hypothetico-deductive methodological setting. Accordingly, it will be highlighted that the so-called ‘Newtonian Revolution’ was not restricted to the empirical and theoretical dimensions of science, but applied equally to the methodological dimension of science. Furthermore, it will be documented that Newton’s methodology was far from static and that it developed alongside with his scientific work. Attention will be paid not only to the successes of Newton’s innovative methodology, but equally to its tensions and limitations. Based on a thorough study of Newton’s extant manuscripts, this monograph will address and contextualize, inter alia, Newton’s causal realism, his views on action at a distance and space and time, the status of efficient causation in the Principia, the different phases of his methodology, his treatment of force and the constituents of the physico-mathematical models in the context of Book I of the Principia, the analytic part of the argument for universal gravitation, the meaning and significance of his regulae philosophandi, the methodological differences between his mechanical and optical work, and, finally, the the interplay between Newton’s theology and his natural philosophy.

William Dilthey differentiated between the method for social science and natural science as understanding (verstehen) versus explanation (erklaren). Understanding implied a participatory first-person perspective rooted in life experiences whereas scientific explanation was assumed to be an impersonal third-person perspective seeped in causal determinism. Others sought common ground in methodology. In hermeneutics, the science of interpretation, DagfinnFøllesdal and Chrysostomos Mantzavinos advocated applying the hypothetico-deductive method to meaningful texts and E. D. Hirsch combined subjectiveunderstanding and interpretation with the discipline of objective testing and critique to validate (or invalidate) interpretive hypotheses. However, very few theologians have followed their lead. Why is this the case?
    My application of the hypothetico-deductive method differs from Føllesdal, Mantzavinos and Hirsch for their process remains within the chosen text to ascertain the best interpretation by fit. This leads to a “vicious hermeneutical circle” for any plausible interpretative hypothesis is inductively constructed from the text details, thus testing that hypothesis by the same text falls into the trap of  bias confirmation. If the biblical canon is accepted as a comprehensive, coherent and ultimately a noncontradictory corpus for orthodoxy, testing an interpretive hypothesis of one part by relevant texts from the rest of the canon allows for a valid external  norm that escapes the self-referential trap. Testing by falsification would increase the rigor of the  process.

This article is a fragment of scientific research devoted to the analysis of modern approaches to the understanding of architecture. The author opposes the productivity of the analytical approach to the architectural theory and the methodological inconsistency of the declarative approach. In this regard, the problem of demarcation of strict analytical (rational) and publicistic (declarative) formats seems to be relevant.

Статья представляет собой фрагмент научного исследования, посвященного анализу современных подходов к теоретическому осмыслению феноменологии архитектуры. Противопоставляются содержательность и продуктивность аналитического подхода к
архитектурной тематике и методологическая несостоятельность подхода декларативного (программного). В этой связи представляется актуальной проблематика демаркации
строгого аналитического (общерационального) и публицистического (декларативного) форматов.

Для цитирования: Фигурный Г.Н. Парадигматика современной архитектуры: аналитика и декларации // Architecture and Modern Information Technologies. – 2019. – №2(47). – С. 71-82 [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа: https://marhi.ru/AMIT/2019/2kvart19/PDF/04_figurnyj.pdf

The Geneva surgeon and naturalist Louis Jurine (1751-1819) wrote around the 1810s a history of Swiss fishes that was published posthumously. The paper reconstructs the way this work was influenced both by popular practices and scientific methods, among other by linneism.

In the first part of this paper, I review Chomsky's meandering journey through several methodological positions, from the phrase-structure and transformational rules of Syntactic Structures up to the minimalist theory of later work. Infected with mentalism from first to last, each and every position vitiates Chomsky's repeated claims that his theories will provide useful guidance to later theories in such fields as cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience studies of language. With the guidance of his insights, he claims, psychologists and neuroscientists will be able to avoid costly dead-end lines of research. What has happened is that current neurolinguistic research proceeds without reference to Chomsky. It also wholeheartedly rejects the mentalism of the associated Language of Thought theory of Jerry Fodor.

In the second part of this paper, I present my own account of the methodology of science. That account has three origins:
• my work as a graduate student from 1966 until I passed my comprehensive exams in 1973 (at a different university);
• reading every issue of Scientific American from 1972 until nearly 2000, (at which point I continued to read it only sporadically, since I concluded that, around that time, it had evolved from a serious science magazine to a popular science magazine); and
• my three-year immersion in the cognitive neuroscience of language after I retired, based on repeated study of and note-taking for, (the 2 books), and several other ones, and finally, numerous articles not hidden behind a paywall.

So, as always with my writings: caveat emptor.

Kant and Aristotle reassesses the prevailing understanding of Kant as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher. Taking epistemology, logic, and methodology to be the key disciplines through which Kant’s transcendental philosophy stood as an independent form of philosophy, Marco Sgarbi shows that Kant drew important elements of his logic and metaphysical doctrines from Aristotelian ideas that were absent in other philosophical traditions, such as the distinction of matter and form of knowledge, the division of transcendental logic into analytic and dialectic, the theory of categories and schema, and the methodological issues of the architectonic. Drawing from unpublished documents including lectures, catalogues, academic programs, and the Aristotelian-Scholastic handbooks that were officially adopted at Königsberg University where Kant taught, Sgarbi further demonstrates the historical and philosophical importance of Aristotle and Aristotelianism to these disciplines from the late sixteenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century.

The book gathers contributions from philosophers of medicine, pharmacologists, philosophers of biology and (formal) epistemologists around topics such as causal inference, evidential standards and study design, as well as the interplay between ethical, social, and financial dimensions in strategic behaviour underpinning methodological choices, evidential standards, and policies related to drug approval, monitoring and regulation. Authors include: Rani Anjum, Jeffrey Aronson, Marta Bertolaso, Giovanni Boniolo, Gustavo Cevolani, Brendan Clarke, Roberto Festa, Sven Ove Hansson, Bennett Holman, Jürgen Landes,  Mael Lemoine, Ulrich Mansmann, Klaus Ruthenberg, Miriam Solomon, David Teira, and Jon Williamson.

The motivation to write a paper on the general nature of science comes from the scientific nature of Quran, which has been a guidance and help in revealing that science is an ontological and teleological construct which the Quran supports. A much-needed discussion of science had to be done because the trend among the people today suggest anything remotely sounding science has become a substituting value for religion and God. People have started believing rather blindly, in science without really understanding what it is, how it works and its limitations. What is science and what is the purpose of science? This paper explains the answers of the question and help reader understand the difference between science and pseudoscience which often people mistake as one. It explains the difference from example of macroevolution, single common ancestor and natural selection. The discussion also elaborates on the essential foundations of science that makes science, science. At the end, the paper elaborates why science cannot be used to ascertain moral truths. The discussion has been analytical in nature rooted in classic literature of philosophy of science and sociology. The readers will come to appreciate the fine principles of science and it’s limitations in revealing scientific truths.

Steering between scientism and cynicism, this book offers a whole new approach, Critical Common-sensism, to understanding scientific evidence, the supposed "scientific method," and the metaphysical presuppositions of the scientific enterprise.  it proposes a new account of the relation between the natural and the social sciences, and of the proper relation of the epistemology and the sociology of science.  Lavishly illustrated by examples from the history of molecular biology, it also includes chapter on science and religion, science and literature, and science and the law.; as well as on the values of science, and predictions that science will soon end.

In this article the author discusses Dennis F. Polis’ defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics. Some of Polis’ methodological and metaphysical arguments are examined and it is explained why they are unfaithful to the Thomistic tradition of metaphysics. There is a discussion of why metaphysics can, within certain parameters, critique the science of evolutionary biology, as well as a discussion of the role of metaphysics in the hierarchy of the sciences. The relationship between biological species to the notion of species in philosophy, including related metaphysical topics, such as essences and Divine ideas in God, is discussed. It is determined that Polis’ view suffers from a kind of relativism and nominalism that is incompatible with the moderate realism of Aquinas. Some of Aquinas’ key existential insights in metaphysics are discussed in this context as well. In addition to being corrective, this essay helps point the way to a better defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics.

"CONTENTS

[I] Foundations of Science

Chapt. 1. Science, Scientific Methods: An Introduction   4
Chapt. 2. The Nature of Scientific Inquiries: Philosophy of science  18
Chapt. 3. A Short History of Formation of scientific Psychology 38
Chapt. 4. Science and Explanation (I); Causality 57
Chapt. 5. Science and Explanation (II); The Logic of Scientific Inference 73

[II] Experiments in Science
Chapt. 6. The Logic of Experiments 91
Chapt. 7. Experimental Designs       113

[III]. Hypotheses, Statistics, Null Hypothesis Testing
Chapt. 8. Problems and Hypotheses in Experiments         131
Chapt. 9. History of developments of scientific inference and its
Introduction into Psychology 136
Chapt. 10. Statistical Testing and Hypothesis Testing 144
Chapt. 11. A Critical Analysis of Null Hypothesis Testing Practice    156

[IV]. Theories in Science: Basic Features and Issues
Chapt. 12. Characteristics of Theories in Science 170
Chapt. 13. Presuppositions and Hypotheses in Scientific Research  181

[V].  Reformulation of Methods in Psychology
Chapt. 14. Theoretical Foundations of Scientific Psychology 193
Chapt. 15. A Reformulation of Psychological Methodologies 225-243
"

From Knowledge to Wisdom argues that there is an urgent need, for both intellectual and humanitarian reasons, to bring about a revolution in science and the humanities.  The outcome would be a kind of academic inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity learn how to create a better world.  Instead of giving priority to solving problems of knowledge, as at present, academia would devote itself to helping us solve our immense, current global problems – climate change, war, poverty, population growth, pollution of sea, earth and air, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, injustice, tyranny, proliferation of armaments, conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear, depletion of natural resources.  The basic intellectual aim of inquiry would be to seek and promote wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides.

This second edition has been revised throughout, has additional material, a new introduction and three new chapters.

What one critic has said about the second edition
“Any philosopher or other person who seeks wisdom should read this book. Any educator who loves education--especially those in leadership positions--should read this book. Anyone who wants to understand an important source of modern human malaise should read this book. And anyone trying to figure out why, in a world that produces so many technical wonders, there is such an immense "wisdom gap" should read this book. In From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities, Second Edition . . . Nicholas Maxwell presents a compelling, wise, humane, and timely argument for a shift in our fundamental "aim of inquiry" from that of knowledge to that of wisdom.”
Jeff Huggins  Metapsychology

What three critics said about the first edition of From Knowledge to Wisdom
“Maxwell is advocating nothing less than a revolution (based on reason, not on religious or Marxist doctrine) in our intellectual goals and methods of inquiry ... There are altogether too many symptoms of malaise in our science-based society for Nicholas Maxwell's diagnosis to be ignored."
Professor Christopher Longuet-Higgins, Nature. 

“a strong effort is needed if one is to stand back and clearly state the objections to the whole enormous tangle of misconceptions which surround the notion of science to-day.  Maxwell has made that effort in this powerful, profound and important book.”
Dr. Mary Midgley, University Quarterly.

“The essential idea is really so simple, so transparently right ... It is a profound book, refreshingly unpretentious, and deserves to be read, refined and implemented.”
Dr. Stewart Richards, Annals of Science.

For further quotations from reviews, see http://www.ucl.ac.uk/from-knowledge-to-wisdom/reviews/#from

Readership: Scientists, philosophers, historians, philosophers and sociologists of science, educationalists, science policy experts, science journalists, undergraduate and graduate level students, and general readers interested in science, or concerned about problems confronting humanity.

Key Features
•  Has dramatic implications for social science and the humanities, for philosophy, for education, and for the long-term capacity of humanity to learn how to make progress towards a better world
•  Written in an informal, accessible way
•  Sets out to solve basic philosophical problems concerning science
Published by Pentire Press and distributed by Amazon, Ingram and Baker & Taylor

Seguiremo all’inverso KUHN [1970], il cui indice generale sarà invertito. Se Kuhn dalle rivoluzioni giunge alle caratteristiche della conoscenza scientifica, dalle caratteristiche della conoscenza scientifica noi giungeremo ad accennare appena l’evento-rivoluzioni. Il perché sarà ampiamente motivato nella trattazione. Tuttavia, già da ora, occorre esplicitare quanto segue: si parla di conoscenza, e non di conoscenze scientifiche. È un distinguo epistemologico che il lettore dovrà sottolineare. E la ragione è bene esporla subito, onde evitare ambigui fraintendimenti.
Indagare sulla conoscenza, impone un’esposizione articolata e approfondita sull’attività del conoscere. Questa attività è l’oggetto di indagine. In realtà, paradossalmente, occorre ammettere che, purificando sempre più tale attività dalle incrostazioni speculative più invadenti, emergerà chiara e distinta un’esigenza teoretica: non è possibile considerare l’oggetto come oggetto puramente materiale; l’oggetto, in realtà, è un soggetto, sebbene non logicamente. L’indagine sull’attività conoscitiva è indagine sul soggetto conoscente: i due ambiti non possono essere scissi nettamente. Si apre, già nelle premesse, il conflitto fra epistemologia e le pseudoscienze, in particolare la sociologia e la psicologia. Possono quest’ultime fornire un contributo nell’analisi del progresso della conoscenza scientifica? Ancora una volta: il progresso è epistemologico-filosofico o storico-sociale? Le difficoltà maggiori, in corso d’opera, hanno condotto a queste domande, accettando la sfida kuhniana a riscrivere il suo pensiero in ordine inverso. È emersa, limpidamente, la particolarità indiscussa dell’attività scientifica: essa non è mai squisitamente individuale, tantomeno perciò solo materiale. È il singolo scienziato ad elaborare teorie e a condurre esperimenti e ad accogliere o escludere osservazioni fenomeniche. Tuttavia, il sostrato teorico e socio-psicologico che costituisce la sua attività normale, quotidiana, è più che determinante e, sorprendentemente, determinato. Occorre allora chiedersi quali elementi distinguano l’attività scientifica da altre imprese conoscitive e pratiche. Per quali vie procede questa attività: teoriche o pratiche?

Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) was one of the foremost twentieth-century philosophers of science. Although he attained infamy by embracing cultural relativism and by providing a searing critique of the claims of science, there has been, to date, no comprehensive critical study of the major themes in Feyerabend’s philosophy. This book rectifies that situation.
The book traces the evolution of Feyerabend’s thought, beginning with his attempt to graft insights from Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning onto Popper’s falsificationist philosophy. The component parts of Feyerabend’s ‘model for the acquisition of knowledge’, the normative aspect of his project, and its roots in a Popperian conception of epistemology, are identified and critically evaluated. Feyerabend’s early work emerges as thoroughly post-Popperian, rather than as a contribution to the historical approach to philosophy of science with which he is usually associated.
In his more notorious later work, notably the 1975 book Against Method, Feyerabend claimed that there was, and should be, no such thing as the scientific method. This ‘epistemological anarchism’ and Feyerabend’s attendant relativism are examined here in the light of his recognition that Against Method was a collage constructed out of his earlier thoughts. The roots of epistemological anarchism are exposed, and the weaknesses of Feyerabend’s later thesis of incommensurability are brought out.
Throughout the book, the influence of Feyerabend’s thought on contemporary philosophers is tracked. The author draws attention to Feyerabend’s exciting but divided legacy. On the one hand, contemporary scientistic philosophers have used his earlier views in a vigorous defence of an uncompromising ‘eliminative’ materialist view of the mind. On the other hand, thinkers influenced by Feyerabend’s later work have begun a humanistic critique of science, scientific myth-making, and scientific claims to knowledge.
The book will be of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students of philosophy, methodology, and the social sciences.

The paper discusses the demarcation problem between non-science, fringe-science and science by considering methodological issues of cultural astronomy when interpreting the Palaeolithic archaeological inventory. The research focuses primarily various astronomical assessments of cave art at Lascaux and at some other locations, as well as on case studies of the artefacts.

Mātauranga Māori spans Māori knowledge, culture, values and worldview. Pūrākau and maramataka, forms of mātauranga Māori, comprise knowledge generated using methods and techniques developed independently from other knowledge systems. Hitherto mostly ignored or disregarded by the science community because it seemed to be myth and legend, fantastic and implausible, mātauranga Māori includes knowledge generated using techniques consistent with the scientific method, but explained according to a Māori world view. Acknowledging this extends the history of scientific endeavour back to when Māori arrived in Aotearoa and Te Wai Pounamu, many centuries ago.

A virulent strain of science denial has succeeded in politicizing scientific expertise. Science denial, which may involve one third of the US population, may be traced back, at least in part, to the evangelical community which has typically taught that science is atheistic and at war with religion. Newly revised and updated, Evolving Certainties presents a detailed overview of the many issues involved at the intersection of science and faith, as well as a thorough review of the literature. Evolutionary biology continues to challenge many people of faith. Evolving Certainties proposes that evolutionary science, rather than being destructive to faith, has the potential to enrich it in many ways.