Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Corps of Engineers The War Against Japan
Corps of Engineers The War Against Japan
vii
The Author
Karl C. Dod received a Ph.D. in history from the University of Illinois
and has taught history at Morningside College and at Montana State College.
During World War II he worked with the U.S. Civil Service Commission
and as historian with the Historical Division in the Office of the Chief of
Engineers, and subsequently served in the U.S. Army with the Field Artil-
lery. After the war he joined the Office of the Chief Engineer, Army Forces,
Pacific, as a civilian historian. In 1950 he rejoined the Engineer Historical
Division and has been a staff member ever since. He is coauthor of Volume
I, Engineers in Theater Operations, and author of Volume II, Organiza-
tions, Troops, and Training, in the series "Engineers of the Southwest
Pacific, 1941-1945."
viii
Preface
This volume covers Engineer operations in support of the U.S. Army
in the war against Japan. The story begins with the defense build-up in
1939 and ends with the Japanese surrender aboard the battleship Missouri
on 2 September 1945. Geographically, Engineer operations extended from
the Panama Canal to India and from Alaska to Australia, in actual or poten-
tial areas of conflict. The author has attempted not only to depict various
types of Engineer operations but also to indicate how Engineer work helped
implement Allied strategy. Included are discussions of the Engineer posi-
tion in the command structure and a general account of both Engineer
combat and service missions within a given theater.
Above all, the author has attempted to indicate the many problems that
had to be resolved—problems stemming from terrain and climate, from the
inadequacy of long-range planning, from insufficient preparations, and from
organizational shortcomings, as well as from the Japanese foe—before the
Engineer mission could be successfully accomplished.
I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to present and former colleagues
in the Historical Division who helped in the preparation of this book. Dr.
Jesse A. Remington, Director of the Historical Division, gave valuable advice
and encouragement. Miss Lenore Fine offered many helpful suggestions.
Miss Louise Marr did research and drafted sections on the defense tri-
angle and on the 1945 Southern Philippines Campaign. Dr. Leslie Anders
prepared the initial drafts for the chapters on the China-Burma-India
theater. Dr. Kenneth J. Deacon wrote the first draft on the Alcan High-
way, and Mr. David Latt did the initial research on the engineers in Panama
and Alaska. I am indebted to a large number of Engineer officers who were
participants in the war against Japan and who reviewed portions of the
manuscript and provided additional information and also pointed out
errors of fact; the names of nearly all of them are recorded in the volume.
In this connection special mention should be made of Col. Desloge Brown,
C.E., Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey (Ret.), Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey (Ret.),
Col. Willard P. McCrone, C.E., Maj. Gen. George J. Nold (Ret.), Col. Earl
North (Ret), Maj. Gen. Bernard L. Robinson (Ret.), Col. Harry A. Skerry
(Ret.), Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr. (Ret.), Maj. Gen. Leif J. Sverdrup
ix
(AUS, Ret), Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Talley (Ret.), Lt. Gen. Walter K.
Wilson, Jr., and Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr. (Ret.). For the facts presented,
I am alone responsible.
Mrs. Caroline Moore and Mrs. Lois Aldridge of the World War II Ref-
erence Branch, Office of Military Records, National Archives and Records
Service, were most helpful in locating engineer files. Many typists in the
Historical Division labored over the manuscript, but special credit is due
to Mrs. Margaret Lillian Tucker, who typed the final version of the manu-
script. Mr. George H. Weitzel of the U.S. Army Engineer District Office
in Baltimore prepared the maps.
I am also indebted to members of the Office of the Chief of Military
History, especially to Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, and to Dr. John
Miller, jr., who, as Deputy Chief Historian, offered numerous valuable sug-
gestions for improving the manuscript. Mr. David Jaffé was responsible
for the final editing, assisted by Mrs. Marion P. Grimes. Miss Mary Ann
Bacon, Chief of the Editorial Branch, gave valuable advice in the editing
of the manuscript. Miss Ruth A. Phillips selected the photographs.
Mr. Nicholas J. Anthony compiled the index.
x
Contents
Chapter Page
I. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA,
HAWAII, AND ALASKA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Early War Plans and the Corps of Engineers. ............... 3
First Steps in Building Up the Pacific Outposts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix
A. U.S. ARMY AND ARMY ENGINEER PERSONNEL
STRENGTH IN OVERSEAS THEATERS, 1 JANUARY
1942-1 OCTOBER 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705
Chart
Major Command Channels and Lines of Engineer Technical Super-
vision, Southwest Pacific Area, 1 May 1 9 4 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Maps
No.
1. The Pacific Outposts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Alaska, 1940. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3. Hawaiian Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Panama, 1 9 4 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5. Philippine I s l a n d s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6. Bataan, 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7. Australia, 1 9 4 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
8. Pacific Ocean Areas, 1 August 1 9 4 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
9. Papua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
10. Milne Bay, August 1 9 4 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
xiii
No. Page
11. Buna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
12. Combat Zone, 1 9 4 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
13. Airfields Constructed or Improved by the Commonwealth of Australia
for the United States Army up to 31 December 1 9 4 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
14. Facilities Other Than Airfields Constructed or Improved by the Com-
monwealth of Australia for the United States Army up to 31 Decem-
ber 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
15. Alaska and Western Canada, 1 9 4 2 - 4 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
16. Aleutian Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
17. Oahu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
18. Honolulu Harbor, 1 9 4 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
19. Makin A t o l l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
20. The China-Burma-India Theater, December 1 9 4 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
21. China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
22. The Ledo Road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
23. Kwajalein Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
24. South Marianas and S a i p a n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
25. Guam, 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
26. The Western Pacific. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
27. Hollandia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
28. The Southern Philippines, 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
29. Central Luzon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589
30. Iwo Jima. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641
31. Okinawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 642
32. Pipelines in CBI, 1 July 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 667
33. Planned Attack on J a p a n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
Illustrations
Brig. Gen. Eugene R e y b o l d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Malinta Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Col. Wendell W. Fertig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Camp Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey and Brig. Gen. Leif J. Sverdrup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
An Australian Road B u i l d e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Nouméa, New Caledonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
The Port Moresby C a u s e w a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Buna Area Adjacent to Simemi Creek. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
43d Engineers at Dobodura Strip No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Improvised Bridge Over Entrance Creek. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Chow Time at a Native Labor C a m p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Airstrip at Dobodura, Showing R e v e t m e n t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
xiv
Page
Moving Supplies on the Rebuilt Railroad, N o u m é a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
A Section of the Oro Bay-Dobodura Road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
A Corduroy Road, New Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Base B Area, Oro B a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Engineer Troops Making Their Own H a r d w a r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Construction of the First Steel Building at Milne B a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Engineers Dressed for -37° F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
Digging Out T u n d r a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Constructing a Pacific Hut on K i s k a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Brig. Gen. William M. H o g e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Skagway Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Trucking Supplies Through M u d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Alcan Highway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Peace River Suspension Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
Refinery at W h i t e h o r s e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
A Pipeline Carried on a T r e s t l e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
King's Wharf, Butaritari, Makin Atoll . . . . . . . . . . . 384
Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
Native Bridge on the Refugee T r a i l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
A Pipeline Carried on an A - F r a m e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
Stringing a Ferry Cable Across the S a l w e e n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Footbridge and Ferry on the S a l w e e n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
A Japanese Pillbox, K w a j a l e i n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
Guam Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505
Floating Ponton Pier, S a i p a n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
Engineers of the 1881st With Full Jungle Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531
Hollandia Development, 1 9 4 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
Dispensary in Native-Type Building, Milne Bay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
Liberty Docks, Oro B a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552
Section of the Map Distribution Area, F i n s c h h a f e n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
Dredging Coral for Runway Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 566
Laying Pierced Steel Plank, Tacloban. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
Repairs on the Carmen Bridge, Agno R i v e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605
Infantry Support Rafts on the Pasig River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 616
Laying a Pipeline to the Mortar Pit, Caballo I s l a n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 622
Fort Drum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623
Trucks Negotiate the Villa Verde T r a i l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 630
Filipinos Help Construct a Road, L u z o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631
Japanese Truck Supporting a Temporary B r i d g e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
Airfield Construction, Iwo J i m a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659
Three Examples of Bridging in the C B I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
MAP 1
notice. The Japanese would in all like- would be at hand to begin the attack on
lihood seize Guam and the Philippines. the Japanese home islands.1
Enemy forces could be expected to make A seemingly modest Engineer force
raids on Hawaii, Alaska, and the west was contemplated for a conflict of such
coast of the United States. The Panama magnitude. The Army's strategic plan
Canal might be wrecked by sabotage or for a war with Japan, prepared in 1936,
by naval and air raids. Initially, the called for the mobilization of 46 engi-
United States would mobilize one mil- neer units on the outbreak of hostilities.
lion men. Two armies would defend
the Pacific coast, Alaska, Hawaii, and the 1
(1) Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The
Canal, while two more would be in re- First Two Years, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
serve. Since it was assumed the Philip- WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1962), pp. 21-30.
pines would soon be lost, no plans were (2) Louis Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in
the Far East," The Military Review, XXIX, No. 9,
made for reinforcing them. Eventually, (December, 1949), 22-39. (3) Mark Skinner Watson,
the Navy, with Army support, would Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations,
fight its way across the central Pacific UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1950), pp. 415, 453-54. (4) Joint Army
toward Japan. Once bases had been es- and Navy Basic War Plan—ORANGE (1938). AG
tablished in the western Pacific, the time Reg Doc 223.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 5
Five engineer combat regiments would This engineer force was wholly inade-
support the infantry and 3 squadrons the quate to deal with the manifold respon-
cavalry.2 In addition, 4 heavy ponton sibilities which the Corps of Engineers,
battalions and 13 light ponton compa- both a combat arm and a supply service,
nies would serve with the combat forces. would have to discharge in the course of
Two general service regiments, 7 sepa- a bitter and probably prolonged struggle
rate labor battalions, 4 dump truck com- in the Pacific. On far-flung battlefronts
panies, 2 depot companies, 2 water sup- of that enormous area engineer units
ply battalions, a topographic battalion, would be called upon to remove mines,
5 railway battalions, and a railway shop cut through barbed wire entanglements,
battalion would be needed in the rear reduce fortifications, and build and re-
areas. An engineer section would serve pair roads to enable the infantry to ad-
with General Headquarters. As the war vance. Units trained in bridging would
progressed more engineer units would have to put troops across streams. Dur-
be formed.3 ing enemy offensives, engineers would
Had war broken out in 1938, the have to try to slow the advance by plac-
Corps of Engineers, like the rest of the ing mines, destroying roads, wrecking
Army, would not have been able to meet bridges, blowing up supplies, and at
the requirements of War Plan ORANGE. times fighting as infantry. Behind the
Engineer officers numbered 739 and en- fighting fronts the Corps could expect
listed men 5,786 in an Army totaling to have its traditional wartime logistical
183,455. There were but ten engineer missions—to build fortifications, con-
units—7 combat regiments, 2 of them at struct airfields, camps, hospitals, ware-
full strength, parts of 2 squadrons, and houses, roads, and ports; operate light,
a topographic battalion. These units power, and water systems; repair and
were for the most part undermanned operate railroads;5 camouflage impor-
and poorly equipped. This small force tant installations; make maps for the
could be augmented. The 23 engineer Army; and at the same time procure the
units of the National Guard—18 combat necessary supplies.6
regiments, 4 squadrons, and a general While the Engineers would do exten-
service regiment, in various stages of or- sive construction for the Army overseas
ganization and totaling 8,768 officers and
men in 1938—could be called into fed- 5
(1) 41 Stat. 759. (2) Responsibility for the repair
eral service. There were besides, 8,057 and operation of railroads was transferred to the
Engineer Reserve officers available for Transportation Corps in November 1942. Chester
Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibili-
duty.4 ties, Organization, and Operations, UNITED
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,
2
1951), p. 64.
6
A brief description of the different types of engi- The organization of the Corps of Engineers and
neer units is given in Appendix B. its World War II mission are discussed in Blanche
3
Army Strategical Plan—ORANGE (1936 Revision), D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal,
an. 2, pp. 1-2. AG Reg Doc 235. The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment,
4
OCE, Annual Rpt Covering Mil Activities of the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
CE for FY Ending 30 Jun 38, pp. 3, 4, 10, 12, 13. (Washington, 1958), pp. 3ff.
6 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
bor. The kind of construction to be The General Staff began to work out
done and its location depended largely a strategy of hemisphere defense along
on the policies of the administration in the lines suggested by the President.
Washington, the strategic planning of Despite the enlarged scope of responsi-
the War Department, and the appropria- bilities, the War Department concen-
tions voted by Congress. It was to be trated almost entirely on strengthening
assumed that by far the larger share of the United States and its outlying ter-
the money for a defense build-up would ritories. The latter, especially, needed
go to The Quartermaster General. In attention, and Puerto Rico and the stra-
a period of strained relations likely to tegic triangle figured prominently in the
precede the outbreak of war with Japan, early planning. In the words of Brig.
it could be expected that one of the first Gen. George V. Strong, chief of the War
tasks assigned the Corps would be the Plans Division of the General Staff, "Pan-
strengthening of seacoast defenses bor- ama, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Alaska,"
dering on the Pacific. were "vital links in our defensive
The mounting international tension chain." 9 Appearing before the Com-
in the late 1930's in Europe and in the mittee on Military Affairs of the House
Far East indicated that a major defense of Representatives on 17 January 1939
build-up was probably close at hand. during a hearing on a request for funds,
Late in 1938, President Roosevelt advo- Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring
cated that the United States, hitherto and General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff,
concerned only with defending its own outlined their defense program. Like
territories, protect all of the western the President, they stressed the need for
hemisphere. Addressing Congress in air power. Of the outlying territories,
January 1939, he stressed the need for they considered the Canal Zone by far
strong armed forces and asked for $525 the most important. General Craig
million for armaments, half of it to be wanted $23 million for work on airfields
spent by 30 June 1940. Three hundred there. He asked for $6.5 million to
million dollars of the total would go for strengthen coastal defenses in the United
airplanes to bolster the air defenses of States, the Canal Zone, and Hawaii and
the continental United States, Alaska, $4 million to build the first air base in
Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone. The Alaska. An unspecified but modest sum
President wanted some $8 million to im- would be needed to build technical facil-
prove seacoast defenses in the Canal ities and temporary housing for the Air
Zone, Hawaii, and the continental Corps in Puerto Rico. No money was
United States.8 requested for the Philippines.10
partment for the fiscal year 1940. By fense appropriations. Until well into
far the greater share of the money for 1940 Congress took no further action.
defense construction requested by the On 12 February it made its last appro-
War Department went to The Quarter- priation for the fiscal year 1940, giving
master General, who received $24,387,- The Quartermaster General $11,661,800
987 for construction in the United States in construction funds, of which $112,800
and its outlying territories. The Chief was earmarked for Panama. Nothing
of Engineers got $2,721,960 to improve was given to the Engineers. This was
seacoast defenses, of which $1,146,000 the period of the "phony war." The
was to be spent in Panama and $268,746 conflict in Europe aroused little alarm;
in Hawaii. D u r i n g the following many members of Congress, well attuned
months Congress made supplemental to public opinion, were strongly disposed
appropriations. In May it gave the En- to slash the War Department's request
gineers an additional $1,059,705 to im- for funds. On 23 February, the Sub-
prove seacoast defenses, $828,805 of it committee of the House Committee on
for Panama and $230,900 for Hawaii. Appropriations began hearings on the
In July the Quartermaster Corps got War Department's requests for funds for
$90,349,459 more for military construc- the fiscal year 1941. The War Depart-
tion in the United States and its outlying ment had asked for $29,461,748 to im-
possessions, including $3,600,000 to build prove and enlarge military posts—$18,-
an airfield near Fairbanks, Alaska, the 535,560 of this sum to be spent on in-
first money to be allotted to the War stallations in the triangle. Over $12
Department for defense in that Terri- million was to go for a second air base
tory. In August Congress gave the in Alaska at Anchorage and for the stor-
Quartermaster Corps an additional $400,- age of gasoline and bombs in the Ter-
000for the Alaskan airfield and the En- ritory. In the report made by the Ap-
gineers $1,500,000 to improve the road propriations Committee to the House
from the Canal Zone to Rio Hato air- on 3 April, the War Department's re-
field. By 1 September 1939 the Quar- quests for the triangle were drastically
termaster General had received a total curtailed. In the bill sent by the House
of $132,466,746 for military construc- to the Senate, the $18,535,560 asked for
tion, about half of it for strengthening had been cut to $4,305,675. The funds
the defense triangle. The Engineers requested for Panama were only slightly
had received $6,526,196, of which they curtailed, but those for Hawaii were cut
were to spend $3,924,451 to strengthen approximately in half and those for
the Canal Zone and Hawaii.14 Alaska eliminated completely.15
The outbreak of the war in Europe
on 1 September had little effect on de- 15
(1) Public Law 415, 76th Cong, 3d sess, 12 Feb
40. (2) House Subcom of the Com on Appns, 76th
Cong, 3d sess, Hearings on the Military Establish-
14
(1) Public Law 44, 76th Cong, 1st sess, 26 Apr 39. ment Appropriations Bill for 1941, p. 375. (3) Wat-
(2) Public Law 61, 76th Cong, 1st sess, 2 May 39. son, Chief of Staff, p. 165. (4) S Subcom of Com on
(3) Public Law 164, 76th Cong, 1st sess, 1 Jul 39. (4) Appns, 76th Cong, 3d sess, Hearings on House
Public Law 361, 76th Cong, 1st sess, 9 Aug 39. Report 9209, p. 5.
10 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
elsewhere, was responsible for building The Canal Zone, a strip of land 10 miles
fortifications, improving rivers and har- wide through which ran the vital water-
bors, and constructing works for flood way, was 3,350 miles from Los Angeles.
control. In late 1939 Maj. Peter E. Ber- Panama, which the Canal Zone bi-
mel was district engineer, serving under sected, had no industry to speak of,
the Pacific Division engineer in San almost no construction equipment, and
Francisco, who in turn was responsible few skilled workmen. The only manu-
to the Chief of Engineers. factured items the engineers could count
There was no engineer organization in upon getting locally were structural clay
Alaska. Responsibility for such rivers products, principally brick and tile. Of
and harbors and flood control work as the three outlying territories, Alaska
was done rested on the Seattle Engineer would offer the greatest obstacles to
District headed by Col. Beverly C. Dunn, large-scale military construction. About
who was under Col. John C. H. Lee, one-fifth the size of the continental
North Pacific Division Engineer. The United States, the Territory had a scant
defense of the Territory was the respon- 75,000 inhabitants. The almost com-
sibility of Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, com- plete absence of industry, public utili-
mander of the Fourth Army, with head- ties, and highways, and the remote lo-
quarters in San Francisco.17 cation of the areas of strategic impor-
An expanding construction effort in tance, presented a dreary prospect.
the outlying territories would pose diffi-
culties. There were few resources in Work Begins
manpower or materials in the triangle.
The Hawaiian chain, about 2,400 miles During 1939 and the first months of
southwest of San Francisco, with an area 1940, the engineers began the task of
of some 6,200 square miles, had a popu- improving the defenses of Panama.
lation of 425,000, almost all of it con- Colonel North's organization casemated
centrated on the five major islands. a few guns, built additional bombproof
Oahu, with the capital city of Honolulu, storage for ammunition, and put in a
was the center of the Territory's econ- small number of access roads. In late
omy, which was based mainly on the 1939 the 11th Engineers began to im-
18
production of pineapples and sugar cane. prove Rio Hato airfield. On the
There was little manufacturing. Al- whole, the expanded program provided
most all of the supplies and the great for by the Congressional appropriations
number of workmen required for an remained in the planning stages. Much
extensive construction program would of the money which Congress did make
have to come from the United States. available for the fiscal year 1940 had to
be spent for equipment. "Our dry sea-
17
(1) Prelim Study, I, 3, 10, 49; III, 127; app. A, son," Colonel North wrote on 27 De-
pp. 1-2. (2) Ltr, North to C EHD, 19 Jul 57. EHD cember, "is about here and we were all
Files. (3) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering
Opns During World War II, POA, pp. VI, X. EHD
18
Files. Hist Rcd of the 11th Engrs, 1943. 314.7, KCRC.
12 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MAP 2
22
(1) Navy Department, Bureau of Yards and 600.1 (Ladd Field AC Progress) vol. II, 1940-41. (3)
Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World War II Rpt of Bd of Offs on Survey of Airfields in Alaska
(Washington, 1947) (cited hereafter as Building the ... 7 Jun to 8 Aug 39. 686 (Alaska) 1939. (4) Ltr,
Navy's Bases) I, 163, 169, 174. (2) Ltr, Maj Edward SW to Chmn CAA, 4 Jan 40. WPD 4239. (5) Ltr,
M. George, CQM Alaska Air Base, to Lt J. B. Kingman to CofAC, 6 Mar 40. 686 (Annette Island,
Rankin, Acting CQM Alaska Air Base, 19 Jan 40. Alaska) vol. I, 1940-41.
14 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
gress rushed plans and preparations for the RAINBOW plans. The fall of France
building up armaments. On 13 June, had caused a decided shift in emphasis
Congress, in its regular appropriation from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Dur-
for the fiscal year 1941, restored the items ing the late spring, Army and Navy plan-
for the triangle that it had cut out a few ners had concentrated on RAINBOW 4,
months earlier. The Quartermaster re- which presupposed possible operations
ceived funds for modernizing and en- in the Atlantic and South America and
larging Fort Shafter and Schofield Bar- a defensive stand in the Pacific. Presi-
racks in Hawaii, improving Albrook dent Roosevelt approved this plan on
Field and the post of Corozal in Panama, 14 August. Thereafter, the planners
and constructing a second air base, El- concentrated on RAINBOW 5, which pre-
mendorf, together with an Army post, supposed operations in Europe and
Fort Richardson, near Anchorage in Africa, while, as under RAINBOW 4, the
Alaska. The Engineers got $8,722,718 United States would remain on the de-
for seacoast defenses; $2,896,813 of this fensive in the Pacific.24
sum was to be spent for installations in Faced with the threat of a two-ocean
Panama and $599,686 for those in Ha- conflict, War Department planners re-
waii. Of the sum for Panama, $212,193 garded the strengthening of the Canal
was to be used to improve fortifications, Zone as more urgent than ever. North
$328,100 to complete work on the 16- and his engineers expanded their con-
inch guns at Fort Kobbe and on minor struction efforts. They got started on
batteries, $236,520 to build storage for the job of making the antiaircraft bat-
ammunition, $1,120,000 to buy and in- teries mobile. A new type of project,
stall searchlights, and $1,000,000 to put assigned in June, was the building of
in access roads.23 the joint command post tunnel for the
During the summer Congress enacted department headquarters at Quarry
additional measures to strengthen de- Heights on the Pacific side. For this
fenses. On 19 July it passed the "Two job, North used men from his regular
Ocean Navy Act," which authorized ex- hired labor force trained in fortifications
pansion of the fleet by 70 percent. In work. Construction was speeded up at
August it authorized the President to Rio Hato. During the summer part of
call the National Guard into federal the 11th Engineers, about 600 men from
service. On 9 September it passed the the Air Corps, and some men loaned
second supplemental defense appropria- by the quartermaster were at work there.
tions act, which increased the authorized A dock was built to unload materials and
program by $5.4 billion. A week later heavy equipment, which had to be
it enacted legislation authorizing the shipped by sea, since the road from the
draft. The strength of the Army was Canal Zone, constructed as part of the
to be increased to 1400,000 men. Pan American Highway, would not hold
The Joint Board accelerated work on
24
(1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemi-
sphere Defense, pp. 34-36, 92-93. (2) Public Law
23
Public Law 611, 76th Cong, 3d sess, 13 Jun 40. 781, 76th Cong, 3d sess, 9 Sep 40.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 15
up under military traffic.25 A hamper- the State Department were making little
ing factor was the rainy season, which progress in persuading the Panamanian
prevailed from May till December. Government to lease land for 999 years,
"One of the major difficulties . .as American
. wascommanders in the Canal
the climate," North wrote later. "Dur- Zone wished. How long it would be
ing the rainy season, the clayey earth be- before Panama would consent to lease
came a soft sticky gumbo and . . land.wascon-
a question impossible to answer
struction which involved earth excava- in the summer of 1940.27
tion and moving was difficult and In only slightly less emphatic fashion,
26
slow." Construction was not North's the engineers in Hawaii felt the impact
only interest. Because military maps of of the growing defense effort. Between
the Canal Zone, made back in 1915, were April 1939 and July 1940 Congress had
almost obsolete, North wanted to re- appropriated $1,197,332 for improving
map certain areas by using aerial pho- seacoast defenses in the islands. General
tography. In September, much-needed Herron, convinced that the program for
equipment began to arrive to make pos- peacetime defense construction as out-
sible a start on the aerocartographic pro- lined in mid-1939 would have to be ex-
gram. panded, continued to insist on more
By the summer of 1940 General Van funds for fortifications, and in this he
Voorhis and his staff were greatly con- was wholeheartedly supported by Col.
cerned with making defenses more mo- Albert K. B. Lyman, who became depart-
bile. But mobility of itself would be ment engineer in July 1940. Herron
of little value unless numerous defense wanted more airfields and seacoast bat-
installations were built in the Republic teries, more antiaircraft guns and search-
of Panama. Some of the 153 search- lights. He was particularly anxious to
lights and most of the aircraft warning bombproof vital installations on Oahu.
stations which Van Voorhis wanted He insisted on more underground stor-
would have to be located there. New age for ammunition, which he planned
defense installations in the Republic to distribute on Oahu as a protection
would necessitate building many addi- against bombing and to relieve conges-
tional roads. A big stumbling block tion at Aliamanu Crater, the main stor-
was securing land from Panama. By a age area, about one mile east of Pearl
treaty negotiated in 1936 and ratified in Harbor. On 5 July he appointed a
1939, any tracts of land which the United board of officers to consider all aspects
States authorities wanted in the Repub- of defense against aerial and naval bom-
lic were to be secured by negotiations bardment. With construction on new
with the Panamanian Government, and military installations about to begin, the
procedures for leasing had not yet been need for more roads and trails was press-
worked out. The War Department and ing. They would have to be put in to
27
(1) Memo, C Constr Sec Mil Div OCE for
25
(1) Public Law 611, 76th Cong, 3d sess, 13 Jun CofEngrs, 29 Apr 40. 660.283 (Panama) File 3, 1936-
40. (2) Hist Rcd of the 11th Engrs, 1943. 314.7.
26
41. (2) Acquisition of Land, PCD, prepared by Hist
Ltr, North to C EHD, 19 Jul 57. EHD Files. Sec AGO HQ PCD, Mar 45, pp. 13-20.
16 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
provide access to the new observation north, northeast, south, or southwest un-
posts, antiaircraft batteries, seacoast bat- til they were quite close. The members
teries, and searchlight positions. Addi- of the board emphasized the need of pro-
tional roads would be needed for military viding protection to the westward as this
operations. The conflict in Europe had was the direction from which an attack
demonstrated that, in the new mobile would most likely come. Their report,
type of warfare, troops, in order to move made in April 1940, called for three fixed
forward or withdraw rapidly, required a and six mobile stations on the four larg-
variety of roads and trails. Lyman est islands and an information center at
doubted that many additional roads Fort Shafter. The fixed stations were
could be built if war were imminent or to be built at the most crucial points.
under way; if built at all, they would The westernmost one would be at Kokee
have to be put in in peacetime. To on Kauai. (Map 3) On Oahu, the sta-
bolster the defenses of the Islands, Gen- tion would be put on steep and craggy
eral Herron and Colonel Lyman wanted 4,000-foot high Mount Kaala, west of
more engineer troops. On 23 August, Schofield Barracks, while the station on
Herron "strongly recommended" to the Maui would be atop 10,000-foot high
War Department that a regiment of avia- Haleakala. On 27 June the War De-
tion engineers, less one battalion—a new partment authorized construction, and in
type of engineer unit trained to build July Lyman conferred with Lt. Col.
airfields—be sent. The reply from Theodore Wyman, Jr., the newly ap-
Washington was that there were so few pointed district engineer, to acquaint
engineer troops none could be spared.28 him with the project. Building these
Especially critical in Hawaii was the stations would not be easy, for the sites
need for aircraft warning stations. were remote and inaccessible. The sta-
Early in 1940, a local board of officers tion on Mount Kaala would require a
had made a study of the need for such cableway to the summit to bring up sup-
stations. The members spent ten weeks plies. To get construction started in
surveying the five principal islands from the summer, Lyman planned to have the
the air and on the ground. It was ap- 3d Engineers begin surveying for an ac-
parent that the configuration of the archi- cess road to the lower terminal of the
pelago limited construction to a line cableway to be built to the top of Mount
extending generally northwest and south- Kaala.29
east from Oahu. It would be difficult The Engineers in the summer of 1940
to detect planes approaching from the somewhat unexpectedly became in part
responsible for defense construction in
Alaska. On 10 May the War Plans Di-
vision had informed General George C.
28
(1) Rad, Herron to TAG, 8 Oct 40. WPD 1928- Marshall, Chief of Staff since 1 July 1939,
27. (2) Memo, Acting ACofS WPD for Marshall, 21
Jan 41. WPD 1928-27. (3) 5th Ind, Herron to
TAG, 15 Nov 40, basic unknown. 600-B Hawaii,
29
1940-42, AAF, Central Files. (4) Interstaff Routing (1) Ltr, Herron to TAG, 17 Apr 40. Engr AGF
Slip, Dept Engr to CofS HD, 4 Oct 40. Engr AGF PAC, Sig 676.3. (2) 4th Ind, TAG to Herron, 27
PAC. (5) Ltr, Herron to TAG, 3 Feb 41. 381 Jun 40, on Herron Ltr. (3) Ltr, Lyman to CofEngrs,
(Hawaii) 106. 13 Jul 40. Engr AGF PAC, Sig 676.3.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 17
MAP 3
stations, and also recommended that the He was in favor of the locations for the
contractors being employed to build the installations at Kodiak, Sitka, Fairbanks,
naval bases be used to build posts for and Anchorage, but wanted the 5 other
Army garrisons. The Secretaries of War sites resurveyed. He suggested that ef-
and Navy approved these recommenda- forts be made to reduce costs, especially
tions, which became the basis of Army for access roads.32
and Navy policies with regard to Alaskan General DeWitt was anxious to im-
31
defenses. prove communications in the almost un-
Since Alaska in time of war would be inhabited territory. Of vital impor-
especially liable to air attack, much tance was the government-owned Alaskan
thought was given to the construction of Railroad running northward from the
aircraft warning stations. Late in May port of Seward through Anchorage and
DeWitt was directed to make a study of on to Fairbanks. From the standpoint
the network of stations which the War of defense, the weakest point in the line
Plans Division proposed for the Terri- was the 100-mile section from Seward to
tory. Included was an information cen- Anchorage, where the railway passed
ter at Anchorage and four detector sta- through deep gorges and over high
tions, three of them to be near the naval trestles, thus providing attractive targets
bases and one near Anchorage. If pos- for saboteurs and hostile aircraft. The
sible, the stations were to be mobile. railroad's management was considering
Should General DeWitt judge that more building a 14-mile cutoff at a point sixty-
stations were needed, he was to decide six miles north of Seward eastward to
where they were to be located. Colonel Passage Canal, an inlet on Prince Wil-
Lee, as North Pacific Division Engineer, liam Sound. DeWitt suggested to the
would be responsible for making surveys, War Department that it exert every influ-
preparing estimates, and constructing the ence to have this project carried out, pref-
buildings for housing the equipment. erably by the Engineers. On 13 July the
After studies had been made by a board War Department authorized Colonel Lee
of officers, DeWitt proposed construction to investigate and consider three choices:
of an information center at Anchorage, improving the line from Seward to
one mobile station at Fairbanks, and 7 Anchorage, constructing the cutoff, and
fixed stations along the coast from Sitka developing Anchorage itself as a port for
to Norton Sound, just south of Bering oceangoing vessels. Two engineers sent
Strait. He believed the number of de- out by Colonel Dunn to explore the pos-
tector stations should eventually be in- sibilities recommended that the Alaskan
creased to 13. In August General Mar- Railroad be authorized to build the cut-
shall approved plans for the information off. While this shortened route would
center and for 8 of the detector stations. require some three and one-half miles
31 32
(1) Memos, Strong for Marshall, 10 May, 17 Jun (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for TAG, 22 May 40.
40. WPD 4297. (2) Hist of the 32d Engr Co (Com- (2) Ltr, ACofS WPD to TAG, 29 May 40. (3) Note
bat) (Sep) While in Alaska. (3) JB 312 Ser 650, 14 for Rcd on Memo, Acting ACofS for TAG, 9 Dec 40.
Aug 40. WPD 3512-68. (4) Watson, Chief of Staff, (4) Memo, ACofS for TAG, 7 Aug 40. All in WPD
p. 456. 3640-6.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 19
By this time, there was a declining ers had great confidence in the Corps of
37
emphasis in Washington on civil works. Engineers' technical ability.
The President, while requesting greater A change in construction responsibili-
sums for military construction, was ask- ties was soon forthcoming, for on 9
ing that rivers and harbors work be held September the President signed a bill
to a minimum. Largely for this reason, which authorized the Secretary of War
the Chief of Engineers made a bid for a at his discretion to transfer to the Engi-
substantial role in the building of de- neers any part of military construction
fense projects.36 The commanders in then assigned to the Quartermaster
the triangle were very much in favor of Corps. This authority was to expire on
transferring military construction from 30 June 1942. For the time being, the
the Quartermaster Corps to the Engi- Secretary did not invoke this power.38
neers. The centralized system whereby In view of the increasingly serious
local constructing quartermasters were international situation, defense work in
under the direct control of The Quarter- the outlying territories seemed exasper-
master General in Washington had atingly slow to the local commanders.
caused a great deal of dissatisfaction. In There were many reasons for the delays.
the Canal Zone, for example, the depart- It took time for the enactments of Con-
ment engineer, a member of General gress to be translated into construction.
Van Voorhis' staff, handled fortifications The War Department had to put detailed
work, but all other military construction plans for building into final form.
was the responsibility of the constructing Workmen had to be hired and organized
quartermaster, who reported directly to into effective construction forces. In re-
The Quartermaster General's office. In cruiting workers, the Engineers were
Hawaii, the Honolulu District Engineer confronted with increasing competition
had broad authority and could, in line from the Quartermaster Corps and the
with General Herron's suggestions, make Navy. Materials had to be ordered and
decisions on the spot, while the local con- shipped as prescribed by government
structing quartermaster had to refer most regulations. In Panama and Alaska,
design and contractual matters to his climatic conditions were a hampering
superiors in Washington. General De- factor. In many cases, work was held up
Witt was of the opinion that The because of strong differences of opinion
Quartermaster Corps, although it did over sites for installations. To many in
excellent work, was inclined to carry on the War Department, the possibility of
construction at a leisurely peacetime an attack on the triangle seemed remote,
pace, while the Engineers, prepared to with the need for fast action not
build in war, put great emphasis on apparent.
speed. All three department command- In the Canal Zone, the rains continued
to be a major hindrance. Insofar as
sphere Defense, pp. 74-75, 93. (2) Public Law 800,
76th Cong, 3d sess, 8 Oct 40.
36 37
Testimony of Robert P. Patterson, USW, 22 Sep Interv, Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington
41. S Com on Mil Affairs, Hearings ... on S. 1884, with General DeWitt, 10 Apr 57. EHD Files.
38
77th Cong, 1st sess, p. 29. 54 Stat. 875.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 21
possible, the engineers worked on search- the United States about acquiring land
light emplacements, antiaircraft bat- in Panama. Instead of a 999-year lease
teries, storage for ammunition, and ac- —or even a 99-year lease as some sug-
cess roads. They made some progress on gested—he wished to limit U.S. tenure to
Rio Hato. When the 9th Bombardment the duration of the emergency. The
Group arrived from the United States in War Department wanted jurisdiction
November, the 11th Engineers put up a over acquired real estate; President Arias
2,000-man camp for them. The Public insisted that Panama should retain full
Roads Administration, with funds sup- sovereignty.40
plied by the Engineers, began to improve Early in December, Arias proposed
the highway from the Canal Zone to the that a joint U.S.-Panamanian commis-
airfield. In November Colonel North sion be appointed to investigate the sites.
set up a Soils Laboratory whose main job A commission of five—three Pana-
was to test the soils of the Canal Zone's manians and two Americans, one of them
generally swampy terrain and recom- Colonel North—was established. After
mend methods of compaction and stabili- the commission's first meeting, North in-
zation for roads and airfields.39 formed Van Voorhis that it would take
Van Voorhis was especially anxious to at least four months to inspect the sites
get work started on the aircraft warning and locate the owners. On 30 Decem-
stations, and in October the War De- ber Van Voorhis forwarded a list of the
partment approved his plans for nine. most urgently needed tracts to the Pana-
Besides the two at the entrances to the manian Government, suggesting that,
Canal, where experimental facilities were pending final agreement, the United
already in place, Van Voorhis wanted States should be permitted to occupy the
seven in the Panamanian Republic. He lands. By the end of the year, no ap-
prepared plans for two coast artillery and preciable progress had been made toward
forty-six searchlight positions, some of a settlement of the land acquisition
the latter to be set up in Panama. In problem.41
addition, he wanted the quartermaster to In Alaska the engineers continued to
build a number of auxiliary airdromes be mainly concerned with the airfields in
and landing fields in the Republic. On the panhandle. The aviation engineers
11 October he gave a list of the desired at Annette were gaining experience on
sites to the Panamanian Government. their first job. Work went ahead on the
Little progress was being made on the camp and dock and, late in the fall, the
leasing question. Dr. Arnulfo Arias, men began clearing the runway sites.
who took office as President of Panama Such problems as Major Nold had were
on 2 October 1940, raised many objec- mainly with people. A few weeks after
tions to the views of the Government of
40
(1) Ltr, Van Voorhis to Marshall, 12 Nov 40.
39
(1) Prelim Study, II, 240-42, 258-60, 345-47; I, WPD 2674-30. (2) Acquisition of Land, PCD, pp.
112-17. (2) Hist of 11th Engrs, Panama, 1940-42. 20-23.
41
314.7, KCRC. (3) Memo, C Constr Sec OCE for (1) Ltr, Van Voorhis to Marshall, 3 Jan 41.
Schley, 29 Aug 40, sub: Progress on Rio Hato Road WPD 2674-31. (2) Acquisition of Land, PCD, pp.
Panama. 611 Panama 1940-45. 23-25.
22 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
work started, the Council of the Metla- camp was nearing completion. Clearing
katla Indians called upon Governor for the runways was continuing.44
Ernest Gruening of Alaska to inform To get work started at Yakutat, Nold
him that their tribesmen were not being sent part of his slender force to that site.
given jobs or an opportunity to sell On 23 October Capt. Benjamin B. Talley
supplies and that Nold had exceeded his with Company B of the 28th Engineers
authority by getting water for his camp and a few civilians arrived from Annette.
from a lake outside the area set aside for No CCC labor was desired and none was
the airfield.42 Agreeing that the Indians sent. As this was the off-season for fish
were partly justified, Nold was prepared canning, a local company leased its
to meet some of their demands. He buildings, wharf, and narrow-gauge rail-
hired some fifty Indians as laborers, and road, and some of the troops were housed
placed them in their own camp, situated in the canneries. By the end of the
at some distance from the soldiers' year, clearing for the runways was about
bivouac to lessen chances of friction. to begin. By using engineer troops, De-
"The scheme," Nold wrote, "worked Witt had gotten a head start on the air-
43
pretty well and satisfied the Indians." fields in the Alaska panhandle.45
The lake was the only adequate source Other Alaskan projects remained in
of water and, in accordance with Nold's the planning stages. In late October,
recommendation, the amount of land G-4 directed the Chief of Engineers to
under lease was extended to include the make preparations to start work in the
lake. spring on the cut-off for the Alaska Rail-
There were difficulties not only with road. General Schley assigned the job
the Indians but also with the CCC. to Colonel Dunn, who planned to have
Under that organization's regulations, hired labor and contractors' organiza-
the work-day included the time spent in tions do the clearing, grading, and tun-
travel between camp and job. Because neling and employees of the Alaskan
the soldiers resented seeing the civilians Railroad lay the track. On 9 December
arrive at work later and leave earlier, the War Plans Division ordered construc-
Nold set out to have the CCC regulations tion of aircraft warning stations at
changed, but without success, at least not Kodiak, Sitka, and Fairbanks and an in-
then. There were bitter complaints formation center at Anchorage. DeWitt
from both the CCC men and the civilian now recommended that one or more sta-
technicians about the inadequate rations tions be built north of Cape Prince of
for the cold, damp climate. In Decem- Wales, which would extend the line of
ber more adequate supplies of food be- protection almost to the Arctic Circle,
gan to arrive. By the end of the year
the dock had been finished and the 44
(1) Ltr, Nold to Dunn, 6 Feb 41. 230.44 Alaska
pt. I. (2) Ltr, Nold to CG, Ninth Corps Area, 5 Nov
40. 430.2 (Alaska).
45
(1) Memo, Kingman for ACofS G-4, 16 Sep 40.
42
Ltr, Nold to Dunn, 18 Sep 40. 686 (Annette (2) Ltr, Dunn to Lee, 14 Oct 40. (3) Semimonthly
Island, Alaska), 1940-41, vol. I. Rpt, Yakutat Landing Field, 1-15 Dec 40. All in
43
Ltr, Nold to C EHD, 7 Aug 57. EHD Files. 868 (Yakutat Airfield), pt. I.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 23
and the War Plans Division took the that money would be forthcoming for
suggestion under study. Preparations such projects. In September the 3d En-
were being made to photomap many of gineers began work on the access road for
the little-known areas of the Territory the aircraft warning station on Mount
now vitally important for defense. De- Kaala. There were indications that build-
Witt planned to send a photoreconnais- ing this station and the others as well
sance flight and Company D of the 29th might take considerable time. The site
Engineer Topographic Battalion to atop Haleakala was in Hawaii National
46
Alaska in the spring. There was much Park. Park officials agreed to give the War
discussion over how many defenses Department temporary use of the land,
Alaska needed and where they should be but they were opposed to having struc-
located. "Generally speaking," Talley tures erected which would "materially
subsequently recalled, "through 1940 an alter the natural appearance of the reser-
atmosphere of peacetime life prevailed, vation." They insisted on first seeing "the
only those who remembered 1914-1917 preliminary building plans showing the
furnished the spark of urgency." 47 architecture and general appearance" of
In Hawaii, some work was started in the structures. The Honolulu District
late 1940. Construction began on a few was finding it difficult to recruit work-
roads and trails, since Congress had al- men because the Navy and the Quarter-
lotted $70,200 for such work in the master Corps had already absorbed a
Islands in the third supplemental appro- large part of the labor force in the
priation, made in September. But this Islands. By late 1940, various military
was only a small beginning in bettering units, such as the Hawaiian Separate
communications. In Lyman's opinion, Coast Artillery Brigade and the Hawaiian
improving the rail net was just as im- Division, were forced to use their own
portant as building new roads. Ur- men to build and maintain the roads and
gently needed was a connecting link trails they needed.48
between Wahiawa on the Central Plateau Wyman had planned to do the addi-
and the island's north shore to keep tional defense work with hired labor, but
supplies moving to the coastal defenses. by fall it was doubtful if enough workers
Also of great benefit would be double- could be found. Using hired labor was a
tracking part of the line from Honolulu method best suited for small jobs, as a
to Schofield Barracks and providing by- rule, and not practical for larger projects,
passes where the railroad crossed over on
high bridges. But the chances were slim 48
(1) Interstaff Routing Slip, Lyman to CofS HD,
4 Oct 40. (2) Interstaff Routing Slip, Maj Vere A.
46
(1) 1st Ind, TAG to CofEngrs, 30 Oct 40, on Ltr, Beers, 3d Engr Regt, to CO, 3d Engr Regt, 4 Oct 40.
DeWitt to TAG, 31 Jul 40. (2) Ltr, Dunn to Lee, Both in Engr AGF PAC. (3) Ltr, Herron to
7 Dec 40. Both in 617 (Alaska). (3) Note for Rcd Wyman, 7 Nov 40. Engr AGF PAC, 676.3. (4) Ltr,
on Memo, Acting ACofS WPD for TAG, 9 Dec 40. Short to Marshall, 15 Mar 41. Pearl Harbor Attack,
WPD 3640-6. (4) 10th Ind, TAG to DeWitt, 20 Dec Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investi-
40, on Ltr, Kingman to DeWitt, 17 Sep 40. 061.01 gation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (cited hereafter as
(Alaska) pt. I. Pearl Harbor Hearings, 79th Cong, 1st sess, pt. 30,
47
Incl to Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57. EHD pp. 3005-3006). (5) Ltr, Herron to TAG, 8 Nov 40.
Files. Engr AGF PAC, 611.
24 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
especially if speed was a primary consid- equipment. The government was ex-
eration, because of the time and effort pected to provide him, if necessary, with
required to recruit, organize, and ad- additional equipment, which it would
minister a large number of workmen. rent from suppliers of such machinery.
There were alternative ways of getting Under the terms of the agreement the
the work done. Wyman could employ government reimbursed the contractor
construction firms under lump-sum con- for nearly all expenditures and paid him
tracts. This would mean advertising the a fee, the amount of which was limited
work, receiving bids from contractors, by law. The haste with which such con-
and giving the contract to the lowest re- tracts had to be let meant that cost esti-
sponsible bidder. Once an agreement mates were often not much more than
was signed, it would be up to the con- guesses of the most general kind. Cost-
tractor to finish the job within the speci- plus-a-fixed-fee contracts were frequently
fied time. Another method—new to the used by big construction firms. The gov-
Engineers—was to give a job to a con- ernment had entered into such contracts
struction firm under a cost-plus-a-fixed- in World War I, but had not used them
fee contract. This type of contract had in peacetime. In 1940 few Army officers
been designed for emergency conditions, outside the Quartermaster Corps were
and was to be used especially when there conversant with them, or with the diffi-
was little or no time for preparing plans culties which might ensue from their
and specifications. Congress had first au- use.49
thorized its use in August 1939 for con- In October 1940 Colonel Wyman dis-
struction in Panama and Alaska. In July cussed ways and means of accomplishing
1940 Congress approved its use without construction with Col. Warren T. Han-
restrictions as to time or place. Under num, the South Pacific Division En-
the new arrangement, the War Depart- gineer, at that time on an inspection trip
ment selected a firm it considered quali- to the Islands. Like engineer officers in
fied and negotiated an agreement. Ad- general, Hannum preferred having work
vertising, receiving bids, and awarding done by purchase and hire and was op-
the job to the lowest responsible bidder posed to using cost-plus-a-fixed-fee con-
—standard procedure under the lump- tracts. But in view of the fact that the
sum arrangement—were eliminated. Navy was using this type of agreement
To qualify for the new type of contract a extensively in the Islands and since there
firm had to have a good reputation and was little time to prepare plans and speci-
the financial resources to do the work. fications, negotiating a cost-plus-a-fixed-
Every cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract had to fee contract appeared to be the best
be approved by the Under Secretary of solution. In a letter to Hannum on 4
War. If it amounted to more than $500,- November, the Office of the Chief of
000, it had to be approved, in addition,
by the Advisory Commission to the 49
For a detailed discussion of cost-plus-a-fixed-fee
Council of National Defense. The con- contracts, see Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington,
Military Construction in the United States, a draft
tractor furnished his organization and manuscript in preparation for the series UNITED
his know-how and supplied materials and STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 25
Engineers approved using the new type job sites, for organizing and directing the
of contract. Looking about for reliable work crews, and for administering their
contractors, Wyman could find none in organization. One of their first tasks
Hawaii not already heavily engaged in would be to recruit workers in the
defense work. Hannum suggested to Wy- United States to build up a construction
man that he come to the mainland to organization in the islands.50
look for suitable firms. Interviewing con- After Congress had empowered the
tractors in Los Angeles, Wyman was able Secretary of War to transfer any part of
to line up three well-known firms, the construction for the Army from the
Rohl-Connolly Company, the W. E. Quartermaster Corps to the Corps of En-
Callahan Construction Company, and gineers, discussions began in the War
Gunther & Shirley Company. Rohl- Department about what changes, if any,
Connolly had completed several large should be made in the construction
projects for the Corps of Engineers and setup. On 19 November, a partial trans-
other agencies of the federal government, fer was made. All construction for the
among them the Los Angeles—Long Air Corps was transferred to the En-
Beach breakwater and Headgate Dam at gineers, except in the Canal Zone, where
Parker, Arizona. many contracts included work for both
On 20 December 1940 Wyman, with Air Corps and ground forces and a divi-
the approval of the Chief of Engineers, sion of responsibility would have been
the Under Secretary of War, and the Ad- impractical. In the United States, the
visory Commission to the Council of first fields were transferred in December,
National Defense, signed a cost-plus-a- while in the triangle, the first ones were
fixed-fee contract in Washington, D. C., scheduled for transfer early in 1941.
with the three firms, who formed a joint Military commanders in Hawaii and
venture known as the Hawaiian Con- Alaska believed the transfer did not go
structors. The contract called for build- far enough. On 16 December, General
ing fortifications, aircraft warning sta- DeWitt wrote to Maj. Gen. Richard C.
tions, and storage for ammunition; Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff, that "the
laying additional railway track; and two parts of the Anchorage construction
making additions to the radio station at . . . are so closely tied together th
Fort Shafter. The work was to cost $1,- efficient and expeditious job cannot be
097,673 and the fixed fee was $52,220. done, if both the Quartermaster Corps
The Hawaiian Constructors would re- and the Corps of Engineers are in-
ceive all plans and specifications from volved." DeWitt wanted the work given
the district as they became ready and to the Engineers, and the General Staff
would be responsible for detailed con-
struction planning to meet the approval 50
(1) Pearl Harbor Hearings, pts. 28-29, Testi-
of the engineer in charge of the field area mony of Col Wyman, pp. 1748ff. (2) Ibid., Testi-
in which the project was located. They mony of Brig Gen Warren T. Hannum, pp. 1060ff.
would be responsible for transporting (3) Ltr, Asst Dept IG to CG HD, 4 Nov 41. Engr
AGF PAC, 331 IG Rpts (Gen)-3. (4) Ltr, Engr CPA
materials and equipment from the en- to CG CPA, 14 Mar 44. Engr AGF PAC, Contracts,
gineer supply yards in Honolulu to the 160, vol. I.
26 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
took his suggestions under study. Herron cember, General Herron was informed
wanted all military construction in the that the transfer of all construction in
Islands transferred to the Engineers, Hawaii was "not favorably considered."51
radioing the War Department on 6 De- In any case, with work for the Air Corps
cember 1940 that most of the work was added to their responsibilities in part of
for the Air Corps. In Herron's opinion, the triangle, the Engineers could look
two agencies engaged in the same type of forward to expanded activities in 1941.
work would mean duplication of organi-
zation and competition for workmen and 51
(1) Fine and Remington, Military Construction
materials. He wanted the construct- in the United States. (2) Memo, CofS for SW, 1
ing quartermaster's entire organization, Apr 41. G-4/31324. (3) Ltr, DeWitt to Moore, 16
plant, and equipment transferred. The Dec 40. (4) Rad, Herron to TAG, 6 Dec 40. (5)
DCofS G-4 to TAG, 31 Dec 40. Last three in AG
General Staff did not agree. On 31 De- 600.12 (11-19-40) Airfield Constr.
CHAPTER II
MAP 4
begin any day. He suggested that his better airfields. He wanted the emer-
airmen help the engineers, since substan- gency strips developed into auxiliary air-
tial numbers of civilian workmen from dromes with hard-surfaced runways, for
the United States were not expected for the original plans had not specified hard-
some time. In May, Andrews put the surfacing. The engineers experimented
airmen to work on the fields, despite the with soil stabilization and compaction at
fact that this prevented them from get- Chame to find out if such treatment
ting proper training as aviation me- would make all-weather use possible. In
chanics. By June six emergency landing June construction began on two of the
strips were ready in Panama with run- aircraft warning stations, one at Jaqué
ways sufficiently graded to allow planes near the Colombian border and the other
to land. Two auxiliary dromes—Agua- at Almirante, at the extreme western end
dulce and Chame—were under construc- of the Republic. Both sites were hard to
tion. (Map 4) With the onset of the get to, being accessible only by plane or
rains late in May, Andrews demanded ship. Land had been acquired for two
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 31
more stations but the three remaining as enough men and materials were on
sites had not yet been taken over. Van hand to make occupation practicable.
Voorhis was already thinking of expand- Negotiations for a permanent settlement
ing the system further. The local joint of the leasing problem were being car-
board wanted five more stations in Pan- ried on through diplomatic channels.
ama, and proposed extending the service There was nothing more the military
9
into Costa Rica and Colombia. authorities or the engineers could do ex-
Work went ahead in Panama during cept finish the surveys and request the
the summer and fall of 1941 despite the transfers.11
downpours of the rainy season. Addi- The engineers continued to put their
tional handicaps as frustrating as the major effort on the airfields, but despite
climate were, Colonel Young believed, hard work, they could not keep up with
the "lack of money, of authority, and of the demands of the Air Corps. Planning
certain equipment for special jobs; to make more intensive use of the fields,
notably, seagoing vessels to service the Andrews wanted more of the emergency
construction crews at several distant landing strips converted into auxiliary
(AWS) sites." 10 airdromes. Those not converted he
The protracted negotiations over the wanted improved through better mark-
acquisition of land continued to hold up ing of the runways and the removal of
engineer work after midyear. Since the obstacles in the approach zones. As the
original stalemate had been broken in rainy season wore on, the experiments
March, a number of sites had been occu- with soil stabilization and compaction
pied. But the procedures still had to be proved that such expedients were no sub-
worked out to make possible the legal stitute for asphalt or concrete. Run-
transfer of tracts. In July two U. S.- ways would have to be hard-surfaced, an
Panamanian boards were established, improvement agreed to by Panama.
one of which investigated sites that were Washington was requested to approve
to be taken over immediately, while the plans to expand some of the emergency
other arranged for their formal transfer, landing strips, particularly the one at
after investigations were completed, to Chorrera and the two at La Joya, into
the United States. This system worked airdromes and to provide hard surfacing
well, and by late August the additional for the runways. Construction was ex-
tracts which Van Voorhis had requested pected to be so extensive that contrac-
late in April had been surveyed and Pan- tors, already working for the Navy and
ama had authorized their occupation by the quartermaster in Panama, would
U.S. forces. By now the Panama Canal probably have to be employed. More
Department was in possession of all sites money was requested but the War De-
for airfields. Tracts needed for other partment did not want to ask Congress
installations would be occupied as soon for additional sums until more land had
9 11
(1) Prelim Study, II, 9-12, 230ff. (2) Note for (1) Acquisition of Land, PCD, pp. 32-40. (2)
Rcd on Memo, WPD for C AAF, 24 Sep 41. WPD Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the
4186-17. United States, 344-45. (3) Langer and Gleason, Un-
10
Ltr, Young to EHD, 28 Jul 57. EHD Files. declared War, pp. 613-15.
32 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
been secured. General Andrews, mean- neglected in the Canal Zone. In line
while, transferred funds from other with a suggestion made in the spring of
projects, hoping that he would later be 1941 by Col. Homer Saint-Gaudens,
reimbursed. Improvements of airfields chief of the Camouflage Branch, OCE,
continued, but slowly.12 The airmen an expert in the subject, Capt. Frederick
occupied Aguadulce in September but L. Fritsche, was sent to Panama. Captain
construction at Chame was still under Fritsche's main concern was how best to
way. Work had barely started at camouflage the waterway and in due
Chorrera and La Joya. course he prepared three plans. The
During the summer the engineers be- first, calling for covering the three sets
gan work on two more aircraft warning of locks with netting, was not considered
stations and obtained the right of entry feasible because of mechanical difficul-
to the three remaining sites. With ties. The second—building a dummy
priority in construction going to the set of locks in the Chagres River and the
stations on the Pacific side, General Van old French canal—was not practicable
Voorhis pressed for the completion of all because the river did not present a
seven stations. Colonel Young believed straight line or follow the contours of
there were only two ways of speeding up the Canal. The third, hiding the water-
construction. One was to postpone way under a smoke screen to be supplied
work on what he called the "elaborate by the Chemical Warfare Service, was
barracks" at the stations until essential adopted.14
apparatus had been installed. The On 19 September, Andrews succeeded
other was to transfer workers from other Van Voorhis and proved as insistent as
jobs. But this would mean slower prog- his predecessor that defenses be strength-
ress on such important installations as ened. The number of Engineer jobs
searchlights and antiaircraft batteries. continued to grow, and work had to be
There remained the difficulty of trans- carried on in the face of mounting short-
porting men and supplies to the remote ages of workmen and equipment. On 1
sites, one of the prime causes of delay. July Colonel Young had 2,295 employees
As recommended by the local joint and 1 ,500 more were expected before the
board, early in September Van Voorhis end of the year, but there were never
asked Washington to approve construc- enough to keep pace with needs. Vari-
tion of several more stations in Panama ous ways were tried to increase produc-
and in Colombia and Costa Rica as tion. On 16 July, Young received per-
well.13 mission to have his employees work
The Engineers now had to devote eight hours a day, seven days a week. In
some attention to camouflage, hitherto October, he asked that the restriction of
working hours to 56 a week be suspended.
12
(1) Acquisition of Land, PCD, pp. 37-39. (2)
Contractors working for the Quarter-
Prelim Study, II, pp. 12-14. (3) Memo, C Constr master Corps and other services already
Sec Pan Engr Div PCD to Pan Div Engr, 28 Oct 43.
CDC 686 (Airfield Facilities, Pan).
13 14
(1) Prelim Study, II, 232-34. (2) Note for Rcd (1) Prelim Study, I, 36; III, 50-54. (2) Ltr,
on Ltr, WPD to C AAF, 24 Sep 41. WPD 4186-17. Young to C EHD, 28 Jul 57.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 33
had their employees work longer hours. lowing April authorized strength was
One group of new arrivals was dissatis- raised from 7,300 men to over 18,500.
fied with the 56-hours-a-week limit. Dur- In May DeWitt asked that a headquar-
ing the rainy season working hours in ters detachment and one company of an
some weeks totaled only 30 or 40; in engineer construction battalion be sent
others as many as 70 hours would have to Fort Richardson to help the 32d en-
been possible except for the limitation. gineers, who had more than enough to
On 16 October, approval was received to do in working on facilities for their
extend the work week. As part of an camp, improving roads, and engaging in
effort to get more equipment, Young in combat training. Meanwhile, the Gen-
July asked for almost $6 million more eral Staff directed Schley and DeWitt to
for the fiscal year 1942, much of it to go prepare plans for housing for the grow-
for additional machinery. The rest ing garrison. By early May Col. Rich-
would be used for hiring more workers, ard Park, Lee's successor as North Pacific
providing housing, and getting materials. Division Engineer, had finished designs
Construction could then be vigorously for the buildings for the enlarged Army
pushed with the beginning of the dry forts at the three naval stations, for a new
season in January. Late in July the post, Fort Raymond, at Seward, and for
War Department approved this plan, housing for a small garrison at the air-
and in the following months additional port being planned by CAA for Nome.
workmen were recruited in the United The engineers were to do all construc-
States and machinery ordered. A new tion, except at the naval stations, where
difficulty arose in October when, in a it would be performed by contractors
coup d'etat, President Arias was replaced working for the Navy. Additional proj-
by Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia. In ects were being planned. In April
the change of administration, the Pan- Colonel Dunn received $1 million to in-
stall tanks for aviation gasoline at the
amanian members of the land boards lost
airfields and naval stations. That same
their places. The land transfer question
15
was stalemated again. month, Company D of the 29th Engi-
neers and Flight F, 1st Photo Squadron,
Alaska arrived in Alaska to begin ground sur-
veys and take photographs for mapping
With the end of the long subarctic purposes. Areas to be mapped included
winter, the tempo of work in Alaska the region around Anchorage, the Rich-
quickened. The Alaska Defense Force ardson Highway, and a number of major
was in February 1941 redesignated the routes regularly flown by military air-
16
Alaska Defense Command, and the fol- craft.
15
(1) Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 462-65. (2) 1st 16
(1) Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 457. (2) Hist of
Ind, 6 Aug 41, on Ltr, TAG to OCE, 29 Jul 41. the 32d Engr Co (Combat) (Sep) While in Alaska.
600.1 (Pan 1941-45) pt. 3. (3) Ltr, OCE to SW, 15 (3) Ltr, Park to Schley, 8 May 41. (4) Memo, G-4
Oct 41, with 1st Ind, WD to CofEngrs, 16 Oct 41. for TAG, 18 Apr 41. Last two in 600.1 (Alaska)
2250, pt. 12 Ser 1051-1175, Natl Archives. (4) Acqui- May 40-Oct 41. (5) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 12 Feb 41.
sition of Land, PCD, p. 40. 061.01 (Alaska) pt. 1. (6) List of Units in, En Route
34 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
On 5 April the President approved the were urgently needed. In addition, De-
Fifth Supplemental Appropriation Bill Witt recommended that the War Depart-
for the fiscal year 1941 which made avail- ment construct seven dispersal fields.
able funds for the cutoff for the Alaska The War Plans Division did not concur,
Railroad.17 Two weeks later, the Seattle but did agree that the CAA program
District advertised for bids. Construc- should be expedited and asked General
tion was to be under a lump-sum con- Schley if the Engineers could take over.
tract rather than under the new and Many in the War Department wanted the
unfamiliar fixed-fee type of agreement. Engineers to do the work because they
On 12 May Dunn opened the two bids questioned whether the runways and
he had received and found that the lower facilities put in by CAA would be ade-
one was about 35 percent above the en- quate for Army planes. Countering this
gineers' estimate of the reasonable cost view, CAA assured the War Department
of building the cutoff. Both bidders, that the facilities and runways would be
Dunn wrote Park, were undoubtedly try- adequate and explained that the cause of
ing to protect themselves "against the the delays was the fact that money had
uncertainties of labor conditions, rising not been received in time to start surveys
costs in construction, remote location" before the winter had set in. Now that
and other factors which ruled out "nor- spring had come, construction could be
mal estimates" in this period of increas- expedited. Contracts for two of the
ing defense construction.18 Dunn re- fields had recently been let, work on the
jected both bids. To get work started others would be pushed, and by fall
with a minimum of delay, he decided to graveled runways would be ready. Per-
let a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The suaded by these assurances, Colonel
following month, he signed an agree- Park recommended against having the
ment with the West Construction Com- Engineers take over. The War Depart-
pany of Boston, Massachusetts, for work ment decided not to press the matter, and
on the subgrade, drainage, and tunnels. by the end of June CAA had let contracts
The job was to begin in July.
19
for four additional fields.20
Receiving a report from General In May, DeWitt decided to go to
Buckner in May that CAA was making Alaska to see for himself how construc-
little progress on its airfields in Alaska, tion was progressing. Accompanied by
General DeWitt again advocated that the General Buckner and Colonel Park, he
work be turned over to the Engineers. made a tour of the various projects.
There were, he observed, only two major The ones at Anchorage and Fairbanks,
airdromes in the Territory suitable for begun early by the Quartermaster Corps,
military aircraft—Ladd and Elmendorf. were the most advanced. The garrison
The fields CAA was preparing to build
20
(1) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 1 May 41. 600.1
to, or Scheduled for Alaska, 28 Mar 41. WPD (Alaska) pt. I. (2) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 1 May 41.
4464-9. 600.1 (Alaska) May 40-Oct 41. (3) DF, WPD to
17
Rad, Kingman to NPD Engr, 4 Apr 41. 617 Spec Staff, Army Avn, 19 Jun 41. WPD 4503. (4)
(Alaska). Memo, WPD for G-4, 22 May 41. (5) Ltr, Park to
18
Ltr, Dunn to Park, 15 May 41. 617 (Alaska). CofEngrs, 24 Jun 41. Last two in 600.1 (Alaska)
19
Rpt of Opns, Seattle Dist, Jun 41. 617 (Alaska). pt. I.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 35
of 5,000 men at Fort Richardson was Alaska's defenses still had one glaring
"properly sheltered." Such work on the weakness. There were no airfields on
post and at Elmendorf as was not finished the Alaska Peninsula or in the Aleu-
was being rushed to completion by Major tians. DeWitt and Buckner pressed for
Talley and the contractors. At Ladd, construction in both areas to protect not
living quarters for an infantry garrison only the Alaskan mainland but also the
of 500 men were nearly finished and it Navy base at Dutch Harbor, which was
was planned to transfer many of the remote from other defense installations.
workmen to Yakutat. Here, improve- Fighter planes could not safely fly the
ment of the runway was continuing and 600 miles from Kodiak, the nearest field,
a start would soon be made on hangars because the distance was too great. In
and storage for gasoline. When De- view of the increased shipping and naval
Witt, Buckner, and Park arrived at An- protection required, Admiral Harold R.
nette on 12 May, they found an emer- Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, argued
gency landing strip in use but, on the that airfields should not be constructed
whole, progress was not as marked as at in the Aleutians without approval by the
Yakutat. An obstacle was the muskeg, Joint Board. General Marshall, on the
a spongy growth found in low, marshy other hand, pressed for the building
places, and sometimes as much as eight- of an Aleutian airfield. Construction
een feet thick. When the engineers would have to wait until differences of
encountered it at a construction site, opinion between the services could be
they often had to scoop it out and fill the resolved.22
hole with gravel. Nold had solved the The rapid advance of the German
troublesome problem of the shorter armies into the USSR during the sum-
working hours for the CCC, for in April mer focused attention especially on
the head of the organization in Wash- Alaska, since many in the War Depart-
ington had authorized the same working ment feared that a quick Soviet collapse
hours for the CCC men as for the troops. might soon bring German forces to the
After reviewing progress of the work to Bering Strait. Early in July, Secretary
date and estimating the number of of War Stimson directed that the sending
troops and civilians likely to be avail- of additional troops to the Territory be
able, DeWitt concluded that one of the expedited. On the 15th of that month
regular runways would be ready by De- the War Department increased the au-
cember. At the three Navy bases, the thorized strength of the Alaskan garrison
temporary buildings for the Army gar- from 18,500 to 24,000. Because the
risons, which had been given priority by Army posts at the three naval stations
the Navy over its own permanent con- were far from ready, Stimson promised
struction, were nearing completion and DeWitt that he would turn over funds to
some troops were already housed. On the Navy to assure housing for the mili-
the whole, DeWitt was well pleased with tary garrisons there as soon as possible.
21
what he found.
21 22
(1) Excerpts of Ltr from DeWitt to Marshall, (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Marshall to Stark, 19 Aug 41.
4 Jun 41. 600.1 (Alaska) pt. I. (2) Ltr, Nold to WPD 4503-3. (3) Memo, WPD for Marshall, 16
C EHD, 7 Aug 57. EHD Files. Aug 41. WPD 4503-4.
36 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
General Schley received additional funds Harbor to Sitka.25 So far, the engineers,
to complete previously authorized con- their jobs restricted to a few coastal areas,
struction. Meanwhile, DeWitt directed had encountered no major difficulties.
Buckner to prepare, in co-operation with "There was cold, rain, 'muskeg,' ice, and
the North Pacific Division and the 13th snow." Talley observed, "and engineer
Naval District, a comprehensive program troops . . . many the first tim
to strengthen further the defenses of the from New York—but no other problem
Territory.23 "Actual pressure," Talley per se." 26
wrote later, "commenced ... on the Contractors and hired labor were also
4th of July 1941, when an alert came to making progress. By midsummer, run-
Brig. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., ways at Ladd and Elmendorf were oper-
. . . from that date the tempo ational. Ladd was a comparatively
changed
and Alaska was psychologically and men- small installation with permanent hous-
24
tally prepared for war. . . ."ing for 560 officers and men. Elmendorf
The small number of engineer troops was the largest military base under con-
continued working on major defense in- struction in the Territory. In July the
stallations. The 32d engineers, imme- West Construction Company began work
diately after 4 July, began building tac- on the railroad cutoff. Much prelimi-
tical roads and bombproof shelters at nary labor was required—unloading sup-
Fort Richardson. At Annette the 802d plies and equipment, erecting camps,
Engineer Aviation Battalion was fully putting through access roads, and grub-
occupied developing the airfield, espe- bing the right of way. Blasting began
cially after DeWitt directed that the run- in August on the two and one-half mile
ways be lengthened to 7,500 feet. The tunnel at the eastern end of the line. In
men were confident that they would have September the Seattle District advertised
one of the runways ready by the end of for bids for the construction of a dock at
the year. At Yakutat the 807th Engi- the terminus of the cutoff. In addition,
neer Aviation Company was making fur- work had begun on those aircraft warn-
ther improvements. On 30 July, De- ing stations which had been approved
Witt ordered the unit to construct a third almost a year before, and survey crews
runway and lengthen the two already were investigating sites for other sta-
27
partially completed; by mid-August, tions.
Yakutat had limited runway facilities.
During August and September, part of
23
the 1st Battalion of the 151st Combat (1) Orgns Hists, U. S. Army, Alaska. C12027,
KCRC. (2) Ltr, DeWitt to Park, 30 Jul 41. 686
Engineers reached Alaska to take care of (Annette Island, Alaska), 1940-41, vol. I. (3) In mid-
maintenance at Ladd Field and various June 1941 the 28th Engineer Aviation Regiment was
other Army installations from Dutch disbanded. Men and material from the regiment
were used to activate the 802d Engineer Aviation
Battalion and the 807th Engineer Aviation Company.
23 26
(1) Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 457. (2) Table, Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57.
27
Incl to AG Ltr 320.2 (5-6-41) MC-E-M, 15 Jul 41. (1) Ltr, Schley to Hon. J. Buell Snyder, HR,
WPD 4297-1. (3) Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 Jul 41. 6 Aug 41. 600.1 (Alaska) pt. 1. (2) Seattle Engr
WPD 3512-120. Dist, Monthly Rpt of Opns, Jul-Sep 41. (3) Ltr,
24
Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57. EHD Files. Seattle Engr Dist to OCE, 27 Sep 41. Last two in
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 37
Many projects which had been planned General Buckner, who had repeatedly
did not get under way. During the sum- requested the War Department for au-
mer, DeWitt wanted to start construc- thority to have an engineer on his staff,
tion on the storage tanks for reserve gaso- was authorized in September to appoint
line. Work had been deferred pending Nold. Nold took up his new duties at
further investigation. Storage for five the close of the month, and during the
million gallons was to be provided in next few weeks became fully aware of
Alaska, over four million of it near An- how far the defense build-up still had to
chorage, but no final decision had been go. Ladd, Elmendorf, and Yakutat were
made regarding the remainder. The operational and refinements were being
Air Corps wanted to put much of it near put in, while Annette was expected to be
various airfields, with maximum disper- operational shortly. The CAA fields
sion and concealment. Discussions con- were coming along fairly well. The
tinued over building landing fields on Army posts at the naval stations were un-
the Alaska Peninsula and in the Aleu- der construction. Work was progressing
tians. In July, DeWitt suggested put- slowly on the aircraft warning stations
ting in a field at Port Heiden and another which had been started in the summer,
at Cold Bay, the latter near the tip of the but other projects were, as before, still
peninsula. He pointed out that the air- in the planning stages. On 6 October
men would need more extensive facili- Colonel Dunn in his preliminary report
ties than those being planned by CAA, summarizing the findings of the engi-
so that longer runways and hard surfac- neers who had made the surveys for air-
ing would be necessary. He asked that field sites in the Aleutians, pointed out
the Engineers be made responsible for that no suitable sites had been found on
building the fields on the Alaska Pen- Unalaska, but Umnak had several which
insula. In August the Joint Planning looked promising. Visiting Alaska in
Committee recommended that the Army the fall, Maj. John F. Ohmer, Jr., of the
construct an airfield on Umnak. The Office of the Chief of Engineers, an ex-
Joint Board postponed making its de- pert in camouflage, found that almost
cision because it wanted the engineers nothing had been done to conceal mili-
first to survey the island to determine if tary installations. He recommended
the sites were as suitable as they seemed. planting trees, using camouflage nets,
Late that month a group of engineers and painting structures so that they
from the Seattle District began a recon- would blend in with their surroundings.
naissance of Umnak and of Unalaska as Soon thereafter DeWitt had buildings
well. Construction would have to wait painted in three colors in place of the
28
until their reports were in. standard ivory previously directed by
the General Staff. In midfall, Alaskan
617 (Alaska). (4) DF, WPD to TAG, 6 Sep 41.
defenses still needed a great deal of
WPD 3640-6. work.29
28
(1) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 15 Jul 41. 600.1
(Alaska) May 40-Oct 41. (2) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, (AG 600.12) (9-23-41) MO-E to CofEngrs, 24 Sep 41.
25 Jul 41. 600.1 (Alaska) 1940-47. (3) Memo, WPD 600.1 (Alaska) May 40-Oct 41.
29
for SGS, 31 Oct 41. WPD 4503-4. (4) WD Ltr (1) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 16 Jul 41. WPD
38 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
one on a ridge at Aliamanu Crater and not specify how much storage it wanted
the other in the side of a steep cliff in or where it wanted it. As with other
Waikakalaua Gulch, two and one-half defense work, there was the problem of
miles east of Schofield Barracks. The rising costs. Originally estimated at two
question arose as to how much bomb- dollars per barrel, by January the cost
proofing was necessary. Many felt that for constructing storage had gone up
only completely bombproof storage was four dollars and, by May 1941, to six.36
practical, while others, believing that While concerned with many new
complete bombproofing would take too projects, Wyman still had to give a good
much time and money, urged conceal- deal of thought to old ones. A matter
ment and protection against light in- of importance was the improvement of
cendiary bombs and bomb fragments Honolulu harbor. The city's port facili-
only. The District Office reported in ties had been gradually expanding north-
June 1941, after an exhaustive study of westward. New areas were being devel-
the problem, that concealment and par- oped around Kapalama Basin, lying
tial protection were of little value. between the mainland and offshore Sand
Complete concealment was impossible Island. On 17 October 1940, Congress
because any region on Oahu could be had authorized the dredging of Keehi
readily identified from the air, and satu- Lagoon north of the island to provide a
ration bombing would quickly destroy a landing place for seaplanes, a project
lightly protected installation. It would which came under the category of im-
be fairly easy to provide enough "cut and proving rivers and harbors. Primarily
cover" protection to withstand hits from of commercial value, the improvement
one-ton bombs, the largest used up to would also benefit the armed forces.
that time. Required would be a con- The work, financed by CAA, was being
crete cover about 6 feet thick, topped carried out by the Engineers. Linked
with earth. But with larger bombs un- with the dredging of the seaplane basin
doubtedly soon to be used, the question was the construction of John Rodgers
arose as to how much additional protec- Airport, which was to be built just east
tion would be necessary. Only tunnels of Hickam on the northern shore of
under 75 feet of solid rock would pro- Keehi Lagoon, partly on land dredged
vide sure protection. Wyman believed from the sea bottom. Construction was
the safety provided by tunnels justified authorized in May 1941, and prepara-
the higher cost of construction and the tions were soon being made to begin
longer time required to finish the work. work. The engineers made little head-
How much storage should be provided way on the aircraft warning stations. In
had not been decided. Although the May, after Short had decided that a
Joint Board had recommended 100,000 larger number of stations would be
barrels, Congress, in the Fifth Supple-
mental, authorized construction for 36
(1) Ltr, Short to TAG, 3 Apr 41. (2) Rpt,
250,000 barrels. Then the Navy re- Wyman to CofEngrs, Definite Proj Rpt for Installa-
tion of War Reserve Avn Gas Storage in Hawaiian
quested storage along with the Army and Islands, 23 Jun 41. (3) Ltr, OCE to SPD Engr, 19
allotted $200,000 for the project, but did May 41. All three in Engr AGF PAC.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 41
needed, twelve were authorized, half of funds be provided so that work could
them to be mobile. Negotiations with begin there for storage for the Army and
the National Park Service over permis- Navy. On 19 May the original contract
sion to build on Haleakala were proceed- with the Hawaiian Constructors was
ing slowly.37 modified. Complying with a recent di-
Responsible for more and more con- rective from Under Secretary of War
struction, Wyman awarded additional Robert P. Patterson for streamlining
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. On 19 administrative and auditing procedures,
May he signed one in the amount of Wyman took over such functions as
$1,801,159.70 with the Territorial Air- timekeeping, preparing payrolls, and
port Contractors, a joint venture includ- procuring supplies. The contractor
ing W. E. Callahan Construction Com- would henceforth be responsible only
pany, Gunther & Shirley Company, and for construction. Wyman's added re-
Paul Grafe. This group was to improve sponsibilities made an ever larger district
the territorial airports with funds sup- organization necessary. By mid-1941
plied by CAA. He signed an agreement there were 10 officers and 401 civilians in
with the engineering firm of Sverdrup the Honolulu office and three officers
and Parcel of St. Louis, Missouri, for the and 220 civilians in the field.38
preparation of designs for bombproof In June, Lyman received the first of
shelters; this firm was also to do field the additional combat troops he had
engineering and supervise some of the been requesting. That month, the 34th
work at the territorial airports. For Engineer Combat Regiment was acti-
most of the additional construction, vated in the Islands, its cadre furnished
Wyman made supplemental agreements by units in the Hawaiian Department.
with the Hawaiian Constructors, en- Bringing the 34th up to full strength
larged in May with the addition of Ralph would take some time, since most of the
Woolley and Company, a prominent con- men for the organization were not ex-
tracting firm of Honolulu. In June pected to arrive from the United States
1941 he made such an agreement with until several months later. Meanwhile,
the Constructors for cut and cover bomb- efforts were being made to bring the 3d
proof storage for 200,000 barrels of re- Engineers up to full strength and steps
serve gasoline in Waikakalaua Gulch. were taken to increase the number of
A tunnel had been considered, but the aviation engineers. Plans called for ex-
contractors had estimated it would take panding the 804th from a company into
twenty months to complete the job, a battalion by 15 July.39 Slowly the de-
whereas cut and cover construction could fenses of the Islands were being built up.
be finished in eight at considerably less
38
cost. Nothing was being planned for (1) Ltr, Asst Dept IG Hawaiian Dept to Short,
4 Nov 41. Engr AGF PAC, 333, IG Rpts (Gen). (2)
Aliamanu Crater, but Wyman asked that Ltr, D. C. Wolfe of Sverdrup and Parcel to Hawaii
War Rcds Depository, 21 Jan 46. Hawaii War Rcds
37
(1) Arthur D. Llewellyn, "Honolulu Harbor," Depository. (3) Ltr, Wyman to Schley, 24 Jun 41.
The Military Engineer, XXXIX (February, 1947), Engr AGF PAC.
39
51-53. (2) Rpt [Brief History of the Air Warning Ltr, Short to TAG, 5 Aug 41. 381 (Hawaii)
Service] n.d. Engr AGF PAC. 113/1.
42 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
By midsummer, the Engineers could Wyman asked General Schley for author-
point to considerable progress in con- ity to proceed.41
struction in the Islands. The Hawaiian The Office of the Chief of Engineers
Constructors were at work on five mili- had misgivings about the whole project.
tary airfields—three on Oahu, one on The bombproof storage being planned
Hawaii, and one on Kauai—jobs ex- for Hawaii "would require an imprac-
pected to be finished by the end of the tical amount of cover." Concealment
year. Improvement of the territorial and protection against light incendiary
airports with CAA funds, just getting bomb and bomb fragments was all that
started and about 5 percent complete, could reasonably be provided. Aviation
was to be finished by July 1942. The gasoline should be placed underground,
Constructors were beginning work on but for concealment only. Brig. Gen.
coastal defenses, including emplacements Eugene Reybold, Assistant Chief of Staff,
for 155-mm. and 240-mm. guns, fire con- G-4, advised General Schley that it was
trol structures, storage for ammunition, "desired that the full amount of storage
and access roads. Meanwhile, they had be provided on the basis of the estab-
made a start on the aircraft warning lished construction policy rather than a
stations which, along with the coastal smaller amount of storage having a
defenses, were to be completed by 1 greater degree of protection."42 In
November. The Honolulu District con- September, Schley accordingly informed
tinued dredging Kapalama basin and Wyman that plans providing for the
expected to complete this job by the end added protection would have to be re-
of the year.40 vised. OCE sent three specialists from
Still in the planning stage was the the oil industry to Honolulu, where in
underground storage for reserve aviation October they consulted with Wyman and
gasoline. Much confusion developed helped revise construction plans. Mean-
over this. The Hawaiian Constructors while, no work was being done at either
43
had been ready to start work at Waika- site.
kalaua Gulch late in June on cut and While Wyman was struggling with
cover construction for 200,000 barrels. construction, Lyman was trying to get
Investigations at Aliamanu Crater indi- more troops and put his units on a war
cated that only a tunnel would be prac- footing. Repeated requests went to the
ticable there. General Short and Rear War Department for more men. The
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Commandant, activation of the 34th Combat Regiment
14th Naval District, wanted storage for and the expansion of the 804th into a
83,000 barrels at the crater. A pipeline battalion with an authorized strength of
would connect the two installations with 41
the airfields. Since no funds had been (1) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 24 Jun 41, with
and Ind, CofEngrs to TAG, 26 Jul 41. (2) Inter-
received for construction at the crater, staff Routing Slip, Dept Engr to G-4 HD, 11 Jul 41.
Both in Engr AGF PAC.
42
2d Ind, TAG to CofEngrs, 3 Sep 41, basic un-
known. Engr AGF PAC.
40 43
Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 14 Aug 41. Engr 3d Ind, CofEngrs to SPD Engr, 9 Sep 41, basic
AGF PAC. unknown. Engr AGF PAC.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 43
656 officers and men in July only parti- ments had highest priority. Most of the
ally met the need for more manpower. aviation engineers went to Wheeler and
More aviation engineers were urgently Hickam Fields. From time to time, de-
needed. Heavy construction equipment tachments were assigned to other fields
was in short supply, especially concrete on Oahu and the outlying islands. On
mixers, compressors, and power shovels. 1 October the square Hawaiian Division
Much of the machinery on hand would was converted into two triangular divi-
be worn out before the defense program sions—the 24th and the 25th. The 3d
44
was completed. "In previous planning Engineer Regiment was split into the 3d
for an emergency," Short wrote to the and 65th Battalions, which were assigned
Adjutant General on 5 August, "much to the new divisions. Both units con-
reliance had been placed upon the avail- tinued on the same tasks, with the 65th
ability of ... equipment in the hands engineers working mainly on beach de-
of local contractors and plantation own- fenses and trails in the southern half of
ers"; now, because of the demands of Oahu, and the 3d engineers, in the
defense construction, equipment was northern.47
fast wearing out and, as Short ex- Plans had long since been prepared
plained, "Manufacturing and transporta- for mobilizing the entire engineer service
tion bottlenecks are making it extremely in case of an emergency. Under the
difficult for both contractors and planta- Mobilization Plan of the Hawaiian De-
tion owners to obtain needed replace- partment, which would go into effect if
ments." 45 The reply from Washington an attack on the Islands was launched or
was not encouraging. Reybold in- appeared imminent, Colonel Lyman
formed Short that "no action is being would have over-all responsibility for
taken at this time with reference to pro- using troops and civilians on engineer
vision of special or additional Engineer tasks as required. He would assume
equipment for the Hawaiian Defense control over the Honolulu District office
Project. It is desired that a listing of and the organization of the zone con-
additional equipment required . . quartermaster.
structing . He would be
be submitted for further considera- responsible for taking over vital civilian
tion. . . ." 46 utilities and industries to insure con-
Most of the men for the 34th and tinued operation. The mobilization
804th Engineers reached Hawaii in the plans called for recruiting some 12,000
fall. Now at almost full strength, the civilians who would work under the
34th took over the Hawaiian Division's supervision of the department engineer.
job of improving roads and trails on Lyman's staff developed in detail the
Oahu. Routes leading to searchlight type of engineer organization which
positions and 155-mm. gun emplace- would be set up in case hostilities oc-
curred. Vehicles, equipment, and sup-
44
Hist of the 804th Engr Avn Bn. plies would be requisitioned from local
45
Ltr, Short to TAG, 5 Aug 41. Engr AGF PAC,
381 (Hawaii) 113/1.
46 47
1st Ind, 4 Sep 41, on Short's Ltr, cited in pre- (1) HD GO No. 71, 4 Nov 41. (2) HD GO No.
ceding note. 53, 16 Sep 41.
44 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
factories and from sugar and pineapple camouflage. Lyman on 10 October ap-
plantations.48 proved the over-all plan, which he be-
The engineers were at work on plans lieved might be especially valuable in the
for better protection of the Islands defense of the fields on the outlying
against air attack, even though Army islands. He recommended to the Chief
and Navy commanders at this time of Staff, Hawaiian Department, that the
seemed to think the chance of such an plan of the 804th be adopted.49
attack was remote. Capt. James A. More emphasis was being put on
Ostrand, Jr., commander of the 804th, camouflage. Much study and experi-
together with members of his staff, made mentation would be needed before mili-
a study of the role the aviation engineers tary installations in the Islands could be
would play in case of an aerial assault. hidden effectively. Early in 1941, the
For planning purposes, Ostrand assumed engineers began training commissioned
that both the USSR and Great Britain and noncommissioned officers at a num-
would be defeated, and that Japan would ber of installations and helped plan
have preponderant power in the Pacific. camouflage treatments. Various groups
An air attack on the Hawaiian Islands were making experiments. The Cam-
would be possible. There might be an ouflage Section of the 3d Engineers was
assault by paratroopers, with landings successful in developing a paint that
by amphibious forces not to be ruled out. would not show up as paint on photo-
The airfields, a major objective of the graphs made with infrared filters. On
enemy, would have to be defended by two of the oil tanks at Pearl Harbor the
infantry and engineers. The infantry men painted trees which did not appear
would try to repel any paratroops or as camouflage on pictures made with spe-
amphibious forces, while the engineers cially equipped cameras. Several men
would block the approaches to the air- of the 804th prepared a plan for camou-
fields with demolitions and obstacles, flaging Wheeler Field with netting.
maintain and repair runways, and put Hickam could not be effectively con-
up camouflage. If necessary, they would cealed unless Pearl Harbor were in-
destroy fields which had to be aban- cluded. The engineers discussed with a
doned. At each field an engineer force number of naval officers plans for cam-
of one officer, four noncommissioned ouflaging this crucial area. The con-
officers, and 200 civilians would be re- sensus was that about forty-five machines
quired. Considerable engineer work of the type used in Hollywood for pro-
would be necessary in advance to pre- ducing fog effects in motion pictures
pare airfields for defense. It would take would be enough to hide Pearl Harbor
time to build plane pens, pillboxes, and and Hickam. Some progress was made
barbed wire entanglements, ready fields
for demolitions, and disguise them with 49
(1) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding
the United States. (2) Hist of the 804th Avn Bn.
(3) Memo, Lyman for CofS HD, 10 Oct 41. Engr
48
(1) An. No. 12 to Mobilization Plan, HD Engr AGF PAC 600.12 (Gen). (4) Hq 804th Engr Avn Bn
(Revision 1940). (2) Interoffice Routing Slip, Lyman (Sep), 8 Oct 41, Rpt, Avn Engrs and the Defense of
to G-4 HD, 21 Nov 41. Both in Engr AGF PAC. the Hawaiian Islands. Engr AGF PAC.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 45
in camouflaging a number of gun posi- on fields in the South Pacific and to have
tions with netting or by planting trees them finished as soon as possible, as the
and shrubbery. Very useful in this con- matter was urgent. "It must be thought
nection was the hau tree, which could beof in terms of weeks and not years," he
made to grow in almost any direction was told. "Every possible expedient
and within a year produced branches must be visualized and utilized. . . .
thirty feet long. Extremely difficult toThe General Staff charged General
camouflage were command and observa- Reybold, who succeeded Schley as Chief
tion posts on mountain and hill tops. of Engineers on 1 October, with con-
The most effective expedients for break-struction of the route. Reybold directed
ing up sharp outlines were the construc-Wyman to carry out the work. An
tion of false rock formations and the initial sum of $5 million was allotted.
planting of cacti. On the whole, be- General Short, after conferences with
cause Washington, despite requests, pro-members of his staff and with Admiral
vided few funds for camouflage, little Bloch, in mid-October ordered construc-
effective work was done. There was tion at Christmas Island, Canton Island,
almost no co-ordination with respect to Fiji, and New Caledonia; in Australia at
camouflage among the various units of Townsville or Rockhampton and Dar-
the Army and no over-all plan. Trees win; and at Fort Stotsenburg in the
planted to conceal an installation wouldPhilippines. At each place, at least one
be removed a few weeks later to make 5,000-foot runway suitable for heavy
room for a new building. Runways, bombers was to be built. Short set 15
taxiways, and hardstands being built at January 1942 as the date for completion
Bellows and at other fields in the usualof the first runway at each field. There-
manner could be easily identified from after other facilities were to be finished
the air.50 as soon as possible. Each site would
ultimately have three runways at least
The Air Ferry Route 7,000 feet long and 200 feet wide. Stor-
age for gasoline and buildings for servic-
In the fall of 1941 a new route was ing crews would be provided later. The
needed to ferry heavy bombers from the project was given an A-1-a rating, the
United States to the Philippines. The highest at that time. Wyman con-
existing one by way of Midway, Wake, sidered this his most important job.52
and Guam, traversing the Japanese man- Wyman and his staff knew little about
dated islands, was dangerously exposed. the islands of the South Pacific, except
A more secure route would be by way of two—Canton and Christmas, which were
the islands of the South Pacific and owned jointly by the United States and
Australia. On 4 October the War De-
partment directed Short to begin work 51
WD Ltr, AG 580.82 (9-30-41) MC-G to CG HD,
4 Oct 41. Engr AGF PAC, 686 (Ferry Route) 1.
52
(1) Ltr, SPD Engr to CofEngrs, 17 Oct 41. (2)
50
(1) Rpt, Lt Col R. C. Williams, 3d Engrs, 13 Ltr, Chief Finance Sec OCE to the Priorities Com
Nov 40. (2) Rpt, Maj John F. Oliver, Jr., 11 Jul 41. ANMB, 20 Oct 41, with 1st Ind, 20 Oct 41. Both in
Engr AGF PAC. Engr AGF PAC, 686 (Ferry Route) I.
46 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
president of Sverdrup and Parcel of St. have to build not only runways but also
Louis, Missouri, arrived in Honolulu, piers, roads, and camps.57
and that same day signed a cost-plus-a- On 3 November a transport, with
fixed-fee contract for architect-engineer about 130 troops and civilians headed by
services in connection with the ferry Capt. C. D. Baker aboard and towing
route on the British- and French-owned four barges loaded with equipment and
islands and Australia. The next day he supplies, began the 2,000-mile trip from
and Major Robinson left for the South Honolulu to Canton. During the voy-
Pacific to establish the necessary liaison age two of the barges filled with water
with the local governments. At this and had to be abandoned though some
time the War Department informed of the equipment was saved. On 14
Short that General Douglas MacArthur, November the ship reached its destina-
commanding U.S. forces in the Philip- tion. Canton was a narrow strip of
pines, would be responsible for work on coral, enclosing a lagoon eight miles
the fields west of New Caledonia.56 long and four miles wide. The land was
On 18 November 4 officers and 145 covered with scrub; the lagoon, choked
men of the 804th Aviation Battalion and with reefs. An Englishman operated
70 civilians of the Hawaiian Constructors the radio station. Pan American Air-
and Honolulu District reached Christ- ways had a few facilities on the island.
mas to join the group already there. In The first jobs were the construction of a
command was Maj. John E. Shield of the temporary dock, the blasting of coral
district office. About 1,350 miles south from the lagoon, the erection of shop
of Honolulu, Christmas, 35 miles long buildings, and the surveying of the site
and 20 miles wide, was the largest coral for the runway.58
island in the Pacific. The newcomers Meanwhile, work had begun on Fiji.
found it to be flat and generally only ten In New Zealand and its possessions, gov-
feet above sea level. At the western end ernmental agencies constructed public
was a sizable lagoon opening into the sea. works. Practically all the heavy equip-
The once numerous coconut plantations ment which would be needed for airfield
had been abandoned after the collapse construction was government owned.
of the copra market. In 1940 the popu- The most feasible solution was to lease
lation had been evacuated, but a British or borrow the machinery and hire native
resident commissioner and 26 Polyne- workers. Sverdrup and Parcel's original
sians had returned in April 1941 and architect-engineer contract was expanded
had established two settlements at the to include supervision of construction.
mouth of the lagoon. There were a The Dominion authorities were most
number of warehouses, a dock fifty feet co-operative. Within thirty-six hours
long at high tide, and two residences, all
inadequate for present needs. The 57
(1) Ibid. (2) Rpt, Maj James A. Ostrand, Jr.,
roads were poor. The engineers would 5 Nov 41. (3) Rad, Wyman to CofEngrs, 25 Nov 41.
Both in Engr AGF PAC.
58
(1) Ltr, Baker to Wyman, 17 Mar 42. (2) Ltr,
Baker to Wyman, 30 Nov 41. Both in Engr AGF
56
Ltr, Short to TAG, 22 Nov 41. Engr AGF PAC. PAC.
48 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
after Ramey and MacCasland had made French High Commissioner for construc-
the survey for the route and discussed tion. Doing any work on the island
with Prime Minister Peter Fraser the would be out of the question until an
desirability of improving Nandi field, agreement between the War Department
work had begun. New Zealand even and the Free French government had
gave the project priority over all defense been signed. Since workmen sent over
work being done in the Dominion itself. by the Australian Government at the re-
The Governor of Fiji issued a proclama- quest of the Free French were already
tion prohibiting the export of lumber improving Tontouta, Sauer asked the
and ordered sawmills to operate under Australians to develop Plaines des Gaiacs
direct orders of the government in order until an agreement could be made by the
that sufficient lumber might be obtained American authorities and the Free
locally. On 20 November several pieces French to permit sending in American
of equipment arrived from the United workmen and equipment. The Austral-
States. The next day Sverdrup wrote ians agreed to complete Tontouta as an
Wyman that work had started at Nandi. emergency field. They also made planes
In late November Capt. Carl F. Ende available for a reconnaissance of addi-
arrived from Honolulu to take up his tional sites in the Solomons and New
duties as area engineer.59 Hebrides, but they were unable to do
Accompanying Captain Ende was 1st anything at Plaines des Gaiacs because
Lt. Richard P. Sauer, who went on to their resources were too slender.60 De-
New Caledonia as area engineer for that velopment of this important field would
island. Visiting Tontouta, Sauer found have to wait.
that the pessimistic report of Ramey and
MacCasland was fully justified. One of Supplies
the field's main drawbacks was that hills
obstructed the approaches to the run- Procurement of supplies and equip-
ways. When Sverdrup and Robinson ment for the burgeoning construction
arrived later, they inspected a field the program in the Pacific outposts was in-
French had started at Plaines des Gaiacs, creasingly hampered by various obstacles.
about 150 miles northeast of Noumea. Transportation bottlenecks began to
They believed the runways there could plague the construction forces. After
be developed easily to minimum require- Congress appropriated funds for projects,
ments. It was planned, consequently, it took three or four months to get
to lengthen the runways at Tontouta for materials from the United States to the
emergency use until the field at Plaines outlying territories. Before long, pro-
des Gaiacs could be gotten ready. Sauer curement became entangled with the
discovered the Hawaiian Department priorities system. In the summer of
had made no arrangements with the 1941, the Army and Navy Munitions
59 60
(1) Ltr, Sverdrup to Wyman, 13 Nov 41. (2) (1) Sauer, Narrative Rpt, Airfield Constr. (2)
Ltr, Sverdrup to Wyman, 21 Nov 41. (3) Ltr, Short Rad, Sverdrup to Short, 27 Nov 41. Both in Engr
to TAG, 22 Nov 41. All in Engr AGF PAC. AGF PAC.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 49
Board (ANMB) rated projects in Panama Although balking at first, the ANMB
A-1-b; those in Hawaii, A-1-c; and Priorities Committee on 4 September as-
those in Alaska, A-1-c or lower. Local signed an A-1-a rating to construction
commanders tried to get their priorities materials for military projects.63 Gen-
raised. In July, Short recommended eral Short was not so successful. The
that projects in Hawaii be given the A-1-c rating remained in effect, except
same priority as those in Panama. He for the ferry route. Construction in
wanted especially to have an A-1-b rat- Panama and Alaska was at this time ap-
ing for materials needed for the storage parently considered more essential than
tanks for reserve gasoline, a request construction in Hawaii.
strongly supported by the Chief of Engi- It was impossible to stockpile mate-
neers. But ANMB refused to grant the rials. Only after Congress had voted
higher rating. In July, all defense proj- funds for a project could the Engineers
ects in Alaska were rated A-1-c. With place orders for the supplies. All mate-
this low rating, the Seattle District Engi- rials shipped from the United States were
neer had great difficulty in getting mate- to be used only on the project for which
rials, particularly steel and copper, all they were designated, a normal pro-
the more so since the Navy's Alaska proj- cedure in peacetime. To make possible
ects enjoyed the top A-1-a rating. building up reserves of materials and
Because of the difficulty of winter de- transferring them from one project to
livery, it was essential that the bulk of another as deemed necessary, efforts were
construction materials be on hand by made to change this system. In the
early fall. Under the current ratings, it meantime, the Chief of Engineers, in
would take several months or even a order to ease the supply situation in
year to get delivery. On 9 August Hawaii, made an allotment of more than
Colonel Dunn requested the A-1-a rat- $1,000,000 to Wyman for the purchase of
ing, stating it should be given at least for materials and equipment. In Novem-
61
steel, spare parts, and similar items. A ber, The Quartermaster General made
few days later, DeWitt reminded the available $400,000 to the Seattle District
War Department that he had been in- for a similar stockpile for work in Alaska.
structed to alert the garrisons in the As materials were withdrawn, the Seattle
Territory and declared that the "defense District was to replace them with stocks
of Alaska will be endangered" unless purchased with funds allocated to the
vital construction was helped in every projects. Dunn planned to have the
way "during the short working season stockpile in operation before the spring
which is now rapidly dwindling." 62 of 1942. Still, these sums could not be
used for building up stockpiles in any
61
real sense because the money was to be
(1) Ltr, Short to TAG, 28 Jul 41. (2) Ltr, Fiscal
Br OCE to Col D. I. McKay, OCE, 29 Aug 44. Both
used for the advance purchase of mate-
in Engr AGF PAC. (3) Ltr, Dunn to Schley, 22 Jul rials for authorized projects. Nor were
41. (4) Ltr, Dunn to Schley, 9 Aug 41. 161 Alaska
(Preferred Rating).
62 63
2d Ind, DeWitt to TAG, 12 Aug 41, on Ltr, 5th Ind, ANMB Priorities Comm OCE, 4 Sep 41,
Dunn to Schley, 9 Aug 41. on Ltr, Dunn to Schley, 9 Aug 41.
50 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Marine Air Station in the southwestern Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., "The Army Air
part of the island. The period of peace- Forces in World War II, vol. I, Plans and Early Op-
erations: January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago: The
time preparations for defense was a thing University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 197-98. For
of the past. The United States was accounts of the attack on Pearl Harbor see (3) Conn,
plunged into war.74 Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United
States, ch. VII, p. 1ff., and Samuel Eliot Morison,
"History of United States Naval Operations in World
War II," vol. III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific,
74
(1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During 1931-1942 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
World War II, POA, pp. 24ff. (2) Wesley Frank 1948), pp. 98ff.
CHAPTER III
point of not only being able to hold off Preparations for Defense
an invasion, but also, of deterring
Japanese expansion southward. Perhaps Plans and Appropriations
a deciding factor in altering American
policy was the successful development of The decision to reinforce the Philip-
the B-17 heavy bomber. Now for the pines placed a heavy load on the engi-
first time the Army had a weapon which, neers. Col. Henry H. Stickney, an
if based in the Philippines, could deliver officer of long experience, who had be-
2
effective blows against the Japanese. come department engineer in May 1940,
In line with the new policy of strength- had only a small staff to supervise con-
ening the Philippines, President Roose- struction, supply, and map making.
velt on 26 July 1941 established in the MacArthur had no engineer in USAFFE
islands an over-all command, United until October 1941, when Lt. Col. Hugh
States Army Forces in the Far East J. Casey arrived from the United States.
(USAFFE). Headed by General Mac- Colonel Stickney thus directed the engi-
Arthur, who had been recalled to active neer effort during most of the prewar
duty in the United States Army, the period. Construction was to be his first
command included both the Philippine concern.
Department and the Philippine Army. Earliest efforts were aimed at strength-
MacArthur had in mind not merely hold- ening the harbor installations in Manila
ing Bataan Peninsula and Manila Bay. and Subic Bays. Guarding the entrance
With an increasing number of B-17's at to Manila Bay were four fortified islands,
his disposal and with a Philippine Army Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile, and
of some 125,000 men to be mobilized by Carabao. Guarding Subic Bay was
the end of the year and an even larger Grande Island. Corregidor claimed the
force in prospect, he believed he could major share of attention. Construction
successfully defend the entire archi- there, begun in 1904, had continued
pelago, provided he had time to complete until after World War I. The result
his preparations. On 1 October he was a maze of defensive works—tunnels,
asked permission to prepare a new war artillery batteries, communications cen-
plan to replace WPO–3, and early in ters, and shops. The island appeared to
November Marshall told him to proceed. be impregnable against any probable
The outbreak of war one month later naval attack, but little, if any, considera-
found MacArthur in the midst of revis- tion had been given to defense against
3
ing his plans for defense. aerial bombardment. Corregidor's forti-
fications were becoming obsolete and the
2
(1) Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 417ff., 440. (2) same was true of the defenses of the other
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active fortified islands. During the twenties
Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1947), p. 338. (3) Craven and Cate, eds.,
and thirties appropriations for the forti-
4
Plans and Early Operations, p. 125. fied islands were pitifully meager. For
3
(1) Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 Feb 41. AG
093.5. P.I. (7-2-40) (4). (2) Ltr, MacArthur to
4
Marshall, 28 Oct 41. AG 350.5 (10-28-41) (1). (3) The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 24 March 1934 pro-
Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 64-71. vided for Philippine independence after a ten-year
58 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the fiscal years 1939-41 inclusive, funds nature.6 Grunert nevertheless persisted,
allotted to the Army for harbor defense and in fact broadened his request to
projects amounted to but $39,000 annu- include $346,000 for the harbor defenses.
ally; in May 1939, however, the Navy He made little progress until early 1941,
transferred $500,000 to the Engineers by which time the War Department's
for the construction of tunnels on attitude had begun to change. In
Corregidor. With this money, Maj. March of that year Congress appropriated
Lloyd E. Mielenz, the engineer in charge $946,000 and in June $3,688,000 for
of fortification work at the harbor de- work on Bataan and Corregidor. In
fenses, built two-thirds of a mile of November 1940 Major Mielenz had
concrete-lined tunnel. By stretching the recommended that an interservice board
Navy funds he was also able to provide be appointed "without delay to formu-
Panama mounts (makeshift concrete late a workable plan for modernizing the
mountings that permitted the trail of a Harbor Defense protection against heavy
field gun to be swung in a full circle), shelling and aerial bombing." The
access roads for the big guns, and other commanding general of the Harbor De-
minor improvements.5 fenses appointed the board at once, and
War Plan ORANGE-3 linked Bataan by early May 1941 it had prepared plans
Peninsula with the fortified islands in the calling for underground protection, gas
defense of Manila Bay. Except for a proofing, and air conditioning. This
few roads and trails, most of Bataan was program was to cost $3,500,000 and take
virtually a wilderness. On 25 July 1940 three years to complete. In June,
Grunert, after outlining for the General Grunert submitted the plan to the War
Staff what he considered to be the Department, but he received no money
"minimum requirements for an efficient until early October.7
defense" of the peninsula, requested Airfields, according to General Gru-
$1,939,000 for roads, docks, and bomb- nert, were the most vital element in the
proof storage. Marshall replied that it defense of the islands.8 In 1940 and early
was against War Department policy to 1941 there were but two Army airfields
put money into large projects of this in the Philippines—Nichols, just south
generally had small staffs and little equip- the time-consuming tasks of making esti-
ment. He could also hire workmen and mates, preparing plans, and arriving at
organize a work force of his own. No terms of agreement.19
troops were available. The only U.S. Construction got under way slowly.
Army engineer unit in the islands in During April and May, Stickney man-
early 1941 was the understrength 14th aged to start 4 projects, including
Engineers (Philippine Scouts), a combat Bataan Field in the southeastern part of
regiment of the Philippine Division, the peninsula, a bombproof shelter for
already engaged in improving tactical general headquarters at Fort McKinley,
roads and trails on Bataan. In this sit- just south of Manila, and a runway at
uation, Stickney had to make the best use Nichols Field. June marked the begin-
of the construction and engineering tal- ning of work on a depot at San Juan del
ent at his disposal.18 Monte, just east of Manila, and on al-
One obstacle to speed was the tradi- ready existing Kindley Field on Corregi-
tionally slow method of awarding lump- dor. Within the next three months the
sum contracts by advertising for competi- engineers broke ground for 16 projects,
tive bids. With so few large construction among them a dock on Bataan, 2 air
firms in the islands and with their warning stations, and 3 new airfields—
capabilities quite well known to the Del Monte and Malabang on Mindanao
department engineer, competitive bid- and O'Donnell on Luzon. By the end
ding would cause needless delay. Be- of September construction was in prog-
sides, the tunnels the engineers were to ress at 26 jobs estimated to cost $1,500,-
construct on the fortified islands and 000.20
Bataan were of a highly secret nature, Colonel Stickney had barely started to
the details of which it was not advisable build when the southwestern monsoons
to make public through advertising. began. For the next five months con-
Accordingly, on 2 May Stickney radioed struction crews battled mud and torren-
to Washington asking authority to nego- tial rains. Maj. Wendell W. Fertig,
tiate contracts. Under Secretary of War assigned to Bataan early in the summer,
Patterson on 19 May directed the depart- later recounted: "[The] rainy season was
ment engineer to use cost-plus-a-fixed-fee in full swing and the forest was a morass.
agreements. After Stickney wired back . . . Thousands of cubic yards of rock
that he did not need to make fixed-fee had been placed as surfacing on the
contracts but urgently required authority secondary roads, but under the pounding
to negotiate lump-sum and unit-price of 10-wheel ammunition trucks, all ves-
contracts, Washington on 13 June gave tiges of hard surfacing disappeared in a
him that authority. Even though he
19
could now negotiate, there still remained (1) Rads, Dept Engr to CofEngrs, 2 and 28 May
41. 600.1 (Phil Dept Airfields) 1941-42. (2) 1st Ind,
OUSW to TAG, 19 May 41, on Ltr, OCE to USW,
18
(1) Ltr, Stickney to Kingman, 28 Apr 41. (2) 10 May 41. (3) Rad, TAG to CG Phil Dept, 23 May
Ltr, Stickney to CofEngrs, 14 Nov 41. 600.1 (Phil 41. (4) Ltr, TAG to CofEngrs, 13 Jun 41. All in
Dept (Airfields) 1941. (3) Rpt of Interv, Capt Man- 600.1 (Phil Dept Airfields) 1941-42.
20
ning J. Dauer with Maj Gen Hugh J. Casey, Jun 44. Dept Engr, Constr Progress Rpt for Semi-
Casey File 9. monthly Period Ending 30 Nov 41.
62 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
sea of mud. Two tractors were kept few items of new and used equipment
busy hauling these monstrous trucks out held by local dealers. He begged a few
of mud holes." Transferred to Clark pieces from the Philippine Department
Field in August, Fertig remarked that of Public Works and borrowed from
construction had become a "night- American commanders. Brig. Gen. Ed-
21
mare." Conditions were so bad at ward P. King, Jr., commanding Fort
Nichols Field that the Air Corps sus- Stotsenburg, loaned two new 1½-ton
pended operations there in July.22 The trucks to the, O'Donnell project. "With-
engineers continued work on the run- out them," wrote an Engineer officer, "it
ways at Nichols but with "25 percent would have been impossible to begin
efficiency." The weather had a hamper- construction ... [in an area] which
ing effect on construction throughout could normally be reached only by horse-
western Luzon.23 drawn units and then only during the
At the outset the department engineer dry season." Notwithstanding co-oper-
had little construction machinery. An ation of this sort, there was never enough
inventory of 28 December 1940 listed the machinery. Only by constant shifting of
following items of power-driven equip- equipment from one location to another
ment: 6 bulldozers, 2 shovels, 2 rock could Stickney keep all of his jobs mov-
25
crushers, an earth auger, and a grader. ing.
Little help could be expected from the Efficient maintenance and repair of
Philippine Government, for, in order to equipment were hard to come by. Most
keep down unemployment, the common- natives were unacquainted with ma-
wealth used practically no equipment. chines, and the skilled mechanic was
Few contractors in the islands had ma- "nearly nonexistent." Too often the
chinery, and delivery from the United Filipino was concerned primarily with
States would take months. Stickney the appearance of his e q u i p m e n t .
proposed to rent and buy locally as much Capt. Harry O. Fischer, area engineer at
equipment as he could and to order from Clark Field, got hold of some tractors
the United States, although shipments belonging to the commonwealth's Bu-
from America would arrive too late "to reau of Public Works, "which looked
be of much benefit this working season." beautiful—freshly painted and shined."
The Chief of Engineers refused to let "But, I found to my sorrow," he wrote,
him rent but gave him permission to "that Filipino maintenance went only
negotiate purchases in the local market, skin deep—what they couldn't see didn't
and promised to send equipment from bother them. One D-8 [tractor] I got
the States along with the first shipment of had had 7,000 operating hours and had
24
troops. Stickney hastened to buy the
(Field Maint Force) Rqmts Br Sup Sec. (2) Ltr,
Stickney to CofEngrs, 8 Mar 41. (3) Rad, CofEngrs
21
Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 5-6, 10. to Stickney, 26 Mar 41. Last two in 686 (Clark
22
Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, Field) 1938-41.
25
pp.2331–32. (1) Ltr, Col Harry O. Fischer to C Staff Br OCE
Dept Engr, Constr Progress Rpt for Semi- GHQ FEC, 28 Apr 49. SWPA File M343. (2) Fer-
monthly Period Ending 30 Nov 41. tig, Guerrillero, p. 8. (3) Dept Engr, Constr Prog-
24
(1) Ltr, Stickney to CofEngrs, 28 Dec 40. 230.14 ress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending 15 Nov 41.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 63
had nothing done to it. It sounded like Construction During the Latter
a corn grinder." There was, besides, Half of 1941
virtually no local supply of spare parts.
Almost all replacements had to be requi- The arrival of U.S. Engineer units
sitioned from the United States and de- gave an impetus to the airfield construc-
livered over a 7,000-mile-long supply tion program. First to come was the
line. These were conditions the engi- 809th Engineer Aviation Company,
neers could do little to correct.26 which, upon disembarking at Manila on
The islands produced many of the 10 July, was assigned to Nichols Field.
materials needed for construction, in- Well supplied with modern equipment,
cluding lumber, slag, cement, lime, and the 176 men of the 809th worked around
aggregate. Local dealers stocked pumps the clock, operating their own machinery
and other common items of installed and serving as foremen of the 800 un-
equipment. Access to these markets was skilled native laborers employed on the
at first restricted by regulations which project. A second unit, the 803d En-
forbade Stickney to purchase in amounts gineer Aviation Battalion (less Company
of more than $500 or to alter standard C), arrived from the United States on 23
plans and specifications without consult- October. Headquarters Company began
ing the Chief of Engineers. OCE lifted extending the turf runways at Clark to
the first restriction in March and the transform this field into a huge base for
second in May when Stickney made it B–17's. Company A took over the proj-
known that shortages of steel would ect at O'Donnell, some twenty miles
force him to build hangars of wood. north of Clark, while Company B went
Since time could not be spared for send- to Del Carmen, near the base of Bataan
ing the new drawings back to the States Peninsula, where on 10 November it
for approval, General Schley gave Stick- started construction of a complete air-
ney authority to alter plans whenever drome estimated to cost $432,500. On
necessary. The department engineer 1 December the 809th became Company
could now draw freely on the resources C of the 803d. These engineer troops
of the Philippines, but many of the sup- helped greatly to make key airfields
plies he most desperately needed still operative at an early date.28
had to come from the United States. Construction gained added momentum
Though shipments of structural steel, after the arrival of Colonel Casey on 8
steel siding, heavy cable, switchboards,
and lighting equipment were anxiously CG Phil Dept, 24 Mar 41. Both in 600-1 (Phil
Dept Airfields) 1941-42.
awaited, months were to pass before any 28
(1) Ltr, CO 809th to CofEngrs, 10 Sep 41. 320.2
of these items would be received.27 (809th Engrs) Mil Files, OCE. (2) Brief Hist (Sta-
tion, Rcds and Events) Co A, 803d Engr Bn (Avn)
(Sep). SWPA Files. (3) Ltr, C Sup Sec OCE to
26
(1) Ltr, Stickney to CofEngrs, 28 Dec 40. 230.14 Stickney, 29 Apr 41. 400.312 (Phil Dept) pt. 2. (4)
(Field Maint Force) Rqmts Br Sup Sec. (2) Fischer Capt. S. A. Goldblith, "The 803d Engineers in the
Ltr, 28 Apr 49. (3) Rad, Stickney to OCE, 18 Jan Philippine Defense," The Military Engineer,
41, and reply 29 Jan 41. 400.312 (Phil Dept) pt. 2. XXXVIII, (August, 1946), 323-25. (5) Dept Engr,
27
(1) Rad exchanges Stickney with OCE, 12, 21 Constr Progress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending
Mar 41, 2, 8 May 41. (2) Ltr, C Constr Sec OCE to 30 Nov 41. AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds.
64 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
October. Having served in the Phil- the islands, had selected sites on Luzon
ippines from 1937 to 1940 as assistant to and on nearby Mindoro and Lubang.
General MacArthur, Casey was familiar Construction of two stations, one on
with conditions in the islands. At the Bataan and the other on the Bicol Pen-
time of his appointment as Engineer, insula, was begun in September, but at
USAFFE, he was chief of the Design Sec- eight other locations nothing had as yet
tion of the Construction Division, Office been done. Since many stations were
of The Quartermaster General. There in out-of-the-way places, the engineers
he had worked under General Somervell had to build hard-surfaced access roads
and had had an opportunity to observe and strengthen many bridges before the
how construction could be pushed at detection units, each weighing over
high speed. Casey, losing no time in eight tons, could be hauled to the sites.
trying to find out where Stickney's pro- On 15 November plans and specifications
gram stood, called for information on the for eight of the stations were but 5 per-
status of major projects. On 1 Novem- cent complete. Casey insisted that every
ber Stickney submitted his first semi- effort be made to get these "high priority
monthly progress report, and from it projects underway." Of even greater
Casey concluded that work would have concern to him was the underground
to be greatly expedited. He urged Stick- chamber at Fort McKinley where the
ney to intensify pressure on contractors headquarters of the air warning service
and suggested that certain jobs be was to be located. This complicated
switched from purchase and hire to con- tunneling job was not begun until. 15
tract. He induced the commonwealth's October. Casey suggested that Stickney
Bureau of Public Works to undertake bring pressure on the contractor, ex-
additional projects, and used all the plaining that this tunnel was "a vital
influence he could muster to speed item of the entire Air Warning Serv-
deliveries from the United States and to ice." 30
streamline procedures.29 With the end of the southwestern
Casey was especially concerned over monsoons, construction of airfields on
the inadequate progress on the air warn- western Luzon progressed rapidly. The
ing stations. Reconnaissance parties led soil of the Central Plains, composed
by Barney Clark, an American civil largely of marine deposits, had admirable
engineer who had spent many years in bearing qualities. Even without sur-
facing, the runways at Clark, O'Donnell,
29
(1) Office of the Chief Engineer, General Head- and Del Carmen could carry the heaviest
quarters, Army Forces, Pacific, "Engineers of the
Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945," vol. I, Engineers in
aircraft then in use. Because the soil
Theater Operations (cited hereafter as Of C Engr was porous, drainage was easily provided.
GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I) (Washington, As one engineer expressed it, Clark Field
1947), p. 4. (2) Fine and Remington, Mil Constr in
the U.S. (3) Ltr, AG USAFFE to CG Phil Dept,
30
20 Oct 41. (4) DS, Engr USAFFE to AG USAFFE, (1) DF, Engr USAFFE to AG USAFFE, 27 Nov
27 Nov 41. (5) DS, Engr USAFFE to AG USAFFE, 41. AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds. (2) Fertig,
4 Dec 41. All three in AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil Guerrillero, pp. 20-21. (3) Dept Engr, Constr Prog-
Rcds. (6) Ltr, CG USAFFE to TAG, 22 Oct 41. ress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending 15 Nov 41.
400.312 (Phil Dept) pt. 2. AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41).
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 65
had "vertical drainage." Dust proved Tagoloan River and by mowing the
to be the major problem. The increas- grass of a large neighboring meadow,
ingly large numbers of planes arriving at natives quickly prepared two additional
Clark wore off the turf, with the result strips. Late in 1941 Del Monte was
that such clouds of dust arose from the transformed into a second base for
runways that the air was seldom clear B-17's. Zamboanga, the third large
unless a strong wind was blowing. At field, showed little progress. The War
Del Carmen the dust was even thicker. Department had insisted on the con-
There, as at Clark, the engineers had struction of a bomber base near the tip
neither equipment nor material for hard of Zamboanga Peninsula, where the only
surfacing. Nor did they have any cal- feasible site was in the rice paddies of
cium chloride, the chemical commonly that area. Local farmers would not give
used for dust control. Fertig, the area up their land willingly and the govern-
engineer at Del Carmen, recalling his ment resorted to expropriation. After
tennis-playing days in Colorado, remem- the land was acquired on 3 November,
bered that clay courts were often treated the engineers drained the paddies, a task
with water and beet sugar syrup to make that consumed much valuable time. By
them dust proof. He decided to experi- mid-November runways at Malabang
ment by applying to the runway a mix- and Del Monte were in use, but construc-
32
ture of water and waste molasses from a tion at Zamboanga had not yet started.
nearby sugar refinery. War came before Meanwhile, work was under way on
the experiment could be completed, but Corregidor, where Mielenz encountered
it was successfully carried out later on difficulties similar to Stickney's. His
Bataan Field.31 chief problem was to find contractors for
Although plans for fields on the the big modernization program; begun
southern islands developed slowly, con- late, negotiations dragged on throughout
siderable work had been done by 15 the fall. Mielenz did manage to begin a
November. Malabang, a small com- number of smaller projects in the sum-
mercial airport on the southwest coast of mer of 1941. At the height of the rainy
Mindanao, was easily enlarged. Its run- season, convicts from Bilibid Prison in
way, surfaced with fine volcanic cinders, Manila laid four-and-one-half miles of
was lengthened by the removal of a few cable six feet underground for the con-
coconut trees. Del Monte, located in
the midst of the pineapple plantations 32
(1) Rad, CG Phil Dept to TAG, 17 Apr 41. AG
of northern Mindanao, was originally 600.12 (10-26-40) sec. 1 (1). (2) Fertig, Guerrillero,
pp. 24-25. (3) Edmonds, They Fought With What
nothing more than the fairway of a golf They Had, pp. 53-55. (4) Rad, TAG to CG Phil
course. By removing a few rocks from a Dept, 27 Mar 41. AG 600.12 (10-26-40). (5) 2d
strip of land which extended out into the Ind, Hq Phil Dept to CG USAFFE, 20 Oct 41, on
Ltr, Chmn of Bd of Dirs Staff of Zamboanga City
Farmers Assn to U.S. High Commissioner in the
31
(1) Dept Engr, Constr Progress Rpts for Semi- Phil, 24 Sep 41. (6) Ltr, Office President of the Phil
monthly Periods Ending 15, 30 Nov 41. AG 319.1 to CofS USAFFE, 24 Nov 41. Last two in AG 600.1
(20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds. (2) Edmonds, They Fought (6 Sep 41) Phil Rcds. (7) Dept Engr, Constr Progress
With What They Had, pp. 51 and 239. (3) Fertig, Rpts for Semimonthly Periods Ending 15, 30 Nov 41.
Guerrillero, pp. 18-20. AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds.
66 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
for hasty demolitions. Mining engineers 500 officers and men. Also to be or-
would be called upon to help destroy ganized were 3 engineer combat regi-
roads and bridges. Colonel Casey began ments, 6 separate battalions, 2 heavy
to formulate a plan in line with Mac- ponton battalions, 3 topographic com-
Arthur's new strategy of defending the panies, and enough additional units to
whole archipelago, but war prevented its provide a complete engineer component
completion.35 for a Philippine Army of 160,000 men to
The one U.S. engineer combat unit be fully mobilized by October 1942. To
in the islands, the 14th Engineers (Phil- accomplish this program would be no
ippine Scouts), a part of the Philippine easy task. Casey had no engineer officer
Division and commanded by Lt. Col. to assist him until 20 November, when
Harry A. Skerry, consisted in mid-1940 Capt. Emilio Viardo of the Philippine
of 322 officers and men. While most of Army was assigned. Occasionally offi-
the officers were Americans, the enlisted cers and men from other arms and serv-
men were Filipinos. When not training ices helped out. Casey would have to
or on maneuvers, the 14th built military try to build the force from a cadre with
roads and bridges and cut trails through but limited training. Most Filipino
the jungles of Bataan. In January 1941, officers did not have the necessary back-
when the Scouts were authorized an in- ground to command technical units, and
crease from 6,500 to 12,000, the 14th was few American officers could be expected.
ordered to add 544 men to its roster. By The bulk of supplies and equipment
late November the regiment had been would have to come from the United
expanded to include 938 officers and States.37
men. Most of the recruits came from Engineer combat battalions of the
the Baguio gold mining area and were Philippine Army mobilized with disap-
36
old hands at construction. pointing slowness. As late as 1 Decem-
The mobilization of the Philippine ber 1941 not a single battalion was
Army, begun in September 1941, was completely manned and equipped, with
expected to provide the great majority actual strength closer to 400 men than to
of the engineer units urgently needed by the authorized 500. Equipment con-
MacArthur. Shortly after Casey arrived, sisted chiefly of hand tools, and there
MacArthur ordered him to develop a were not enough of these to go around.
force "equipped and trained to meet the The Philippine Army as a whole was no
heavy demands now required of the better prepared than its engineers, a state
Engineers in modern warfare." Each of of affairs that did not augur well for the
the 12 Philippine Army divisions was to future. 38
include an engineer combat battalion of To make matters worse, MacArthur's
35 37
Phil Dept Engr Plan—ORANGE (1936 Revision). (1) Ltr, Casey to CofEngrs, 17 Oct 41. SWPA
36
(1) Ltr, Skerry to C Staff Br, 5 May 49. SWPA Files. (2) Fischer Ltr, 28 Apr 49. (3) Ltr, Casey to
Files. (2) OCE, Annual Rpt for Mil Activities of the G-1 USAFFE, 29 Jan 42. Casey File 1.
38
CE for the FY 1941, pp. 6, 9. (3) Morton, Fall of the (1) Skerry Ltr, 30 Jun 49, Comment 4. (2) Ltr,
Philippines, p. 21, n. 16. (4) Ltr, Skerry to C Staff Col William C. Chenoweth (formerly Engr SLF and
Br, 30 Jun 49, Comment 2. SWPA Files. II Corps) to Chief Staff Br, 30 May 49. SWPA files.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 69
merchants, manufacturers, and mining Not until autumn did the War Depart-
companies all contributed to Bonham's ment take decisive action to speed de-
43
stores. No likely source escaped his at- liveries to the islands.
tention. Learning that the Cadwallader- Early in September MacArthur ex-
Gibson Lumber Company was to be pressed dissatisfaction with the low
liquidated, he quickly bought up its priority assigned to the Philippines.
stock of one and a quarter million feet Unless his orders for supplies and equip-
of lumber, paying 40 percent less than ment were filled more promptly, he
the current market price. Devising an would be unable to put the Army on a
"unorthodox plan" whereby he himself war footing as rapidly as he considered
guaranteed payment, Bonham was able necessary. Marshall, fully aware of the
to import from India enough burlap to difficulties that faced MacArthur, agreed
make more than half a million sandbags. to give the Philippines highest priority.
Ingenuity notwithstanding, scientific in- The engineers in the islands could now
struments, mechanical equipment, and hope to get the troops, supplies, and
other special engineer items could not be equipment they so sorely needed. By
procured in the Orient. These would mid-November a general service regi-
42
have to come from the United States. ment—the 47th—was being readied for
Colonel Stickney asked the Chief of movement overseas, and equipment for
Engineers to send searchlights, bridging, two aviation battalions was en route.
and water purification units in addition OCE was making an all-out effort to
to construction equipment for the troops. speed reinforcements. Encouraged by
He also appealed for spare parts. Gen- the Chief's attempts to aid them, Casey,
eral Schley promised to fill the requisi- Stickney, and Mielenz sent back a huge
tions as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, requisition. They asked for 21,000 tons
Bonham ordered equipment from of construction materials and equipment
American manufacturers through the costing $5 million dollars, but this re-
Pacific Commercial Company of Manila. quest did not reach the Chief of Engi-
44
The U.S. defense program and lend- neers until after Pearl Harbor.
lease requirements took precedence over
the needs of the Philippines, however, 43
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, 9 Nov 40, and Rads, 18 Jan,
and consignments to the islands had a 20 Mar 41, Stickney to OCE. 400.312 (Phil Dept)
low priority. By 19 September Bonham pt. 2. (3) 1st Ind, 27 Nov 40 on Ltr, 9 Nov 40. (4)
Rad, 29 Jan 41 and Ltr, 29 Apr 41, OCE to Stickney.
had accumulated sufficient stocks of earth Last three in 400.312 (Phil Dept) pt. 2. (5) Rqns,
augurs, assault boats, and gas shovels to Bonham to Pacific Commercial Co., 15, 22 Aug 41.
equip the U.S. troops at initial war 600.1 Phil Dept (Airfields) 1941. (6) Table, Rqmts
and Status of Controlled Items of Engr Equip, 19
strength. Nevertheless, his inventories Sep41. 400.31 (Phil Dept).
44
showed great shortages of such basic (1) Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 7 Sep 41, and
reply, 9 Sep 41. AG 320.2 (7-28-41). (2) Rqn Form,
items as explosives, searchlights, ponton Dept Engr to CofEngrs, 21 Oct 41. 600.1 Phil Dept
bridges, water purification units, tractors, (Airfields) 1941. (3) Memo, C Misc Br G-3 for C
trailers, and gas-motored timber saws. Opns Br, 10 Nov 41. AG 320.2 (7-28-41). (4) Rad,
Acting CofEngrs to CG USAFFE, 18 Nov 41. 400.31
(Phil Dept). (5) Notes of Conf in G-4, with Incl, 13
Nov 41. 381 (Phils). (6) Ltr, AG USAFFE to TAG,
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 71
was spent in lazy fishing and in enjoyment of the defense of the Philippines is thus
of the huge steaks prepared over a drift- almost entirely one of fighting on Luzon.
wood fire. The brilliant sunset illumi- It was here that the engineers had to
nated the lake and we started home across
the reddened waters. make their greatest effort.
The engineers urgently required a
The picnickers were awakened at 4:30 large increase in troop strength, but be-
the next morning to the news that the cause of Japan's naval superiority, no
Japanese had attacked Hawaii. "We more units could be expected from the
stood by ... awaiting the inevitable United States, at least not in the near
blow. . . . ," wrote Fertig. "We could future. All that could be done to in-
only hope that, in matching our puny crease the number of men in the field
weapons against the aggressor, somehow was to speed mobilization of the combat
48
help would reach us before too late." battalions of the Philippine Army. Most
retired and Reserve officers had already
Withdrawal to Bataan and been ordered to active duty and the
Corregidor remaining few were called up immedi-
ately.50 Casey appealed to civilian engi-
War came to the Philippines with neers to serve with the Army. Many
overwhelming suddenness. On the volunteered, with some being commis-
morning of 8 December enemy planes sioned at once and others serving as
appeared over the islands to bomb stra- civilians.51 American mining engineers,
tegic targets. About noon Japanese who came to be known as "Casey's
bombers carried out devastating attacks dynamiters," were to be of inestimable
on Iba and Clark Fields. So effective value.52 "These men," Casey wrote,
were these and succeeding raids on air- "although they in general knew little of
fields that within a few days the striking the military, were ideally qualified to
power of the Far East Air Force was perform all phases of engineer opera-
almost completely destroyed. On 10 tions. They were of a pioneer type
December Japanese troops landed at accustomed to doing crude engineering]
Vigan on the northwestern coast of Lu- under great difficulties . . . and capable
zon and near Aparri on the northern of improvising and getting the work
coast. Two days later a third force came done." 53 Since the number of mining
ashore at Legaspi near the southeastern engineers was small, each man knew
tip of the island. From these three
50
points enemy troops began moving in- Incl 5 to Ltr, Mielenz to C Staff Br, 17 Mar 47.
land—their major objective, the nearby SWPA Files.
51
From December 1941 to May 1942, approxi-
airfields. In the Visayan Islands and on mately 85 men were commissioned as Engineer of-
Mindanao no landings of decisive or even ficers directly from civilian life or the enlisted
critical importance were made until grades. Incl 2 to Mielenz Ltr, 17 Mar 47.
52
Frazier Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against
49
fairly late in the campaign. The story Japan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), pp.
53
39ff. Casey, Rpt on Conduct of Demolitions in the
48
Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 40-41. Philippines (cited hereafter as Casey, Demolitions),
49
Morton, Fall of the Phillipines, pp. 98ff. draft MS, 1942. SWPA File M344.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 73
most of the others either personally or by neers over to Capt. Frederick G. Saint
reputation. This simplified recruiting. and left to take up his new duties as
Many of the mining engineers, moreover, Engineer, North Luzon Force. When,
brought with them their crews of loyal on the following day, he reported to
Filipino workmen.54 Wainwright's headquarters at Fort Stots-
When war began, two Army ground enburg, he found he was the only engi-
forces were mobilizing on Luzon. neer on the scene. On 7 December three
North Luzon Force (NLF), commanded enlisted men were loaned to him, and he
by Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, was told he could expect an officer within
was responsible for the defense of the a few weeks. Four divisional combat
part of the island north of Manila. The battalions were mobilizing, the 11th,
part south and east of the capital was to 21st, 31st, and 71st. The 91st, also mo-
be defended by South Luzon Force bilizing, was attached to NLF but was
(SLF), commanded by Brig. Gen. George not to be assigned until a week later.
M. Parker, Jr. A third force, USAFFE There were no force engineer units for
Reserve, under the immediate command work in rear areas; neither was there any
of General MacArthur, was to hold equipment. For work behind the front
Manila and the area immediately to the lines Skerry was expected to make use of
north along the shore of Manila Bay. the divisional combat battalions, insofar
In USAFFE Reserve were the 14th en- as possible. In accordance with plans of
gineers. The 803d, under Stickney's long standing, he could also employ the
direction, was kept hard at work repair- district engineers of the commonwealth's
ing bomb damage at Clark and Nichols Bureau of Public Works.56
and rushing Del Carmen and O'Donnell The engineers of NLF were to operate
to completion. Each of the divisions in in an area some 275 miles long and 100
the North and South Luzon Forces had miles wide. In the north it was moun-
its engineer combat battalion. The tainous. On the west was a narrow
first engineer units to see combat were coastal plain and in the east the moun-
the battalions with Wainwright's North tains extended directly to the sea. The
55
Luzon Force. only passageway south through the north-
ern ranges was the narrow Cagayan
Engineers With North River valley. Southeast of Lingayen
Luzon Force Gulf was an extensive level area, the
Central Plains. About 40 miles wide
On 4 December, Colonel Skerry had and stretching 100 miles from the Gulf
turned the command on the 14th engi- to Manila, the plains provided a natural
avenue of approach to the Philippine
54
capital. Northern Luzon had three
Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 17 Mar 47. SWPA
Files. principal rivers, the Cagayan flowing
55
(1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 69ff.
56
(2) [Hist of] The Philippine Division in 1941-42. Memo, Skerry to CofS NLF, 1 Aug 42, sub: Rpt
OCMH Files. (3) Goldblith, "803d Engineers," of Orgn and Opns of NLF Engrs Between 8 Dec 41
The Military Engineer, XXXVIII (August, 1946), and 6 Jan 42 (cited hereafter as Skerry, Rpt of NLF
323-25. Engrs). SWPA Files.
74 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
northward through the mountains, the most powerful explosive and the best
Agno following a westerly course and types of detonators, Skerry prescribed
emptying into Lingayan Gulf, and the exceptionally large charges of dynamite
Pampanga cutting southwestward across and ordered the use of time fuzes. One
the Central Plains to Manila Bay. Ex- expert described this method as "plainly
cept in their upper reaches and in a few a matter of loading heavy charges of
other places, these rivers were unford- dynamite, sandbagging or tamping them
able. Northern Luzon boasted a fairly as much as possible, and . . . pray[ing]
good road net. Along the west coast for a complete job of demolition." Steel
from Lingayen Gulf to Bataan was a bridges with concrete floors proved espe-
graveled highway capable of taking heavy cially difficult to destroy. In the con-
military traffic during the dry season. fusion of the times, no use was made of
An all-weather road, Highway 5, ran the demolition book, so carefully pre-
from Aparri through the Cagayan Valley pared over the years. It remained in
and across the Central Plains to Manila. Stickney's office in Manila, to be de-
Another all-weather road, Highway 3, stroyed shortly before the capital was
extended down the northwest coast to evacuated. By 19 December, the engi-
Lingayen Gulf and thence across the neers had completed their demolitions
Central Plains to the capital. Northern in north central Luzon and had sealed
Luzon was also served by the main line off the region with roadblocks. The
of the narrow-gauge Manila Railroad, enemy advance southward from Aparri
58
which ran from Manila to San Fernando, to the Central Plains would be difficult.
La Union, on the coast north of Lin- A greater menace was the Japanese
gayen Gulf.57 thrust along the coastal road southward
On the day the Japanese landed at from Vigan. On learning of the enemy
Vigan and Aparri, Casey ordered the landing, Casey had issued orders for
destruction of roads, bridges, and ferries large-scale demolitions between Vigan
in the Cagayan Valley and the mountain- and San Fernando. Since no engineer
ous regions of northern Luzon. Skerry units were available, he asked the Bureau
called upon the engineers of the Bureau of Public Works to take this assignment.
of Public Works to do this job. No By 16 December enemy troops had pene-
TNT was available, nor were there any trated as far south as Tagudin, about
tetryl caps or electrical cap exploders, twenty-five miles above San Fernando.
but mining companies of the Baguio That same day USAFFE received word
region had ample stocks of dynamite, that its orders for demolitions were not
and Skerry asked three of the largest to being carried out. Casey telephoned
send him 180 tons. Within a few days
shipments began to arrive. Lacking the 58
(1) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 10 Dec 41,
Casey File 8. (2) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (3)
57
Rpt of Opns of NLF and I Phil Corps in De- McCandlish, "How Explosives Went to War in the
fense of North Luzon and Bataan From 8 Dec 41 to Philippines," The Explosives Engineer, XXIII, No.
9 Apr 42 (hereafter cited as Rpt of Opns of NLF 5 (September-October, 1945), 211. (4) Incl, Com-
and I Phil Corps), p. 2. OCMH Files; copy in ment by Stickney, "Engineer Organization," to
SWPA File M278. Mielenz Ltr, 17 Mar 47.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 75
Skerry at once, ordering him to blow the even these were fordable at certain
bridges to the north of San Fernando. points. Because the land was flat, there
The next morning Skerry made a hurried were few good sites for roadblocks.
reconnaissance of advance positions and Tanks could easily traverse the dry rice
found that bridges south of Tagudin had paddies of the almost treeless Central
60
already been destroyed. He saw, how-Plains.
ever, that the situation called for more Given this terrain, Skerry prepared a
engineers. On the afternoon of the plan of defense in depth, making use of
17th he visited the local district engineer the only important obstacles in the entire
to urge greater speed in the preparation region—the natural barriers of the
of demolitions around San Fernando and rivers. Under his direction, the engi-
the following day persuaded the manager neers of the Philippine Army and em-
of a nearby mine to lend him twelve ployees of the Bureau of Public Works
foremen. Meanwhile, on orders from set out to prepare all major highway
USAFFE, Skerry's engineers destroyed bridges from the Agno to Tarlac and
the large concrete pier, the telephone Cabanatuan for instant demolition.
exchange, and the oil and gasoline tanks Casey furnished groups of miners under
at San Fernando. Although demolitions the command of Lt. Col. Narciso L.
did not appreciably retard the Japanese Manzano (Philippine Scouts) to help
advancing down the coast, they entered with this work. Colonel Manzano and
the city to find little of military value his miners were temporarily attached to
remaining.59 North Luzon Force. Casey's office also
A major enemy landing at Lingayen sent a special detail—a second lieutenant
Gulf appeared imminent. On 18 De- and three miners—to NLF to help
cember Wainwright ordered Skerry to Skerry prepare the large railroad bridges
prepare for demolition the roads and for destruction. Small spans and cul-
bridges from Lingayen Gulf to as far verts in the area were to be taken care
south as the towns of Tarlac and Cabana- of by the rearmost divisions if and when
tuan—an area about forty miles wide and Wainwright's force withdrew through
61
sixty miles deep. Holding up enemy the Central Plains.
forces by demolitions on the Central A serious weakness in the defense was
Plains would be much more difficult than the lack of antitank mines. On 18 De-
delaying them in the mountainous re- cember Casey asked the USAFFE ord-
gions of the north. In the upper Central nance officer to order 70,000 from the
Plains, there were only two rivers that United States. Meanwhile, Bonham,
would be serious obstacles to an invader using designs supplied by Casey, fur-
equipped for modern war—the Agno nished makeshift mines. Consisting of
and the Tarlac. During the dry season a wooden box about ten inches on a side,
with approximately five pounds of dyna-
59
(1) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 10 Dec 41.
60
Casey File 8. (2) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (3) (1) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (2) Memo,
DF, Engr USAFFE to G-3 USAFFE, 16 Dec 41. (4) Casey for Rcd, 23 Dec 41. Casey File 4.
61
DF Engr USAFFE to CofS USAFFE, 16 Dec 41. Last (1) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (2) Ltr, Skerry
two in Casey File 8. to C EHD, 13 Apr 56, Comment 5. SWPA Files.
76 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
mite, a flashlight battery, and a detona- the critical line. It had to be held until
tor, each mine was put together and South Luzon Force was safely across the
63
placed by the troops. Bonham could not Pampanga.
supply enough materials to mine exten- Because there were few planes left to
sive areas. The most the engineers interfere with the enemy's progress and
could hope for was that an enemy tank because the untrained Philippine troops
would occasionally blunder into a mine could not withstand the powerful Japa-
field. Skerry's success in delaying the nese onslaughts, Wainwright had to rely
enemy would have to depend mainly on heavily on his engineers. It was they
62
the destruction of bridges. who had to keep open roads and bridges
Fears of a landing at Lingayen Gulf ahead of the retreating columns—not an
proved well founded. On 22 December easy task in view of the Japanese su-
a large Japanese force came ashore be- premacy in the air. It was the engineers,
tween Bauang and Damortis. The too, who had to prepare all bridges for
enemy troops were too numerous to be demolition and assure their destruction
beaten back by the few NLF units near after friendly troops had passed over.
the gulf, and reinforcements were not Four of Wainwright's five engineer
available. Hopes of defeating the combat battalions participated in the
enemy at the beaches vanished. On the withdrawal—the 11th, 21st, 71st, and
night of 23 December, General Mac- 91st. The 31st had gone with its divi-
Arthur declared War Plan ORANGE-3 in sion to help guard the western coast just
effect. Wainwright would withdraw above Bataan and on 14 December had
southward and attempt to hold back been removed from NLF control. Wain-
Japanese forces coming down from the wright decided to keep the 11th, 21st,
gulf long enough to enable South Luzon and 71st Battalions with their divisions
Force to fall back through Manila, cross until they reached San Fernando, Pam-
the Pampanga, and continue on to panga. Then each battalion, less one
Bataan. NLF was to carry out its with- company, was to be detached to maintain
drawal in five phases, designated D1, D2, the roads leading into Bataan.
D3, D4, and D5. Making his first stand By Christmas Eve, Wainwright's forces
midway between Lingayen Gulf and the were retreating toward the D2 position,
Agno, Wainwright would retire to four located along the southern bank of the
successive positions, the last of which, Agno. The engineers had been at work
D5, stretched from the town of Bamban here for more than a week. Anticipat-
on the west to Sibul Springs at the foot ing bottlenecks when the heavy traffic
of the mountains on the east. This was from the north reached the bridges at
Bayambang and Carmen, Skerry had put
62
men from the Bureau of Public Works
(1) Office of the Chief Engineer, General Head-
quarters, Army Forces, Pacific, "Engineers of the to work building two bridges of palm
Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945," vol. VII, Engineer
Supply (cited hereafter as Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC,
Engrs of SWPA, VII) (Washington, 1947), p. 21. (2) 63
Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (3) Hq USAFFE, Instr (1) Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wain-
on Use of Improvised Antitank Mines, [n.d.]. Casey wright's Story (New York, 1946), pp. 32-42. (2)
File 4. Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 166-69.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 77
logs at Wawa and Urbiztondo. Charges the entire battalion was placed under
had been placed on all the bridges over Skerry, and, except for one company
the Agno. When the Japanese bombed which later returned to its division, re-
the big highway bridge at Carmen on 23 mained with him throughout the with-
December, some of the charges exploded, drawal. Still farther to the rear, other
dropping the southernmost span to the engineers readied roads and bridges for
river bed. Wainwright, alarmed be- destruction. When War Plan ORANGE-3
cause most of his tanks were still north went into effect, Wainwright ordered
of the river, ordered immediate repair. Skerry to prepare demolitions and erect
The 91st engineers, under constant obstacles in the territory south of Tarlac
enemy air attack, built a temporary span and Cabanatuan. In the large new area,
within 24 hours.64 After the last of the stretching southeast toward Manila and
American and Philippine troops had southward to Bataan, mining engineers
crossed the river, the engineers demol- and district engineers of the Bureau of
ished all the bridges along the 50-mile Public Works again rendered valuable
front. Wainwright's forces had reached service.66
the south bank of the Agno and tempo- As NLF withdrew farther south, the
rary safety.65 engineers made ready to blow up every
During most of the ensuing with- bridge in the path of the Japanese.
drawal, the front-line engineer battalions Skerry personally directed the placing of
were kept intact. They moved in a the charges at the critical highway
definite pattern: on completing an as- bridges across the Tarlac and the Bam-
signment in a given area, a unit leap- ban Rivers and over the Pampanga at
frogged over the one behind it and Cabanatuan, Arayat, and Candaba. The
continued working farther to the rear. special detail of miners, with the aid of
These battalions, with other covering troops, prepared the spans on the Manila
forces, prepared and executed demoli- Railroad, taking special care with the
tions and put in roadblocks near the great bridge at Bamban. At all the large
front. To the rear, all important demo- bridges on the highways and the railroad
litions, whether of bridges and roads or the engineers managed to place their
67
of equipment and supplies, were carried charges well ahead of time.
out by engineers under Skerry's com- Groups of miners, getting the innu-
mand. Much of this work was done by merable smaller spans ready for destruc-
the 91st Engineers. On 21 December tion, had to work rapidly, for they had
much to do and time was short. W. L.
64
Their commander, Capt. Antonio P. Chanco McCandlish, a demolitions expert who
(Philippine Army), writing to Wainwright later, re- had arrived in the islands shortly before
called this effort "as one of our best under stress." the outbreak of war, worked with a small
Ltr, Chanco to Wainwright, 10 Jun 46. SWPA Files.
65
(1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 169ff. group under Manzano which operated
(2) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 16 Dec 41. north of San Fernando, Pampanga. Mc-
Casey File 4. (3) Wainwright, General Wainwright's
Story, pp. 39-40. (4) 2d Ind, Skerry to Hq Fourth
66
Army, Awards and Decorations Bd, 6 Sep 46, on Ltr, Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs.
67
Chanco to Wainwright, 10 Jun 46. Ibid.
78 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Candlish's description of the group's light the fuzes. An engineer would then
activities furnishes an example of how have to take upon himself the responsi-
such parties operated. While fighting bility of destroying the bridge. Some-
was going on at Tarlac, about twenty- times officers, with but incomplete
five miles to the north, McCandlish and knowledge of the tactical situation,
his men prepared the bridge at Angeles. ordered demolitions too soon. Occa-
After placing the charges, the blasting sionally, Filipino engineers grew panicky
cap, and six feet of fuze, they arranged to and set the charges off without waiting
have three Scouts stationed at the south for any orders at all. The foot soldier
end of the bridge to guard against pre- who found himself stranded on the
mature detonation, and then moved wrong side of a wrecked span might
southward. Between Angeles and Mex- somehow manage to get across and re-
ico, they found only small timber struc- join his outfit, but to the tanker, a pre-
tures. They drenched these with fuel maturely blown bridge could spell
oil and directed the troops stationed as disaster. Since tanks operated under
guards to ignite them when the order USAFFE control, the engineers made
was issued by the proper divisional staff special efforts to get information on their
officer. At Mexico, McCandlish and his movements but were not always success-
miners found a 30-foot concrete bridge ful. One tank commander, Col. Ernest
over a deep gorge. At both sides of the B. Miller, concluded that he would have
north and south abutments they dug pits to place his own men at each bridge
six feet deep, and in each of the four over which his tanks must pass, "with
holes they placed 150 pounds of dyna- orders to shoot anyone who attempted to
mite, attaching a cap and a fuze three blow it without our authority." On at
feet long. They then instructed the de- least one occasion Miller's tankers had
tachment at the bridge how to fire the to rebuild a bridge before they could
charges, cautioning the men that it move south. Colonel Skerry pointed
would take only two minutes for the out that demolition at the proper time
fuzes to burn through to the blasting was his greatest problem by far. As a
caps.68 rule, the engineers tried to keep a bridge
Inexperienced Filipino engineers left intact until strong enemy action on the
to blow up bridges found it difficult to far bank made destruction imperative,
determine when to set the charges off. but the fact remained that some bridges
They frequently could not ascertain were blown too soon.69
whether all friendly forces had crossed, In these tense days the engineers were
for the Philippine infantrymen very called upon not only to destroy but also
often did not arrive at the right place at
the right time. Sometimes the engi- 69
(1) Map 2, facing page 10, Office of the Chief
neers could not find the divisional staff Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces,
Pacific, "Engineers of the Southwest Pacific," Volume
officer who was to notify them when to VIII, Critique (Washington, 1950), shows the location
of the principal demolitions on Luzon. (2) Skerry,
Rpt of NLF Engrs. (3) Col. Ernest B. Miller,
68
McCandlish, "How Explosives Went to War in Bataan Uncensored (Brainerd, Minn., 1949), pp. 103-
the Philippines," The Explosives Engineer, XXIII, 104. (4) Ltr, Skerry to C Staff Br, 4 Jun 49, Com-
No. 5 (September-October, 1945), pp. 209-10. ment 6. (5) Casey, Demolitions.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 79
to build. On 18 December MacArthur
directed Stickney to prepare temporary
landing fields for the "large reinforce-
ments of airplanes" expected from the
United States. These fields were first to
be developed for pursuit craft and later
to be enlarged for bombers. Every
likely site was to be turned to use.
Ordered to move to Bataan, the
companies of the 803d Aviation Bat-
talion built a number of fields while
on their way to their new location.
On 21 December, Company A left
O'Donnell for Dinalupihan, near the
base of Bataan Peninsula, where it
put in three emergency strips in as
many days and then began work on
revetments. On Christmas Day, head- COLONEL FERTIG. (Photograph taken in 1953.)
quarters company left Clark to join
Company A. Four days later, both
moved south to Orani to build an- The situation confronting Wain-
other strip there. Company B, mean- wright grew progressively more serious.
while, having finished one runway at Del Six days after their landing at Lingayen
Carmen, moved on to construct two Gulf, the Japanese reached the D4 line,
bomber strips at Hermosa and Pilar on and on the night of 30 December Wain-
Bataan's eastern coast. Company C left wright ordered a withdrawal to the D5
Nichols and went to the tip of Bataan to position. That the retreat from Lin-
push work on Bataan and Cabcaben gayen Gulf had been a planned and
fields. Filipino civilians helped greatly orderly withdrawal was owing in no
in the preparation of these fields. Under small measure to the demolitions of the
the direction of Colonel Fertig, who in engineers.71 With Wainwright's men
October had been appointed chief of now making a determined effort to hold,
Stickney's Construction Division, thou- much depended upon the speed with
sands worked to improve existing run- which the troops of South Luzon Force
ways and rough out additional fighter
strips. The engineers provided the Co A, 803d Engrs. (5) Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 5
Jun 47. SWPA Files.
fields, but there were few planes to use 71
The importance of this work in helping prevent
them. Most of the newly constructed the enemy from disrupting the withdrawal is attested
strips were soon to be overrun by the to not only by American but by Japanese officers as
well. Lt. Gen. Masami Maeda, chief of staff of the
enemy.70 14th Army, later stated that "the destruction of all
bridges by the American forces delayed our advance"
70
(1) Ltr, MacArthur to Dept Engr, 18 Dec 41. from the gulf to Manila. Statement of Gen Maeda,
Casey File 8. (2) Mielenz Ltr, 14 Mar 47. (3) Gold- 2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56234. Copies are in Interro-
blith, 803d Engineers," The Military Engineer, gations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div,
XXXVIII (August, 1946), 323-25. (4) Brief Hist of GHQ, FEC, I and II, and in OCMH Files.
80 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
could clear the bridges over the Pam- Bicol Peninsula. Because of its length
panga at Calumpit on their way to and the small number of troops at his
Bataan.72 disposal, MacArthur had decided not to
defend the peninsula. He relied chiefly
Engineers With South upon the engineers to impede the
Luzon Force enemy's advance toward the capital.74
Upon learning of the landing, General
When war broke out, South Luzon Parker ordered an engineer detachment
Force was mobilizing in the mountainous to the peninsula, and a group from the
country below Manila. An engineer 51st Engineer Battalion, under the com-
organization had barely begun to take mand of 2d Lt. Robert C. Silhavy, left
form. Arriving at headquarters at Fort at once to destroy highway and railroad
McKinley on 8 December, Capt. Wil- bridges. The Japanese rushed small
liam C. Chenoweth, the engineer, SLF, motorized units forward in an attempt to
found he had a staff consisting of two head off demolition parties. On 17 De-
enlisted men from the 14th Engineers. cember, while placing charges on the
Force engineers were entirely lacking, railroad bridge near Ragay, 75 miles
nor were any divisional engineers avail- northwest of Legaspi, Silhavy and his
able for work behind the front lines; the men were fired on by a Japanese patrol.
only battalions in SLF, the 41st and 51st, The engineers returned the fire and pro-
could not be spared by their divisions. ceeded with their work. After demol-
Chenoweth quickly mobilized the em- ishing the bridge, they took up positions
ployees of the Bureau of Public Works. on the near bank of the gorge and soon
Within a few days after the first enemy thereafter the Japanese retired. This
landings on Luzon, he had 2,000 men at was the first encounter with enemy
work stockpiling materials to be used in ground forces on southern Luzon.
repairing roads and rebuilding bomb- Silhavy and his men continued demoli-
73
damaged bridges. tion work on the peninsula until ordered
With the landing at Legaspi on 12 to move to Bataan.75
December, much of southern Luzon was On 14 December Casey directed the
in danger of being overrun by the enemy. district engineers to destroy the bridges
About 250 miles southeast of Manila, and "critical road cuts and fills" on the
Legaspi was connected with the capital main highway running along the length
by a good highway and the main line of of the peninsula. Their work in wreck-
the Manila Railroad. The only ob- ing many highway bridges and roads
stacles in the way of the advancing Japa- greatly hampered the enemy's progress
nese were the numerous ravines, gorges,
and isthmuses of the long and narrow 74
(1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 109-10.
(2) Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Defense Force, and
72
(1) Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. II Phil Corps in Defense of South Luzon and Bataan,
41-42. (2) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. pp. 8-9. Copy in SWPA File M281.
73 75
(1) Ltr with Inch, Chenoweth to C Staff Br, 27 (1) Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Defense Force,
Sep 47. SWPA File M339. (2) Chenoweth Ltr, 30 and II Phil Corps, app. II, p. 7. (2) Casey, Demo-
May 49. litions.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 81
toward Manila. Casey, meanwhile, in- southeast of Manila damaged three cars
structed the Manila Railroad to prepare and tore up a section of track. Casey
to dynamite its principal bridges. The attributed the accident to "interference
president of the railroad, Mr. Jose Paez, by the local military authorities with
on 16 December told Casey that he had railroad operation." Seeking an end to
ordered all rolling stock and materials mishaps of this sort, he arranged a meet-
moved toward the capital. His crews ing between officials of the railroad and
had already pulled spikes out of thirty officers of SLF. Better timing in the
kilometers of track. Stocks of gasoline destruction of vital bridges arid improved
and oil which could not be hauled north- scheduling of trains resulted.77
ward were being burned or dumped into With but few mining engineers in his
the sea. He agreed to destroy all bridges part of the island, Chenoweth had to rely
and promised to give special attention to heavily on men from the Bureau of
the destruction of spans over deep gorges. Public Works. McCandlish, who made
These pledges were in large part ful- several inspection trips in southern
filled. By the 17th the piers of the Luzon, reported that in many instances
bridges at Libmanan and Banga Caves demolitions were not expertly handled.
had been partly wrecked, the trusses On the eastern Luzon coast, for example,
dropped about three feet, and the ties he happened upon a district engineer
and rails thrown into the river. The and a group of Filipino workmen who
destruction of the 150-foot center span were preparing to destroy a section of
of the bridge across the gorge at Del road near the mouth of the Tignuan
Gallego effectively ended all rail traffic River. The road ran along the side of a
between Legaspi and Manila for months steep cliff about 500 feet above the river.
to come.76 The men were digging holes two feet
Lack of co-ordination between the deep in the road and loading each of
Manila Railroad and South Luzon Force them with two cartridges of dynamite.
increased the difficulties of evacuating McCandlish considered these measures
supplies. Around 14 December, before entirely inadequate. A tunnel with
any trains could be moved out of the crosscuts blasted out of the cliff and
peninsula, the bridges at Malicbuy and loaded with three or four tons of dyna-
Pagbilao, both west of the Bicol Penin- mite "would have taken out the road,
sula, were blown on orders of a tactical brought down the cliff, and stopped all
commander of South Luzon Force. transportation for a considerable period."
Casey ordered the bridges rebuilt at With little experience in complicated
once. Since they had not been seriously demolitions work, and lacking the time
damaged, reconstruction was completed for adequate planning and preparation,
in thirty-six hours. On the 16th a wreck district engineers nevertheless carried out
hundreds of small jobs successfully.78
76
(1) Memos, 14, 17, 18, 19 Dec 41, Casey for
CofS USAFFE. (2) Memo, M[anzano] for Rcd, 16
77
Dec 41. Both in Casey File 4. (3) Fertig Ltr, 5 Jun (1) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 16 Dec 41.
47. (4) Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Def Force, and Casey File 4. (2) Casey, Demolitions.
78
II Phil Corps, p. 16, and app. II, p. 25. McCandlish, "How Explosives Went to War in
82 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
gether with other experts from Casey's noted that more dynamite had been
office and a company of soldiers, began placed at the critical panel points and
preliminary tasks. They first turned covered with sandbags. Before leaving,
their attention to the highway bridge, Skerry instructed his men to lay still
breaking holes through the concrete deck more explosives across the decks of the
directly over the piers. Blowing the structures after all traffic had passed over.
north abutment would be easy, since at The bridges would then be ready.84
its base was a recess three feet deep in By the early morning hours of New
which a half ton of dynamite could be Year's Day SLF and NLF had cleared the
loaded and tamped with sandbags and bridges. A flank guard which had been
boulders. While one group of soldiers stationed at Plaridel, some seven miles to
packed charges in the holes on the high- the southeast, crossed over between 0430
way bridge, another placed explosives and 0500. All U.S. and Filipino forces
under the railroad bridge. Japanese were now safely across the Pampanga—
planes dropped several bombs, but ap- all except Manzano and his men, who
parently made no determined efforts to were somewhere between Manila and
destroy the bridges. Still, even near Calumpit. Skerry asked Wainwright to
misses were dangerous to the heavily delay the destruction of the bridges as
loaded structures. During one raid, a long as possible in order to give Man-
bomb hit a sugar warehouse near the zano's party time to get across. Wain-
south end of the highway bridge; an- wright agreed to wait until 0600, even
other landed in the river only fifty yards though he felt the situation was becom-
downstream. At first, air raid warnings ing more and more serious. Dawn was
delayed the work, but as the men gained beginning to break, and rifle fire was
confidence, they continued to pack dyna- increasing on the south bank of the
mite and fill sandbags, heedless of the Pampanga. Enemy patrols were getting
wailing sirens.83 close to the river. "In weighing the
When Skerry inspected the bridges on tactical importance of blowing the
30 December, he found that heavier bridges and making the . . . unford-
charges would be required at the lower able Pampanga a real obstacle," wrote
panel points to insure complete destruc- Skerry, "against waiting for a small
tion. The highway bridge needed addi- group, that . . . could withdraw to
tional dynamite on its concrete deck. Bataan by other routes, . . . [there
Intending to take no chances, he pre- could be] but one answer. . . ." Wain-
scribed an extra ton for each of the two wright directed Skerry to blow the
structures and ordered an alternate sys- bridges. At 0600, the engineer went to
tem of firing for the deck charges on the the men waiting at the two abutments
highway bridge. Inspecting the bridges and instructed them to fire the highway
again on the morning of the 31st, he bridge at 0615, the railroad bridge im-
mediately thereafter. Wainwright and
83
the members of his staff took cover, and
McCandlish, "How Explosives Went to War in
the Philippines," The Explosives Engineer, XXIII,
84
No. 5 (September-October, 1945), p. 210. Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 9.
84 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the engineers lit the fuzes. After a few and Rizal. Casey had instructed Bed-
minutes the huge charges went off with a ford to stay in Manila as long as possible
tremendous roar and the spans fell into to destroy any military equipment he
the river. The broad Pampanga lay in could find, and to make his way to Bataan
the path of the enemy.85 by whatever means he could command.
As the Japanese columns neared Bedford and his men destroyed three
Manila, the engineers touched off large- large bridges and many small ones south
scale demolitions in and around the city. of the city. They wrecked the piers at
Preparations for denying the enemy Wawa. While mining bridges, they
everything of military value had been noticed about twenty-seven native house-
under way for more than a week. In- boats and barges moored in the tidal
dustrial plants, radio stations, ware- waters of the rivers. Bedford succeeded
houses and shops of the Manila Railroad, in burning four in the Imus River, but
Nichols and Nielson Fields, and Fort the strenuous objections of the owners
McKinley were to be wrecked. Supplies stopped him from setting the rest on fire.
which could not be moved to Bataan On New Year's Day he and his crew of
were to be destroyed, all except food, the Filipinos destroyed quantities of aban-
loss of which would inflict greater hard- doned supplies at Fort McKinley. With
ship on the Filipinos than on the Japa- another American civilian he went to
nese. Casey was especially anxious to Pandacan to ignite any remaining sup-
leave no oil, since the enemy's stocks plies of gasoline and oil. The two men
were extremely limited. He had there- found three tanks still intact but sur-
fore made elaborate plans for setting on rounded by moats of burning oil. Un-
fire the large oil tank farm in the Panda- able to get near enough to place
can district. Roads and bridges within explosives against the valves, they used
Manila were to be left intact. On 30 rifle fire to perforate the center tank and
December the work of destruction be- then ran to escape the ensuing explo-
gan. On that day and the next, the city sion. On 2 January, the day the Japa-
was dotted with fires and rocked by nese occupied the capital, Bedford
explosions, as the engineers put into arranged to leave for Bataan by boat.
effect their scorched earth policy.86 But while on his way to a rendezvous
Demolition engineers were among the with two of his Filipino foremen in
last to leave the city. One of the many Intramuros, the old walled city of
to remain behind was Earle Bedford, Manila, he was picked up by the Japa-
before the war a civilian engineer in the nese and interned at Santo Tomas
islands, and now in charge of demolition University for the duration of the occu-
work south and east of Manila in the pation. Many who stayed behind shared
provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, Bedford's fate, but others managed to
escape, some finding small boats to take
85
(1) Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, them across the Bay. Among those elud-
pp. 43-44. (2) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. ing the enemy were Manzano and his
201, 208-10. (3) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49. Comment 9.
86
(1) Casey, Demolitions. (2) Fertig, Guerrillero,
men, who, after destroying six bridges
pp. 50-51. just north of the city, made their way to
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 85
MAP 6
lane coastal highway, ran south along the Mariveles Mountains. As Engineer,
the eastern shore to Mariveles at the tip, USAFFE, Colonel Casey was to supervise
crossed over to the western side, and all engineer activities during the siege.
extended north as far as Moron. The By early January he had eight officers to
other stretched across the middle of the assist him. Five remained with their
peninsula from Bagac to Pilar.89 chief on Bataan; three were sent to Mac-
Early in January, Casey and Stickney Arthur's headquarters on Corregidor.
went to Bataan to help organize the de- As service command engineer, Colonel
fenses, setting up their offices at "Little Stickney was to be responsible for work
Baguio," high on the southern slopes of in the rear areas, including all construc-
tion. A week after war began, Washing-
89
ton had ordered the duties of the con-
(1) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 10. (2) Rpt
of Opns of NLF and I Phil Corps, pp. 16-17. (3)
structing quartermaster in the islands
Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 63. transferred to the department engineer.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 87
Stickney immediately took over construc- The Main Battle Position
tion as well as repairs and utilities work
in and around Manila, but elsewhere on The main battle position, along which
Luzon the confused tactical situation pre- Wainwright and Parker would first at-
vented the transfer. On 28 December tempt to hold, extended from Mauban
Stickney assumed direction of all con- on the west to Mabatang on the east, a
struction on Bataan and Corregidor. distance of about 18 miles. At the
He had succeeded in augmenting his center of the line were two precipitous
staff considerably since the beginning of mountains, Mount Natib and Mount
the defense build-up and now had forty Silanganan, covered with jungle, which,
officers. His organization was divided it was believed, the enemy would be able
into three sections: Construction, under to penetrate only with the greatest diffi-
Fertig; Supply, under Bonham; and De- culty. Extensive field fortifications were
fense Works on the Fortified Islands, therefore to be prepared only on the
under Mielenz. 90 eastern and western portions of the line
When the Filipino troops moving and were to extend about 5 miles inland
down from the north reached Bataan, all from the coast on either side of the
the detached units of combat engineers peninsula. The position had one obvi-
were once more with their divisions. ous weakness. The almost impassable
The 1st, 31st, and 91st Battalions moved interior made communication between
to the western half of the peninsula, be- the two corps extremely difficult. Casey
coming part of General Wainwright's believed there was still another draw-
command, now redesignated I Corps. back. On 2 January he pointed out that
The 11th, 21st, 41st, and 51st Battalions between Mauban and Moron, 3 miles to
became part of II Corps, formerly SLF, the northwest, lay an excellent beach
which, under General Parker, was to which would invite a Japanese flank at-
defend the eastern half of Bataan. The tack. He recommended that the line be
2d and 71st Battalions went first to the anchored at Moron, and that the Mauban
service command area; the 71st was later line be used as a switch position. The
transferred to I Corps, the 2d to II line remained at Mauban, but Mac-
Corps. Skerry as Engineer, I Corps, and Arthur took steps to strengthen the
Chenoweth as Engineer, II Corps, set to beach, posting a company of infantry and
work immediately to help ready front- a troop of cavalry at Moron and along
line positions.91 the shore to the south to guard against
an amphibious landing.92
During these first days of strenuous
90
(1) Fertig, Guerrillero, p. 60. (2) Memo, Casey effort to prepare the main battle position
for Rcd, 25 Jan 42. (3) Ltr, Mielenz to CG Harbor
Defense of Manila and Subic Bays, 19 Jan 41. Last
two in Casey File 8. (4) 2d Ind on Mielenz Ltr, O
92
HD QM, Fort Mills to CG Harbor Defense of Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 248-50.
Manila and Subic Bays, 14 Jan 42. (2) Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 48.
91
(1) Ltr, Casey to CofS USAFFE, 19 Jan 42. (3) Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Defense Force, and
Casey File 8. (2) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, II Phil Corps, p. 20. (4) Memo, Casey for CofS
p. 247. USAFFE, 2 Jan 42. AG 381 (2 Jan 42) Phil Rcds.
88 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
before the Japanese could strike, the the difficult terrain, an enemy attack was
engineer combat battalions were not only less likely to succeed.93
developing roads and trails, laying mines, Skerry was plagued by a shortage of
and building gun emplacements but engineer troops, but Chenoweth was
were also clearing fields of fire, digging more fortunate. During the last days
foxholes, and stringing barbed wire. of December a number of mining engi-
Inspecting his portion of the line during neers had made their way to the east
the first week of January, Skerry found coast of Bataan. About 500 troops who
the work but half complete and noted a had become separated from their units
number of deficiencies. The outpost were also in the II Corps area. Most of
line of resistance had good fields of fire, the soldiers were stragglers, or survivors
but too much of the scarce barbed wire of a ship that had sunk after hitting a
had been placed here. Along the main mine in Manila Bay. On 29 December
line of resistance, foxholes were too close these men were organized into the 301st
to the wire. The regimental reserve Engineer Combat Regiment (Philippine
line, while well located, was badly in Army), which on 13 February was split
need of the wire which had been used so into two battalions, the 201st and the
lavishly on the outpost line. Skerry 202d. The miners were commissioned
concluded that engineer troops were not as officers. Assigned to Chenoweth,
being used to best advantage. He asked these new engineer troops erected field
division commanders to take their engi- fortifications, prepared tank traps, and
neers off such jobs as digging foxholes, laid mines. In time they became some
which should be done by infantry, and of the best road builders on Bataan.94
put them to building roads and trails. After the Japanese assaults began, the
He also arranged to have the engineers engineers continued to strengthen the
work with the infantry in stringing wire. lines. Visiting I Corps positions in mid-
Chenoweth reported troubles, too, but January, Casey observed that Skerry's
of another variety. The troops "were men had felled trees and placed antitank
green and could see no reason for digging mines and timber piles in front of the
foxholes, clearing fields of fire, or laying main line of resistance. He found in-
barbed wire." They expended "no fantrymen stringing an additional
great amount of energy ... in digging twenty-five tons of wire on the defense
themselves in." The 41st engineers lines and along the shore of the South
were attempting to build roads across China Sea. The troops were also con-
rice paddies, but "as fast as ... [they] structing underwater obstacles south to
would dry out a rice field someone else
would turn in the water." Yet, despite 93
(1) Skerry Ltrs, 4 Jun 49, Comment 11-1/2, and
many difficulties, the lines along the II 20 Jul 49, Comment 7. (2) Chenoweth Ltr, 27
Corps front were fairly well fortified Sep 47.
94
when the Japanese attacked on 9 Janu- (1) 1st Lt P. V. Cardenas, Hist and Composition
[of the 301st Engr Combat Regt]. SWPA Files. (2)
ary. In the I Corps sector, fortifications Hq USAFFE GO No. 26, 13 Feb 42. (3) Ltr, Casey
were less elaborate, but there, because of to CofS USAFFE, 19 Jan 42. Casey File 8.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 89
ground. The eastern sector of the line outposts without any covering forces.
was, at that time, not much better pre- By the end of the month Casey found
pared. The 14th engineers, sent to the positions in the II Corps "relatively well
II Corps area in late December, were the organized." The I Corps sector, where
only troops to work steadily on the line. jungles restricted fields of fire, was, in his
Other units, both engineer and infantry, opinion, the weaker one. He pointed
came and went in rapid succession. out, however, that a concentrated enemy
Outfits were ordered to the area only to drive could penetrate either position.
be pulled out after a short stay and sent He therefore stressed the need for a
into combat. In mid-January two com- strong mobile reserve which could be
panies of the 301st and 600 additional rushed to any point along the front.
Filipino soldiers, most of them airmen, "If our strength is all tied down," he
were rushed down to the reserve position. warned, "it is bound to fail."99
But time was fast running out. When There was no lateral communication
MacArthur withdrew from the first line, between the two corps except by the
much still remained to be done on the roundabout coastal highway. The front
second.98 lines cut across the Pilar-Bagac road in
On reaching the reserve position, every such a way that the central portion was
available man, combat engineer and in- held by the Japanese. Troops in the
fantryman alike, was put to strengthen- center of the peninsula were isolated.
ing the new line. All the work of An attempt to carry in supplies to them
digging foxholes, stringing wire, laying on pack mules met with little success,
mines, and hacking out underbrush had and some companies had nearly ex-
to be repeated. Tools were now fewer hausted their food and ammunition
and materials more scarce. Much of the before roads could be cut through.
wire expended on the first line could not Engineer units in II Corps alone built
be reclaimed; many picks, axes, and bolos over 100 kilometers of roads. But the
had been broken or lost. When the men most important and difficult task of all
of the 41st Combat Battalion fell back was that of building a road to parallel
from the original battle line, they left the Pilar-Bagac highway. The new
everything behind, including 1,700route cut through the jungles on the
shovels and 140 rolls of barbed wire. northern slopes of the Mariveles Moun-
Bayonets, mess kits, and tin cans, which tains and across river valleys with vertical
had sometimes served as entrenching drops of as much as 2,000 feet. This
tools on the first battle position, were project was assigned to the 14th engi-
used even more extensively on the sec- neers. Having but five dozers of their
ond. The engineers of both corps toiled own, they borrowed an angledozer and a
long and hard to build fortifications, tractor from Chenoweth and two graders
occasionally working well in front of the from the 803d. Beginning the job on 5
98
(1) Rpt of Opns of NLF and I Phil Corps, p. 18.
99
(2) Skerry Ltr, 20 Jul 49, Comment 7. (3) Ltrs, (1) Ltr, Casey to CofS USAFFE, 31 Jan 42. (2)
Casey to CofS USAFFE, 19 and 24 Jan 42. Casey Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42. Both in Casey
File 8. (4) Chenoweth Ltr, 30 May 49. File 1.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 91
February, the 14th completed it two over two hours sleep a night. Some
weeks later, one day ahead of schedule.100 nights none." 101
Often the combat engineers had to Field manuals had little to say about
fight as infantry. On 2 February, when the defense of positions in the jungle
Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel, the com- terrain. Most of their space was devoted
mander of the 31st Infantry Division, to the conduct of operations in country
launched a counterattack to prevent an like that of western Europe. Although
enemy breakthrough in the II Corps defensive warfare in the jungle was in
area, he took his engineer battalion from many ways similar to that in other types
reserve to make the assault. The men of terrain, Skerry noted certain essential
crossed the defense lines and advanced differences. The dense vegetation of
toward the enemy but soon encountered Bataan limited visibility to from 10 to
strong opposition. Infantrymen were 100 yards. In order to provide them-
sent in to support the engineers, and by selves with fields of fire and with pas-
sundown the attackers were directly in sageways through the jungle, the troops
front of the Japanese position. The had to cut out trees and underbrush, but
next morning engineers and infantry- they had to be careful not to clear so
men again moved forward, this time much that their positions could be
without meeting any resistance. Under spotted from the air. Positions to be
the cover of darkness, the enemy had mutually supporting had to be closer
withdrawn. Frequently engineers be- together than in open, rolling terrain.
came involved in combat when the posi- If units were not to be isolated, the
tions they were fortifying came under regimental reserve line had to be nearer
attack. One hundred and eighty men the main line of resistance. Patrols had
of the 51st Battalion worked on the out- to be constantly on the lookout for in-
post line from 26 January to 8 February. filtration parties. It was highly advis-
They had no machine guns and but three able to have the main line of resistance
automatic rifles. Ten percent of the continuous and to have it wired through-
men were sick with malaria and dysen- out in order to conceal the location of the
tery, yet they helped beat off three at- mutually supporting areas and to prevent
tacks and suffered 25 percent casualties. infiltration. At all times, maximum
102
Recalling these grueling times, Skerry camouflage was essential.
wrote, "The problem we had was to stave With the stabilization of the line be-
off pursuit by the enemy after the crush- tween Orion and Bagac, the struggle
ing of the main battle position and to became a test of American and Filipino
organize and occupy the reserve battle endurance. Japanese naval and air
position ... I doubt if ... any staff
101
engineer in the I Philippine Corps got (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 335. (2)
Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42. Casey File 1.
(3) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 14.
100
(1) Ltr, Engr USAFFE to CO 14th Engr Bn 102 (1) w i t h Wainwright's approval, Skerry, pre-
et al, 5 Feb 42. Casey File 4. (2) Wainwright, pared instructions incorporating these ideas and
General Wainwright's Story, p. 63. (3) Ltr, Casey distributed them to all units of I Corps. Skerry Ltr,
to CO 14th Engrs, 22 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (4) 20 Jul 49, Comment 10. (2) Ltr, Skerry to EHD, 13
Chenoweth Ltr, 27 Sep 47. Feb 56, Comment 4. SWPA Files.
92 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
sending supplies to the peninsula and sawmill, which Chenoweth located early
get ready, instead, to disperse them in January near the Pilar-Bagac road.
throughout the islands. In November Stickney dismantled the mill and moved
they opened a second depot in Manila it to Mariveles, where, reassembled and
and another on the island of Cebu, and operated by civilians under the super-
shortly after the outbreak of war they vision of Bonham's Supply Division, it
started up two more depots on Luzon, was producing lumber before the end of
one at Tarlac and one at Los Banos. the month. By March it was supplying
Not until WPO-3 went into effect were 25,000 board feet daily. The 803d
they permitted to move large quantities moved rice mills from the vicinity of
to Bataan. In the confusion of the hur- Orion and Pilar to lower Bataan.
ried withdrawal, vital supplies were lost. Though none of the men had ever seen
Stocks at some of the advanced depots a rice mill, they succeeded in setting up
had to be destroyed or left behind. On four. Three were turned over to the
the way to Bataan, Filipino soldiers quartermaster in late January, the fourth
abandoned much of their equipment and in early February. After the mills went
supplies. Colonel Mielenz later com- into production, the engineers were
mented that "many supplies could have called upon to keep them in running
been saved and the troops finally retreat- order.106
ing into Bataan would have been much What they did not have and could not
more adequately provided for" had War find, the engineers undertook to make.
Plan ORANGE not been temporarily dis- One of their specialties was a mat, 3 feet
carded.105 wide and from 5 to 12 feet long, woven
Determined to increase their stores, of wire, bamboo, and vines. These mats
the engineers set out to salvage every- were used as temporary revetments.
thing of use on Bataan. Groups dis- Rolled into cylinders and filled with
patched by Bonham to scour the penin- earth, they could also be used in place
sula stripped the fences of barbed wire of sandbags. Another improvisation
and took nails, roofing, lumber, and was the hand grenade or "Casey Cookie"
machinery from bombed-out buildings made of a hollow joint of bamboo some
and sunken barges. One of Bonham's six inches long and three inches in di-
parties found 6,500 feet of pipe, six ameter. Containing half a stick of dyna-
transformers, and four motor boats at mite and tightly packed with 2½-inch
Orion. Another raised 100 tons of nails, broken glass, or sharp stones, the
barbed wire from the waters off Cabca- bamboo container had its open end
ben. Learning that 150 tons of wire sealed with concrete through which pro-
had gone to the bottom off Corregidor,
the engineers hastened to retrieve it. 106
(1) Memo, Casey for Engrs, I Corps and II
Among the more important finds was a Corps and Dept Engr, 29 Jan 42. Casey File 1. (2)
Bonham, Engr Sup. (3) Inspec Rpt, Maj William
A. Gay, 11 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (4) Ltr, Cheno-
105
(1) Incl 5 to Mielenz Ltr, 17 Mar 47. (2) weth to C Staff Br, 30 Aug 47, with Incl. (5) Gold-
Bonham, Engr Sup. (3) Fertig Ltr, 17 Jun 49. (4) blith, "The 803d Engineers," The Military Engineer,
Incl 4 with Mielenz Ltr, 17 Mar 47. XXXVIII (August, 1946), 323.
94 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
truded a 3-inch fuze. Stickney produced developed two series, one covering the
these weapons in sizable quantities. By entire archipelago, the other, the major
15 February he was turning out 500 a islands. After the switch to War Plan
day and by the end of the month, 10,000 ORANGE-3, plans to continue map pro-
had been made. At times the grenades duction in Manila had to be quickly
were highly successful, but many failed revised. Stickney ordered as many maps
to explode. Bonham meanwhile con- and as much reproduction equipment as
tinued to manufacture mines, producing possible transferred to Corregidor by
not only the antitank mine but also a midnight of 31 December. One of the
smaller one to be used against personnel. four barges loaded with maps, plates, and
Running short of seasoned lumber, he equipment sank in Manila Bay, and
had to use green timber, which warped another disappeared; the remaining two
in the heat and sometimes set the charges reached Corregidor in heavy seas, their
108
off accidentally. On one occasion, the cargoes lost or badly damaged.
engineers substituted submarine depth Without presses and with few plates,
charges, brought over from Corregidor, Stickney had to devise some way of mak-
for mines.107 ing maps for the combat units. He put
Maj. Clarence F. Maynard, formerly of
Maps the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey office
in Manila, in charge of map production.
Even to provide the army with maps, Gathering together the pieces of equip-
the engineers had to resort to expedients. ment that had survived the voyage from
When the war began, they had on hand Manila, Maynard rigged up a small re-
two series of topographic maps. The production plant in one of the plotting
first, based on surveys made between rooms of a gun battery on Corregidor.
1911 and 1914, covered most of Luzon at Here he produced prints and tracings of
a scale of an inch to the mile. The the Engineer and Geodetic Survey maps.
second, based on surveys made in 1934 Stickney sent a couple of men to Bataan
and 1935, covered important tactical to turn out copies of the trail map on a
areas on that island, such as Cavite and gelatin duplicator. The sketch maps
Bataan, at a scale of two inches to the were amended from time to time to show
mile. Also available was a trail map of the latest information on roads and trails.
Bataan, prepared by the 14th Engineers Although a scarcity of paper limited pro-
in 1939. The Engineer maps were not duction, most requests were met. On 1
the only ones on hand. Over the years, March Casey reported that "map supply
the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey had stocks continue adequate for require-
108
(1) Ltr, Brig Gen Herbert B. Loper to C Staff
107
Br, 13 Sep 46. (2) Ltr, C. F. Maynard to C Staff Br,
(1) Rpt of Interv, Lt C. C. Peters with Lt Col
M. S. Janairo, 23 Nov 45. SWPA File M21. (2) 1 Dec 47. Both in SWPA Files. (3) Office of the
Hq USAFFE, Tng Memo, [n.d.] sub: Improvised Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces,
Hand Grenade. Casey File 1. (3) Ltr, Casey to Pacific, "Engineers of the Southwest Pacific 1941-
MacArthur, 1 Mar 42. Casey File 6. (4) Inspec 1945," vol. III, Engineer Intelligence (cited hereafter
Rpt, Maj Gay, 15 Feb 42. (5) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, as Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, III),
Comment 19. (Washington, 1950), pp. 12-14.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 95
merits." For a small area such as Bataan, At first progress was fair, largely because
these primitive methods were satisfac- the 803d still had much of its heavy
tory. Had it been necessary for the equipment, but later, as enemy raids took
defenders to hold a larger area, the story their toll of men and machinery, the pace
might have been a different one.109 slowed. Dwindling supplies of gasoline
restricted the use of equipment so that
Construction in Rear Areas much of the rock had to be crushed by
hand. Plans to extend runways to 6,000
Fertig, as Stickney's construction feet seemed more and more impractical.
officer, carried heavy responsibilities, Soon after the siege began there was but
confronted as he was with the job of one plane left for each field. And no
completing a number of tasks proposed more were to come.111
or started before the war. The little Roads were more vital than airfields to
work that remained to be done on the the defense. The coastal highway was
Mariveles dock and the Limay wharf was the chief supply artery for both corps.
quickly accomplished, and the big tun- The stretch between Pilar and Orion,
nels near Mariveles were soon under con- the only paved section, had been torn up
struction. Four thousand linear feet of by heavy traffic during the withdrawal.
underground storage space was provided South of Orion, the road consisted largely
during the siege. Fertig kept the quarry of base rock intended as a foundation for
at Mariveles going at full blast while paving, while along the west coast from
Bonham operated a ferry service to trans- Mariveles to Bagac, the surface was soft
port rock to Corregidor. As the num- dirt. The 803d Aviation Battalion de-
bers of sick and wounded mounted, voted much of its energies to this all-
construction and maintenance of hospi- important coastal highway. The men
tals, a function recently taken over from spread gravel over practically the whole
the quartermaster, became increasingly length of the road in the service com-
important. Roads and airfields, how- mand area. They widened stretches on
ever, claimed the major share of Fertig's the west coast and constructed alternate
effort.110 bridges. After air attacks, they filled in
Engineers of the 803d and civilians bomb craters so that the flow of supplies
prepared airfields for the planes that to the front would not be interrupted.112
were still expected. They continued to The 71st Engineer Battalion with its
widen and lengthen the runways at the attached labor companies maintained the
three remaining fields—Bataan, Mari- west coast road north of the service com-
veles, and Cabcaben, the quarry near
Mariveles supplying rock for surfacing.
111
(1) Ltr, Maj Albert J. Kircher to Casey, 24 Jan
109
42. Casey File 7. (2) Ltr, Casey to CofS USAFFE,
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, 31 Jan 42. Casey File 1. (3) Incl 1 to Ltr, Fertig to
III, pp. 15-17. (2) Memo, 26 Jan 42, and Ltr, 31 C Staff Br, 31 Jun 49. (4) Fertig, Guerrillero, pp.
Jan 42, Casey to CofS USAFFE. Casey File 1. (3) 85-86.
112
Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 1 Mar 42. Casey File 6. (1) Ltr, Kircher to Casey, 24 Jan 42. Casey File
(4) Skerry Ltr, 20 July 49, Comment 13. 7. (2) Goldblith, "The 803d Engineers," The Mili-
110
Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 16 Jun 49. tary Engineer, XXXVIII (August, 1946), 323.
96 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
mand area and placed crushed rock on Point, and after scaling the rocky cliffs,
part of it. managed to work their way through the
In most of their undertakings, the jungle to within 100 yards of the coastal
engineers were aided by Filipino civil- road. On the 25th, Company A was
ians. Thousands had fled to Bataan ordered to help repulse the enemy, and
before the advancing Japanese. Many of the 90 engineers who took part in the
Filipinos were reluctant to leave their fight, nine were killed and 38 wounded.
families and go to Army projects, which According to the company commander,
were likely to be bombed; nevertheless, the high casualty rate resulted mainly
the engineers persuaded hundreds to from the failure of the bamboo grenades
work for them. At one time Stickney to explode and the impossibility of get-
had about 500 on various jobs, and sev- ting cross fire on the enemy. Driven
eral hundred more were employed in the back down the cliffs, the Japanese took
I Corps area. Short rations, cramped refuge in caves and ravines. When as-
quarters, and frequent bombings led to saults by infantrymen and shelling by a
a steady deterioration in morale, and small gunboat failed to dislodge them,
many natives were unwilling to stay on Wainwright sent Skerry with a platoon
the job. The engineers offered such of the 71st Battalion to blast them out.
inducements as blankets, transportation, The engineers lowered 50-pound boxes
and more food. When the ration was of dynamite with time fuzes over the edge
increased from two ounces of rice and of the cliff to the mouths of the caves.
one-eighth loaf of bread per man per day After a sergeant was killed while letting
to nine ounces of rice, two ounces of down one of the boxes, the engineers
bread, and some fish, morale improved tried another method. They threw
noticeably. Despite efforts to better the grenades consisting of four sticks of dyna-
workmen's lot, the high rate of turnover mite with a 30-second time fuze into the
in the labor force continued.113 ravines at the base of the cliff from where
Exposed to constant bombings and the Japanese were firing. The enemy,
frequent artillery fire, the engineers in numbering about 50, retreated into a
the rear areas on occasion also had to large cave. The engineers again low-
fight. In mid-January, Company A of ered dynamite, and "blew the place to
the 803d began working on the west road pieces."114 The few survivors were
and putting in gun emplacements along mopped up later.
the coast. On 23 January, the Japanese
made a surprise landing at Quinauan The End of Resistance
Japanese guns were silent, and there lent," others "reasonably well pre-
were few planes overhead. American pared." 115
and Filipino patrols sometimes moved As the strain of the siege began to tell
as far north as the original battle position on the defenders, the psychological un-
without encountering hostile troops. preparedness and lack of training of the
Many officers, among them General Filipino engineers, as of the Philippine
Bluemel, talked of re-establishing the Army as a whole, became more and more
Mabatang-Mauban line. The enemy apparent. Many of the soldiers, re-
was merely biding his time. Early in cently inducted into the Army, had little
February the Japanese commander had understanding of the issues of the con-
decided to pull back his forces, tighten flict. The language barrier alone was
the blockade, and prepare an offensive nearly insurmountable, for 75 percent of
aimed at overwhelming the weakened the men understood almost no English.
defenders. The pause in battle gave Nor was there one native tongue; eight
MacArthur's men time to throw up new major dialects existed. Efforts to form
defenses against the assaults, which would this polyglot army into an effective
inevitably come. fighting force had not begun until
The engineers now had an unhoped shortly before the outbreak of war.
for opportunity to strengthen positions Upon induction, most of the combat
all along the line. In the II Corps area, engineers had been assigned to help the
they dammed the Pilar River, creating a Quartermaster Corps build camps. Not
barrier against enemy tanks, and mined until November 1941 was a training
roads leading to the river crossings. To program for engineer enlisted men
provide additional fields of fire, they started. Some inductees were taught
dynamited or cut out extensive thickets how to use hand tools and pioneer equip-
of bamboo. Along the front lines, they ment and to build field fortifications and
constructed more than 1,150 yards of bridges. A month before the war, twelve
double apron fence. Along the water's hundred engineer officers began train-
edge near Limay, they burned houses to ing; the Japanese invasion abruptly
get better fields of fire on the beach. terminated the program. The prepara-
Meanwhile, they pushed work on roads tion of the Filipino engineer was at best
and trails. In the I Corps area, they rudimentary.116
strung additional barbed wire, connected Performance in battle reflected the
foxholes by trenches, and flooded rice lack of training. Many defense lines
paddies in front of defensive positions. were poorly prepared and carelessly
They built log and earth dams across the maintained. Trenches were sometimes
Bagac, the Tuol, and the Tiis Rivers.
During February, they cleared 875,000 115
(1) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 1 Mar 42. Casey
square yards of underbrush from the File 6. (2) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Mar 42. AG
densely wooded bluffs along the South 319.1 (5 Jan 41) Phil Rcds.
116
China Sea and the jungles near the front. (1) Skerry Ltr, 20 Jul 49, Comment 11. (2)
Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Force, and II Phil
Early in March, Casey found some of the Corps, p. 11. (3) Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 10 Jul 47.
front-line positions "outstandingly excel- (4) Rpt of Interv, Peters with Janairo, 23 Nov 45.
98 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
so close to the barbed wire that the formance of their units. Toward the
enemy could easily toss grenades into the end of February, as the tactical situation
ranks of the defenders. Along the shores worsened, MacArthur ordered the com-
of Manila Bay, wire strung too far out bat engineers to train to fight as infantry,
in the water was beaten down by waves, and during the second week of March,
and no one took the trouble to replace it. training was begun in both camps.
The Filipino soldier frequently dug his Little could be done at this late date, for
foxhole behind a mound of earth or a "fight and learn" was now the chief, if
clump of bamboo, which gave him a not the only, method of training. Phil-
sense of security but prevented him from ippine engineers showed some progress,
firing directly at the approaching enemy. and American officers reported that on
Often he did not appreciate the impor- the whole the Filipino engineer, despite
tance of grazing fire; in many cases, he his inadequate preparation, performed
placed his machine gun on a slope, and well when ably led. But basic weak-
his fire thus went over the heads of the nesses in training could not be over-
119
advancing Japanese.117 When Chen- come.
oweth asked one platoon commander A number of division commanders,
why his men had their foxholes at the American and Filipino alike, apparently
top of a hill instead of at the bottom did not understand how to employ their
where they could have delivered grazing engineer units properly. They fre-
fire, the officer replied that "he had quently required them to do guard duty,
placed them up high where they could bury the dead, transport rations for other
retreat faster." 118 units, or serve as infantry even though
In an effort to teach the Filipinos the infantry units were available. Chenow-
bare essentials of combat engineering, eth relates that "an entire infantry divi-
Casey, Skerry, and Chenoweth launched sion was found sitting quietly in bivouac"
an intensive training program. Officers while its half-strength engineer battalion
of the 14th and the 803d were assigned to "was stringing barbed wire and digging
the combat battalions to give instruction foxholes for the entire division." Some
in the proper use of tools and equip- division commanders would not permit
ment, placing machine guns, and prepar- their battalion engineers to make ad-
ing beach defenses. These instructors verse reports to Chenoweth and Skerry.
found themselves in a difficult position. Brig. Gen. Vincente Lim of the 41st
Without command authority, they were Division told 1st Lt. Henry Harris, an
frequently held responsible for the per- instructor assigned to the engineer bat-
talion, that anything wrong would be
117
(1) Insp Rpts, Delamore, 8 and 11 Feb 42. (2) reported to him, the general, and not to
Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42. Both in Casey
File 1. (3) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Mar 42.
119
AG 319.1 (5 Jan 41) Phil Rcds. (4) Ltr, CofS USAFFE (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,
to Corps and Beach Defense Subsector Comdrs, 9 II, 16. (2) Incl to Chenoweth Ltr, 30 Aug 47. (3)
Feb 42. (5) Insp Rpt, Maj Gay, 13 Feb 42. Last Ltr, Hq USAFFE to CG's I Corps and II Corps,
two in Casey File 1. (6) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 25 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (4) Ltr, Stickney to Mac-
15 Feb 42. Same file. Arthur, 15 Mar 42. Casey File 6. (5) Skerry Ltr,
118
Chenoweth Ltr, 27 Sep 47. 20 Jul 49, Comment 10.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 99
the corps engineer. "General Lim," much good work had been done and the
one of Casey's assistants stated, "is de- troops were determined to hold. Skerry,
termined that no reports of deficiencies who accompanied the Engineer,
in his division will get to higher head- USAFFE, on part of his tour of the I
quarters but he does not take steps to Corps area, was less optimistic. He
correct his deficiencies. He considers observed that the men were tired, hun-
his division his kingdom and does not gry, and sick and that their supplies of
intend for anyone to interfere with him." barbed wire and entrenching tools were
Casey and members of his staff as well as extremely low. As Casey and Skerry
Skerry and Chenoweth had to make re- moved from unit to unit, they explained
peated and time-consuming inspections how positions might be improved but
of the Philippine engineer combat bat- refrained from making any adverse
talions and front-line positions to check criticism, "knowing full well that morale
on the progress of engineer work. As a and a determination to fight it out . . .
rule, division commanders were co- [were] of paramount importance."121
operative and tried to follow suggestions Casey had visited the front for the last
for improving defenses and for using time. When MacArthur, acting on or-
their engineers properly, but all this re- ders from President Roosevelt, left
quired much time and effort on the part Corregidor on 12 March for Australia,
of top-ranking engineer officers.120 he took with him seventeen members of
During the first week of March, Casey, his staff, among them Casey. On 21
inspecting the front-line positions, noted March U.S. Forces in the Philippines,
many weaknesses. There was still no (USFIP), under General Wainwright,
mobile reserve; practically all the troops replaced USAFFE as the command in
were spread "in a continuously occupied the islands. Colonel Stickney hence-
trench line clear across the front." forth served as Wainwright's engineer
Casey again saw no need for occupying and as staff engineer to Maj. Gen. Ed-
every foot of ground, since natural ward P. King, who was in charge of
strongpoints, well organized and mutu- Luzon Force. Bonham became service
ally supporting, could control many command engineer under Brig. Gen.
yards. The men thus released could be Allan C. McBride and at the same time
formed into a reserve. The handiwork served as engineer supply officer for
of the amateur Filipino soldier was still USFIP in Colonel Stickney's office. The
in evidence—Casey's listing of mistakes engineer organization in the field, not
in the organization of positions filled affected by the changes in the high com-
half a dozen pages. But, he reassured mand, remained as before, with Skerry
MacArthur, not everything was wrong; and Chenoweth continuing as engineers
120
of I Corps and II Corps, respectively.122
(1) Ltr, CofS USAFFE to Corps and Div
Comdrs, 2 Mar 42. Casey File 6. (2) Insp Rpt, 121
Casey and Gay, 7 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (3) Ltr, (1) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Mar 42. AG
CofS USAFFE to Corps and Div Comdrs, 9 Feb 42. 319.1 (5 Jan 41) Phil Rcds. (2) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49,
Casey File 4. (4) Chenoweth Ltr, 27 Sep 47. (5) Comment
122
18.
Insp Rpt, Maj Gay, 17 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (6) (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 359. (2)
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 16. Incl with Ltr, Mielenz to C Staff Br, 4 May 51.
100 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Hawk and other craft. With the sur- effective bastion, were above ground.
render of all forces on Bataan later that Keeping utilities in operation, maintain-
day, the engineers still on the peninsula ing the island's 62 miles of roads and
became prisoners of war. The long siege trails and its 13 miles of electric railway,
125
was over. and providing additional tunnels and
shelters were the responsibility of the
126
Corregidor and the End engineers.
of the Campaign Just before the war began, Colonel
Mielenz and his assistants were attempt-
To the men on Bataan, Fort Mills on ing to get the projects for modernizing
Corregidor seemed a place of security. Corregidor under way. The contractor
The elaborate fortifications, many big and his crews were on the scene, but no
guns, and subterranean chambers ap- formal agreement had yet been signed.
peared to justify the name, Gibraltar of Most of the requisitions for supplies and
the East. The power plant, water sys- equipment sent to the United States
tem, cold storage plant, and sizable stocks months before were still unfilled. Ex-
of munitions and supplies gave a meas- cept for the construction machinery
ure of self-sufficiency. But life on the brought over by the contractor, items of
island, though not so perilous as on equipment on the island were few. On
Bataan, was still precarious. Four miles hearing the news of Pearl Harbor, Miel-
long and one and one-half miles across enz suspended negotiations, hired the
at its widest point, Corregidor offered an contractor's men as temporary civil serv-
excellent target. Its importance as the ants, and forced into high gear a program
key to Manila Bay insured repeated previously estimated to take three years
bombings. Only by going underground to complete. Some of the workmen
could its garrison be safe. Largest of were soon building bombproof shelters
the tunnels was Malinta, which the at gun batteries, while others were plac-
engineers had blasted out of the rocky ing baffle walls and sandbags in front of
hill in the center of the island many the doors and windows of the power and
years before. Its main east-west passage, cold storage plants. Still others were at
825 feet long and 50 feet wide, and its work on Malinta Tunnel, where they
fifty-odd lateral tunnels, each about 150 began laying a concrete floor in the hos-
feet long, housed the headquarters, pital, installing a temporary ventilating
repair shops, and the hospital, and system, and putting sandbags at the east
provided space for large quantities of and west entrances.127
supplies. But all the men on the island For three weeks the Japanese ignored
could not remain in Malinta. The the island. On 29 December, a few
guns, the power plant, the water reser-
voirs, and indeed most of the facilities 126
(1) Strong, "The Lean Years," The Military
needed to maintain Corregidor as an Engineer, XLI (May-June, 1949), 179-81. (2) Rpt
of Opns of USAFFE and USFIP in the Phil Islands,
1941-1942, Exhibit J, Malinta Tunnel Plan. AG
125
(1) Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 92ff. (2) Bonham, 98-USFI-0.3. (3) Mielenz, Engr Preparation.
127
Engr Supply. Ibid.
102 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
days after MacArthur moved to Corregi- be used. The restoration of water lines
dor, enemy planes made the first of a was difficult and time consuming; not
series of attacks which continued until 6 until 14 January were the troops again
January. Almost all buildings were permitted to use fresh water for washing
destroyed or heavily damaged. Power clothes or bathing.129
lines were knocked out, pipelines dam- Saturation bombing demonstrated the
aged, water tanks demolished. Large defects of some of the existing tunnels
sections of road were obliterated and the and shelters and brought home the need
electric railway was wrecked. In the for increased passive protection. Dur-
huge fires that swept the island, great ing the raids several of the shallower
quantities of supplies were lost, includ- tunnels collapsed and a number of bomb-
ing large amounts of construction mate- proof shelters turned out to be death
rials. When the smoke had cleared, the traps. Many of the shelters built before
engineers began removing the wreckage the war were covered with 4 feet of con-
and strengthening the island to withstand crete, topped by 8 feet of earth. Bombs
128
further attacks. penetrated the earth and exploded when
Even while the raids were in progress, they hit the concrete. The soil served
Mielenz was making frantic efforts to re- as tamping and forced the blast down-
pair the damage. As soon as the all ward. When the troops manning the
clear sounded, crews went out to patch gun batteries and beach defenses began
roads and mend power, sewage, and digging tunnels and building bomb-
water lines. Fixing the roads, most of proofs for their own protection, the
which were surfaced with gravel, was engineers furnished technical advice.
comparatively easy, since bulldozers Mielenz directed that no new tunnels
could quickly fill in craters and smooth were to be constructed unless the rock
out churned-up sections. The few cover was at least 50 feet thick. He also
stretches of concrete were more difficult adopted a type of bombproof with a
to repair, but detours could be readily layer of concrete covered with rubble to
provided. Road gangs worked all act as a burster course. Meanwhile, he
through the night until raids at dawn pushed projects to protect installations
forced them to take shelter. The above ground and to make Malinta Tun-
plumbers, electricians, and mechanics nel safer and more livable. The engi-
who had formed the small peacetime neers put covers of reinforced concrete
maintenance staff were unable to cope over the large gasoline tank and the
with the extensive damage to utilities. telephone exchange. Neither installa-
The electric railway was ruined beyond tion was ever damaged. In Malinta,
repair. Electric cable was scarce and they installed stand-by water and power
only the most vital power lines could be systems and completed a sewage system
maintained. The sewage system was so
badly damaged that field latrines had to 129
(1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Ltr, Mielenz
to CG Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays,
7 Jan 42. (3) Hq HD of Manila and Subic Bays,
128
(1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 479-80. Fort Mills, Official Bull, No. 10, 14 Jan 42. Last two
(2) Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 61-62. in Casey File 7.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 103
for the hospital. They placed additional construction of five splinter-proof, cam-
sandbags inside the tunnel entrances to ouflaged plane pens. Located on the
deflect the burst of bombs landing be- eastern end of the island, Kindley was
hind the protective wall of bags previ- rocky and muddy, and could be used
ously stacked outside. Almost until the only for emergency landings. Stickney
end, the men on Corregidor continued had started work on the runway in early
building shelters and providing cover. 1941, but shortages of equipment and
Between 8 December and 10 April they personnel had hampered progress. Lit-
blasted about two miles of tunnel.130 tle had been done before the war, except
Keeping the island supplied with to extend the runway from 2,100 to
water was one of Mielenz' chief concerns. 2,400 feet. Since Mielenz could spare
Eighteen wells normally furnished some no men for work on Kindley, volunteers
675,000 gallons a day, while eight reser- from the air force in mid-January were
voirs held about six million gallons. given the job of building revetments of
Wells and reservoirs were scattered in sandbags but accomplished little. Casey
such a manner that it was hardly likely was at length able to get Company A of
that they would all be hit in one raid. the 803d assigned to the project, and on
Nevertheless, by 20 January four reser- 4 February the unit moved to Corregidor,
voirs had been knocked out. To replace but it had been so badly mauled in the
them, the engineers installed temporary fighting at Quinauan Point that it was no
tanks and a stand-by pumping system longer an effective organization. Poorly
was also provided. Usually enemy equipped and subjected to repeated
bombings damaged only the pipelines. aerial and artillery bombardment, it
To prevent the loss of large quantities of constructed the five revetments but could
132
water from broken lines, the engineers do little to improve the runway.
posted guards at the reservoirs with Calls for engineer assistance came from
orders to close the valves when the air every quarter. Each branch and service
raid sirens sounded. On 9 March Miel- had its special construction projects and
enz reported that 6,642,251 gallons were its urgent need for repairs. The troops
in storage. Except for occasional short- building fortifications and shelters re-
ages, the supply of water was adequate quired expert direction. Engineers and
until the last few days before the sur- skilled workmen had to be spread
render.131 thinner and thinner. Mielenz urged
In January Casey pressed for the im- that every man who could be spared be
provement of Kindley Field and the assigned to engineer projects; even so,
many jobs went begging. Dynamite,
130
(1) Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 65-66. (2) Ltr, lumber, and crushed rock were sent
Mielenz to CG Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic
Bays, 7 Jan 42. (3) Memo, D. J. Rutherford for
132
Rcd, n.d. Casey File 4. (4) Mielenz, Engr (1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Memo,
Preparation. Casey for CofS USAFFE, 26 Jan 42. Casey File 1.
131
(1) Memo, Mielenz for Rcd, 20 Jan 42. Casey (3) Hq USAFFE FO No. 12, 3 Feb 42. (4) Ltr,
File 7. (2) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 26 Jan Mielenz to Casey, 9 Feb 42. Casey File 4. (5)
42. Casey File 1. (3) Ltr, Mielenz to Casey, 9 Mar Memo, D. J. R[utherford] for CG Harbor Defense of
42. Casey File 6. Manila and Subic Bays, 2 Feb 42. Casey File 7.
104 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
from Bataan, but replenishing many of water storage tanks, and placed wire
the supplies was almost impossible. In along the beaches. For forty-four days
an effort to do first things first, Mielenz the guns on the islands answered the
tried to hold to a system of priorities, but enemy bombardment. When the Jap-
he was not completely successful. The anese lifted their fire on 22 March, the
wishes of high-ranking officers sometimes forts still commanded the bay. That
took precedence over priorities.133 they had withstood the intense shelling
Late in January the Japanese moved was due to the courage of their defenders,
artillery to Cavite Province on the south- to the fact that utilities were kept in
ern shore of Manila Bay and on 6 Febru- operation, and to the strength of the forts
ary began a prolonged bombardment of themselves.134
the fortified islands. The smaller forts Corregidor, rather than the smaller
bore the brunt of the shelling. Fort islands, was the enemy's ultimate objec-
Frank, on Carabao Island, nearest the tive. Working against heavy odds, the
coast of Luzon, suffered the greatest engineers tried to check the deterioration
number of hits. Here the engineers of utilities and roads and to strengthen
partially casemated several guns and the fortress against the day when it would
strengthened beach defenses but at- have to stand alone. Because a number
tempted no tunneling. North of Cara- of tunnel entrances were directly in the
bao was El Fraile Island, on which the line of the projectiles coming from
engineers had built Fort Drum, a thick- Cavite, the engineers relocated some of
walled concrete fort resembling a battle- the entrances and provided baffle walls
ship. When the war began, the fort's for the rest. Power lines and water
dilapidated power plant was being over- pipes, broken repeatedly by shells and
hauled under the direction of a Mr. bombs, kept maintenance crews busy.
Williams of Manila. With the occupa- The refrigeration plant required con-
tion of the city by the Japanese, Williams stant attention. When the cold storage
remained on the island and was mainly room was damaged by a bomb, the en-
responsible for the fact that Fort Drum gineers immediately undertook to restore
was never without power. Although the it. Much of the ammonia and tubing
Japanese placed heavy concentrations on they needed was salvaged from wrecked
the fort, they failed to silence its 14-inch ships off the shores of Bataan and Cor-
guns. Closest to Corregidor was Ca- regidor. A new steel roof was almost
ballo, on which Fort Hughes was located. finished at the time of the surrender.
This island was too small to be easily hit The defenders meanwhile kept up the
by enemy aircraft, but it offered a worth- continual round of piling sandbags,
while target to the artillery emplaced erecting baffle walls, propping up struc-
across the bay. Troops and civilians tures, and covering observation and
worked on a tunnel, bombproofed the command posts.135
133
(1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Memo, 134
R[utherford] for CG Harbor Defense of Manila and (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 485ff.
Subic Bays, 2 Feb 42. Casey File 7. (3) Ltr, (2) Mielenz, Engr Preparation.
135
Mielenz to Casey, 2 Mar 42. Casey File 6. (1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Rpt of
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 105
After the fall of Bataan, Corregidor Visayan-Mindanao force, the 61st, 81st,
received a still more merciless pounding. and 101st Battalions, had erected fortifi-
The Japanese moved artillery to the cations and prepared roads and bridges
heights of the Mariveles Mountains and for demolition. Men from Stickney's
raked the island with fire. Air attacks office had readied many airfields with
mounted in fury. On 29 April, the the help of contractors and civilian
emperor's birthday, air and artillery laborers. The Japanese assaults began
bombardments reached their height. on 10 April with a landing on Cebu, and
During the first week in May, the island within a week the enemy was in control
shook from incessant shelling and of the coastal areas. On 16 April the
bombing. The engineers found it im- Japanese invaded Panay; four days later
possible to repair the damage. Artillery organized resistance ceased. On the
and aerial bombardments were so in- 29th they made a major landing on Min-
tense that work in the open was impos- danao's western coast and on 3 May
sible day or night. Roads could no another on the northern coast. The
longer be kept free of obstructions. defenders were quickly overwhelmed.
Many broken power and water lines With the seizure of these three islands,
could not be repaired. Company A of the Japanese controlled the southern
the 803d, still struggling with the run- Philippines. Only the islands in Manila
way of Kindley Field, was subjected to Bay still resisted the enemy.137
almost continuous bombing. By the The landing of Japanese troops on the
end of April the company commander eastern end of Corregidor on the night of
and 18 men had been killed. In the 5 May and their advance toward Malinta
last days four engineer officers were Tunnel the next morning convinced
given the hazardous assignment of acting Wainwright that continuation of the
as observers for the artillery. Two lost suicidal struggle could serve no useful
their lives. 1st Lt. Hersel E. Philippe, purpose. With the surrender on 6 May
one of Mielenz' assistants, was killed of the remaining USFIP forces on Cor-
while serving as a spotter on the western regidor and the southern Philippine
part of the island, and Captain Gewald Islands, all organized engineer opera-
was burned to death on top of Malinta tions came to an end. Except for a few
Hill.136 who escaped, the men on Corregidor
Early in April the southern Philip- were sent to prisoner of war camps in the
pines came under attack. Except for Philippines, and many were later trans-
the small force which had come ashore ferred to camps in Japan and Manchuria.
on Mindanao on 20 December, no en- Most of the engineers of the Visayan-
emy troops had landed in the southern Mindanao force eluded the enemy by
islands during the first four months of retreating into the almost inaccessible
the war. The combat engineers of the
MAP7
but seven million. Only the southeast- three feet six inches to five feet three
ern areas were highly developed; two- inches.
thirds of the total population lived in the Most of the Commonwealth's trained
two states of Victoria and New South fighting forces were overseas at the time
Wales. (Map 7) Natural resources of Pearl Harbor. Nearly all of the Aus-
were limited, with agricultural and pas- tralian Imperial Forces (AIF) and the
toral products forming the foundation of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)
the country's economy. By American were fighting in Europe and the Mediter-
or European standards, Australia's indus- ranean or helping to protect the Middle
trial system was small. Its communica- East and Malaya. The two heavy and
tions network was poor. Except in the three light cruisers, which comprised the
southeast, there were few paved roads. bulk of the Royal Australian Navy
Most rail lines were single track and (RAN), had only recently returned to
gauges in the various states ranged from home waters after serving in the Medi-
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 109
terranean and the Indian Ocean. The tant outposts as Darwin in the northwest
air force assigned to defend Australia and the Cape York Peninsula in the
consisted of forty-three British and northeast. 3 Not unless the Australians
American bombers and an equally small received substantial reinforcements
number of Australian-built training would they be inclined to adopt a more
planes. The troops on hand included aggressive plan of action.
the Australian Military Forces (AMF)—
a militia poorly equipped and with little Reinforcements Arrive
training—and one AIF armored division
without its tanks. There was, besides, A few reinforcements were soon to
the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC), an come from the United States. When
organized reserve of some 50,000 men, Japan declared war, a convoy of eight
most of them veterans of World War I.2 transports, carrying men and supplies to
Because their means were limited, the the Philippines, was approaching the Fiji
Australians understandably adopted a Islands. Instructed by General Marshall
defensive strategy. Soon after the Jap- not to return to Hawaii but to go on to
anese began their rapid thrust south- Australia, the convoy headed for Bris-
ward, the Australian Chiefs of Staff had bane, arriving there on 22 December.
come to the conclusion that any attempt The 4,600 men aboard, commanded by
to hold the islands northeast of the con- Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, included a
tinent or even the underdeveloped, regiment and two battalions of field
sparsely inhabited areas of the northern artillery and the ground echelon of a
part of the Commonwealth would be ill bomber group. There were no engi-
advised. Should the Japanese invade, neer units. Late in December Maj.
the Australians would have no choice but Gen. George H. Brett, Chief of the Air
to abandon all territories except the Corps, at that time on a mission to
southeastern corner of the continent Chungking, flew down to take command
containing the major cities of Brisbane, of the American troops. On 1 January
Sydney, and Melbourne. Most of the his command was designated United
military forces in the Commonwealth States Army Forces in Australia
were therefore concentrated in this im- (USAFIA). Marshall gave Brett two
portant industrial and agricultural area. major tasks: get supplies to the Philip-
Only small forces were sent to such dis- pines and transform Australia into a
major air base. As hope of getting help
2
to MacArthur dimmed, Brett concen-
(1) Samuel L. Milner, Victory in Papua, UNITED 4
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,
trated on his second objective.
1957), pp. 3-4. (2) C. Hartley Grattan, ed., Australia
(Berkeley, Calif., 1947), pp. 165, 204, 389ff. (3)
3
Richard M. Leighton and Robert M. Coakley, Global Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 4-6.
4
Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, UNITED STATES (1) Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA, pp. 2-7.
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), SWPA File A161. (2) Rad, Marshall to U.S. Mil
pp. 167-68. (4) Memo, OCE Tr Div Railway Br for Attache in Australia, 17 Dec 41. Incl 6b to Rpt of
C Opns and Tng Br, 29 Aug 42. 617 (Australia) Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (3) Rad, Marshall to
1942. (5) Sydney Morning Herald, February 26, Brett, 25 Dec 41. Incl 11 to Rpt of Orgn and
1942, p. 7. Activities. USAFIA.
110 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
bombers, and the RAAF had begun to the limit. Brett persisted in asking
work two days later. Circumstances for large shipments, but Marshall refused
7
now required not one, but a whole series to yield.
of bomber fields in the Darwin area. As Eager to do their part, the Australians
a result of his trip, Brett saw clearly that promised Brett a "maximum measure
carrying out his plans would require of co-operation." The Commonwealth
large-scale construction, but he was con- government quickly agreed to furnish
vinced his program was necessary if the supplies, provide workmen, hire con-
enemy advance southward was to be tractors, and turn over such buildings as
halted.6 could be spared. The Treasury fore-
Asked by the War Department for a saw little difficulty in financing projects.
rough estimate of his needs, Brett called The Australians were careful to point
for a large contingent of engineer troops out the limitations of their resources.
and generous quantities of construction They emphasized that construction ma-
supplies. In cable after cable, he de- chinery was scarce, that most of their
tailed his requirements—three engineer manpower was already committed to
airdrome units, two labor battalions, one defense, and that many materials, among
service unit, and one general service them asphalt and bitumen, now so
regiment; rock crushers, jack hammers, urgently needed for airfields, would have
trucks, compressors, landing mat, trucks, to be imported. The "most vital and
32,000 tons of rail, and 100,000 tons of difficult factors" in construction, they
asphalt. Marshall, when he saw the tack warned, "would be materials, labor, and
Brett was taking, became somewhat con- time." 8
cerned and asked him to trim his sails.
The Chief of Staff could not go along Engineer Tasks
with plans for developing "a second
England." He explained to Brett that Even though the Australians would do
he did not intend to send many service their utmost, the U.S. Army engineers
troops to Australia and reminded him
that the shortage of shipping was critical 7
Rad, Marshall to Brett, n.d. Incl 12 to Rpt of
and that the War Department had to Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (2) Leighton and
save "every possible ton of ship space." Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, pp. 168-69.
(3) Rad, Brett to Marshall, n.d. Incl 12a to Rpt of
American forces in Australia would Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (4) Cable, Brett to
therefore have to exploit local resources MID, 4 Jan 42. G-4/33861 sec. II (Jan 42). (5)
Cable, Brett to AGO, 7 Jan 42. WPD WDGS Msg
File No. 5, 1-12 Jan 42. (6) Memo, G-4 WD for
6
(1) Rad, Brett to Marshall, 2 Jan 42. Incl 12a Marshall, 8 Jan 42. (7) Ltr, Marshall to CG
to Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (2) Cable, USAFIA, 6 Feb 42. Last two in G-4/33861 sec. II
Brett to TAG, 3 Jan 42. WPD WDGS Msg File No. (Jan 42).
8
5, 1-12 Jan 42. (3) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, (1) Notes of Conf between Australian CofS and
pp. 25-26, 72-75. (4) [Hist of] Base Sec Two (Draft their deputies, the Secy Dept of Defense Coordina-
MS), p. 1. SWPA File A173. (5) Ltr, Col Albert G. tion, the Secy Defense Com, Gens Brett, Brereton,
Matthews to Staff Br Of C Engr GHQ FEC, 10 Nov and Barnes, et al., 3 Jan 42. Incl 13b to Orgn and
49, pp. 8, 19. SWPA Files. (6) Ltr, Matthews to Activities, USAFIA. (2) Min 2, Second Mtg of
Staff Br OF C Engr GHQ FEC, 20 Apr 50, p. 6. Admin Plng Com, 13 Jan 42. Incl 13d to Orgn and
SWPA Files. Activities, USAFIA.
112 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
would have to assume heavy responsibili- ferry route. Derby negotiated a con-
ties. They would have to provide plans tract with the firm whereby he secured
and specifications, advise in the selection the services of about thirty skilled archi-
of sites, and guide the Australians in the tects, engineers, and draftsmen. The
unfamiliar task of building for the Australians saw to it that he was well
American Army. The officers who had supplied with money. The story goes
reached Australia by early January were that he went to one of the Melbourne
far too few to carry the load. Brett in- banks, introduced himself, and explained
formed the War Department that more his needs for funds. The bank promptly
engineer officers were urgently needed. made out a note for 1,000,000 pounds,
He asked that Brig. Gen. Raymond A. adding that he was welcome to more if
10
Wheeler be sent posthaste to Australia, he needed it. Derby scarcely had
but since Wheeler was then on an im- time to do more than assemble a staff
portant mission to Iran, General Rey- and secure funds before leaving early in
bold chose Col. Dwight F. Johns for as- February for Java. He was replaced
11
signment to the southwest Pacific. The temporarily by Maj. Elvin R. Heiberg.
Chief of Engineers also selected several To decentralize operations, Brett had
officers of lower rank for Brett's staff. established four base sections on 5 Janu-
Meanwhile, Maj. George T. Derby, who ary. Base Section One, with headquar-
had come over on the convoy, served as ters at Darwin, included Northern
Brett's first engineer. Because Brett had Territory. Two and Three were set up
so few men to staff his headquarters, in Queensland, with headquarters in
Derby served also as finance officer and Townsville and Brisbane, respectively.
briefly as G-4.9 Base Section Four, with headquarters in
On 5 January, Derby moved from Melbourne, included Victoria in south-
Brisbane to Melbourne and before long eastern Australia. When the base sec-
had set up his office on the top floor of tions were first organized, there were not
an empty, ramshackle warehouse. Dur-enough engineer officers to staff them all.
ing the course of the month, he added an Capt. Willard Farrar was assigned to
engineer and two infantry officers to his Brisbane and Maj. Ward T. Abbott to
staff and hired a small number of civil- Townsville, while Derby himself, before
ians. At the same time he fell heir to a his departure, assumed the duties of base
ready-made engineering organization. section engineer in Melbourne. Dar-
The firm of Sverdrup and Parcel had win was left to the RAAF. Base section
built up a staff of Australian civilians for engineers, like the chief engineer, were to
work on airfields for the South Pacific air be staff officers only. Under the techni-
9 10
(1) Cable, Brett to AGO, 7 Jan 42. (2) Cable, Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 23.
11
Brett to MID G-2 [recd 3 Jan 42]. Both in WPD (1) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, pp. 1-2, 4. (2)
WDGS Msg File No. 5, 1-12 Jan 42. (3) DF, G-4 Cable, Mil Attaché in Australia to G-2 WD, 4 Jan
WD to TAG, 7 Jan 42. G-4/33861, sec. II (Jan 42). 42. WPD WDGS Msg File No. 5, 1-12 Jan 42. (3)
(4) A Narrative Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, Jan-30 Memo, C of Finance WD for G-4 WD, 6 Jan 42.
Jun 42 (cited hereafter as Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA), G-4/33861, sec. II (Jan 42). (4) Hq USAFIA GO
p. 1. SWPA File A147. 10, 7 Feb 42.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 113
cal supervision of Derby and his suc- ble for formulating "policies concerning
cessors, they were to take orders only the distribution of troops and facilities
from their base section commanders.12 for the U.S. Army in Australia." In
The engineers found themselves al- other words, they would decide what to
most totally dependent on the Austral- build and where. The Administrative
ians. Although the War Department Planning Committee had the task of
gave Brett authority to use fixed-fee or recommending ways in which the con-
negotiated lump-sum contracts to lease struction effort could best be organized,
whatever properties he needed and to materials and equipment equitably ap-
overobligate funds if necessary for urgent portioned between Australians and
construction, the engineers could do Americans, and the work of the supply
little without Australian advice and as- services co-ordinated. The decisions of
sistance. Not acquainted with local con- these three predominantly Australian
tracting or supply firms, they called on committees would greatly affect the prog-
the RAAF, which controlled most air- ress of construction.13
field work, and on government works Work for the Americans would have to
agencies for help in getting projects be superimposed on a broad defense pro-
started and pushing them to completion. gram which the Commonwealth govern-
Lacking knowledge of real estate prices, ment was already carrying out. Soon
methods of acquisition, or terms of leas- after the outbreak of hostilities in Eu-
ing, they turned to the Australian Army's rope, Australia had launched a large
Hiring Service for land and buildings. construction effort, designed both to
Because of the Americans' unfamiliarity strengthen the nation for war and to
with the local scene, setting up a pro- develop the postwar economy. By the
cedure whereby the engineers as well as time of Pearl Harbor, work had been
other branches of the Army could work undertaken on some thirty-five new
together with the Australians was of munitions plants and on seventy-seven
fundamental importance. To bring additions to existing ones. The RAAF
about co-ordination at the highest level, was building fields for forty-two squad-
Brett and the Australian chiefs of staff rons in the southern half of the conti-
established three joint committees, made nent. Tanks for motor gasoline were
up of representatives of USAFIA and the being erected at various points located
Commonwealth's armed services. The inland at least one hundred miles from
Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Joint
Planning Committee, the latter com- 13
(1) WD Ltr, AG 381 (12-20-41) Misc-D-M to
posed of the deputy chiefs, were responsi- CG American Forces in Australia, 20 Dec 41, sub:
G-4 Admin Order—Plan X. G-4/33861, sec. I. (2)
12
(1) Hq USAFIA GO 1, 5 Jan 42. (2) Hist Sum- WD Ltr, AG 400 (1-31-42) MSC-D-M to CG
mary of Activities of Hq of Base Sec 3 From 23 Dec USAFIA, 2 Feb 42. G-4/33861, sec II (Jan 42). (3)
41 to 31 Mar 44. (Draft MS). SWPA File A176. Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 16. (4) Of C Engr
(3) [Hist of] Base Two. (4) Hist of Base One (Draft GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 10. (5) Rpt of
MS). SWPA File A174. (5) Of of the Engr Base Orgn and Activities, USAFIA, pp. 14-15. (6) Notes
Sec Four, [Hist Rpt] From 21 Feb 42 to 30 Mar 44, of Conf Between the Australian CsofS et al., and
dtd 20 May 44. (Draft MS). SWPA File A182. (6) Gens Brett, Brereton et al., 3 Jan 42. Incl 13b to
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 25-26. Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA.
114 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the eastern and southern coasts, and the Commonwealth government found
storage for aviation gasoline was being space for the Americans. Headquarters
provided at army and oil company of Base Section Four moved into the
depots. Two major links in the trans- Seamen's Mission, which Derby con-
continental highway system were being verted into an office building. He had
improved: one, the North-South Road the Sailor's Home altered to accommo-
from the railhead at Alice Springs to date the military police and turned a
Darwin, the other, the East-West Road wool warehouse into an engineer depot.
from Mt. Isa in western Queensland to The engineers leased the Royal Mel-
Tennant Creek on the North-South bourne Hospital, 95 percent complete
Road. A huge drydock for capital ships when the war began, thus obtaining
was building at Sydney. Two large space for over 700 beds. They built
permanent hospitals were going up, one barracks for enlisted men on the hospital
at Brisbane, the other at Adelaide. grounds and provided lodgings for nurses
These undertakings were already taxing and medical officers inside the hospi-
the Commonwealth's slender resources tal buildings. Many Americans found
to near capacity, and with the war com- quarters in private homes, apartments,
ing close to Australia's shores, a great and hotels; others pitched tents on
deal of additional construction would be cricket fields, race tracks, and other flat
needed. In the south, where much ground.15
could be turned over to the Americans, The establishment of a major base at
co-operation with the engineers imposed Brisbane was to require more extensive
no great burden, but any help the work. In mid-January, Col. Alexander
Australians could give for the new proj- L. P. Johnson, the base section com-
ects in the north would have to be at the mander, together with his engineer,
expense of their own program and in Captain Farrar, began pushing base de-
violation of their own strategic con- velopment. Here, as at Melbourne, the
cepts.14 Australians made a number of properties
available, among them two large air-
Construction Begins fields, Amberly and Archerfield, a wharf
near the mouth of the Brisbane River,
At Melbourne, consequently, the and several warehouses. Queensland
engineers found their task fairly easy. Agricultural College at Gatton, fifty-five
Even though the city was crowded, the miles west of the city, was also turned
headquarters of the Australian Army, over to the Americans. Contractors
Navy, and Air Force being located there, were soon adapting these facilities to
American requirements. At Amberly
14
(1) Paul Hasluck, "Australia in the War of and Archerfield, they began building
1939-1945," The Government and the People, 1939- additional barracks, operations build-
41 (Canberra, 1952), pp. 469-70, 560. (2) Of C Engr
GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942 (Draft MS).
ings, and bombproof shelters. Near the
SWPA Files A1-A6. (3) Allied Works Council,
15
Report on the Activities of the Allied Works Coun- (1) Of of the Engr Base Sec Four [Hist Rpt]
cil for the Period February 26, 1942 to June 30, 1943 From 21 Feb 42 to 30 Mar 44. (2) Of C Engr GHQ
(cited hereafter as AWC, Report, February 1942- SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942. (3) Memo, G-4
June 1943) (Melbourne, 1943), pp. 49ff., 60ff. USASOS, 2 Nov 42. SWPA File 94.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 115
wharf they erected frame office buildings, Because of the grave danger of Japanese
a warehouse, and a 40-ton crane. They raids, a strong air defense was needed,
began converting Queensland Agricul- but placing more fighter planes at
tural College into a hospital with 250 Townsville would necessitate construc-
beds. Quite a few new projects had to tion of at least one new airdrome to
be undertaken. Colonel Johnson di- supplement the bomber fields at Garbutt
rected the building of eight frame ware- and Charters Towers. If oceangoing
houses to be dispersed throughout the vessels were to use the port, the harbor
city and arranged for contractors to build would have to be deepened, new wharves
an ordnance depot in suburban Derra. built, and roads to the docks improved.
Camps were a major requirement. On 5 January the base section com-
Johnson selected a site near Wacol, fif- mander, Brig. Gen. Henry B. Clagett,
teen miles southwest of Brisbane, and and his engineer, Major Abbott, arrived.
soon work was under way on a 5,000-man After checking in at their hotel, they set
staging camp, later named Camp Colum- out for a conference at the local head-
bia. He also set work in motion on a quarters of the RAAF. Having dis-
1,000-man camp near Archerfield. Far- cussed their needs with the Australian
rar designed both camps on a dispersal airmen, they inspected several airfield
basis, with buildings to be constructed in sites selected earlier by General Brereton
wooded areas and concealed from air and found them suitable. A tour of the
observation. By far the largest of the town and the surrounding countryside
jobs was Eagle Farm air base, which was convinced them that there were "acres of
to be Brett's main depot for assembling open country on which to build" but
planes. Designing and laying out the little else. Labor was scarce, many resi-
two all-weather runways, assembly plant, dents having fled to the south. Since
hardstandings, shops, and warehouses local merchants stocked few of the items
and finding contractors, workmen, plant, needed for large-scale construction proj-
and materials presented Johnson and ects, supplies were low. Despite the dis-
Farrar with a real challenge, but, with couraging outlook, Clagett and Abbott
Australian help, they soon succeeded in went ahead. Within a few days, they
getting construction started.16 had obtained the RAAF's permission to
Farther north the engineers faced a award fixed-fee contracts and sent out a
tough assignment. At Townsville, des- call for workmen to all the towns within
tined to be the great base in northeastern a radius of 200 miles. By the ninth, con-
Australia, most construction would have tractors had been hired, workmen re-
to be from the ground up. Brett wanted cruited, and construction started on
a plant for assembling fighters, shops for barracks at Garbutt and on a fighter strip
repairing them, and a great deal besides. at Charters Towers.17
Brett considered Darwin the key
16
(1) Hist Summary of Activities of Hq of Base point in the fight for the Indies and
Sec 3 From 23 Dec 41 Through 31 Mar 44. (2)
Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations,
17
p.376.(3) Extracts, Maj Farrar, 23 Dec 42. SWPA (1) Notes of Conf Held on 4 Jan 42, Incl 13 to
File 241. (4) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (2) [Hist of]
SWPA, VI, 36. Base Two.
116 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
CAMP COLUMBIA
Australia, and believed the establishment construction and asked the Australian
of a major base there was "absolutely Government to speed work on the road
necessary." He nevertheless recognized and railroad leading into the town. Al-
that construction in the town and sur- though little could be accomplished im-
rounding territory would be extremely mediately, Darwin continued to figure
difficult. Living conditions in this for- prominently in Brett's long-range
18
bidding tropical outpost were almost plans.
unbearable. There were few workmen The construction program, modest as
to be had, and supplies would have to be it was, got off to a faltering start. Dur-
brought in by tortuous overland routes or ing their first weeks, the engineers had to
shipped by sea from southeastern Aus- grope their way along. Since those who
tralia. To develop Darwin fully would had arrived with the convoy had ex-
be a long-term proposition. For the pected to serve in the Philippines, they
time being it would have to serve merely
as a staging area for air units moving
18
northward. Brett called initially only (1) Notes of Conf Held on 4 Jan 42. Incl 13c
to Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (2) Min of
for construction of a field for fighters, Mtg, Admin Plng Com, 5 Jan 42. Incl 13d to Rpt
shops for emergency repairs, and hous- of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (3) Cable, Brett
ing for 2,500 troops. Since no Ameri- to TAG, 3 Jan 42. WPD, EDGS, Msg file 5, 1-12
Jan 42. (4) Rad, Brett to MID, 5 Jan 42. Incl
can engineer could be spared for Darwin, 13d to Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (5)
he persuaded the RAAF to take charge of Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 12-14.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 117
had not even brought along sets of draw- facturers turned out fairly large numbers
ings or field manuals.19 The engineers of concrete mixers and light tractors and
knew little or nothing of the local ter- trucks. They also produced certain
rain, rainfall, or wind directions. "The other items of equipment, but without
rocks, trees, and soil," wrote one, "were essential parts, which had to be im-
without parallel in our previous experi- ported; bearings for carryalls, for ex-
ence. The very stars and constellations ample, had to come from abroad, as did
were strange." 20 Derby, in Melbourne, motors for graders. Spare parts for all
at first had difficulty finding out what his types of machinery were at a premium.
engineers one or two thousand miles Only a thin trickle of supplies came from
away were doing or what their needs the United States. The Chief of Engi-
were. They, on the other hand, with neers had little to spare for overseas, and
few regulations to guide them, did not the European Theater of Operations got
always know how far to go in hiring con- first priority on that. And, to make mat-
tractors, buying supplies, and dealing ters worse, the shipping shortage slowed
with the Australian authorities. Small delivery of such items as could be ear-
wonder that construction appeared to be marked for the southwest Pacific.22
slow in getting under way. When Gen- Competition for such supplies as there
eral Brereton visited Australia in late were further aggravated a bad situation.
January he complained that "conditions The Australians placed orders without
at Darwin were unsatisfactory" and that reference to the needs of the Americans,
projects at Brisbane had not "progressed who also bought up meager stocks, heed-
beyond the planning stage." 21 less of the requirements of their allies.
Difficulties in procuring scarce build- The American services likewise bid
ing materials and equipment also had a against each other. On 21 January the
hampering effect. Of the raw materials Commanding General, USAFIA, in an
needed for construction, only iron ore attempt to bring about more orderly
and timber were plentiful, and the coun- procurement, ruled that all supplies pro-
try's capacity for turning them into fin- cured locally must be obtained through
ished products was limited. The output Australian military channels. Also, base
of hardware, steel plate, and lumber fell section commanders could purchase on
far short of wartime demands, as did the their own authority only in amounts up
production of roofing and pipe. Ce- to $500; purchases costing more had to
ment was the only manufactured product be approved by USAFIA. While this
produced in ample quantities. Bitumen order prevented a good deal of indis-
was almost impossible to get. Manu- criminate buying, it did not put an end
19 22
Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, pp. 4-5, 7. (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for
20
Col Albert G. Matthews, Data for a Hist Rpt of 1942. (2) Incls, 22 Jun 42, to Memo, Barnes for
Engr Activities in SWPA (cited hereafter as Mat- Somervell, 9 Jul 42. 400.312 (Australia) 1942-43.
thews, Data for Hist Rpt), p. 4. Incl to Ltr, Mat-(3) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 3. (4) Memo,
thews to Casey, 3 Jun 46. SWPA Files. OCE Supply Div Intl Sec for C Intl Sec, 1 Apr 42.
21
(1) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49. (2) Brereton, Office file, Intl Div, DA 400.33 (Australia) (up to 19
The Brereton Diaries, pp. 80-81. Jan 44).
118 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
manpower and resources on a "total war ages of supplies and equipment, the
basis." In line with this policy, the AWC surveyed existing stocks, impressed
Australian Government established the privately owned machinery, searched for
Allied Works Council (AWC) on 26 ways to increase production, and sent
February. The council was to direct urgent requests to the American govern-
and control "the carrying out of works of ment for lend-lease aid. One of their
whatever nature required for war pur- major tasks, the members of the council
poses by Allied Forces in Australia." believed, was the recruitment of work-
Curtin appointed Mr. Edward G. Theo- ers. At first, they relied on private in-
dore, former Commonwealth treasurer, dustry and on state construction agencies,
as director general, and Mr. C. A. Hoy, such as roads commissions, to round up
head of the works agency of the Depart- additional laborers. Appeals for volun-
ment of the Interior, as assistant director. teers met with little success. Men could
General Brett, asked to nominate a third not be readily persuaded to leave defense
member, chose Major Heiberg, who was jobs in Melbourne and Sydney to go to
succeeded within a few days by General work in the inhospitable regions of the
Johns. The council was given broad north. When the manpower shortage
powers, including the right to com- continued acute, the council considered
mandeer supplies and equipment, con- drafting workers but hesitated to take
demn property, and adopt any form this unpopular step unless there was no
of contract that would expedite con- alternative.31
struction.30 The Allied Works Council was no
Theodore and his colleagues strove to panacea. It could not alter the basic
bring order into the building program. fact that Australia's resources were
Meeting in Melbourne, they began at limited, nor could its members simply
once to assemble a staff and to establish ignore political considerations and insist
offices in each of the states and in North- on unpopular measures. It had, more-
ern Territory. The state organizations over, to operate as part of a cumbersome
would hire contractors, recruit workers, system. Before work on a project could
and obtain materials and equipment. begin, the council had to obtain the ap-
Finding it almost impossible to use proval of what many thought was an in-
peacetime methods of contracting, the ordinately large number of governmental
council adopted the fixed-fee contract bodies, military and civilian. Among
for the bulk of the jobs, offering builders them were the Administrative Planning
an average profit of 3 percent of the esti- Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Com-
mated cost. In order to alleviate short- mittee, who assigned priorities. The
30
(1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, pp.
31
5-7. (2) Melbourne Argus, February 18, 1942, p. 1. (1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, pp.
(3) Commonwealth of Australia, Statutory Rules, 80, 85, 107. (2) AWC, Office Memo No. 196, [5 Nov
1942, No. 88 (February 26, 1942), Regulations Under 42], sub: AWC Projects. SWPA File 242. (3) Memo,
the National Security Act, 1939-1940. (4) Rpt of WD Of Defense Aid Dir Distr Br for CofEngrs, c.17
Orgn and Activities, USAFIA, app. 20, Hist Rcd, Mar 42, sub: Constr Engineering Equip for Australia
Gen Purchasing Agent USAFIA, pp. 10-11. (5) and New Zealand. 400.333 (Australia) 1942-44. (4)
Who's Who, 1943. Incls, n.d., to Memo in (3), above.
122 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
ministers of the Australian armed serv- complishment the AWC took particular
ices were notified of pending construc- pride in was the launching of work on
tion so that they might determine if new runways at Charters Towers. The
existing facilities could be used. The council's field representative in Queens-
Treasury reviewed projects for American land received the request for this job on
forces to arrange for financing through a Saturday night early in March. He at
reverse lend-lease. The war Cabinet re- once suspended operations at most of the
served the right to pass upon all large other projects in the area and ordered
projects or those of a controversial na- the equipment sent to Charters Towers.
ture. Only after all these agencies had He requisitioned three trains to haul the
approved was the Allied Works Council machinery and called workmen from
permitted to go ahead with construction. their homes to get everything in readiness
All too often this procedure proved to be at the airfield for construction to begin.
32
exasperatingly slow. By Monday morning 200 men, with 100
Yet, despite many obstacles, the Allied trucks, 12 bulldozers, and a large number
Works Council could by mid-March re- of scoops, tractors, and graders, were
port considerable progress. The num- hard at work. The Australians, well
ber of going projects was mounting aware that they were just embarking on a
steadily. Most of the new jobs were in vast undertaking, were eager to get on
the south, where the council was to per- with the program as a whole.33
form extensive construction for the Aus-
tralian services and provide numerous First Engineer Units
key facilities for the Americans. Ex-
pansion of camps near Melbourne and While the Australians were intensify-
Brisbane was continuing. A beginning ing their efforts, the first engineer troops
had been made on the largest job in the arrived from the United States. On 2
entire airfield program—the Tocumwal February the 808th Aviation Battalion
Repair and Assembly Depot in New had landed at Melbourne. The people
South Wales, located on the Murray of the city, says the battalion chronicler,
River, which formed the boundary with "were very glad to see the U.S. forces
Victoria. This gigantic project, cover- come in" and gave the 808th a "rousing
ing sixteen square miles, was to include welcome." But the men so warmly re-
4 runways for heavy bombers, seventy ceived were in some ways unprepared
miles of roads, and 608 buildings. But for the task ahead. Activated in Septem-
while the bulk of its effort was in Victoria ber 1941, the 808th, like most of the
and New South Wales, the council was early aviation battalions, had received
beginning to devote some attention to only haphazard training. The unit ar-
the north. Work on roads leading from rived without its heavy equipment, ex-
South Australia and Queensland to cept for three dump trucks and two
Darwin was being speeded up. An ac- 33
(1) AWC, Report February 1942-June 1943, pp.
44-47, 49-53. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual
32
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC Engrs of SWPA, II, Rpt for 1942. (3) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, [Rpt on]
40-41. (2) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 8. Warehouses [1942]. (Draft MS). SWPA File A5.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 123
tractors. The bulk of its machinery was the new bomber fields, instead of going
to follow later. Brett lost no time in on to Darwin, 200 miles to the north,
giving the unit its assignment. Under which that day had been hard hit by an
Capt. Andrew D. Chaffin, Jr., the 808th air attack. After experiencing the diffi-
was soon on its way to build airdromes culties of movement between Melbourne
in the Darwin area.34 and the Darwin area, the men of the
The long journey northward intro- 808th, deep in what the Australians
duced the engineers to the Australian called the "Never-Never" land, felt
transportation system. On 12 February "completely isolated as far as the re-
the men went by truck to Baccus Marsh mainder of the U.S. Army was con-
35
near Melbourne, where they boarded a cerned."
special train. The next day, on reach- The 808th got orders to turn the civil
ing Terowie, in the state of South airdrome at Katherine into a field for
Australia, where the broad gauge ended, medium bombers and to find sites for
they transferred to the narrow gauge line new fields in the area. On his own
which ran through the desert to Alice initiative, Chaffin undertook another
Springs, a thousand miles to the north. project in order to eliminate the need
Having a top speed of twenty miles an for transshipping cargoes at Larrimah.
hour, the train did not reach Alice He decided to improve the road from
Springs until 2130 of the 15th. Since that point northward so that supplies
there was no railroad northward out of could be trucked all the way from Alice
the town, trucks carried the troops on to Springs. The battalion quickly settled
Larrimah, 635 miles distant. The pas- down to work. Survey parties, sent out
sengers found the road rough and the daily, located several good sites for air-
"vibration . . . terrific." Arriving in fields. Men of Company B began re-
Larrimah on the 18th the men "broke moving trees and providing detours
out laughing" when they saw the train around bad spots on the road to the
that was to take them on to Darwin. "It south. At first, the 808th made scant
consisted," one wrote, "of cattle cars for progress on runways. On 6 March
personnel, small open cars (trucks) for Captain Chaffin reported "little . . .
baggage, and a small wheezy locomotive has been done towards building airfields
which looked as though each hour of in this vicinity because of the complete
existence would be its last." The Aus- absence of equipment." The battalion
tralian crew's custom of stopping every had brought to Katherine only the three
few hours to have a "spot of tea" was an dump trucks and two tractors it had un-
added irritation to the Americans, who loaded at Melbourne in early February.
were impatient to get to their destina- Chaffin had been able to obtain 11 cargo
tion. On 19 February the battalion left trucks and 2 old bulldozers at Darwin.
the train at Katherine, the site of one of But at least 7 of his 14 trucks were
needed to keep the battalion supplied
34
with food and water. The others were
Lt Col Ralph C. Glover, The Hist of the 808th
Engr Avn Bn (MS), pp. 1, 15, 22, 27. SWPA File
35
A167. Ibid., pp. 28ff.
124 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
used to haul gravel for the Katherine later the bulk of their equipment was
runway. The cargo trucks were of the shipped. The units were at full
type which had to be emptied by hand; strength when they landed, but did not
unloading these trucks in the tropical long remain so. "USAFIA shanghaied
sun was so exhausting that the men could both officers and men ruthlessly . . . ,"
work only six hours a day. Still, in Matthews wrote. Brett took the 46th's
spite of these handicaps, occasional Japa- motor repairmen for the base motor pool
nese bombings, and the ever-present at Melbourne. When their vehicles ar-
dread of enemy invasion, the battalion rived early in March, the commanders
persevered. By mid-March the Kath- discovered that the spare tires had been
erine runway had been lengthened and removed in the States. The first days in
was being surfaced with gravel, and the Australia seemed to portend difficult
clearing of three sites for new strips had times ahead.37
begun.36 The 43d Engineers began work almost
Prospects for construction in Australia at once preparing Camp Seymour near
brightened with the arrival at Melbourne Melbourne for the 41st Division, ex-
on 26 February of two general service pected in April. Seymour was an old
regiments—the 43d, commanded by Lt. Australian tent camp. With the addi-
Col. Heston R. Cole, and the 46th, com- tion of huts for kitchens, mess halls,
manded by Lt. Col. Albert G. Matthews. showers, latrines, recreation buildings,
Since these units were older than the and hospitals, it was quickly made ready
aviation battalion, they had received to accommodate the American division.
more extensive training in the United In mid-March, when the 43d received its
States. The 43d, activated in April vehicles, the headquarters and service
1941 and given seven weeks of basic company and the 1st Battalion left to
training, had in June taken part in army join the 808th in Northern Territory.
maneuvers in Tennessee, where, accord- Except for one company which remained
ing to an observer from the Office of the at Seymour, the 2d Battalion moved to
Chief of Engineers, the men had per- Adelaide to enlarge Australian camps
formed "as nearly like veteran troops as there for the 32d Division. Using mate-
could possibly be expected from such a rials supplied by the Commonwealth's
short training period." The 46th, acti- Department of Defence, the Engineers
vated in July 1941, had undergone train- strove to complete the facilities by the
ing in road building, airfield construc- time the 32d would arrive in May.38
tion, bridging, fortification, and demoli-
tions—the usual instruction given to 37
(1) Hist of 46th Engr GS Regt, 1942. (2) Of C
general service regiments—and in addi- Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942. (3) Incls,
tion had had the benefit of experience 3 Jul 41, to Of C Engr Info Bull No. 89, 18 Jul 41.
(4) Ltr, OCE Mil Div, Opns and Tng Sec, to C Opns
in the Louisiana maneuvers in the fall. and Tng Sec, 9 Jul 41. 354.2 pt. 8. (5) Incls to
On 23 January 1942 the 46th and the 43d Memo, Port and Water Sec Transport Br G-4 WD
had sailed for Australia; three weeks for Somervell, 24 Jan 42. WPD, 4630-41 (Equip
and Trps—Australia) (sec. II). (6) Matthews Ltr,
10 Nov 49, p. 7.
36 38
Ibid., pp. 36ff. (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 125
After two weeks of combat training ing over trees and pulling out stumps.
near Melbourne, the 46th Engineers left Even final grading often had to be done
by rail for northern Queensland, an area by hand. Still, the regimental historian
which might at any time become a battle reports, "the men were eager and en-
zone. To protect themselves against thusiastic, and went about their work
enemy air attack the men mounted ma- with vigor . . . troops laboring under
chine guns on the flatcars of their trains. the intense heat of the sun, and in clouds
During the trip they passed trainload of dust, slashed away at trees and
after trainload of refugees headed south- stumps. . . ." Four days after construc-
ward. On 13 March the first of the tion began, the first plane landed on one
troops reached Woodstock, a town twenty of the runways. Matthews had mean-
miles southwest of Townsville. Here while lined up sites for additional strips,
and in the surrounding countryside the but soon the regiment was dispersed.
regiment was to build airstrips so vital On 22 March Company A arrived at
to the defense of the Townsville area. Torrens Creek, a small town about 180
Colonel Matthews was under exceptional miles southwest of Townsville. Here
orders. Since the officer who com- the men rapidly cleared the site and laid
manded Base Section Two was a major, steel mat, 2,500 by 100 feet, in five days—
Matthews was to report directly to Gen- possibly, they thought, a speed record for
eral Johns. Matthews was to be largely putting down mat up to that time.40 On
responsible for the development of air- 29 March, Companies B, C, and F moved
fields in northeastern Australia in the to Reid River, 40 miles south of Towns-
critical days of early 1942.39 ville, where they began building a third
On 18 March the entire regiment airfield. Although this job, undertaken
began the work of clearing and grading in a heavily wooded area, required much
three runways for a giant airfield at clearing, the first landing strip was ready
Woodstock. Matthews ordered around- by 15 April.41
the-clock operations, scheduling three 8- Matthews described the construction
hour shifts a day. Because general serv- of these airstrips as "field improvisation
ice troops were trained as jacks of all at its ... best." The officers of the
engineering trades rather than as spe- 46th were largely on their own and "did
cialists in airfield construction, their what seemed good to them and in most
equipment included no rooters, rollers, cases their engineering common sense
or scrapers. The troops worked mainly was the primary and single qualification
with picks and shovels, keeping their for the work." Construction was held
trucks and few dozers in reserve for push- to the simplest standards. Because
equipment was short, dispersal taxiways,
(2) [Hist of] Base Sec V, Adelaide, South Australia,
40
3 Mar 42-8 Mar 43, pp. 10ff. SWPA File A183. (3) Steel mat was also known as pierced steel plank,
[Hist of] Base Sec V, Rpt of Estimate of Cost of pierced plank, or Marston mat, from the name of
Work Performed to Last Day of Jun 42. Incls to the town in North Carolina near which this type of
Hist cited in (2), above. mat was first tested.
39 41
(1) Hist of 46th Engr GS Regt, 1942. (2) (1) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 10. (2) Hist of
Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 40. 46th Engr GS Regt, 1942.
126 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
hardstands, and revetments were omitted. less gratified by the decreasing competi-
As the long dry season was just begin- tion for supplies. On 21 February the
ning, drainage was dispensed with. Commanding General, USAFIA, had set
Since the engineers had no asphalt or tar, up the American Procurement Commis-
they surfaced the runways with rotted sion, in response to General Marshall's
granite, semidecomposed shale, or some- suggestion that a central purchasing
times merely with gravel and clay. The board be established in Australia, "along
fields were rough and crude, but planes the lines which were so successful . . .
could land on them. Construction took in France during the last war." The
a heavy toll of equipment. Machinery new commission included representatives
broke down quickly under hard usage. of all the Army's procurement services,
Constant turning and twisting over with Heiberg serving as the Engineer
rough ground wore out the front tires of member. Henceforth the services had
the graders, and the tires of many of the to send requests for supplies to the com-
trucks were slashed by the stumps of mission, which determined priorities and
eucalyptus trees, cut off by Australian placed orders with the Australians. On
surveyors just above the ground. 20 March the organization was renamed
Having no maintenance repair truck, the General Purchasing Board. It soon
Matthews converted a motorized earth succeeded in bettering relations with the
augur, "which wasn't any good anyway," Australians and in effecting a more
into a mobile shop and equipped it with equitable distribution of supplies among
tools obtained from the Air Forces and the American services.44
the Australians. For repair work, he Ships fleeing before the Japanese ad-
relied on men "who . . . weren't ex- vance through Malaya and the Indies
perts but . . . learned fast." The short- meanwhile were bringing large quanti-
age of tires was remedied when the 46th ties of "distress cargo" to Australia.
took over a retreading plant whose work- Ports were crowded with fugitive mer-
men had been evacuated from the chantmen; so great was the mass of mate-
42
Townsville area. Despite the regi- rial dumped at Sydney that the wharves
ment's many difficulties, building in the threatened to collapse. Many ships had
bush country of northern Queensland to anchor in the harbor to await their
was, as Matthews pointed out, "excellent turn to unload, and once they docked,
training for the officers and men engaged supplies were hurriedly removed and
in doing much with nothing, [and] . . . thrown into warehouses. The Austral-
living under the most primitive condi- ian Department of Import Procurement
tions. . . ." 43 took possession of the cargoes and began
44
Supplies (1) Ltr, Marshall to Brett [n.d.]. WPD 4630-41
(Equip and Trps—Australia), sec. II. (2) WD Ltr,
AG 334.8 (1-3-42) MSC-D-M to CG USAFIA, 3 Feb
If Brett and Johns were cheered by the 42. 400.333 (Australia) 1942-43. (3) Memo, Barnes
coming of engineer units, they were no for Heads of Gen and Spec Staff Sec USAFIA, 21
Feb 42. (4) Memo, Brett for Heads of Gen and
42
Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, pp. 13-14, 32. Spec Staff Sec USAFIA, 20 Mar 42. Last two in
43
Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 30. Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA, app. 20.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 127
sorting them, after which the Common- the engineers still had too few supplies
wealth government gave the U.S. Army and too little equipment, their lot was
first choice of all goods brought in by gradually improving.46
American and Dutch vessels. Distress
cargo proved to be a windfall for the A New Command
engineers, providing them with more
tools, steel plate, pipe, cable, generators, On the morning of 17 March the
and construction machinery than any planes bringing MacArthur and his staff
other source.45 from the Philippines to Darwin landed
One of the ships which had escaped at Batchelor Field. From there the
from Java brought Mr. Albert Wright, a group traveled by plane, train and auto-
petroleum executive of many years' ex- mobile to Melbourne, where MacArthur
perience in the Indies. The engineers set up his headquarters. He and his
immediately pressed him into service, staff at once began to take stock of the
commissioning him a major. Named situation. General Casey was particu-
Johns' supply officer, Wright was ordered larly anxious to get out into the field and
to get equipment quickly. After con- see construction projects firsthand. On
ferences with officers of the 808th, the 28 March, accompanied by Johns and
43d, and the 46th, all of whom stressed Theodore, he flew to Amberley Field
the urgent need for earth-moving ma- near Brisbane, which he found "well
chinery, Wright began requisitioning provided with paved runways." Pro-
farm tractors from the Australians. But ceeding to Eagle Farm, he noted that one
these machines were too light for the job, 5,000-foot runway had been surfaced and
and, since most of them were second- another was under construction. The
hand, large stocks of spare parts would strips at nearby Archerfield were of turf,
have to be found. When Wright's soft in spots and slippery when wet.
efforts to get parts from dealers met with Troops were moving into the recently
slight success, distress cargo again proved finished camps near the fields. Inspect-
a godsend; a shipload of parts for cater- ing these camps, Casey was disturbed by
pillar tractors enabled the engineers to the "relatively high type construction,"
keep most of their equipment running. which included tongue and groove floor-
Meanwhile, rock drills, wire rope, and ing, asbestos roofing, and waterborne
hand tools from Australian gold mines sewage systems. He suggested that
supplemented the engineers' meager "temporary and less costly shelter . . .
stocks of equipment, and carbon dioxide be provided." The members of the
cylinders from breweries were rebuilt to party continued on to Townsville, where
hold oxygen for use in welding. While they were met by Colonel Matthews,
who took them to see the fields being
built by the 46th Engineers. Casey pro-
45
(1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, p. nounced the fields "excellent" and was
109. (2) [Hist of] Base Sec 7, (Draft MS), p. 12.
SWPA File A185. (3) Engr Br Proc Div USASOS,
46
12 Dec 44, Hist Rpt, Engr Proc in Australia. SWPA Engr Br Proc Div USASOS, 12 Dec 44, Hist Rpt,
File M35. (4) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 18. Engr Proc in Australia.
128 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
pleased to find the troops still out work- (SWPA). (Map 8) The latter was to in-
ing at 2200. The activities of the Aus- clude the large land masses, Australia,
tralians at Townsville evoked less enthu- New Guinea, the East Indies (except
siasm. Much effort was going into the Sumatra), and the Philippines, as well as
dredging of the harbor and the improve- the Bismarck Archipelago and part of the
ment of the road to Brisbane; Casey Solomon Islands. POA was to include
wondered if such jobs might not be sus- most of the remainder of the Pacific.
pended and the men and equipment put Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who already
to work on airfields. Nor was he overly commanded naval forces in this area,
impressed with Charters Towers. He was named commander in chief of Allied
noted much equipment on hand but re- forces. Roosevelt's choice for command
marked that there were not enough men of all Allied air, sea, and ground
to run it. The job, he felt, should be forces in the Southwest Pacific Area was
reorganized and given a "general push." MacArthur. The Australians received
The tour convinced him that designs Roosevelt's nomination of the general
must be simpler, equipment and man- with great enthusiasm. Almost from the
power allocated more wisely, and efforts time of his arrival in the Commonwealth,
centered first of all on airfield construc- MacArthur had had the prerogatives if
tion. Much good work had been done, not the title of commander in chief. His
but the program required better over-all nomination as supreme commander ap-
direction.47 proved by the governments concerned,
MacArthur on 18 April officially assumed
Toward a More Aggressive Strategy his position as the leader of the Allied
forces in the Southwest Pacific. He or-
Strategic Plans ganized three new commands under his
own General Headquarters, Southwest
While MacArthur had been making Pacific Area: Allied Land Forces under
good his escape from Corregidor, Ameri- Australian General Sir Thomas Blamey,
can and British plans for carrying on the Allied Air Forces under General Brett,
war against Japan were beginning to and Allied Naval Forces under Vice
crystallize. On 9 March President Adm. Herbert F. Leary. Continuing
Roosevelt proposed that the United under MacArthur's direction were
States assume responsibility for the con- USFIP, commanded by General Wain-
duct of the war in the Pacific; on the 18th wright, and USAFIA, now headed by
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill General Barnes. As set forth in
agreed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff mean- Marshall's orders, MacArthur's mission
while were dividing the Pacific into two was threefold: to hold Australia, prevent
main theaters, the Pacific Ocean Area the Japanese from cutting supply lines to
(POA) and the Southwest Pacific Area the United States, and prepare to take
47
the offensive.48
(1) Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against
Japan, pp. 70-74. (2) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, n.d.,
48
sub: Rpt of Inspec Northeast Australia—New (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 16-23. (2)
Guinea Areas, 28 Mar-3 Apr. SWPA File 158. Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 129
MAP8
MacArthur, on arrival at Melbourne, twenty-five divisions might not be
had learned of the plans of the Australian enough. Considerable air and naval
Chiefs of Staff which called for a defense power would also be necessary, and no
of the southeastern part of the Common- such force was available or in prospect.
wealth. He almost at once came to the In the near future, the Southwest Pacific
conclusion that a different strategy was could count on having only two Ameri-
needed. Plans for continental defense can and possibly three Australian divi-
he rejected as impractical. To hold the sions and small naval and air forces.
vast stretches of the sparsely inhabited But, MacArthur reasoned, it might be
country would require a large army; even possible, with only limited forces, to
ward off invasion by striking enemy-held
Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 165-72. (3) Morton, Strategy
islands and enemy naval forces and ship-
and Command, p. 253. ping during an attempted approach to
130 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Australia. The Japanese seemed most could advance, the engineers would
apt to try to seize the rich industrial have to provide maps of the uncharted,
regions of Victoria and New South Wales enemy-held regions. Once an offensive
rather than the barren deserts of the west was launched, they would have to sup-
and north. Consequently, the islands to port the infantry in combat, help reduce
the northeast appeared most liable to at- enemy strongpoints, and perform many
tack. Port Moresby, on the southern of their traditional functions in moving
coast of New Guinea, would be a particu- the army forward. Though MacArthur
larly valuable prize, since it controlled would employ the engineers in many
the air and sea lanes southward along the ways, the effectiveness of his strategy
Australian coast. MacArthur decided would, in large measure, depend on the
not to wait for the Japanese to come to speed with which they could build
Australia, but to go north to meet them. bases and, above all, airfields from
With the forces allotted to the Southwest which fighters and bombers could
Pacific a good defensive position could strike at enemy targets.
be maintained, and it might even be That Casey would be chief engineer
49
possible to launch limited offensives. of SWPA had been a foregone conclu-
sion, and on 19 April MacArthur issued
Role of the Engineers the necessary orders. Having already
had several weeks to study conditions
In choosing to defend Australia in the in Australia, Casey was aware of the
islands to the north, MacArthur gave the immense task ahead. As chief engineer
engineers a decisive role. The battle of an Allied headquarters, he would co-
would be joined on mountainous, ordinate the activities of all engineers,
jungled, rain-drenched islands, where Australian and American, under Mac-
overland movement and supply would Arthur's command, frame the policies
be all but impossible. The airplane under which they would work, and
would be a principal weapon and heavy give them technical direction. To han-
reliance would have to be placed on dle this assignment, he believed he would
water transport. What MacArthur en- need a staff of at least 25 officers and
visioned was a war in which airfields, men. But the number of officers in the
ports, and bases would be the pre- theater was so scant that at first he could
requisites of victory. Northern Aus- set up only a small section consisting of
tralia had few facilities for waging mod- 5 officers and 5 enlisted men. Heiberg,
ern war; New Guinea and the nearby transferred from Johns's office, became
islands had almost none. The engineers his executive officer; Maj. Emil F.
would have to build what was needed Klinke, transferred from the 43d General
from the ground up and under the Service Regiment, became chief of oper-
most difficult conditions. Construction ations and training. Lacking experts in
would be their chief mission, but not construction, Casey asked Reybold to
their only one. Before Allied troops send him Lt. Col. Bernard L. Robinson,
then in Wyman's office in Honolulu, and
49
Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 23-25. Leif J. Sverdrup, at that time about to
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 131
return to the United States in connection the Allied Land Forces under General
with work on the air ferry route and Blamey. Working with the Australians
soon to be commissioned a colonel. and integrating their engineer effort into
Sverdrup and Robinson reached Aus- the Allied program would require not a
tralia in late May. Sverdrup became little tact and diplomacy, since the Com-
chief of the Construction Section and monwealth's Department of Defence
Robinson, assistant chief. Although his lay outside MacArthur's jurisdiction.50
staff was part of an Allied headquarters, (Chart)
Casey had but one subordinate who was
not American, an Australian major who 50
(1) GHQ SWPA GO 2, 19 Apr 42. (2) Memo,
served as liaison officer. He nevertheless Casey for CofS GHQ SWPA 9 Apr 42. SWPA File
intended to work closely with Maj. Gen. 26. (3) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,
Clive S. Steele, who was both Engineer II, 26-28. (4) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 12 May 42.
(5) Memo, Casey for Rcd, 20 May 42. (6) Rad,
in Chief of the Royal Australian Engi- MacArthur to Reybold, 27 Apr 42. Last three in
neers (RAE) and Engineer in Chief of SWPA File 26. (7) Data obtained from Mil Pers
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 133
At conferences held during the last more troops trained in general and com-
weeks of April, Casey and Steele took bat engineering must be sent from the
stock of their resources. They had to United States. Urgently needed were
assume that they would not have large an additional aviation battalion, 2 sepa-
numbers of American engineers at their rate battalions, and 2 dump truck com-
disposal. One aviation battalion, 2 gen- panies, a depot company, and a combat
eral service regiments, 2 separate bat- battalion, all fully equipped, and a heavy
talions, and 2 dump truck companies ponton battalion without its equipage.
would be in Australia by the end of This was the absolute minimum but
April. Scheduled to arrive in May and probably all that could be expected in
June were 2 divisional combat battalions, view of the shortage of trained units in
2 topographic units, and a depot com- the United States, the lack of shipping,
pany, the only additional engineer units and the priority of operations planned
approved by the War Department for for Europe. With a few reinforcements
SWPA at that time. This small contin- from the United States, Casey and Steele
gent would hardly be sufficient for the believed they could support the kind of
tasks ahead, but fortunately, increasing strategy MacArthur had in mind. But
numbers of Australian engineers were engineer strength would have to be
available. Units of the RAE were re- spread thin in the Southwest Pacific.51
turning home with their divisions, and While Casey drew long-range plans for
Steele had launched a strenuous recruit- the coming offensive, he had to supervise
ing drive. The engineers of the Aus- a construction program that was growing
tralian Military Forces, while poorly rapidly larger and more difficult of
trained and equipped, were receiving in- accomplishment. In announcing his
tensive instruction from veterans of the strategy, MacArthur had indicated the
RAE. Steele expected soon to be in a need for prodigies of engineering in
position to furnish not only combat, northern Australia and New Guinea.
construction, and supply units, but also Port Moresby, northeastern Queensland,
all the camouflage and railway troops and Darwin were now areas of primary
MacArthur needed. He was further military importance. Greatest stress
prepared to supply the Americans with would have to be placed on developing
bridging, landing barges, barbed wire, Port Moresby, which MacArthur re-
and camouflage nets. Casey reasoned garded as the key to the defense of Aus-
that water supply units from the United tralia and the springboard for future
States could be dispensed with, since offensives. Building an air and supply
providing water would be difficult only base in this exposed area would require
in the parched deserts in the interior of much more than an ordinary engineer
Australia, and in his opinion the Allies effort. Large numbers of men and
did "not propose to have any operations
there." He did believe, however, that 51
(1) Memo, Casey for Rcd, 28 Apr 42. SWPA
File 27. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt
for 1942. (3) Check sheet, Press Relations Off to
Div OCE. (8) Ltr, Robinson to Lyman, 1 Jun 42. Casey, 24 Jun 42. SWPA File 240. (4) Memo,
Engr AGF PAC, 686 (Ferry Route). Casey for Rcd, 15 Apr 42. SWPA File 210.
134 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
sion to make minor changes in specifica- issue orders, but since he was MacAr-
tions. Casey concluded that this state of thur's chief engineer, his recommenda-
affairs would force him to take a strong tions would carry great weight.
stand.53 He encountered resistance almost at
One of his prime objectives was to give once. The American airmen, not con-
the program unified direction. He tent to be dependent on the base sections,
therefore set out to view construction in wished to handle their own construction.
broad perspective, to consider projects They were quick to cite examples of
not on an individual basis but as parts waste and inefficiency in the existing ar-
of an integrated program. As a first step rangement. To strengthen their posi-
toward this goal, he directed his staff to tion, they had already made a beginning
inventory jobs, under way and projected, toward setting up their own engineer
and to make a survey of available man- establishment with the appointment on
power, materials, and equipment. He 16 March of Abbott as air engineer.
next attempted to formulate "a planned After reminding Casey of the many
program of ... construction with defi- difficulties the base sections had encount-
nite time limits based on ... a knowl- ered in getting Air Forces projects fin-
edge of requirements and resources." ished on time, Brett on 18 April proposed
Once the program had been defined, he that a separate field organization be
intended to keep close check on rates of created to handle the building of air-
progress and percentages of completion. fields. He asked that each air area
He asked for uniform progress reports commander be assigned an engineer who
from each project, explaining that "the would be responsible to USAFIA for all
purpose is to see that the job is approxi- Air Forces jobs in the area, selecting the
mately up to date and if behind . . . sites and supervising the construction.
[what] action can be taken to bring it up Casey was unalterably opposed to such
to schedule."54 Merely analyzing the an arrangement. Not only would the
program and diagnosing its ills were not authority of the air engineers conflict
enough. Casey would have to persuade with that of the base section command-
others to follow his suggestions. Under ers, but this might well be the first step
the command-staff setup, he could not toward the establishment of a dual engi-
neer organization with control of the
53
(1) Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamber- aviation battalions exclusively by the Air
lain, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New York, 1954), pp. Forces. Because the number of engi-
83-84. (2) W. A. Rogers, Secy AWC, Memo for Rcd, neers in SWPA was so small, Casey
sub: Conf Held at the Of of the Dep Dir Gen of
Allied Works on Sunday, 31 May 42. SWPA File believed that having two separate field
240. (3) Memo, Casey for Staff Sec Heads, 27 Jun systems would merely slow down prog-
42. SWPA File 26. (4) Memo, Sverdrup for Casey,
27 Jun 42. SWPA File 243. (5) Rad, Brett to Air
ress. He countered Brett's proposal
Bd, 18 Apr 42. (6) Ltr, Casey to Brett, 24 Apr 42. with one of his own. What was needed,
Last two in SWPA File 490.
54
he suggested, was not another field
(1) Memo, Casey for Brett, 20 May 42. SWPA
File 490. (2) Min of Conf Held at Engr Hq Office
organization but better co-ordination
of Col Bres, . . . Jun 17, 1942. SWPA File 240. between the existing one and the Air
136 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Forces. He persuaded Brett to let Johns broad picture of Allied Air Force con-
assign engineers from the base sections struction requirements be pulled to-
to air commands in areas where extensive gether into an all embracing program."
airfield construction was under way. He went on to say that if "we are to be
These air engineers would act as liaison forced back into the southeastern Aus-
officers between the air areas and the base tralian area, an extensive construction
sections. They would also help select program in that area is undoubtedly
sites and inspect projects and could order wanted" but implied that if MacArthur's
minor changes in plans and specifica- strategy were sound, many of the south-
tions, but they would not be responsible ern projects could be dropped. While
for construction. Thus, Casey was able this memo was still on his desk, Casey
to forestall the setting up of a separate received a letter from General Steele of
engineer organization under the Air the RAE, telling him of the RAAF's plan
55
Forces. to organize four works units for building
Casey had no sooner come to an under- airfields, each unit to consist of 1,000
standing with Brett than he found him- men and to be equipped with heavy
self at odds with the RAAF. Although machinery. "I feel a little diffident,"
this organization was engaged in an Steele wrote, "but in view of [the] man-
extensive construction program, Casey power shortage feel that I should . . .
was unable to get a list of its projects. [suggest] that their establishment seems
Nor was the RAAF inclined to tell him somewhat top-heavy." Casey had addi-
how many fields it planned to build or tional grounds for objecting—the works
what its over-all requirements would be. units would probably be used exclusively
He learned indirectly that it was concen- on RAAF projects. He quickly drafted
trating heavily on the southeast and was a second memo to Brett in which he
planning to work on some eighty fields recommended that smaller units, mod-
in the Sydney area alone. While these eled on U.S. engineer aviation com-
matters were not, strictly speaking, his panies, be formed and placed under
affair, Casey believed that the concentra- Steele. Taking both memos, he set off
tion of so much effort in the southeast for the headquarters of the AAF. Brett
was detrimental to Allied strategy. He glanced over the documents and passed
prepared a memorandum for Brett, indi- them on to his chief of staff, Australian
cating that there was not "complete Air Vice-Marshal William D. Bostock.56
coordination," between the American Two days later Bostock held a meeting
and Australian air forces. He expressed of air officers and engineers. Casey,
the belief that it was "desirable that the away on a field inspection trip, could not
attend. Among those present were Lt.
55
(1) TWX, Brett to Air Bd, 18 Apr 42. (2) Col. Ward T. Abbott, Col. E. S. Bres of
Memo, Casey for Brett, 24 Apr 42. (3) Memo, Casey
for DCofS GHQ SWPA, 24 Apr 42. (4) Memo,
Johns' office, and 1st Lt. Max D. Lovett
Casey for Johns, 24 Apr 42. (5) Memo, Casey for 56
DCofS GHQ SWPA, 26 Apr 42. (6) Ltr, MacArthur Memo, Casey for Brett, 20 May 42. (2) Ltr,
to Brett and Barnes, 7 May 42. All in SWPA File Steele to Casey, 19 May 42. (3) Memo, Casey for
490. (7) Memo, Brett for CG's U.S. Air Commands Brett, 20 May 42. (4) Ltr, Casey to Steele, 21 May
No. 1 and No. 2, 9 May 42. SWPA File 459. 42. All in SWPA File 490.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 137
of Casey's staff. A rather heated discus- construction work and to centralize re-
sion developed. Bostock opened the sponsibility, Casey, together with other
conference with the statement that he engineers, favored the policy of giving
thought a great many of Casey's misgiv- more authority to the field. In the early
ings about the RAAF's construction days the men directly in charge of proj-
program were the result of "incomplete ects had had little leeway. Approval for
information" and suggested that the even the most trifling jobs had to come
chief engineer possibly had not "had an from Melbourne. The granting of more
opportunity of thoroughly dealing with power to the base section commanders
. . . [the] problem." Bostock was not had been advocated for some time. On
inclined to discuss the question of how 26 March Brett had ruled that jobs cost-
RAAF works units should be organized. ing less than £1,000 (about $3,200) could
This, he said "was the concern of the be undertaken by base section com-
Australian Government and a matter for manders on their own authority. On
the Ministry of Air to decide. . . . It 13 April he raised the ceiling to £5,000
was not a question for Allied Air Forces (about $16,000). Since the vast majority
to worry about." Remarking that Casey of projects were to cost less than this
seemed "somewhat worried" over the sum, Brett thus decentralized his author-
amount of construction going on in the ity over most of the program. Many
southeast, Bostock stated that manpower engineers believed that Theodore would
and materials available there could not have to follow suit. Contractors were
always be sent elsewhere. On the island having to get the AWC's approval for
of Tasmania, for example, there were practically everything they did. When
plenty of laborers ready to work at home Colonel Matthews tried to stop certain
but unwilling to go to New Guinea. work he considered unnecessary at
When Colonel Abbott asked if the equip- Charters Towers and Cloncurry, the
ment in Tasmania could not be sent contractor refused to quit, saying that he
north, Bostock retorted that that was a took "his orders from Brisbane." Both
matter for the Allied Works Council. Casey and Steele proposed that the AWC
As Colonel Heiberg put it later, the "gen- send to the projects representatives
eral attitude . . . seemed to be that clothed with authority comparable to
works are now progressing satisfactorily, that of the base section commanders.
and no external control is desired or Then, if Matthews wanted a few build-
necessary." The RAAF nevertheless ings more or less at Charters Towers, he
agreed to make one concession; it would could get approval directly from the
furnish a statement of its airfield pro- AWC's man at the site. Theodore at
gram to Brett.57 first objected, maintaining that a tele-
Even as he attempted to co-ordinate phone call to him would bring action
within twenty-four hours. To this
57
(1) Memo, Bostock for Casey, 21 May 42. (2) Steele replied that "he was interested in
Memo, Bostock for Casey, 21 May 42. Both in a method of operation that can go on in
SWPA File 490. (3) Min of Mtg Held at RAAF Hq,
22 May 42. SWPA File 481. (4) Memo, Heiberg
the event a bomb should cut the tele-
for G-4 SWPA, 30 May 42. SWPA File 490. phone lines." Finally Theodore agreed
138 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
to send out men empowered to make value insofar as near term operations are
on-the-spot decisions. Soon "coordi- concerned." Many of the AWC officials
nating engineers" were on their way to agreed with him. They too wished to
many of the large projects with orders to avoid "spit and polish" construction and
remove bottlenecks and improve effi- to eliminate jobs which would not con-
ciency.58 tribute to the winning of the war. But
paring down to essentials was no easy
Minimum Construction matter. Many commanders, American
Requirements and Australian, were interested in
building elaborate installations for them-
It was difficult to escape the conclusion selves and in promoting their own pet
that much of the construction was over- projects. Many jobs had been started
elaborate and some of it unnecessary. before Japan declared war, and supplies
On the road from Townsville to Charters and materials had already been allocated.
Towers Casey observed workmen putting Yet the situation was not quite so hope-
in a heavy type of culvert, better suited less as it appeared. Officials of the
for a permanent peacetime highway than AWC through their control of man-
for a temporary military supply route. power, materials, and equipment could
He learned that the RAAF was planning do much to correct abuses, and Casey
to build an officers' club costing $100,000 kept up unremitting pressure to make
59
at Darwin. There were many projects them do so.
which would not be finished for years but The chief engineer saw still another
would benefit the Australian economy opportunity to economize. Believing an
after the war. Insisting that construc- enemy landing imminent, the Austral-
tion be held to "bare essentials," Casey ians were making frantic preparations in
suggested that long-term projects be de- the southeast to hold back the invader
ferred. "The tactical situation might and, failing that, to destroy everything
materially alter . . .," he pointed out, in his path. Around Sydney, Mel-
'and works which will not be completed bourne, and Brisbane, large numbers of
for say a year or more hence will be of no men were mining roads and bridges,
digging trenches, preparing tank traps,
58
and making ready to put a scorched-
(1) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, n.d. sub: Rpt of
Inspec Northeast Australia-New Guinea Areas, 28
earth policy into effect. Undoubtedly
Mar-3 Apr. SWPA File 158. (2) Memo, CofS much of this work could be suspended.
USAFIA to G-4 USAFIA, 25 Mar 42. SWPA File Fixed positions would be of little value
275. (3) Ltr, Hq USAFIA to CG's All Base Secs, 26
Mar 42. SWPA File M51B. (4) Ltr, CG USAFIA to
since the enemy could easily bypass most
Cs All Arms and Servs and CO's, All Base Secs
59
USAFIA, 13 Apr 42. SWPA File 275. (5) Col Bres, (1) Memo, Klinke for Casey, 19 May 42. SWPA
Memo for Rcd, sub: Conf Held at Engr Hq, The Of File 275. (2) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 5-6.
of Col Bres, . . . 17 Jun 42. SWPA File 240. (6) (3) Memo, Sverdrup for Casey, 27 Jun 42. SWPA
Telg, Brett to Air Bds, 18 Apr 42. SWPA File 490. File 243. (4) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 8 Jun 42.
(7) Memo, Opns and Tng [Br] of C Engr, GHQ SWPA File 158. (5) Telg, Brett to Air Bd, 18 Apr
SWPA for Casey, 19 May 42. SWPA File 275. (8) 42. (6) Memo, Casey for Brett, 20 May 42. (7)
AWC Of Memo 196 [5 Nov 42], sub: AWC Projects. Memo for Rcd, Casey, 24 Apr 42. Last three in
SWPA File 242. SWPA File 490.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 139
of them. Because 10,000 miles of coast buildings that were both cheap and easy
line had to be protected, Australia's de- to construct, their projects would con-
fenses should be mobile. Casey held tinue to consume excessive amounts of
that materials for fortifications and de- effort and materials. On 5 April Johns
molitions should be stockpiled at points had settled the question of uniform plans
"where they can be procured quickly in and specifications by ruling that the
an emergency rather than all emplaced theater of operations drawings would
. . . beforehand." In place of the henceforth be standard. As fast as
scorched-earth policy, he advocated a plans could be modified to meet condi-
"two stage" program for wrecking Aus- tions in Australia, they were to be sent
tralia's industrial plant; first, a partial to the field. Base section engineers were
demolition, and second, a complete de- permitted to make minor changes which
struction. The Japanese, he argued, would enable them to utilize locally
would very likely be expelled from the available materials and to expedite
continent within a few months after construction.
their first landing. The Australians had As the name implied, theater of opera-
therefore but to put important industrial tions drawings were intended for use in
and power plants out of operation for a overseas theaters, where only the flimsiest
comparatively short period, a task that and most temporary structures were
could be quickly accomplished by re- required. The Australian Army, build-
moving or destroying vital machine ing in home territory, erected more
parts. Total destruction should be car- durable installations and would have
ried out only as a final resort and then preferred that the Americans also con-
only on orders from MacArthur. Al- struct along more permanent lines.
though General Steele gave this sug- When MacArthur in April ordered
gested program wholehearted support, camps for two American divisions in
the Australian Government insisted that northeastern Queensland, Casey, follow-
the work of fortifying the southeast and ing the theater of operations plans, di-
preparing for total destruction be con- rected a minimum of shelter and no
tinued.60 conveniences. The enemy, he reasoned,
Sometimes the engineers themselves was already accustomed to living under
were guilty of overelaborate construc- the most primitive conditions. If the
tion. This situation developed largely Americans were to defeat the Japanese,
because they still had so few suitable they must be no less rugged. General
plans and specifications to work with. Blamey saw the matter in a different
Until the Americans had designs for light. Contemplating the eventual use
of the camps by the Australian Army, he
60
proposed that the Allies work out de-
(1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 8 Jun 42. SWPA File signs together. If Blarney's suggestion
158. (2) Grattan, ed., Australia, p. 397. (3) Ltr,
CofS SWPA to Blamey, 31 Jul 42. (4) Ltr, Steele to were followed, the engineers might as
Casey, 29 Jul 42. (5) Commonwealth of Australia well forget the theater of operations
Defence Com, Denial of Resources to the Enemy,
Directive for Guidance in the Formulation of De-
plans. Pointing out that General Steele
tailed Plans. Last three in SWPA File 175. considered American structures suitable
140 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
for Australian units, Casey ruled that ships to carry them to Australia were
adherence to the theater of operations not. Reybold's advice was to ask for less
drawings would continue to be required from the United States and to get more
at all American projects.61 in Australia.62
Surveys of Australia's industrial capac-
Supply Policies ity showed that local production of
engineer items could be considerably ex-
Although the campaign to cut down to panded. The Broken Hill Proprietary
bare essentials was moderately successful, Company, the country's largest industrial
the demand for materials and equipment combine, was capable of producing
still far exceeded the supply. Both 9,000,000 gallons of tar annually, and
Americans and Australians were banking this material could be used in place of
heavily on shipments from the United asphalt or bitumen. Steel fabricating
States. The Commonwealth was calling plants could be converted to the manu-
for tremendous quantities of lend-lease facture of landing mat. Several con-
equipment; on one occasion, Prime cerns had facilities for making stone
Minister Curtin had requested nearly a crushers, portable pumps, and sheepsfoot
thousand items of heavy machinery, in- rollers. The Commonwealth govern-
cluding 445 tractors, 111 carryalls, 142 ment had ordered the AWC to increase
rollers, 161 rooters, and 83 graders. The the manufacture of earth-moving equip-
U.S. Army's total requests were nearly as ment. Working closely with members
large as those of the Australians. By of the council on this job, Casey and
March, Reybold's office had on file nu- Colonel Wright had a hand in promoting
merous orders from USAFIA. A single the formation of the Earth Moving
requisition listed 2,000,000 square feet of Manufacturers Group. This body in-
landing mat, 3,250,000 gallons of asphalt, cluded not only the principal makers of
200 motors, 70 D-8 tractors with dozers, this type of machinery, among them the
50 carryalls, and large quantities of other Australian affiliates of International Har-
types of equipment and supplies. The vester and of Le Tourneau, but also a
Chief of Engineers promised to do his number of concerns which had not pre-
best to meet requirements in the South- viously built such equipment. By pool-
west Pacific but offered little encourage- ing their resources and distributing
ment. Manufacturers of construction orders so that one plant would not be
equipment were booked heavily for many overburdened with work while others
months to come. A few of the items, stood idle, the members of the group
among them asphalt, bitumen, and land- stepped up production of graders, dozers,
ing mat, were immediately available, but
62
(1) Incls to Memo, Johns for Casey, 11 Apr 42.
61
(1) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 5. (2) Ltr, (2) Cable, Prime Minister's Dept to Dir Gen, Aus-
MacArthur to Barnes, 11 Apr 42. (3) Memo, Casey tralian War Sups Proc, Washington, D.C., 4 Mar 42.
for DCofS GHQ SWPA, 18 Apr 42. (4) Ltr, Blamey Both in SWPA File 210. (3) Memo, WPD for TAG,
to MacArthur, 3 Jun 42. (5) Draft Ltr of Mac- 20 Feb 42. AG 381 (11-27-41). (4) Incls with Ltr,
Arthur to Blamey, prepared by Casey, 7 Jun 42. Sup Div OCE WD to WPD, 27 Mar 42. 400.333
Last four in SWPA File 545. (Australia) 1942-44.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 141
had begun erecting facilities that would dore's direction, recruitment and con-
enable the Americans to use the port as scription were left to the states. Vic-
their main base of supply. Theodore toria, the first state to conscript workers,
had meanwhile accelerated work on de- started calling up men in May; New
fense highways, on tank farms for storing South Wales began one month later.
114,526,000 imperial gallons of oil, and The Allied Works Council had made a
on munitions plants. He now had to substantial contribution and would soon
cope with a program that was increasing be in position to make an even larger
at the rate of 2,000 jobs a month. So one. But the fact remained that most
extensive had construction become that of its efforts, directed as they were to the
the council reluctantly concluded that Australian defense program, were con-
workers must be drafted. On 14 April, fined to the southeastern part of the
the government had empowered Theo- continent.65
dore to establish the Civil Constructional
Corps, an organization of civilian volun- 65
(1) Memo for Rcd, Brief Statement of Works
teers and draftees. All male civilians Being Carried out Under Direction of the AWC.
between the ages of 18 and 60 were liable SWPA File 240. (2) AWC, Report, February 1942-
June 1943, pp. 40-47, 87. (3) Of C Engr GHQ
for service, except defense workers. AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 25-46. (4) [Hist of]
While the CCC was to be under Theo- Base Sec 7. (5) Memo for Rcd, Constr Sec Of C
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 143
From the American point of view the The Air Forces could not bring their
most crying need was for airfields in the
full strength to bear under these condi-
northeast. The critical area of south- tions. If the Allies were to neutralize
eastern New Guinea was still almost de- Japanese positions on the northern coast
fenseless. While enemy planes, based at of New Guinea and on New Britain and
Rabaul on New Britain and at Lae and to gain control of the skies over Moresby,
Salamaua on the northeastern New more air power must be based farther
Guinea coast, bombed Port Moresby at north.
will, Allied airmen were severely handi- Construction there would have to be
capped by the lack of bases in New accomplished without the help of the
Guinea and on the Cape York Peninsula. AWC. Theodore was reluctant to send
At Moresby were two fields, both small workers to the Cape York Peninsula,
and crudely built. Seven-Mile Drome, much less to New Guinea. In May,
east of the town, had one 5,000-foot run- when the council began to consider
way, surfaced with bitumen but in poor establishing the Civil Constructional
condition. Surrounding hills made Corps in Queensland, the question arose
takeoffs hazardous. Kila Drome, a com- whether the men should be assigned to
mercial field 3 miles southeast of forward areas. The Australians hesi-
Moresby, was "a 3,000 foot roller coaster tated to take such a step. Some thought
with 300-foot hills at its ends and grades that because of the possibility of attack
to make your hair stand on end." The by enemy raiding parties, the workers
fields on the Cape York Peninsula at would have to be armed for their own
Cairns, Cooktown, and Coen, and on protection. General Steele pointed out
Horn Island, off the tip of the peninsula, there was a chance they would be shot if
were small and rough, and so near the captured. He was of the opinion that
sea that they were fogged in much of the employing the Civil Constructional
time. Small numbers of fighters and Corps in forward areas would need "care-
light bombers could be based at the ful consideration." Australian com-
Moresby and Cape York fields, but manders in New Guinea were adamant
B-17's had to operate out of Townsville, against bringing in civilians, insisting
far down on the Queensland coast. that all persons in that threatened area
From there the heavy bombers flew the must be under military control. So long
600 miles to Moresby, arriving at dusk. as the grave danger of invasion remained,
Taking on fuel and bombs during the Theodore would not send civilians north
night, they left early in the morning to of Townsville. Nor would he send large
strike at enemy targets to the north.66 quantities of supplies. Concerned lest
Australian defense projects be slighted,
Engr GHQ SWPA, 8 May 42. SWPA File 241. (6) he hesitated to "denude" the works
Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942. (7)
Commonwealth of Australia, Statutory Rules, 1942, agencies in Victoria and New South
No. 170, Regulations Under the National Security
Act, 1939-1940.
66
(1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 30ff. (2) (4) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, n.d., sub: Rpt of Inspec
Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, Northeast Australia-New Guinea Areas, 28 Mar-
pp. 416-17. (3) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 12. 3 Apr. SWPA File 158.
144 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Wales of their equipment and to deplete had high praise for the Australians'
their stock of materials. Americans effort. "Had it not been for Jumbo
found that the farther north they went, Jack Mathison, the Main Roads Com-
the more difficult it became to secure the missioner, located at Townsville," he
council's assistance.67 wrote, "the work we undertook in ...
For airfields in the Cape York Penin- [Base Section Two] by civilian forces
sula, the engineers would have to depend could not have been accomplished, as
on the Queensland Main Roads Com- AWC was not only unable but ap-
mission. After reconnaissance parties of parently unwilling to do much." 68
the 46th Engineers had located two good
sites—one near Mareeba, a small town Engineer Units in Northern Australia
on the Atherton Tablelands west of and New Guinea
Cairns, the other, near Cooktown Mis-
sion, about a hundred miles to the north Matthews needed more engineers
—the commission took over the work of desperately. Until early April the 46th
construction. Farther north it began was the only engineer unit in Queens-
lengthening the principal runway of the land. On the 10th of that month, two
small field at Coen and improving the battalions (separate), the 91st under Lt.
strip on Horn Island. These jobs had to Col. Burton B. Bruce and the 96th under
be carried out in the face of great diffi- Lt. Col. Leverett G. Yoder, reached
culties. All of the sites were isolated. Townsville. With the landing of these
There were no rail or road connections two units, some 2,200 troops were added
with the remainder of the continent so to the labor force.69 Unfortunately,
that supply was possible only by air or separate battalions were never intended
sea. Men experienced chiefly in build- to handle large or complex construction
ing roads now had to build airfields with- jobs. They were designed rather to
out adequate equipment or supplies. serve mainly as labor pools. Men were
Progress was understandably slow, but to be attached as needed to other engi-
the engineers were grateful for Aus- neer units. With an authorized strength
tralian help. "I was deeply impressed of 28 officers and 1,059 enlisted men, a
with the splendid work performed by the battalion had but one motorized road
Main Roads Commission organization" grader, one ½-cubic-yard power shovel,
at Cooktown Mission and Mareeba, 8 medium tractors with angledozers, and
Casey wrote later. "Both of these fields
are important ones for our present and 68
(1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 30-34. (2)
proposed operations." Matthews also Memo for Rcd, Rogers, sub: Conf held in the Office
of the Dep Dir Gen of Allied Works, 31 May 42.
SWPA File 490. (3) Ltr, Casey to J. C. Mathison,
67
(1) Memo for Rcd, W. A. Rogers, Secy AWC 14 Aug 42. SWPA File 492. (4) Matthews Ltr, 10
Queensland Div, sub: Conf Held at the Of of the Nov 49, pp. 8, 11-12.
69
Dep Dir Gen of Allied Works on Sunday, 31 May 42. The 91st and 96th Battalions were Negro units.
SWPA File 240. (2) E. F. Borrie, Dir of Engr, Dept For the role of Negro troops in the Pacific in World
of Interior, Min of Conf of Representatives of State War II, see Ulysses G. Lee, Jr., The Employment of
Road Authorities . . . Held in Melbourne . . . 2 and Negro Troops, THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN
3 Jun 42. SWPA File 481. WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1966).
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 145
47 trucks, nearly one-third of which were equipment. The 96th tackled the job
2½ ton. Hand tools were the principal at Giru with picks, shovels, wheelbar-
equipment. After they reached Aus- rows, and a carpenter's level. Re-
tralia, neither the 91st nor the 96th was quested to supply machinery, the local
to receive the greater part of the ma- office of the AWC rented some from
chinery assigned to it. What happened farmers in the surrounding countryside.
is something of a mystery. "These units The first implement obtained was a
never did get their organic equipment horse-drawn mowing machine. In time
except their half-tracks and their air the council turned over a few trucks and
compressors," Matthews wrote. "We graders. The three remaining com-
know the equipment was landed. But I panies of the 96th did not work in
never could trace it after that. . . ." Queensland, having been alerted, after a
The 46th Engineers furnished a few few days ashore, for movement to Port
trucks to both the 91st and the 96th, but Moresby.71
the men would have to do their daily Plans for developing Moresby into a
work mainly by hand. Although greatly first-class operational base had been in
disappointed because he had not re- the making for almost a month. After
ceived general service regiments, inspecting the town early in April, Casey
Matthews found plenty of work for the had written MacArthur, "[this] is one of
troops to do.70 our most vital areas, and . . . highest
Most of the men were put to building priority should be given to the develop-
airfields. After helping the 46th Engi- ment of the airfields in this locality."
neers at Woodstock for a few days, the Moresby had much to commend it.
91st Battalion moved to Giru, thirty Besides the two airfields, it had a deep
miles southeast of Townsville, to clear water harbor with a dock for unloading
ground for a new strip. Meanwhile, freighters, two piers for barges, and a sea-
Companies A and C of the 96th were plane ramp. There was also a power
assigned the dual mission of providing plant, a water supply system, and about
three 7,000-foot turf strips at Kelso Field twenty-five miles of road, seven of which
near Townsville and furnishing work were asphalted. The chief engineer
parties for other jobs. The troops were recommended that the port and the two
severely handicapped by their lack of airfields be improved and that three new
fields be built. He asked that one gen-
70
(1) Hist of 91st Engr Regt, Jan 42-Jun 43. (2) eral service company, one separate bat-
Hist of 96th Engr GS Regt, 1942-43. (3) Memo, talion (less two companies), and one
Brig Gen Clarence L. Sturdevant, ACofEngrs, for
CG AGF, 2 May 42. 320.2 (Engrs, Corps of). (4) dump truck company be sent in as soon
Memo, Col F. K. Newcomer, Engr Third Army, for as possible.72
ACofS G-3 Third Army, 21 Jan 42. 320.2 (Engrs,
Corps of) pt. 15. (5) Incl 1, Comparison of Pers
71
and Major Items of Equip of the Sep Bn and GS (1) Hist of 91st Engr Bn (Sep), 1942-43. (2)
Regt, to Memo, Newcomer for ACofS G-3, 21 Jan 42. Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 9. (3) Hist of 96th Engr
(6) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 17. (7) Ltr, Hei- Bn (Sep), 1942-43.
72
berg to Casey, 29 May 42. SWPA File 469. (8) (1) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, n.d., sub: Rpt of
Interv, author with Lt Col David M. Matheson, for- Inspec Northeast Australia-New Guinea Areas, 28
merly CO of Co D, 96th Engr Bn (Sep), 14 Mar 55. Mar-3 A p r - SWPA File 158. (2) Matthews, Data for
146 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Rorona after a native village located Australians was not co-ordinated. More
there. Airfields at this location would or less by chance, a division of labor
make possible better dispersal of aircraft evolved. Under Colonel Yoder, the
and would also enable fighters to cover Americans concentrated their efforts on
Port Moresby more adequately. But a airfields, including access roads and
major drawback was Rorona's almost in- bridges. The Australians worked prin-
accessible location. Between the plain cipally on camps, roads, and base facili-
and Port Moresby were numerous ties. Under this haphazard arrange-
swamps. Coral reefs and sandbars along ment, neither group was very effective.
the coast made navigation extremely High-ranking engineer officers generally
hazardous. Despite these adverse con- agreed that something should be done
ditions, the Air Forces wished to have an but could not agree on what. Colonel
airfield there. When on 4 May, Com- Robinson suggested that units working
pany E of the 43d Engineer General on airfields be placed under the U.S. Air
Service Regiment, some 165 men, arrived Forces and that an engineer be assigned
at Port Moresby, it was not assigned to to the staff of the Australian commander
the fields near that town but to Rorona. at Moresby to co-ordinate all construc-
With no equipment except their hand tion in that area. No more willing to
tools, one Australian grader, and three place engineer officers under Australian
dump trucks, the men began work, commanders than to assign engineer
helped by 150 natives.75 units to the Air Forces, Casey did not act
Progress in New Guinea was ham- on these recommendations. Although
pered not only by shortages of troops various proposals were made to develop
and equipment but also by an inade- a more effective Australian-American or-
quate organizational setup. The Royal ganization, no solution was reached.76
Australian Engineers were under the While the 96th was struggling to get
Australian commander at Moresby; the fields started at Moresby, the 808th, the
American engineers, under the com- only aviation engineer unit in the the-
mander of Base Section Two, Maj. ater, reinforced by one battalion of the
Francis I. Irwin. Except for an occa- 43d General Service Regiment, con-
sional inspection, neither Irwin nor tinued to work in Northern Territory,
Matthews, who succeeded him as base building fields along the rail line from
section commander on 28 May, could Darwin to Birdum. Even though the
give much attention to the troops in area of greatest danger appeared to be in
New Guinea. The men at Moresby the northeast, the possibility of an enemy
seemed to be working without any defi- assault from the northwest remained.
nite purpose, having only vague informa- Brett, still thinking in terms of an ad-
tion as to what to build or why. This vance against the East Indies, continued
partly explained their noticeable lack of to emphasize the importance of fields
incentive. Work of the Americans and
76
(1) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 40. (2) [Hist of]
75
(1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 37-38. Base Sec Two. (3) Memo, Robinson for Sverdrup,
(2) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 44. 22 Jun 42. SWPA File 158.
148 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
one D-8 tractor illustrates the type of termasters, who were able to provide
difficulties the 808th encountered. The generous amounts of supplies. The
big "cat" began its journey north from country around the Pine Creek airfield
Alice Springs aboard a 20-ton trailer, had once been a gold mining center, and
which bumped along over the washboard some of the troops spent their few free
road. The trip ruined the trailer, the hours prospecting and panning for the
only one of its size in the area. North precious metal. But the greatest boost
of Birdum the flatcar carrying the tractor to the men's morale was the knowledge
buckled under the weight of its cargo. that their mission was important. Well
A lieutenant and an enlisted man had to aware of their nearness to the fighting
go down and drive the D-8 up to Kath- zone and realizing only too well that a
erine under its own power. Once the landing at Darwin could easily take
engineers got their equipment, they were place, the men knew that their best
hard put to keep it running. Spare defense was the rapid building of air-
parts had to come from Melbourne and fields.80
shipments were infrequent. Two en-
listed men, Pvt. Karl F. Bretschneider Eastern New Guinea
and Pvt. Jerald F. Patnode, were espe-
cially good at keeping the machines in The long-expected Japanese thrust
repair. They combed the area for any soon materialized. During April, the
materials they might be able to use and enemy assembled near Rabaul a task
even searched bombed-out ships in Dar- force of 2 carriers, 7 heavy cruisers, and
win harbor. By adapting the parts they 13 destroyers, together with transports.
could find and by improvising others, Such a concentration of naval forces,
they succeeded in keeping most of the coupled with an increase in enemy air
battalion's equipment going.79 strength in eastern New Guinea and on
The engineers in Northern Territory New Britain, was sufficient indication
were meeting the challenge of an ardu- that the Japanese were about to strike,
ous assignment. In an area which of- probably at both the Solomons and Port
fered none of the usual American Moresby. Forces in northeast Australia
recreations, the men were "enjoying life and on New Guinea were alerted. The
as far as it was possible . . . under the engineers near Townsville stopped work
circumstances." Working in an area to prepare for defense. The 91st and
2,000 miles from the main American Company F of the 46th took up positions
quartermaster depots, the engineers, in a gap in the coastal range near Giru.
after the first few weeks in this remote Companies E, D, and Headquarters and
part of Australia, were able to get abun- Service Company of the 46th remained
dant quantities of food. They arranged at Woodstock field, ready to move to the
to get rations from the Australian quar- beaches should the enemy attempt a land-
ing. Companies A and C of the 96th
79
(1) Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp.
80
72, 73, 75. (2) Ltr, Heiberg to Casey, 29 May 42. (1) Ltr, Heiberg to Casey, 29 May 42. (2)
SWPA File 469. Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp. 77-78.
150 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
were held in reserve near Townsville. Of major importance was the con-
At Port Moresby, the newly arrived struction of a base near the southeastern
Headquarters Company and Companies tip of New Guinea. As demonstrated by
B and D of the 96th got orders to carry the Battle of the Coral Sea, an airfield
full field equipment. They were to help was needed here so that Allied planes
defend a line fifteen miles inland from could intercept enemy ships rounding
the beach. Should the Japanese break the tip of the island. Brett argued,
through, the engineers were to retreat moreover, that airdromes in that area
into the jungle and make their way back would be essential to any offensive
to Australia as best they could. But the against Rabaul. On 20 May MacArthur
Japanese did not land. The Allied vic- chose as the site for a fighter field the
tory in the Battle of the Coral Sea saved general vicinity of Abau-Mullins Harbor
Port Moresby and stopped the Japanese on the southern coast of New Guinea,
thrust southward across the Pacific supply midway between Moresby and the south-
lines.81 eastern end of the island. A landing
MacArthur believed the Japanese strip was to be built as quickly as pos-
would try again. The enemy would sible and a bomber field constructed
need at least a month to prepare for a later. As soon as a reconnaissance party
second assault on Moresby. In the in- had picked a specific site, one company
terim the Allies would have to make of engineers was to be sent in, along with
every effort to build up their forward infantry and antiaircraft units. Planes
defenses. Uppermost in the minds of were to be operating from the field three
theater planners was the need for locat- weeks after construction started. Since
ing more air power in southeastern New activity in this area might provoke a
Guinea to give added protection to Port Japanese attack, MacArthur enjoined
Moresby and at the same time enable greatest secrecy.83
Allied airmen to strike more effective On 22 May, General MacArthur's
blows at enemy bases and shipping. headquarters directed Yoder, the senior
MacArthur also intended to base more Engineer officer in New Guinea, to make
fighters and bombers on the fields of the a reconnaissance by air of possible air-
Cape York Peninsula. If the Allies field sites on the southern coast of the
were not to be caught short, existing island. Five days later, Yoder with a
fields would have to be improved and party of Australians and Americans ex-
new ones made operational before the plored the region around Abau. The
82
Japanese returned. location did not appear promising. In-
formation gathered by the group indi-
81
(1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 37-39. (2) cated that it would take about four
Hist of 46th Engrs GS Regt for 1942-43. (3) Hist of months to build an airdrome at that
91st Engr Bn (Sep), 1942-43. (4) Hist of 96th Engr
Bn (Sep), 1942-43. (5) Interv, author with Mathe-
83
son, 14 Mar 55. (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 39-41. (2)
82
(1) Memo, MacArthur for Blamey et al., 25 May Memo, Brett for MacArthur, 1 May 42. (3) Memo,
42. G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA. (2) Milner, Victory in MacArthur for Blamey et al., 20 May 42. Last two
Papua, pp. 39-41. (3) Memo, MacArthur for Blamey in G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 686 (New Guinea) No. 1.
et al., 20 May 42. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 385 (Fall (4) Memo, Casey for Johns, 22 May 42. SWPA File
River). 491.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 151
point. Twelve days later Yoder, with to carry them eastward. At Milne Bay,
eleven Americans and Australians, unloading of machinery and supplies was
made a second trip, this time to Milne rendered difficult by inadequate wharf-
Bay, at the extreme southeastern tip of age. Only one vessel at a time could
New Guinea. In and near the coconut discharge cargo. To help remedy the
plantations at the western end of the bay, situation, the Australian commander
they found several good sites for airfields. ordered one platoon of Company E to
The next day they turned in a favorable build an unloading ramp and an access
report to Casey. Among the advantages road. The rest of the engineers shortly
of Milne Bay were the availability of began work on Strip No. 1, about two
fresh water, coral, and gravel, and the miles west of the bay. Not the least of
presence of native laborers and Aus- the company's troubles was the climate.
tralian overseers. The area already had The heat was intense. This was a no-
a landing strip, a road net, and a power torious malarial region, and before long
plant. One of the principal drawbacks 6 percent of the men of the task force had
was that the area was "open on all sides become ill with the disease. Since the
to enemy attack." The new informa- rainfall was extremely heavy, averaging
tion corroborated the sketchy data 150 inches a year, the engineers had to
Casey's office already had about Milne provide the field with an extensive drain-
Bay. On 11 June MacArthur canceled age system. Despite their many handi-
the project at Abau and on the next day caps, the men of Company E, helped by
directed that the airdrome be built at natives, labored day and night in a race
Milne Bay instead.84 against time.85
On 18 June Company E of the 46th Meanwhile, the engineers were under
Engineers left Townsville for Milne Bay, pressure to step up construction on the
arriving on the 25th, together with some Cape York Peninsula and in the area
500 Australian ground troops. The around Port Moresby. MacArthur di-
next day MacArthur's headquarters set rected that going projects be accelerated
20 July as the date the bomber field must and that several new fields be built
be ready. Prospects were dim for meet- quickly. Responsibility for carrying out
ing this deadline. The equipment these orders now fell on Col. Willis E.
brought in by the engineers consisted of Teale, chief engineer of USAFIA after
2 medium bulldozers, both in need of 25 May when Johns became the G-4.
repair, 2 graders, 4 small dump trucks, Teale was hard put to find enough man-
and one cargo truck. Twenty addi- power. No assistance from the AWC
tional items were at Moresby awaiting
shipment, but no vessel had been found 85
(1) Hist of 46th GS Regt, 1942, pp. 57-58. (2)
Rad, Land Forces, Melbourne, to Mil Comd,
Moresby, 26 Jun 42. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 385
84
(1) Yoder, Rpt of Reconnaissance—BOSTON (Fall River). (3) Rads, Hq New Guinea Forces to
[Abau] Area, 30 May 42. (2) Memo for Rcd, Sver- Land Forces, Melbourne, 26, 27, 29 Jun 42. Last
drup, 9 Jun 42. Both in SWPA File 491. (3) Rpt, two in G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 385 (Fall River). (4)
Yoder, 9 Jun 42. (4) Memo, MacArthur for Blamey Memo, Robinson for Casey, 14 Jul 42. SWPA Files
et al., 11 Jun 42. (5) Memo, MacArthur for Blamey 492. (5) Memo for Rcd, Casey, sub: Rpt on Inspec
et al., 12 Jun 42. Last two in G-3 Files, GHQ of New Guinea and North Queensland Between 29
SWPA 385 (Fall River). Jul-7 Aug. SWPA File 491.
152 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
was in sight. The Queensland State were providing runways for defense
Roads Commission already had as much and offense. In Northern Territory
work as it could handle. Any impetus 8 fields had been completed by1
the projects received would have to be July and 7 more were well along. Of
provided by engineer units, and Teale the 4 fields at Port Moresby, one, Seven-
pulled as many troops out of Townsville Mile, was suitable for all-weather opera-
as he could. On 19 June Companies A tions; the other three could take bombers
and C of the 96th moved to Moresby, in emergencies. The field at Milne Bay
where they began a new runway at Kila had been started. Australians and
and took over the operation of a quarry. Americans were developing a chain of
Company A of the 46th went to Horn fields on the Cape York Peninsula. Few
Island to help the Australians complete of the runways in these forward areas
two runways for B-17's. Companies B were sealed, most had not even been
and C of the 46th sailed to Portland treated to hold down dust, and, in the
Roads, 150 miles south of Horn Island, haste to carve out the many strips needed
to begin work on an airdrome for light by the Air Forces, drainage had fre-
bombers. During June MacArthur quently been held in abeyance. Their
ordered construction of a bomber field substantial progress notwithstanding,
near the tip of the Cape York Peninsula neither the Allied Works Council nor
and of a fighter strip at Merauke, on the the engineers were able to keep pace
southern coast of New Guinea 450 miles with MacArthur's demands.87
west of Moresby. Teale, by this time The inability of the engineers to do
scraping the bottom of the barrel, could more can be charged chiefly to shortages
not at once find engineer units for these of men, materials, and equipment. So
86
last two jobs. far only 10 engineer units had arrived
from the United States—1 aviation bat-
Progress by Midyear talion, 2 general service regiments, 2
separate battalions, 2 dump truck com-
As the first half of 1942 drew to a close, panies, 2 combat battalions, and 1 depot
construction was progressing over a vast company—about 6,000 men in all. The
area. By mid-June the Allied Works RAE and the RAAF had as yet been
Council had under way a program com- able to send but few men to the north.
prising more than 10,000 projects esti- The supply situation was not encourag-
mated to cost a total of £60,520,000.
Throughout the southeast new run- 87
(1) Memo for Rcd, AWC, n.d., sub: Brief State-
ways, warehouses, tank farms, wharves, ment of Works Being Carried Out Under the Di-
camps, and hospitals were coming rection of the AWC on Behalf of Commonwealth
into use. In northern Australia and Depts and USAFIA. SWPA File 240. (2) Memo
for Rcd, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 1 Jul 42. SWPA
on New Guinea, American engineers File 491. (3) Progress Rpt, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA
Constr Sec, 9 July 42. SWPA File M244. (4) Prog-
86
(1) Casey's Notes on Conf, 18 Jun 42. SWPA ress Rpt, G-4 USASOS, n.d., sub: Constr Proj Under-
File 491. (2) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 1. (3) way Under Supervision of Hq USASOS SWPA, as of
Hist of 96th Engr Bn (Sep), 1942-43. (4) Hist of 13 Aug 42. SWPA File 469. (5) Memo, Robinson
46th GS Regt, p. 31. for Casey, 29 Jun 42. SWPA File 491.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 153
ing. The Australians were continuing New Guinea, with the ultimate object of
to husband their meager stocks, and capturing Rabaul, the chief Japanese
shipments from the United States were stronghold in the Southwest Pacific.
pitifully small. At the end of June, The first phase of the operation was to
Colonel Teale listed 37 tractors, 62 grad- begin on 1 August, when the marines
ers, 36 carryalls, one distributor, and one were to land in the southern Solomons.
shovel with dragline, as the principal MacArthur had already been planning a
items received from the United States thrust through New Guinea and the
during the last six months. The one Solomons toward Rabaul, a plan of cam-
Engineer supply unit, the 391st Depot paign known by the code name TULSA.
Company, had reached the theater in On receiving the joint chiefs' directive,
May, and its 6 officers and 188 men were he further developed this plan and pre-
attempting to organize and run 3 depots pared for the attack.90
at Melbourne, Brisbane, and Towns- To conquer Rabaul, the Allies would
ville.88 Summing up, late in June, first have to gain air supremacy over the
Colonel Robinson wrote that "equip- approaches to New Britain. Brett esti-
ment and personnel are inadequate to mated the task would require at least
accomplish the Engineer mission in the twenty-four squadrons based in New
Southwest Pacific Area, and it is there- Guinea. On 10 July he informed Mac-
fore recommended that immediate steps Arthur that 12 additional airdromes
be taken to augment Engineer construc- were urgently needed—4 at Moresby, 4
tion forces and equipment." He de- at Milne Bay, and 4 at Buna on the
clared such action to be "vital to the northeastern coast of the island. All
success of any contemplated offensive." 89 were to be provided with dispersals and
sealed runways capable of taking heavy
Preparing for the Offensive bombers. Brett pressed for "speedy con-
sideration," "prompt action," and "rapid
The Battle of Midway proved to be a completion." Information from Casey
turning point in the war against Japan. indicated that it would take all the engi-
In this decisive naval engagement of 3 neers in the theater to do the job. This
and 4 June, the main striking force of the would mean "the withdrawal of all such
Japanese Combined Fleet was destroyed. personnel now in northern Queensland
For the first time, the Allies were in a and perhaps in the Darwin area." Yet,
position to seize the initiative. The as Brett himself pointed out, much vital
Joint Chiefs of Staff began to revise their work remained to be done in the Cape
plans accordingly. On 2 July, they di- York Peninsula. 91
rected Nimitz and MacArthur to mount Casey had been concerned with the
a joint offensive, northwestward through problem for some time. As early as 2
the Solomon Islands and eastward from July he had suggested that the 808th be
88
(1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 90
(1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 45-48. (2)
1942. (2) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, pp. 18ff. Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 16ff.
89 91
Memo, Robinson for Sverdrup, 25 Jun 42. Memo, Brett for MacArthur, 10 Jul 42. SWPA
SWPA File 469. File 491.
154 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
92 94
Extract from Ltr, Casey to CofS SWPA, 2 Jul (1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 11 Jul 42. SWPA
42. SWPA File 481. File 491. (2) Incls to Memo for Rcd, Casey, 11 Jul
93
(1) Memo, Lt Col David Larr, GSC, GHQ SWPA, 42. (3) Ltr, MacArthur to Brett, 6 Jul 42. G-3
for Casey, 7 Jul 42. 686 (Airdromes) 6/42-12/43. files, GHQ SWPA 385 (Fall River). (4) Min of Conf
G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Memo, Sverdrup for Held in the Of of the Comdr AAF, 1000, Fri, 10 Jul
Casey, 8 Jul 42. SWPA File 492. (3) Incls to Memo 42. G-3 files, GHQ SWPA 686 (Airdromes) 6/42-
for Rcd, Casey, 11 Jul 42. SWPA File 491. 12/43.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 155
ward. The troops who left Townsville Air Forces troops, who should have done
during July went therefore not to New the job, were not on hand. There were
Guinea but to various points on the other interruptions. Because rainfall
peninsula. On 12 July, Headquarters was infrequent, the engineers had to
and Service Company and Company D spend considerable time searching for
of the 46th arrived at Portland Roads to water. At Horn Island, the Australian
help elements of the regiment already at commander, fearing enemy attack, in-
work there. One week later the 91st sisted that the troops blast a tunnel under
Battalion moved to the tip of the penin- the runway. At each of the fields in
sula to build an airfield in an area shown northeast Australia the men worked
on the maps as Red Island Point but steadily, but the pace was slow.95
more frequently called Jacky Jacky after In New Guinea, the troops were ex-
a small river nearby. Later, one platoon periencing trouble too. The 96th, still
of the 91st went on to Horn Island. the only engineers at Moresby, were
While these units were better equipped having an especially rough time. About
than before, the conditions they found all they had received in the way of addi-
were not conducive to the rapid comple- tional equipment was a shipment of
tion of airfields. The region was an secondhand items from the AWC. This
engineer's nightmare. Around Portland machinery was in such bad repair that
Roads the terrain was jungled and "some of it wouldn't even run when it
dotted with huge ant hills, some of them came off the ship and had to be towed
twenty feet high. Jacky Jacky was a for- off the dock." 96 Since no bitumen, cal-
bidding place, barren and desolate. cium chloride, or molasses had been
Rocky beaches there prolonged the received, the engineers had to try to
lightering of men and supplies for twelve keep down the dust by sprinkling water
days. Horn Island was "an ancient on the runways. Although multiple
lump of granite," devoid of gravel or shifts were at work in the quarry, there
coral. The isolation of these areas com- were too few trucks to keep the jobs
plicated supply. Signal communications supplied with gravel, the chief surfacing
were poor, so that requests for materials material. The projects at Moresby
and equipment were difficult to send out lagged behind schedule. At Milne Bay,
and were seldom acknowledged. The Company E of the 46th was likewise beset
best way of getting action was to send a by difficulties. Company E, the sole
man by plane to Melbourne or Brisbane. engineer outfit at this location until mid-
The shipping shortage was often given July, when one company of RAE landed,
as the reason why engineering supplies
and equipment were not getting to Cape 95
(1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, p.
York Peninsula, but frequently large 87. (2) Hist of 46th GS regt, 1942. (3) Hist of the
91st Engr GS Regt, Jan-Jun 42. (4) Matthews, Data
quantities of bombs, aviation gasoline, for Hist Rpt, pp. 33-34. (5) Memo for Rcd, Casey,
and telephone poles, not yet needed, sub: Rpt on Inspec of New Guinea and North
were dumped on shore. These articles Queensland Between 29 Jul-7 Aug. SWPA File 491.
(6) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 8 Aug 42. SWPA File
usually had to be hauled away by the
94.96
engineers, because quartermaster and Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, p. 92.
156 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
had to rely heavily on the help of natives. next day, a party of six officers, headed by
Not until 6 July did the bulk of its Colonel Robinson, left Moresby by
equipment reach Milne Bay, and even plane. They found the existing field to
then several badly needed items were be of little military value. But on the
lacking. Having no rock crusher to grass plains at Dobodura, fifteen miles to
break up the coral in the area and no the southwest, they discovered many
dragline to remove gravel and sand in excellent sites. Drainage was good,
the river bed, the company hastily laid and gravel and timber were plentiful.
the landing mat on a silt base. Rains Workmen could be drawn from the
were especially heavy even for this wet native population of the region. With
region, and the mud oozed up through little effort, a number of runways could
the perforations of the mat, making a be provided. On 15 July MacArthur
slick film on the surface. There was issued orders to seize and occupy Buna
then nothing to do but send for drag- and build an airdrome. He directed
lines, take up the mat, and put down a the organization of a special task force,
gravel base.97 Buna Force, to consist of engineers and
Meanwhile, pressure was mounting on protective troops. D-day was set for 10
the engineers to build fields in the vicin- August. 98
ity of Buna. Once established on the As plans for the occupation of Buna
upper coast of Papua, MacArthur would took form, MacArthur began to ready
be in a position to get the offensive roll- his command for the offensive. He or-
ing. Allied intelligence indicated that dered the 41st and 32d Divisions north
there was not much time to spare, for the from Melbourne and Adelaide to new
Japanese were showing increasing inter- camps in Queensland, where they were
est in the Buna area. On the basis of to undergo training in jungle warfare.
reports he had received, MacArthur In order to be nearer the combat zone,
predicted that the enemy would attempt he transferred his headquarters from
to land and then push southward over Melbourne to Brisbane, completing the
the Kokoda Trail. This primitive track move on 20 July. These shifts of Amer-
ran from the vicinity of Buna to Kokoda, ican forces northward were accompanied
a village in the foothills of the Owen by organizational changes. On 20 July,
Stanleys, and thence over the mountains MacArthur redesignated USAFIA as U.S.
to Moresby. MacArthur planned to get Army Services of Supply (USASOS).
to the northeastern New Guinea coast
first. On 9 July he ordered a recon- 98
(1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 50-53. (2)
naissance to determine if the small emer- Ltr, MacArthur to Blamey, 9 Jun 42. G-3 Files,
gency landing strip at Buna would take GHQ SWPA 385 (New Guinea). (3) Rad, Land
military aircraft, and if not, whether Forces, Melbourne, to Mil Comd, Moresby, 20 Jun
42. Last two in G-3 files, GHQ SWPA 385 (New
there were suitable sites nearby. The Guinea). (4) Memo, Robinson for Casey, 13 Jul 42.
SWPA File 58. (5) Rad, Matthews to MacArthur, 13
97
(1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, Rpt on Inspec of New Jul 42. SWPA File 491. (6) Ltr, MacArthur to
Guinea and North Queensland Betw 29 Jul-7 Aug. Blamey et al., 15 Jul 42. (7) Memo, Heiberg for
SWPA File 491. (2) Rad, Matthews to MacArthur, Casey, 15 Jul 42. Last two in G-3 files, GHQ SWPA
7 Jul 42. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 385 (Fall River). 385 (Buna Bay Plan).
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 157
The organization was henceforth to dis- from Buna and almost half way to their
100
continue such administrative and tactical goal.
functions as it had acquired during its Four days after the enemy landing at
first months of operations and concen- Buna, the 808th engineers reached
trate its efforts more and more on pro- Moresby. Their arrival was timely, for
viding logistical support. Brig. Gen. construction of airfields here was now
Richard J. Marshall replaced Barnes as more imperative than ever before. Ad-
head. The Allied Air Forces was also ditional planes had to be based at
to come under new leadership. Some- Moresby if the Allied Air Forces were
time before, MacArthur had chosen Maj. effectively to bomb Buna, harass the
Gen. George C. Kenney to replace Brett column advancing along the Kokoda
as commander of the Allied Air Forces Trail, and drop supplies to Australian
and the U.S. Fifth Air Force. Kenney, infantry units marching north to meet
who arrived from the United States on the enemy.101
28 July, assumed his new duties on 4 The 808th's first job was to build a new
August." airdrome, Waigani Field, about twelve
The Japanese acted more quickly than miles north of the town. A part of the
had been expected. Although their dis- site had already been cleared, but a
astrous setback at Midway had ruled out dense growth of timber had still to be
further large-scale assaults, they were still taken out. The men found the work
strong enough to undertake limited much more difficult than had been the
offensives. Having failed, as a result of case in Northern Territory. The trees
the Battle of the Coral Sea, in their at- were huge, many of them more than
tempt to take Moresby from the sea, they seventy-five feet high and with trunks
decided to launch an overland campaign. measuring over two feet in diameter.
As MacArthur had anticipated, their Their roots were large and deep and
strategy called for a landing on the north- their branches entangled in a thick
eastern coast of Papua, after which their growth of vines. The job of clearing
troops were to advance through the was not one that could be accomplished
mountains and take Moresby from the merely with cables hooked to tractors.
rear. On 21 July enemy transports put These trees had to be chopped down or
a force ashore near Buna. Encountering dynamited. The increasingly serious
little opposition, the Japanese started tactical situation added to the strain
out over the Kokoda Trail toward brought on by long, fatiguing hours of
Moresby. Within a week they had work. Air raids were frequent, even
reached Kokoda Village, eighty miles during day time, and at night, "the con-
tinual fight against hordes of mosquitoes,
the . . . sounds of the jungle . . . , the
99
(1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 48-50. (2) rotten limbs dropping off the great trees,
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.,
"The Army Air Forces in World War II," Vol. IV, 100
Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 56, 64-65.
101
The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to (1) Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp.
July 1944 (Chicago: The University of Chicago 88 ff. (2) Ltr, Casey to Teale, 23 Jul 42. SWPA
Press, 1950), pp. 25-26. File 481.
158 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
small animals scurrying through grass any faster, more engineers would be
and leaves, and the flying foxes swishing needed.
through the air made the men nervous Help for the New Guinea jobs was in
and irritable from loss of sleep and per- sight. At Darwin the RAAF units had
sonal discomfort." The presence of a begun to take hold, and Teale was pre-
well-equipped and experienced aviation paring to transfer the 1st Battalion of the
battalion at Moresby speeded construc- 43d Engineers to Moresby. Since efforts
tion, but there was still far more to do by Australian civilians on the Cape York
than these additional engineers could fields were beginning to produce results,
cope with.102 the engineers there could soon move
The enemy landing at Buna likewise northward, turning unfinished construc-
rendered construction at Milne Bay all tion over to the Main Roads Commission,
the more urgent. Yet for some time no which would complete its current proj-
reinforcements could be sent. While ects in the peninsula around the middle
the Australian field company worked to of August. The increased support pro-
provide seventy miles of road, Company vided by the Australians enabled most of
E of the 46th struggled to hasten the the engineers to pull out of Queensland.
building of runways. Colonel Teale By early August the last of the units had
was by now able to dispatch larger quan- left Townsville. On 6 August Company
tities of supplies to Milne Bay, but the F of the 46th reached Merauke, on the
difficulty of unloading ships continued southern coast of Netherlands New
to have a hampering effect. To get Guinea, to build a field to protect Mores-
materials and equipment ashore, the by's western flank. Two days later
engineers, using floating gasoline drums, Companies D and F of the 43d disem-
rigged a makeshift wharf on which ships barked at Milne Bay. The withdrawal
could discharge cargo into four trucks of the engineers still remaining on the
at a time. The new wharf helped the continent would have to be accomplished
situation, but was not adequate for the as soon as possible.104
quantities of cargo coming in. By late A clash between the Allies and the
July the engineers had succeeded in Japanese in New Guinea could not be
getting the first strip far enough along to long postponed. With enemy forces
accommodate a squadron of pursuit beyond Kokoda making their way
planes and had begun clearing a second through the precipitous Owen Stanley
strip, three miles to the west of the first. Range, the threat to the Allied position
MacArthur was meanwhile demanding
greater speed. And speed was essential, (2) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 8 Aug 42. Both in
for reports indicated that the Japanese SWPA File 491. (3) Memo, Casey for Rcd, 25 Jul
might soon attempt to land at Milne 42. (4) Ltr, Casey to Teale, 23 Jul 42. Last two in
SWPA File 481.
Bay.103 But if construction were to go 104
(1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 11 Aug 42. SWPA
File 491. (2) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 23 Jul 42. (3)
102
Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp. Rad, Matthews to Hq USASOS, 2 Aug 42. Last two
102-03. in SWPA File 481. (4) Hist of 46th GS Regt, 1942.
103
(1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, Rpt on Inspec of New (5) Ltr, CO 2d Bn 43d Engr GS Regt to CG USASOS,
Guinea and North Queensland Between 29 Jul-7 Aug. 2 Nov 42. SWPA File Al.
BUILD UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 159
in Papua was growing steadily. While Solomons. The engineers were soon to
the Japanese advance was much slower be involved in combat on a broad front.
than it had been across the coastal plain, The strides they had already made in
it was continuous. Meanwhile, on 7 building up defenses in the Southwest
August, American forces in the South Pacific had substantially increased the
Pacific were moving forward, and fight- Allied chances of victory in the coming
ing had begun on Guadalcanal in the test of strength.
CHAPTER V
The South Pacific Ferry Route work on the ferry route pushed with all
possible speed. In carrying out his
The engineers, at work on the ferry instructions, the engineers in the South
route when war began, were the first Pacific islands were confronted with
American troops in the South Pacific. mounting difficulties. The islands were
At the time of Pearl Harbor, engineer almost completely isolated. Peacetime
officers were reporting good progress on sailing schedules were disrupted, and
the airfields. On Christmas and Canton, there were few vessels to carry cargo to
troops and civilian workmen were clear- the South Pacific. Even the project's
ing and grading runways. On Fiji, A-1-a priority was of little help. Wy-
natives were lengthening the airstrips, man complained that, while he assumed
and New Zealand was sending in more the rating to be in effect, it had proven
men, materials, and equipment. On virtually useless for getting materials
New Caledonia, the Free French were and equipment to places where they
making headway on the fields at Ton- were needed. Shipping was not to be
touta and Plaines des Gaiacs. Just had for the stocks piled up in the San
before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Gen- Francisco port. On Christmas and Can-
eral Short had assured Washington that ton even supplies of food and water ran
the route would be open by 15 January. low. Poor communications complicated
3
Events of the following weeks rendered matters. "[The] greatest obstacle . . .
completion more urgent than ever. toward the proper direction of the jobs
Heavy bombers were desperately needed down here," one of the civilian em-
to stem the Japanese tide in the Phil- ployees on the ferry route wrote Wyman
ippines. The Central Pacific route from New Caledonia, "is the lack of
through Midway and Wake was lost in communication whereby detailed infor-
the first days of the war. The only mation can be transmitted between jobs.
alternate besides that through the South Cables and radios are fine, but you can-
Pacific was the long, roundabout way not say enough, and we always have a
across the Atlantic, Africa, and the certain amount of garbling which some-
Indian Ocean—two-thirds of the distance times is not recognized as such." 4 Gen-
around the globe.2 eral Short's efforts to get a Navy or
In Hawaii Colonel Wyman ordered Pan American plane to fly couriers back
and forth among the Pacific islands were
unavailing, as were those of his successor,
1939-45" (Wellington, New Zealand, 1952), p. 26. Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, who assumed
(2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coali-
tion Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 115, 154-55. (3) Craven
command of the Hawaiian Department
and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 428- on 17 December. The situation was
30.2 alleviated to some extent when Wyman
(1) Incl to Ltr, Dist Engr Honolulu to CofEngrs,
14 Dec 41. 686 (Trans Pac) Serials 1-470, 1942. (2)
3
Rpt by Sverdrup, 9 Dec 41. 319.1 (New Caledonia, (1) Rad, SPD to CofEngrs, 7 Jan 42. 686 (Trans
Rpts), Engr AGF PAC. (3) Craven and Cate, eds, Pac), 1942. (2) Rad, SPD to CofEngrs, 13 Jan 42.
Plans and Early Operations, pp. 192-93, 228-29, 331- 686 (Trans Pac), Serials 1-470, 1942.
4
32. (4) Rad, Emmons to TAG, 27 Dec 41. WPD, Ltr, Wolfe to Wyman, 18 Jan 42. 686 Airflds,
Msg File 4. Australia, Engr AGF PAC.
162 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
cessfully defended, General Short or- tant seaplane base in operation. When
dered the civilians evacuated. On 14 an outbreak of bubonic plague on New
December the ship to take them off the Caledonia prevented the firm of Sverd-
island arrived, bringing with it ten rup and Parcel from sending in civilian
artillerymen, two 75's, and a dozen ma- engineers and draftsmen from the States,
chine guns. After the civilians departed, the officers in New Caledonia undertook
the engineer troops, under Captain to do the work of the architect-engineers.
Baker's direction, continued work on the When Rear Adm. Thierry d'Argenlieu,
airfield, and not without success, since the new Free French High Commissioner
they had plenty of equipment for what for the Pacific, announced that he would
they were trying to do. On Fiji, natives, negotiate only with representatives of
helped by increasing numbers of skilled the U.S. Army with regard to the airfield
workmen from New Zealand, continued program, the engineers had to take a turn
improving and enlarging Nandi Field. at diplomacy. The French were most
Urged by Short to strengthen the garri- co-operative. They diverted the bulk
son and to step up construction of the of their scant stock of dilapidated equip-
airfield, New Zealand replied on 20 ment to airfield work and hired every
December that additional reinforcements man who could be recruited in New
were being rushed to the Crown Colony. Caledonia and nearby islands, even going
Within a short time thereafter, the Do- as far afield as Australia to get skilled
minion had 3 infantry battalions on Fiji labor. The New Caledonia Bureau of
and had increased the number of skilled Public Works assumed the complicated
7
workmen to 1,200. task of administering a motley force of
New Caledonia, the most westerly some 400 men at work on the airfields—
island of the route in the South Pacific, Frenchmen, Australians, Javanese, Ton-
was almost completely cut off from Wy- kinese, Indochinese, and Kanakas. Ef-
man's office. On 7 December the engi- forts centered on Tontouta. Though
neers were represented on the island by the engineers knew this field was poorly
Lieutenant Sauer. He was shortly located and part of it would probably be
joined by Captain MacCasland, who under water during the rainy season, con-
henceforth served as area engineer. As struction there was considerably further
the, only American officers in the French along than at Plaines des Gaiacs. The
colony, their responsibilities were heavy. outbreak of war rendered imperative the
When Pan American Airways evacuated completion of an emergency runway that
its employees soon after hostilities began, could serve until Plaines des Gaiacs was
MacCasland and Sauer took over the ready. Urged on by MacCasland and
company's property and kept the impor- Sauer, the French set themselves the task
of finishing Tontouta before the dead-
line of 15 January. 8
7
(1) AAF Hist Of, AAF Hist Studies, 45, Develop-
ment of the South Pacific Air Route, 1946, p. 64.
Maxwell AFB. (2) Honolulu Dist Of, Rpt for Week
On 28 December Wyman announced
Ending Dec 27, 1941. (3) Ltr, Area Engr 8th Field
Area to Dist Engr Honolulu, 17 Mar 42. Last two
8
in 319.1 Canton Island, Engr AGF PAC. (4) Rad, (1) Ltr, with Incls, Sauer to Honolulu Dist Engr,
Emmons to TAG, 27 Dec 41. WPD, Msg File 4. 15 Feb 43. (2) Rpt by Sverdrup, 9 Dec 41. Both in
(5) Gillespie, The Pacific, pp. 40-42. 319.1 New Caledonia, Rpts, Engr AGF PAC.
164 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
that the South Pacific ferry route was adequately protect those islands. Steps
open. Canton, Tontouta, and Nandi were soon under way to send 2,000 men
were far enough along to take heavy to Christmas, 1,500 to Canton, and a
bombers. Runways were 5,000 feet in pursuit group (700 men) to Fiji. New
length at the first two fields, 4,200 at the Caledonia also stood in need of reinforce-
third. On 12 January the first flight of ments, but Australia could spare nothing
B-17's completed its trip over the route, more for the island. Reports had
landing at Canton, Nandi, Tontouta, reached Washington that Admiral D'Ar-
and Townsville. The pilots pronounced genlieu was threatening to stop work on
the runways excellent. The strip at Plaines des Gaiacs unless more troops
Christmas, which lagged behind the rest, and weapons were forthcoming. The
was reported ready on 20 January, and War Department assembled a task force
the next day a flight of B-17's landed of some 16,000 men under Brig. Gen.
there. From this time on, increasing Alexander M. Patch for shipment to New
numbers of planes flew over the route. Caledonia late in January.10
The work of providing adequate gasoline Reinforcements reached Christmas
storage and other facilities still remained and Canton in February. On the loth,
to be done. There remained, too, the a task force under Col. Paul W. Rutledge
problem of defense.9 landed at Christmas, and three days later
another under Col. Herbert D. Gibson
Arrival of Task Forces arrived at Canton. Soon after going
ashore, Colonel Rutledge inspected the
By late December top-ranking Allied air base and was shocked by what he
strategists were considering means of found. There was bickering among the
reinforcing the South Pacific. The engineer officers and "much friction"
danger here had become apparent a few between Shield and the workmen. So
weeks after Pearl Harbor, when the complete was the demoralization of the
Japanese occupied the Gilbert Islands. civilians that, in Rutledge's opinion, they
At the ARCADIA Conference, the Ameri- could not be expected to accomplish
cans voiced fears that Australia might anything worthwhile. One runway was
be isolated, while the British expressed completed and another half-finished, but
apprehension over the growing threat there was "no evidence of any other sat-
to New Zealand as well. The Ameri- isfactory work." Indications of inept
cans promised to strengthen Canton planning and weak administration were
and Christmas and to aid New Cale- numerous. Building materials were
donia and Fiji if it appeared that strewn around and equipment was
Australia and New Zealand could not rusting. Sanitary conditions were intol-
erable; garbage and filth littered the
9
(1) Rad, Emmons to TAG, 28 Dec 41. WPD,
10
Msg File 4. (2) Rad, Wyman to CofEngrs, 28 Dec (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for
41. Same file. (3) Rad, Div Engr SPD to CofEngrs, Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 114ff. (2) Memo,
17 Jan 42. 686 (Trans Pac) Serial 1-470. (4) Rads, WPD to Marshall, 4 Jan 42. (3) Memo, WPD to
22, 24 Jan 42, Div Engr SPD to CofEngrs. 686 GHQ G-3, G-4, and CofAAF, 10 Jan 42. Both in
(Trans Pac) 1942. WPD 4571-38, Additional Basic Rqmts, BOBCAT.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 165
camp area and formed breeding grounds new project. He received an unlocked
for swarms of flies. Rutledge asked for addition to his slender labor force
Emmons to relieve Shield immediately. when the 125 civilians taken off Canton
The situation on Canton, while not so unexpectedly appeared at Noumea on 10
bad as on Christmas, left room for con- January and 100 remained. These men
siderable improvement. Colonel Gib- built a camp at Plaines des Gaiacs, while
son found that much construction re- the French, who insisted on retaining
mained to be done, that morale was low, direct supervision of their workers, con-
and that living conditions were deplor- centrated on the runways. Initial speci-
able. fications had called for strips of asphaltic
Steps were shortly taken to set matters concrete, but since there was now small
right on the islands. The disgruntled chance of importing this material into
civilians on Christmas were returned to New Caledonia, a substitute had to be
Honolulu. Shield and Baker were re- found. About four miles from the field
placed. Both officers had had difficult was a bed of gravel composed of about
assignments, starting out as they had with 50 percent iron ore. The gravel proved
pioneer expeditions to build on remote to be satisfactory for surfacing. The
and undefended islands.11 Colonel Wy- French made rapid progress; one reason,
man supported both officers, stating undoubtedly, being their method of
that he found little fault with their working. It consisted in placing the
performance. They had, he maintained, surfacing material on the ground with
"accomplished their missions . . . with little if any grading and no compaction
remarkable speed" and in accordance of the soil. As a result, the runways,
with directions.12 Nevertheless, condi- from which roots and snags protruded,
tions improved noticeably after the had many bumps and dips. But the
construction forces on the islands were iron ore made an exceptionally hard sur-
placed under the task force com- face, and planes were able to land. On
manders.13 15 February one strip was complete and
Meanwhile, on New Caledonia, Sauer, two days later the first heavy bomber put
who succeeded MacCasland as area engi- down at Plaines des Gaiacs. Work on a
neer in January, was making strenuous second runway began immediately.14
efforts to get Plaines des Gaiacs finished. The first ships carrying General Patch's
Upon completion of the emergency strip task force steamed into Noumea harbor
at Tontouta, he transferred every avail- on 12 March. Only days before, the
able man and piece of equipment to the Japanese had established a foothold in
the northern Solomons, and New Cale-
11
(1) Ltr, Rutledge to CG HD, 21 Feb 42. 319.1 donia now appeared to be directly in the
Christmas Island (Rpts). (2) Ltr, Baker to Honolulu enemy's path. Patch's tersely worded
Dist Engr, 17 Mar 42. 319.1 Canton Island, Engr
AGF PAC. orders read, "Hold New Caledonia
12
Memo, Wyman for CofS HD, 27 Feb 42. 319.1
14
Christmas Island (Rpts). (1) Ltr, with Incls, Sauer to Honolulu Dist Engr,
13
Ltr, Maj Gen Robert C. Richardson, Jr., to 15 Feb 43. (2) Resident Engr for Sverdrup and Par-
Marshall, 22 Jun 42. OPD 333 (Gen Richardson's cel in New Caledonia, Inspec Rpt, 2 Feb 42. Both
Trip). in 319.1 New Caledonia, Rpts.
166 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
against attack." Making plans for carry- light of these conditions, Patch concluded
ing out this directive was the first order that he must first of all protect Noumea.
of business for the task force commander, That being the case, the Allied forces
his engineer, Col. Joseph D. Arthur, Jr., could not be stretched to Plaines des
and other members of his staff. It was Gaiacs, 158 miles away. Patch therefore
obvious that 16,000 men could not gar- selected Tontouta as the principal air-
rison the whole island. A mobile de- field for defense. The work of main-
fense would have to be ruled out until taining Tontouta and completing Plaines
communications were improved. Al- des Gaiacs could for a time be left to
most all of New Caledonia was mountain- Sauer. Patch's engineers must at once
ous. There was but one main highway, begin improving the island's system of
15
a narrow, twisting road running parallel communications.
to the western shore line. The only
railroad, a line extending a short distance 15
(1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for
northward from the capital, had been Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, p. 150. (2) Memo, WPD
for TAG, 22 Jan 42. WPD 3718 France (Gen). (3)
abandoned in 1940. Noumea was the MID WD, A Survey of the French Islands of the
one port worth mentioning. In the Pacific, Feb 1942. USAFISPA, Survey of the French
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 167
Three engineer units had come with second runway completed by the Aus-
the task force, the 57th Combat Bat- tralians on 17 March was too short for
talion, commanded by Maj. George H. heavy bombers to use safely. Plaines
Lenox, and two aviation battalions, the des Gaiacs was operational but needed
810th, commanded by Maj. R. P. Burt, much more work. In April, General
Jr., and the 811th, under Maj. Charles Patch began giving special attention to
H. McNutt. Except for a detachment the fields. He ordered one company of
of the 57th which remained near the 811th Battalion to Tontouta to re-
Noumea to rehabilitate the railway, all pair the runway and build dispersals,
engineers were put to work on roads. which pilots who had been in the Phil-
Most were assigned to the coastal high- ippine and Java campaigns insisted
way, which was crumbling under heavy were necessary. Construction of a pur-
traffic. By early April the engineers suit field at Bourake, a short distance
were fully occupied in patching and north of Tontouta, was undertaken by
widening this main artery. Though the another company of the 811th. Since
bulk of their equipment had yet to ar- the site had good natural drainage, sandy
rive, the men built several new sections soil, and only scrub vegetation, the task
of road. One such project was a detour, was comparatively easy. In eight days
eighteen miles long, around a mountain the men were able to clear a 3,000-foot
pass, at a place where a direct hit would runway. The job at Plaines des Gaiacs
have isolated the northern half of the was gaining momentum. The Austral-
island. But even with these improve- ian crew, their work at Tontouta done,
ments, the road was inadequate. Mov-moved with a considerable stock of
ing heavy construction machinery up to equipment to this project late in March.
the airfields was no easy feat, as the On 24 April the entire 810th went to
engineers learned when most of their Plaines des Gaiacs and began operations
equipment finally reached New Cale- on a three-shift basis. On 10 May,
donia in April. To eliminate the need Major Burt assumed direction of all
for trucking all supplies from Noumea, work. When Sauer relinquished control
Colonel Arthur started construction of of the project to the commander of the
piers near Tontouta and Plaines des 810th, a second runway was usable, dis-
Gaiacs.16 persals were almost complete, thirteen
Dispatching engineer troops to the miles of access roads were in, and housing
airfields could not be long deferred. and utilities were well along. The job
Under heavy use, the emergency strip at of the 810th was to lengthen the run-
Tontouta was beginning to break up. A ways, install gasoline storage, provide
lighting, and maintain a base from which
heavy bombers could attack enemy forces
Islands of the Pac. (4) Sauer, Narrative Rpt—Air-
field Constr—12th Field Area, New Caledonia. 319.1
moving south.17
New Caledonia, Rpts.
16
(1) Hist of the 57th Engr Combat Bn. (2) Hist
17
of the 811th Engr Avn Bn. (3) Hist of the 810th (1) Ltr, Sauer to Arthur, 23 Jun 42. 319.1
Engr Avn Bn. (4) Sauer, Narrative Rpt, Airfield New Caledonia, Rpts. (2) Hist of the 811th Engrs.
Constr. (3) Hist of the 810th Engrs.
168 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
The danger to the South Pacific line The Alternate Ferry Route
of communications was becoming acute.
On 3 May the Japanese occupied Tulagi, As early as January, Wyman had an-
an island of the southern Solomons, some ticipated the need for a second ferry
800 miles north of New Caledonia, just route—one less in danger of being over-
as their task force at Rabaul was prepar- run. On the 25th, he had recommended
ing to leave for Port Moresby. Shortly to General Emmons that a series of air-
after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the fields be developed in the Marquesas,
enemy prepared to strike again as a Society, and Tonga Islands. Late in
mighty task force assembled in home February, after receiving permission
waters. The islands of the South Pa- from Washington, Emmons ordered a
cific seemed a probable objective. survey of the proposed route. Wyman
Among the most likely targets were the picked Sverdrup, at that time still
ferry bases. Although the islands had working as a civilian on the ferry route,
been reinforced, their defenses were still as the man for the job, and recalled him
pitifully weak, and reports from the from Suva to Honolulu for instructions.
bases were uniformly pessimistic. After The district engineer wished to make
inspecting the three easternmost islands sure that lessons learned on the first
in April, Maj. Robert J. Fleming, Jr., of route would be taken into accountand
Emmon's G-4 section, confirmed the that the peculiarities of the weather in
findings of earlier official visitors. Al- the region would be considered.19 Ex-
though he observed that the engineers periences on Christmas and Canton had
were making good progress toward demonstrated that American workmen
completing facilities, he considered the were "not temperamentally suited for
efforts to strengthen the islands against construction work on these islands,
attack largely ineffectual. Needed were largely due to the foreign environment,
ammunition, guns, barbed wire, and, danger of enemy action, and the confine-
above all, troops. Even camouflage was ment in a small area without . . .
lacking. The installations on Christmas amusement and recreation." 20 Wyman
could be clearly seen from the air, and insisted that Sverdrup select islands
the acres of brilliant red drums used for "with a native population engaged in
storing gasoline on Canton were visible agriculture or mining." 2 1 Because the
for many miles. Weakly fortified and unloading of supplies at Christmas and
lightly held, the islands of the ferry route, Canton had been complicated by reefs
except possibly New Caledonia, could and shoals, he also instructed Sverdrup
18
have been taken with very little effort. to find good natural harbors or lagoons.
19
(1) Memo, Wyman for Emmons, 25 Jan 42. (2)
18
(1) Memo for Rcd, SGS, HD, 1 Mar 42. 686, I, Rad, Emmons to TAG, 27 Feb 42. (3) Ltr, Emmons
1942-43, Engr AGF PAC. (2) Memo, G-3 HD for to Nimitz, 24 Feb 42. All in 686, I, 1942-43.
20
CofS HD, 1 Apr 42. OPD 381 (Fiji Islands) 1944. 1st Ind, 27 Feb 42 on Ltr, OCG HD to Wyman,
(3) Ltr, Fleming to CG HD, 6 May 42. 686 (Ferry 27 Feb 42. 686, I, 1942-43, Engr AGF PAC.
21
Route) File I. Ibid.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 169
The violent storms that swept the area compacted. With a population of 2,000,
just south of the equator would present the island could provide all the common
an added problem. Since the many low labor needed. The Government of
atolls of the region were frequently New Zealand would undoubtedly be
awash in rough weather, Sverdrup was able to send in a few skilled equipment
cautioned to pay particular attention to operators. About 1,000 miles to the
elevation. Early in March, after signing southwest, Sverdrup found a third de-
a contract with the Honolulu District, sirable site on Tongatabu in the Tonga
Sverdrup boarded a Navy plane for group, a protectorate of Great Britain
Tahiti to begin his reconnaissance.22 that he had visited before in the fall of
During the latter part of March, he 1941. Tongatabu had one great advan-
visited some thirteen islands and found tage—it already had an airfield. Sverd-
a number of good sites. One was on rup believed little effort would be re-
Penrhyn, a possession of New Zealand, quired to develop three 6,000-foot run-
770 miles south of Christmas. Most of ways. On 1 April he sent word to the
this atoll was awash during high seas, as Honolulu District that Penrhyn, Aitu-
only one of the many islets was more taki, and Tongatabu met Wyman's
than two feet above sea level. But this specifications. Shortly thereafter Em-
one, 4 miles long arid a quarter mile mons informed Washington that an
wide, offered ample room for a runway, alternate ferry route was feasible. On
and planes could be dispersed under the 11 May authority was given to go ahead
numerous coconut trees. All the land with construction.23
was native owned. It was passed down
from generation to generation within the Further Strengthening of the
family and for a native to dispose of any South Pacific
was illegal. The local representative of
New Zealand assured Sverdrup that he While the Army had been reluctant
did not believe there would be any to commit itself heavily in the South
trouble in arranging for its use. He Pacific during the first months of 1942,
also estimated that at least 75 of the 500 the Navy had strongly urged a build-up
natives could probably be recruited for of forces there. Admiral Ernest J.
work on the runway. Some 800 miles King, who in March became Chief of
south of Penrhyn, Sverdrup found an- Naval Operations, wanted to garrison
other promising site on Aitutaki, an additional islands, especially Efate in the
island in the Middle Cook Group, also New Hebrides, an archipelago to the
a possession of New Zealand. Of vol-
canic origin, Aitutaki was rugged, but 23
(1) Ltr, Sverdrup to Dept Engr HD, 1 Apr 42.
there was one fairly flat area where two 686, I, 1942-43. (2) Sverdrup, Rpt on North Cook
runways could be readily graded and Island, 1 Apr 42. Incl to Ltr, Sverdrup to Dept
Engr HD, 1 Apr 42. (3) Paraphrase of Rad No. 3643,
Emmons to TAG, 25 Apr 42. 686, I, 1942-43. (4)
22
Rad, Wyman to Div Engr San Francisco, 2 Mar Memo, OPD for WD Msg Ltr, 4 Jul 42. OPD 384
42. 686, I, 1942-43. PTO sec. 1.
170 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
north of New Caledonia, and Tonga- by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff,
tabu. General Marshall was at first Admiral Nimitz was commander in chief
hesitant to adopt King's views but finally of all Allied forces in POA. His mis-
agreed to go along with them. The Joint sions were similar to MacArthur's. The
Chiefs in May issued two basic plans: one two commanders were to hold the lines
for the occupation and defense of Tonga- of communications between the United
tabu and another for Efate. Tongatabu States and Australia, contain the enemy
was to be primarily a Naval base, while in the western Pacific, and prepare for
Efate was first to be an "outpost for major amphibious offensives. Each was
supporting both New Caledonia and to support his neighbor's undertakings.
Fiji and later was to serve as a minor Nimitz was to command the Central and
advance air and naval base for future North Pacific Areas directly but was to
offensive operations." On 17 March appoint a subordinate to command the
General Patch, following instructions South Pacific. In April he selected Vice
from Marshall, sent a battalion of in- Adm. Robert L. Ghormley for the post.25
fantry and a platoon of the 57th engi- Strenuous efforts were made to
neers to Efate. A small beginning had strengthen the New Hebrides. On 8
been made toward strengthening the April the small force of infantry and
New Hebrides.24 engineers on Efate was joined by a
With the formal delimitation of the marine defense battalion. Sauer, now
Pacific theaters on 30 March, responsi- a captain, going to the island later that
bility for the South Pacific was more month to line up sites for airfields,
sharply defined. The Pacific Ocean found that the engineers, the marines,
Area was divided into three subordinate and some 200 natives had already cleared
areas—the North, Central, and South 2,000 feet for a fighter strip and had
Pacific. The first included all the begun the arduous task of providing
region above 42 degrees north. The roads. Most of the island was a jungle
second was bounded by the 42d parallel wilderness. The only roads to speak of
and the equator. The third took in the were the 15-odd miles of track near the
area south of the equator, west of longi- town of Vila. In order to penetrate into
tude no degrees west, and east of the the interior, even on the existing trails,
Southwest Pacific Area. Except for the it was necessary to have native cutting
forces responsible for the land defense parties out in front.26 "[The] . . .
of New Zealand, which were controlled roads," wrote one engineer who explored
the island by jeep in May, "[were] . . .
(1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for
24 absolutely the worst in the world—it
Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 151, 155-56, 210-12. took us 2½ hours to go about 10 miles.
(2) Memo, OPD for TAG, 8 Mar 42. OPD 381 . . ." 27 On 4 May, the day after the
Efate, New Hebrides. (3) Joint Basic Plan for the
Occupation and Defense of Tongatabu. OPD 381
Tongatabu sec. 1. (4) Joint Basic Plan for the
25
Occupation and Defense of Efate, New Hebrides. Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 2-3.
26
OPD 381 Efate, New Hebrides. (5) 57th Engr Com- (1) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 204-05. (2)
bat Bn, War Diary. (6) Building the Navy's Bases, Ltr, Sauer to Arthur, 1 May 42. Engr Files, U.S.
II, 204. Army Forces in New Caledonia, KCRC.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 171
enemy moved into Tulagi, the Efate 821st Aviation Battalion. Work com-
Task Force arrived from the States, menced the same day on an airfield at
bringing with it Company B of the 116th Espíritu Santo. The men on this proj-
Engineer Combat Battalion and two ect were involved in a race against Japa-
companies of Seabees. The newcomers nese construction forces who had only
at once buckled down to extend the air- recently begun building an airfield on
strip to 6,000 feet. With the Japanese the northern shore of Guadalcanal in the
about 700 miles to the northwest, pres- Solomons, within easy bombing distance
29
sure for completion of a runway for of the advanced Allied bases.
bombers was intense. By prodigious By June problems of administration
efforts, the engineers, seabees, marines, and supply had assumed formidable pro-
and natives completed the field on 28 portions. A well-knit Army organiza-
May. That same day, a small party of tion had yet to be evolved. Each base
infantry and engineers moved 200 miles handled its own affairs. The War De-
northwest to Espíritu Santo, the largest partment, the San Francisco Port of
island of the group, where extensive de- Embarkation, the Hawaiian Department,
fense works would soon be needed.28 and USAFIA all had a part in supplying
Efforts to bolster other islands of the the area. Local procurement was not
South Pacific were intensified. In May regulated in any way. When Ghormley
the 37th Infantry Division, then being took command of the South Pacific Area
readied for shipment to New Zealand, on 19 June, one of his first acts was to
was ordered to Fiji instead. The unit, set up the Joint Purchasing Board at
which included the 117th Engineer Com- Wellington, New Zealand. Composed
bat Battalion, reached its destination in of three officers, representing the Army,
June. Later that month steps were the Navy, and the Marine Corps, the
taken to enlarge an old French runway board was to control the procurement of
at Koumac, near the northern tip of all supplies except those obtained from
New Caledonia, to enable it to take the United States. The War Depart-
heavy bombers. The 810th engineers, ment was also taking steps to rectify the
assisted by Australian workmen, had the situation. On 25 June Emmons was
field operational by the end of the relieved of responsibility for directing
month. Construction of the alternate and supplying Army forces in the South
ferry route got under way when natives Pacific, except those working on the
began clearing runway sites on Aitutaki alternate ferry route. The War Depart-
and Tongatabu in June and on Penrhyn ment would henceforth administer the
in July. The construction program on Army forces in the South Pacific, while
Fiji received a boost on 8 July with the
29
landing of 687 officers and men of the (1) Joint Army and Navy Plan for the Relief of
New Zealand in the Fiji Islands, [13] May 42. OPD
381 Fiji Islands 1944. (2) Hist of the 117th Engr
Combat Bn. (3) Hist of the 810th Engr Avn Bn.
27
Ltr, Robinson to Lyman, 1 Jun 42. 686 (Ferry (4) Hist Review, CE U.S. Army, Covering Opns
Route), File I. During World War II, POA, pp. 1199-1200, 1203,
28
Ltr, Chamberlin to C Opns Sec WDGS, 2 Jun 1207. (5) Hist of the 821st Engr Avn Bn. (6) Build-
42. OPD 381 Efate, New Hebrides. ing the Navy's Bases, II, 228.
172 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MAP 9
ment of bases and airfields on islands to advancing along the Kokoda Trail had
the rear. Since the Marine Corps and reached Isurava, sixty miles from Port
Navy carried full responsibility for fight- Moresby. (Map 9) Intercepts of radio
ing the Japanese on Guadalcanal during messages indicated the Japanese were
the first two months of combat on that planning to land troops on the island of
island, the story of the engineers in the Samarai, at the mouth of Milne Bay.
first offensives in the South and South- From this vantage point, the enemy
west Pacific is largely one of their opera- could control the waters near the south-
tions in New Guinea. east tip of New Guinea and would be in
a better position to strike along the
Preparing To Fight in island's southern coast. Early in August,
New Guinea MacArthur moved to meet the growing
When the marines landed on Guadal- danger. In order to have a unified com-
canal, the enemy forces in New Guinea mand in the combat area, he placed all
174 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
ignore the fact that, in view of the miles to the west, detachments of Com-
shortage of ships in the theater, the ports pany D were working on Strip No. 1,
at Moresby and Milne Bay would have to which, despite its poor foundation, was
be enlarged to permit faster unloading being regularly used by planes. Com-
and quicker turn around. These de- pany E of the 46th was preparing Strip
mands were only the beginning of many No. 2, some four miles southwest of No.1
additional requirements the engineers and five miles from the bay. There were
would have to meet. Taking stock of 9,458 Allied troops in the area—the
his resources—the few engineer troops Americans, including the engineers and
and the meager stocks of supplies and an airborne antiaircraft battery, num-
equipment—and viewing the task ahead, bered 1,365; Australian strength totaled
Matthews could only conclude that the 8,093. On 22 August, Australian Maj.
job would not be completed before1 Gen. Cyril A. Clowes had assumed com-
November and that it could be finished mand of all forces at Milne Bay. The
by then only with "weather permitting engineers and antiaircraft gunners of
and God helping." 37 Clowes' command were to be the first
American ground troops to meet the
Battle of Milne Bay Japanese in combat in New Guinea.38
On learning of the enemy's approach,
While preparations for the offensive General Clowes began at once to deploy
were going ahead in Papua, the enemy his forces. The Australian infantrymen
struck again. Having learned in mid- were readied, and the RAAF pilots at
August of the airfields at the head of Strip No. 1 were briefed for a strike at
Milne Bay, the Japanese decided to land the enemy convoy. The engineers were
there rather than on Samarai. On the likewise ordered to prepare for combat.
morning of 25 August reports reached On the 22d Company D was taken off the
the forces at the bay that nine enemy airfields and directed to fortify its
ships were approaching. Three engi- bivouac area. Later that day, Company
neer companies—D and F of the 43d and F stopped work on Strip No. 3, and the
E of the 46th—were in the threatened men were issued rifles and 128 rounds of
area, battling mud and almost incessant ammunition each. Farther west, at Strip
rains to complete the airstrips. (Map 10) No. 2, Company E of the 46th was in no
All of Company F and part of D were immediate danger. General Clowes as-
working on Strip No. 3, recently begun signed that unit to the rear sector, about
at the northwest tip of the bay. They
had just finished clearing a site 6,000 38
The account of the battle of Milne Bay is based
feet long and 300 feet wide. Three on the following sources: (1) Clowes, Rpt by Cmdr
Milne Force on Opns Between 25 Aug 42 and 7 Sep
42. SWPA File B188. (2) Rpt, ALF in SWPA, 18
37
(1) Memo, Casey for Kenney, 26 Aug 42. 686 Oct 42. Both in SWPA File B188. (3) Ltr, CO 2d
New Guinea No. 1, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Bn 43d Engr GS Regt to CG USASOS, 2 Nov 42.
Memo, Casey for Rcd, 11 Aug 42. (3) Rad, Kenney (4) Ltr, Adj 2d Bn 43d Engr GS Regt to Casey, 18
to Matthews, 23 Aug 42. Last two in SWPA File Sep 42. Last two in SWPA File Al. (5) 46th Engr
491. (4) Rad, Matthews to GHQ SWPA, 7 Sep 42. GS Regt, Hist for 1942. (6) Milner, Victory in
686 New Guinea, No. 1, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. Papua, pp. 76-88.
176 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MAP 10
four miles square, where it was to con- field clearing was an ideal location for a
struct fortifications and patrol jungle defensive stand. It was improbable that
trails. One platoon was to defend the the enemy could successfully carry out
airstrip, about 75 percent cleared, and an encircling movement. Just to the
smash any paratroop landing the enemy north were the rugged foothills of the
might attempt to make. Protected Stirling Range. Between the foothills
against air attack by overcast skies, 1,171 and the northwestern edge of the clear-
Japanese landed that night on the north- ing flowed Wehuria Creek, which con-
ern shore near Waga Waga, about 6 tinued on behind the airstrip in a south-
miles east of Strip No. 3, and began erly direction. The southeastern end of
advancing westward along the swampy, the clearing was only 500 feet from an
mile wide, coastal shelf. Since the inlet of Milne Bay. At 0200 on 26
jungle track skirting the northern shore August most of the men of Company F
crossed the center of the runway site, the were sent to join the Australians and the
enemy was expected shortly. The air- antiaircraft troops already in position
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 177
along the southwestern edge of the clear- seize the airstrip. On the 29th more
ing. Most of the engineers were as- reinforcements landed, raising the num-
signed to the center of the line. Com- ber of enemy troops to some 3,100 men.
pany D, meanwhile, continued digging Convinced an attack was not far off, the
trenches and foxholes around its bivouac defenders again strengthened their line
area to the rear and prepared its 37-mm. on the 29th and 30th. Three officers
gun and half-track for action. and 132 men of Company F, flanked on
The first night was a quiet one for the both sides by Australian infantry, were
defenders along the airstrip. No attack already fully committed to the defense
materialized. The next day Japanese of the clearing. The remaining 27 men
warships shelled Strip No. 3 and planes of the company had moved miles to the
raided Strip No. 1. There was no seri- rear with the company's heavy construc-
ous damage to either field, but many tion equipment and supplies. Members
engineers had narrow escapes. Slowed of Company D who could be spared from
by soggy terrain and the Australians, their work on Strip No. 1 and on the
enemy ground troops doggedly con- roads leading from the wharf to the air-
tinued their advance westward. On the fields were sent to help man the defenses
26th some 1,200 more Japanese were along the clearing. The company's half-
landed, and on the night of the 27th the track and 37-mm. gun were moved up
enemy approached the clearing. By to the line alongside those of Company F.
early morning they stood at the northern At 0330 on 31 August the attack
edge, directly opposite the positions oc- came. The Japanese laid down heavy
cupied by Company F. After exchang- rifle and machine gun fire as 300 men
ing fire with the defenders for about prepared to storm across the clearing.
half an hour, the Japanese withdrew. Strong counterfire disrupted the enemy's
During the daylight hours of the 28th plans, a hail of bullets stopping the ad-
there was no further activity, except for vance before it got started. The Japa-
occasional enemy rifle fire on the clear- nese failed even to set foot on the clear-
ing. Since Allied air superiority had ing. Nor did they break through along
forced the Japanese to restrict themselves the beach or at Wehuria Creek. At
to night attacks, the defenders, aware dawn they withdrew, pursued by the
that additional troops had landed, looked Australians. The attack had failed
for a more determined assault that night. completely. Later that day the engi-
They were not mistaken. Under cover neers counted 160 bodies, most of them
of darkness, the enemy made what ap- in the wooded area opposite the position
peared to be several haphazard attempts, held by Company F. As the surviving
to cross the strip. All ended in failure. Japanese made their way back to Waga
Two or three riflemen got through the Waga, the engineers bulldozed shallow
defenders' line and penetrated into Com- graves for the enemy dead. Although
pany F's bivouac area but did not inflict the enemy had been repulsed, General
any damage. Clowes did not believe the danger of
Ashore for three days, the Japanese surprise attack had passed. During the
had still made no determined effort to first week in September, Companies D
178 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
and F exchanged defensive positions Abau to Jaure, crossed what was believed
daily. Air attacks continued, and on the to be gentler terrain; its highest elevation
8th, Japanese planes bombed Company was about 5,000 feet. On 15 September,
F's bivouac area, killing 4 men and a reconnaissance party organized by
wounding 7. But ground fighting was MacArthur's G-4, Brig. Gen. Lester J.
over. By the second week of Septem- Whitlock, began to explore the Kapa
ber Japanese warships had evacuated Kapa Trail. The day before, a company
most of the enemy troops. The battle of the 91st Engineers had begun improv-
of Milne Bay, which was soon to assume ing the dirt track from Moresby to Kapa
legendary aspects for the engineers of Kapa. On the 16th, Casey and Sverd-
the Southwest Pacific, had ended in a rup, who were in Moresby at the time,
complete victory for the Allies. took charge of investigating the Abau
Trail. The march through the moun-
Allied Preparations Continue tains would have to wait until the recon-
39
naissance reports were in.
The beaten invaders withdrew from Casey and Sverdrup reached Abau on
Milne Bay, but the enemy force on the the morning of 18 September. They
Kokoda Trail continued to advance wanted the answers to two questions:
through the Owen Stanley Range. Out- could the harbor be made to serve as a
numbered and poorly supplied, General base of supply for a regimental combat
Rowell's Australians fell back from one team and would it be possible to send
ridge to another. In early September jeeps and mule trains up over the trail? 40
Australian reinforcements were rushed to Casey took on the job of exploring the
the front to contain the Japanese ad- harbor. For "hours that stretched into
vance. MacArthur and Rowell believed days" the chief engineer lay off shore in
the Japanese, overextended as they were, a native canoe sounding the depths of the
could now be contained. In order to waters.41 Meanwhile, Sverdrup had
put additional pressure on the enemy, started out for Jaure with a party of one
MacArthur planned to execute a flank- American, 2 Australians, 10 native po-
ing movement by sending an American licemen, and 26 carriers. The first
regimental combat team (RCT) from the day's march was easy and the party cov-
32d Division on foot over the mountains ered 13 miles. But the following
to attack the enemy from the rear. Of morning when they reached the foothills
the trails that led north through the
39
Owen Stanleys, two seemed most prac- (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 88-91. (2)
Memo, Hq Adv Ech Fifth AF for Whitlock, 17 Sep
ticable. One, starting from Kapa Kapa, 42. 384 New Guinea 2, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA.
a few miles southeast of Port Moresby, (3) Spec Abau Reconnaissance Party, MAPLE, Order
wound through the mountains to Jaure No. 1, 16 Sep 42. SWPA File 631. (4) CO 91st
on the eastern slopes. But it presented Engr GS Regt, Constr Progress Rpt for Period End-
ing 30 Sep 42. SWPA File 627.
difficult obstacles since it crossed innu- 40
(1) Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 5 Oct 42. (2)
merable hogbacks and at the divide Spec Abau Reconnaissance Party MAPLE, Order No.
reached an elevation of 9,000 feet. The 1, 16Ltr,Sep 42. Both in SWPA File 631.
41
Sverdrup to C Staff Br, 13 Jun 50. SWPA
second track, leading northward from Files.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 179
of the Owen Stanleys, the going got on Guadalcanal induced Imperial Gen-
rougher. "Some of the hills we climbed eral Headquarters to change its strategy
are over 45 degrees—would like to see a temporarily. It planned to withdraw
mule climb that," Sverdrup wrote in a the troops on the Kokoda Trail and con-
letter he sent back to Casey by native centrate them for the time being on the
bearer. At noon of the fourth day, he coastal flats at Buna. Operations in
noted in his log, "elevation 3,380 and New Guinea were to be held to a mini-
still going up." After scaling heights of mum until Guadalcanal was secured.
almost 5,000 feet and toiling up precipti- In Allied eyes, however, the Japanese
ous grades of 80 percent, Sverdrup and were still a powerful adversary. On 23
the members of his party began to suspect September, General Blamey assumed
that they were "on a wild goose chase," direct command of New Guinea Force
and would never be able to "build a and two days later launched the Allied
motor transport road in here and prob- counterdrive. Soon the Japanese were
ably not a mule track either." By the in full retreat along the Kokoda Trail.43
time the group reached Jaure on 25 As the enemy withdrew, MacArthur
September, after eight days on the trail, adopted a more aggressive plan of action.
Sverdrup doubted whether it would be He envisioned a three-pronged advance
possible even to march troops over the on Buna. The Australians were to pur-
route. On the 27th the party began its sue the Japanese along the Kokoda
trek back to Abau, arriving there on 3 Trail. One American force was to cross
October. By this time, Casey, having the Owen Stanleys on either the Kapa
concluded that the harbor was too shal- Kapa or the Abau Trail. A second was
low even for lightering, much less for to move in small boats from Milne Bay
use by cargo vessels, had returned to up the northeastern coast. When all
Moresby.42 these forces were sufficiently close to
The day Casey and Sverdrup went to Buna, MacArthur would order a con-
Abau the Japanese had reached the certed attack. The success of such
native village of Ioribaiwa on the south- tactics hinged largely on getting the
western slopes of the mountains over- troops across the mountains. Casey's
looking Moresby and the coastal plain. report on the Abau Trail, which he gave
The Allied position was less precarious to Sutherland on 5 October, indicated a
than it seemed. The enemy column tremendous effort would have to be
had overreached itself, and Kenney's air- made to convert the track into a prac-
men had been knocking out the enemy's ticable route. The Kapa Kapa Trail
supply line along the Kokoda Trail most appeared to be the more feasible way.
effectively. Nor was the war going well By late September, a regimental combat
for the Japanese elsewhere. The set- team had been readied for the march.
back at Milne Bay and serious reverses On 6 October, one company of infantry
with a platoon of twenty-three engineers
42
(1) Ltrs, Sverdrup to Casey, 19, 20, 22 Sep 42. set out across the mountains as the ad-
SWPA File 631. (2) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 11 Oct
42. SWPA File 629. (3) Memo, Casey for Suther-
land, 3 Oct 42. SWPA File 630. 43
Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 95-100.
180 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
vance detachment. On their backs the grass and readying the landing strip.
engineers carried axes, saws, machetes, But Wanigela was many miles from Buna
and shovels to clear the trail for the and surrounded by almost impenetrable
troops who would follow. The expedi- swamp and jungle. Sverdrup, as a re-
tion would be supplied by airdrop. sult of his reconnaissances north of the
None doubted the march would be diffi- Owen Stanleys, believed that fields could
cult, but there seemed to be no other be constructed rapidly in terrain from
way of getting the men to Buna. 44 which Buna would be easier to get to.
While on the Abau Trail, Sverdrup Early in October, Mr. Abel, who was
had chanced upon a plateau in the north- flown to Port Moresby to talk to Allied
ern foothills of the Owen Stanleys which commanders, assured them that a landing
appeared to offer a good site for an air- field could be readily developed near
strip. On returning to Abau he dis- Fasari in the upper valley of the Musa
cussed the possibility of building landing River. From there the troops could
fields beyond the mountains and flying make their way on foot along trails over
the troops across. The practicality of relatively flat, though heavily jungled,
such a scheme was confirmed by Cecil terrain. The idea was enthusiastically
Abel, a missionary who owned a planta- received all around and MacArthur ap-
tion near Abau and knew well the terri- proved the project. Sverdrup was to
tory north of the divide. The possibility round up natives, hand tools, and sup-
of flying troops and supplies across plies and march north from Abau to
Papua had been considered before. As carry out this mission. On 11 October,
far back as July, air and engineer officers Abel was flown to Wanigela, where he
had suggested that a field at Wanigela recruited over a score of natives and set
Mission, sixty-five miles southeast of out with them for Fasari. Sverdrup,
Buna, on the eastern Papuan coast be after laying in a store of tobacco, calico,
developed to make possible ferrying boy scout knives, garden seeds, and other
troops and supplies from Moresby. At trade goods, left Abau on 14 October
various times during August and Septem- with 185 natives and 5 white men, among
ber, Kenney had urged that troops be them Flight Lt. Michael J. Leahy, who
flown to Wanigela and then be moved up had spent most of his life in New Guinea
the coast to Buna. MacArthur had held and knew personally many of the tribal
back, waiting to see if the Australians chieftains. 45
could stop the Japanese on the Kokoda
Trail. When the enemy began retreat- 45
(1) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 11 Oct 42. SWPA
ing toward Buna, he accepted the plan. File 629. (2) Ltr, Harding to Sutherland, 12-14
On 6 October, Australians were flown Oct 42. GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16-21 Oct 42. (3)
from Milne Bay to Wanigela. Under Check Sheet, G-3 GHQ SWPA to CofS GHQ SWPA,
17 Jul 42. 686 Airdromes, Jun 42 to 1 Dec 43. G-3
their direction, natives began cutting the Files, GHQ SWPA. (4) Kenney, General Kenney
Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War (New
44
(1) Ibid. pp. 100-103, 111. (2) Memo, Casey for York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 41-42, 50,
Sutherland, 5 Oct 42. SWPA File 631. (3) 114th 70, 75-76, 102. (5) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp.
Engr Combat Bn, Engr Opns in Papuan Campaign. 102-03, 106, 115-16. (6) Incl with 1st Ind, Hq
SWPA File A82. USASOS to MacArthur, 14 Oct 42, on Ltr, Casey to
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 181
Reaching Fasari on the afternoon of beef tins smashed and opened. No hold-
18 October, Sverdrup found that Mr. ing [the] boys after that. Had to go to
Abel "had made a fine start on the strip." camp and eat themselves out of shape."
The site had been burned over and all The plane having dropped a note in-
that remained to be done was to remove structing him to go to Pongani, Sverdrup
some stumps and widen and smooth the on 25 October hiked to that coastal vil-
clearing. The next morning Sverdrup's lage. Fifty men of Company C of the
natives joined Abel's in finishing up the 114th Combat Battalion were already
work. Later that day a DC-3 put down there, having been part of a group flown
at the field, henceforth known as Abel's from Moresby to Wanigela in mid-
Landing. On the 20th Sverdrup and October and moved up the coast by boat.
Leahy headed north over jungle trails, Since the troops seemed to be making
leaving an Australian officer and the little progress, Sverdrup went back to
Papuans to put in refinements at Fasari. Kinjaki to bring up several hundred
Near the native villages of Embessa and natives, and returned to Pongani with
Kinjaki Barige, they located two fairly them on 28 October. Working twelve
level sites, overgrown with kunai grass hours a day in oppressive heat, the na-
some eight to twelve feet high. Lured tives and engineers completed the Pon-
by the prospect of getting trade goods, gani airstrip in two and one half days.
entire villages turned out to help with By the end of October planes could land
the cutting. Soon the work force num- there, at Kinjaki, and at Abel's Landing.
bered in the thousands. By pitting vil- Sverdrup was proud of his "Papuan
lages "against one another as teams," Aviation Battalion," defying anyone to
Sverdrup got the natives to put forth a beat its performance at Pongani. "One
tremendous effort. At Embessa, "the thing has been definitely proven," he
Musa boys won hands down and got an wrote. "If strips are to be built by
extra one-half stick of tobacco each as a hand in this country, native labor com-
reward and damn near killed themselves petently led is the only answer." 46
earning it," he wrote. As the natives Meanwhile, the engineers at Port
were rapidly exhausting the expedition's Moresby and Milne Bay were struggling
stores, Sverdrup appealed frantically to against almost insurmountable odds.
Moresby for additional supplies. The Colonel Matthews was hard put to find
first airdrop, made on 24 October at the wherewithal to push construction at
Kinjaki, disrupted the work there for these advance bases. His staff was too
some time. "At 9:45," Sverdrup noted small. His engineer, Yoder, was bor-
in his log, "a B–25 came . . . roaring rowed from the 96th Engineers. He
down . . . with bomb doors open, and had almost no personnel to help him
then it rained rice and corned beef. . . . organize and direct the work, and the
When we started to pick up [the] stuff, troops at his disposal were too few to
we found forty percent of [the] corned carry the load. He had the 808th, the
46
AG GHQ SWPA, 11 Oct 42. 384 New Guinea 2, Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, sub: Diary from 13
G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. Oct to 31 Oct 42. SWPA File 631.
182 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
96th, one battalion of the 91st, and Com- unsuccessfully to get the 116th Combat
pany E of the 43d at Moresby and two Battalion to stop training in Queensland
companies of the 43d and one of the and go to Moresby, where under
46th at Milne Bay—a total of some USASOS direction it would help im-
3,200 men.47 But more annoying than prove port facilities. At the same time,
the shortage of troops and personnel was the Allied Air Forces opposed taking
the absence of even a general statement engineers off airfields to improve ports
of what he was to build. "No one at and to build such things as the road to
GHQ, at Hq, Fifth Air Force, or at Hq, Kapa Kapa.49
USASOS, ever revealed, to me at least," MacArthur, visiting Moresby in late
Matthews later wrote, "the probable September, quickly concluded that cen-
plan and garrison to be supported." 48 tralized co-ordination of all service activi-
The Australian commanders, asserting ties in New Guinea was urgently needed.
the authority granted them of exercising On 5 October he established the Com-
operational control when an enemy at- bined Operational Service Command
tack threatened, took the engineers off (COSC) for New Guinea under the
important construction projects. When direction of New Guinea Force. This
the Japanese were approaching Moresby, was to be a joint Australian-American
General Rowell had ordered the 808th logistical organization; its function was
to stop work on airfields and sent them to co-ordinate all service activities in the
into combat reserve along the Goldie forward areas. General Johns, now
River northeast of Moresby. There Chief of Staff, USASOS, was designated
they remained until the arrival of the commander both of Advance Base and
114th in mid-September. After the of COSC. Each of the sections in Head-
Japanese withdrew from Milne Bay, quarters, COSC, had two chiefs, one an
General Clowes refused to let the engi- American and the other an Australian.
neers resume work on Strips No. 2 and Matthews was henceforth Engineer, Ad-
No. 3, despite the fact that Matthews had vance Base, and together with an Aus-
ordered this work expedited. Casey, in- tralian lieutenant colonel, head of
specting Milne on 15 September, dis- COSC's Engineer Construction Section.
covered that Clowes had overruled Operating under priorities laid down
Matthews' instructions and had diverted by Blamey, Johns was to be responsible
the engineers to repairing strip No. 1, for all engineer work in the advance
building a dock, and standing guard. bases. He was to prepare a co-ordinated
It took a direct order from MacArthur to plan for building airdromes, roads, ports,
Blamey to get the men back on airfield and other installations. Under him
construction. Marshall, the command- were all Australian and American engi-
ing general of USASOS, meanwhile tried
49
(1) Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 41. (2)
47
Incl, 19 Sep 42, with Ltr, Heiberg to Casey, 23 Rad [Matthews] to Hq USASOS, 18 Sep 42. (3) Ltr,
Sep 42. SWPA File 26. MacArthur to Blamey, 16 Sep 42. Both in SWPA
48
Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 45. Fifth Air Force File 491. (4) Memo, Marshall for MacArthur, 30
was established on 3 September 1942 as the subordi- Sep 42. SWPA File 27. (5) Ltr, CG Adv Ech Fifth
nate U.S. command of Allied Air Forces. AF to CG Fifth AF, 30 Sep 42. SWPA File 494.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 183
neer units in the service areas. He was had waded from the mainland to Tatana
to allot them to the various projects in at low tide and was never in water above
such a way as to carry out most expedi- his chest. Matthews suggested that a
tiously Blarney's wishes. This was an causeway be constructed across this shal-
attempt, insofar as construction was con- low water and that a floating pier be
cerned, Johns wrote later, "to provide built on the island first and permanent
the maximum utilization of the meager docks later as labor and materials be-
means available. . . . " But bringing came available. Casey readily accepted
about an integration of effort would this plan. Visiting Milne Bay, he found
take considerable time.50 that docking facilities could be easily ex-
As Johns took over his new duties, panded. Two crib piers already in
more and more of the engineer effort could be extended with the addition of
was going into port development. On pile piers into deeper water 250 feet
11 September MacArthur had sent Casey from shore to provide berths for large
to New Guinea to find out what could be vessels. Casey sent word back to
done to increase the capacity of the ports USASOS that launches, pontons, lumber
at Moresby and Milne Bay. Casey had decking, and piling would have to be
seen that it would not be easy to enlarge sent to Moresby and Milne Bay imme-
the Moresby port. Shoal water ran out diately.51
to about 1,500 feet from shore. With Once construction started, the engi-
from 11 to 18 feet of water at low tide, neers made rapid progress. On 6
the harbor was too shallow for large ships October Matthews reported the new pier
and too deep for construction of a cause- at Milne could take a ship up to 430
way. A piling approach dock seemed to feet long and with a 22-foot draft. Two
be the only answer, but there was no days later he began construction of the
piling at Moresby and little prospect of causeway to Tatana Island. Part of the
getting any from Australia. A deep- 2d Battalion of the 96th Engineers
water dock had existed at Bootless Inlet, opened borrow pits on the island and on
a few miles to the east, but the Aus- the mainland from which to take rock
tralians had destroyed this and mined and dirt. The men loaded their trucks,
the harbor without plotting the mines. drove them out on the lengthening
Matthews had learned that oceangoing causeway, and dumped the loads into the
vessels could come to within 50 to 100 shallows. The gap was gradually closed
feet of Tatana Island, about 4 miles and the roadway packed by the traffic of
northwest of Moresby. The island was the trucks. The floating pier was built
separated from the mainland by half a concurrently on the north side of the
mile of water from 6 to 12 feet deep at
high tide. One of Matthews' officers 51
(1) Rad, Sutherland to Rowell, 11 Sep 42. 826
Ports, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Matthews Ltr,
50
(1) Ltr, MacArthur to Blamey et al., 5 Oct 42. 16 Jun 50. (3) Rpt, Matthews, 15 Nov 42. SWPA
385 New Guinea. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Of File 675. (4) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 36-
C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II 50-52. 37. (5) Rad, Matthews to GHQ SWPA, 18 Sep 42.
(3) Ltr, Matthews to Staff Br, 16 Jun 50. (4) Ltr, 826 Ports, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (6) Rad, Casey
Johns to Casey, 13 May 46. SWPA Files. to USASOS, 18 Sep 42. SWPA File 491.
184 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
concern over the progress of the fields eyes of the airmen, were of relatively
did not deter the air force from heaping small importance. The engineers made
new demands on the engineers. Among no secret of the fact that they believed
the items they requested were steel huts, the airmen were too demanding. When,
electric lighting, and screened mess halls on 8 October, General Whitehead issued
with concrete floors.53 "As long as we a stinging indictment of Colonel
were the only ones doing any fighting in Matthews, stating, in effect, that Advance
the American forces," Kenney later ex- Base was going back on its commitments
plained, "I was going to see that if any to the Fifth Air Force, Casey felt obliged
55
gravy was passed around, we got first to intervene.
crack at it." 54 One of the Fifth Air Writing to Kenney on 14 October,
Force's frequent protests against the Casey pointed out that the construction
slowness of airfield work was made at the program at Moresby consisted of a good
same time that Colonel Matthews was deal besides jobs for the Army Air Forces.
being asked to construct "water-borne "The Air Corps," he reminded Kenney,
sanitary facilities [and] install wash bowls "is vitally concerned in the program as a
and other china fixtures" at air force whole, as airdromes without access roads
installations near Port Moresby. The will not be usable during the wet season
engineers of Advance Base refused to nor will air operations be effective unless
sanction such departures from theater of unloading facilities and transport facili-
operations plans. Unable to get what ties in the harbor area are materially
he wanted through the usual channels, improved." The engineers were put-
Kenney began procuring materials for ting first things first. Not having
air force projects himself and shipping enough manpower to undertake all the
them from Australia to Moresby. projects requested of them at once, Casey
Matthews, learning what was afoot, in- explained, they had to split the program
voked the authority of General Johns into two parts—jobs which were "abso-
as base commander to control construc- lutely essential" and jobs which were
tion supplies and confiscated the cargoes. "useful but which can be postponed."
In order to bypass such control, Kenney In the first category were all-weather
began flying materials directly to his dromes, improved ports, minimum
units in New Guinea. Relations be- shelter and utilities, and hard surfacing
tween air and engineer officers were for key roads; in the second were blast-
rapidly deteriorating. The air force proof revetments, additional roads,
kept up an almost constant complaint more ample water supplies, and more
that the engineers were devoting too comfortable quarters. Since the essen-
much effort to projects which, in the tial projects must be usable before the
others were tackled, the Fifth Air Force
53
(1) Ltr, CG Adv Ech Fifth AF to Kenney, 30 Sep would have to wait for much of the con-
42. SWPA File 494. (2) Ltr, CG Adv Ech Fifth AF
to CO Adv Base New Guinea, 17 Sep 42. SWPA File
55
495.54 (1) Matthews Ltr, 16 Jun 50, p. 9. (2) Rad, CG
Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 73-75, Adv Ech Fifth AF to Kenney, 8 Oct 42. SWPA File
119-20. 460.
186 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
struction it wanted. But they could rest The units already in New Guinea con-
57
assured, Casey said, that the Moresby tinued to carry the load alone.
fields would be ready for the rains. The strain of constant operations was
Apparently mollified, Kenney sent to his beginning to tell. Men and machines
airmen at Moresby a radio prepared for were wearing out. Sverdrup, stopping
him by Casey's office. The chief engi- at Moresby on his way back to Bris-
neer, the message read, was "fully cogni- bane from Pongani, found the situa-
zant of the situation" and would have the tion alarming. The engineer troops
dromes "in shape to operate from" when were tired and large numbers were re-
the rains began.56 porting for sick call. Many were suffer-
During October the engineers made ing from malaria, dengue, dysentery, and
great strides toward completing the New disease of the skin. Accidents were fre-
Guinea dromes. The "roller coaster" quent. "I am much worried," he wrote
runway at Three-Mile was torn up, re- to Casey, "about how these same Engi-
graded, and hard surfaced. The field at neer troops will be able to perform when
Rorona was lengthened to take heavy we advance, as we hope to do. . . . "
bombers. New strips were begun at The condition of the units' equipment
Bomana and Ward's Drome. Dispersals was just as discouraging. A large part
were provided for twenty-six planes, of it was sidelined for repairs. Me-
revetments for twelve. At Milne Bay, chanics were scarce. Spare parts were
Strip No. 3 was graveled and covered almost nonexistent. Such cargoes of
with mat. Still, much essential work equipment and parts as were reaching
remained. The gravel runways at Australia seldom found their way to New
Laloki and Seven-Mile Drome had yet Guinea. USASOS could not arrange for
to be sealed or surfaced with mat. Most shipping space, and cargo space on planes
access roads had to be paved, and nearly was at a premium.58
half of the three hundred dispersals and As the rainy season approached, the
plane pens provided so far were suitable airmen grew increasingly impatient. An
only for use in dry weather, and many unseasonable downpour on the night of
more were needed. Drainage systems 21 October seemed to confirm their fore-
left much to be desired, and taxiways, bodings. Seven-Mile, Three-Mile, and
hardstands, and warm-up areas were far Rorona were unserviceable for a time.
from adequate. Believing that the engi- The road to Waigani was barely passable,
neers at Moresby were doing all that was and the bridge to Laloki was washed out.
humanly possible to hasten construction, Greatly perturbed, Kenney again brought
Casey was trying hard to move the units pressure to bear on the engineers. In a
that remained in Australia to New
Guinea, but without success. Because 57
(1) Rad, Johns to Casey, 24 Oct 42. 686 New
of the acute shortage of ships, USASOS Guinea No. 2. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Rad,
could spare no vessels for the engineers. Johns to Casey, 28 Oct 42. SWPA File 496. (3)
Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 28 Oct 42. SWPA File
495.
56 58
(1) Memo, with Incls and notations thereon, (1) Hist of the 96th GS Regt. (2) Memo,
Casey for Kenney, 14 Oct 42. SWPA File 460. Sverdrup for Casey, 8 Nov 42. SWPA File 27.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 187
the 43d and 46th General Service Regi- tactical maps with scales varying from
ments were loading to ship out within a 1:62,500 to 1:300,000. The scale
week, and USASOS was promising to 1:63,360 was especially popular because
transport more units to New Guinea at it was one inch to the mile. Necessary
an early date. Meanwhile, at Moresby in moving large bodies of men across
additional engineers were being pulled unfamiliar terrain, these maps supplied
off non-air-force projects and sent to much the same information as strategic
work on the dromes. Australians took maps but in far greater detail. For
over operation of the quarry and con- artillery batteries and small infantry
struction of docks and dumps as the units, the engineers had to provide battle
Americans moved in with their equip- or terrain maps with a scale of 1:20,000.
ment to finish up access roads, hardstands, Since these large-scale projections were
and dispersals. By mid-November, the used in firing on unseen targets, their
first reinforcements from Australia were delineation of distance, direction, and
unloading their gear on the Moresby elevation had to be very precise. All
docks. On 18 November the chief engi- these varieties of maps had to be sup-
neer sent word to Kenny that "every plied quickly, some of them by the
effort [was] being made to get and hold thousands; and because Ghormley had
all airfields here to wet weather opera- no military mapping units, MacArthur's
tional condition."61 topographers not only had to cover New
Guinea but the Solomons as well.62
Maps Among the least explored areas of the
world, the islands north and northeast of
The days before the attack on Buna Australia had been mapped haphazardly
were scarcely less hectic for the topo- or not at all. In months of searching,
graphic engineers than for the engineers the engineers of USAFIA had failed to
engaged in construction. The coming turn up much information of value on
offensive was generating a brisk demand the now vital parts of Melanesia. The
for maps. Top commanders and their Army Map Service at Washington, an
staffs had to be furnished with strategic agency of the Corps of Engineers re-
maps of the combat zones. Ranging in sponsible for providing maps to the
scale from 1:500,000 to 1:1,200,000 and Armed Services, could supply but few
depicting large areas with such salient of the far Pacific. Nor could the Aus-
features as mountains, large bodies of tralians do much better. Their topo-
water, important lines of communica- graphical surveys had been confined
tions, and major centers of population, primarily to the continent itself—in fact,
maps of this type were indispensable to almost entirely to the southeastern coastal
men who were planning campaigns. region. Good maps of Papua and the
Commanders in the field were calling for
62
(1) Memo, ACofEngrs for CofAAF, 23 Sep 41,
61
(1) Memo, Casey for Teale, 2 Nov 42. SWPA with Incls. 061. (2) For a detailed discussion of
File 460. (2) Memo, Teale for Casey, 8 Nov 42. military maps and mapping techniques, see Coll,
SWPA File 496. (3) Memo, Casey for Kenney, 18 Keith, and Rosenthal, Troops and Equipment, chs.
Nov 42. SWPA File 460. III, XIX.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 189
mandated territories were simply not to straight down and the others pointing
be had. The only military maps of the sideways. Three cameras arranged in
Buna area—Australian sketches drawn this manner could, of course, photograph
to a scale of four miles to the inch—were a much wider area than could one
so seriously in error that they showed camera aimed directly down. But aerial
some rivers flowing up over mountains. photographs had their limitations. Un-
Just as disheartening was the situation less the elevation of some point in the
with regard to the South Pacific. Al- picture were known, there was no way
though sketches had been made of some of determining the elevation of any of
of the Solomons, no comprehensive the terrain features. Because the photo-
effort to map the islands had ever been graphs were taken from an altitude of
made. Data on the topography of 20,000 feet or more, many objects ap-
Guadalcanal, now the scene of desperate pearing on the prints, each about nine
fighting, was both incomplete and un- inches square, were hard to make out.
reliable. In mapping the combat zone, Photo interpreters had to try to identify
a vast land and water area much larger an object mainly from its outline and its
than the United States, the engineers shade of gray. It was not easy to deduce
63
had to start virtually from scratch. what might lie beneath the heavy jungle
To map the forward areas by the time- growth directly below the camera or be-
honored method of surveying the ground hind the mountain off to one side.
was impossible. Much of the contested Shots taken from oblique angles pre-
territory was occupied by the enemy, sented an added difficulty—that of deter-
and even where the ground was acces- mining the elevation of the terrain fea-
sible, there was no time for painstaking tures and their distance from one
measurements with transits, tapes, and another. 64
levels. Chief reliance had to be placed The men of the Australian Survey
on aerial photography. New tech- Corps, the only topographers in Mac-
niques, just coming into use, enabled Arthur's command at the outset, were
cartographers to make maps from photo- surveyors of the ground with little or no
graphs of the terrain furnished them by experience in photomapping. Although
airmen. Mapping, once the exclusive the 8th Photo Squadron, an Air Forces
province of the engineers, was now a unit trained in trimetrogon photography,
joint responsibility of the Corps of Engi- began arriving in Australia in April,
neers and the Air Forces. A recent few, if any, engineers were yet available
development was trimetrogon photogra- to transform photographs into maps.
phy, which involved mounting three Johns, soon after becoming Chief
cameras in a plane with one pointing Engineer, USAFIA, had requested two
mapping units from the United States—
63
(1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for an army topographic battalion and a
1942. (2) 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and Men, corps topographic company, but some
Battalion History, 1941-45. (3) Of C Engr GHQ time was to elapse before these units
AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, III, 19-20. (4) WD MID
Survey of the Solomon Islands, 15 Mar 43.RED VAULT,
64
USAFISPA. 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and Men.
190 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
would reach the Southwest Pacific. the 69th was scattered, as detachments
Casey, who assumed over-all direction were sent north to begin field surveys in
of the mapping effort on becoming chief Queensland. The 648th moved to Mel-
engineer of SWPA, was meanwhile plan- bourne, where it was to establish and
ning to co-ordinate the work of Aus- operate a fixed base printing plant, a
tralian and American topographers. mission normally reserved for the larger
Shortly after the signing in Washington and better equipped GHQ topographic
on 12 May of the Loper-Hotine Agree- battalions. The unit had, moreover, to
ment, a convention between the British accomplish under pressure of war what
and the Americans that gave the latter would ordinarily have been a long-term,
primary responsibility for mapping in peacetime program and to pioneer in
the Pacific, Casey reserved for the making maps from trimetrogon photo-
American topographic units a dominant graphs. Lacking sketchmasters and
role in SWPA's mapping program. The angulators—the devices used in produc-
Americans, under USAFIA, were to ing planimetric maps from such photo-
concentrate mainly on mapping the for- graphs—the battalion gave its water
ward areas; the Survey Corps, operating purification units to the 8th Photo
under General Blamey, on mapping Squadron in exchange for a set of these
Australia. While the Allies would co- instruments. Seventeen men of the
operate fully in all they did, the Aus- battalion who had had training in work-
tralians would, as a rule, be the surveyors, ing with trimetrogon undertook to
the Americans the photomappers of the teach the new mapping technique to
Southwest Pacific.65 others. The engineers located a large
The units that Johns had sent for Harris offset press in Melbourne which,
arrived at Brisbane late in June. One, with the three smaller presses they had
the 648th Engineer Topographic Bat- brought with them, enabled them to
talion (less Company A), commanded by print all required sizes of maps in quan-
Maj. Emil F. Kumpe, was set up to map tity. The battalion had barely moved
limited areas and reproduce existing into its new headquarters, a 5-story ware-
maps while moving with an army in the house in downtown Melbourne belong-
field. The other, the 69th Engineer ing to Australia's largest department
Topographic Company, under Capt. store, when it was put to work. Even
Orris A. Carnegie, was prepared to serve before the building was cleared of mer-
near the front, where it would print maps chandise, the photomappers were tack-
for immediate distribution and carry out ling their first job, which was to produce
such short-term, emergency assignments maps of Guadalcanal "with the utmost
as running quick surveys, making hasty speed." No sooner had nine halftone
sketches, and helping the artillery co- photomosaics and nine planimetric draw-
ordinate its fire. Soon after debarking, ings of the island been reproduced and
shipped out than the battalion turned to
65
compiling maps of eastern New Guinea.
(1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942.
(2) Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, Troops and Equip-
But it was immediately apparent that
ment, pp. 445-46. provision of anything like adequate
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 191
coverage of that area must await receipt Getting pictures was only half the
of quantities of aerial photos.66 battle. Trimetrogon theory was still in
Photographs came in slowly. The 8th its infancy, and the engineers had to
Photo Squadron had difficulty in getting learn by trial and error how best to
even a fraction of the shots the engineers interpret the photographs. To supple-
needed. Until August 1942, it had only ment information deduced from the
three single-seater planes which could be pictures, they gathered as much data as
used for taking photographs. That they could from other sources. Aus-
month it got a number of additional air- tralian libraries were ransacked for books
craft, but it still had far too few. These on islands to the north. People who
planes, "rickety crates . . . little better fled before the advancing Japanese were
than flying coffins," had to operate under interviewed. Many supplies had to be
extremely difficult conditions. In the obtained in the Commonwealth. While
first place, the Air Forces insisted on high-grade inks were satisfactory and
using them primarily for reconnaissance some types of paper were scarcely in-
and permitted only occasional photo- ferior to American brands, a number of
graphic flights. In the coastal and products of local manufacture produced
mountainous areas of New Guinea there unpredictable results. Most of the
were often only fifteen minutes of good, highly complex technical equipment, so
clear weather a day. Time and again important for map making, had to be
missions had to be abandoned because gotten from the United States. The
of enemy interference. Even when con- men worked long and hard during the
ditions were best, good aerial photo- chill Australian spring to produce maps
graphs were still not easy to come by. of the critical areas of New Guinea as
The pilots had to make painstaking ef- quickly as possible. "This Buna busi-
forts to interlock the cameras at the ness was . . . miserable because at night
exact angle and set them correctly in the the temperature was down to about
plane. Once aloft, the pilots found it freezing . . . ," the chronicler of the
difficult to maintain a constant altitude, 648th reported. The men worked on
to fly straight lines without tipping and the maps in overcoats and hats and con-
tilting, and to make sure they got pic- tinued work until their fingers got numb.
tures of all the area assigned to them. By mid-November, the engineers were
By late September, the 8th Photo Squad- distributing strategic and tactical maps
ron had accomplished but 5 percent of of the combat area. To be sure, these
its photography missions, largely because maps had inaccuracies, but as one of the
of the diversion of its planes to recon- topographic engineers pointed out, "any
naissance.67 map, based on any photographs, is better
than no map at all."68
66
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,
III, 25-27. (2) 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and (2) Memos, for Rcd, Casey, 11, 12 Dec 42. SWPA
Men. (3) 69 Engr Topo Co, Sixty Ninth Overseas. File 130. (3) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of
ENCO-69-0.1, (21115) M. SWPA, III, 30-32.
67 68
(1) 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and Men. 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and Men.
192 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
was slogging its way across the Owen 114th(1)Engr Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 106ff. (2)
Combat Bn, Rpt of Engr Opns in Papuan
Stanleys, had reached Jaure by 28 Octo- Campaign. SWPA File A82.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 193
the scheduled assault, he stated his in- field. Between the southeastern tip of
tention of having plenty of engineers on this field and the shore to the south of
70
hand. Cape Endaiadere, the Japanese had
cleared a dummy runway, which the
Engineers in Combat Allied troops called the New Strip.
Simemi Creek, flowing in a northerly
The enemy forces in Papua had with- direction, passed between the two air-
drawn into three small pockets on the strips. The Japanese occupied prac-
northeastern coast, one at Buna, another tically all the dry ground in the area.
three miles to the northwest at Sana- South of the enemy perimeter were
nanda, and a third some five miles still jungle and boundless, impenetrable
farther west at Gona.71 The largest was swamps, broken here and there by
the one at Buna. There the enemy held patches of kunai grass. Three native
an area three-quarters of a mile wide, tracks led through this nearly impassable
which extended from Buna Village east- terrain to the enemy positions. One,
ward three miles to Cape Endaiadere, extending northward from Dobodura,
where the coast line turned abruptly ran along the east bank of Entrance
southward. (Map 11) Just to the east of Creek to a point about a mile from its
the village was Musita Island and, beyond mouth, and then branched, with one
it, Entrance Creek. On the other side fork leading westward across the creek
of the creek was the Government Station, to the village and the other continuing
usually called Buna Mission, consisting on to the mission. Another track from
of three European houses and several Dobodura ran northeastward to the na-
dozen native huts at the edge of a coco- tive settlement of Simemi and from there
nut plantation. Beyond the plantation continued on along the east bank of
lay the major Allied objective, the air- Simemi Creek. Crossing the stream be-
tween the two airstrips over a low
70
(1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 137-39. (2) wooden bridge, it curved northwestward
Ltrs, Harding to Sutherland, 20, 31 Oct 42. GHQ to Buna Mission. A third followed the
SWPA G-3 Jnl, 27-31 Oct 42.
71
Unless otherwise indicated, the account of the
coast to Cape Endaiadere. Since treach-
engineers in the Papua Campaign is based on the erous coral reefs offshore made an attack
following sources: (1) Rpt of the CG Buna Forces, from the sea well-nigh impossible, the
on the Buna Campaign, 1 Dec 42-25 Jan 43. (2)
AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION, Papuan Cam-
assault would have to be channeled along
paign, The Buna-Sanananda Operation, 16 No- these three trails.
vember 1942-23 January 1943 (Washington, 1944). The attack was set for 16 November.
(3) Milner, Victory in Papua. (4) 114th Engr
Combat Bn, Rpt of Engr Opns in Papuan Cam-
The 7th Australian Division, under Maj.
paign. (5) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for Gen. George A. Vasey, was to take Gona
1942. (6) Ltrs, Maj. David B. Parker, U.S. Engr and Sanananda; the 32d Division,
Liaison Off with the First Aust Army, to USASOS
et al., 2 Dec 42, 12 Jan 43. SWPA File 56. (7) Rpt,
under General Harding, was to capture
Work Accomplished by 43d Engr Regt in New Buna. The Australian and American
Guinea. SWPA File 145. (8) Rpt, Sverdrup to forces would be separated by the Girua
Casey, 5 Jan 43. SWPA File 159. (9) Robert L.
Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New
River, which emptied into the sea just
York: The Viking Press, 1950). west of Buna Village. Harding's men
MAP 11
were to converge on Buna along the engineers were to transform the landing
three trails. The troops near the coast strips at Dobodura into a major Allied
would be supplied by small boats mov- base for fighters and bombers—the first
ing up the coast from Milne Bay; those one north of the Owen Stanleys.
in the interior, mainly by airdrop. Trails, ports, and airfields figured
These makeshift arrangements would large in Harding's plans, but only two
have to be relied upon until the engi- companies of the 114th Combat Bat-
neers could clear fields for transports at talion were assigned to the campaign.
Dobodura and open a port for ocean- The makeup of this engineer force was,
going freighters at the deepwater harbor moreover, decided without the advice of
of Oro Bay, about fifteen miles south of Col. John J. Carew, the battalion's com-
Cape Endaiadere. The Allied com- manding officer and Harding's engineer.
manders also planned to have the engi- Carew knew little of Harding's plans
neers put in a road from Oro Bay to until 28 October, when he received
Dobodura. As soon as possible the orders to proceed to Moresby with one
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 195
member of his staff. On arriving in the heat, which was so oppressive that
eastern Papua he found his units, Com- some of the men threw away their tools
panies A and C, in poor shape. The to lighten their load. As the pioneers
men had almost no equipment or sup- hacked away at the underbrush, the engi-
plies. A small number of hand tools, a neers put the troops over the streams
few coils of rope, and an assault boat or that crossed the trails every half mile or
two made up almost their entire stock so. At some of the crossings they built
of engineer items. Carew learned that footbridges; at others they constructed
Harding was planning to bring heavy rafts to ferry the men over; at still others
machinery, tools, and materials by boat natives paddled the troops across in dug-
from Milne Bay. The engineer units out canoes, sometimes pulling their
were no better trained than they were craft by hand along a rope the engineers
equipped. Prepared like the rest of the had stretched from shore to shore.
32d Division primarily to defend Aus- First contact with the enemy came
tralia, they had little knowledge of that afternoon. At 1210, Japanese ma-
jungle warfare and almost none of night chine gunners near Cape Endaiadere
fighting, in which the Japanese excelled. opened fire on the column advancing
Weary from their hard march to the along the coast but inflicted no damage.
Buna area, the men had to go into com- At 1300 forward elements on the inland
bat carrying on their backs such tools as trail routed an enemy patrol near Dobo-
they had in addition to their usual packs dura. The first big attack came at 1900,
and arms. when enemy dive bombers strafed the
column moving along the coast. Little
First Contacts With the Enemy thought had been given to the possibility
of air attack. Now, in a mad scramble
At dawn on 16 November one bat- for shelter, the men dug slit trenches
talion of infantry crossed the Samboga with whatever tools they could find.
River and began its advance toward Cape Shovels, bayonets, mess kits, and bare
Endaiadere, five miles to the north. An- hands were brought into play. The
other moved inland from the coastal main target of the Japanese was not the
village of Embogo to Dobodura, its column of troops, but the luggers off-
destination the eastern edge of the new shore bringing up supplies and ammuni-
strip. A third advanced along the trail tion. All the small craft were hit. Sev-
toward Dobodura on its way to Ango and eral sank immediately; the rest caught
Buna. A platoon of thirty-five engi- fire and exploded. Colonel Carew
neers, reinforced by a pioneer platoon of helped to rescue many of the survivors.
one officer and twenty-two infantrymen On the beach when a lifeboat carrying
and a group of native carriers, accom- the crew from one of the luggers reached
panied each battalion. Hope ran high shore, he called for volunteers to help
for a quick and easy victory. During him row the boat back toward the burn-
the morning the three groups pushed ing ships. Bombed and strafed, the
ahead without seeing any signs of the rescuers neared one of the craft as its
enemy. The greatest annoyance was exploding ammunition was throwing
196 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
flaming debris in all directions. Carew with bunkers, dugouts, and gun posi-
and his men pulled a number of sur- tions, many of them prepared long be-
vivors from the water and took them fore the assault began. Bunkers were
safely to shore. The luggers and cargoes sturdily built of dirt, logs, and sandbags,
could not be saved. Their loss was a topped with thick roofs, and connected
severe blow to Harding's forces and the by trenches. Gun positions were well
forward movement had to be post- sited and mutually supporting. The
poned.72 Japanese had made expert use of leaves
The advance along the coast was re- and grass for camouflage. Many bunk-
sumed on the 19th. As the troops ers and pillboxes were completely con-
neared the Japanese positions south of cealed by the lush jungle growth which
Cape Endaiadere, the enemy opened up had sprung quickly from their covering
with murderous fire, pinning the men to of earth. Some were so hard to spot
the ground. The troops marching along that the attacking troops unwittingly
the trail from Simemi to the airfields passed them by, only to be shot at from
fared no better. They were stopped in behind.
their tracks by machine gun and rifle fire The attackers were handicapped by a
from positions near the bridge over dearth of information on the area they
Simemi Creek. To the west, the situa- were trying to take. Troops in the
tion was equally serious. The area jungle swamps and grass flats before
where the track from Dobodura branched Buna could neither see the enemy nor
73
to Buna Mission and Buna Village—the learn much about his positions. The
Triangle as it was called—bristled with Australian maps to the scale of one inch
defenses. When some of the men tried to four miles, on hand when the cam-
to flank the enemy positions, they sank paign began, were so inaccurate as to be
into seemingly bottomless swamps. almost worthless. The small number of
It was now clear that the Allies had hastily prepared photomaps that shortly
greatly underestimated the strength of began to reach the front were of some
the enemy's position and his will to re- help, especially to the artillery, but
sist. Only about 2,200 troops were en- lacked much essential data. No enemy
trenched at Buna, but the excellence of positions and few jungle trails appeared
their defenses was astonishing. The on them, and many place names were
Japanese engineers had done a masterful missing. Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichel-
job. Maj. David B. Parker, sent to berger, commanding general of I Corps,
Buna as engineer liaison officer with the who had under him all American combat
First Australian Army, described the forces in the Southwest Pacific, was
enemy's defenses as "well planned," his highly critical of the mapping effort,
field fortifications as "comparatively im- condemning not only the shortage of
pervious," and his camouflage as "per- maps but also the poor quality of those
fect." The area was lavishly provided
73
Memo for Rcd, Lt. Col. Emil F. Klinke, C Opns
72
GHQ SWPA GO No. 64, 28 Dec 42, and GO No and Tng Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 29 Nov 42. SWPA
1, 1 Jan 43. File 159.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 197
furnished. "[In] a dense jungle where a men to volunteer for patrol duty, and
bunker or entrenchment cannot be seen Colonel Carew had no engineers to
from thirty yards away," he later wrote, spare. Most of what little information
"aerial photography must be swallowed was obtained came from natives who
with a full shaker of salt."74 Since lived near Buna.
aerial observation was so ineffective, On the Buna perimeter, the engineers
reconnaissance on the ground seemed were fully occupied with roads and
the only answer. But it proved to be bridges. Besides having to maintain
hazardous and difficult. The Japanese twenty-eight miles of existing trails, they
held all the high ground, and riflemen had many miles of new construction to
who seemed to be everywhere were so do. With the start of the rains in late
well concealed that it was nearly im- November, jobs multiplied and became
possible to spot them. Infantry com- more arduous. Roads were transformed
manders had great difficulty getting their into seas of mud, and flash floods swept
bridges away. If routes were to be kept
open, bridges had to be repaired quickly
74
Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p. 20. and long stretches of corduroy put in.
198 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
There was almost no machinery, and were not the only ones to be diverted
the shortage of hand tools remained from construction. When the 1st Pla-
acute. Machetes, now the most useful toon of Company A of the 11i4th reached
of tools, were especially scarce. The the front on 21 November, after march-
small stock of rope originally brought in ing over the Owen Stanleys, it was as-
had long since been exhausted. Be- signed to carrying rations and ammuni-
tween 15 and 24 November no building tion for the infantry, a chore it had for
supplies were delivered to the front. over a month. Since the natives would
The handful of engineers were limited not go near the front, there was nothing
to pioneer construction. Not properly left to do but use the troops to carry
trained in such work, they sometimes supplies.
bungled. In laying corduroy, they re- Because the loss of the luggers had
peatedly put down logs without first crippled supply up the coast, completion
providing bottom stringers, with the re- of an airstrip at Dobodura was all the
sult that the corduroy soon sank out of more urgent. By 20 November the 2d
sight in the mud. Platoon of Company C of the 114th had
The plight of the engineers would reached Dobodura, where, together with
have been much worse had it not been 22 infantrymen and a group of natives,
for the Papuans. Familiar with the local they began work on the first runway.
flora, the natives pointed out the kinds Clearing away kunai grass and scrub
of timber best suited for construction. trees with brushhooks, machetes, and
They demonstrated how to sink poles bayonets, they completed the first tempo-
into sandy stream beds by hand and how rary strip in a day. On the 21st, Com-
to use lashings of bark to hold bridge pany A, less one platoon, arrived to help
timbers in place. The size of the native enlarge the field. Next morning the
work force available to the engineers engineers were ordered north to support
fluctuated widely. Although the Aus- the infantry trying to get to Buna Mis-
tralians had recruited well over a thou- sion and Buna Village. Since no
sand Papuan helpers, none were at first quartermaster units had yet arrived, 25
attached permanently to any unit. men stayed behind to stake out a ceme-
Blarney's headquarters parceled the na- tery and unload the supplies already
tives out to the various commands on a being flown in from Moresby. On 25
day-to-day basis. Of the 400 allotted to November, 210 men of the 43d General
Colonel Carew at the start of the cam- Service Regiment were flown to Dobo-
paign, none continued, uninterrupted, dura to build more runways. They
on construction. From time to time, brought with them part of their equip-
large groups were taken off engineer ment—five mowing machines, two trac-
projects to act as stretcher bearers. tors, one sheepsfoot roller, and one
After especially severe rains, when the grader, all of which they had cut up
roads were impassable to vehicles, all with torches at Moresby in order to get
were used to carry supplies. The engi- them aboard the planes. As soon as the
neers might have several hundred natives machines were welded together again,
one day and none the next. Papuans the engineers, with a force of natives,
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 199
43D ENGINEERS Mow KUNAI GRASS ON THE OLD DOBODURA STRIP No. 1
began clearing the kunai grass for addi- top officers were relieved, and units
tional strips. which had become jumbled together
were unscrambled and assigned to other
The Fall of Buna parts of the line. As Eichelberger took
over, things were already taking a turn
By the end of November little prog- for the better. Tanks were being
ress had been made against the enemy. brought from Milne Bay, and fresh
On the front near Buna Village and Australian and American troops were
Buna Mission, the troops, now known as scheduled to arrive soon. The airlift
Urbana Force, were stymied. Warren from Moresby to Dobodura was becom-
Force, fighting near the airfields, was ing more effective. Efforts of the engi-
likewise unable to advance. Alarmed neers on the trails were showing results.
by the way the campaign was going, Supplies could be carried to the front
MacArthur prepared to take action. On more rapidly, and jeeps could travel the
1December he gave General Eichel- road from Dobodura to Simemi. More
berger direct command of the bogged accurate maps, though still too few, were
down forces. When the new com- being provided. The survey platoon of
mander reached the front, a number of the 69th Topographic Company was on
200 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
its way to Moresby, where it was to help up the coast to Cape Endaiadere, turn
members of the Australian Survey Corps westward, and push on to Simemi Creek
75
bring maps of Buna up to date. A near its mouth, thus getting behind the
map depot was being set up at Moresby enemy's line at the airstrips. One
to speed distribution to the troops. In American battalion, supported by the
nearly every respect, the outlook was tanks which had recently arrived, was to
more favorable than when the campaign move over the bridge between the strips
began two weeks before. and drive on to Buna Mission. At the
Five days after Eichelberger assumed same time, Urbana Force was to reduce
command, the offensive was renewed. the Triangle and capture Musita Island.
During the next few days, the troops of The outcome of these operations would
Warren Force, at the eastern end of the depend in considerable degree on the
New Strip, made slight gains. But the engineers' success in bridging Simemi
progress of those advancing towards the and Entrance Creeks.
bridge over Simemi Creek was negligi- On Warren front, the drive along the
ble. The span remained in enemy coast was a complete success. The Japa-
hands. On Urbana front, events took a nese positions on Cape Endaiadere were
more favorable turn. The troops overrun. But when the troops turned
worked their way up the west bank of westward and began to push into the
Entrance Creek and then followed the area behind the new strip, they were
trail to Buna Village. They broke again held back by intense fire from
through to the sea just east of the village. enemy bunkers. Meanwhile, the ad-
The objective now was to clear the entire vance through the swamps towards the
area west of the Triangle, and then seize bridge over Simemi Creek was painfully
the heavily fortified Triangle itself. slow. When, on the 20th, the troops
One noncommissioned officer and twenty at last converged on the span, they were
men of Company A of the 114th engi- fired on by about fifty riflemen and
neers were assigned to Urbana Force as several machine gunners near the old
a "roving detachment" to destroy cap- strip. The vitally important bridge, a
tured bunkers, dispose of duds, and build low, wooden structure, 125 feet long and
bridges. Everywhere the enemy's re- 10 feet wide, was found to be in fair
sistance was fanatical. Nevertheless, his shape, but the flooring was poor and a
defenses began to crack. On 14 Decem- 12-foot section had been blown out of
ber, the Americans entered Buna Village, the far end. Unable to cross the bridge,
already abandoned by the Japanese. the troops tried to ford the creek at
Gona had fallen to the Australians five several places, but found the water over
days before. 6 feet deep. A smoke screen was put
Eichelberger scheduled an all-out at- down under cover of which infantrymen
tack for 18 December. On Warren tried to span the gap with a catwalk,
front, the American troops, recently re- which turned out to be too short.
inforced by Australians, were to advance Meanwhile, the Australians discovered a
ford some distance to the north and
75
69th Engr Topo Co, Sixty Ninth Overseas. began crossing over. Since tanks were
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 201
slated to support the combat troops, times before the bridge was ready. That
repair of the bridge was imperative. At afternoon, the remaining infantry and
dawn of the 23d, while the infantry four tanks crossed over. By the 27th,
strove to clear out the Japanese who were the enemy positions around the airstrip
placing fire on the structure, engineers were crumbling.
of Company C moved in to repair the After a faltering start, Urbana Force
bridge. Soon after the work began, the also scored some decisive gains. Addi-
enemy opened up with machine guns tional troops which had begun arriving
and mortars. When the men took cover, in the Buna area were sent into the line
the Japanese stopped firing. Staying out to reinforce the weary veterans. A two-
of sight for a time, the troops returned to pronged attack on Musita Island and the
their job and continued working until Triangle was launched on 18 December.
the enemy fire again became intolerable, Attempts to capture Musita were re-
when they once more took cover. This pulsed, and the troops withdrew that
round of operations was repeated four evening. To the south, the infantry
202 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
made repeated thrusts at the Triangle, way which paralleled the coast and then
all of which failed. Eichelberger then passed through extensive swamplands
changed his plans. Orders were issued along the Embogo River. Progress on
for the infantry to cross Entrance Creek the air base, port, and road was under-
to the north of the Triangle, bypass that standably slow. Though they generally
heavily fortified area, and push on to employed several hundred Papuans, the
Buna Mission. To get the troops over Australians had less equipment than the
the creek, engineers of the roving de- 43d. On 18 December Company B of
tachment lashed coconut logs together the 43d, with a large stock of equipment,
and laid them across two captured boats left Milne Bay under orders to unload at
which they had anchored in the middle Oro Bay, make arrangements for for-
of the stream. On 22 December one warding the machinery to Dobodura,
company of infantry crossed this bridge and then march inland to work on the
safely. Several hundred yards down- airfields. These engineers were not able
stream, the other company, with no to carry out their instructions. When
bridge, was forced to swim to the oppo- Sverdrup visited the front at the end of
site bank and a number of men were December, he found part of Company B
drowned. That same day the attack on at work near the bay, building a stretch
Musita was renewed. The engineers of road through a swamp where the
had by this time completed a makeshift water sometimes reached a depth of four
footbridge to the island. The infantry feet. Noting that the road was so poorly
swarmed over and, meeting little opposi- located it might never be completed, he
tion, pressed on to the bridge near the set out to find the rest of the unit. He
mouth of Entrance Creek, which they discovered the men unloading ships and
would have to cross to get to the mission. doing odd jobs at Oro Bay. Part of the
There the men ran into such heavy fire equipment, he was told, was in the hands
that they could get no farther. By this of the Australians. Inquiries revealed
time the troops who had crossed up- that one of Blarney's officers, mistakenly
stream were driving eastward through thinking the unit had been assigned to
the plantation south of the mission. New Guinea Force, had taken charge of
After overrunning the Japanese defenses, it. Only after Sverdrup had made it
they reached the sea on the 29th. clear that the 43d was under USASOS
Meanwhile, construction of logistic was Company B permitted to go on to
facilities was not being neglected. An Dobodura. The mix-up, Sverdrup
Australian field company had made a wrote, "had resulted in loss of valuable
start on docking facilities at Oro Bay, time which will adversely affect con-
some twenty miles southeast of Buna. struction of the airstrips. . . ." 76
Part of the unit began work on an By the time the struggle for Buna
urgently needed road from Oro Bay to moved into its final phases, engineer
Dobodura. The Australian engineers strength was greatly depleted. The
had selected a rather difficult route, heat, the weeks of unceasing labor, the
much of it through hilly country, in
preference to an alternate "low level" 76
Rpt, Sverdrup to Casey, 5 Jan 43.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 203
lack of equipment and supplies had taken Quick to learn and proud of the part
their toll. Torrential downpours were they were playing in the war, the
a regular occurrence. "It was common Papuans made a substantial contribution
practice to leave the M1 helmet outside to the Allied cause. "The success of
the tents ... at night in order the next engineer operations in this campaign,"
morning to estimate the amount of rain wrote Colonel Carew, "was due, in no
which had fallen," Major Parker re- small way, to the loyal, whole hearted,
ported. ". . . if the helmet was com- and tireless efforts of the natives. . . ." 78
pletely full of water, the rainfall was On 28 December, Eichelberger alerted
considered . . . normally severe.77 Many the troops on Musita for the final assault
of the men were exhausted. Disease had on Buna Mission. Entrance Creek still
cut the ranks severely. When the two barred the way. Spanning the stream
companies of the 114th arrived at the near its mouth was a ramshackle, native-
front, they totaled 304 men. Six weeks built bridge, about 125 feet long, with a
later they were down to 140. At Dobo- large hole in the flooring. Enemy bunk-
dura, where the engineers had a com- ers on a spit of land jutting into the
paratively easy time of it, 12 percent mouth of the creek from the mission side
were suffering from fever or malaria at could rake the bridge with machine gun
the end of the year. fire. A plan of attack was worked out.
Reliance on the Papuans became in- A group of infantry was to cross the
creasingly heavy. By late December 400 creek in assault boats and charge the
had been permanently assigned to the bunkers. While the enemy was busy
114th, and attempts were being made to beating off this attack, several men would
get 100 to assist the 43d. As a rule, the carry planks to the gap in the bridge and
natives camped in groups of 100, with drop them in place. Then the infantry
each group supervised by an Australian would race across. When a call was
officer. Through discussions with the made for volunteers to fix the bridge, 4
Australians as well as through experi- engineers of the roving detachment and
ence, the engineers learned how best to 2 infantrymen offered to take on the
handle the Papuans. Men from the perilous job. Shortly after 1700 on the
same village were kept together, since the 29th, the boats shoved off, but on near-
natives were suspicious of anyone not ing the opposite bank, they came under
from their own tribe. Since each tribe such heavy fire they had to turn back.
had its own specialty—for example, the Meanwhile, the volunteers ran out on
coastal natives excelled in bridging the bridge and hastily threw three tim-
streams and the hill people in hacking bers over the gap in the flooring. One
out trails—it was advantageous to keep of the engineers was shot dead. The 5
the Papuans on the jobs they could do other men returned unhurt. Two in-
best. Here, again, competition between fantrymen succeeded in crossing over,
villages was an incentive to speed. but before the rest could follow, the
78
114th Engr Combat Bn, Rpt of Engr Opns in
77
Parker's Ltr, 12 Jan 43. Papuan Campaign.
204 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
planks toppled into the water. The from Buna Village came close to the one
way to the mission remained closed. jutting into the creek from the opposite
Visiting Musita Island the next day bank. On returning to the infantry
and hearing of the attempt to repair the command post, he suggested that assault
bridge, Sverdrup persuaded Cpl. Charles troops ford the narrows and make a flank
H. Gray, one of the engineer volunteers attack on the pillboxes. The infantry
of the night before, to take him to see the commanders had apparently been think-
structure. Gray and the two surviving ing along the same lines. A reconnais-
engineers of his party had offered to sance made the night before had dis-
make another try at repairing the bridge. closed that the water between the two
Since the Japanese were now on the alert, spits of land was only ankle deep at low
Sverdrup believed that a second attempt, tide, which occurred at four in the
if made while the bunkers were still morning. That night two companies
intact, would be suicidal. While go- set out to wade the narrows. In a con-
ing over the ground with Gray, he noted fused action the men got across but were
that a spit of land extending eastward unable to knock out the bunkers. Re-
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 205
pair of the bridge had to wait once roadblocks. The first element of the
again. 41st Division to go into combat, the
On New Year's Day Urbana Force platoon suffered its first casualties when
launched its final assault. The troops two men were wounded while laying
who had cut across the coconut planta- corduroy beyond the American lines.
tion to the sea attacked the mission from Meantime, the Buna campaign over, an
the southeast. The men who had American battalion set out with a num-
crossed the shallows again advanced ber of tanks to reinforce the Australians.
along the spit, and by late afternoon of Ahead of them went Company B of the
2 January had wiped out the bunkers 114th, clearing the trail and putting
commanding the bridge. The engineers down corduroy so that the armor could
thereupon repaired the span and within pass. In early January the remainder
an hour the infantry were streaming of the regimental combat team of the
across. By the evening of the 2d, organ- 41st Division reached the front. The
ized resistance had ended. The enemy 2d Platoon of Company B of the 116th
survivors were mopped up during the was committed to combat; the 3d was
next few days. held in reserve. Though they en-
countered the same swampy, jungled ter-
Sanananda rain that the 114th had found at Buna,
the 116th engineers were somewhat bet-
Between the capture of Gona on 9 ter equipped, for each man carried along
December and the fall of Buna Mission, with his field equipment a machete, a
the Australians had made little headway shovel or pick, and a coil of rope or wire.
west of the Girua. General Vasey's The men were kept busy digging
forces, consisting initially of Australian trenches, building bridges, corduroying
troops and one battalion of American roads, guarding positions, and carrying
infantry, had been unable to do much supplies—often under fire. Gradually
more than maintain roadblocks inside the enemy strongholds were reduced, and
the Japanese outpost area and keep the by 22 January all organized resistance at
enemy bottled up. In late December Sanananda had been wiped out.
MacArthur sped reinforcements. A
regimental combat team of the 41st Guadalcanal
Division was ordered north from Queens-
land. In the van went the 1st Platoon When the Papua Campaign ended,
of Company B, 116th Engineer Combat fighting was still in progress on Guadal-
Battalion. 79 On 31 December the pla- canal. The first phase of the battle,
toon flew into Dobodura and from there during which the marines struggled to
marched to Ango and on across the Girua consolidate their foothold and the Japa-
to the Sanananda front. The engineers nese tried vainly to dislodge them, had
relieved the Australians at one of the lasted for more than three months.
While the Americans strove to hold their
79
116th Engr Combat Bn, Opns Rpt, Jan 1-Sep beachhead and to gain air and naval
30, 43. superiority, the enemy tried repeatedly
206 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
ways, and 75 hardstands had been put in. whereas the main enemy strength was
On 23 November, the 822d Engineer lodged near Mount Austen in the foot-
Aviation Battalion had landed. Part of hills southwest of the American position
this unit went to Pallikulo to build hard- and in the area beyond the river.
stands, taxiways, a pier, and a control Guadalcanal had almost no roads. At
tower, and part went to Pekoa to help the time of the invasion, the island's
the engineers there. Most of the bat- network had consisted only of a trail
talion, however, was put to building along the northern shore and a few
roads, camps, and a hospital. Although native footpaths into the hinterland.
the facilities on Espíritu were limited Marine engineers had done much good
and crude, they played an important role work, improving the coastal track and
in backing up the forces in the starting a road toward Mount Austen,
Solomons.81 but an immense job remained to be
The first Army engineers to reach done. Although the 57th Combat Bat-
Guadalcanal were members of the 57th talion was to be employed in clearing
Combat Battalion of the Americal Divi- mines, supplying water, and doing many
sion who arrived on 12 November in the different types of construction, its prin-
midst of the decisive battles. After un- cipal concern was to be roads and bridges.
loading during an air attack and witness- The men did not have long to wait be-
ing a naval engagement off the coast, fore beginning. On 18 November they
the men took the lay of the land. were sent to support the infantry in an
Clearly, engineers were needed here. attempt to push the Japanese westward
Some ninety miles long and twenty-five along the coast. In a hard-fought action,
miles wide, Guadalcanal had a generally the troops succeeded in establishing a
rugged terrain. A chain of mountains bridgehead on the west bank of the
ran its entire length from east to west, Matanikau. By the 21st the engineers
with the highest peak, Mount Popo- had completed a span over the flooded
manisu, reaching an elevation of nearly stream and heavy vehicles were rolling
8,000 feet. Along the central part of across. Two days later the Americans
the northern coast were flat, sandy were firmly established west of the
beaches, in back of which was a plain river.82
extending west to the Matanikau River. Late November and early December
Beyond the river, the plain narrowed witnessed preparations for the final
and was broken by ridges and ravines. offensive. Now the combat battalion
The American beachhead was on the was occupied with what the men referred
northern coast east of the Matanikau, to as "normal duties." One group
helped the marines clear out enemy
81
Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. machine gun nests, using dynamite and
37ff. (2) Hq XIII AF Serv Comd Hist Monograph
17, The Opns of Avn Engrs in SOPAC, Jan 42-Aug
82
44, pp. 82-87. COMD-AF-SV-13-HI, Jan 42, Max- (1) 57th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl-War Diary, 7
well AFB. (3) 810th Engr Avn Bn, Hist From Dec 41-21 Mar 45. 300-Engr-0.7 (2540)(M). (2)
Activation to 31 Dec 43. (4) 822d Engr Avn Bn, Hist of the 57th Engr Combat Bn, 19 Jan 42-1 Jul
Hist Data, 15 Apr 42-1 Jul 43. (5) Building the 43. Engr-0.1. (5217) Master. (3) Miller, Guadal-
Navy's Bases, II, 228-30. canal, pp. 43-44, 202-09, 225.
208 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
bottles filled with gasoline and explo- In mid-December the pace began to
sives. Another helped construct a quicken. On the 16th General Patch
fighter strip near the front lines, while ordered the capture of Mount Austen.
marines stood guard against enemy raid- Two days earlier, a part of the 57th
ing parties. A third worked to complete engineers had started extending the trail
a hospital and provide shelters for divi- the marines had built toward the enemy
sion headquarters. Some of the engi- strongpoint. For a time the road crews
neers prepared artillery and radar kept pace with the advancing infantry.
positions along the northern shore. But when the foothills were reached,
Others took over the operation of water construction slowed almost to a halt.
points. By far the largest contingent Here the engineers encountered slopes
worked in the valley of the Matanikau, with grades of up to sixty degrees. The
building bridges and cutting trails. Pre- rains became more intense. The bat-
vented by the shortage of cargo space talion's heavy equipment, the trucks and
from bringing in more than a fraction dozers left behind on New Caledonia,
of their equipment, the men had to do were missed more sorely than before.
most of their work by hand. As in As the engineers tried to extend the trail
Papua, the climate and terrain were any- up the slippery mountainsides, the in-
thing but favorable. The days were in- fantry outran its line of supply. Such
tensely hot, the nights were cold, and food and ammunition as the forward
downpours were frequent. Streams elements received was dropped from the
were swollen and roads were mudholes. air or carried in by native bearers. The
The ridges west of the river presented hard work of the engineers was some-
an added difficulty. Whenever they times coupled with danger. On the
could, the engineers ran the roads 19th, a group of enemy infantrymen in-
through the lowland rain forests, laying filtrated the American lines to harry the
corduroy of coconut logs to keep the men busy on the road. On the 21st one
traffic out of the muck. Where the officer and five enlisted men of the 57th
jungles were impenetrable, the road answered a call for volunteers to remove
builders had to take to the ridges. Be- a mine field that stood in the way of the
cause construction here required innu- advance. These engineers, locating the
merable fills, great quantities of coral mines without detection devices, re-
and gravel had to be hand-loaded and moved 225 before they were ordered to
trucked in. The men worked long stop. They met their death when the
hours, their clothes often wringing wet, truck in which they were hauling the
and they shivered through the chilly mines to a depot mysteriously blew up.
nights. Before long, symptoms of fever Occasionally the men of the 57th applied
83
and malaria began to appear. engineering techniques to the problems
of other services. When the medics had
(1) 57th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl-War Diary. (2) difficulty evacuating casualties from the
83
heights around Mount Austen, the engi- through the jungles and put down
neers devised litters with skids that could corduroy. The difficulty of supplying
be eased downhill and stretched cables troops in the interior was eased to some
on which litters could be moved across extent when the engineers dredged the
ravines by means of pulleys. The main Matanikau, enabling boats to ply up and
work of building roads meanwhile went down the river. As the fighting moved
forward, receiving a boost on 30 Decem- westward into increasingly rugged ter-
ber when a sizable group of natives was rain, ravines too deep for filling were
assigned to help. By early January the spanned with trestles. Heavy rains, al-
Japanese on Mount Austen had been most unbearable heat, and frequent
compressed into a small area and the bombings and strafings added to the
infantry had turned west toward the strain. By mid-January the malaria rate
Matanikau.84 in some of the engineer platoons had
On 10 January Patch launched the reached 40 percent. Gradually the
final offensive. The Americal and 2d Americans made their way westward.
Marine Divisions struck west along the On 1 February an amphibious force
coast and the 25th Infantry Division landed near Cape Esperance, on the
pushed through the hills beyond Mount northwestern end of the island, cutting
Austen, with the object of surrounding off the Japanese retreat. During the
and annihilating the enemy forces. following week, some of the enemy were
Two engineer combat battalions took evacuated, the remainder were hemmed
part in the advance, the 57th and the in. On the afternoon of 9 February the
65th, the latter having recently arrived engineers got the welcome news that
from Hawaii with the 25th Division. organized resistance had ended.85
The second engineer unit was more
poorly equipped than the first, for it Problems of Logistics
lacked not only bridging materials
gasoline-operated saws, and many minor Japan's expansion southward had been
items, but dump trucks as well. It had stopped. Australia and the islands in
but two bulldozers, described by the the South Pacific at last seemed secure.
battalion commander as being "of in- The victories at Buna and Guadalcanal,
ferior make, partially worn out, and too however significant in themselves, were
light for the job." Again, the engineers also indicative of the growing Allied
functioned mainly as road builders. strength in the Far Pacific. While
But now, in addition to extending the combat troops were fighting in Papua
interior and coastal trails, they had to and the Solomons, service forces, some
keep open lateral communications be-
tween the two spearheads of the ad- 85
(1) Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 254ff. (2) Maj
vance. Natives helped hack trails George F. Dickson, Rpt, Opns of the 65th Engr Bn
in Opns of 25th Inf Div on Guadalcanal 17 Dec
84
(1) Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 237-52, passim. (2) 42-5 Feb 43, pp. 145-148. 3.2.11 Guadalcanal Opns.
57th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl-War Diary. (3) Craven (3) 57th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl-War Diary. (4) Incl
and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 82. (4) Hq to Ltr, Harmon to OPD, 6 Jun 44. 98-USF 2-0.5
USAFISPA GO No. 310, 19 Oct 43. (3721) M, 6 Jun 44.
210 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
to perform much vital construction. and Class IV items in the far Pacific. In
The engineers of the Southwest Pacific July 1942 a 90-day reserve was added.
received their greatest support from the Engineer stocks in the two theaters never
Royal Australian Engineers, who by late approached such levels. Shipments
1942 totaled some 25,000, from the from the United States fell short of
Royal Australian Air Force engineers, requirements, and local resources were
now grown in number to about 2,700, not rich enough to make up the defi-
and from the Allied Works Council, ciency. In rugged jungle terrain where
which had 52,000 men on its rolls at everything had to be built from the
the end of the year. Seabees and ground up, supplies were expended in
Marine engineers, together with New unprecedented amounts. The engineers
Zealand troops and civilians, undertook in the Southwest Pacific received more
a large share of construction in the matériel in terms of tons from all sources
South Pacific. In remote and backward than any other service—about 40 per-
areas, it was the natives who often made cent of the total. But since most of
up a large part of the labor force.86 their supplies were heavy construction
materials, which were expended as
Supply Problems quickly as they were obtained, the engi-
neers were not able to build up any
Just as critical as the shortage of troops reserves. To make matters worse, the
was the scarcity of supplies. Insofar as engineers in the theaters did not get
the Engineers were concerned, the War detailed information on strategic plans
Department's plans for supplying the far far enough in advance to make intelli-
Pacific were unrealistic. Five categories gent estimates of what or how much they
of material were furnished the Army. would need. By the end of the year
The Engineers were concerned primarily construction forces were still operating
with two of them, Class II and Class IV. "virtually on a hand to mouth basis." 87
Issued to units in accordance with tables After construction equipment and
of equipment, Class II items were ex- materials in the United States had been
pected to suffice for routine work. Class earmarked for the Pacific, months
IV stocks were those needed over and elapsed before they reached their destina-
above Class II, usually for extensive con- tions. One reason for the lag was the
struction projects. Soon after the small proportion of shipping space al-
United States entered the war, the lotted to engineer items. Although
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, authorized a their supplies were exceedingly bulky,
90-day level of supply for both Class II and although the Engineers were more
86 87
(1) WD AGO, Monthly Strength of the Army. (1) WD Ltr AG 400 (1-31-42) MISC-D-M to
(2) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and CG USAFIA, 2 Feb 42. 33861 sec. II (Jan 42). (2)
Strategy, pp. 412-14. (3) USASOS SWPA GO No. 4, Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,
29 Jul 42. (4) Ltr, Casey to Brig Gen S. C. Godfrey, PP. 335-36, 734. (3) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC,
AF Engr, 1 Jan 43. 381 (Australia). (5) Of C Engr Engrs of SWPA, VIII, 49, 56. (4) Memo, Casey for
GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 32-34. (6) Incl Lt Col R. C. Kramer, AUS, 14 Mar 43. SWPA File
to Ltr, Farrar to Teale, 27 Jan 43. SWPA File 94. M51.
212 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
quests from the theaters for equipment lack of equipment and spare parts in
repair units brought the word from overseas theaters with active fighting
Washington that none were available. fronts." 92
Finally, on 10 November, the 472d. Both Australia and New Zealand were
Engineer Maintenance Company landed making determined efforts to ease the
at Noumea, the sole unit of its kind to shortage of construction supplies. Hav-
be sent to the far Pacific in 1942. With- ing diverted as much as they felt they
in a few days the men were swamped could spare from existing stocks and
with work. Because their shop equip- current production to American projects,
ment was being sent on a later transport, the Australians branched out into new
they had to tackle the tremendous back- manufacturing fields. Using pilot mod-
log of repairs with a few tools borrowed els developed in Colonel Teale's office
here and there.90 A month after reach- from designs drawn by General Casey's
ing New Caledonia, the unit's com- staff, the seven firms of the Earth Moving
mander wrote, "Life is very busy over Manufacturers Group tooled up to make
here, but very interesting, what with heavy construction machinery. Between
three-cylinder Southern Cross engines, April and September 1942 the engi-
Leeds-Fowler power units, five-cylinder neers contracted for the manufacture
Paxman-Ricardo diesel engines, 75-year- of £2,000,000 worth of heavy equipment
old French locomotives, Nippon brand in the Commonwealth. Not much
cement mixers, [and] miscellaneousequipment could be expected from New
Japanese electrical apparatus . . . there
Zealand. The only supplier in SOPAC,
is never a dull moment." 91 The situa- New Zealand had a much smaller pro-
tion in the Southwest Pacific was not ductive capacity than Australia and was
encouraging. Visiting the two theaters itself badly in need of machinery. Al-
in January 1943, Lt. Col. Raymond L. most no tractors had been imported since
Harrison, head of the Spare Parts 1938, and in 1940 the best of New Zea-
Branch, Supply Division, Office of the land's plant had been sent to the Middle
Chief of Engineers, was alarmed to find East, Malaya, and Fiji. By September
that 40 percent of the equipment in 1942 members of the New Zealand Sup-
SWPA was deadlined. Recalling the ply Mission in Washington were com-
prodigal expenditure of equipment and plaining that their country was "almost
spare parts on construction jobs in the without plant," and Prime Minister
States, he wrote his chief, "I cannot help Fraser was warning that important de-
but believe . . . that sufficient prefer- fense construction could not be com-
ence is not being given to overseas re- pleted unless tractors and carryalls were
quirements. ... I am appalled by the forthcoming from the United States.
But New Zealand was able to contribute
90
(1) Ltr, Hq USASOS to TAG, 22 Jul 42. 400.312 some supplies. Like Australia, it fur-
(Australia) 1942-43. (2) 472d Engr Maint Co, Orgn nished materials on reverse lend-lease
Hist, 1 Oct 42-31 Dec 42.
91
Ltr, CO 472d Engr Maint Co to Smith, 14 Dec
92
42. Of Files, R&D Div, Mech Engineering Br Maint Ltr, Harrison to Smith, 28 Jan 43. 400.312 SP
Misc No. 1, EHD Files. Area.
214 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
mander was reminded that putting issued in July 1942 had stated: "Denial
requests through regular channels was plans should aim at total destruction
"not only essential to sound budgetary . . . and should not be compromised
planning in view of the incidence of the by any desire to recover resources intact
Reciprocal Lend-Lease Agreement, but when the enemy withdraws. He will
also . . . to ensure that all important most certainly himself destroy anything
97
works proposals affecting the war effort of value in his retreat." As General
in Australia come before the War Cab- Blamey pointed out to the Americans,
inet for consideration." MacArthur's even the limiting of destruction to im-
reply was an endorsement of Teale's portant industries would "involve a
shortcut. He stated that in his opinion major change in a policy that had already
the approval of a project by the Chiefs been given wide circulation." Mac-
of Staff Committee followed by assign- Arthur had decided not to press the
ment of a priority was sufficient justifica- issue, and the various Australian states
tion for starting construction. He had gone ahead with their preparations
furthermore assured the Prime Minister for total destruction. By late 1942 New
that a fund of several million dollars South Wales had drawn up a scorched
was available in case Australian funds earth code and had mined numerous
were not sufficient for American con- roads and bridges. Western Australia
struction needs. But MacArthur could had completed total denial plans for her
not persuade the government to alter its principal cities. Even Tasmania had a
methods. The War Cabinet continued detailed and comprehensive plan for
to insist that, in view of Australia's severe total destruction. But as the fear of in-
limitations in manpower and resources, vasion abated, less attention was devoted
all requests for construction must be to denial schemes. By the end of the
closely scrutinized. Procedures re- year preparations for destruction had all
mained as they were.96 but ceased. Although the government
The Australians did make one major was still officially bound to it, the
change the engineers considered long scorched earth policy was a dead letter.98
overdue. They let their demolitions
program go by the board. MacArthur, Changes in Design
who was inclined from the first toward
an offensive strategy, had never deemed Since there was little the engineers
the program appropriate. But the could do to augment their resources
Commonwealth government was fully further, they were forced to seek ever
and it seemed, irrevocably, committed to more efficient methods of doing things.
a scorched earth policy. A directive
97
Incl to Memo, F. G. Shedden for the Secy, Dept
96
(1) Memo, Robinson for Casey, 7 Oct 42. (2) of the Army, 27 Jul 42. SWPA File 175.
98
Ltr, Secy of the War Cabinet to MacArthur, 4 Sep (1) Memo, Casey for Steele, 2 Sep 42. (2) Incl
42. (3) Ltr, MacArthur to Curtin, 25 Sep 42. (4) to Ltr, ALF to Aust Liaison, Of C Engr GHQ
Memo [Capt] M. D. L[ovett] for Casey, 28 Nov 42. SWPA, 8 Dec. 42. (3) Memo, C Engr First Aust
All in SWPA File 270. Army for G (0), 29 Dec 42. All in SWPA File 175.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 217
As Casey pointed out many times, they borne sewerage. But as time went on,
had to do more with less. The main more and more men were living in tents,
idea was to give the combat forces what sleeping on the ground, dining in un-
they required in the shortest possible floored mess halls, working in unscreened
time and with a minimum of effort. offices, and doing without electric lights
This meant lowering construction stand- and modern plumbing. For a while
ards, devising shortcuts, and resorting to floors could be put in mess halls, and
improvisation. During 1942 the great- bunks and floors in tents, if time and
est strides toward increased efficiency funds permitted, but later, standards be-
were made in the Southwest Pacific. came still more rigorous. A construc-
Here an effective theaterwide engineer tion policy issued by GHQ SWPA in
organization had functioned at a much October eliminated tent floors entirely
earlier date than in the South Pacific. and cut out nearly all other refinements.
After the Battles of Coral Sea and Mid- Although no such drastic innovations
way had ended Japanese naval predomi- could be made in hospital designs,
nance and placed the South Pacific floored tents and prefabricated huts had
seemingly beyond the enemy's reach, the made their appearance at many medical
danger to the Southwest Pacific still re- installations by the close of the year.
mained, making speed of construction Similar developments occurred in the
particularly urgent there. design of warehouses. One popular new
During their first year in the South- type was a modified version of the theater
west Pacific, the engineers had to make of operation warehouse with the interior
frequent changes in structural plans. columns eliminated—a change made pos-
By late 1942 there were few vestiges left sible by the amazing strength of Aus-
of the original theater of operations tralian hardwoods. Another was the
drawings. To make possible better use standard storehouse of the Australian
of local materials, theater of operations Army, also designed to take advantage of
designs had been revised and many of the unique characteristics of native tim-
them had been replaced by blueprints for bers. A third was a prefabricated, port-
less substantial structures. With the able warehouse of corrugated iron
demand for quarters, hospitals, and developed by the Australians. A fourth,
storage space rising rapidly, the engi- and among the most widely used, was
neers could not afford to miss any the igloo warehouse, modeled on a
opportunities to save on manpower and hangar designed by Mr. Brizay, a French
materials. There was a marked trend engineer who had come to work for the
toward flimsier housing. In the early base section engineer in Brisbane after
days of the war, most Americans had fleeing from Malaya. Brizay's hangar
occupied fairly commodious quarters in consisted of arches constructed of scrap
Australian barracks, hotels, apartments, lumber, held together by purlins and
and private homes, and the first camps covered with camouflage netting. By
constructed for United States troops had taking such a hangar, adding a concrete
featured screens, electricity, and water- floor and a corrugated iron or fibrolite
218 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
roof, and closing the ends, a large and earth moving was required. "We
roomy warehouse could be quickly tended," Matthews explained, "to go not
provided.99 to wide runways but to double barreled
Construction for the Army Air Forces, and triple barreled runways, approxi-
which represented about 80 percent of mately parallel but separated by 100 feet
the engineer program, offered a reward- or so between the edges of the pavement.
ing field for savings. When the war This actually simplified both drainage
began, blueprints for military airports and grading and gave us uninterrupted
were more or less standard. Fields were construction and paving work on each
to have three intersecting landing strips of the new strips while the older strip
running in the direction of the prevail- was in full use." 100
ing winds. Strips for fighters were to Although the Air Forces generally
have an average length of 3,000 feet, preferred concrete pavements, few land-
those for medium bombers, 4,000, and ing strips of that material were built in
those for heavy bombers, 5,000. All SWPA. Runway surfaces, the engineers
runways were to be 150 feet wide with a found, had to be neither so thick nor so
1,000-foot clearing on each side. The rigid as had previously been thought
engineers soon discovered that the necessary. The first designers of airfield
shorter runways did not work out in pavements, most of them highway engi-
SWPA. Overloaded planes needed ex- neers, had usually assumed that a run-
tra length to take off, and disabled ones, way must be strong enough to carry a
to land. In the fluid tactical situation, wheel load one and one-half times the
a field might be used by fighters one day weight of the plane. With the fast new
and by bombers the next. Six-thousand- planes of World War II, most of the
foot runways, capable of taking the weight in landing and taking off was
heaviest craft, became the rule. The borne by the wings, not the wheels.
added effort expended on longer airstrips With this discovery, the concrete run-
was more than offset in other ways. way passed from the scene in SWPA, for
Since it was found that pilots could it was both expensive and time consum-
align their planes just as easily on nar- ing to build. In Queensland and New
rower strips, runways were reduced in Guinea, graveled strips were the rule.
width to 100 feet. Because the speed of But wherever possible, the gravel was
planes landing or taking off was at least topped with bitumen to give a better
100 miles an hour, the direction of the wearing surface and eliminate dust. A
wind made little difference. Intersect- thin bitumen surfacing of the type used
ing runways were replaced by parallel on country roads in the United States
strips, and thus satisfactory sites could served the purpose well. Four coats
usually be located more quickly and less were applied for heavy planes and two
for light on a gravel base from three to
99
(1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for
100
1942. (2) Ltr, CG USASOS to CG Fifth AF et al., (1) WD OCE, Info Bull No. 53, 1 Aug 40. (2)
3 Oct 42. SWPA File 275. (3) Memo for Rcd, Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 26ff. (3) Ltr,
Casey, 25 Nov 42. SWPA File 94. (4) Memo for Casey to Godfrey, 1 Jan 43. SWPA File 497. (4)
Rcd, Casey, 25 Nov 42. SWPA File 159. Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 35.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 219
five inches thick. A half-inch layer of Putting in runways was only a small
pea-size gravel was then spread on the part of the job of building an airfield.
bitumen and rolled. This thin paving In addition to well-paved and well-
saved a great number of man-hours, and drained strips, a complete airdrome in-
although it was sometimes picked up by cluded miles of taxiways, innumerable
the wheels of the planes, especially in the hardstands and dispersals, and such
turnaround areas, repair was easy. necessities and refinements as operations
While gravel and bitumen runways be- buildings, hangars, fuel storage and dis-
came standard, the engineers experi- pensing systems, camouflage, and revet-
mented with other types of paving. Soil ments. The engineers in SWPA could
cement, a recent development in the not hope to build such elaborate fields.
United States, was tried for the first time Any feature that could be dispensed with
in Australia. The formula called for had to be omitted if essentials were to
about six parts of dirt and gravel to one be provided. Little was done with
part of cement, with water added. The camouflage. Making an airfield invisi-
mixture formed a weak concrete but ble from the air was anything but easy,
saved a good deal of labor, since it made and the engineers considered the effort
use of the materials found at the site of unjustified in any case, since the enemy
construction and thus eliminated the would have little trouble locating an
hauling of gravel and rock. It was tried active airdrome even if it were camou-
on an experimental basis at Roto and flaged. During the early months of the
North Burke, two fields of the Mel- war some attention was paid to camou-
bourne-Cloncurry ferry route. Visiting flage in Australia. Several types of
Roto in mid-November, Colonel Robin- hangars were designed which could be
son reported that the first runway there quickly erected and would serve to hide
had been completed in six weeks, and the planes, the best known being Mr.
second, in two. He expected the strips Brizay's igloo. In the advanced areas,
to give good service for one or two years. concealment became largely a matter of
However, since soil cement did not stand dispersal. Revetments were gradually
up as well at bitumen and gravel and eliminated. Originally, the engineers
cost half again as much, it was not widely had been called upon to build an enor-
used. The engineers made rather ex- mous number of them, each one consist-
tensive use of the recently developed ing of a hardstand with an earthen wall
Marston mat, or pierced steel plank, as fifteen feet high on three sides. It took
an alternate type of surfacing to bitumen three D-8 tractors about three days to
and gravel. Capable of being put down produce one such revetment. When it
quickly, the mat proved very satisfactory became apparent that the best protection
when placed on a firm foundation.101 was a strong air force ready to meet the
enemy in the skies, the engineers stopped
101
(1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 27. (2)
"Bituminous Surfacing of Flight Strips in Combat
Zones," The Military Engineer, XXXV (November, Annual Rpt for 1942. (5) AWC Report, February
1943). 552-54. (3) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs 1942-June 1943, pp. 40ff. (6) Memo, Robinson for
of SWPA, VI, 442ff. (4) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Sverdrup, 18 Nov 42. SWPA File 94.
220 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
putting earthen walls around hard- out, since stocks of pipe and cement had
stands. Still other items were dropped. been quickly used up. Adequate drain-
Hangars were seldom built. Gasoline age could not be supplied in a hurry,
storage tanks with fueling systems at and several runways gave signs of buck-
airfields in the combat zones were a rare ling as water seeped into the subgrades.
luxury. Usually gasoline was stored in The strips at Seven-Mile were weakened
drums.102 by underground springs, which put the
Work that could not be eliminated field out of operation for a time. Early
was sometimes postponed. During the in December, Casey flew to Moresby to
dry season, graveled strips in northern see the fields at firsthand and discuss
Queensland and New Guinea went weeks with the airmen some of the problems
and sometimes months before a coating about which they had been continually
of bitumen was applied. Planes land- complaining. Talking to Kenney, he
ing and taking off raised huge clouds of maintained that the engineers had, on
dust which sometimes took as long as the whole, clone a splendid job. Few
thirty minutes to settle. Calcium chlo- fields had been out of operation and then
ride was of no value here, for it was only for a short time. But in conversa-
effective only when it could draw tions with the engineers, Casey expressed
moisture from the air. In hot, dry his dissatisfaction over the way drainage
climates it merely became additional had been handled. He was not con-
dust. Gradually, the engineers brought vinced "that all had been done that
the situation under control. At some could be done." Suggesting that closer
fields they sprinkled the runways with attention and more intelligent thought
oil and tar, while at others they experi- be given to this aspect of construction,
mented with solutions consisting of one he reminded the engineers that even
part molasses and nine parts water, though a strip might consist of "six-inch
which proved quite effective. The de- armor plate, if it rests on soup it will
lay in sealing the runways produced sink and not support anything." So
little more than a temporary annoyance. long as the rains continued, conditions
In deferring drainage work the engineers were far from ideal. Even so, the dis-
ran a greater risk. When the tropical aster that some had predicted, the
downpours began, they were hard grounding of large numbers of planes,
pressed to keep many of the fields, espe- did not occur.103
cially the highly critical ones at Moresby,
from being flooded out. Hundreds of Construction Progress
culverts and drains had to be put in
almost overnight. Many of them had to Despite manifold difficulties, construc-
be built of wood or improvised out of tion forces in the South and Southwest
gasoline drums with the ends knocked
103
(1) Ltr, Casey to Godfrey, 1 Jan 43. (2) Of C
102
(1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 28-29. Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942. (3) Incl,
(2) Ltr, Casey to Godfrey, 1 Jan 43. SWPA File Advice from 808th Engrs, to Ltr, CO, 808th Engrs
497. (3) Memo, Robinson for Casey, 9 Oct 42. to Casey, 25 Sep 43. SWPA File 144. (4) Memos
SWPA File 496. for Rcd, Casey, 10 and 11 Dec 42. SWPA File 130.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 221
AIRSTRIP AT DOBODURA, SHOWING REVETMENTS. Note the dust behind the plane.
Pacific had succeeded by the close of they nevertheless showed some progress.
1942 in forging a chain of bases to secure At Milne, the troops had finished a
the Allied position. All the engineer ponton wharf, a Liberty dock, a pier for
construction units in SWPA had been small ships, and several stretches of road,
sent to New Guinea. At Moresby, in addition to completing two airfields
where most of them were located, work and surfacing them with steel mat. The
was fairly well along. Finishing touches third had been abandoned because of its
were being put on the airdromes, and swampy site. The engineers at Oro
base development was continuing with Bay, where work had only recently be-
the improvement of the port and the gun, had built a dock for barges and a
building of depots, hospitals, camps, few miles of road. In the South Pacific,
roads, and bridges. Though Milne Bay also, construction had advanced. When
and Oro Bay were considerably behind the fighting ended on Guadalcanal,
Moresby, largely because of the swampy Espíritu Santo boasted four airfields, a
terrain and the shortage of engineers, seaplane base, three hospitals, ten small
222 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the 810th Aviation Battalion, and Ton- Within the two theaters, the most
touta, as a result of the almost continuous extensive construction was still by far on
efforts of the 811th, was on the way to the Australian continent. The program
becoming perhaps the leading air base of the Allied Works Council included
in the theater. Considerable attention nearly every type of military installation
had been devoted to ports and roads. In —airfields, camps, depots, hospitals, ar-
November the engineers embarked on a senals, staging areas, and harbor defenses.
program of extensive development at Included also were munitions plants,
Noumea harbor. Reaching New Cale- aircraft factories, docks, defense high-
donia on the 7th of that month, the 131st ways, oil pipelines, radio stations, and
Combat Battalion was given as one of telephone lines. By 31 December 1942,
its jobs the building of a new dock, 60 the AWC had built or improved over 200
by 500 feet, complete with warehouses airfields—to cite only one figure. In
and a railroad siding. This unit also Queensland, a number of camps were
repaired the approach to the port's going up, including four to house units
original dock. When the 955th Topo- expected soon from the United States.
graphic Company arrived at Noumea The center of construction activity re-
late in 1942, it went to work not on maps mained in the southeast, where the bulk
but on the harbor. While much of the of the Commonwealth's defense projects
construction and repair of highways was were located. During the last months
handled by the New Caledonia Depart- of 1942, the Australians began three
ment of Public Works, every engineer large jobs in this area for the Americans.
unit on the island, with the exception Two were hospitals, one of which, the
of the mapping company, had a part in largest in the Southwest Pacific, was be-
widening, surfacing, and maintaining ing built at Herne Bay in Sydney, while
roads. The 810th alone kept up eighty the other, only slightly smaller, was
miles of roads in the northern part of going up at Holland Park in Brisbane.
the island. Transforming New Cale- The third project was a huge supply
donia into a major base necessitated all depot at Meeandah near Brisbane, which
kinds of projects. Besides working on was to have 47 warehouses dispersed
roads, ports, and airfields, the engineers over 260 acres. Notwithstanding the
had completed such varied assignments size of some of the installations being
as building a new headquarters for built for the Americans, work for the
USAFISPA, rehabilitating the tracks and United States forces on the whole had
rolling stock of the Nouméa-Paita rail- dropped off considerably and accounted
way, renovating a sawmill which had for only a small proportion of the
been out of operation for fifteen years, AWC's construction by the end of the
working in stone quarries, and putting a year. Funds being expended by the
fence around Tontouta to keep out council totaled slightly more than
cattle and deer.106 forty-five million pounds on 31 Decem-
106
(1) Hq XIII AF Serv Comd, Hist Mono 17, 811th Engrs, 1 Dec 41-31 Dec 43. (4) Hist of 131st
Opns of Avn Engrs in SOPAC, pp. 7, 66-80. (2) Engr Regt (Combat). (5) Building the Navy's Bases,
Hist of 810th Engrs, Oct-31 Dec 43. (3) Hist of II, pp. 221-25.
224 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
ber, but only 6 percent of that amount From their bases in the South and
was being spent for the Americans. Yet Southwest Pacific, the Allies hoped to
many of the Australian projects, by launch large-scale offensives during 1943.
strengthening the major Allied base of As the old year ended, plans were already
operations in the Southwest Pacific, being drawn for the reduction of the
would benefit the U.S. forces.107 Japanese stronghold at Rabaul. Once
details of strategy and command had
107
(1) AWC Report, February 1942-June 1943, pp. been settled and sufficient forces had
17-74, passim. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual
Rpt for 1942. (3) Incl to Ltr, Farrar to Teale, 27
been assembled in the theaters, opera-
Jan 43. SWPA File 94. tions would commence.
CHAPTER VI
MAP 12
Colonel Sturgis set up his headquarters Australia and Papua, Colonel Sturgis
at nearby Camp Columbia. The re- soon became acquainted with current
mainder of the engineer section, on its operations and learned of some of the
way to Australia by ship, was expected major engineer problems in the theater.2
in mid-April. By visits to engineer In February and March, several units
offices and installations in and near Bris-
2
bane, including Casey's office and the (1) Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nip-
pon (Washington, 1953), pp. 5-6. (2) Engr Sec
engineer section of Headquarters, Base Sixth Army, Engr Hist (Draft MS), Chs. I, III.
Section 3, and by trips through eastern Sturgis File 31.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 227
arrival of the amphibian engineers was the assembly plant with its three produc-
not greeted with enthusiasm on all sides. tion lines.9
General Heavey found "considerable
antagonism" on the part of many Navy Problems of Organization
officers, a number of whom expressed
serious doubts that the brigades could If CARTWHEEL were to have proper
operate successfully.8 Engineer support, the continuing dis-
Late in January the 411th Engineer agreement in the Southwest Pacific be-
Base Shop Battalion, 1,145 officers and tween the Engineers and the Army Air
men, arrived with the first elements of Forces over the control of airfield con-
the brigade. The 411th had originally struction would have to be resolved.
been organized to repair and maintain The Air Forces persisted in its attempts
the amphibian engineers' landing craft. to get control of the aviation units, and
When the decision was subsequently Casey continued to oppose strongly the
made to send the craft overseas knocked demands of Kenney and Whitehead.
down, the mission of the 411th was He maintained, as he had done pre-
changed to boat assembly. The unit viously, that if the aviation units were
was reorganized so that all three com- placed under the control of the Air
panies could put landing craft together. Forces and were used solely on airfield
The first job in Australia was the build- construction, there would in effect be
ing, with the help of a regiment of two construction agencies in the theater.
amphibian engineers, of an assembly They would have to compete for the
plant at Cairns. Here LCVP's, and limited amounts of materials, equip-
later LCM's, were to be launched and ment, and spare parts. Over-all plan-
used in the drive up the New Guinea ning for construction would become
coast toward Rabaul. The 411th had needlessly complicated, and control of
not been organized or trained to build the construction program would become
an assembly plant; it turned to this job much more difficult. It was Casey's
when it arrived at its destination only to view that, in the communications zone,
find "the plant not even started and the there should be not two construction
site encumbered with an old saw mill organizations, but one, and it should
whose owners were holding out for a be under the operational control of
high settlement." It was many weeks USASOS, to be used on any type of work
before the battalion retrieved its equip- that MacArthur believed was most
ment from the various Australian ports. urgent. 10 The question was settled late
Thereafter followed the struggle to build in February. MacArthur directed that
the construction of airfields continue as
9
through 30 Sep 43, pp. 1ff. SWPA File E15. (2) (1) Hist of 411th Engr Base Shop Bn, 20 Jul 42-
Brig. Gen. William F. Heavey, "Down Ramp," The 31 Oct 43. (2) Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Mili-
Military Engineer, XXXVIII (August, 1946), 334. tary Engineer, XXXVIII (August, 1946), p. 334.
8 10
Ltr, Heavey to Brig Gen Daniel Noce, formerly (1) Ltr, Kenney to MacArthur, 4 Feb 43. (2)
commander of the Amphib Tng Comd, 3 Jan 44. Memo, Casey for G-3 GHQ SWPA, 12 Feb 43. Both
SWPA File 62. in SWPA File 27.
230 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Jacky, and in the Millingimbi area near were frequent; the Australians had to do
Darwin. These projects were to pro- much of the work with picks, shovels,
ceed "simultaneously and with the great- and crowbars. Progress was slow. In
est possible speed."14 In the South out-of-the-way areas to the north, work
Pacific aerial reconnaissances were being was speeded on runways.16 Early in
made of the Solomons, especially of those March, Sverdrup directed Lieutenant
places where Japanese installations were Leahy to prepare one strip at Mt. Hagen
located.15 In February reconnaissance and two at Ogelbang, four miles to the
parties sent out by Casey's office investi- northwest.17 For these jobs Leahy
gated two little-known islands—Wood- rounded up 5,000 Papuans who worked
lark and Kiriwina—midway between with great energy in the way they knew
Papua and the Solomons and found best: They hauled earth in their native
excellent sites for airfields. baskets, Colonel Robinson wrote later
Engineer work was already under way in describing this project, "and compac-
in the most forward areas. A continuing tion was accomplished by thousands of
task was improving communications in bare native feet tramping in time with
northeastern New Guinea, where air- their weird chant or 'sing-sing.' " 18
fields, roads, and trails were primitive, to
say the least. A promising link between Troop Requirements
southern New Guinea and the Markham for ELKTON
Valley was the 68-mile-long trail stretch-
ing from the native village of Bulldog By 22 February, Casey's office had
north over the Owen Stanleys to Wau. completed a preliminary study of engi-
Improvement of this track would make neer troop requirements for ELKTON.
possible transporting substantial quan- More exact needs, to be worked out
tities of supplies overland from the Gulf later, would in large measure depend on
of Papua to Lae and Salamaua. On 18 the time allotted for the various phases
February a company of Royal Austral- of the operation, the number of native
ian Engineers began work at Bulldog, laborers who could be recruited, and the
and three days later another company demands for additional construction
started in at Wau. American units which might be made. Principal engi-
could not be spared from high priority neer tasks would include supporting the
airfield construction, but a number of combat troops, building airfields, ports,
bulldozers were sent to the Australians and roads in the combat zone, and pre-
for this difficult construction job. The paring and distributing maps. It was
terrain was rugged, little material could estimated that 15 new runways would
be found for surfacing, and downpours have to be built, 16 improved, and pos-
14 16
Ltr, CofS AAF SWPA, to AirO Comdg RAAF Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI,
Comd, AAF, 22 Mar 43. SWPA File 498. 159-62, 164.
15 17
(1) Maj Merrill E. DeLonge, AAF Representa- Ltr, Sverdrup to Leahy, 9 Mar 43. 686 New
tive Engr Bd Fort Belvoir, Rpt on Observations in Guinea No. 2, G-3 Files GHQ SWPA.
18
SOPAC 15 Jan 44. EHD Files. (2) Of C Engr Ltr, Robinson to C Staff Br, 31 Jul 50. SWPA
GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 146-48. Files.
232 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Nandi area. An extensive road im- The combat forces focused their main
provement program was under way. attention on the Solomons. The steady
The commanding general of the island infiltration of the Japanese down the
selected a plateau 2,000 feet above sea island chain posed a continuing threat
level as the site for a rest camp. After to Guadalcanal. Halsey decided to
conducting an extensive survey, the unit seize the Russell Islands, about thirty
began work on an 18-mile road from miles to the northwest. Occupation was
Nandi to the camp, a difficult job, as scheduled for late February, with the
much of the route had to be blasted from 43d Infantry Division assigned to the
almost sheer rock.22 operation. The division's 118th Engi-
On New Caledonia the major task was neer Combat Battalion sailed with the
improving the airfields. The 811th assault forces for the Russells on 15 Feb-
engineers were at various places—Com- ruary and landed on the 21st. No
pany A was at Tontouta; B, at Oua Tom; enemy troops were found. Combat en-
and C, at Plaines des Gaiacs. With the gineer missions comprised, for the most
installation of aviation gasoline storage part, road improvement, installation of
tanks on Penrhyn and Aitutaki, work on water points, and clearing of gun posi-
the alternate ferry route was almost tions. Naval construction battalions
complete. Such slight construction and built the airfields. The 118th engineers
maintenance as was still required was found their tasks easy. They were able
done by engineer units of the task forces to establish water points in short order,
on the islands.23 Construction was now and, since most of the terrain was flat
under way in New Zealand, where work and coral surfaced, road construction
was carried on in and near Auckland. proceeded rapidly.25
In early 1943 New Zealand's Public As preparations for the offensive in-
Works Department, using local con- creased, engineer supply was given
tractors, was building a 1,000-bed hos- greater attention than before. In March
pital, a replacement and supply depot, a 1943 a general engineer supply depot
camp, and installations for the Quarter- was organized at Noumea. Subse-
master Corps. The exploration for oil quently, the Seabees, with some help
continued. In January 1943 the man- from Army engineer units, built a large
aging director of the Shell Oil Company depot, where a heavy shop company was
in New Zealand asked Colonel Beard for installed. Supplies from the United
help in testing a geological formation States were stored there and then dis-
on South Island. In March the War tributed to engineer units in the South
Department approved, and plans were
made to begin drilling in several weeks.24 Caledonia, KCRC. (3) Beard, Concluding Rpt-Oil
Exploration Opns in New Zealand Under WD Fixed
Fee Contract W-412-eng-49.
22 25
Hist of the 821st Engr Avn Bn. (1) Memo for Rcd, n.d., Brief Appreciation of
23
Hist of the 811th Engr Avn Bn. Russell Islands Situation. RED VAULT, USAFISPA,
24
(1) Memo for Rcd, Hq USAFINZ and Serv Misc Hist Info, Russell Islands, 5 Jan 44. (2) Rpt,
Comd, Of of the Engr, 8 Dec 42. (2) Hq USAFINZ G-3 Sec 43d Inf Div, 25 Feb 43. RED VAULT,
and Serv Comd, Of of the Engr, Progress Rpt, 2 Apr USAFISPA. (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 257-
43. Both in Engr Files, US Army Forces in New 58.
234 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
26 27
SOS, SOPAC Hist Rpt From Activation to 30 Miller, CARTWHEEL: Reduction of Rabaul,
Jun 43. 98-SS2-0.1 (23774)M, 10 Nov 42-30 Jun 43. pp. 12ff.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 235
necessary. The engineers would have LCM's were expected from the United
to do much work for the ground and States in May.29 On 17 April the re-
service forces. It was essential to have mainder of the Engineer Section, Sixth
a balanced engineer force, but such a Army, reached Australia and Colonel
force was not in the theater in early 1943. Sturgis now had a more adequate staff to
Urgently needed were construction units, help him plan for combat. As rapidly
general service regiments, and dump as possible the units arriving from the
truck companies. Requirements for United States were being sent to New
such units were so heavy that it was not Guinea and were employed around the
possible under the troop basis to provide clock. In mid-April, the 46th, 91st, and
light or heavy ponton units, camouflage, 96th engineers were working on airfields,
water supply, or additional topographic roads, docks, and hospitals at Port
units. There was a critical need for a Moresby. The 808th Aviation Battal-
forestry company to provide timber in ion, which had recently left for Sydney
the forward areas and thus reduce ship- for rest and recuperation, was replaced
ping requirements. In a campaign such by the 857th Aviation Battalion, which
as that contemplated in ELKTON, to be reached Port Moresby early in April.
waged in the jungles of New Guinea and The 43d engineers were continuing work
the Solomons, engineer work, especially on airdromes and roads at Milne Bay and
construction, would be particularly Dobodura. Their effectiveness, Casey
heavy during the first three months. noted, had been lowered by "a high sick-
From now on the engineers would not ness rate resulting from continued hard
be able to count on civilian workmen to physical activity under severe tropical
meet most or a large part of their con- conditions with much of their opera-
struction needs. All that would be tions in malarial infested regions."
available, besides troops, would be the Two companies of the 96th were to be
natives of New Guinea and the transferred to Dobodura and two to
Solomons.28 Milne Bay to help the 43d. The 842d
Aviation Battalion, just arrived in the
Further Engineer Preparation Southwest Pacific, was to go to Port
in SWPA Moresby to become acclimatized and to
replace other units being moved to more
By April engineer work for the coming forward areas. A heavy shop company
offensive was moving ahead satisfactorily. and a maintenance company, which had
The 2d Special Brigade was training for recently landed in Australia and which
its missions. On the 7th the first LCVP had been urgently needed to repair
slid down the ways of the boat assembly equipment, were to be moved to New
plant at Cairns, and before long the men Guinea as soon as shipping became
were completing six a day. The first available. The American units in New
Guinea were being supplemented by
28
(1) Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 31 Mar 43.
29
(2) Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 8 Apr 43. Both in Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military Engineer,
SWPA File 111. XXXVIII (August, 1946), p. 335.
236 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
it could not be depended upon during problems at Waga Waga, where, in some
heavy rains. Casey directed that after places, swamps extended half a mile in-
the high-level road was finished, the low- land. A major handicap was the almost
level route be worked on to provide an complete lack of engineer troops. Only
alternate highway. Both roads were to Company F of the 96th Engineers was at
be completed eventually to take the Milne Bay, together with some Aus-
heavy traffic which would soon be moving tralian troops and natives. The units
inland from Oro Bay to Dobodura. The which had built the airfields the year
party found that facilities at Oro Bay before were gone; Company E of the
were well advanced. Hastily con-46th Engineers had been transferred to
structed warehouses, well dispersed, pro- Port Moresby and Companies D and F
vided excellent storage for the large of the 43d Engineers to Dobodura and
amounts of supplies arriving daily. On Oro Bay. Most of the Papuans at Milne
Goodenough, also, Casey found that the Bay were working for the Australians;
RAAF works units had made noteworthy 2,500 of them were building facilities for
progress on the airfields.34 the Australian Army, but only 250 had
Milne Bay, from which the advance up been assigned to the Americans. Ma-
the New Guinea coast and against the laria reduced the effectiveness of troops
nearby islands would have to be mounted and natives further. Shortages of equip-
and largely supplied, presented a differ- ment and materials were serious. Casey,
ent picture. Construction was far be- in a radio to Sutherland on 9 May, recom-
hind schedule. Some work was going mended that the principal advance base
on at three areas on the northern shore be located at Ahioma and that the K. B.
—Ahioma, K. B. Mission, and Gili Gili— Mission area be developed for staging
and at one area on the southern shore troops. He emphasized the need for
—Waga Waga. Farthest along was Gili sending in more engineer units.
Gili, where work had been started as far USASOS was hard pressed to find addi-
back as July 1942. Here were two air- tional troops; it had practically none to
35
fields, two docks, several warehouses, and spare.
a fair network of roads. At the other At the time of Casey's visit, the pros-
areas, work was just beginning. Waga pects were dim that the base would be
Waga was the only other place where ready to support combat operations by
piers had been built. Casey believed early June. Colonel Sturgis was greatly
that K. B. Mission, Ahioma, and Waga concerned over the slow rate of progress.
Waga were excellent for base develop- Members of his staff, having made a
ment. They had extensive, well-drained reconnaissance of Milne Bay in mid-
areas, ample supplies of water, and May, reported that much additional work
beaches with deep water close to shore, was necessary. On 26 May, General
well suited for piers. There might be Krueger, with the approval of Mac-
Arthur, ordered an advance echelon of
34
Headquarters, Sixth Army, including
(1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 May 43. SWPA
File 98. (2) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 10 May 43.
35
SWPA File 94. Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 May 43.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 239
Colonel Sturgis with a staff of thirteen through swamps. "It was common," the
officers and men, to go to Milne Bay to historian of the 46th Engineers wrote,
help with the development of the base. "to see three D-8 tractors stuck in the
The advance echelon reached Gili Gili same mud hole." Meantime, Sturgis
the next day. Borrowing a launch from readied two advance detachments, one
the base commander, Sturgis, with part under Col. Orville E. Walsh, the other
of his staff, cruised along the northern under Lt. Col. William J. Ely, to go to
shore, stopping off at K. B. Mission and Woodlark and Kirwina about a week
Ahioma for a closer look at sites for before the assault and select good land-
docks, warehouses, camps, and staging ing areas, locate sites for airfields, and
36
areas. A number of units, recently ar- find possible routes for roads.
rived from the United States, were Despite growing efforts being made in
rushed to Milne Bay; included were the New Guinea, Australia remained the
339th General Service Regiment, the major base in the Southwest Pacific, and
198th Dump Truck Company, and the an extensive construction program was
445th Heavy Shop Company. The 46th still under way there. On 30 June 1943,
General Service Regiment, a USASOS 48,000 civilians were at work on mili-
unit, was put under Sixth Army control; tary projects—an all-time peak. An
on 1 June, the second battalion and impressive amount of building had been
Company B arrived at Milne Bay from accomplished. Over 300 airfields had
Port Moresby. The next day, Sturgis been provided, from unpretentious grass
directed that a staging area for 10,000 strips without facilities to large air-
men be ready east of Ahioma by the 15th dromes with four or five paved runways.
of the month. Required were clearing (Map 13) The Allied Works Council
the jungle, putting in access roads, reported having built or reconditioned
wharves, and water supply points, and 4,621 miles of road. The Queensland
erecting buildings for an advanced com- Island Defense Road was finished, and
mand post. By 5 June, 2,824 engineers about two-thirds of the North-South
and 700 natives were cutting out patches Road from Alice Springs to Larrimah
of jungle, building piers, and erecting had been surfaced with bitumen. Hard
native-type structures. It was slow surfacing of the road from Larrimah to
work. Shortages of supplies, especially Darwin was in progress, and sealing of
of piling, were extreme. Sturgis had the road from Mt. Isa to Tennant Creek
the natives cut mangrove; the logs, some was nearing completion. Work had
of them seventy-five feet long, made ex- been finished on storage for gasoline—
cellent piling and could also be used for 174 tanks with a capacity of 110,092,000
decking. Engineer blacksmiths cut and gallons had been provided. The AWC
shaped spikes from lengths of concrete had built hospitals in all the states and
reinforcing rods. The rains were almost Northern Territory. The largest one,
continuous, and vehicles became hope-
36
lessly mired on the primitive roads, (1) Engr Sec Sixth Army, Engr Hist, ch. I. (2)
Comments by General Sturgis on draft of this chap-
which, for the most part, paralleled the ter. (3) 46th Engr GS Regt, Hist Rpt, 16 May-4
beaches and streams and meandered Aug 43.
240 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MAP 13
the Temperate Zone Hospital at Herne ville, Darwin, Fremantle, and other cities
Bay in Sydney—being built for the were being dredged and their port facili-
American forces—was to be finished by ties improved. The Brisbane graving
September, and the slightly smaller Hol- dock was more than half finished. Ex-
land Park Hospital in Brisbane, likewise cavation for the dock at Sydney was
being built for the U.S. Army, was also complete. The largest maritime proj-
to be finished that same month. Mil- ect was the transshipment port being
lions of cubic feet of warehouse space had built at Cairns for American forces at an
been provided, and construction was still estimated cost of £3,500,000, work on
going on. Again, the largest project which was just getting under way by the
under construction was a group of forty- end of June. Cairns harbor was to be
seven warehouses being built for the dredged, wharves totaling more than a
American forces at Meeandah, near mile were to be built, almost 100 ware-
Brisbane. (Map 14) The program of houses were to be erected, and 15 miles
camp construction was vast, particularly of road and 10 miles of railroad were to
in Queensland. The harbors of Towns- be put in. When finished the trans-
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 241
MAP 14
shipment port would be able to receive northern Australia were the hardest to
and distribute up to 25 percent of all complete. In early June 167 major
supplies and equipment sent from the projects, costing from £6,000 to
United States to Australia. During the £3,050,000, were under way in Queens-
fiscal year ending 30 June 1943, the land and Northern Territory. The
Allied Works Council spent £55,961,398 four largest, each costing more than
for military construction. About one- £1,000,000, were the transshipment port
third of this amount went for facilities at Cairns, the camp at Atherton Table-
for the American forces.37 lands, the road from Mt. Isa to Tennant
The AWC still found it impossible to Creek, and the road from Alice Springs
get enough workmen and equipment for to Larrimah. On 12 June, Theodore
its projects. As before, the jobs in wrote to Air Marshal George Jones,
Chief of the Air Staff, RAAF, that the
37
(1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, pp. council was "experiencing the greatest
21, 22, 24-26, 40, 50, 53, 56, 57, 60-61, 68, 71, 80.
(2) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 17 June 43. SWPA
difficulty in providing sufficient plant,
File 94. materials and manpower to enable . . .
242 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
works [in Queensland and Northern satisfaction with "red tape" grew. Some
Territory] to be completed within the kind of action was required to simplify
period asked for by the Services, and it procedures.40
is safe to say that there are few, if any, Little could be done to expedite pro-
works in these areas which are proceed- cedures on the Australian side. The
ing at the desired rate." As exasperat- Commonwealth authorities insisted on
ing as the lack of manpower and the reviewing all requests for construction
shortages of supplies was the transporta- from the U.S. Army for which Australia,
tion bottleneck. On 12 June there were from its limited resources, had to provide
3,775 tons of supplies piled up at Bris- workmen and materials. The Aus-
bane, Townsville, and Sydney awaiting tralian authorities studied each request
shipment to projects in the northern part to determine if it was in line with Mac-
38
of the continent. Arthur's operational and strategic plans
Procedure for construction, already and made surveys to ascertain whether
involved, became still more elaborate— Australian facilities were already avail-
partly the result of the establishment of able. They reviewed all requests for
the additional commands. After Head- construction of permanent type installa-
quarters, USAFFE, was set up, it was tions to determine if the standards of
empowered to approve all requests for construction were in harmony with those
construction before USASOS could for- of the Australian services. The Aus-
ward them to the various Australian- tralians agreed that confusion and red
American committees, a procedure insti- tape existed; the remedy, they said, was
tuted principally to curb requests from not to change the system but to operate
the Army Air Forces. Moreover, head- it more efficiently. They complained
quarters of both Sixth Army and Fifth that full details, plans, and estimates for
Air Force first reviewed all requests American projects were not furnished
from their lower echelons before sub- soon enough. Casey stressed the need
mitting them to USAFFE for approval. for prompt submission of the necessary
In April 1943, USAFFE directed that all data. But in other respects, the system
requests for construction in the service would have to go on as before.41
areas, whatever their cost, be submitted
for approval, if construction required The South Pacific by Midyear
building a new installation or expanding
an existing one in order to increase the In the South Pacific Area, construction
scope of operations.39 Considerable in the rear areas, except in Fiji, was
confusion resulted. Many base section largely complete by mid-1943. There
commanders would not authorize any
40
construction without first getting a de- (1) Ltr, Brig Gen Carl W. Connell, Hq Fifth
cision from higher headquarters. Dis- AF Serv Comd, to Casey, 15 Jul 43. (2) Ltr, Heiberg
to Connell, 21 Jul 43. Both in SWPA File 270.
41
(1) War Cabinet Secret Agendum No. 249/1943,
38
Ltr, Theodore to Jones, 12 Jun 43. SWPA Filesub: Works for the USASOS, Rec'd Of C Engr,
241. GHQ, 24 Jun 43. SWPA File 241. (2) Memo, AWC
39
Ltr, MacArthur to Krueger et al., 26 Apr 43. to Dep Dir-General of Allied Works, Queensland,
SWPA File 270. 27 Jul 43. SWPA File 270.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 243
was little left to do on the islands of the ways, constructing housing and storage,
ferry route. In New Zealand, the camp, and building roads.43
depot, and hospital near Auckland had By 30 June there were 145,443 United
been finished in April. The drilling for States Army troops in SOPAC, of whom
oil, resumed in May, had been discon- 13,434 were engineers. In SWPA, U.S.
tinued after about two weeks when it Army troops at this time numbered
appeared fairly certain that no oil would 176,254, of whom 23,909 were engineers.
42
be found. The Southwest Pacific, with a more ex-
The engineer aviation battalions had tensive engineer organization, had four
initially been assigned to the Services of major engineer offices, one each for GHQ,
Supply in the South Pacific. In January USAFFE, USASOS, and the Sixth Army.
1943 the Thirteenth Air Force was acti- The Australian military engineer organi-
vated, and shortly thereafter the XIII zation worked closely with the U.S. Army
Air Force Service Command. The latter Engineers. In the South Pacific during
was responsible for the administration the first months of 1943, there was but
and operations of engineer aviation units. one over-all Army engineer office—that
The first unit was transferred on 19 of Colonel Beadle in headquarters of the
April. The remote location of many Services of Supply at Noumea. On 10
units and poor communications resulted June, Beadle reconstituted the theater
in a great deal of local autonomy. On Engineer Section, which had been dis-
many of the outlying islands, the aviation continued the previous December. The
engineers were supervised by the base new section had 2 officers and 2 enlisted
engineer, and they remained under his men. As Engineer, USAFISPA, Beadle
supervision. On the islands more cen- was henceforth responsible for formu-
trally located—New Caledonia, New lating policies with regard to Army engi-
Hebrides, and Guadalcanal—the Air neer activities in the theater, advising
Forces took direct responsibility for the General Harmon on engineer matters,
administration and operation of engi- and co-ordinating Army engineer work
neer aviation units. On such islands as in the theater. Col. Lacey V. Murrow
New Caledonia and Fiji, the aviation took over from Beadle as engineer for
battalions were largely responsible for the Services of Supply; his staff num-
the building of airfields. In the combat bered 21 officers and 53 enlisted men.
zone of the Solomons the Navy directed Even with their expanded setup, the
airfield planning and construction, and engineers of SOPAC had nothing like
work on the fields was done for the most the engineer organization of SWPA.44
part by the naval construction battalions
and Marine engineer units. Army engi-
neer aviation battalions did such minor 43
(1) Hq XIII Air Force Serv Comd, Hist Mono-
work as extending and maintaining run- graph, Opns of Avn Engrs in SOPAC, Jan 42-Aug
44. (2) Memo, Kumpe for Casey, 27 Sep 43. 061.20
42
Intel Rpt, SWPA Files, KCRC. (3) DeLonge, Rpt
(1) SOS SOPAC Hist Rpt From Activation to on Observations in SOPAC.
44
30 Jun 43. (2) Beard, Concluding Rpt—Oil Ex- Hq and Hq Co USAFISPA, Hist, 1 Jul 42-30
ploration Opns in New Zealand. Jun 43.
244 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
would begin base construction as soon southern tip of New Georgia island, and
as the Japanese had been cleared from a soon thereafter Seabees began to build a
newly won area. The commanding fighter strip and a base for motor torpedo
general of USASOS was directed to push boats (PT's). Ten days later elements
completion of facilities on the Cape of the 43d Division landed on small
York Peninsula, and at Port Moresby, Rendova island. On 2 July they crossed
Dobodura, and Milne Bay. He was to the narrow channel and came ashore on
put special emphasis on building up New Georgia, some five miles southeast
Milne Bay, as this was to be the major of Munda Airfield. The engineers of
supply base in southeastern New Guinea. the 118th Combat Battalion went in
General Blamey was to begin the devel- with the infantry. They first cleared
opment of the base at Lae at the earliest beach areas and developed water points
possible time and was to get reinforce- and then prepared to support the in-
ments from USASOS for that purpose. fantry in the drive toward Munda Air-
As soon as the tactical situation per- field. Though the objective was not
mitted, USASOS would be made re- far away, it was hard to get to because of
sponsible for developing the base.46 the almost impenetrable jungle, the
swamps, and the skillful resistance of the
CARTWHEEL enemy. The engineers had more than
enough to do to clear trails, cut roads
Combat Engineers on New Georgia through the jungle, and build timber
bridges. On 14 July a second landing
CARTWHEEL was to begin with an as- was made on New Georgia at a more
sault on New Georgia in the central favorable point to the west, named
Solomons. A task force including the Laiana. The combat engineers again
Army's 43d Division and two Marine supported the infantrymen in the ad-
raider battalions had been organized for vance. Early in July Company C of the
the operation. Landings were to be 118th had landed on southern New
nade at various points on New Georgia Georgia. They helped the marines with
and nearby islands. The principal ob- base construction and destroyed enemy
jective was Munda Airfield, the capture pillboxes with flame throwers. In mid-
of which was to be followed by the July this company moved to Laiana to
destruction of the major concentrations support the advance on Munda. Mean-
of the Japanese forces. Since the islands time, a force of marines had landed on
of the New Georgia group were moun- the northern coast and was moving south.
tainous and blanketed with tropical Everywhere the forward movement was
forests and tangled undergrowth, the slow; Munda would not be easy to take.47
destruction of the enemy was expected to
be a laborious process. 47
(1) Hq 118th Combat Bn, Opns Jnl, 29 Jun 43-
On 20 June the marines landed at the 21 Aug 43. 343-43.3 (20433). (2) Capt. Joseph A.
Lieberman, "Road Construction on New Georgia,"
The Military Engineer, XXXVI (March, 1944), 75-
46
ELKTON Plan, Engr Annex, 1 July 43. SWPA 78. (3) Incl, The Army in the South Pacific, to Ltr,
File 117. Harmon to Handy, 6 Jun 44 (cited hereafter as
246 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
could also be used to build airfields in one, were on their way back to Port
remote, out-of-the-way places into which Moresby by 1100, just two hours after
machinery could not be moved overland. they had first taken off. The engineers
The battalions were ideal for construc- immediately began to improve one of
tion in Markham Valley. Airfields built the strips at Tsili Tsili, continuing this
there would enable the Allies to main- work until nightfall. The next day
tain continuous fighter cover over Lae they began work with their airborne
at an early date and make possible raids equipment on a 2-shift basis. By the
on Wewak, a sizable enemy base on the end of the second day, the runway was in
52
northern New Guinea coast. fair shape to take transports. The men
The initial unit selected for work in then began work on a nearby fighter
the Markham valley was the 871st. strip that Colonel Abbott, engineer of
Early in July the men trained a few days the Fifth Air Force, said he wanted as
in loading equipment on C-47's and "smooth as a billiard table," an assign-
taking it off again. A major objective ment the engineers considered "a pretty
was to cut down the time for unloading big order for airborne equipment."
one plane to three minutes. Since The men were soon working around the
the airborne engineers would have to clock. Since the kunai was six feet high,
rely mainly on their own resources to the mowing machines brought from Port
protect themselves against enemy planes Moresby were a godsend. About 400
and ground troops while working in natives helped on the field, clearing,
forward areas, each company of the bat- grubbing, and ditching. Defense was
talion received additional machine guns. provided by two companies of Australian
Soon the men learned where they were infantrymen "astride all the trails lead-
going. At Marilinan and Tsili Tsili, ing into the area." According to in-
natives, working under Australian and telligence reports, there were about 9,000
American officers, had for several days Japanese troops at Lae and Salamaua,
been clearing some old turf runways, some forty miles away. The engineers
once used by missionaries and gold found conditions ideal for construction
miners. On 7 July a plane carrying five with airborne equipment. The natural
men of Company C, a tractor, and a mow- drainage and bearing value of the soil
ing machine took off for Marilinan along were excellent. The skies were clear
with other planes carrying an antiaircraft with no sign of rain. Company C
battery. Two days later, the remainder worked alone until 21 July, when the
of the company—about 125 men—to- rest of the battalion landed, after having
gether with equipment and supplies, was been held back by bad weather over the
loaded on thirty planes and flown over Owen Stanleys. By this time the trans-
the Owen Stanleys to Tsili Tsili. The port runway had been extended to 5,000
thirty planes were unloaded and, except feet and the fighter strip to 4,600. On
26 July two fighters landed.53 "Had
52
Memo, Engr Sec Directorate of Base Serv Hq
53
AAF WD for Theater Group OPD WD et al, 2 Nov Memo, Maj J. R. Walton, ExecO 871st Engr
42. SWPA File 23. Avn Bn, for Woodbury, 5 Sep 43. EHD Files.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 249
you been here this morning you too the interior of the island. In mid-
would have been proud of your aviation August elements of the 65th Combat
engineers," Lt. Col. Harry G. Woodbury, Battalion landed to help the 117th and
Jr., the battalion commander, wrote to 118th engineers in the jungles around
Brig. Gen. Stuart C. Godfrey, engineer Munda. By the 25th of the month or-
54
of the Army Air Forces. ganized resistance on New Georgia had
ended.55
Progress in the Central Solomons Henceforth, the main engineer job on
the island was the building or improving
Meanwhile, in the Central Solomons of roads in support of the infantry trying
the campaign moved ahead. By late to eliminate isolated pockets of resist-
July the troops on New Georgia were ance. Even when completed, most of
slowly closing in on Munda. Engineer the roads were merely narrow clearings
support was continuous. The 118th through the tangled vegetation and were
Combat Battalion built a small boat pier just wide enough to take 2½-ton trucks.
at Laiana, cut roads through the jungle, Many of the routes were located by
and established water points. Responsi- native guides and with excellent results.
ble for the defense of the beachhead, Because the advance of the infantry was
the men established a peripheral defense now so rapid, the engineers found it im-
with barbed wire and automatic possible to provide drainage, not to men-
weapons. At various times, both com- tion surfacing. The numerous bridges
panies of the battalion went into the and culverts required were made of local
front lines with the infantry, using flame timber and discarded gasoline drums.
throwers with excellent results. Engi- During the rainy season, the roads be-
neer machine gunners shot down an came impassable; the engineers at-
enemy plane. On 22 July the first ele- tempted to provide surfacing with coral,
ments of the 117th Combat Battalion of but the coral was too badly weathered to
the 37th Division arrived. Part of the be suitable. Considerable corduroying
men served as infantry. All regular was necessary. Although the rainy sea-
engineer work had to be carried on son lasted, as a rule, from November to
under fire and the threat of ambush. May, rains occurred in the dry season
Bulldozer operators, to protect them- too.56
selves from snipers, improvised cabs with Additional airfields were needed in the
armor plates taken from captured or
55
beached Japanese barges. On 5 August, (1) Rpt, CO 65th Engr Bn to CG 25th Inf Div,
Munda Airfield was captured. Eight 265th Sep 43. (2) 65th Engr Combat Bn, Opns of the
Engr Combat Bn. (3642) 325-33.4, 16 Aug-
days later the first planes landed. Engi- 12 Oct 43.
56
neer work continued as the enemy troops (1) Lieberman, "Road Construction on New
Georgia," The Military Engineer, XXXVI (March,
were destroyed piecemeal or driven into 1944). 75-78. (2) Harmon, The Army in SOPAC.
(3) Opns of the 25th Inf Div in the Central
Solomons. (3462) 325-33.4, 16 Aug-12 Oct 43. (4)
54
Ltr, Woodbury to Godfrey, 26 Jul 43. Engr- Lt. Col. William B Eubank, "Combat Engineers in
871-SU, Tsili Tsili Airdrome New Guinea, Max- the Solomon Islands," The Military Engineer,
well AFB. XXXVI (August, 1944), 260-63.
250 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
back to a defense line being formed a kinds of weather and required little
hundred yards to the rear, remained in maintenance in the following months.
his pit and continued to fire point-blank Meanwhile, the airborne engineers had
at the enemy, now bent on wiping out begun a third major airfield at Gusap in
his position. An Australian rifle platoon the far northwest part of the Markham
moved to the beach to mop up the Jap- Valley, near the source of the Ramu
anese. Van Noy was found dead from River. After the area had been recon-
numerous wounds, his last round of noitered in September, the decision was
ammunition fired. Estimates were that made to develop an all-weather airfield
he killed at least half of the 39 enemy including complete servicing and repair
troops who had come ashore. "Van facilities and runways to handle 200
Noy's gallant action," an Australian ob- transports daily. Early in October an
server wrote, "gained time for all troops advance party of the 872d laid out the
to get into position to repel the landing landing strips and taxiways. Later
and undoubtedly saved lives," an opinion that month, the entire unit arrived and
shared by the Australians and Americans began work. By mid-November, a
alike at Finschhafen. Van Noy was 6,000-foot gravel-surfaced runway was
awarded, posthumously, the Medal of almost finished. Arriving at Gusap in
Honor, the highest award for bravery November, the 871st Battalion supple-
66
given by the United States Army. mented the efforts of the 872d. In
December, a 5,000-foot section of the
Airfields in the Interior initial strip was given an asphalt surface,
of New Guinea the fair-weather strips, previously cleared
by the 872d, were maintained and re-
During September the engineers con- paired, and a number of buildings were
tinued work on the airfield at Nadzab, erected. At Gusap the men were fortu
concentrating on the construction of a nate in that they could build comfortable
second runway. During October they quarters for themselves. For their mess
worked chiefly on graveling and asphalt- halls all companies erected portable
ing a third strip. They employed sev- huts with concrete floors. They had
eral hundred natives, who cleared camp screened buildings with walls of lumber
sites, unloaded aircraft, and worked on and roofs of canvas for their dispensaries
the runways, sorting rock and spreading and recreation rooms. These were al-
gravel by hand. Although designed as most unheard of luxuries in the out-of-
67
fair-weather strips and gravel-surfaced the-way reaches of New Guinea.
only, the first two runways constructed
at Nadzab remained serviceable in all Bougainville
one on Bougainville. The largest island engineer units were scheduled to arrive
68
in the chain, Bougainville, for the most to begin work on a sizable base.
part mountainous and jungle covered, By this time the decision had already
had swampy coastal plains. The assault been made to bypass and neutralize
was to be under the direction of I Marine rather than capture Rabaul. In June
Amphibious Corps. The 3d Marine Di- various planning staffs in Washington
vision was scheduled to go in first, fol- had reasoned that the advance toward
lowed by the Army's 37th Division. On the Philippines and the Japanese home
1November, the marines landed at Em- islands would thereby be speeded up
press Augusta Bay on the western part of considerably, and on 21 July General
the island. Naval construction battal- Marshall suggested to MacArthur that
ions began work on a base and an airfield. Rabaul be isolated. MacArthur at that
A week later a combat team of the 37th time did not believe that this would be
Division, including elements of the 117th a wise course, but the Washington strat-
Combat Battalion, came in. During egists became more and more convinced
their first two days ashore, the engineers that Rabaul should not be captured.
cut supply trails through the jungle east At the Quebec Conference Roosevelt
of the Koromokina River so that the and Churchill approved the recommen-
infantry could be supplied. Late in dations of the Combined Chiefs that
November they put a 3-span all-traffic Rabaul be merely neutralized. This
bridge across the river in five days. The decision was forwarded to MacArthur on
117th engineers gained considerable ex- 17 September. CARTWHEEL would be
perience in building roads through continued, but, in its final phases, the
virgin jungles. Using bulldozers and major objective would be not to take
explosives, the men first cleared a strip Rabaul but to neutralize it and at the
a hundred feet wide. Next, shovels and same time provide bases to support oper-
"cats" scooped out drainage ditches ten ations farther west.69
feet wide and up to ten feet deep on
either side of the planned 30-foot road. The Engineers Continue To Furnish
Under the top soil, about one foot thick, Logistic Support
was volcanic sand, which proved to be
adequate for surfacing. The sand was The South Pacific
excavated, piled up on the road, and
then leveled by bulldozers and graders. In SOPAC the engineers made even
Dump trucks were not necessary. By greater efforts on airfields and bases
15 December the engineers had com- during the last half of 1943. When the
pleted most road construction. On 810th Aviation Battalion had arrived on
that date responsibility for operations on
the island passed from the Marine I Am- 68
(1) Hist of the 117th Engr Combat Bn, 1 Oct-
phibious Corps to the Army's XIV 31 Dec 43. (2) Lt Col William B. Eubank, "Combat
Corps. A service command was organ- Engineers in the Solomon Islands," The Military
ized for Bougainville, and engineer work Engineer,
69
XXXVI (August, 1944), 263.
Miller, CARTWHEEL, The Reduction of Ra-
thereafter was directed by it. Additional baul, pp. 222-25.
256 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
fields along the northeast New Guinea The demands on the engineers at the
coast. Work at Milne Bay continued to two bases continued to be enormous. In
be difficult, and as the engineers enlarged October, the program at Milne Bay still
the base at Oro Bay, they found con- called for five Liberty ship docks for the
struction there more involved than had exclusive use of USASOS. Gasoline
been expected. The greatest obstacle storage for 2,500,000 gallons had to be
in both areas was the soggy terrain. put in. Over a million square feet of
USASOS did not have enough engineers covered storage had to be built at numer-
to develop the two bases as rapidly as had ous sites, and an ordnance depot for
been planned. There was, moreover, a 30,000 tons of ammunition was required
basic weakness in organization; USASOS, near the southern shore. A hospital
a service command designed for work in program of portable prefabricated huts
rear areas, had up to now also been for 2,500 beds was planned, and possibly
operating in what was, for all practical 2,500 additional beds would be needed.
purposes, the combat zone; the forward In general, the base was to provide sup-
bases, without adequate defense, were in port for 140,000 men, and indications
serious danger of being overrun. Con- were that this figure might even have to
struction had gotten so far behind be increased. By the end of the year
schedule that MacArthur directed Sixth work was progressing at a fairly rapid
Army to take over the work at Milne and rate. Seven wharves had been con-
Oro Bays from USASOS on 1 July. structed for Liberty ships along the
The two bases, with engineer units of shore from Gili Gili to Ahioma. Stor-
both Sixth Army and USASOS laboring age space had been increased to 750,000
on them, developed at a more rapid pace. square feet. Depots were located along
Base C on Goodenough Island, placed the coast in such a manner that almost
under Sixth Army control in July, was each one had its own pier. One hun-
inactivated that same month. On 15 dred miles of gravel road had been pro-
August, with construction at Milne Bay vided, together with six major bridges.
and Oro Bay fairly well along, the two Two airdromes, Gurney and Turnbull,
bases reverted to USASOS control. were in operation. At Oro Bay and
With a growing number of Sixth Army Dobodura, work was near completion,
as well as Australian combat units in largely because extensive facilities were
New Guinea, the danger of an enemy not required. Oro Bay was to be a
attack on USASOS installations in the staging area for 50,000 troops. By the
forward areas lessened considerably. end of the year, Base B had eight run-
Milne Bay and Oro Bay set the pattern ways of bitumen or steel mat, almost
for the future; henceforth, Sixth Army half a million square feet of covered
began base construction in the forward storage, 125 miles of road, 35 bridges, 10
areas and, later on, when the tactical wharves, including 4 which could take
situation permitted, USASOS took over.73 Libertys, together with hospitals and
73
administrative buildings.74 Inspecting
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,
I, 122ff. (2) Memo, Sturgis for Sverdrup, 17 Aug
74
43. Sturgis File 35. (1) Ltr, CG USASOS to MacArthur, 13 Oct 43.
258 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
sive construction being planned for enough to take Liberty ships. There
Finschhafen was not to reach its full were hospital beds, most of them in pre-
stride until 1944.78 fabricated portable units or native-type
At Moresby work had tapered off and huts, for over 2,000 troops.79 "The con-
by the end of the year was almost com- struction achieved in this area, especially
plete. Six airfields were in operation. airdrome construction, is most impres-
Eighty miles of road had been built, sive," Colonel Lane wrote to Casey in
about one-tenth of them surfaced with November.80 By the end of the year
bitumen. The engineers had built or most of the engineer troops had left Port
improved six docks, four of them large Moresby for more forward areas. The
78 79
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I,
II, 67. (2) Ltr, ExecO Of C Engr GHQ SWPA to 122ff.
80
Casey, 9 Nov 43. Memo, Lane for Casey, 9 Nov 43.
260 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
road from Bulldog to Wau had been for American commanders to send every
opened to traffic in August. By Sep- request to Headquarters, USAFFE, for
tember jeeps with trailers loaded with approval. Brig. Gen. Carl W. Connell,
about ten tons of supplies could make head of the V Air Force Service Com-
the rather rough trip in ten hours. mand, writing to Casey on 15 July, re-
With the capture of Lae and Salamaua, quested that something be done so that
the need for a route linking Port a base commander could go ahead with
Moresby with the Markham Valley be- his work "without the necessity of writ-
came unnecessary, and work on the road ing a scenario concerning his each and
was discontinued.81 every effort, and then waiting a fortnight
Construction in Australia in the latter while it is reviewed by someone who has
half of 1943 was still extensive. From 1 very little knowledge of his problems.
84
July to 31 December 1943 the Allied . . ." This matter was shortly clari-
Works Council expended £25,845,556. fied. On 21 July MacArthur directed
There was less building in the southern that "construction involving minor re-
part of the continent, but outlays for con- pairs, alterations, and improvements at
struction in Queensland and Northern a cost estimated to be less than 5,000
Territory increased slightly. Work for pounds will not be submitted . . . for
American forces, though declining, was approval" to Headquarters, USAFFE,
still considerable. In mid-October, the "unless such alterations and improve-
number of projects being built for the ments are not in accord with construction
U.S. Army totaled eighty-eight.82 The policy and directives." 85
jobs of highest priority were the im-
provement of five airfields—Garbutt, Supplies
Iron Range, Charters Towers, Amberley,
and Eagle Farms—the enlargement of In both theaters, stocks of supplies
two camps—The Caves and Mary- and equipment were extremely low.
borough—and the construction of a cold- In 1943, as in 1942, the authorized level
storage warehouse at Townsville. The of supply for Class II and Class IV items
size of the transshipment port at Cairns was a 90-day operating level, plus a 90-
had been cut drastically because of the day reserve. Most stocks in the two
rapidly expanding port facilities in New theaters never remotely approached the
83
Guinea. quantities called for. In the Southwest
The complexity of the construction Pacific, in late 1943, only about 7 percent
procedures remained. Particularly of the Class II items were on hand in
troublesome was the apparent necessity amounts sufficient to meet estimated
needs for 180 days. Class IV stocks were
81
equally scarce. The engineers in both
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI,
theaters needed far more than the ordi-
159.
82
AWC, Report for the Period July 1, 1943-Febru- 84
ary 15, 1945, pp. 9-11. Ltr, Connell to Casey, 15 Jul 43. SWPA File
83
Memo for Rcd, Hq USAFFE, sub: Relative 270.
85
Order of Importance of U.S. Army Constr Projs in Ltr, MacArthur to CG USASOS et al., 21 Jul 43.
Australia, 11 Oct 43. SWPA File 241. SWPA File 270.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 261
nary amounts of supplies and equip- liberal policy in editing Class IV requisi-
ment. Getting materials from the tions should be adopted." 87
United States was an extraordinarily Both theaters reported many critical
slow process. In the Southwest Pacific, shortages. In the South Pacific, lumber,
about 300 days elapsed between the time pipe, and electrical wire and fittings were
a requisition was sent to the United almost invariably in short supply. In
States and the time the troops received the Southwest Pacific, there was a heavy
the supplies. About one-third of this demand for corrugated iron. It was the
time was taken up with the transship- best material for covered storage because
ment of stocks from Australia to New it was easy to erect, easy to ship, and held
Guinea and their distribution to the up well in the tropics; on the whole, it
using units. One requisition for the was far superior to sisalcraft, fibrolite, tar
Papua Campaign reached the San Fran- paper, or native thatch. The engineers
cisco Port of Embarkation in October ordered 6,500 tons from the United
1942. The War Department did not States in May and another 6,500 tons in
finish editing it until February 1943, and August, but by mid-November they had
seven months later, materials ordered on received nothing. Lumber was con-
this requisition were still arriving at tinually in short supply. It was needed
Australian ports. In 1943 MacArthur's mainly for camps, hospitals, warehouses,
headquarters began sending requisitions wharfs, and bridges. Only about one-
for engineer Class II items to San Fran- sixth of the 154,000,000 board feet
cisco 300 days in advance. Once a requisitioned in 1943 from the United
month a new over-all requisition was States had been sent by mid-November.
sent to indicate changes in needs. Thus, Exploitation of New Guinea's lumber
there was constantly on file with the War resources was urgent, but it was held
88
Department a requisition for 300 days of back by a lack of sawmills. "All
engineer supplies and equipment for the engineering troops . . . should come
Southwest Pacific. There were fre- equipped with sawmills; lumber is the
quently difficulties in getting these big cry here," Col. Carl A. Brandt of the
requisitions approved and many were cut V Air Force Service Command informed
extensively in the United States.86 Gen- General Godfrey. "We in the Air
eral Reybold, visiting the Southwest Service Command have had to salvage
Pacific in November 1943, reported that old saw mills and fly them to for-
"reserve stockages have not been built ward areas, set them up, and operate
up in this theater, and as a result the for- them to get any lumber at all."89 The
ward displacement of port and airdrome 43d Engineers and the 116th improvised
facilities has been retarded both by lack sawmills from scrapped equipment, but
of construction equipment and by lack even though the units now had the
of sufficient engineer troops. A more
87
Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43. SWPA
File 88.
86 88
(1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 Nov 43. (2) Ltr, Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 Nov 43.
89
Casey to Reybold, 7 Oct 43. Both in SWPA File Ltr, Brandt to Godfrey, 24 Aug 43. AAF, RG
139. 501 Central Files, 322 Comds, Aug-Sep 43.
262 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
equipment, they lacked skilled operators. screening, but of these items, only cement
Casey's efforts to have a forestry company was available in adequate amounts. In
sent from the United States in 1943 were the South Pacific only New Zealand con-
unsuccessful; nevertheless he requested tinued to be a supplier of any conse-
six such companies for 1944. Shortages quence.90
of dock hardware, especially of nuts,
bolts, and steel rods, held back the con- Distribution of Supplies
struction of badly needed wharfs and
unloading facilities in the forward areas. With the arrival of growing, though
The only items not in short supply in still insufficient, amounts of supplies in
both theaters were fortifications mate- the theaters, distribution to the units in
rials. Insofar as possible the engineers the combat zones became a vexing
continued to rely on local resources.
Australia furnished considerable quan- 90
(1) Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43. (2)
tities of cement, lumber, nails, corru- Hist of USAFISPA During World War II From 30
gated iron, dock hardware, and wire Mar 42 to 1 Aug 44 (Draft MS). OCMH Files.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 263
matter. This problem was particu- at Port Moresby and made it responsible
larly acute in the Southwest Pacific. for co-ordinating engineer supply in the
USASOS established engineer supply forward areas. The Advance Echelon
depots at the various forward bases but was to receive all supply requisitions
set up no systematic procedure for requi- from the forward areas and decide which
sitioning, with the result that most units engineer depot was to fill them.93
in New Guinea continued to order from
depots in Australia. No engineer office Shortage of Supply Units
was responsible for co-ordinating supply
requisitions, nor was there an engineer Difficulties in both theaters were com-
office which had an over-all view of the pounded by an inadequate number of
supply situation. Since stock control engineer depot companies. The South
was almost completely absent, locating Pacific had to manage with two platoons
supplies was difficult. A second prob- of one company during the first half of
lem arose. Insufficient amounts of sup- 1943. In the latter part of the year a
plies had to be allocated to engineer provisional depot company was organized
units of USASOS for base development in Fiji, and one entire company and two
and to engineer units of task forces for platoons of another arrived in the
initial base construction. 91 General theater from the United States. Ele-
MacArthur delegated to USASOS, as the ments of these units were dispersed to the
major logistics agency of the theater, various islands. In the Southwest Pa-
responsibility for allocating supplies. cific, there was but one depot company
Colonel Sturgis suggested that stocks, throughout most of 1943. In the second
upon arrival in the Southwest Pacific, be half of the year, three more arrived.
allocated to General Headquarters, to These were too few to handle adequately
USASOS engineers, and to task force the growing quantities of supplies.94
engineers. He believed that resupply General Reybold, upon returning from
for Sixth Army engineer units should be the Southwest Pacific in November 1943,
from Army and not USASOS depots. reported to Somervell, ". . . until re-
Casey did not look with favor on this cently this theater has operated with one
suggestion. In his opinion, USASOS, engineer depot company, and ... [in
responsible as it was for logistic support Australia with] such civilian assistance as
in the theater, should determine, on the could be procured. There have re-
basis of operational directives, how cently arrived three more companies
supplies in the theater should be allo- which should ease the situation." 95 To
92
cated. Late in 1943 the engineers keep supply from sinking into chaos,
attempted to co-ordinate distribution of
supplies more adequately. In Decem- 93
Memo, Casey for Engr Adv Ech USASOS, 23
ber USASOS set up an advance echelon Dec 43, with 1st Ind, Engr Adv Ech USASOS to
Engr GHQ Adv Ech, 30 Dec 43. SWPA File 219.
91 94
Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 3 Sep 43. SWPA (1) SOS SOPAC, Hist Rpt From Activation to
File 211. 30 Jun 43, app., List of Trp Units, SOPAC, 15 Jul
92
Memo, Sturgis for Sverdrup, 29 Sep 43. SWPA 43. (2) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 Nov 43.
95
File 124. Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43.
264 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
men had to be detailed from general Repair Group on 15, and that of the
service regiments to engineer depots 864th Aviation Battalion on 18. In an
from time to time. effort to bring about more efficient use
of the inadequate amount of equipment
Equipment Shortages available, the War Department required
the overseas theaters to submit a Mate-
Equipment was chronically short. rial Status Report at the end of each
Because there were so few troops, they month, beginning on 31 October 1943.
usually had to be furnished with more This report was to state how many pieces
machinery than the tables of equipment of machinery were on hand in the
called for. Some units, such as general theater, the number of items in depots,
service regiments and combat battalions, and the number "lost" during the
needed not only more, but also heavier, month. Computations would be made
machinery. As soon as a machine ar- in the War Department as to the num-
rived in either theater, it was immedi- bers of each item of equipment to which
ately sent to a unit which was greatly in a theater was entitled. Late in 1943,
need of it. In both theaters units Casey reported that "the rate of ship-
worked in widely separated and isolated ment of construction plant either as
areas; because of the shortage of ship- Class II or IV has been barely sufficient
ping, it was difficult to send equipment to replace losses and obsolescent plant
back to a central pool for redistribution. and to issue the additional plant required
As a result, while there might be a con- by units. . . ." 96
siderable stock of some types of machin-
ery in a theater, equipment could not Spare Parts and Maintenance
always be delivered where and when it
was most needed. In the Southwest Since spare parts were almost non-
Pacific there were serious shortages of existent, much equipment was deadlined.
tractors, graders, cranes, concrete mixers, In some respects, matters were worse in
ditching machines, and welding equip- the SOPAC than in the SWPA because
ment. In the South Pacific tractors, the former theater had so few commer-
97
cranes, shovels, and dump trucks were cial concerns to supply parts. The en-
most in demand. A bad situation was gineer of the service command on New
made worse by the continual arrival of Caledonia reported in late 1943 that a
so many engineer units without their large percentage of engineer equipment
98
machinery. Often the plant did not was "down due to lack of parts."
show up until months after a unit had Spare parts, especially those needed for
reached its destination. An equally shovels, tractors, motor graders, and
great cause of confusion was the arrival carryall scrapers, were scarce in both
of a unit's equipment on many ships at
widely scattered ports. In the South- 96
Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 Nov 43.
97
west Pacific the machinery of the 839th Rpt on Conditions in SOPAC, pt. I.
98
TWX, Maj Gen Thomas M. Robins to Engr
Aviation Battalion arrived on 11 ships, SupO Columbus QM Depot Columbus Ohio, 26
that of the 1052d Port Construction and Dec 42. CE South Pac 1.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 265
theaters for a number of reasons. Far parts services. Some 1,300 cases of
larger quantities of equipment were urgently needed parts have arrived but
required than had been anticipated. A cannot be handled for lack of personnel
great deal of the machinery, too light for and suitable storage space." 99 Efforts
the work which had to be done, was, were being made to better the situation.
nevertheless, subjected continuously to By late December a warehouse, 80 by
hard usage. Extraordinarily large num- 400 feet, with a concrete floor, had
bers of parts were needed because en- been completed. Bins were being con-
gineer equipment was not standardized. structed, and the classification of spare
One unit arrived in Australia with seven parts was being "vigorously pushed." 100
kinds of tractors manufactured by five Just as scarce were spare parts for the
firms. Because stocks of spare parts in amphibian engineers' landing craft.
the United States were low and shipment They were needed in much greater
to the theaters infrequent, parts often amounts than had been expected.
were not received until eight months Tropical waters quickly corroded gen-
after requisitions for them were sent in. erators and starters; coral reefs tore up
After the parts arrived in either theater, propellers and shafts. Since the Navy
it sometimes took as long as five months was responsible for supplying spare parts,
to get them to the using units. Auto- the amphibian engineers sent their
matic shipments were just as unreliable. requisitions to Service Forces, Seventh
The 842d Aviation Battalion left San Fleet, at Brisbane. The Navy procured
Francisco on 26 February; second eche- the items it needed from its stocks in the
lon parts for its D-7 tractors, which United States and supplied the amphib-
should have been sent automatically ian engineers with their share. Al-
with the unit, were not shipped until five though a supply system was set up in the
months later. theater, the engineers received only a
A bad spare parts situation was aggra- trickle of spare parts. During the last
vated by an almost complete lack of six months of 1943, the Navy could meet
personnel trained in storing and dis- only 5 percent of the amphibian engi-
tributing. During 1942 and 1943 there neers' demands, although it turned over
were no spare parts companies in either to them half the stocks in its distribution
theater, even though requests for such center at Milne Bay.101 "Our really
units had been sent to Washington re- important and only serious trouble has
peatedly. On 1 August the War De- been [the] shortage of spare parts,"
partment stated that no such companies Heavey wrote on 3 January 1944 to Brig.
would be available in 1943. Late that Gen. Daniel Noce, formerly head of
year spare parts began to arrive in more the Engineer Amphibian Command.
adequate amounts. Now the problem
of storing and issuing them became 99
Memo, Lane for Casey, 9 Nov 43.
acute. Great confusion existed at Milne 100
Memo, Col C. R. Bathurst, SupO Of C Engr
Bay. "The most striking Engineer GHQ SWPA for Casey, 23 Dec 43. SWPA File 160.
101
Ltr, Capt Donald Joseph, Liaison Off 2d ESB
problem at this base," wrote Lane, "is USAFFE Engr Sec, to Casey, 13 Nov 43. SWPA
the organization of [the] Engineer spare File 228.
266 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
". . . no one foresaw that electrical scarce, speed, especially in the construc
parts, generators and starters would go sotion of airfields, was as urgent as ever.
fast in these tropics. . . . Not a spare In the Southwest Pacific a landing field
generator or starter now in this whole now consisted of a single runway. If a
theater. . . . Navy is as short as we second strip was put in, it was con-
are. . . ."102 structed parallel to the first. Runways
The shortage of parts alone would were, as a rule, initially grass landing
have made it hard to keep machinery in places or captured Japanese airstrips;
good running order. Now most equip- but in either case they were improved
ment was being used constantly in iso- and later surfaced with mat, coral, or
lated areas, hundreds, and sometimes bitumen. In the South Pacific, where
thousands, of miles from repair centers. airfields were built under the Navy's
Maintaining equipment properly under guidance, they were more elaborate.
such conditions was extremely difficult. Early in 1943, runways were still crossed
A maintenance company and a heavy in the "traditional" manner and were
shop company arrived in the Southwest 150 feet wide and of varying lengths.
Pacific in April; a heavy shop company But by the end of the year it was the rule
and a maintenance company, in the to put in a single runway and provide
South Pacific in June. Elements of two parallel taxiways. In the South
these units were sent far and wide in Pacific coral was extensively used for
order to get the most urgent repair jobs surfacing; the airmen preferred it to
out of the way. As a rule, construction mat, also widely used. Coconut planta-
units had to repair and maintain their tions were generally the most ideal sites
own equipment as best they could. Al- for landing strips. Construction at each
ready working on two or three shifts a runway followed standard procedures.
day, the units were hard pressed to pro- Fill was placed in a 4-inch layer and was
vide operators for heavy equipment and compacted with sheepsfoot rollers. The
at the same time furnish men for repair- final surfacing consisted of a 6-inch layer
ing and maintaining it. General Rey- of coral. The result was a "smooth,
bold reported to Somervell in November hard, impervious, reasonably dust-free
that "the lack of maintenance and shop surface." If landing mat was used, it
installations and personnel has been was placed on the compacted coral.104
apparent." 103 This was an understate- In both theaters troops in the forward
ment. areas lived in tents. Wherever possible,
screened and floored mess halls and
Construction Standards kitchens were built of local materials.
Makeshift facilities were provided
Building in the forward areas con- for bathing. In April 1943, General
tinued to be mainly on a makeshift basis. Breene, head of the Services of Supply
Though troops were few and supplies in the South Pacific, directed that north
102 104
Ltr, Heavey to Noce, 3 Jan 44. (1) DeLonge, Rpt on Observations in SOPAC.
103
Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43. (2) Memo, Kumpe for Casey, 27 Sep 43.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 267
of the New Hebrides only tents or sections. By late 1943 shipments to New
105
native-type structures requiring no im- Guinea began.
ported materials would be permitted for
troop housing. South of the New Men and Machines
Hebrides, frame structures were per-
missible, but such construction would Engineer units were being put to a
receive the lowest priority. In late severe test. Since operations in SWPA
1943 prefabricated buildings began to be extended over a much wider land area
used. In the Southwest Pacific, Colonel than those in the SOPAC, conditions
Teale's engineers developed a number of under which the engineers had to work
standard types, the three major ones imposed greater hardships. In the prep-
being 20, 47, and 88 feet wide and of aration of the tables of organization and
variable lengths. The one 20 feet wide, equipment of general service regiments
and usually 54 feet long, was the most and other kinds of construction units in
practical as it could be used as living prewar days, it had been assumed that
quarters, an administrative building, or the men would do their work mainly
as a warehouse. In the South Pacific, with hand tools and that machines would
New Zealand supplied prefabricated be used only occasionally. This basic
hutments 20 feet wide, with lengths in assumption had to be drastically revised.
multiples of 4 feet. Very noticeable in Getting a large amount of machinery
the SOPAC was the superior type of and keeping it going around the clock
106
housing provided for Navy personnel. were most important matters. The
They usually lived in comparatively commander of the 808 th Aviation Bat-
comfortable Quonset or Dallas huts. talion estimated that the 800 men of his
Colonel Murrow believed that housing unit, using their machinery around the
for the Army was not good enough, that clock, could do as much work as 50,000
if troops were to occupy an area for more men equipped only with hand tools.107
than six months, they should live in Small wonder that machinery was oper-
frame buildings of some kind. In the ated for twenty or more hours a day and
forward areas, makeshift structures were was stopped only for maintenance and
used as warehouses and hospitals. Na- repair. Small wonder, also, that under
tive huts and canvas-covered native-type such usage problems arose. It was hard,
frames often had to do as hospital wards in fact, usually impossible, to find enough
but were not satisfactory. Teale's engi- capable equipment operators and main-
neers adapted the 20-foot-wide prefabri- tenance personnel. Most units, espe-
cated buildings to hospital needs. cially general service regiments, did not
Lengths could be extended by 9-foot
105
increments. Eaves were wide and over- (1) AWC, Report for the Period July 1, 1943-
February 15, 1945, pp. 49-54. (2) Hist of USAFISPA
hanging. Units contained from 50 to During World War II From 30 Mar 42 to 1 Aug 44,
100 beds. One of Australia's leading pp. 585-611. (3) Rpt on Conditions in SOPAC, pt.
building contractors was appointed co- III.
106
Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 13.
ordinator of the manufacturing program, 107
Ltr with Incls, Ellison to Casey, 25 Sep 43.
and many firms built the prefabricated SWPA File 144.
268 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
have enough high ratings for the large general service regiment seemed espe-
numbers of specially trained men re- cially unwieldy in vast theaters with
quired. "Their disadvantage as to fluid tactical situations. Greater flex-
grades and ratings in comparison with ibility in organization was needed.
Aviation and C. B. battalions is resulting Attempts were being made to find
in much dissatisfaction," 108 Reybold re- solutions to these problems.
ported to Somervell after his visit to the Faced with severe shortages of troops
Southwest Pacific. The fact that jobs and equipment, the engineers, in 1943
were scattered over such wide areas as in 1942, had to rely heavily on native
meant that many detachments had to be workmen, especially in New Guinea.
sent out from the larger units. This Little interested in the war, the natives
practice led to complications in setting of that island were nevertheless eager to
up an efficient organization, providing work for certain types of goods. Those
equipment, performing maintenance, living near the coast, who had had fairly
and furnishing supplies. The large extensive contact with white men,
wanted tobacco, matches, knives, razor
108
Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43. blades, calico, and salt. Those living in
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 269
third mapping unit, the 960th Aviation Reybold. The map makers were mainly
Topographic Company, reached the occupied with producing hasty terrain
110
Southwest Pacific during the year. maps and photomaps of areas in the Solo-
In the South Pacific, Army mapping mons likely to be the scene of combat.112
and intelligence functions were the re- In the Southwest Pacific, even as late as
sponsibility of Admiral Halsey's G-2 July 1943, a half-strength photographic
section. G-2 had placed all mapping reconnaissance squadron, equipped with
and intelligence functions, Army, Navy, P-38-type F-4 planes, was all that was
and Marine, in the Combined Intelli- available for photographic missions.
gence Center, which, along with other Much of the photography obtained in
headquarters installations, was located 1942 had been poor because the airmen
in a converted warehouse in Noumea. were not fully aware of the engineers'
The center had six sections, each con- needs. To give them a better idea of
cerned with a particular aspect of map what was expected, an officer from the
making or gathering intelligence; Army, 648th began to serve with the photo-
Navy, and Marine personnel worked in graphic squadron in a liaison capacity
all sections. The one Army mapping late that year. He gave the airmen a
unit in the South Pacific, the 955th better understanding of the importance
Aviation Topographic Company, had of getting good photographs. Pilots vis-
arrived in May 1942 without its equip- ited the base map plant at Melbourne to
ment. For eight months thereafter it see how their photographs were used and
was on construction jobs. With the to learn how hard it was to make good
113
arrival of its equipment late that year, it maps from indifferent photography.
began to make photomaps of the Solo- To meet the growing complexities of
mons and was in late 1942 engaged in supplying maps to units, especially in
111
this work on Espiritu Santo. such large theaters as the Southwest Pa-
The map makers had to rely more and cific, the War Department activated map
more on aerial photography. The South distribution units, each with one officer
Pacific was better off than the Southwest and twelve enlisted men. The first of
Pacific in this respect, for the land areas the units to be shipped to SWPA arrived
that had to be mapped were compara- in late 1943 and was sent to Finschhafen,
tively small and there were sufficient where it opened a map depot. The
numbers of aircraft to furnish fairly Australians opened a similar depot at
114
adequate photographic coverage. "The Port Moresby.
photo reconnaissance group has appar- Of growing importance was the gather-
ently given excellent cooperation in sup- ing of engineer intelligence. Extensive
plying those photographs necessary for construction needs in the forward areas
planning purposes," Maj. Merrill E.
DeLonge wrote in his report to General 112
DeLonge, Rpt on Observations in SOPAC.
113
(1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for
110
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 1943, Intelligence. SWPA File I 27. (2) 648th Engr
97ff. Topo Bn GHQ, Interim Rpt, 1 Jan-30 Sep 43.
111
Memo, Col Kumpe for Lt Col E. A. Dunbar, SWPA File I 4.
114
Intel Sec OCE GHQ SWPA, 3 Oct 43. SWPA Files. Ibid.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 271
made accurate analyses of the terrain little time could be set aside for teaching
highly important. Here too, aerial entire units. The only exceptions were
photography continued to be a most the combat engineer units, which were
important source of information, espe- given rather intensive training before
cially in the Southwest Pacific, where being sent to the front lines. In SWPA,
great stress was being put on terrain training centers were set up in early
intelligence. On occasion, members of 1943 near the major Australian coastal
Casey's intelligence section made per- cities from Melbourne to Cairns to train
sonal reconnaissances of the forward American and Australian units in all
areas. The information gathered from phases of amphibious operations. The
different sources was compiled and issued 114th and 116th Combat Battalions and
in numerous publications, such as ter- the 8th Engineer Squadron of the 1st
rain analyses, engineer annexes to terrain Cavalry Division spent three weeks at
studies, preliminary terrain estimates, the center north of Brisbane, undergoing
and spot area studies. Toward the end training in landing operations. Exer-
of 1943 Casey's intelligence section also cises were realistic, even to the point of
began to gather more extensive informa- including bombardments. But for the
tion on the organization of the Japanese men of the service units, unit training
engineers and on their equipment and almost invariably meant on-the-job
activities.115 training.116
A number of men from service units
Training were sent to specialist schools. The
Australian armed services had several
The training of troops was the func- that enrolled engineers in need of addi-
tion of engineer training centers in the tional training. The RAE school in
United States. Sometimes additional bomb disposal at Bonegilla in Victoria,
instruction was necessary overseas. Oc- one of the first which the engineers at-
casionally, entire units had to be given tended, provided excellent training.
special training so that they could cope After finishing their course of instruc-
with conditions peculiar to the theater tion, the men returned to their units to
or meet new tactics developed by the become heads of bomb disposal squads
enemy. Specialists were sometimes sent and train others in the subject. The
to schools to take refresher courses. If RAE and the RAAF had several schools
there was a great demand for men with to teach camouflage. A small number
certain skills, such as for operating of engineers attended the courses. On
equipment, removing mines, and mak- the whole, the instruction provided was
ing soil analyses, special instruction had too technical to serve U.S. Army needs,
to be given to train the additional men and the fast-growing Allied air superior-
needed. Because of the pressure of ity made training in camouflage seem
work in the South and Southwest Pacific,
116
(1) For a more detailed discussion of Engineer
115
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, troop training in the Southwest Pacific, see Of C
100-101. Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 52ff., 108ff.
272 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
be made at Saidor, on the New Guinea Dukws continued their fire until the
coast.119 first wave was only 150 yards from shore.
MacArthur scheduled the landing at While they did not have pinpoint
Arawe for 15 December, and the 59th accuracy, they threw up an effective bar-
Engineer Combat Company and boat rage. Riding low in the water, they
and shore units of the 2d Special Brigade made small targets. The barrage at
were assigned. This was to be the first Arawe proved to be largely a practice
assault since the Nassau Bay landing in one, for there was but slight opposition
which the amphibious engineers would to the landing.122
support a task force made up solely of The 59th engineers had few combat
American troops. Naval transports took missions. They found no mines or
the amphibious engineers with seventeen obstacles, and rarely saw any enemy
LCVP's and two LCM's to the rendez- troops. Most of the men at first worked
vous area about four miles from Arawe. as stevedores. Some began to improve
Since the tops of the reefs were just the landing beach. One man with a
barely submerged, only the Navy's bulldozer stripped off the 15-foot-high
Alligators and Buffaloes were sent in on undergrowth. Teams of thirteen men
the first four waves.120 The first engi- laid landing mat, stapled it down, and
neer craft to go in—part of the fifth wave covered it with sand to keep it from
—had a hard time. One LCVP, stuck curling. Despite some interruptions
on a reef, was riddled by bullets from caused by bombing and strafing by
Japanese planes. Previous amphibious enemy planes, unloading and dispersing
operations had a serious weakness in that of supplies were carried out in an orderly
protective naval fire stopped when the manner. Supplies unloaded, the 59th
assault craft were about a thousand yards turned to construction. The men built
from shore. The next few minutes were a small dock, a refueling pier, a station
crucial. Enemy fire from the beach, hospital, five miles of all-weather roads,
even if minor, might seriously disrupt and three baseball diamonds. They had
the landing. At Arawe, the amphibian ample equipment for their work, having
engineers used two of the newly devel- recently received the additional ma-
oped Dukws equipped with rocket chinery required by their unit's table of
launchers which fired on the beaches organization and equipment. Enemy
after the naval barrage had lifted.121 air raids were frequent. During their
Each Dukw had 120 rocket tubes capa- first ten days ashore, the men bivouacked
ble of shooting 4.5-inch rockets for a in a narrow area between the shore and
distance of 1,100 yards. At Arawe the a swamp. One night, planes bombing
119 122
Krueger, Rpt of the DEXTERITY Opn, 15 Dec (1) Heavey, "Amphibious Engineers in Action,"
43-10 Feb 44. SWPA File A167A. The Military Engineer, XXXVI (May, 1944), 150.
120
Alligator was the popular term for the landing (2) 2d ESB, Monthly Rpt of Opns, 1-31 Dec 43.
vehicle, tracked, Mark I (LVT (1)); the Water Buffalo, SWPA File E20. (3) 59th Engr Combat Co (Sep),
or landing vehicle, tracked, Mark II (LVT(2)), was Engr Opn Rpt. SWPA File 74. (4) Heavey,
an improved type of Alligator. "Rockets by Army Engineers at Arawe," The Mili-
121
The Dukw was a 2½-ton 6x6 amphibian truck. tary Engineer, XXXIX (August, 1947), 345.
274 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the area killed two men and wounded using the excess to fill the low spots.
four. Washing Machine Charley, as the Construction was hampered by the al-
124
enemy planes were called, caused much most continuous torrential rains.
loss of sleep. The Japanese made no On 17 December General Krueger re-
attacks by land. Amphibian engineers, ceived MacArthur's directive to take
their craft equipped with automatic Saidor. Five days later he organized a
weapons, ranged through the swampy in- task force made up of elements of the
lets and coastal waterways near Arawe, 32d Division which would attack on or
seeking out enemy craft that might at- after 1 January 1944. The attack was
tempt to approach the landing area. made on the 2d. Boat units of the 2d
They came upon several and sank ESB brought the troops ashore in calm
them.123 seas with little trouble. The engineers
On 26 December the 1st Marine Divi- placed landing mat on the loose stones
sion landed at two points on Cape and sand of the beach, thus enabling
Gloucester. The amphibian engineers, trucks to move across easily. As the
their small craft tossed about by high infantry expanded the beachhead, the
seas stirred up by strong northwest amphibian engineers carried out numer-
winds, helped bring in the marines, em- ous resupply missions, necessary because
ployed rocket Dukws to protect the heavy rains had made the few roads and
boats in the first waves and subsequently trails almost impassable. There were
engaged in resupply missions and carried no Japanese in the area. Company A
on patrols nightly off nearby beaches of the 114th Combat Battalion, re-
where the Japanese were reported lurk- sponsible for combat missions, built
ing. One rocket Dukw knocked out roads and bridges. Much corduroy and
four pillboxes that were holding up the many small bridges were required. The
advance along the coast. On shore, Australians, upon abandoning Saidor
Marine engineers were responsible for early in 1942, had dug trenches across the
combat support; Army engineers, for landing strip and had erected 12-foot
base construction. Work was under the poles. Trenches and poles were still
direction of the Marine task force com- there and the field was overgrown with
mander. Already in the area were two kunai grass. The task force engineer di-
Japanese-built airstrips, both poorly con- rected that the runway be rehabilitated.
structed. Engineer officers who in- Shore engineers and field artillery troops,
spected them believed that the better of using bulldozers, shoved the dirt back into
the two could be developed. In Janu- the ditches while fifteen men of a depot
ary, three aviation battalions—the platoon took down the poles. Trucks,
1913th, the 841st, and the 864th (less ranging back and forth, knocked down
one company)—arrived and proceeded to the grass and compacted the surface.
put in two parallel runways. The men Combat engineers and field artillery
removed the humus and cut down the
124
underlying gravel to the required level, (1) Heavey, "Amphibious Engineers in Action,"
The Military Engineer, XXXVI (May, 1944), 151.
(2) Hq 1913th Engr Avn Bn, History of the Bn
123
59th Engr Combat Co (Sep), Engr Opn Rpt. During Dec 43 and Jan 44.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 275
troops policed the area. On the after- continued to play an important part in
noon of the third day the strip was ready supporting the infantry in combat, and
for use. The next day the 808th Avia- they had had increasing responsibilities
tion Battalion arrived and was assigned for construction in the forward areas.
the job of extending the runway to 6,000 The most striking aspect of engineer
feet. It carried out this work, assisted operations in the two theaters was the
by the 863d and 860th Aviation Bat- divergence from usual patterns in that
talions. Soon a minor base was under service engineers did not work behind
construction at Saidor.125 the combat forces, but beside them.
CARTWHEEL had come to an end. Almost as soon as the first combat forces
Rabaul was so effectively neutralized that landed in a forward area, construction
it could be bypassed. Engineer activi- units came in to begin the building of
ties in the South and Southwest Pacific bases and airfields. As a result, adequate
had greatly expanded in 1943. The support of the combat troops was pos-
number of U.S. Army engineer troops sible sooner, the air forces were able to
had increased from 8,770 to 15,261 in strike at the more remote enemy strong-
the South Pacific and from 7,594 to points at an early date, and the rapid
42,285 in the Southwest Pacific. The advance of the Allied forces could be
engineers had had their first experience sustained. It was becoming increas-
with amphibious operations. They had ingly clear that the rapidity of the ad-
vance in the two theaters in large
125
(1) 114th Engr Combat Bn, Opns of Co A, measure depended on the speed with
114th Engr Combat Bn From 2 Jan 44 to 29 Feb 44.
(2) Task Force Engr Rpt, MICHAELMAS Task Force,
which the engineers could build bases
12 May 44. Sturgis File 38. and airfields.
CHAPTER VII
that were considered urgent. In Decem- The expanded and accelerated con-
ber a number of jobs, some of them struction program meant a great increase
under review since July, were quickly in the workload of the engineers. Lt.
approved. Improvements were to be Col. George J. Nold as engineer of the
made at Ladd, Elmendorf, Annette, and Alaska Defense Command and Major
Yakutat. All airfields, including those Talley as area engineer would have far
built by the Civil Aeronautics Authority, greater responsibilities than before.
were to have storage for aviation gaso- The Seattle District under Colonel Dunn
line and for bombs and ammunition. would likewise have much more to do.
Army posts were to be enlarged. The At the close of 1941 there were in Alaska
camp for the Army garrison at the CAA Company D of the 29th Topographic
field at Nome was almost finished; simi- Battalion at Seward, the 32d Combat
lar facilities were to be built at nine Company at Fort Richardson, the 802d
other CAA fields. Eleven of the air- Aviation Battalion at Annette, the 807th
craft warning stations were to be com- Aviation Company at Yakutat, and the
pleted. At long last, work was to be 1st battalion of the 151st Combat Regi-
started on an airfield and Army post on ment, elements of which were at various
Umnak; on 9 December Reybold got the Army posts from Dutch Harbor to Fair-
signal to go ahead with this construction, banks. Contractors for the Navy were
which DeWitt had been urging since building the posts for the Army garrisons
July. The two fields which CAA was at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor.
planning to construct on the Alaska Projects not being built by troops or
Peninsula at Cold Bay and at Port Navy contractors were the responsibility
Heiden were to be built by the Army. of the Seattle District. Most of this
At all installations dispersion and con- work was being done by hired labor.
cealment, hitherto largely ignored, were Colonel Dunn had made no large con-
to be stressed. Refinements, such as tracts, except the one with the West
family quarters for married officers and Construction Company for work on the
fencing around military installations, railroad cutoff. More troops and civil-
were to be eliminated. The estimated ians were urgently needed.2
cost of construction as of 31 December
was approximately $90 million. Vari- Shortages
ous projects of benefit to the Army would
be undertaken by civilian agencies. The It was difficult to get either troops or
Department of the Interior was getting civilians for Alaskan projects after Pearl
ready to improve the Richardson High- Harbor. Enlistments and the draft cut
way, and the Public Roads Administra-
tion was preparing to build or improve
(2) Ltr, TAG to CofEngrs, 31 Dec 41, with 1st Ind,
other roads. The Department of Com- Asst C Opns Br OCE to NPD, 5 Jan 42. (3) Ltr,
merce planned to hard-surface the CAA TAG to DeWitt, 31 Dec 41. Last two in 600.1
runways.1 (Alaska) 2 Jan-Mar 42.
2
(1) Hists of the 32d Engr Combat Co, 807th Engr
Avn Bn, and 151st Engr Combat Regt, in Orgns
1
DF, Somervell to C AAF, 15 Dec 41. G-4/30436. Hists, U.S. Army, Alaska.
THE FAR NORTH 279
deeply into the supply of civilian man- of March. After Pearl Harbor, almost
power; deferments were as a rule not all jobs west of Fort Richardson except
granted to men who wanted to work in those at Kodiak and Dutch Harbor were
the Territory. Governor Gruening be- assigned to troops. To ease the man-
lieved more use should be made of local power shortage, some work was done by
residents. In his opinion, salmon fish- troops of other arms and services under
ermen and packers, unemployed because engineer supervision.3
of war conditions, would make good A persistent problem was the shortage
construction workers. Secretary of the of matériel. Almost all supplies and
Interior Harold L. Ickes suggested that equipment had to be procured in the
the 4,000 prospectors in the Territory, United States. Before January 1942,
many of whom owned construction Colonel Park's approval was necessary
equipment, could be of help. The for all purchases; after that date, the
Seattle District, while glad to take any Seattle District was permitted to buy in
qualified residents, could not draw ap- the open market, but this new freedom
preciable numbers of workmen from was of little value. Despite Alaska's
sparsely inhabited Alaska. Because of high priority of A-1-a, sufficient quanti-
the great distances and poor transporta- ties of supplies could not be obtained to
tion, it would, as a rule, have been more meet requirements. The greatest need
of a problem to assemble a working force by far was for heavy earth-moving equip-
within the Territory for a project than ment, but prospects of getting any were
to send one in from the United States. slight. "After Pearl Harbor," Nold
Local civilians could not always be re- wrote later, "we were practically limited
lied upon to stay on the job. Some of to the equipment we had in hand or
the fishermen who had been hired were could obtain locally. . . ." All such
planning to quit when the fishing season machinery was kept going around the
began in the spring. With the out- clock and used under very unfavorable
break of war, many workers from the conditions. Tractors churned through
United States wanted to return home. mud, snow, muskeg, salt water, and
Even if they could be persuaded to re- sandy beaches. Many of the operators
new their contracts, most insisted on were inexperienced or untrained in
interim vacations. Neither local nor handling equipment under such condi-
imported civilian labor could fill the tions. Repairs were constantly neces-
need. The shipment of more engineer sary, and there were no maintenance
troops was imperative, but few could be units in the Territory. Spare parts were
spared for Alaska. The first unit to scarce. Not enough came in with the
arrive after Pearl Harbor was the 2d
3
Battalion of the 151st Combat Regiment, (1) Incl, Tab A, ADC to Memo, ExecO Sup Div
OCE to G-4, 18 Dec 41. 400.34. (2) Ltr, Stimson to
which reached Cold Bay in January. Anthony J. Dimond, Delegate from Alaska in HR,
The next was the 42d General Service 16 Apr 42. 600.1 (Alaska) (Misc) pt. 2. (3) Ltr,
Regiment, the first battalion disembark- Ickes to Stimson, 19 Jan 42, with 3d Ind, Dunn to
NPD, 28 Feb 42. Same file. (4) Hists of 151st
ing at Juneau on 28 February, and the Combat Regt and 42d GS Regt, in Orgn Hists, U.S.
second reaching Cordova in the middle Army, Alaska.
280 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
authorize construction had been re- Buckner, Jr., entirely responsible for the
served to the Secretary of War. Soon execution of military construction in
after Pearl Harbor the War Department Alaska. Buckner's headquarters ab-
had directed DeWitt to undertake emer- sorbed Talley's office in Anchorage, and
gency work on his own responsibility. Talley's title was changed to Officer in
Directives for construction now came Charge, Alaska Construction. Although
from Washington and from DeWitt. In Talley was now directly under Buckner,
February the War Department sus- his office was not consolidated with
pended DeWitt's authority to initiate Nold's. No over-all organization had
emergency work, and DeWitt assumed been set up in Alaska to repair and main-
that henceforth he could not start any tain buildings which had been com-
projects without approval from Wash- pleted and turned over to post
ington. On 11 March the War Depart- commanders. In May three colonels,
ment made General DeWitt solely re- sent from the Corps of Engineers' Moun-
sponsible for construction and real estate tain Division office in Salt Lake City to
in the Alaskan theater of operations. investigate the matter, found a pressing
Henceforth, the responsibility of Colonel need for repair and maintenance. Two
Dunn and, after 15 April, of his suc- were assigned to Buckner's headquarters
cessor, Col. Peter P. Goerz, to the Chief as liaison officers. They began to re-
of Engineers for work in Alaska was cruit qualified civilians in the United
limited to flood control and the improve- States and searched for enlisted men to
ment of rivers and harbors. The Seattle do repairs and utilities work at Alaskan
District, however, continued to do work stations. Some delays had heretofore
of a technical and administrative nature resulted because project engineers lacked
for all Alaskan projects. It still pre- authority to initiate construction. Fre-
pared designs, made up fiscal, account- quently they had to hold up work of even
ing, and cost statements, and took care minor scope for months while awaiting
of civilian personnel matters. The dis- approval from Talley's office, Buckner's
trict also continued to purchase supplies office, the Seattle District, or General
and equipment. In the words of DeWitt. Now authority was partly de-
Colonel Park, "Though our authority is centralized. After 1 May area engineers
theoretically nil, our responsibility re- could build projects costing less than
mains about as before." 8 $20,000 without reference to higher au-
Further changes in organization were thority, and they could start those cost-
made. On 1 May, DeWitt made the ing up to $50,000 without getting prior
Army commander, Maj. Gen. Simon B. approval from higher authority.
While a great deal was done to improve
8
(1) Memo, AC Proj Sec Opn Br Constr Div OCE organization, little could be done to in-
to Opns and Tng Sec, 13 Mar 42. 600.1 (Alaska),
3 Jan-Mar 42. (2) Ltr, TAG to DeWitt, 11 Mar 42.
crease the number of troops or civilians.
USW Files, Misc and Sub, Constr Beginning Dec. Only two engineer units arrived during
(3) Nold, Hist of Development and Accomplishments the spring. In March the 639th Engi-
of Of of Engr Alaskan Dept, pp. 15-17. C 12027,
KCRC. (4) Ltr, Park to Robins, 20 Apr 42. 333.1
neer Camouflage Company reached Fort
Alaska 1920-45. Richardson and began construction of a
THE FAR NORTH 283
depot for the newly established Eleventh In May several groups from Talley's office
Air Force. In May the 813th Engineer made a 3-week air and ground survey of
Aviation Battalion arrived to begin work the almost unknown region west of Fair-
on satellite fields for Elmendorf. By 1 banks in an effort to find a route for a
June, approximately 4,500 engineer highway or railroad from Fairbanks to
troops and 3,000 civilian workmen were the coast and a site for an ocean terminal.
in the territory.9 The preliminary investigation indicated
a route along the Yukon Valley would be
Construction Progress feasible. Two locations were found on
the Bering Sea deep enough for port
The engineers could show consider- construction.10
able progress by June. Annette and Progress on the eleven aircraft warning
Yakutat were virtually complete. Cold stations approved for construction was
Bay had a good gravel runway which, disappointingly slow. Differences of
while not finished, was usable. No work opinion still existed over where some of
had as yet been done at Port Heiden be- the stations should be located. In
cause of bad weather. Since their ar- March the Eleventh Air Force wanted,
rival in February, the 42d Engineers had at its major bases, additional information
been building camps for the Army garri- and filter centers to receive signals from
sons at the CAA fields at Juneau and and transmit signals to nearby detector
Cordova. Facilities for gasoline storage stations. Work was further retarded
were being erected at major airfields. when a new type of radar detector was
At all projects the engineers were putting developed that permitted 360-degree
in access roads. By the end of May coverage. Buckner believed 20 of these
drilling of the tunnels for the railroad would be required, but the War Depart-
cutoff was about half finished, and work ment would allow only 10; after plans for
on the roadbed was about one-fourth installing 10 of the devices had been
done. With the beginning of spring the prepared, only 5 turned out to be avail-
strategically important Seward Peninsula able. Work on the aircraft warning
began to receive more attention. In stations, most of them in isolated places,
March and April Air and Engineer offi- was difficult. At some, cableways had
cers made a reconnaissance of that area first to be built so that supplies could be
for a site for an airfield away from the brought up. At most stations, the
coast where weather conditions would be Alaskan winter slowed construction; at
better than at Nome. A site was found four, work was impossible before spring.
sixty-five miles to the north of the city. By the beginning of May only the mobile
9
(1) Nold, Hist of Of of Engr Alaskan Dept, pp.
10
20-25. (2) Incl to Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57. (1) Hist of 42d GS Regt, in Orgn Hists, U.S.
(3) Memo, WDC for Buckner, 21 Apr 42. ADC 600.1, Army, Alaska. (2) Ltr, Park to Robins, 20 Apr 42.
Constr in Genl, vol. III. (4) 2d Wrapper Ind, U.S. 333.1 Alaska 1920-45. (3) Bush, Narrative Rpt of
EngrO Anchorage, Alaska, to CG ADC, 16 Jan 43, on Alaska Constr, pp. 217, 269-71, 412-413, 424. (4)
Memo, SOS to CG ADC, 12 Dec 42. 600.1 (Alaska) Anchorage AreaO, Rcn Rpt for RR or Hwy West of
(Labor) pt. 1. Fairbanks, 15 Jun 42. NWSC 617 (NWD).
284 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
station at Anchorage and the fixed one Although the Japanese thrust at
at Kodiak were in operation.11 Alaska, as is now known, served mainly
as a feint, preliminary to the major strike
Concentrating on the Aleutians against Midway, General DeWitt saw in
it the possible beginning of a full-scale
The attack on the Territory, which invasion and suggested to the War De-
many had regarded as almost inevitable, partment on 14 June that an expedition
was soon to come. Early in May Navy be launched against the Japanese in the
intelligence learned that the Japanese western Aleutians. DeWitt's recom-
were planning to strike at Midway and mendations evoked no enthusiastic re-
the Aleutians. On 3 June two enemy sponse. As far as the Joint Chiefs were
carriers launched their planes for an at- concerned, there were more urgent com-
tack on Dutch Harbor. (Map 16) De- bat theaters than the North Pacific. De-
spite the bad weather 17 aircraft got Witt then proposed that an airfield be
through to their target, demolishing bar- built on Tanaga Island, about 200 miles
racks and killing about 25 men. On the east of Kiska, so that the Japanese-
afternoon of the next day about 30 occupied islands could be effectively
planes came in and again caused some bombed. No time was lost in making a
loss of life and considerable damage to reconnaissance. Talley, together with
installations. Eight men of Company C an Air officer and a Navy officer, landed
of the 151st Engineer Combat Regiment on Tanaga on 27 June. They found the
were killed. After the attack some of island to be similar to Umnak and esti-
the enemy airmen chose a rendezvous mated that a runway could be built in
point near Umnak almost directly over three weeks. But the Navy preferred
the airfield, of whose existence they were Adak, 60 miles farther east, because of
unaware. Here U.S. fighters shot down its good harbor. Whichever site was
4 enemy planes. Meanwhile, two Japa- chosen, the engineers would have a for-
nese occupation forces approached the midable construction job. The islands
Aleutians. On 7 June one landed on of the Aleutian chain extended south-
Attu, the most remote island of the chain, westward for 1,100 miles. Peaks of a
and the next day the other came ashore partially submerged mountain range,
on Kiska. As soon as enough planes they were treeless and much of the time
could be concentrated on the strip on shrouded in fog. They were unin-
Umnak, bombing of the Japanese foot- habited; the natives, about 1,300 Aleuts,
hold on Kiska began.12 of Eskimo stock, had been evacuated by
the U.S. Navy after the attack on Dutch
(1) Memo, Hq Eleventh AF for Buckner, 24 Mar Harbor. Those on Attu and Kiska had
11
42. WDC-ADC, 381/32, pt. I. (2) Bush, Narrative been removed by the Japanese. Dur-
Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp. 217ff. (3) Memo, TAG
for OinC, Alaska Com System, 29 May 42. WDC-
ing the summer the Joint Chiefs ordered
ADC 660.2 AWS/48. airfields put in on Atka and Adak, and
12
(1) Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Opera- on small St. Paul Island in the Bering
tions, pp. 466-67. (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic
Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 225ff.
Sea, 300 miles north of Umnak. Air-
(3) 151st Engr Combat Regt, Regtl Hist. fields on these various islands would
THE FAR NORTH 285
MAP 16
provide a fairly effective barrier against At Unalaska, the men assembled a motley
Japanese air fleets operating from car- collection of some 250 craft, including
13
riers or from Attu and Kiska. tugboats, barges, fishing scows, and a
Work began first on Adak. Having four-masted schooner, to take them to
completed its job on Umnak, the 807th their new destination. They were to
Aviation Battalion, less a company which go with the task force which would
had begun work at Port Heiden, was occupy the island. On 26 August, the
scheduled to start the new undertaking. engineer "fleet," escorted by five de-
stroyers, headed into the Bering Sea in
13
the teeth of a rising gale. The crews
(1) Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Guadal-
canal to Saipan, pp. 368-69. (2) Bush, Narrative
worked hard to keep their supplies from
Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp. 178, 184, 189, 193. (3) being washed overboard. A route well
DeWitt, Memo for Rcd, 22 Jun 42. WDC-ADC up into the Bering Sea was taken to avoid
384/7, vol. III, Notes by DeWitt, 22 Jun 42. (4)
Memo, DeWitt for Marshall, 16 Jul 42. ADC 381
enemy aircraft and submarines. Dur-
Defense Plans, bk. 4. ing the night some vessels became sepa-
286 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
rated from the convoy, and the destroyers through the dunes, two and one-half
had a busy time locating and bringing miles from the creek's original mouth.
back the wanderers. One barge was On 10 September the sand strip could
lost. After five days, Adak was sighted. take a B-18 bomber. In order that
Destroyers and boats headed into Kuluk planes might operate more effectively,
Bay on the island's eastern shore, just as 3,000 feet of landing mat were laid down.
a heavy fog closed in. Several of the On the 13th forty-three planes took off
barges were beached and some of the to bomb Kiska. A second runway was
tractors and light cranes unloaded. The ready five days later. To allow water
tractors dozed sand ramps to two scows accumulating in the lower reaches of the
sunk in tandem to provide access to an creek to escape, bulldozers had to break
oceangoing barge being used as a floating open the dike across the mouth of the
dock. Troops, bivouacked in tents, creek daily. To eliminate this repeated
found living conditions extremely un- opening and closing, culverts with gates
comfortable.14 were installed. Sometimes the accumu-
The mountainous island seemed to lated water flooded the runways, espe-
have no good location for an airfield. cially when rainfall was heavy during
The sand dunes along the shores of high tide, and the gates had to remain
Kuluk Bay appeared promising but closed. The airmen, ignoring shallow
would require much more earth moving flooding, would take off in a cloud of
than could be done with the small spray. In November water pumps ar-
amount of machinery on hand. Beyond rived and were put in operation later that
the dunes was a low, flat area of firmly month. In dry weather, the sand was
packed sand, about two miles long. kept moist and stable by means of con-
Along the western edge flowed Sweeper trolled pumping.15
Creek, which emptied into Kuluk Bay In September construction began on
through a narrow gap in the dunes just Atka and St. Paul. On the 17th Com-
to the south of the flat. Tidal waters pany A of the 802d Aviation Battalion
which entered through the mouth of came ashore on Atka near an abandoned
the creek covered the area twice a day. fishing village of some fifteen buildings.
If the tide could be shut out and, at the The men took over a number of the
same time, the waters of the creek con- empty structures. As the dock was too
trolled, a strip could be provided quickly. small, the engineers provided a tempo-
On 1 September the engineers, after rary pier by turning a barge upside down
bulldozing dikes along the banks of the at the water's edge. They were soon at
creek, dozed a sand dam across its mouth work leveling nearby sand dunes for an
to shut out the tide. To keep the pent- airstrip with mat surfacing. Work was
up waters from overflowing the dikes, soon well in hand on Atka; two days
they gouged a new channel into the bay after Christmas a 3,000-foot runway was
ready. One company of the 42d Gen-
14
(1) Hist of the 807th Engr Avn Bn. (2) Bush,
15
Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, p. 178. (3) Incl to (1) Hist of the 807th Engr Avn Bn. (2) Bush,
Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Jan 59. Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, p. 230.
THE FAR NORTH 287
eral Service Regiment reached St. Paul mounts at Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, Sitka,
late in September, its job to build a and Seward. Work on additional de-
fighter strip surfaced with steel mat. fenses authorized in late 1941 had been
The men found a deserted village of held up by delays in site selection and
fifty-five buildings. Some of the 1,400 revisions in the numbers and sizes of the
officers and men of the garrison were batteries. It was finally decided to have
sheltered in the houses, with about one- the Navy build the defenses at the naval
third living in winterized tents. On 14 bases and to have the Engineers improve
November the runway, surfaced with the harbor defenses at Seward. The
volcanic ash, was completed. From this Corps made a contract with the West
time on, little work could be done, for Construction Company for this job and
blizzards, occurring almost daily, filled work began in September. Work on
the roads with drifts so high that equip- the railroad cutoff was shaping up well.
ment could not get through. Rough The 714th Railroad Battalion, men from
seas and masses of floating ice destroyed the 42d and 177th General Service Regi-
or damaged almost every boat and barge ments, and employees of the Alaska
moored to the island.16 Railroad were laying the tracks and the
job was expected to be finished by the
Alaska: July-December 1942 end of the year. A dock terminal was
under construction at Whittier on Prince
During the last half of 1942 the engi- William Sound. Late in July the War
neers did a substantial amount of work Department authorized going ahead
on the defenses of the Alaskan main- with the barge terminal which Dunn
land. They undertook additional con- had advocated in March. Plans called
struction at Ladd and Elmendorf, most for establishing a terminal for nine
of it to house more troops. During the oceangoing vessels on the eastern shore of
summer elements of the 176th General Excursion Inlet on Icy Straits to the west
Service Regiment arrived to build camps of Juneau. In August the Engineers
for garrisons at the remaining CAA awarded the contract to the Guy F.
fields in the interior of Alaska. At the Atkinson Company of San Francisco.
naval air stations, Seabees took over Toward the end of the month the con-
from the contractors and finished the tractor's employees began work on piers
facilities for the Army garrisons. The and warehouses. In October the 2d
runways were in at Cold Bay and Port Battalion of the 331 st General Service
Heiden by the end of the year. At long Regiment, about 1,300 officers and men,
last, work had got under way on the arrived to help the civilian forces.
seacoast batteries. Before Pearl Harbor, Meantime, the port of Juneau was being
Alaska's only seacoast defenses were a enlarged so that it could be used until
few 155-mm. gun batteries on Panama the barge terminal was operational.
Still far behind schedule were the air
16
(1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp. warning stations. After the Japanese
184-85, 189-90. (2) Memo, Opns and Tng Br Tng
Div OCE for C Opns and Tng Br, 14 Jun 43. 600.1
defeat at Midway, previously chosen
(ADC). sites in the Alaskan interior and on the
288 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
west coast in the Bristol Bay and Norton possibility of developing river routes.
Sound areas were abandoned for sites on Two were planned—one from Fairbanks
the Alaska Peninsula and in the Aleu- to Tanana on the Yukon and another
tians. Construction plans had to be from Fairbanks to McGrath on the Kus-
revised and work started anew.17 kokwim. Supplies could be stored at
Interest in improving communications these two points and, after the spring
within Alaska heightened in the summer thaws, loaded on barges and sent down
and fall. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the rivers to the Bering Sea, whence they
Canada was building a string of airfields could be forwarded to various points on
in the western part of the Dominion the Seward Peninsula. In order to have
from Edmonton to Whitehorse. These transportation out of Fairbanks as soon
fields, soon being used to fly planes from as possible, General Somervell in Janu-
the United States to Alaska, formed part ary 1943 instructed the Engineers to
of the Northwest Staging Route. Six build the winter roads to Tanana and
fields in Alaska—Northway, Tanacross, McGrath and develop and operate the
Big Delta, Ladd, Galena, and Nome— barge lines on the Yukon and Kusko-
formed the other part. After the attack kwim Rivers when the ice broke up.18
on Dutch Harbor, the Engineers got the
task of improving the runways at the Amchitka
fields in Alaska. Since the fall of 1941
negotiations had been under way with In early November 1942 Admiral
the Soviet Union to fly planes from Nimitz, conjecturing that the Japanese
Alaska to Siberia. In September 1942 might be planning to occupy Amchitka
the Russians accepted the first planes via Island, between Kiska and Adak, ad-
the northern route. Work on the vised sending an American force there
Alaskan fields of the route, now called to develop an advanced air base. The
the Alaskan Siberian Ferry Route Joint Chiefs tentatively approved this
(ALSIB), was pushed even more, so that move on 18 December, providing a good
larger numbers of planes could be ferried site for an airfield could be found on the
to Siberia in the spring. Much thought island. Colonel Talley, with a party of
was now given to developing ground engineers, went to Amchitka by Navy
communications westward from Fair- plane on 17 December, and after a 2-day
banks. During the fall of 1942 the survey reported finding a site on which a
Seattle District made additional surveys fighter strip could be built in less than
for a road or railroad and a pipeline from three weeks. Accordingly, on 11 Janu-
Fairbanks to the Seward Peninsula.
Since building a road or railroad would 18
(1) Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Be-
take too long, a study was made of the tween the United States and Canada, 1939-1945,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1959), pp. 200-204. (2) Memo, C TC
17
(1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp. for Somervell, 8 Nov 42. ASF HQ CG Alaska, 1943-
170-72, 220-21, 344-45. (2) Hist of the 176th GS 46. (3) Ltr, SOS to CG NWSC, 16 Nov. 400 (AD).
Regt, 10 Feb 42-12 Mar 45. (3) Hist of the 331st (4) Ltr, Somervell to CG NWSC, 8 Jan 43. NWSC
Engr Regt. (4) Memo, Talley for Buckner, 3 Aug 600.93 (Fairbanks). (5) Matloff and Snell, Strategic
42. ADC 600.1, Constr in Genl, vol. IV. Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 339ff.
THE FAR NORTH 289
ary 1943 the first U.S. troops, including amount rose to 585,443 tons. Still
the 813th Aviation Battalion, came larger and speedier shipments to the
ashore at Constantine Harbor. The Territory were possible in 1943 because
engineers, finding the flat coastal area of improved transportation. By the be-
excellent for airfield construction, began ginning of that year the expanded rail
to put the strip in on a tidal flat, using facilities at the Canadian port of Prince
the methods employed on Adak. The Rupert were being put into use. Addi-
heavily overcast skies required the use tional docks had been built at Juneau,
of artificial lighting even in the daytime. Seward, and Anchorage. The cutoff to
Operations were not too onerous because the Alaska Railroad and the port of
the men had an adequate amount of Whittier were finished by June. The
heavy construction equipment. Almost barge terminal was in use. Shortages
daily visits by Japanese patrol planes had so stimulated production of local
with intermittent bombings made it materials that some surpluses accumu-
highly urgent to complete the runway lated. More lumber was being pro-
quickly. The first American plane duced than was required, and Alaskan
landed in mid-February. Henceforth, strip mines were furnishing more than
there was only light enemy activity. enough coal. But the procurement of
Earlier that month, the 1st Battalion of some items not produced locally became
the 151st Combat Regiment had arrived difficult during late 1942 and early 1943
to construct base facilities on the island, as needs became greater and Alaska lost
and in March the 2d Battalion of the its relatively high priority to more active
177th General Service Regiment arrived combat theaters. The short shipping
to build storage tanks for aviation gaso- season added to the troubles. Supplies
line. The aviation engineers mean- for many projects west and north of
while began work on the main bomber Juneau had to be delivered after 1 July
runway on a high, flat area above Con- and before mid-October, when the ice
stantine Harbor.19 pack began to form. To complete a
project during a given year, it was neces-
Supplies, Equipment, and sary to have most of the materials on
Spare Parts hand by the previous fall. But this was
extremely hard to do because of the
By early 1943 the most critically shortage of vessels and the lack of ade-
needed supplies were reaching Alaska in quate planning in the scheduling of
fairly adequate amounts. During 1941 shipments. "It was impossible," Nold
the Seattle District had sent 182,531 later wrote, "for agencies and authorities
measurement tons of construction mate- within the United States to visualize the
rials and equipment. In 1942, the necessity for . . . early shipment of
supplies to permit construction ... in
20
(1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp. the short working season."
19
large part of the Arctic and subarctic building site. The most effective treat-
regions, permafrost, possibly a remnant ment generally consisted of excavating
of the Ice Age, was encountered from 2 the top layer of the permanently frozen
to 5 feet beneath the surface of the earth ground and replacing it with insulat-
and it extended downward sometimes to ing materials. Sometimes the damage
a depth of 1,500 feet. It was invariably caused by settling could be remedied
found in regions where the average an- rather quickly. At Fairbanks a well was
nual temperature was below 32°F. drilled in one corner of a powerhouse
Permafrost was widespread in Alaska, through more than 200 feet of perma-
but there was little of it in the Aleutians. frost to water-bearing gravel. The pas-
If the thin layer of topsoil which thawed sage of the water through the pipe
in the summer and froze in the winter softened the permafrost and caused the
was removed, the permanently frozen corner of the building to settle. The
ground underneath was left without its pumping was stopped, the soil refroze,
insulating cover. If subjected to heat, and the settling ceased. "Thereafter,"
it became soft and lost its bearing power. Talley wrote, "we located wells from 100
26
Unpredictable results followed; the to 200 feet away from buildings."
ground might shrink, crack, slide, or Muskeg and tundra were troublesome
creep. When permafrost froze again, it obstacles until the engineers learned how
produced an upward thrust. A number to deal with them effectively. Muskeg
of buildings constructed by the engineers was the heavy growth of moss found in
were heavily damaged when warm cur- bogs, sometimes to a depth of twenty
rents of air from the heated structures feet, and often extending many square
softened the underlying permafrost and miles in area. In many instances, the
caused parts of the structures to sink. semidecayed matter at the bottom had
Flowing water presented a constant turned into peat; often buried in the
hazard because it might cause the perma- muskeg were logs and branches. The
frost to melt. One of the runways at surface was spongy. A man walking on
Ladd Field was believed to have failed it had the feeling of treading on a mat-
because the waters of a nearby river in- tress. Once its surface was broken,
explicably seeped into the frozen ground muskeg could sustain little weight, and
underneath the runway. Little was anyone venturing across would sink in
known about permafrost. No scientific to his knees or even deeper. Shallow
studies of it had been made before World patches were not a serious hindrance and
War II, except by the Russians as a con- neither were deeper ones, provided
sequence of structural failures on the sufficient precautions were taken. If
Trans-Siberian railroad. Attempts to heavy machinery was to be moved across
get information from the Soviet Govern-
ment were fruitless. The engineers had 26
(1) Col. Lynn C. Barnes, "Permafrost: A Chal-
to learn from experience how best to deal lenge to Engineers," The Military Engineer,
with permafrost. Before constructing XXXVIII (January, 1946), 9-11. (2) Col. Walter K.
Wilson, Jr., "The Problem of Permafrost," The
buildings and runways, they had to make Military Engineer, XL (April, 1948), 162-64. (3)
a thorough study of the conditions at the Incl to Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57.
294 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
muskeg, the engineers usually dumped ways and buildings could be constructed
gravel or laid mats over the route before- on the solid base of sand, gravel, or rock
hand. Sometimes they built trestles underneath. When it could not be
over the more treacherous sections. If easily taken out and extensive construc-
a runway was to be constructed or a tion was not called for, tundra was cov-
building put up, the muskeg had to be ered with sand or gravel and would cause
scooped out and replaced with rock or no further trouble.27
sand. Rare on the Alaskan mainland, During much of the year, and espe-
tundra was common in the Aleutians. cially from October to March, violent
Tundra was the term used by the local winds, called the williwaws, swirled over
inhabitants for the heavy, wet, partly de- the Aleutians or sped across Alaskan
cayed masses of grass from two to ten
feet deep. When left undisturbed, 27
(1) Hardin, "Engineers Rush Alaskan Defenses,"
tundra could support considerable The Military Engineer, XXXIV (January, 1942), 1-3.
weight. Like muskeg, once its surface (2) Harold W. Richardson, "Construction in the
Tundra," Engineering News-Record, CXXXII (29
was ruptured, it lost its bearing capacity. Jun 44), 106-10. (3) Incl to Ltr, Talley to C EHD,
It usually had to be removed so that run- 6 Nov 57.
THE FAR NORTH 295
up alongside and cranes hoisted the sup- of Alaska, particularly the airfields, had
plies directly into trucks. The dock been built up sufficiently to make it
withstood the battering of the sea, but highly improbable that the Japanese,
its excessive height made unloading ex- especially after their defeat at Midway,
tremely slow. Two docks built later at would be able to expand their foothold
a lower level were destroyed, when heavy in the Aleutians or launch a successful
seas floated the decking off the posts. It attack on the Alaskan mainland. While
was found that it was easier to unload the engineers were strengthening Alaska
barges in the turbulent surf if they were and helping to prepare the Territory as
docked perpendicular rather than par- a possible springboard for an offensive,
allel to the beach.33 they were at the same time at work on
By the beginning of 1943 the defenses two important projects in northwestern
Canada, the purpose of which was, at
least in part, to strengthen Alaska. One
33
(1) Hist Sec Alaskan Dept, Official Hist. (2) project was the construction of the
Hammond, "Aleutian Water Transportation Prob-
lems," The Military Engineer, XXXVI (November,
Alaska-Canada, or Alcan Highway; the
1944). 373-75. other was the development of Canol.
THE FAR NORTH 299
east of Fort St. John. The Chief of and ponton units would have to trans-
Engineers would be responsible for the port men and equipment across rivers
work. On 2 February the War Plans and lakes. Through the access afforded
Division informed Brig. Gen. Clarence by the pioneer road, civilian contractors,
L. Sturdevant, Assistant Chief of Engi- working under the Public Roads Ad-
neers in charge of the Troops Division, ministration, would soon be able to
of its decision to build the road and di- work on many stretches and put in a
rected him to submit within the next permanent highway. On 14 February,
few days a plan for surveys and construc- three days after Presidential approval of
tion.35 the program, the War Department di-
General Sturdevant at once consulted rected the Chief of Engineers to proceed
with members of his staff and with with the project. Because most of the
Thomas H. MacDonald, Commissioner route passed through British Columbia
of the Public Roads Administration and the Yukon Territory, the consent of
(PRA). Two days later, he submitted a the Canadian Government had to be
plan that called for building the 1,500- obtained. On 26 February the Perma-
mile highway in two phases. First, the nent Joint Board of Defense, Canada-
Engineers would push through a pioneer United States, reported favorably on the
road. Public Roads would then trans- project, and less than two weeks later
form it into a permanent road. The William L. Mackenzie King, the Cana-
main obstacle to building any kind of dian Prime Minister, announced his
highway would stem from the fact that government's approval of the board's
there were so few points of access from recommendation.36
which the construction forces could start
working. To avoid losing any of the Organizing for Construction
short subarctic working season, Sturde-
vant advised using engineer troops rather While discussions between the Cana-
than taking time to assemble and organ- dian and the United States Governments
ize a civilian construction force. If the were under way, General Sturdevant
troops could be moved over the frozen organized a task force for building the
expanses of the north before the spring highway. In mid-February Col. Wil-
thaws made the terrain impassable and liam M. Hoge was named commander
could begin work at several points at and ordered to report directly to Rey-
once, it might be possible to finish a bold. Two combat regiments, the 18th,
pioneer road by fall. Along with con- commanded by Lt. Col. Earl G. Paules,
struction units, topographic units would and the 35th, under Col. Robert D. In-
have to be moved in to reconnoiter the 36
terrain over which the road would pass, (1) Memo, Sturdevant for WPD, 4 Feb 42.
Alaska Hwy, p. 62. (2) Ltr, TAG to CofEngrs, 14
Feb 42. Alaska Hwy, p. 68. (3) Brig. Gen. C. L.
35
(1) Paraphrase of Telg sent to American Lega- Sturdevant, "The Alaska Military Highway," The
tion, Ottawa, by Secy of State Cordell Hull, 12 Feb Engineering Journal, XXVI (March 1943), 117. (4)
42. Alaska Hwy, pp. 70-71. (2) Notes of Cabinet Memo, Stimson for Roosevelt, 7 Mar 42. Alaska
Mtg of 16 Jan 42. Alaska Hwy, p. 59. (3) Excerpt Hwy, p. 81. (5) Memo for Rcd, Permanent Joint
from notes of Gen Sturdevant. Alaska Hwy, p. 61. Bd on Defense, 6 Mar 42. Alaska Hwy, p. 82.
THE FAR NORTH 301
galls, were the first units assigned. They Fort St. John without mishap. The
were to start work on the highway and, men then pushed ahead over 265 miles
at the same time, furnish cadres for new of frozen muskeg in an effort to reach
regiments which would move up later Fort Nelson before the thaws set in. A
for work on the road. On 9 March Maj. drop in temperature from 50 degrees
Alvin C. Welling, executive officer of above to 35 degrees below hardened the
the task force, arrived at the town of winter road sufficiently to permit the
Dawson Creek, at the end of the rail line equipment to move forward easily. But
from Edmonton, and proceeded north- the men suffered greatly from the cold,
ward by way of the provincial road to the bitter wind, and the roughness of
Fort St. John, situated on the far bank the trail. Truck drivers, hauling load
of the Peace River. Here he set up a after load of troops and supplies, went
command post from which Colonel for days with little rest. The most
Hoge would supervise the construction grueling task was driving the tractors,
of 650 miles of the highway northwest- graders, and power shovels. Frostbitten
ward from Dawson Creek to the town and shivering operators approached the
of Watson Lake. A second command limits of physical endurance in "walk-
post for the remainder of the route was ing" their ponderous machines for 40
to be set up later.37 to 80 miles at a stretch without relief.
No time was lost in moving the first Upon reaching Fort Nelson, the men
troops up. Elements of the 35th Engi- were so exhausted from cold and expo-
neers under Colonel Ingalls, forming the sure that they could scarcely move. On
vanguard, were on the train with Major 5 April the last of the equipment
Welling. Company A of the 648th crawled into Fort Nelson, shortly before
Topographic Battalion reached Dawson the spring thaw made the trail impass-
Creek on the 13th, and the 74th Light able. The 35th Regiment and its aux-
Ponton Company came in the next day. iliary units were ready to begin 38
work
The last elements of the 35th arrived on westward out of Fort Nelson.
the 16th. Men, vehicles, and supplies Meanwhile, in a formal exchange of
were moved northward to Fort St. John. notes on 17 and 18 March, Canada and
At this point, the Peace River was 1,800 the United States agreed to co-operate
feet wide. There was no bridge, and in the construction, maintenance, and
ice on the river ruled out ferrying men use of the highway. The United States
and equipment to the other bank. agreed to make surveys and to send in
Speed was imperative because a warm engineer troops to construct a pioneer
spell made the crossing of the troops road; to have contractors, Canadian or
with their heavy machinery hazardous. American, complete the highway under
The 35th Engineers laid planks and the supervision of the Public Roads Ad-
sawdust over the ice and drove across to ministration; to maintain the road for
38
(1) Sturdevant, "The Alaska Military Highway,"
37
(1) Memo, Sturdevant for WPD, 4 Feb 42. (2) The Engineering Journal, XXVI (March, 1943).
Ltr, Sturdevant to Paules, 19 Feb 42. (3) Ltr, Stur- (2) Ltr, Welling to CofEngrs, 1 Apr 42. (3) Hist of
devant to Hoge, 3 Mar 42. Alaska Hwy, pp. 62-64. the 74th Engr Light Ponton Co.
302 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
six months after the war, unless Canada leading westward to Kluane Lake.
should prefer to assume maintenance of The next week the other two units dis-
the Canadian portion sooner; and to embarked at Skagway. They had none
turn the Canadian part of the highway of their heavy equipment, though it was
over to Canada at the end of the war expected shortly. Weeks passed with no
with the understanding that citizens of sign of it. In mid-May, General Hoge
the United States would not suffer dis- flew to the United States to find out the
crimination in its use. The Canadian reasons for the delay. In Seattle, he
Government, in turn, agreed to provide came across tractors, graders, and trucks
the right of way, to permit the use of lined up on the docks and in nearby
local timber, gravel, and rock, to waive yards because too few vessels had either
all import duties, sales taxes, and license sufficient space to carry the machinery
fees in connection with work on the or booms capable of putting it aboard.
road, and to exempt American citizens To relieve the overburdened facilities
employed on the project from paying at Seattle, Hoge arranged to have the
Canadian income taxes.39 E. W. Elliott Company send some heavy
Early in April, Hoge, now a brigadier equipment by barge out of Prince Ru-
general, set up his second command post pert. After mid-May prospects that the
at Whitehorse, a point from which he equipment would soon arrive at Skag-
would direct construction of the 850 way were brighter, and, late that month,
miles of road from Watson Lake to Big it began to appear. A major feat was to
Delta. On the 9th of the month, the get it from the docks to its destination.
73d Light Ponton Company disem- The White Pass and Yukon Railroad, an
barked at Skagway and during the next antiquated, narrow-gauge line, 111 miles
two weeks set up camp at Whitehorse. long, was the only link between Skagway
Soon thereafter Company D of the 29th and Carcross and Whitehorse, the trans-
Topographic Battalion reached the town. portation hubs of the Canadian North-
Meanwhile, the 18th Combat Regiment west, both of them on the route of the
under Colonel Paules, the 340th General highway. During the latter part of May
Service Regiment under Lt. Col. F. the railroad, which had but twelve loco-
Russel Lyons, and the 93d General motives, was taxed far beyond its capacity
Service Regiment under Col. Frank M. to transport the machinery needed on
S. Johnson had sailed from Seattle. The the highway. But despite the difficul-
18th Engineers, the first to arrive, set up ties, the equipment began to arrive for
40
their headquarters at Whitehorse on the work on the road.
15th and, with the little equipment they The 18th Engineers, having received
had, began work on the wagon trail
40
(1) Memo, Col Clarence L. Adcock, Exec Asst,
39
(1) Paraphrase of Telg sent by Secy of State Hull Tr Div OCE for Somervell, 18 Apr 42. (2) Sturde-
to American Legation, Ottawa, 12 Feb 42. Alaska vant, "The Alaska Military Highway," The En-
Hwy, pp. 70-71. (2) Ltr, Pierrepont Moffat, Amer- gineering Journal, XXVI (March, 1943). (3) Hist of
ican Minister to Canada, to Mackenzie King, 17 Mar the 93d Engr GS Regt. (4) Hist of the 340th Engr
42. Alaska Hwy, pp. 86ff. (3) Ltr, Mackenzie King GS Regt. (5) Ltr, Adj 18th Engrs to CofEngrs, 26
to Moffat, 18 Mar 42. Alaska Hwy, pp. 90ff. May 42.
THE FAR NORTH 303
most of their machinery by late May, then marched to the Teslin River, part
continued working on the trail leading of the way over the trail being blazed by
to Kluane Lake. The 93d Engineers the 93d Engineers, and sailed up the
had about 60 percent of their machinery river to Lake Teslin. The men arrived
by the end of the month; with this and at their destination east of the lake on 18
two tractors borrowed from the 18th, June and started hacking out a trail.
they began clearing a trail eastward out Work had also begun on the part of the
of Carcross toward the Teslin River, route in Alaska. On 7 May, the 97th
some fifty miles away. The 340th Engi- General Service Regiment, commanded
neers remained at Skagway till June, by Col. Stephen C. Whipple, disem-
when they received enough trucks and barked at Valdez, the southern terminus
equipment to make work on the highway of the Richardson Highway. The men
practicable. One platoon remained at had brought only a few items of heavy
Skagway and another went to Whitehorse equipment. Before embarking at Seattle
to do stevedoring. The remainder of they had turned in their wornout trucks
the regiment went by train to Carcross, and requisitioned new ones. They
304 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
SKAGWAY HARBOR
spent their first weeks in Alaska in main- horse and Fort St. John for resolving
taining the Richardson and Nabesna many important matters regarding con-
Highways. Early in June their equip- struction. There were neither tele-
ment arrived, including the same trucks phone lines nor passable trails between
they had turned in, still in need of a the two towns, which were 600 miles
complete overhauling. The men began apart by air, and atmospheric disturb-
working on a pioneer road from the ances made communication by radio
village of Slana, on an arm of the Rich- uncertain. To remedy the situation,
ardson Highway, northeastward toward Reybold late in April split the project
the Tanana River.41 into two independent commands, plac-
As over-all commander, General Hoge ing Col. James A. O'Connor in charge
found he was needed at both White- of the Fort St. John, or Southern Sector,
and leaving General Hoge in charge of
41
(1) Ibid. (2) Hist of the 93d Engr GS Regt. (3) the Whitehorse, or Northern Sector.
Hist of the 340th Engr GS Regt. (4) Ltr, Maj. C. F.
Waite, OpnsO Whitehorse Sec, to CofEngrs, 24 Jun
Watson Lake was the dividing point.
42. Colonel O'Connor assumed command at
THE FAR NORTH 305
Fort St. John on 6 May. Both he and toured around them. Short strips
General Hoge reported directly to the proved to be unavoidable. Shallow
Chief of Engineers.42 patches were usually scooped out and
filled with gravel; deeper ones were
Construction Progress corduroyed.43
Meanwhile, Sturdevant and MacDon-
In the Southern Sector little progress ald prepared a plan whereby the Engi-
could be made during the first weeks. neers and the Public Roads Administra-
Rain and mud held up the 35th Engi- tion would co-operate on building the
neers, working westward out of Fort road. MacDonald envisioned a smoothly
Nelson. In May, two more units ar- surfaced highway for two-way traffic, with
rived, the 341st General Service Regi- gentle grades and curves, built according
ment, commanded by Col. Albert L. to specifications for roads in national
Lane, reaching Dawson Creek on 1 May, forests. It would normally be 36 feet
and the 95th General Service Regiment, wide but, where construction was diffi-
under Col. David L. Neumann, arriving cult, would be temporarily limited to 20
on the 31st. Both units were assigned or 22 feet. Local materials would be
to the section between Fort St. John and used for surfacing and for small culverts
Fort Nelson. The 341st bulldozed the and temporary bridges. If desired,
pioneer trail through forests of alder and permanent structures could be put in
poplar; the 95th, directly behind, im- later. Public Roads would help make
proved and maintained the completed reconnaissances for routing the perma-
trail. Both units had come without nent highway, but the military com-
their road-building machinery. Of all manders would have the final decision
the units on the highway, only Colonel on location because their mission re-
Ingall's 35th Engineers had arrived ade- quired opening a road for military
quately equipped. But shortages were traffic as soon as possible. If time per-
no major obstacle in the Southern Sector, mitted, engineer troops could improve
for excellent rail connections permitted any section beyond pioneer road stand-
a fairly steady flow of machinery and ards if this could be done without
supplies from Chicago and other centers interfering with the contractors' oper-
44
of the industrial Midwest. More diffi- ations.
cult to contend with was the unpredict- Construction had begun before a
able weather. At times, the temperature thorough investigation of the route
soared to 80 degrees and frozen earth could be made. Considerable informa-
turned into sticky mud. This dried up tion existed on the sections located in
and became dust, which, under heavy Alaska and the Yukon Territory and on
rain, turned into mud again. Soon the the section between Fort St. John and
men ran into many patches of muskeg. Fort Nelson, but for the remainder, al-
Insofar as possible, the route was de-
43
Ltrs, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 19 May, 22 Jun 42.
44
(1) Memo for Rcd, Sturdevant, 29 Apr 42. (2)
42
(1) Ltr, Sturdevant to Hoge, 24 Apr 42. Alaska Ltr, MacDonald to Sturdevant, 4 Mar 42. Alaska
Hwy, p. 179. (2) Ltr, Hoge to Sturdevant, 3 May 42. Hwy, p. 183.
306 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
By early June, all engineer troops mit enough sunlight to dry out the
scheduled for work on the highway had ground. Clearing crews readily accom-
arrived. Colonel O'Connor at Fort St. plished this additional work without
John had a combat regiment, 2 general excessive effort because most of their
service regiments, a light ponton com- time was spent in turning and lining up
pany, and a topographic company, total- for new cuts. By June the many hours
ing 4,354 officers and men. General of sunlight of the northern summer day
Hoge at Whitehorse had a combat regi- made it possible to work two and some-
ment, 3 general service regiments, a times three shifts every twenty-four
light ponton company, and a topographic hours. Working around the clock,
company, totaling 5,806. Auxiliary sig- crews could clear from three to four
nal, finance, quartermaster, and medical miles a day. Behind the clearing eche-
troops numbered approximately 340 in lon, engineer units built log bridges and
the Southern Sector and 165 in the culverts over gulleys and small streams.
Northern. Two gaps remained in the Using hand tools and the versatile air
building of the highway. One, at the compressor with attachments, a platoon
extreme northern end, extended from could build a bridge, or a squad a cul-
Big Delta to Tanacross, a distance of a vert, in less than a day. Farther to the
hundred miles. The other ran south- rear, other units smoothed the trail with
eastward for fifty miles from Whitehorse scrapers and graders, corduroying where
to Jake's Corner, midway between Car- necessary. Still farther back, others
cross and the Teslin River. It was widened narrow spaces, reduced the
planned to assign these stretches eventu- worst grades, and filled soft spots with
46
ally to PRA contractors. gravel. The tactics of rapid construc-
In all sections, the pioneer road was tion depended on the use of special
pushed through in more or less the same equipment, particularly the heavy bull-
manner. As stretches were located and dozer. Every other piece of machinery
surveyed, clearing crews, driving 23-ton was auxiliary to this item. Strenuous
D-8 tractors with bulldozers, smashed a efforts had been made to supply the
corridor through brush and woods. units with plentiful amounts of equip-
The shallow-rooted trees of the north ment. Under normal circumstances, a
were easily toppled. While the lead combat or general service regiment was
dozer opened a pathway, others widened furnished 8 medium tractors, but on the
the clearing and shoved aside fallen highway each regiment was allotted 20
trees and debris. General Hoge had heavy and 24 medium tractors with bull-
originally specified a clearing thirty-two dozers and winches. Equipment lists
feet wide, but it soon became evident further included 6 12-yard carryalls, 3
that in wooded areas a corridor two or motor patrols, and 2 power shovels; from
three times as great was necessary to ad- 50 to 90 dump trucks and many other
vehicles; one portable sawmill, two pile
"Alaska Highway—Organizing $30,000,000 Job," drivers, water purification sets, electrical
Western Construction News (February 1943), 55ff.
46
(1) Memo, Sturdevant for Somervell, 7 Jul 42. generators, and radio receivers and
(2) Alaska Hwy, p. 241. transmitters. Men sent to northern
308 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Canada and Alaska were also furnished Fort Nelson, where much muskeg was
arctic clothing, sleeping bags, and tents, expected, less than four miles of it were
as well as mosquito bars and head nets encountered. On 17 June the Senate
for protection against the great swarms subcommittee recommended that no
of mosquitoes and flies which infested further investigation be made of con-
the northern regions in the summer.47 struction on the Alcan Highway.48
Back in the United States, critics were
waging a vigorous campaign against the Reconnaissance
construction of the highway. Their
most violent attacks were directed against To make rapid construction possible,
the route which had been selected. reconnaissance had to be continuous.
After the bombing of Dutch Harbor, the Since it was difficult to remember all the
project attracted unusual interest. In features of the ground from a swiftly
response to various charges, among them moving plane, the engineers turned to
that the road was an "engineering mon- aerial photography. Photographic air-
strosity because of the muskeg swamp craft became available to the Southern
along the major portion of the route," Sector in May; to the Northern, in June.
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcom- Examining aerial photographs, sector
mittee held hearings in June to consider and regimental commanders were able
a formal probe of the matter. Witnesses to avoid locations that involved extreme
appearing before the subcommittee con- elevations, long stretches of swamp, or
tended that in the Southern Sector a road excessively rugged terrain. Location
might be built for a few miles out of parties made low-altitude flights for on-
Fort St. John, but it would be swal- the-spot inspections of critical areas.
lowed up in the hundreds of miles of Ground survey parties went forward on
muskeg near Fort Nelson. The engi- foot, or by dog sled, horse, or tractor-
neers had obviated most of these drawn trailers. To investigate likely
criticisms before they were made. They river crossings, the parties sometimes
had relocated the pioneer road westward used improvised ponton rafts, powered
on the foothills of the Rockies and thus by outboard motors, or flew in with air-
avoided the poor drainage along the craft equipped with pontons. After
original route. They blazed the trail they decided upon the location of the
on the ridges west of the Blueberry River route, the surveyors blazed a center line
and then east of the Minaker and to guide the leading bulldozers. In
Prophet Rivers into Fort Nelson. By
painstaking care in routing, they by- 48
(1) Ltrs, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 22 Jun, 23 Aug
passed a great deal of muskeg, save for 42. (2) Ltr, OpnsO Fort St. John Sec to CofEngrs,
scattered stretches from 200 to 400 yards 24 Jul 42. (3) Ltr, Gruening to Stimson, 3 Mar 42.
(4) Ltr, Chmn of British Columbia-Yukon-Alaska
in length. In the last sixty miles into Hwy Cmte to Sturdevant, 21 Mar 42. (5) Alaska
Highway Hearings Before a Subcmte of Senate Cmte
on Foreign Relations, 77th Cong, 2d sess, 1, 12, 16
47
Sturdevant, "The Alaska Military Highway," Jun 42. (6) Rpt of Subcmte of Senate Cmte on
The Engineering Journal, XXVI (March, 1943), pp. Foreign Relations, 17 Jun 42. Alaska Hwy Hear-
120-21. ings, Exhibit I-f.
THE FAR NORTH 309
which the 95th was improving and main- Between the 7th and the 18th of July
taining. The 35th had reached a point General Sturdevant inspected the entire
48 miles west of Fort Nelson. This unit route by airplane and traveled 500 miles
had perhaps the most trying section of by car over the part under construction
all. "The sloppy soil conditions which or already completed. He observed that
prevailed . . . near Charlie Lake [north the troops, instead of putting in a rough
of Fort St. John]," O'Connor wrote access trail, were building a fairly well-
Sturdevant late in May, "were almost of drained and graded highway. This was
minor magnitude in contrast with the necessary because the road was the only
sloppier conditions which prevailed . . . line of supply the troops had with their
in the vicinity of Fort Nelson. At this bases. It appeared that the pioneer
latter point the soil was in general noth- road, besides providing access for PRA
ing better than pure mud." 51 In the contractors, could also be made to serve
Northern Sector, the 93d Engineers had the airports during the coming winter.
finished 33 miles from Carcross to Lake To operate vehicles over the entire route
Teslin and the 340th had completed 10 the year round would require not only
miles east of the lake. The 18th had pushing 1,000 miles of pioneer road to
pushed 112 miles along the wagon road completion, but also constructing rest
west of Whitehorse. Working in diffi- camps, telephone lines, and fuel supply
cult terrain in Alaska, the 97th General depots. Sturdevant decided to modify
Service Regiment had completed only 6 existing arrangements with PRA so that
miles, but it expected to make more the contractors and engineers could
rapid progress once it got into the merge their forces to expedite work on
Tanana River valley. Most of the route the pioneer road. So far, PRA had done
had been determined, at least tentatively, no work on the permanent highway ex-
in both sectors. Detachments of the cept for short distances out of Fort St.
ponton companies were fully occupied John and Whitehorse. The contractors
ferrying men and equipment across the were still spending most of their efforts
many streams. With the beginning of in setting up camps and collecting equip-
summer, progress could be more rapid. ment. Early in August, Sturdevant and
Temperatures ranged up to 84°F. The MacDonald agreed that for the re-
frost was gone from the ground, save in mainder of the working season the con-
heavily wooded sections. PRA's opera- tractors would help put the pioneer road
tions were gaining momentum, and its in shape for winter traffic. Sturdevant
contractors were already at work on the asked PRA to give precedence in con-
permanent road out of Fort St. John. struction to the sections between Big
Some of the contractors' men and equip- Delta and Tanacross and between White-
53
ment had been flown from Fairbanks to horse and Jake's Corner.
Tanacross and Gulkana. PRA expected On 8 August MacDonald directed his
to begin construction in the Northern
Sector in July.52 Ltr, Maj. C. F. Waite, OpnsO Whitehorse Sec, to
CofEngrs, 24 Jun 42.
53
(1) Memo, Sturdevant for Somervell, 1 Aug 42.
51
Ltr, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 19 May 42. (2) Ltr, Sturdevant to Somervell, 8 Aug 42. Canol
52
(1) Ltr, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 22 Jun 42. (2) Files.
THE FAR NORTH 311
field offices to comply with the new July for one-way traffic. By the first
policy. During the next weeks, he set week in September, the 340th had
up additional offices at Edmonton, pushed through to Watson Lake.
Whitehorse, and Gulkana. Public Thereupon, one of the battalions wid-
Roads meantime enlisted the services of ened the last fifty miles of the trail
four management contractors, who, by while the other continued eastward.55
August, had under them forty-seven West of Whitehorse, work was pro-
American and Canadian construction ceeding at an equally fast pace. By mid-
firms, working under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee August, the 18th Engineers had swung
contracts. The E. W. Elliott Company past the western shore of Kluane Lake
of Seattle, which had helped the engi- and had reached the Duke River, 200
neers get equipment to Skagway, was miles from Whitehorse. Fording the
now called upon to transport men, sup- river, the regiment came up against the
plies, and machinery for PRA. In forbidding terrain that the survey parties
August, some of the contractors began to had described. It was at first "heavily
clear the sections which PRA was to con- wooded and creased with many small
struct. Other contractors' crews, upon ridges." Beyond lay a desolate area of
arriving at the highway, moved in behind burnt trees that "stood together like
the troops to widen, improve, and gravel thousands of scarecrows." 56 This burnt
the roadbed. Relieved of heavy mainte- timber stood on permafrost which defied
nance on stretches of road to the rear, the heretofore tried and tested methods of
engineers could henceforth apply most road building. Once the surface of the
of their efforts to the construction of new ground was disturbed, the sun brought
road.54 on as much mud as heavy rains could
During the summer, favored by warm, produce. Uprooted trees left gaping
clear weather, and with most of their holes that deepened as the subsurface
equipment now on hand, the troops thawed. Unaware at first that the
made rapid progress. By 20 August the permafrost extended for another hun-
35th Engineers had blazed 209 miles of dred miles, Colonel Paules on 17 August
one-way trail to the Liard River and were prodded his troops to push through this
pushing forward along the river's north- final stretch by early October, before the
ern bank. At the end of the month, the Yukon winter set in. The regiment
341st and 95th Engineers, having turned was unable to attain such a pace, but did
their section of the road south of Fort find ways of coping with the frozen sub-
Nelson over to PRA, moved in behind soil. Instead of clearing by bulldozer,
the 35th Engineers and began to convert the men chopped trees level with the
the pioneer road into a two-lane high- ground. To keep sunlight off the ex-
way. The 340th Engineers, working posed area, they cut a corridor of
eastward from Teslin Lake, first put in a
trail for two-way traffic and after mid- 55
(1) Ltr, OpnsO Fort St. John Sec to CofEngrs,
24 Jul 1942. (2) Ltr, Hoge, to CofEngrs, 24 Jul 42.
54
(1) MacDonald Paper. (2) Ltr, Hoge to Cof- (3) Ltr, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 23 Aug 42. (4) Ltr,
Engrs, 24 Aug 42. (3) Ltr, O'Connor to CofEngrs, Ingalls to CofEngrs, 30 Sep 42.
56
23 Aug 42. (4) Ltr, Sturdevant to Somervell, 1 Sep The Eighteenth Engineers (Combat) in Yukon
42. Territory, Apr 42-Jan 43, p. 57. 94 KCRC.
312 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
medium width which they immediately River at Fort St. John. After the ice
corduroyed with small trees and broke up, the provincial government
branches. One company spread gravel operated a 20-ton ferry from shore to
over the corduroy, while another, using shore, but this craft was too small to
almost all the dump trucks of the regi- handle the great quantities of equipment
ment, hauled rock day and night. The that had to be carried over the river.
graveled strip crept forward at the rate From June on, a detachment of the 74th
of half a mile a day. Meanwhile, in Light Ponton Company hauled men and
Alaska, the 97th Engineers had by 25 supplies across on the Alcan, which con-
August finished the stretch of pioneer sisted of a tug and a 65-foot barge, capa-
road from Slana to the Tanana River. ble of carrying up to sixty tons. In the
The regiment then worked southeast Northern Sector, detachments of the 73d
along the river toward the international Light Ponton Company manned tugs
boundary in the direction of the 18th and barges which plied back and forth on
57
Engineers. the Teslin River and on Teslin and
Tagish Lakes.58
Bridges Unfamiliar with the quirks and va-
garies of the northern rivers, the engi-
Every one of the more than 100 major neers believed it best to build only
streams which crossed the route between temporary structures at first. They ex-
Dawson Creek and Big Delta was a pected spring floods to damage or even
hindrance to rapid construction. The carry away many of these spans. The
two light ponton companies had from troops used local timber, originally cut
the first supported the road-building and trimmed by hand and later prepared
regiments at the water crossings. Wher- with portable sawmills. Forward bridg-
ever possible, equipment was forded ing crews built simple stringer spans by
across. If streams could not be forded, hand over small streams, leaving the
ponton bridges were used. If there was construction of the longer pile and
insufficient equipment for bridging, the trestle structures to troops with cranes,
pontoniers made rafts by lashing pontons pile drivers, and other heavy equipment.
together and decking them with timber. In Yukon Territory, a number of streams
To power these rafts, they generally used had cut narrow channels through wide
outboard motors. As soon as possible, valleys, which were strewn with heavy
the rear elements of the regiments moved deposits of boulders and gravel. These
up to build timber bridges. When these streams would rise to unpredictable
were finished, the ponton units moved levels. Here the temporary bridges, as a
on to the next crossing. At the wider rule, were built only across the channels.
waterways, the pontoniers operated ferry To keep the approaches open necessi-
lines until bridges could be erected. tated considerable maintenance. A
One of the major barriers was the Peace
58
(1) Waldo G. Bowman et al., Bulldozers Come
First (New York, 1944), pp. 136fF. (2) Ltr, O'Connor
57
(1) Ltr, Hoge to CofEngrs, 24 Jul 42. (2) Ltr, to CofEngrs, 22 Jun 42. (3) Ltr, Hoge to CofEngrs,
Johnson to CofEngrs, 30 Sep 42. 24 Jul 42.
THE FAR NORTH 313
number of structures of more than 500 for operating the highway and the stag-
feet were built. In July, the 18th Engi- ing route during the coming winter.
neers built a pile and trestle bridge To improve the communications system,
across Slim's River, a tributary of Kluane Somervell authorized a telephone line
Lake. Toward the center of the channel from Edmonton to Fairbanks, parallel to
the gravel was frozen so solidly that the the highway. Although a private corpo-
piles splintered under the impact of the ration would install the line, the engi-
3,000-pound hammer. Blasting proved neers were to build repeater stations at
ineffective. Steel caps were radioed for 100-mile intervals. To supplement the
and flown in, enabling the engineers to fields of the Northwest Staging Route,
drive the piles into the bottom. Other the Army Air Forces requested that the
engineers, working from the opposite Corps of Engineers construct eight flight
bank, improvised a hydraulic pile-driving strips and weather observation stations
machine which consisted of a hose along the highway. Realizing that con-
fastened to an iron pipe. Men in boats siderable quantities of supplies and
held the pipe against the bottom near the equipment would have to be moved over
pile and pumped water under high pres- the pioneer road as soon as it was opened,
sure through the hose and pipe, thus General Sturdevant made arrangements
loosening the frozen gravel. When fin- during August and September for winter
ished, the bridge was 1,040 feet long, had traffic. He planned to build barracks
86 bents, and despite the frozen river for maintenance and snow-clearing
bottom and the swift current, took only crews, way stations for changing drivers,
a month to erect. In August elements and repair shops for servicing vehicles.60
of the 35th Engineers constructed a 730-
foot combination crib, pile, and trestle Northwest Service Command
bridge across the Muskwa River, just
west of Fort Nelson, finishing it shortly The additional construction, together
before the arrival of construction troops with the rapidly expanding activities in
working north from Fort St. John. All connection with Canol, made it desirable
these structures were temporary. Once to have one man in command of all U.S.
the behavior of the streams was better projects in northwestern Canada. On 2
known, PRA contractors would install September the Northwest Service Com-
the permanent structures.59 mand was activated to direct work on the
highway and related undertakings.
Preparations for Winter Traffic O'Connor, now a brigadier general, was
placed in command. General Hoge left
During the summer the engineers also for the United States and another assign-
had to construct the facilities required ment. Col. W. J. Wheeler took direct
charge of work on the highway. The
59
(1) Bowman et al., Bulldozers Come First, pp.
136ff. (2) The Eighteenth Engineers (Combat) in
60
Yukon Territory, Apr 42-Jan 43, p. 54. (3) Ltr, (1) Memo, DCofAS for Somervell, 29 Jul 42.
Hoge to CofEngrs, 24 Jul 42. (4) Ltr, O'Connor to (2) Memo for Rcd, Col George Horowitz, Opns Br
CofEngrs, 23 Aug 42. Constr Div OCE, 20 Oct 42. Canol Files.
314 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Northern Sector was henceforth under Several days later, a truck which had
Colonel Paules; the Southern, under started out from Dawson Creek crossed
Ingalls. The Chief of Engineers re- the stream and continued on its way to
tained technical supervision over the Whitehorse. It made the trip of 1,000
work.61 miles in seventy-one hours.62
In the Northern Sector additional
Closing the Gaps work was needed to complete the road.
By October a considerable gap still re-
By mid-September, the road in the mained at the Alaskan-Canadian border.
Southern Sector was almost complete. Realizing that the construction season
The 35th and the 340th Engineers had would not last long enough for the 18th
nearly closed the gap between them. and 97th Engineers to complete their
On the 24th, "amid the roar and thunder sections and bring them to pioneer road
of the big 'cats' and the swishing crash of standards, Colonel Paules sent two
the giant trees as they bent to the . . . platoons of the 18th across the White
will of the big dozer blades, there was a River on 10 October to build a trail that
strong feeling of suspense and anticipa- would be suitable for winter travel.
tion," wrote the unit historian of the This region had many hillocks, covered
340th Engineers. While the men waited with tall grass which slowed travel on
on the west bank of Contact Creek, foot or horseback. To avoid damaging
about fifty miles east of Watson Lake, the the ground on which the permanent road
35th Engineers, on the opposite side of would be built, a trail was blazed parallel
the stream, blasted rock from the side to the line already surveyed by PRA
of a steep hill which was the last obstacle engineers. The 18th Engineers cut
to the completion of "two long and many of the clumps of grass by hand.
treacherous stretches of the road through When the ground was sufficiently frozen,
the northwest wilderness of Canada." they took bulldozers and "walked down"
One of the bulldozers made a run down the heaviest growths.63
the yet unfinished cut on the hill and By November prospects were bright
pushed forward through brush and trees. that the remaining gaps in the pioneer
It moved into the creek and met the lead- road would soon be closed. On 25
ing bulldozer of the 340th in the center October the lead bulldozers of the 18th
of the stream. Colonel Lyons, com- and 97th Engineers had met at Beaver
mander of the 340th, and Maj. James A. Creek, a few miles east of the Alaskan-
McCarthy, commander of the 35th, Canadian border. The two units had
standing on the tracks of their bull- joined their sections by means of a winter
dozers, shook hands amid the shouts of road which would be passable until
the men and the blare of the band of the broken up by the spring thaws. During
340th. Everybody was milling about on
land and in the water to get snapshots. 62
(1) Ltr, Ingalls to CofEngrs, 30 Sep 42. (2) Ltr,
Johnson to CofEngrs, 30 Sep 42.
63
(1) Ltr, Ingalls to CofEngrs, 31 Oct 42. (2) Ltr,
61
(1) WD GO No. 44, 4 Sep 42. (2) Ltr, Sturde- Welling to CofEngrs, 30 Nov 42. (3) Ltr, Paules to
vant to TQMG, 4 Aug 42. CofEngrs, 31 Oct 42.
THE FAR NORTH 315
the next weeks the engineers and the 35th Engineers spent nine days in
contractors' forces graveled this road east September erecting a pile-bent structure,
of the international boundary as far as 1,270 feet long, across the Liard River
the White River. Still to be finished 209 miles west of Fort Nelson. Two
was a trestle bridge across the river. It months later the 340th built a pile-bent
was to be a makeshift affair, the frame bridge 750 feet long across the same
bents being placed directly on the ice stream, 15 miles east of Watson Lake.
except in the stream's channel. Mean- PRA also put in temporary structures.
while, PRA contractors finished their Late in September the Oakes Construc-
sections from Big Delta to Tanacross and tion Company began work on a 2,200-
from Whitehorse to Jake's Corner; on foot timber structure across the Peace
20 November, the 18th and 97th Engi- River at Fort St. John and finished it in
neers completed the bridge over the three weeks. In November a sudden
White. The Alcan Highway was open thaw hurled huge floes of ice against the
from Dawson Creek to Big Delta. A bridge, tearing out a 200-foot section.
pioneer road, 1,450 miles long, had been The gap was closed, and traffic resumed
pushed through in eight months. That within a few days. That same month,
same day Canadian and American offi- the 340th Engineers joined contractors
cials assembled at Soldier's Summit, over- in building a 2,300-foot pile-trestle
looking Kluane Lake, to hold a short bridge across Nisutlin Bay. Many of the
ceremony in celebration of the comple- piles were driven through ice. While
tion of the pioneer road. The next day temporary bridges were under construc-
the first trucks from Dawson Creek rolled tion, PRA studied sites for the perma-
64
into Fairbanks. nent structures, and contractors prepared
to begin work on several late in the
Winter on the Alcan year.65
As the cold weather set in, many of the
Although the pioneer road was fin- troops were shifted to work on camps
ished, the engineers still had many jobs and shelters. During the summer the
to complete, some of which they had men had slept on the ground in tents,
started in September. In the Southern but by October, better quarters were
Sector a major task was building a num- needed, for the temperature had dropped
ber of connecting roads from the high- below freezing in both sectors. Hun-
way. One was put in to the radio dreds of steel huts and prefabricated
station at Toobally Lakes. Another buildings were shipped from the United
was being run from Fort Nelson to Fort States and distributed along the route.
Simpson on the Mackenzie River, to be Most of the camps and shelters, however,
used as a supply route for the Canol were built by the troops from standard-
project. Bridges required a major ized plans and specifications prepared by
effort, and the engineers built a number the Construction Division of the Office
of long structures during the fall. The
65
(1) Ltrs, Ingalls to CofEngrs, 30 Sep and 31 Oct
64
Ltrs, Paules to CofEngrs, 31 Oct and 30 Nov 42. 42. (2) Ltr, Paules to CofEngrs, 31 Oct 42.
316 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
because of a series of rapids on the Slave large numbers of barges and rafts built
River between Fort Fitzgerald and Fort or improvised to move the supplies and
Smith. Supplies and machinery would equipment. Docks would have to be
have to be unloaded at Fort Fitzgerald, constructed at Waterways, Fort Fitz-
transported 16 miles over dirt roads, and gerald, and at other points on the rivers
then reloaded on other steamers at Fort so that the great tonnages about to arrive
Smith. The river boats, dating from the could be forwarded expeditiously. Con-
pre-World War I period and the 1920's, struction of landing strips would be
and serving mainly prospectors and trap- necessary so that some men and supplies
pers during the four and one-half months could be moved by air. Eventually
of the late spring and summer, were winter roads would have to be pushed
incapable of moving thousands of men through so that supplies could be
and tons of supplies and equipment dur- shipped northward after the rivers froze
ing a single season. To expedite the over early in October.
flow of men and materials, the War De- On 26 May, the War Department
partment planned to activate a special activated Task Force 2600 and placed it
task force made up of engineer units under Wyman's command. It included
proficient in stevedoring and in operat- the 388th Engineer Battalion (separate)
ing barges and pontons and send it to and the 89th and 90th Engineer Heavy
northern Canada. As soon as the trans- Ponton Battalions, together with signal,
portation system had been sufficiently quartermaster, finance, and medical units
improved, civilians would replace the —2,500 men in all. Their job was to
troops.74 improve transportation from Waterways
On 28 May Colonel Wyman, together to Norman Wells. The troops and
with a small party of civilians from the seventy civilians from the Kansas City
division office in San Francisco, arrived District Office reached Waterways dur-
at Edmonton, where he set up his head- ing the first two weeks in June. It was
quarters. At the same time, the con- cold and rainy and the frost was not
tractors opened their offices in that city. completely out of the ground. The men
Five days later, Wyman organized an ad- lived in pup tents in Camp Prairie, as
vance headquarters at Fort McMurray. their bivouac was called. The first jobs
Soon after his arrival, he got an idea of of the 388th engineers and the civilians
the magnitude of his task. Camps were to build more adequate living quar-
would be needed for troops and civilians; ters, unload the great quantities of equip-
storage areas and depots, for supplies ment already arriving from Edmonton,
and equipment. Boats would have to be and cut and stack firewood for the two
imported from the United States and somewhat dilapidated steamers tied up
at Waterways. The ponton engineers
74
(1) Ltr, R. V. LeSueur, Imperial Oil Ltd, to Gen
lashed their boats together to make rafts
Carter, 2 May 42. (2) River and Lake Navigation and floating docks. To get materials
Through Northern Alberta and the Northwest Ter- and supplies to Norman Wells would
ritories to the Arctic Ocean, Incl with Memo, WD,
SOS OCE Tr Div Intel Br for Opns and Tng Br,
require using the two steamers and as
9 Jul 42. (3) Ltr, Sturdevant to Wyman, 5 May 42. many pontons, rafts, barges, and other
322 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
view of the military needs of Alaska, the Canol 2. It would not provide a local
project has my full approval." Still, by source of gasoline, but it could be put
mid-June, it had become fully apparent into operation much sooner than Canol
that Canol could not be finished by the 1. Late in June, Reybold informed
end of the year. A more expeditious Wyman that the completion of the
and yet fairly dependable method of original Canol project in 1942 was not
getting oil to the northwestern part of desired; the remainder of the year should
77
the continent would have to be found. be spent in drilling at Norman Wells to
Many had advocated shipping gasoline determine if enough crude could be
by barge from Seattle or Prince Rupert produced to warrant putting in the re-
to Skagway and transporting it from finery and the pipeline.78
there by rail to Whitehorse. The Engi-
neers had suggested this alternative when Progress During the Summer
Canol was first discussed. On 25 June
Sturdevant wrote Somervell that the Great quantities of supplies continued
most optimistic date for starting produc- to pour into Waterways, and were for-
tion of 100 octane gasoline at Whitehorse warded by steamer and raft. By the end
was 1 January 1943. By the following of June, 5,450 tons had been shipped out.
July 65,000 barrels could be produced. Having gotten their preliminary jobs
One tanker could carry twice that much. out of the way, the civilians from the
That same day Somervell authorized the Kansas City District office began to
organization of an oil barge line to oper- build Missouri River-type barges and to
ate from Prince Rupert to Skagway, the assemble trailers to transport barges and
laying of a pipeline from Skagway to rafts over the portage roads. By early
Whitehorse, and the erection of storage July they had completed twelve of the
tanks at Whitehorse. Construction of barges. With the arrival of men and
the pipeline would mean diverting some equipment at the oil field, the drilling
workmen and about 110 miles of pipe of additional wells began the first week
from the original Canol project. Com- of July. The first well was in produc-
pletion of the refinery and of the crude tion on the 18th, and four others were
oil line from Norman Wells to White- being drilled. The outlook was opti-
horse, called for under the original mistic that the goal of 3,000 barrels a
directive for Canol, would have to be day could be reached. OCE meanwhile
postponed from October 1942 to De- procured 550 miles of 4-inch pipe for the
cember 1943. On 27 June the Canadian crude-oil line from Norman Wells to
Government gave informal consent to Whitehorse. That month the first
the new project, soon referred to as aerial reconnaissance of the route was
made. To get enough well-drilling
(1)Memo for Rcd, Dept of State, 16 May 42. equipment and pipe to Norman Wells
77
was a most arduous task. Since the acter. . . . The approach to the Mac-
rivers would be frozen over within a few kenzie River is very dangerous due to
months, Wyman had to begin at an submerged rocks." After the debacles
early date to develop other means of resulting from the first attempts with
supply. He arranged with the Air rafts, the pontons were decked with can-
Transport Command and a Canadian vas and boards; later, all rafts were pro-
airline to operate a modest aerial trans- vided with wave breakers. Nevertheless,
port system from Waterways to Norman during the summer of 1942 a number of
Wells, to be fully operational by au- rafts were swamped by waves or badly
tumn. To facilitate air transport, he damaged by rocks or snags. Several
planned in late summer to construct more piled up on sandbars. Only heavy
fourteen landing strips from Waterways barges of from 200- to 300-tons capacity
to Norman Wells. Meantime, Canol 2 proved suitable for crossing Great Slave
was not neglected. Laying of the pipe- Lake and making the trip down the
line from Skagway to Whitehorse began Mackenzie to Norman Wells.80
on 17 August.79
Transportation remained the main Canol Is Expanded
bottleneck. By far the greatest prob-
lems were encountered in connection On 17 and 18 August, Somervell and
with getting materials and equipment to Reybold made an inspection of the Alcan
Norman Wells. In many places the Highway and the Canol project. Wy-
channels of the meandering rivers were man informed them that Imperial Oil
shallow and obstructed by shifting sand- now freely predicted that 3,000 barrels
bars. No charts were available, and a day would be attained. On the 18th,
Indian guides often had to be used to Somervell, in a conference with Wyman
pilot the engineer craft. The lakes and representatives of the contractors at
were especially hazardous. In stormy Edmonton, directed that work on Canol
weather Lake Athabaska was dangerous be expanded. The pipeline for Canol
even for the river steamers which regu- 2 was to be finished at the earliest prac-
larly made the run from Waterways to ticable date. Canol 1 was to be con-
Fort Fitzgerald. Sometimes the ships tinued as planned. During the coming
had to wait for days near the entrance of winter Task Force 2600, which had been
the lake until calm weather set in. scheduled to return to the United States,
Great Slave Lake was just as treacherous. was to remain and help the contractors
"The lake is difficult to navigate," Wy- transport equipment and materials to
man wrote to Sturdevant on 3 August, Norman Wells. A suitable refinery was
"and during high winds the turbulence to be found in the United States, dis-
approximates ocean conditions, except mantled, and shipped to Whitehorse. A
that the waves are very choppy in char- plan for distributing gasoline from
80
(1) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 31 Jul 42. (2) Ltr,
79
(1) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 30 Jun 42. (2) Wyman to Sturdevant, 3 Aug 42, quoted in Rpt on
Memos, Pyron for Somervell, 7, 23 Jul 42. (3) Canol Proj, p. 70. (3) Ltr, CO Hq Base Zone Canol
Telg, Wyman to CofEngrs, 25 Aug 42. Proj to Wyman, 10 Oct 42.
THE FAR NORTH 325
Whitehorse to Fairbanks, Nome, and drilling 100 wildcat wells; Noble was
Anchorage was to be devised. Formally to begin work with the arrival of
directed by Sturdevant on 28 August to its equipment at the oil field in mid-
carry out these decisions, Wyman con- November. Although the Transporta-
sulted his architect-engineers and several tion Corps report also emphasized the
days later recommended laying a pipe- need for more pipelines, Wyman's major
line along the Alcan Highway from emphasis during the fall was on increas-
Whitehorse to Fairbanks and thence ing production at Norman Wells, in
westward to Tanana. From here barges order to make sure that there was suffi-
could carry petroleum products down cient oil to warrant going ahead with
the Yukon to the Bering Sea. To carry the rest of Canol. Ground reconnais-
gasoline east of Whitehorse, he proposed sances of the route for the crude oil
putting in a pipeline to Watson Lake, pipeline were started. The first party
which could transport 800 barrels of to begin a survey of the route, led by an
gasoline a day to various points along American surveyor, Kent Fuller, left
the Alcan Highway.81 Whitehorse in September and headed
On 4 September the Transportation northeast for Sheldon Lake, the midway
Corps sent a report to Somervell concern- point. In November a party headed by
ing the possible use of Alaska as a spring- a Canadian set out from Norman Wells
board for an attack on Japan. If such in a southwesterly direction.82
a strategy were adopted, large supplies In September construction began on
of oil would be needed, and the continu- the first of the fourteen landing strips
ing scarcity of shipping indicated the between Waterways and Norman Wells.
necessity for developing resources in or Air transport alone, however, could not
near Alaska. If Norman Wells could bring in the tonnages needed; most
produce 20,000 barrels of crude a day, freight would have to be moved over-
Alaska could be made well-nigh self- land. Wyman began work on a system
sufficient with regard to gasoline. Som- of winter roads, which could be cleared
ervell forwarded this report to General and smoothed quickly by bulldozers.
O'Connor, who passed it on to Wyman. Without roadbed or surfacing, they
On 15 September, Wyman recommended could support traffic as long as ground
to O'Connor that a wildcat drilling remained frozen but would break up in
program be undertaken north and south the spring thaws. Because the routes
of Norman Wells. Imperial could do crossed swamps, construction could not
some of the drilling, but an additional be undertaken until freezing weather set
firm would have to be brought in. On in. Employees of Bechtel, Price, and
25 September Wyman signed a contract Callahan and such troops as were avail-
with the Noble Drilling Corporation of able were to bulldoze the main road
Tulsa, Oklahoma, which called for from the railhead at Peace River north-
82
(1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 76-77. (2) Ltr,
81
(1) Memo for Rcd, Somervell, 18 Aug 42. NWSC Wyman to CofEngrs, 26 Sep 42. (3) Ltr, Robins to
337 Canol. (2) Ltr, Sturdevant to Canol Proj, 28 Hickerson, 11 Dec 42. (4) Ltr, Sturdevant to Hicker-
Aug 42. (3) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 31 Aug 42. son, 13 Aug 42.
326 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Dawson Creek. The winter roads Despite all efforts to improve trans-
showed rapid progress. By the begin- portation to Norman Wells, sufficient
ning of January, the 388th and 90th materials could not be shipped in to
engineers had bulldozed 374 miles from expand crude production as scheduled.
Peace River to Alexandra Falls, and by Planes could do no more than bring in
the end of February, the contractors' men supplies of food, clothing, fuel, and
had completed the road to Norman other necessities to the men stationed at
Wells. Additional roads were bulldozed the northern posts during the winter
across the Arctic expanses. Company B months. To keep trucks going on the
of the 388th completed one 200 miles rough roads during the bitter cold
long from Fort Smith westward to the proved to be an almost impossible task.
Hay River. The reconnaissance parties "The winter roads," the engineers re-
meanwhile continued their exploration ported, "were nightmares both to the
of the route for the crude oil pipeline. men who built them and to those who
In December the party that had set out operated vehicles over them." Never-
from Norman Wells finished its survey theless, about 8,000 tons of supplies were
of the eastern half of the route; the one trucked from Peace River as far as the
which had set out from Whitehorse Mackenzie and stored to be sent down
reached Sheldon Lake on 28 February. the river when the ice broke up in the
The route finally selected was 577 miles spring. Wyman planned to turn traffic
long, running southwestward, usually on the rivers over to civilians during the
along the valleys of streams, from Nor- coming year. On 2 February he signed
man Wells across the Mackenzie Moun- a contract with Marine Operators, an
tains to Johnson's Crossing on the Alcan association made up of the firms of C. W.
Highway, 80 miles east of Whitehorse. Cunningham and Peter Kiewit of
The maximum elevation was 5,000 feet. Omaha, Nebraska, and Paul Grafe,
In January 1943, elements of the 35th president of the W. E. Callahan Con-
Engineers at Johnson's Crossing began struction Company. The Marine Oper-
the difficult job of building the road to ators were to run barges and rafts on the
Sheldon Lake, which would parallel the rivers and operate docks and portage
pipeline, and had to be put in first so equipment between Waterways and Nor-
that trucks could haul pipe to the weld- man Wells.86
ing crews. Employees of Bechtel, Price, In the spring of 1943 work on Canol,
and Callahan began work on the other carried on under Colonel Worsham's
half of the road from Norman Wells. direction after Wyman's departure on 25
Work also moved ahead on the airfields. March, was accelerated. That same
Troops and civilians had finished eleven month Canol 4—the pipeline from
by the end of January.85 Whitehorse to Fairbanks—was started.
85
(1) Memo, Maj J. M. Wild, OCE, for WDGS, 5 Maj L. E. Laurion, Whitehorse Dist Engr, to
Feb 43. (2) Northwest Div, Feb 44, Rpt, Winter Wyman, 15 Feb 43.
86
Road Ops Grimshaw, Alberta, to Norman Wells, (1) History of Force 2600 (Gainesville, Texas),
Northwest Territory, 1942-43. (3) Ltr, S-3 388th p. 65. ENBN-89-0. (2) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp.
Engr GS Regt to CG NWSC, 6 May 43. (4) Ltr, 59, 90.
328 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Although the route paralleled the Alcan the Japanese from the Aleutians. Kiska
Highway, construction was not easy. was to be recaptured first. An Army-
There were 101 water crossings. Per- Navy planning staff was set up at San
manent highway bridges would carry the Diego, and during the winter the 7th
pipeline over the major rivers, but over Infantry Division began training at Fort
the smaller ones the pipe had to be laid Ord. The role of Alaska in the war
on stream bottoms or carried across on came under close scrutiny at the Casa-
A-frames or cable suspension bridges. blanca Conference in January 1943.
Often glaciers of ice covered the low Roosevelt and Churchill decided that
temporary bridges, which in the spring efforts made in the North Pacific should
were torn out by floods. When the be aimed not so much at driving the
thaws set in, the highway beyond the Japanese from the Aleutians as prevent-
White River became an impassable ing them from expanding and consoli-
quagmire. More rapid progress was dating their holdings. Rear Adm.
made on the pipeline from Whitehorse Thomas C. Kinkaid, commander of the
to Watson Lake, and on 21 May, the line North Pacific area, was informed that the
was completed. Sections of the refinery ships required for the planned attack on
began to arrive at Whitehorse in the Kiska would not be forthcoming. Since
spring, and the job of reassembling it Attu was believed to be less heavily de-
began on 19 April. But with the be- fended, Kinkaid suggested that Kiska be
ginning of the spring thaws, work on the bypassed and that available forces be
crude oil pipeline and the parallel access used to capture Attu and occupy the
road came almost to a standstill and was nearby Semichi Islands. Such a strat-
not resumed until May. When the agem would isolate Kiska and provide a
Arctic summer began, Canol was still far fine site for an airfield on Shemya
from finished. By this time, the tactical Island, 50 miles east of Attu and one of
situation in the Aleutians had changed the Semichi group. On 22 March the
the thinking regarding the Pacific north- Army and Navy ordered preparations
west. The Japanese were being driven begun for the capture of Attu. Ele-
out of the islands, and it appeared that ments of the 7th Division were to make
the threat to Alaska would be elimi- the landing; the division's 13th Engineer
nated.87 Combat Battalion would support the
infantry, while the 50th Engineer Com-
The Danger Passes bat Regiment would act as shore party.
Lt. Col. James E. Green, commander of
Attu and Shemya the 13th, was named Force Engineer.88
When the task force left Cold Bay on minutes. A tractor with a winch was
4 May, D-day was set for the 8th. Be- moved up and anchored on top of the
cause of fog at the landing beaches, the ridge. Supplies were hauled up in to-
assault was postponed till the 11th. On boggan sleds attached to a cable. Mean-
that day the troops came in at two places time, the infantry advanced up the
on eastern Attu: at Massacre Bay on the valley, along both sides of the hogback
southern shore and near Holtz Bay on toward Sarana Pass.
the northern. (See Map 16.) They To improve supply, the engineers
were to move inland, meet at Holtz Bay started to build a road along the top of
pass, and then drive eastward against the the hogback. Here the bulldozers easily
enemy troops concentrated in the valleys stripped the tundra, from one to two feet
and peninsulas. At Massacre Bay four deep, exposing the rock or hardpan base.
companies of the 50th Engineers and The road was pushed through all the way
three companies of the 13th went in to Sarana Pass, which was reached on 24
with the infantry. At Holtz Bay, one May. By this time, the infantry had
company of the 50th landed with an driven the Japanese out of the pass and
infantry detachment. Both forces en- forced them to retreat up Chichagof
countered no resistance at the time of the Valley.90
landings.89 On 25 May three companies of the
During the next few days the troops 50th Engineers and elements of the 13th
advanced inland against stubborn enemy set up their camps on a high point to the
opposition. The engineers with the east of Sarana Pass, on the south side of
larger force at Massacre Bay had a hard Sarana Valley, a site that soon became
time because of the difficult terrain. known as Engineer Hill. Infantry, ar-
Inland from the beach, swamp and tillery, and service troops were encamped
tundra extended for about a mile up on both flanks. In order to get supplies
Massacre Valley to a hogback ridge. into Chichagof Valley, the engineers
Moving equipment across the tundra began to build a switch-back road down
was impossible. The engineers decided the steep slope of the hill, a job that
to use the rocky bed of a creek as a road, would take several days. A cableway
and lines of heavily laden tracked ve- would speed supplies forward even more
hicles were soon moving up this novel expeditiously. To operate such a con-
highway. The forward movement trivance a tractor would have to be
stopped abruptly at the ridge. Strug- gotten down to the valley floor, attached
gling for two days to get a bulldozer to to the cableway, and run back and forth.
the top of the tundra-covered slope, the Additional tractors would be needed
men finally succeeded. They then below to move supplies forward. The
turned the machine around and cut a problem was to get a machine into the
trough down through the tundra in five
90
(1) Richardson, "Engineers in the Battle of
89
(1) Harold W. Richardson, "Engineers in the Attu," Engineering News-Record, CXXXI (December
Battle of Attu," Engineering News-Record, CXXXI 30, 1943), 46-50. (2) Ltr, ExecO 13th Engr Combat
(December 30, 1943), 46-50. (2) 50th Engr Combat Bn to Hq Task Group 16.11, APO 726, 15 Jun 43.
Bn, Unit Hist, Sep 42-Sep 45. 307 Engr (13) 0.3 (12414)M.
330 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
valley. The 1,000-foot slope of Engi- rifles at the onrushing enemy. Some of
neer Hill, the most feasible route, was the machine guns that the 13th engineers
steep, rocky, and partly covered with brought into play proved highly effec-
tundra. Equipment could not descend tive. The fighting continued during
under its own power. The engineers the morning but by noon the routed
tumbled six tractors down, hoping that enemy troops were fleeing to the gorges
one or two would be in running condi- on the far side of Sarana Valley. When
tion after hitting the bottom. All six wounded or cornered, many of the Jap-
were. A cableway was rigged up and anese killed themselves with their own
attached to one of the tractors. Run grenades. By nightfall the enemy had
back and forth across the valley floor, the been practically wiped out. Over 250
tractor lowered and raised the sleds Japanese bodies were found around En-
attached to the cable. By the morning gineer Hill, many of them armed only
of the 29th, a road had been completed with bayonets tied to sticks. The engi-
91
down the slope, replacing the cableway. neers had borne the brunt of the attack
By this time the enemy's position in —29 had been killed and 47 wounded.92
Chichagof Valley was hopeless. Despite The fierceness of the fighting on Attu
the heavy odds, the Japanese commander is attested to by the fact that about 2,350
decided to counterattack. At 0300 on Japanese were killed but only 29 prison-
29 May nearly a thousand screaming ers taken. Some 550 American lives
Japanese who had broken through Amer- were lost. The wounded numbered ap-
ican infantry lines stormed up Chichagof proximately 1,150. Disease and non-
Valley and within two hours were at En- battle injuries claimed another 2,100
gineer Hill. An attack at this point was men. Certain inadequacies in training
wholly unexpected. Some men in the and tactics made the fighting on Attu
engineer camp were killed while asleep. costlier than necessary for the engineers.
Confusion and panic gripped many of Lt. Col. Virgil M. Womeldorff, com-
the others as, partly dressed, they mander of the 50th Engineers, reported
stumbled out of their tents. Company that "realistic training in combat tactics,
officers and noncommissioned officers night patrolling, outpost duty and uses
hastily organized small groups to form of terrain features would have saved
makeshift defense lines. The men many of the casualties encountered and
fought back as best they could. Some
crouched behind tractors and piles of 92
wooden cases, lobbing grenades into the (1) The Capture of Attu As Told By The Men
Who Fought There (Washington, 1944), pp. 21-23,
darkness. Others, taking positions be- 118-19. (2) Hist Sec Alaskan Dept, Official Hist,
hind piles of earth and rock which they pp. 71-73. (3) Ltr, Womeldorff to CG Task Group
had excavated in the course of road 16.11, 14 Jun 43, in Opns Rpt, 50 Engr Combat Bn,
11 May-2 Jun 43. (4) Hq 50th Engr Combat Regt,
construction, fired their carbines and Unit Jnl, 11 May-2 Jun 43. Last two in ENBN-50-
0.3 (16522)M. (5) Ltr, ExecO 13th Engr Combat Bn
to Hq Task Group 16.11, APO 726, 15 Jun 43. 307
91
Richardson, "Engineers in the Battle of Attu," Engr (13) 0.3 (12414)M. (6) Maj Gen Eugene M.
Engineering News-Record, CXXXI (December 30, Landrum, Rpt of Opns on Attu, 25 Jun 43, p. 15.
1943), 46-50. 91-TF4-0.3.
THE FAR NORTH 331
93 94
(1) Hist Sec Alaskan Dept, Official Hist, p. 73. (1) 50th Engr Combat Bn, Unit Hist, Sep 42-
(2) Ltr, Womeldorff to CG Task Group 16.11, 14 Sep 45. (2) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr,
Jun 43. pp. 201-07. (3) Hist of the 807th Engr Avn Bn.
332 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
defeating the enemy's forces. Each our constant naval blockade." At Ger-
beach combat team, with one company trude Cove, where the Japanese had
of combat engineers, was to unload ships, located some of their important installa-
establish dumps, and move supplies in- tions, "five ravens as large as turkeys,
land. Both teams were organized and scratching about in a pile of rotting food,
equipped to fight.95 proved to be the only living things
On the evening of 12 August the task there." 99
force left Adak, arriving off Kiska two Soon after the island was retaken, most
nights later. Soon after midnight, in of the 7th Division left for Hawaii. The
the light of a bright moon, the troops battalion of the 50th Engineers, which
clambered into their landing craft, had engaged in shore party work, re-
"grimly expectant" as they saw the "fog- mained behind. The men had plenty
obscured mass of Kiska for miles of work to do, even though the size of
ahead. . . ." 96 The first landings were the base that had been planned for Kiska
made without incident, and the men was reduced drastically and no air force
advanced over the rocky beaches "with units were to be stationed there. Some
nothing but mysterious silence as wel- of the Japanese installations could be
come." 97 Each combat team moved for- used. On a high ridge near the north-
ward to attack the enemy as it had been ern part of the island the enemy had
directed to do. Defenses were consid- partly finished a runway, the two ends of
erably stronger than on Attu. Barbed which sloped downward. Considerable
wire and mines were encountered on cutting was required at the center and
most of the beaches. Further inland the fill was needed at both ends. The engi-
men ran into pillboxes, radar installa- neers had only light equipment and had
tions, and searchlights. But none of to haul dirt in push carts, but eventually
the defenses were manned. "Each ob- they managed to even up the strip to the
jective taken without contact of enemy proper grade. They also improved the
caused the men to be even more tense," Japanese-built road between Gertrude
wrote the historian of the 50th Engi- Cove and Kiska Harbor. In many
neers, "for the fear of moving into a places it had to be entirely reconstructed.
trap was common." 98 Fog, rain, and They blasted rock from the hillsides, and
strong winds heightened the feeling of carried much of it by hand to the road-
apprehension. No enemy troops were way because trucks were not to be had.
ever found. "The impossible had been "This was by no means a pleasant proj-
accomplished," the historian of the 50th ect, or one on which desired progress
Engineers continued, "Japan had com- could be made," the 50th Engineers re-
pletely evacuated the island in spite of ported. Late in September, the 50th
moved to Hawaii. The 223d and 521st
95
(1) 50th Engr Combat Bn, Unit Hist, Sep 42-
Combat Companies, recently arrived on
Sep 45. (2) Hist Sec Alaska Dept, Official Hist, pp.
125-26.
96 99
Hist Sec Alaska Dept, Official Hist, p. 134. (1) Ibid. (2) WD, Bureau of Public Relations
97
Ibid, p. 135. Press Br, Jap Mode of Living on Kiska Described by
98
50th Engr Combat Bn Unit Hist, Sep 42-Sep 45. A.G.F. [Observer], for release 8 Oct 43. EHD Files.
THE FAR NORTH 333
the island, remained to construct base and the Construction Division. There
100
facilities. was little change in the way the engineers
carried on their work, apparently the
Engineer Reorganization only difference being that correspond-
ence formerly exchanged between Nold
The expulsion of the Japanese ended and Talley over Buckner's signature was
the immediate danger to the Aleutians now forwarded in memorandum form
and Alaska. It was not likely that Japan among the three divisions. The duties
would again try to seize any of the islands. of the Seattle District office remained as
But the North Pacific area was still im- before. No new projects were in pros-
portant because it was near the Soviet pect for the mainland, but additional
Union. Whether the USSR might be- work was to be undertaken in the
come an ally in an offensive against Aleutians. When, in November, the
Japan was not known. In any case the Alaska Defense Command became a
military forces were kept strong and were separate theater of operations and was
reorganized to meet changing conditions. renamed the Alaskan Department, Gen-
The engineer organization was re- eral Nold became the first department
vamped. The anomalous situation of engineer.102
having two engineer organizations in the Work on airfields and bases in the
Alaskan Defense Command had worked Aleutians continued. On Kiska, the
well in practice. But, as General Nold engineers labored on the docks, the run-
wrote later, the War Department had not way, gasoline storage, and quarters for
liked it and had objected to it "at in- the troops. On Shemya, their main
tervals of about three months because it concern was coping with the extremely
did not follow the diagrammatic pattern rough seas. During 1943 most supplies
of relationships that applied to other and equipment had to be brought ashore
theaters." 101 The first changes in the by barge and landing craft; a few could
engineer setup had been made in the be flown in. In 1944, the engineers
previous June. Colonel Talley's organi- built a dock out to deep water, 1,400 feet
zation with its 250 officers, enlisted men, from shore, and to protect it erected a
and civilians, together with the Utilities 2,000-foot breakwater. A violent storm
Engineer Section, was consolidated with wrecked breakwater and dock. Landing
Nold's office. Talley, as scheduled, then mats, laid on the slopes of the break-
returned to the United States, and Nold water to give added protection, were
henceforth had technical supervision tossed about on the boiling seas. Fifty-
over all engineer work in the Territory. foot sections of the dock were torn off
The three units of his office were the their piles, some of which broke as the
Military Division, the Utilities Division, sections were wrenched loose. Tons of
rock were thrown on the beach. The
100
(1) 50th Engr Combat Bn, Unit Hist, Sep 42-
Sep 45. (2) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr,
102
pp. 210-11. (3) Nold, Hist of Of of Engr Alaskan Nold, Hist of Of of Engr Alaskan Dept, pp.
Dept, Incl 3, p. 11. 31ff. (2) Ltr, TAG to Buckner, 27 Oct 43. 400.312
101
Ltr, Nold to C EHD, 7 Aug 57. (AD).
334 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
October, the Joint Chiefs declared that pipeline would be able to carry only
the completion and operation of the 3,000 barrels. The committee's attacks
project were necessary for the war effort, were directed entirely at the conception
and two months later, Secretary Stimson and scope of the project and not against
informed the Truman Committee of the the way it was executed. The commit-
War Department's intention to continue tee agreed that the War Department
work. On 8 January 1944, the com- should decide whether or not Canol
mittee issued a highly critical report, should be completed.106
charging among other things that Canol Work moved ahead. By November
had been authorized after insufficient
study and was continued contrary to the 106
(1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 123-25 and app. A.
advice of government and industry. (2) Investigation of the National Defense Program,
One of the criticisms was that a produc- pp. 9287ff., 9337ff. (3) Ltr, USW Patterson to Senator
Harry S. Truman, 24 Nov 43. (4) Ltr, Stimson to
tion goal of 20,000 barrels a day was the Truman, 23 Dec 43. Investigation of the National
aim at Norman Wells when the crude oil Defense Program, p. 9915.
THE FAR NORTH 337
REFINERY AT WHITEHORSE
1943, Imperial had twenty-nine wells in Pelly River. Completion of the road
production. Noble found little oil. enabled the contractors to speed up work
On 23 November the latter company on the pipeline, 470 miles of which had
was told to discontinue all drilling out- now been completed. Since tests indi-
side the proven field, and later its con- cated the oil would flow even at -75°F.,
tract was terminated. The exploratory the pipe could be laid directly on the
operations showed that the oil deposits ground. A telephone line was installed
were larger than originally assumed; re- which connected Norman Wells with the
serves, once estimated at 2 million pumping stations and Whitehorse and
barrels, were now believed to range tied in with the line along the Alcan
from 60 to 100 million. By the end of Highway. In mid-February 1944 the
the year, the road from Norman Wells to last two pipes were welded. Ten pump-
Whitehorse was finished, together with ing stations were in place. On 16 April
some of the bridges over the many the first oil from Norman Wells reached
streams, including the 600-foot-wide Whitehorse. Two weeks later the re-
338 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
petroleum distribution in the areas in Canol were of the opinion that if oil
which they served. To ship a barrel of shipments from the United States had
gasoline from Skagway to Whitehorse by been cut off and a local source of oil
rail cost $8.40; by Canol 2 pipeline, 23 that existed in the northwestern part of
cents. Nevertheless, Canol could sup- America had not been developed, the
ply the North Pacific theater with only War Department might well have come
a fraction of its gasoline requirements, under more severe criticism than it did
and on 1 April 1945, operation of the for having built Canol.
crude oil pipeline and refinery was The Engineers had made an extensive
108
suspended. effort in Alaska and northwestern Can-
The Canol project, pushed through at ada. Their work was not altogether
the insistence of General Somervell, futile. Alcan remained as a permanent
served little practical purpose. To link between the United States and
many, Canol had seemed a visionary and Alaska. Canol was abandoned, but a
expensive undertaking. But it was also great deal had been learned about con-
true that the possibility of an attack on struction in the far north. And much
Alaska could not be ignored in early of the engineer work in Alaska was of
1942. Many of those who supported permanent value because of Alaska's im-
portant strategic position in the post-
108
Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 136, 146, 150. war world.
CHAPTER VIII
portant as it was the only one in the stream of cars, buses, and trucks arrived
Islands with runways capable of taking on the campus. Keys not being readily
B-17's safely. During the evening, work- available, some of the doors of the build-
men from the district began repairing ing were forced open. A number of
Hickam's broken water mains and dam- the faculty, hurriedly called in, helped
aged utilities. Bellows also received at- clear out furniture and equipment and
tention. One of the 12 B-17's that made inventories of the items being re-
happened to arrive in Hawaii during moved; Monday morning found the new
the attack on Pearl Harbor made an headquarters ready for work.3
emergency landing at this field; the Martial law went into effect in the
Hawaiian Constructors that same day Islands on the afternoon of the 7th.
began lengthening the second runway so General Short became military governor.
that it could take more of the B-17's ex- As stipulated in the defense plans,
pected from the mainland within the Colonel Lyman, the Hawaiian Depart-
2
next few days. ment engineer, became the head of the
Wyman believed it imperative to move military engineer organizations in
the district's advance headquarters from Hawaii.4 He henceforth directed all
its exposed position at Kewalo Basin to a engineering activities in connection with
safer place. A trustee of Punahou, defense, except those under the control
Honolulu's exclusive and venerable pri- of the U.S. Navy. He was authorized to
vate school, suggested that he move the spend money without limit on engineer
district office into the school buildings. work. Wyman's job was to help Lyman
Located back in the hills, Punahou of- give the commanders in the Islands the
fered a more sheltered location, had defenses they needed. Specifically, he
adequate office and storage space, and was to maintain permanent fortifications
possessed superior messing and dormi- in a state of readiness, help civilian au-
tory facilities, a most important con- thorities keep the roads and other means
sideration, since civilian employees who of communications open, construct
worked at night were not permitted to shelters in and around Honolulu, relieve
travel to and from work while blackouts the 804th engineers as soon as possible
were in effect. The school's authorities of the responsibility of keeping perma-
appeared to have no inkling of what was nent airdromes repaired, and lastly, as
about to happen when, at two o'clock in directed by Lyman, furnish workmen
the morning of 8 December, the first and equipment to the military forces in
cars from the district arrived at Puna- the Islands. These various tasks got
hou's gates. When the night watchman under way immediately. On the 8th
rushed out to learn what was going on,
3
he was informed the engineers were tak- (1) Wyman, Comments on Draft Manuscript of
this chapter. EHD Files. (2) O. F. Shepard, for-
ing over. During the next few hours, a mer President of Punahou, An Account of the Early
Days of World War II at Punahou School. (MS).
2
(1) Memo, Wyman for Rcd, 7 Dec 41, sub: Tele- Hawaii War Records Depository. (3) Ltr w/Incl,
phone messages. Engr, AGF PAC, KCRC. (2) Pearl Maj Gen B. L. Robinson to C, EHD, 23 Dec 60.
Harbor Hearings, Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. EHD Files.
4
Short, Parts 30-31, p. 2473. See above, p. 43.
342 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Wyman took over all building materials, and Land Company, and the pineapple
supplies, and equipment, called all con- and sugarcane plantations. The planta-
struction companies into service, and tions were of vital importance. They
started constructing bunkers and extend- had extensive repair shops, sizable
ing runways at the airfields. Lyman quantities of heavy construction equip-
distributed material to the troops and ment, and many trained mechanics.
got work on field fortifications under Their electric generating facilities could
way. No sooner had the engineer or- be tied into commercial power circuits.
ganization been consolidated than it was Each plantation was so organized and
also enlarged. The transfer of the con- equipped that its workers could be used
structing quartermaster's staff and field as corps engineer troops. Besides help-
organization to the Engineers had been ing the engineers, the plantations were
scheduled for the 16th. Short directed expected to contribute to civilian de-
that it take place on the 8th. The con- fense. The director of Civilian Defense
structing quartermaster's 200 employees divided rural Oahu into districts; men
were transferred to the district. Wyman from the plantations were organized in
acquired from the Quartermaster Corps each to carry out such jobs as repairing
63 construction contracts for work esti- airfields, maintaining roads, railroads,
mated to cost $12,793,942, about one- and utilities, fighting fires, and rounding
6
fourth of which was finished. He con- up saboteurs.
tinued to be responsible for the efforts Besides the district and civilian organi-
of the Hawaiian Constructors. They zations, Lyman could rely on troop
moved their main offices to Punahou, units. The 34th Combat Regiment,
so that they could co-operate better with under the direction of the department
the district. Wyman was still responsi- commander, was already busy on roads
ble to the Chief of Engineers for the and trails; so were the two divisional
improvement of rivers and harbors and combat battalions, the 3d and the 65th.
flood control, but such civil work not in The 804th engineers, assigned to the
some way pertaining to defense was now Hawaiian Air Force, were responsible
5
negligible. for keeping all airfields used by military
Lyman, besides looking to the district aircraft in a state of repair, until re-
for help, had made plans to use as many lieved by the district. The few troops
civilian organizations as possible. He on hand were hardly adequate to do the
was prepared to turn to contractors and work that now had to be done, and
suppliers of building materials, public Lyman appealed to the War Department
roads departments, the Oahu Railway for more units. He asked for two avia-
tion battalions, a camouflage company,
5
(1) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding a topographic company (corps), a depot
the United States and Its Outposts, ch. VIII. (2)
Pearl Harbor Attack, Statement by General Short,
6
pts. 30-31, p. 2473. (3) Hq Engr Serv FO No 1, 8 (1) Ltr, Lyman to Honolulu Water Works, 8 Dec
Dec 41. (4) Ltr, Lyman to Honolulu Water Works, 41. (2) 1st Ind, Lyman to G-1 HD, 4 Mar 42, basic
8 Dec 41. Last two in Engr, AGF PAC. (5) Hist unknown. (1). (3) Ltr, Military Governor to
Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering Opns During Territorial Dir of Civil Defense, n.d. All in Engr
World War II, POA, p. 11. AGF PAC.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 343
7
company, and a mobile shop company. The plantation owners agreed to make
He pointed out that his staff was too available their equipment, materials, and
small for the multitudinous jobs ahead. workers as needed. The Hawaiian Con-
"I have been making strenuous efforts to structors were geared for war. General
obtain suitable officers for the engineer Short directed that all construction for
service," he wrote to Reybold on 3 Janu- the Army being done by civilian firms in
ary, ". . . and I find myself blocked by the Islands be placed under the Ha-
inaction in Washington and cumber- waiian Constructors; the other firms
some regulations." 8 He went on to say would henceforth be considered their
that he had few military men, Regular subcontractors. Many jobs were sus-
or Reserve, who had had much experi- pended while Short and his staff reviewed
ence. Members of his staff were work- the over-all program. For the time be-
ing from sixteen to twenty hours a day ing, work was to continue on only the
trying to "handle the great volume of most urgent projects. Many of the con-
Engineer work that has to be done as tractors' forces were switched to what
fast as possible because it was not done were now deemed emergency jobs.
before the war began. . . ." "Between Blackouts and restrictions on traffic
overworked officers and inexperienced forced the engineers to provide quarters
officers," Lyman concluded, "the Engi- and subsistence to men who were work-
neer service is in a serious condition." ing in remote or barely accessible places
With the over-all shortage of engineers, from which they could not return home
General Reybold could do little to fill after the day's work.11
Lyman's request in the near future. 9 Besides his mounting engineer re-
An especially heavy burden fell on the sponsibilities, Wyman was given a num-
district office. As military governor, ber of special jobs. He shared with the
Short charged Wyman with the "super- navy yard supply officer the responsibility
vision and direction of all normal civilian for apportioning gasoline and other
engineer activities, including operation petroleum products to the armed forces
of utilities." 10 Under martial law, all and for rationing them to the public.
employees of essential industries had to Huge quantities of war materials and
stay in their jobs. Construction ma- civilian goods were piling up on the piers
chinery and materials, vital supplies, and of west coast ports for shipment to the
wages were frozen. Wyman signed con- islands. Much of the accumulating
tracts with a joint committee made up of merchandise was destined for Honolulu
representatives of the Sugar Plantations stores for the Christmas shopping season.
and the Pineapple Growers Associations. Wyman got the job of determining ship-
ping priorities. He appointed a local
7
Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 17 Dec 41. 400.312 shipping man to review all orders placed
(HD) 1941-43.
8
Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 3 Jan 42. 210.3 (HD) by the local stores and recommend ship-
1919.42. ment in accordance with the military
9
Rad, SPD to Reybold, 17 Jan 42. 210.3 (HD)
1919.42.
10 11
Ltr, Hannum to Reybold, 15 Dec 41. 600.1 Rad, SPD to Reybold, 3 Jan 42. 523.07 (HD)
(HD) 1941-42. 1942.
344 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
importance of the material. This com- said, "to recommend that people stay
plex task required a most diplomatic inside their houses no matter how well
handling of the Honolulu firms.12 Since reinforced . . . the single or double
the Islands did not produce enough food frame walls of the residences in Honolulu
to support the population, General offer little or no protection from shrap-
Emmons, who replaced Short as Depart- nel or machine gun bullets. In addi-
ment Commander on 17 December, tion, there is the serious danger of falling
directed that certain pineapple and debris or the ever present danger of
sugarcane fields be turned into vegetable fire. . . ." Lyman recommended the
gardens, which should be producing "in digging of trenches. Most practical
four months." He put Wyman in would be an excavation about 6 feet
charge of this program. The South deep and from 3 to 6 feet wide. To give
Pacific Division office in San Francisco added protection against machine gun
began to buy seeds, fertilizer, and farm bullets and bomb fragments, the trench
machinery for the gardens. "It is evi- could be covered with timbers 2 inches
dent," Colonel Hannum, South Pacific thick, topped with about 6 inches of
Division engineer, wrote to General earth. A bench put in along one side
Reybold on 15 December, "that the would make a stay in one of the shelters
Commanding General leans heavily upon more endurable. Simpler to construct
the District Engineer and the forces would be a slit trench 4 to 5 feet deep
under his charge." 13 and 20 inches wide. It would be rather
uncomfortable during a prolonged raid,
Protection Against Air Raids but since an attack would probably be
by carrier-borne planes, the cruising
One of the urgent tasks after Pearl time of which was relatively short, at-
Harbor was to quiet the fears of the tacks would most likely not last long and
civilian population, which lived in dread elaborate shelters would not be neces-
of another air raid. A great clamor sary. On 9 December Lyman ordered
arose in Honolulu for shelters to pro- trenches be dug on military posts, in
vide at least some degree of protection. parks, and near schools.14
The engineers were asked to advise what Joseph P. Poindexter, Governor of
kind of shelter would, on the whole, be Hawaii, requested Wyman to undertake
best for the population at large. This a "program of construction for protec-
was a question hard to answer. Since tion of the civilian population of Hono-
the fear of another raid was widespread, lulu." 15 Major stress was to be placed
shelters which offered at least some pro- on slit trenches. Emmons subsequently
tection against light bombs and machine
gun fire would have to be provided 14
quickly. "I would hesitate," Lyman and Ltr, Lyman to H. A. R. Austin, Consulting Engr
Chmn of the Civilian Engrg Comte, 12 Dec 41.
Engr AGF PAC, 383.
12 15
Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering Opns Ltr, Emmons to Dir of Civilian Defense, Terri-
During World War II, POA, pp. 828-29. tory of Hawaii . . ., n.d., sub: Civilian Defense:
13
Ltr, Hannum to Reybold, 15 Dec 41. 600.1 Protective Measures and Evacuation. Engr AGF
(HD) 1941-42. PAC, 383/1.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 345
directed that they be at least two feet pound bombs exploding fifty feet away.
wide and up to five feet deep. Insofar Required would be a concrete wall at
as possible, they were to be dug under least fifteen inches thick. There were
trees, were to have zigzag patterns, and few buildings in Honolulu with walls
were to be "well away from buildings." so sturdily built that they could with-
As time permitted, they were to be im- stand splinters even from 100-pound
proved by widening, trimming, and re- bombs. Building enough splinterproof
moving rocks and debris, and by shelters for the inhabitants of the city
"planting the revetments with grass for would be a considerable, even impos-
camouflage purposes." Two and one- sible, task. It was ruled that splinter-
half feet lengthwise would be allowed proof protection was to be provided for
for each adult; one and one-half feet, for employees of vital industries and key
each child. installations and for parts of the installa-
The Director of Civilian Defense, as- tions themselves. One of Larrison's
signed to the Office of the Military duties was to lay out, approve, and con-
Governor, shared with Wyman the re- struct splinterproofs in Honolulu with
sponsibility for providing shelters. On labor, equipment, and material furnished
24 December the director added Lt. Col. by Wyman. Larrison's men built splin-
G. K. Larrison, CE, to his staff. With terproof shelters of concrete or wood.
the help of two civilian engineers, and Generally 6 feet square and 6 feet high,
under Lyman's general direction, they were provided with benches. If
Colonel Larrison was to help provide possible, each shelter was placed to take
protection for the people of Honolulu. advantage of the protection of trees, was
He "borrowed" two engineers from the at least 25 feet from other shelters, and
office of the chief engineer of the City was topped with about 2 feet of earth
and County of Honolulu, and soon he free from rock. Entrances to first-aid
and his organization were working closely stations and hospitals were protected
with the district office, using materials against shell fragments by wooden baffle
and workmen supplied by Wyman. walls 2.5 feet thick, filled with earth or
Civilians, helped by some fifty volunteers sand.17
from Hawaiian prisons, dug trenches in In case of dire necessity, the civilian
parks and on the grounds of public build- population of the city was to be evacu-
ings "to provide immediate protection ated. Governor Poindexter directed
for the general public." 16 construction of evacuation centers near
Many thought more adequate protec- Honolulu, a job which Wyman gave to
tion was needed. Some urged the build- the Hawaiian Constructors. Soon three
ing of shelters to withstand heavy bombs, centers were under construction in the
or at least of shelters which were splinter- Kalihi and Palolo Valleys. Structures,
proof. The latter were structures which
could withstand fragments from 500-
17
(1) Ltr, Lyman to Austin, 12 Dec 41. (2) Ltr,
Emmons to Wyman, 11 Mar 42. Engr AGF PAC,
16
Memo, Larrison to Lt Col Frederick W. Her- 600.96. (3) Ltr, Emmons to Dir of Civilian Defense
man, Asst Dept Engr, 14 Jan 42. Engr AGF PAC.
346 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
of a temporary nature, were for the most They bought 250,000 seedlings from the
part long, shed-type buildings, with indi- Territorial Board of Agriculture and
vidual quarters for families, together Forestry and replanted many of them on
with small sheds which could be used as the Punahou football field, which they
one- or two-family units. The camps had turned into a nursery. Most of the
would have public wash houses and la- camouflage was of little value. Netting
trines. Protective measures against air hid small buildings and dumps and con-
raids were generally limited to Oahu. cealed the entrances to tunnels, but large
On the other islands, the population and installations could not be disguised. No
the few important installations were so way could be found to conceal runways.
well dispersed that little or nothing could In flying over Oahu, one could readily
be done to give added protection.18 recognize camouflaged buildings and air-
fields.19
Camouflage
Military Defenses
Frantic efforts were made to camou-
flage important installations. Before Meanwhile, work was being rushed on
the war, some interesting experiments strictly military defenses. To bring
had been made in concealment, but little about some kind of order in construction,
effective work had been done to disguise Emmons set up a list of priorities. At
telltale targets. Now the aim was to the head of the list was the protection of
hide, insofar as possible, most, if not all, existing aircraft warning stations and the
of the conspicuous structures, both mili- building of additional ones. Next came
tary and civilian, on Oahu. The engi- the construction of more airfields, com-
neers used paint extensively on large plete with revetments, and the strength-
buildings, canneries, oil tanks, piers, and ening of coastal defenses. This was
even such a prominent landmark as followed by the protection of vital public
famed Aloha Tower on the Honolulu utilities, the building of shelters at the
water front, covering them with bizarre airfields, the dispersion of supplies for
splotches of green and brown. Netting the Hawaiian Air Force, and the build-
and garlands were used to conceal ing of underground air depots. Of sec-
smaller targets such as ammunition ond priority were slit trenches for
dumps and gun emplacements. Many military personnel and expansion of ex-
of Honolulu's lei sellers wove and dyed isting hospitals. Of third priority were
the garlands and prepared the netting. the construction of field fortifications, the
Two 8-inch guns at the outskirts of a improvement of roads and trails, and
village were concealed under a dummy the erection of minimum housing for
house. Fake planes of wood and burlap the troops arriving from the mainland.20
were placed in open fields to draw enemy
fire. To hide, at least partially, some 19
(1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During
installations, the engineers began exten- World War II, POA, pp. 6 2 9 f f . (2) Gwenfread
sive plantings of trees and shrubbery. Allen, Hawaii's War Years (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1950), pp. 91-92.
20
Ltrs, Emmons to subordinate commands, 25
18
Ltr, Emmons to Dir of Civilian Defense . . . . Dec 41; 6 Mar 42. Engr AGF PAC, AG 600.12.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 347
MAP 17
island of Hawaii, but did not load them. fleet, the Islands' next line of defense
On Kauai they mined Burns Field and would be the guns of the Coast Artillery.
Barking Sands.23 Under Wyman's direction, the Hawaiian
Constructors worked around the clock
Coastal Defenses on all the fixed batteries along Oahu's
southern coast. Among their main jobs
Should the Hawaiian air defenses be were the casemating of the 16-inch guns
incapable of holding off an approaching of Batteries Hatch and Williston and the
12-inch guns of Closson. At each gun
23
(1) Ltr, Lyman to Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd., site, casemates, magazines, and store-
20 Dec 41. Engr AGF PAC, 384.3 (2) Interstaff rooms were combined into a single struc-
Routing Slip, G-4 to Wyman, 20 Feb 42. Engr AGF
PAC, 686. (3) 2d Ind, 1st Lt Edward A. Flanders,
ture of reinforced concrete with walls
804th Engr Avn Bn, to Dept Engr, 19 Mar 42, basic twelve feet thick, which supported roofs
unknown. Engr AGF PAC, 231.4. of concrete slabs, eight feet thick. On
350 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the east and west coasts of Oahu, work- "day and night, seven days a week, until
men began to casemate the 8- and 6-inch they [were] completed." 26
guns, and at numerous gun sites they The biggest job was yet to come. In
built projectile stands and powder stor- mid-December Emmons' G-3 informed
age chambers, replaced disintegrating Maj. Gen. Harry T. Burgin, chief of the
sandbags, built splinterproof plotting Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command,
rooms, camouflaged positions, built ac- that there was a good chance that some
cess roads, and provided adequate utili- of the big guns of the battleships and
ties. Where the terrain permitted, they aircraft carriers sunk or damaged at Pearl
drove tunnels to house magazines and Harbor could be salvaged and emplaced
operational facilities.24 on land. In numerous conferences,
Soon after Pearl Harbor the engineers Army and Navy authorities discussed the
got an unlooked-for job. They were practicality of the scheme. Under con-
directed to install various types of guns sideration were the 8-inch guns of the
which the Navy had removed from its aircraft carrier Saratoga and the 14-inch
warships and turned over to the Army guns of the battleships Arizona and
for emplacement on land. On 15 Febru- Pennsylvania. On 16 January General
ary the Navy gave the Army 11 5-inch Burgin wrote Emmons that the "Navy
gun batteries, which the Coast Artillery authorities" believed that "two 3-gun
wanted installed at four points on Oahu. turrets, 14-inch, with all their appurte-
Next, the Navy offered the Army 12 old nances could be obtained and in all
7-inch guns; 2 of these were to be in- probability a third . . . might be ob-
27
stalled on Oahu and 2 on Kauai. The tained for use by the Army." Burgin's
additional armament was expected to staff began to investigate various sites on
provide many advantages. Since prac- Oahu where the guns might be emplaced.
tically all fixed seacoast guns had been Nimitz doubted that the 14-inch guns of
emplaced at or near the beaches, it was the Arizona and the Pennsylvania could
highly desirable to have additional large- be easily installed on land; he thought
caliber guns placed well back from the the turrets with their guns too heavy.
shore, preferably at an elevation high But he believed the Army could make
enough to assure the batteries not being good use of the 8-inch guns of the Sara-
overrun by small landing parties. Con- toga. Burgin wanted both and re-
siderable ingenuity was required to plan quested Emmons to have the engineers
layouts and prepare barbettes for these make a survey to determine if they could
guns to ensure efficient operation on be moved "to locations some 300 feet up
land; plans for standard batteries proved on the ridges to the north and east of
to be of little help.25 Lyman considered Pearl Harbor and installed in usable
these jobs of gun installation so impor- condition with magazines and ammuni-
tant that he directed they be carried on tion servicing from below as . . .on
24 26
Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During Memo, Lyman for Area Engr 2d Field Area
World War II, POA, pp. 305ff. et al., 23 Mar 42. Engr AGF PAC.
25 27
Memo, Asst Dept Engr for Wyman, 14 Dec 41. Ltr, Burgin to Emmons, 16 Jan 42. Engr AGF
Engr AGF PAC. PAC, 472.3.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 351
28
battleships." On the basis of the sur- vulnerable to the defenders' machine gun
vey, made by Lyman on orders from fire. To meet such tactics, defensive
Emmons, the engineers concluded that positions on Oahu, especially those on
the transfer would be practical. The the beaches and in the foothills close to
Coast Artillery decided to take both the shore line, were being strengthened,
types. On 8 February Emmons directed principally by the construction of "heavy
Wyman to begin work on four emplace- overhead cover" which would "give ade-
ments for the 8-inch guns, two of them at quate protection against enemy machine
Diamond Head and two in the pineapple guns and bomb and shell fragments." 30
fields north of Schofield Barracks. He Little was being done or could be done
considered this job extremely important; to increase antiaircraft fire. Few of the
Colonel Robinson was to give it the coastal guns on Oahu were so emplaced
"highest priority equal to flying fields," that they could fire on planes. The
and the engineers were to work around Navy removed a few antiaircraft guns
the clock on it.29 The 14-inch guns of from its ships for installation on Oahu.
the Arizona and the Pennsylvania, to be Wyman took over this work in February.
emplaced at Barber's Point and Ulupau Beach defenses had a large number of
Head, were a different matter. It was machine guns emplaced in a single line
soon apparent that their tremendous size near the shore. Most were so close to
and weight, their intricate construction, the water that it was impossible to main-
and the vast number of parts would tain effective wire entanglements at a
create the most complex problems. reasonable distance in front of them, and,
Months of planning and preparation as a consequence, penetration of the
would be necessary before the job of beach line would be fairly easy. Lyman
moving the big guns to their sites could stressed the need for organizing defenses
even begin. in depth. It was imperative that these
Despite growing defenses, amphibious defenses have strongpoints so organized
landings by an enemy force were a that heavy fire could be placed in any
distinct possibility. In Lyman's opinion, direction. In addition, the defending
a most serious problem for an attacking forces should be kept as mobile as
force was the one of providing sufficient possible. In the positions already organ-
protective cover for the first troops to hit ized on hilltops, machine gun emplace-
the beaches. Naval guns of the attack- ments in many instances were so sited
ing force would have to lift their fire just that they could deliver only plunging
as the landing craft were nearing shore; fire in support of the beach defenses.
the enemy would then have to use his Many were poorly camouflaged. Lyman
planes, which, to give protection, would emphasized that emplacements should
have to fly so low that they would be be concealed from aircraft, that beach
positions close to the water should be
28
Ltr, Burgin to Emmons, 18 Jan 42. Engr AGF moved inland and set up to deliver fire
PAC, 472.
29
(1) Ltr, Emmons to Wyman, 8 Feb 42. (2)
30
Memo, Capt Joseph Matson, Jr., Asst Dept Engr, for Ltr, Lyman to Emmons, 8 Jan 42. Engr AGF
Robinson, 28 Mar 42. Both in Engr AGF PAC, 662. PAC, 381.
352 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
in more than one direction, that the roadblock be prepared; a temporary one
silhouettes of positions should blend strong enough to hold off an initial as-
with their surroundings, and that anti- sault, and a permanent one requiring
personnel mines should be used exten- demolition to be executed by the engi-
sively in the natural avenues of approach. neers as part of the over-all tactical plan
Work was being undertaken along all of the combat forces. Co-ordination of
these lines. At the same time boat major demolitions would have to be
obstacles were placed off the shores of worked out between the local command-
Oahu. They consisted for the most part ers of the beach defenses and the combat
of railroad and streetcar rails, many of forces. The engineers placed various
them pulled up from the streets of Hono- kinds of obstacles and prepared demoli-
lulu, and driven into the coral sea bot- tions. The 3d and 65th engineers
tom to form tetrahedrons submerged at readied roads, highway bridges, and rail-
high tide.31 way bridges, principally by drilling holes
for explosives but, except in a few cases,
Mines and Demolitions they did not put the charges in place.32
Should the Japanese make a successful
If worst came to worst, and the Ha- landing, they would probably attempt
waiian air and coastal defenses could not to advance first across the low-lying areas
halt an attacking force, mobile ground and plains of the islands. There were
troops would have to prevent the land- few natural obstacles to slow such an
ings and, if unable to do so, would be advance, particularly on Oahu. The
responsible for stopping or retarding the central plateau had practically no trees,
enemy's advance across the Islands. and, in general, streams and marshes
Preparing roads, bridges, airfields, and were few. On all the islands, the de-
buildings for demolition to slow down a fenders would have to rely heavily on
successful enemy invasion would require mines. On 23 December Emmons
considerable effort. Because of the asked the War Department for 160,000
Islands' peculiar topography, the use of antitank mines. While awaiting ship-
demolitions was a complicated matter. ment, the engineers placed the few on
Normally, local commanders decided hand and prepared to improvise.
when the charges should be set off, but in Howitzer shells were satisfactory substi-
Hawaii this would not be good practice tutes but would be used only as a last
because the main routes of communica- resort. The engineers improvised hand
tion were limited, and the destruction of grenades by filling bottles with gasoline
a vital bridge during retreat, for example, and petroleum which would ignite upon
might make an effective counterattack striking a tank. Hawaii had a scorched
later on impossible. It was suggested earth plan; it would go into effect in
that in each critical area two types of whole or in part only upon orders of the
32
(1) Ltr, Lyman to Emmons, 8 Jan 42. Engr
31
(1) 1st Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip, Lyman to AGF PAC, 381. (2) Hq 65th Engr Bn, 30 Dec 41,
CofS HD, 13 Aug 42. Engr AGF PAC. (2) Ltr, Col Rpt, Demolitions, 25th Inf Div Sector, Data and
Desloge Brown to C EHD, 21 Dec 60. EHD Files. Present Status. Engr AGF PAC.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 353
Interstaff Routing Slip, Lyman to G-4 HD, 2 Jan nothing to do because supplies did not
42. Both in Engr AGF PAC. (3) Memo, Asst Dept arrive as scheduled. Meanwhile, largely
Engr for Engr Offs, 11 Jan 42. Engr AGF PAC,
660.3. (4) Ltr Emmons to Lyman et al., 13 Jan 42. because of conditions beyond their con-
Engr AGF PAC. trol, the Hawaiian Constructors were be-
354 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
ing subjected to mounting criticism for terms and confirmed in writing by proper
incompetence and inefficiency, not a little authority." But commanders in Hawaii
of it coming from the contractors who continued to press Wyman to get started
had been placed under their direction.34 on their projects. His well-meaning
Wyman had other troubles, among efforts to be helpful to everybody only
them his inability to resist the demands made his position more difficult.35
of many military commanders. Stating
they had verbal authorization for their Supplies and Equipment
projects, the commanders insisted that
Wyman get started on the work at once. Since there was a chance that the
Pressure was especially strong from the shipping lanes from the mainland would
Hawaiian Air Force, redesignated the be cut, the engineers had to give special
Seventh Air Force on 5 February. In- attention to supply. Stocks for the
sofar as the district engineer knew or troops, stored for the most part at Scho-
could determine, many of the requests field and Fort Kamehameha, were dan-
from the air force, and from others as gerously low. After Pearl Harbor,
well, had not been officially approved by Lyman began building up his reserves,
higher authority. More confusion arose particularly of fortifications materials.
because it was not clear what the chain It was not hard to find and distribute
of command really was. The engineer sufficient quantities of supplies for the
organization had supposedly been con- few engineer units assigned to the Ha-
solidated under Lyman; nevertheless, waiian Department. Dealers had quite
Emmons gave orders directly to Wyman, a few items. Lyman stored his new
and the district engineer at times at- acquisitions at various points on Oahu,
tended the department commander's including the district's yards in Hono-
staff conferences. Inquiries from Wy- lulu. Ample numbers of civilians could
man to the Office of the Chief of Engi- be hired as clerks for sorting and dis-
neers brought rather vague replies. On tributing. Since Oahu had good roads
12 January, General Reybold radioed and excellent rail lines, transportation
"Wyman is in complete charge of all was adequate. Already evident was the
construction working directly under the lack of spare parts and of units to dis-
commanding general" of the Hawaiian tribute them. Fortunately, some spare
Department. Reybold stressed the need parts could be procured in Honolulu,
for caution in accepting construction re- and requisitions for additional items
quests. He told Wyman to do "only were sent to the mainland. The 34th
that construction specifically authorized Engineers organized a stopgap parts sup-
by the commanding general preferably ply unit at Schofield. The lack of
in writing, but in any event in definite maintenance units was noticeable; civil-
34 35
(1) Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44, sub: (1) Rad, Hannum to Reybold, 9 Jan 42. 600.1
Contract W-414-Engr 602, Hawaiian Constructors. Hawaii 1927-45. (2) Memo, Robins to SGS 16 Jan
(2) Memo for Rcd, Robinson, 5 May 44. Both in 42. (3) Rad, Reybold to SPD Engr, 12 Jan 42. (4)
Engr AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1. (3) Ltr, Rad, Reybold to SPD Engr, 16 Jan 42. All in 600.1
Brown to C EHD, 21 Dec 60. EHD Files. Hawaii 1927-45.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 355
ian repair shops were called upon for One of the district engineer's biggest
36
help insofar as possible. jobs was to find construction machinery
For Wyman and the Hawaiian Con- and allocate it to the various projects.
structors, with their huge construction The plantations supplied some machin-
program, supply was much more com- ery and local contractors managed to
plex. Measures had to be taken imme- scrape together a few odds and ends.
diately lest construction bog down. An These were makeshift arrangements.
engineer officer, Maj. Louis J. Clatterbos, It would soon be necessary to turn equip-
arriving in Honolulu on 5 December, ment back to the plantations so that they
bound for Africa by way of the Pacific, could begin planting foodstuffs, and
was temporarily detained by the tide of equipment would have to be returned to
war. Reporting to Army headquarters the contractors to enable them to "pro-
on Pearl Harbor day, he was assigned to ceed with the large and complicated
the Honolulu District office. He ar- fortifications items." Because of the
rived at Punahou at 0900 the next mor- shortage of transports, great amounts of
ning, and Wyman made him his supply machinery earmarked for Hawaii were
officer. Hitherto a responsibility of the piling up on the docks at San Francisco.
Operations Division, supply had not All ships arriving at Honolulu were
been one of the district's most important thoroughly searched for the equipment
functions; the division office in San they might have aboard. The engineers
Francisco had taken care of most pro- requisitioned any new automobiles, sta-
curement. Wyman directed Clatterbos tion wagons, and trucks they could find.
to set up a separate supply division, Under authority from Emmons, Wyman
pointing out the rapid expansion that directed that practically all construction
would be necessary to meet wartime equipment which the engineers could
needs. Soon requisitions to San Fran- get hold of be turned over to the Ha-
cisco for large amounts of supplies, espe- waiian Constructors.38
cially lumber, cement, corrugated iron, By the end of the year a start had been
and camouflage materials, were being made in coping with major supply
prepared. Wyman was responsible for problems. On 29 December, Wyman
procuring these supplies and determin- sent his first order to San Francisco. It
ing the priorities in which they were to called for 3,740,000 dollars' worth of
be shipped. How much material would materials. In January, Capt. Carl H.
actually arrive depended as much on Trik, transferred from the Quartermas-
how many ships were available as on ter Corps about a month before, became
anything else. Clatterbos had just chief of the Supply Division. Despite
gotten started on his many tasks when the improvement in the outlook for
he left for Africa on 20 December.37
World War II, POA, pp. 820ff. (2) Ltr, Gorlinski,
Tr Div OCE, to Hannum, 17 Jun 42, with 2d Ind,
36
(1) Ltr, Asst Dept Engr to CG HD, 3 Jan 42. Asst Dept Engr HD to SPD Engr, 1 Sep 42. Copies
Engr AGF PAC, Engr 475.4 (Defense Reserves). (2) in Hist Review, cited (1), above, pp. 835-38.
38
Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During World (1) Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 17 Dec 41. 400.312
War II, POA, pp. 82off. HD, 1941-43. (2) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army,
37
(1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During Opns During World War II, POA, p. 827.
356 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
supply, Captain Trik had numerous the Constructors were far apart as to
difficulties. Hawaiian projects now had price. Meanwhile, spare parts shortages
40
an A-1-a rating, but their high priority were causing increasing trouble.
did not seem to expedite the sending of
cargo. Distribution was slowed because Real Estate
of the poor condition of supplies when
they arrived. Manifests were often After Pearl Harbor the acquisition of
garbled or were not received before the real estate, a function transferred from
arrival of a vessel, and identification tags the Quartermaster Corps, was added to
on boxes and crates were frequently in- Wyman's growing list of responsibilities.
decipherable. Early in February Wy- The pressure of events forced the engi-
man set up a separate field area on Oahu neers to streamline procedures, particu-
to operate the base yards, shops, gas sta- larly those for acquiring tracts for a
tions, and factories which served more temporary period. Under the new
than one field area. The district engi- system, a military unit wishing a piece
neer, meantime, had been freed of a few of land sent its request to the command-
of his more burdensome and rather ing general of the major echelon con-
extraneous supply chores, for shortly cerned. If he approved, he informed
after the beginning of the year the Office Wyman, who thereupon directed his real
of the Military Governor took over the estate officer to acquire property. It
rationing of gasoline and construction took about six weeks to get legal posses-
materials and the allocation of shipping sion. From 11 December 1941 to 16
39
for civilian goods from the mainland. February 1942, the Real Estate Division
A muddle developed over equipment. of the Honolulu District processed some
The Honolulu District had turned over 200 cases, involving all types of trans-
practically all the machinery it could get actions. The Army tried to take as few
to the Hawaiian Constructors. Because residential areas or cultivated tracts as
equipment was so scarce, Wyman wanted possible. For the most part, it occupied
to buy a large part of the stocks of the forest preserves, pastures, and wasteland.
Hawaiian Constructors, but they were It leased many hotels, offices, shops,
willing to sell only if the district engi- warehouses, and schools. In the tense
neer took over everything they owned. days after Pearl Harbor, numerous tracts
Since there was small chance of getting and buildings had to be occupied with-
enough machinery from the mainland, out proper authorization. 41
Wyman and Robinson thought it best to
buy everything the Constructors had. Financial Problems
Poor pieces could be repaired or used to
repair other items. The engineers and The feverish efforts to build up de-
fenses after Pearl Harbor produced
39
(1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During
40
World War II, POA, pp. 82off. (2) Ltr, Asst Dept Memo for Rcd, Robinson, 5 May 44. Engr
IG HD to Short, 7 Nov 41, with 1st Ind, Wyman to AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1.
41
Emmons, 19 Feb 42. Engr AGF PAC, 333 IG Rpts Ltr, 2d Lt George R. Lumsden, Asst IG HD 16
(Gen). Feb 42. Engr AGF PAC, 331 IG Rpts (Gen).
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 357
growing disorder in the district's tape, to dispense with the now intoler-
finances. To speed up construction, ably slow peacetime procedures, and to
procurement of supplies in the Islands get on with vital construction with the
was partially decentralized. Each of greatest possible speed.42
the district's fifteen field areas was au- A tremendous number of bills from
thorized to purchase at least some of its local merchants accumulated. Busi-
supplies, and the Hawaiian Constructors nessmen pressed the district's Finance
were permitted to buy part of what they Section for the payment of accounts long
needed in the open market. As the overdue. By March 1942 the Honolulu
number of purchases mounted, invoices District owed local merchants about $3
and vouchers sent to the district office million, most of which had been out-
piled up. Not enough bookkeepers standing since December. A number of
and auditors could be found for the businessmen threatened to protest to
swelling volume of paper, and effective Washington, and others stated they
control over the purchase of supplies would make no more deliveries unless
became impossible. Apparently the the amounts owed them were paid and
magic words "Charge it to the District they were given assurance that payments
Engineer" were sufficient to get construc- for new purchases would be made within
43
tion supplies from local dealers, who a reasonable time.
believed that defense required rapid
delivery to any purchaser who appeared Mounting Difficulties
to be bona fide. The district's Procure-
ment Section often did not know what The district office was so swamped
materials had been contracted for and with work that administrative proce-
delivered, and it was frequently not in- dures almost collapsed. The sudden
formed when orders for materials had expansion of the organization and the
been changed or canceled. Vouchers lack of clear-cut lines of authority were
began coming in from department en- largely to blame. In November 1941,
gineer units, and not always for con- the district office had directed or super-
struction materials; some were for food, vised the work of about 3,500 civilians
lodging, or clothing, and even such and spent approximately $1,700,000 a
extraordinary items as "medicinal month. By March 1942 the number of
liquors." Some supplies ordered from personnel had risen to 17,000, and ex-
44
dealers by telephone never reached their penditures to $8,000,000 a month.
destination, yet they were undoubtedly Many of the thousands of newcomers
delivered somewhere, if the more or less were not well qualified for their jobs,
undecipherable signatures on the re-
42
ceipted invoices meant anything. One (1) Draft Memo, 1st Lt H.E. Wilbert, Trans-
portation Off Honolulu Engr Dist, for SupO, 6 Feb
invoice came back with the notation 42. Engr AGF PAC, IG Rpts (Gen) File 1. (2) Lt
"Received by Captain Blackjack of the Col Willard P. McCrone, The Honolulu District and
Horse Marines." Much of the con- Pearl Harbor. Draft MS copy in EHD Files.
43
Alien, Hawaii's War Years, p. 282.
fusion was the result of good intentions, 44
Figures for civilian personnel include the con-
of a laudable desire to cut through red tractors' employees.
358 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the control of the District Engineer, the trict employees and their families out joy
people wrathfully rise up ... against riding, Colonel Nurse posted eight com-
him." 4 9 Many engineer officers con- missioned officers one Sunday with
50
curred in these views. When an edi- orders to stop every military vehicle and
torial favorable to the district engineer ascertain the reason for its being on the
appeared in one of the Honolulu dailies, road. Only one was spotted; its driver
a reader called up the editor to find out was on his way to Bellows Field to make
when the district engineer had taken the some repairs on a bulldozer. When
newspaper over.51 This, Colonel Nurse Colonel Nurse reported his findings to
relates, "was considered the joke of the the "prominent resident," the latter
day, and was kicked around with a great replied that he "was glad to hear it ...
deal of glee." 52 Even relations between turned on his heel, and walked off with-
Lyman and Wyman became so strained out further comment." 54 In the grow-
that an almost intolerable situation re- ing controversy, the valuable work being
sulted.53 done by the district was deliberately
The rumors were, of course, almost ignored.
entirely unfounded. The take over of Perhaps much of the clamor could
Punahou was orderly with only a min- have been avoided had an effective pub-
imum of disturbance, and care was taken lic relations program been instituted
to safeguard property. Some damage early. Before the war the Honolulu
was inevitable but "much . . . [could] District had been a relatively small and
be forgiven," the school's president wrote, little-known government department;
" . . . because of the emergency and of the civilian population could not under-
the confusion into which everybody was stand why, after Pearl Harbor, this par-
thrown." Furniture was not tossed out ticular organization had suddenly be-
of the Pleasanton, and the few items come so important with so many things
taken from the Royal Hawaiian were to do so fast and on such a large scale.
obtained in the proper manner. Never- Many people, from lack of information,
theless, the fact remains that many resi- misconstrued the intentions of the engi-
dents of Honolulu believed the stories neers. President Shepard, who had a
and some still do. In an effort to get at sympathetic attitude toward the district,
the truth of the charges regarding dis- relates that he was present when Wyman
"in no uncertain terms" told Mr. Ralph
49
Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 14 Feb 42, in ch. V, Wooley, one of the Hawaiian Construc-
Rpt of Pearl Harbor Army Board, pp. 53-54. 100 tors, an alumnus of Punahou and a
A48-82, pt. II, Army Pearl Harbor Rpt.
50
(1) Rpt of IG HD to CofS HD, 14 Feb 42.
horticulture expert, to replant the de-
Quoted in part in Ch. V, Rpt of Pearl Harbor Army stroyed part of the cereus hedge and
Board, p. 58. (2) Pearl Harbor Attack, Testimony make sure that no further harm was done
of Gen Hannum, pts. 28-29, p. 1066.
51
Memo, Nurse for Wyman, 5 Mar 42. Rpt of
to it. But the public was never in-
Pearl Harbor Army Board, pp. 53-54.
52 54
Ltr, Nurse to C Mil Hist, 2 Jun 60. EHD (1) Alien, Hawaii's War Years, p. 236. (2)
Files. Shepard, An Account of the Early Days of World
53
Memo, Wyman for Robinson et al., 4 Mar 42. War II at Punahou School. (3) Ltr, Nurse to C
Engr AGF PAC 333 IG Rpts (Gen) vol. 1. Mil Hist, 2 Jun 60. EHD Files.
360 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
formed of this, and "the Colonel got all district engineer was responsible to the
the blame for the mutilation of the Chief of Engineers only for work in con-
hedge." On the advice of members of nection with the improvement of rivers
his staff, Wyman eventually started a and harbors and flood control. All
public relations program. He hired a employees and all funds, equipment,
writer to prepare a series of articles and supplies of the district which were
setting forth the importance of the work not included in the last categories were
of the engineer district. Two appeared to be transferred to the department.
in one of the Honolulu dailies, the sec- Henceforth, whoever was department
ond one along with the favorable engineer would also be district engineer.
editorial. The public reaction was so Emmons, empowered to set the day for
adverse that the project was dropped.55 the consolidation, designated it as 15
March.57 Wyman was returned to the
Change in Organization United States and subsequently was
assigned to the Canol project.
For some time the War Department Colonel Lyman became head of the
had been making plans to consolidate Honolulu District and at the same time
the engineer organization in the Islands continued to serve as department engi-
more fully. Despite the reorganization neer. For the first time district and de-
made on 8 December, the explanatory partment were under one head. Lyman
letters from the Chief's Office, and did not try to reorganize or unite the
statements by General Emmons, the or- two offices; any attempt to do so would
ganization was not functioning well. very likely have increased the confusion.
On 28 February the Secretary of War The great gain was that Lyman had
wrote to Emmons delimiting the respon- under him the military engineer organi-
sibilities of the commanding general in zation in the islands and that his place
Hawaii with regard to engineer work. in the chain of command was abun-
Emmons, as commanding general, was dantly clear. He would be able to ad-
completely responsible for "military vise Emmons on the best course of action
construction ... in the Department, from the engineer standpoint, and as a
including administration of existing member of his staff would not be subject
construction contracts."56 Within the to direct pressure from other command-
limits set by Congressional legislation ers in Hawaii. Partly of native Ha-
and War Department regulations he waiian descent, Colonel Lyman was a
could transfer contracts of the depart- member of an old and widely known
ment and the district to any command island family; a graduate of Punahou
he wished. It was made clear that the and of West Point, where he had been a
classmate of General Emmons, he un-
55
(1) Shepard, An Account of the Early Days of
derstood well the local temperament and
World War II at Punahou School. (2) Ltr, Nurse made every effort to improve public
to C Mil Hist, 2 Jun 60. EHD Files.
56
Ltr, SW to Emmons, 28 Feb 42. Reproduced in
57
Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During World Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 27 Feb 42. Copy in
War II, POA, pp. 30-32. Rpt of Pearl Harbor Army Bd, app No. 1, p. 56.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 361
relations. Soon a marked change for island, was canceled because the terrain
the better was noticeable. There was and flying conditions were found to be
58
no lessening in the urgency of the unsuitable.
situation. The Japanese continued to A special type of project for the air
enjoy naval preponderance in the Pa- forces was now requiring a considerable
cific and were still strong enough to construction effort—this was the under-
attempt an assault on Hawaii. ground bombproof shop for repairing
airplanes. The Honolulu District Of-
Strengthening of Defenses Continues fice and Hawaiian Air Depot had started
Under Lyman preliminary studies for such a shop early
in 1941. In September General Short
Under Colonel Lyman, work con- had asked the War Department to au-
tinued on all engineer projects in the thorize construction near Wheeler Field;
Islands. After mid-March great empha- the War Department disapproved the
sis was put on construction for the air project. Later the department reversed
forces. In a conference held on the itself and authorized construction. Gen-
30th of March, Emmons, Tinker, and eral Short selected a site in a pineapple
Lyman discussed the construction effort field southwest of Wheeler. Two days
still required. It was agreed that as after Pearl Harbor, Wyman directed the
regards Oahu, work on Bellows was Hawaiian Constructors to begin work.
especially urgent and that efforts would Since the project had the highest priority,
have to be speeded up on runways and it was soon under way. Late in Febru-
housing at Mokuleia and Kahuku. At ary the Seventh Air Force proposed a
Kipapa, a new field on the central pla- different layout; Emmons approved, and
teau, where some construction had al- in mid-April a new directive was issued.
ready been done, activities for the time Plans now called for a bombproof cut
being would be limited to clearing cane, and cover shop of three floors, air-
building runways to minimum stand- conditioned throughout, with an ele-
ards, and providing housing for 225 vator of 10-ton capacity. Diesels and
officers and men. Greater efforts were generators taken from obsolete sub-
needed on the airfields on the outlying marines would serve as a power plant of
islands. There the engineers were to about 100,000-kilowatt capacity. A con-
remove the demolitions at Hilo and pave crete slab roof, 10 feet thick, under a 5-
two of the runways. They were to pave foot layer of earth was considered suffi-
the runways at Barking Sands as soon as cient to withstand ½-ton bombs and at
they could get a hot-mix asphalt plant the same time would be deep enough to
and transport it to the field. They permit the growing of pineapples for
were to continue construction at Home- camouflage. The entrance, in a sheer
stead on the island of Molokai, the
runways of which were to be surfaced
58
with Marston mat or paved with as- (1) Memo, Emmons to Lyman, 1 Apr 42. (2)
Interstaff Routing Slip, 2d Ind, AirO Hawaiian AF
phaltic concrete. Work on a number of to Lyman, 25 May 42, on Ltr, Hawaiian Pineapple
fields, including the one on small Lanai Co to Lyman, 24 Mar 42. Both in Engr AGF PAC.
362 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
cliff on the west side of Waiele Gulch could, on the whole, be considered
60
and practically invisible from the air, encouraging.
was to be large enough to admit B-17's. Some problems that had appeared ear-
Planes going to the repair shop would lier persisted under Colonel Lyman—no-
land on a runway to be built at the bot- tably shortages of equipment. Shortages
tom of Waiele Gulch or would approach existed while large amounts of machinery
on ramps leading from Wheeler Field.59 continued to pile up in San Francisco
By May construction was proceeding and Los Angeles for lack of shipping.
satisfactorily. Members of the Truman Committee,
By 1 June, the Hawaiian Islands were investigating the equipment situation
far more secure than they had been six late in March, came across large numbers
months before. Airfields, coastal guns, of items at the Albany Race Track
fortified positions, antiaircraft batteries, near Oakland that were scheduled for
offshore obstacles, underground shelters, shipment to the Hawaiian Constructors.61
and an alerted defense force would make On 28 March Col. Raymond F. Fowler,
an assault anything but easy. Lyman be- assistant chief of engineers for supply, in
lieved there were still certain weaknesses a memorandum to the Director of Pro-
in the defensive system. For one thing, curement and Distribution, SOS, stated,
although the engineers had finished ". . . every effort is being made to expe-
their share of construction on 12 of the dite shipment of available articles to San
aircraft warning stations—7 on Oahu Francisco within the next 30 days." He
and the rest on the outlying islands— explained that supplies and equipment
none of the stations was as yet operating were accumulating in California be-
on a permanent basis, a deficiency made cause of the scarcity of transports. "All
up to a considerable extent by the Signal requisitions received from Hawaii,"
Corps' use of mobile stations. He was Fowler stated, "have at present either
also perturbed by the continued shortage been shipped from available stocks or
of mines. The Hawaiian Department placed on expedite procurement requi-
62
had requested 160,000 on 23 December, sition." On 1 April Colonel Hannum
but by June only a few thousand had reported that 57,140 tons of equipment
been received. In Lyman's view, large were on hand in Los Angeles and San
quantities were needed because of the Francisco for shipment overseas. But
few natural obstacles in the Hawaiian the shortage of ships was so great that
chain, and because so many airfields, 60
close to excellent landing beaches, could (1) 1st Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip, Dept Engr
to Dept Ord Off, 11 May 42. (2) 2d Ind to Inter-
be easily overrun. Yet, despite these staff Routing Slip noted in (1), above, Dept Ord Off
minor deficiencies, the state of defenses to Dept Engr, 30 May 42. (3) 3d Ind to Interstaff
Routing Slip noted in (1), above, Dept Engr to Dept
Ord Off, 2 Jun 42. All in Engr AGF PAC.
61
Ltr, Mr. Hugh A. Fulton, Chief Counsel Tru-
59
(1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering Opns man Committee, to Julius H. Amberg, Spec Asst to
During World War II, POA, pp. 501ff. (2) Memo, SW, 12 Jun 42, copy in Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army,
Asst Dept Engr for Robinson, 9 Apr 42. Engr AGF Opns During World War II, POA, p. 834.
62
PAC, 600.12 (Waiele). (3) Ltr, Brown to C EHD, Memo, Fowler for Dir of Proc and Dist, SOS,
21 Dec 60. 28 Mar 42. 400.312 HD, 1941-43.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 363
the materials would probably remain on under the contract unless a more effi-
the wharves for months.
63
cient administration and more effective
co-operation between the contractors and
Efforts to Resolve Administrative the government were achieved. A com-
Problems mittee made up of representatives of the
Hawaiian Constructors agreed. Lyman
Also persistent were the difficulties of informed the Constructors on 9 May
administering the contract with the that a "substantial revision" would prob-
Hawaiian Constructors. By 15 May ably, soon be made in the handling of
forty-three supplemental agreements had construction in the Islands. The con-
been added to the original contract. tract would not be terminated, but work
The number of projects had risen to thereunder would be greatly curtailed.
about 1,400. It was impossible to In view of the changes, bound to ensue,
amend the contract and make supple- the program of work included in the
mental agreements fast enough to keep contract and the supplemental agree-
65
pace with the changes and additions to ments would have to be reviewed again.
the construction program. Neverthe- Meanwhile the district initiated action
less, Colonel Robinson and the Con- to eliminate the confusion in finances by
structors reached agreement as to the hiring additional help to prepare vouch-
over-all cost and the fixed fee as of mid- ers for payment. It set up a special
May—the total estimated cost of the "detective" section, whose job it was to
work was $84,436,887; the fixed fee, find out who had signed the vouchers
$1,014,690.64 with illegible and unknown signatures;
Criticism of the Hawaiian Construc- in turn area offices set up their own spe-
tors, growing in volume during the first cial "detective" sections to help with
months of 1942, became still louder. this work. Lyman accepted responsi-
Colonel Lyman chose two officers and a bility for vouchers which indicated the
civilian from the Honolulu District to goods had been delivered to military
review the question of whether the units. Trying to find out who had re-
contract should be terminated. Having ceived the materials was often a slow and
made their study, two of the men be- laborious process; as a rule, the search
lieved it should be; the third thought the began with the questioning of the clerk
interests of the government would be or driver who had delivered the goods.
better served "by continuing the con- But progress was made. By May the
tract with clearly defined lines of respon- Finance Section was forwarding some
sibility and with the Government per- 300 certified vouchers a day to Lt. Col.
forming the function of administering Herbert Baldwin, finance officer of the
and inspecting the work." All three Hawaiian Department. Some further
believed the work should not continue delays resulted because Baldwin thought
63
Ltr, SPD to CofEngrs, 1 Apr 42. 400.312 HD,
65
1941-43. Rpt of Bd Appointed To Consider Termination
64
Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44. Engr of Fixed Fee Contract No. W-414-Eng-602, 6 May
AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1, p. 6. 42. Engr AGF PAC, 333 IG Rpts (Gen) vol. 1.
364 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the evidence presented with some vouch- and northeast of their home islands—
ers that materials had been delivered to they would seize Midway and part of
people entitled to them was not good the Aleutians. By occupying Midway,
enough. Numerous Honolulu mer-Japan could extend her air coverage
chants were still of the opinion that eastward from that island by 1,300 miles.
payments were much too slow.66 Japanese planes could then sweep over
Early in June the war in the Pacific the Hawaiian chain. In June, the
took a crucial turn. In the first months Japanese successfully occupied Attu and
after Pearl Harbor, Hawaii had not been Kiska, but their thrust at Midway met
on the list of Japanese objectives. with disaster. In a battle between a
Japan's main concern had been to seize Japanese task force and U.S. air and
southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the naval units northwest of Midway on 3
Netherlands Indies, and, if possible, to and 4 June, the enemy lost 4 aircraft
cut the lines of communications from carriers, 1 heavy cruiser, and some 250
the United States to Australia. Having planes, together with 100 of his best
67
attained most of these goals in the first pilots. The possibility of a serious
months of 1942, the Japanese prepared attack on the Hawaiian Islands after that
to strengthen their position still further was considered most unlikely.
by establishing a defense line to the east
67
(1) United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The Campaigns
66
(1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During of the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), pp. 58-60,
World War II, POA, pp. 141-42. (2) McCrone, 78-81. (2) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guard-
Honolulu District and Pearl Harbor. ing the United States, p. 222.
CHAPTER IX
After Midway
The Battle of Midway was followed Work on Defensive Installations
by an uneasy period as work on defenses Slows Down
continued and base build-up was accel-
erated to make possible the launching of As the weeks went by and the Army
offensives. Construction needs, despite garrison increased to 100,000, the fear
the Japanese defeat, were still great. of invasion almost vanished and made
On 14 June Emmons wrote to Somervell work on purely defensive installations
that $50 million more was required for less urgent. Some defenses could even
work in the Islands. Much remained to be eliminated. The Navy was no longer
be done on airfields; Hickam, especially, greatly interested in the seaplane basin
needed a great deal of attention, since in Keehi Lagoon. The request for large
the runways were in danger of crumbling numbers of antitank mines was dropped.
under the continuous, heavy traffic. By July the Hawaiian Department had
The Seventh Air Force was pressing for received 14,000, but there was no indi-
the completion of additional construc- cation from Washington that any more
tion—shops, warehouses, and storage for would be sent. The need for anti-
reserve gasoline. More aircraft warning personnel mines had likewise lessened.
stations were needed and considerable Boat obstacles placed offshore lost most
effort was still required on seacoast de- of their effectiveness, since the action of
fenses, field fortifications, and bombproof the waves had loosened them from their
storage for ammunition. The growing moorings, and they were removed in
numbers of troops called for many more August.
camps, warehouses, and hospitals. And The growing sense of security had an
there remained innumerable minor jobs, adverse effect on those projects still
such as fencing critical areas, camouflag- deemed important, and much of the
ing, splinterproofing, and constructing work progressed slowly. This was par-
and maintaining utilities. All this work ticularly true of the coastal batteries.
required additional supplies. Some 200,- Headway on the 8-inch gun turrets, for
000tons were still needed—about 35,000 example, was far less rapid than had
a month. The most pressing demands been expected, and at some of the larger
1
were for lumber, cement, and asphalt. batteries, also, work was considerably
behind schedule. One of the main
difficulties at the coastal batteries was
the short workday. The men had to be
1
Ltr, Emmons to Somervell, 14 Jun 42. 600.1
taken by car or bus to the job sites, some
Hawaii 1927-45. coming from as far as Honolulu. They
366 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
started work anywhere from 0800 to prescribed earth floors for barracks and
0930, depending on the distance they latrines; in Hawaii, the engineers in-
had to travel; some quit at 1500. Ab- stalled floors of wood or concrete. The
senteeism was common. Shortages of drawings prescribed waterborne sewage
equipment, especially of power shovels, for hospitals only; in the Islands it was
2
further slowed construction. a feature of other buildings as well.
Officers' quarters had interior plumbing
Construction Tailored to Hawaii's and lounge space not called for in the
Needs original designs.3
Among the greatest changes were
Stress was now being placed on build- those made in troop housing. The first
ing up Hawaii as a base to support of- men to arrive in the Islands had been
fensives and as a staging area to move quartered in buildings on permanent
troops westward. From December 1941 posts; soon all space was filled. Quarters
to October 1942 alone, the number of of the type built before Pearl Harbor
Army troops in the Islands rose from were expensive to construct and required
42,000 to 132,000, and the archipelago great amounts of now scarce materials.
was also crowded with Navy personnel Construction of the 2-story, 63-man,
and civilian war workers. Once again, mobilization-type barracks was also dis-
the engineers had to make as much use continued for still another reason. It
as possible of existing facilities, and once could not be evacuated as rapidly as a
again, they had to revise standard theater one-story structure. During the attack
of operations drawings to meet local on Pearl Harbor, men had been trapped
conditions. In an important overseas on the upper floors in several of these
4
base such as Hawaii, where structures structures.
might be needed for an indefinite period In any case, shortages, especially of
after the war, the flimsiest possible con- lumber, made imperative the building
struction consistent with safety was not of a more economical type of barracks.
necessarily the most desirable. Where In January 1942 the district office pre-
standard theater of operations drawings pared designs for "demountable build-
were modified, it was done to improve ings"—one-story prefabricated structures
and strengthen the buildings and at the that could serve as barracks, and, if
same time make as much use as possible necessary, as warehouses or administra-
of local materials. In some cases the tion buildings. Sixteen and one-half
engineers even used critical materials if feet wide, these buildings, which could
that was necessary to produce a more be extended in multiples of ten feet,
adequate building. Standard drawings were erected rapidly. Roofs and inside
2
(1) Ltr, Brig Gen Robert C. Garrett, Hq to C of 3
Arty HD, 24 June 42. Engr AGF PAC, 662. (2) (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During
Memo, Of of C of Hawaiian Arty for General World War II, POA, pp. 369ff. (2) 5th Ind, Inter-
Burgin, 19 May 42. (3) 2d Ind, Interstaff Routing staff Routing Slip, Kramer to G-4 HD, 2 Nov 43.
Slip, Lyman to CA HD, 5 Jul 42. Last two in Engr Engr AGF PAC.
4
AGF PAC. (4) Ltr, Asst Dept Engr to CofEngrs. Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During World
Engr AGF PAC, 660.3. War II, POA, p. 378.
AFTER MIDWAY 367
MAP 18
rived in the Islands on the 26th and also, including even the telephone ex-
took over as department and district changes, were being put underground.
11
engineer. These underground structures, built on
a tropical island that at times had ex-
Base Build-up Continues tremely heavy rains, were most unusual;
they were "bone dry." In most tunnels
Kramer soon learned that the Engi- in the tropics, even without leakage
neers in Hawaii were still responsible for through rock faults, condensation was a
an extensive construction effort. The serious problem. On Oahu, because of
work yet to be done on airfields, even if the remarkably low humidity (60 to 65
of a minor nature, was of considerable percent) and the small range in tem-
scope; in the fall of 1942, the engineers perature (25 degrees) the installation of
were working on eight fields on Oahu drainage or even the drying of the air
alone. Not the least of the many proj- was seldom necessary.12
ects on Oahu was the huge 3-story sub-
terranean airplane repair shop. A still Problems of Administration
sizable job was the construction of the
tunnels for reserve gasoline. In Wai- Surveying the construction effort in
kakalaua Gulch, nine tanks, each to hold Hawaii, Kramer found a number of
40,000 barrels, were nearing completion. areas where improvement was possible.
Enormously increased requirements for He believed many engineers gave in
gasoline had necessitated construction of too easily to commanders who wanted
more tanks; storage for an additional to expand their projects; the result
240,000 barrels had been approved. was unnecessary construction. Numer-
Soon after arriving in the Islands, ous projects had "too many frills."
Kramer proposed that tunnels be drilled Some installations were being graced
in Kipapa Gulch, and late in 1942 work with such features as concrete sidewalks
on the new tunnels began. and curbed streets. The demand for
A striking feature of construction in luxuries was widespread; requests were
Hawaii was that so many installations even coming in for chromium-plated
were being put underground. Among coat hangers. "Engineers," Kramer
the big subterranean projects, besides stated at a conference with his key men,
the airplane repair shop and the gasoline "particularly military engineers—must
storage tanks, which were either under be realists. . . . Refined design is not
construction or about to be started, were needed for . . . most war installations.
the joint Army-Navy operating center . . . " In numerous instances, Kramer
at Aliamanu Crater and the tunnels for
12
ammunition in Kipapa and Waikakalaua (1) Ltr, Ostrand to Emmons, 9 Nov 42. Engr
AGF PAC. (2) 5th Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip,
Gulches. Many smaller installations, Engr to G-4 HD, 1 Sep 42. Engr AGF PAC,
D00381.4/459. (3) 5th Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip,
Kramer to G-4 HD, 1 Oct 42. Engr AGF PAC. (4)
11
Ltr, Brig Gen David McCoach, Jr., Asst Col G. R. McMeekan, British Army Staff, Rpt on a
CofEngrs, to G-1 SOS WD, 17 Aug 42. 210.3 HD Visit as Engr Observer to Central Pacific, Aug-Sep
1940-42. 44. EHD Files.
AFTER MIDWAY 371
felt, the engineers were adding to the engineers and the contractors reached
cost by inadequate planning. For agreement as to the extent of the cutback
example, with the rainy season ap- in the contractor's efforts up to that time,
proaching, or already under way in some and early in September they arrived at
areas, buildings were going up without an accord on how much work was cov-
access roads or with roads so poor that ered by the forty-three supplemental
the first rains washed them out entirely. agreements. Still to be decided was the
Plans for one underground shop pro- question of how much work the Con-
vided for gravity drainage, but water structors had under way or had finished
was being pumped out during construc- which was not included in the original
tion, when permanent drainage could contract and the supplemental agree-
have been installed and utilized from the ments.14
first. "Don't trust to dry weather from After Kramer arrived, the burden of
now on," Kramer warned.13 the discussions centered on how the con-
The new district engineer soon had to tract should be terminated. This led
turn his attention to the contract with to an acrimonious wrangle. Some of
the Hawaiian Constructors. Quite a the engineers believed it should be ter-
few changes had been made during the minated because of the fault of the con-
preceding months. In May, Lyman had tractors; Kramer's position was that
informed the Constructors that the since both government and contractor
amount of work would be curtailed. had made mistakes, termination should
Soon thereafter, the first jobs were be at the convenience of the government.
transferred to the government, to be Ending the contract on that basis would
completed by hired labor, engineer probably mean retaining, at least for a
troops, or, in a few cases, by local firms time, the good will of the contractor and
working under lump-sum contracts. By his employees. Another matter of con-
midsummer numerous jobs had been tention coming more to the fore was the
transferred. The canceling of some amount of the fixed fee. The Hawaiian
projects, the transfer of others, and last- Constructors felt that the many supple-
minute additions to still others required mental agreements and the countless
a revision of the figure of $84,436,887 changes in the work had made the fee
which the engineers and the Hawaiian hitherto agreed upon entirely inade-
Constructors had agreed in May was a quate. Meanwhile, confusion increased
fair estimate of the total cost of the as job after job was transferred to the
work up to that time. In weeks, even government. Many of the contractors'
months, of conferring, the two sides employees did not look forward to work-
could come to no agreement. A num- ing for the government any more than
ber of preliminary matters had been the government employees relished the
settled, however. Late in August the
14
(1) Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44.
Engr AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1. (2) Ltr, Lt
13
Notes on Confs presided over by Gen Kramer, Col Edward H. O'Rourke, Asst IG HD, to Emmons,
30 Sep 42, 18 Jan, 15 Feb 43. Engr AGF PAC, 337 24 Jul 42. Engr AGF PAC, 333 IG Rpts, loth Field
Confs. Area, File 1.
372 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
prospect of working with the contractors' the new unit had a difficult assignment.
men. "Some feeling exists," Kramer Its major job, Kramer announced, was
remarked, "that, by and large, every "locating and removing ... all forms of
Hawaiian Constructors' man is a obstruction—too much or too little
scoundrel." To make the transition as labor, slackers who cheat and chisel . . .
smooth as possible, Kramer held numer- favoritism and cliques, grievances and
ous conferences attended by key engineer jealousies, boondoggling, lack or mis-use
employees and representatives of the of equipment." 18 The division was to
Hawaiian Constructors.15 deal at first primarily with problems on
On 31 January 1943 the contract was Oahu; those on the outlying islands
terminated at the convenience of the would be gone into later. Insofar as
government. Up to that time the engi- possible, the members of the division
neers had paid a fixed fee of $541,031. were to make use of the technical assist-
They had bought $625,051.75 worth of ance of men working on the jobs being
used equipment from the Hawaiian investigated; a small force would do
Constructors and had paid them $124,- administrative and supervisory work in
105.05 for the rental and recapture of the district office. Colonel Nurse's men
new equipment. The debate over the found the greatest inefficiencies in con-
full amount of the contract and the fixed nection with the assignment of the work-
fee continued. Two of the most vexing men to the various projects. Many, im-
problems were to determine what properly classified, were not doing the
changes had been made in various jobs jobs they were best qualified for. Some
and how much work had been done projects had too many workers; others,
which had not been stipulated in the not enough. Low morale and loafing
original contract and in the supple- on the job were all too common. A
mental agreements. Representatives of number of projects were administered
the Hawaiian Constructors and the engi- haphazardly at best; at some, the work-
neers held many meetings to iron out men did not even have regular paydays.
differences; they were to have months of By mid-February, about 400 "bottle-
16
work ahead of them. necks" had been broken—an average of
On the whole, the Honolulu District 14 a day. Difficulties nevertheless con-
seemed to be plagued by more than the tinued, and complaints about inefficiency
usual difficulties and inefficiencies. To kept coming in. A new problem arose.
improve the work, General Kramer set Because the amount of construction re-
up the "Bottleneck Busting Division" in quired was diminishing, there was a
17
January. Headed by Colonel Nurse, surplus of some types of labor. "We
have been fighting absenteeism," Kramer
15
told key officers and civilians of the
Rpt of Kramer Conf, 18 Jan 43. Engr AGF district as late as 10 April. "I assure
PAC.
16
Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44. Engr
AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1.
17
Honolulu Engr Dist, Dist Order No. 1, 1 Jan 43. 18
Reproduced in Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns Rpt of Kramer Conf, 15 Feb 43. Engr AGF
During World War II, POA, pp. 1324-26. PAC.
AFTER MIDWAY 373
you that loafing, idleness, and laxness on area for combat troops. In camps where
19
the job are going to disappear." the troops were to be toughened, such
Despite two years of continuous con- comforts as electric lights, hot water, and
struction, there was still a great demand flush toilets were not essential. To
for new projects. Kramer's office made make matters worse, some commanders
an analysis of all requests received by the in the Islands seemed to feel that tactical
engineers during the period from 15 troops should be exempt from labor
February to 15 April 1943; during these duties. The engineers held that this
two months, 576 came in, of which 101 belief was incorrect. Troops occupying
were disapproved. Of those approved, an area should perform such simple jobs
most were for more troop housing, more as clearing weeds and underbrush,
water, power, or sewerage facilities, espe- digging ditches for drainage, and doing
cially for the Seventh Air Force, the minor road repair. But, as in other
improvement of piers, the construction theaters, restricting construction to es-
of more warehouses, and the strengthen- sentials was difficult. Lt. Col. W. H.
ing of fortifications. Of the projects Johnson of the Supply Division, OCE,
approved, only 14 could be regarded as in a memorandum of 26 May 1943 stated,
of major importance.20 There were "Hawaii recently submitted a very com-
great numbers of requests for minor con- prehensive and bulky estimate in six
struction. "The current uninterrupted parts embracing over 400 pages and call-
flow of directives authorizing minor ing for a large amount of air compressors,
. . . work at stations where the major air diffusers, water valves, thermostats
program has already been completed and coils, all of which are to be used
... is unduly delaying the desired re- principally in installing air conditioning
duction of overhead and construction equipment." Johnson went on to say
personnel," The Adjutant General that all these supplies were being re-
stated in a memorandum of 2 April, quested despite the fact that the status
addressed to the Army as a whole.21 reports from the Hawaiian Department
Another memorandum sent out on 15 indicated that depots were well stocked
April directed: "Spartan simplicity must with these items.23
be observed. Nothing will be done
merely because it contributes to beauty, Construction Progress
22
convenience, comfort, or prestige."
These instructions seemed especially Much progress was made in 1943.
applicable to Hawaii. The Islands were Work on airfields on Oahu moved ahead
in a theater of operations and were con- steadily, and the underground airplane
sidered a better than average training repair shop was beginning to take shape.
By fall, the military outlook had im-
19
Rpt of Kramer Conf, 10 Apr 43. Engr AGF proved so much that the blocking of
PAC. airfields on the outlying island was dis-
20
1st Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip, Kramer to
CG/SF, D/C, n.d. Engr AGF PAC.
21 23
AG Memo No. W100-7-43, 2 Apr 43. Memo for Rcd, Johnson, 26 May 43. 400.291
22
AG Memo No. W100-10-43, 15 Apr 43. (HD) 43.
374 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
continued and at the same time obstacles first steel-lined tunnels for storing gaso-
on grazing lands and pineapple and cane line ever constructed. Final locations
fields on all the islands were removed. for the big guns were selected by April.
Improvement of Honolulu harbor was The Navy, making good progress in
continuing. By early 1943, five new salvaging the turrets, had them ashore
warehouses at Kapalama Basin were al- by midyear; installing the batteries
most finished, and work was well along proved to be even more complicated than
on two new piers. Army and Navy offi- earlier engineer estimates had indicated.
cials and businessmen in Honolulu had Detailed plans for the design and as-
for years stressed the need for a second sembly of of naval turrets on land were
harbor entrance; now something was be- nonexistent. Kramer set up a ware-
ing done about it. In February the house near Pearl City to store the hun-
engineers began to clear "underwater dreds of small parts which were salvaged
obstacles for a second entrance across or newly fabricated, and Emmons ap-
Keehi Lagoon to Kapalama Basin; at the pointed a board of four officers, includ-
same time they prepared plans for piers ing an engineer, to expedite the work
and warehouses to be built on Sand of emplacement. One project on which
Island. Although the Navy was no no progress was made was the repair of
longer greatly interested in the seaplane disintegrating roads and highways.
runways in Keehi Lagoon, dredging con- Army commanders were inclined to feel
tinued mainly as a quarrying operation it was the responsibility of local civilian
to provide coral for John Rodgers Air- officials to maintain and repair roads and
port. The engineers provided more streets, particularly since local tax reve-
camps, staging areas, and rest and recrea- nues had increased enormously during
tion centers; in midyear, they started the war, with much of the additional
work on a number of general, field, and money coming from the armed services.
evacuation hospitals, and began surveys The civilian authorities did not agree,
for a huge new structure to replace and a workable program of road im-
Tripler General Hospital, located north- provement was not initiated. On the
west of Honolulu. At the same time, whole, by late 1943, much of the major
some of the schools taken over for hos- construction in the islands had been
pitals were being returned to the civilian completed. The new work the engi-
authorities. Still two of the most un- neers received was mainly for additional
usual projects were the drilling of tunnels facilities at some of the airfields.24
in Kipapa Gulch for the storage of re-
serve gasoline and the emplacement of 24
(1) Ltr, Maj Edward A. Flanders, CO 804 Engr
the big naval guns. The tunnels con- Avn Bn, to Richardson, 5 Oct 43, with 1st Ind, G-3
sisted of four parallel, cylindrical excava- HD to Engr HD, 11 Oct 43. Engr AGF PAC, 661.
(2) Kramer to Emmons, 1 Feb 43, Rpt, Comprehen-
tions, 938 feet long and 22 feet in diam- sive Study of Honolulu Harbor and Vicinity, In-
eter, with a cover of 200 feet of solid cluding Kapalama Basin, Keehi Lagoon, and Sand
rock. They were being lined with steel Island. Engr AGF PAC. (3) Hist Review, CE, U.S.
Army, Opns During World War II, POA, pp. 173ff.
plate. Insofar as the engineers in Ha- (4) Draft of Ltr, Kramer to Reybold n.d. Engr
waii could determine, these were the AGF PAC. (5) Ltr, Lt Col O. M. McDale, Asst AG
AFTER MIDWAY 375
the Central Pacific was a GHQ topo- in laying Marston mat, and specialists
graphic battalion, less one company. were trained in using flame throwers.
The plan was to expand the 64th into A school was started to provide instruc-
such a unit in 1944.32 tion in operating water stills. A major
drawback in the Hawaiian Islands was
Training the absence of sizable rivers. Little
could be done to give the combat engi-
In the rush to complete construction neers adequate training in putting up
after Pearl Harbor, the engineers had to ponton bridges and in using expedients
neglect training. As a rule, the men for crossing streams. In any event,
learned by doing—by going out and Kramer wanted all units that were
building runways, warehouses, roads, alerted for movement to the combat
fortifications, and obstacles. From time zones to get at least some "catch-as-catch-
to time, the combat engineers partici- can training." 33
pated in maneuvers designed to test
various aspects of the defense plans. Plans for the Offensive
The coming offensives forced the engi-
neers to emphasize training as never Early in 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
before. It was especially important to began to make plans for an offensive in
prepare the men for combat. Soon the Central Pacific to start later that year.
after arriving in Hawaii, Kramer stressed At the TRIDENT Conference in Wash-
the need for something better than the ington in May, they obtained British
sketchy instruction being given. He be- agreement to a drive from Hawaii to
lieved, for example, that more training Japan that would begin with the capture
in removing mines was necessary and of the Gilbert Islands, to be followed by
that qualified instructors—men who had the seizure of the Marshalls. These as-
had actual experience in removing saults were to have a higher priority than
enemy mines in a combat zone—should any possibly conflicting operations in the
teach the troops. Despite the increased South or Southwest Pacific. On 1 June
emphasis on training, inadequacies per- Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., re-
sisted. In March 1943 the Inspector placed Emmons as commander of the
General reported that there was still in- Hawaiian Department. On 14 August
sufficient stress on preparing troops for General Richardson became the head of
combat. The difficulty was that com- the newly activated United States Army
manders were expected to get the work Forces in the Central Pacific Area
done and train the troops at the same (USAFICPA). He chose Kramer as his
time. In the fall of 1943, engineer engineer. On 1 September Kramer
training was stepped up. The troops merged the department and district or-
received more training in small arms ganizations into the Engineer Office,
fire. Some men were given instruction
33 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During
32
Ltr, Kramer to Loper, 26 Sep 43. Engr AGF World War II, POA, pp. 819Dff. (2) Kramer Conf,
PAC, 061. 6 Mar, and various confs in Jun, Aug, and Sep, 1943.
378 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Central Pacific Area, but the two com- quarters with the other three members
ponents continued to have their separate of the Joint Staff. Somervell expected
functions. Kramer appointed two depu- that Leavey would "secure the proper
ties—Lt. Col. Desloge Brown, to super- arrangements in the logistics field"
vise the activities of the department, and through his "tact and downright
Col. Benjamin R. Wimer, those of the capacity." 35
district.34 One of the shortcomings of the Joint
For the coming offensives, Admiral Logistical Board had been that it did not
Nimitz set up a joint Army-Navy staff to provide sufficient over-all direction and
replace the Joint Logistical Board, co-ordination in Army and Navy plan-
POA, which had heretofore resolved ning for construction and supply at new
supply problems pertaining to both serv- bases. The board merely co-ordinated
ices. The new Joint Staff, POA, di- plans already prepared independently by
rectly under Nimitz, had four divisions. the services. Thus, in advance of each
Two of them, J-1 and J-3, were headed operation, Army and Navy would arrive
by Navy officers, and two, J-2 and J-4, at a formal agreement as to which facili-
by Army engineers. J-2 was under Col. ties and what supplies each would pro-
Joseph J. Twitty. He established close vide for its own use and which each
contact with Kramer's office with regard would provide for joint use. Difficulties
to engineer intelligence and mapping. arose in co-ordinating Army and Navy
J-4 was headed by Brig. Gen. Edmond plans already prepared, especially to pre-
H. Leavey, who for many years had vent unnecessary duplication of such
worked under Somervell as one of his facilities as hospitals, post exchanges, and
most capable assistants. In 1943, while communications systems. At times,
Leavey was serving in the Mediterranean Army and Navy disagreed considerably
Theater, Somervell recommended him on how joint supply should be handled.
for the important assignment on Nimitz' Since the operations so far undertaken
staff. There had been some feeling had involved the occupation of small
among high ranking Navy officers, among islands with no enemy resistance, the
them Admiral King, over having Army difficulties had not been insurmountable.
men on Nimitz' staff. Somervell, visit- As planning began for more extensive
ing Hawaii during his tour of the Pacific operations, the problems of co-ordina-
areas in the fall of 1943, reported to tion loomed larger.36
Marshall that Leavey's arrival in Hawaii The Joint Staff, patterned after the
had been "more or less of a bombshell." concept of the Army General Staff, modi-
But owing to his "outstanding capabili-
ties" he had been "well received." 35
(1) Ltr, Kramer to Loper, 26 Sep 43. Engr
Harmony had apparently been estab- AGF PAC, 061. (2) McMeekan, Rpt on Visit as
Engr Observer to Central Pac, Aug-Sep 44. (3)
lished, since Leavey was living in Navy Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 12 Sep 43. OPD
384 PTO sec. III Cases 57-89. (4) Min, Staff Conf
ASF, 6 Nov 43. Staff Conf, ASF, 337.
34 36
(1) U.S. Army Forces, Mid Pac and Predecessor Min Staff Conf, ASF, 6 Nov 43. Staff Conf,
Comds, MS, vol. 3, pp. 360ff., pp. 427ff. OCMH ASF, 337. (2) Ltr, Leavey to C EHD, 21 Jun 61.
Files. (2) Kramer Conf, 18 Sep 43. EHD Files.
AFTER MIDWAY 379
fied to meet conditions in the theater, bilities of the Joint Staff was the shipping
provided greater over-all direction and of supplies in the proper priorities.
co-ordination. In accordance with di- Leavey's section had the main responsi-
rectives from Admiral Nimitz, it was to bility for fixing priorities. Having a
prepare a master plan for each operation representative of the Army in this im-
in advance. J-3 developed the over-all portant job would, Somervell believed,
operational plan; J-4 worked out a de- result in better conditions than in the
tailed logistics plan. Both plans were South Pacific, where the Army was at a
co-ordinated and then discussed with the disadvantage because it was completely
senior staffs of the various service com- dependent on the Navy for getting its
mands in Hawaii and, if necessary, supplies sent forward. One of the aims
altered to meet available means. Mean- of the staff was to work toward "direct
while, the Joint Staff prepared the final loading" from San Francisco, that is,
command directives, which it discussed sending supplies straight to the islands
informally with the staff members of the where they were to be used, which would
task force scheduled to conduct the mean bypassing Hawaii.38
operation. These directives set forth The new procedures had to be devel-
responsibilities for construction and oped gradually. Since campaign plans
supply, allocated shipping space, and were formulated some time in advance,
established shipping priorities. Upon those already prepared had to be brought
receiving their formal directives, task under the new system in somewhat piece-
force commanders completed the details meal fashion and co-ordinated as quickly
of their plans and set out to obtain such as possible. When the Joint Staff took
additional men and supplies as they over on 6 September 1943, planning for
needed. Major Army and Navy admin- the assault on the Gilberts was already so
istrative commands screened requests far along that little could be done to
from task force commanders and com- revise arrangements already made.
puted over-all space and tonnage require- Little could have been done in any case,
ments, which they forwarded to the Joint since the Joint Staff had to spend many
Staff for final review. Insofar as the weeks in assembling personnel to take
Engineers were concerned, the new sys- care of its multitudinous duties. The
tem not only eliminated some unneces- staff had to be set up on an experimental
sary duplication in construction and basis, since there was no headquarters
supply, but also centralized responsibil- organization which might have been
ity for construction. Each new base used as a model. Leavey estimated that
would have one engineer, either Army 85 officers and 120 enlisted men were
or Navy, directly responsible to the base needed for J-4 alone; as the war pro-
commander for all construction.37 gressed, this estimate proved to be too
One of the most important responsi- low. Men began arriving in fairly ade-
quate numbers in the fall of 1943 and
37
(1) Ltr, Leavey to C EHD, 21 Jun 61. EHD
38
Files. (2) Memo, M. W. Marston for Richardson, Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 12 Sep 43, OPD
11 Sep 43. OPD 384 PTO sec. III Cases 57-89. 384 PTO sec. III Cases 57-89.
380 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
set to work to make the new procedures of the Gilberts. Marines and naval con-
more effective for operations scheduled struction battalions were sent to Nuku-
to take place after the capture of the fetau and Nanomea. An Army task
Gilberts.39 force was to go to Baker, garrison the
By the fall of 1943 the Central Pacificisland, and build an airfield. The 804th
was ready to launch its first offensives. Aviation Battalion, commanded by Maj.
Hawaii had been converted into a pow- Edward A. Flanders, had the job of
erful base. The fleet, having overcome construction.
the setback it received in the Pearl On the morning of 1 September, the
Harbor debacle, was prepared to strike. task force reached its destination. The
The Army was also ready. By 1 October island, one mile long and almost a mile
the number of troops in Hawaii num- wide, was rimmed by a narrow beach
bered 165,423, with the engineers total- behind which the coral rose to a height of
ing 10,626. Ample and well-trained about twenty feet. The sand on the
manpower was on hand to seize some of beaches was so deep that no equipment
the Japanese-held islands in the Central except bulldozers could move forward.
Pacific. Men of the 804th dozed roads across the
landing beaches, laid down Sommerfeld
First Offensives in the mat, and cut roadways through the
Central Pacific island's rim to the central plateau. A
reconnaissance party, making a survey
Baker Island the morning of the landing, found the
center of the island was a dry basin.
The offensive got under way in late The runway site which had been se-
1943. The Gilbert Islands, the first ob- lected was not the best, and a new center
jective, were about 2,500 miles southwest line was run so that a longer strip could
of Hawaii; in Allied hands they would be built. Grading began shortly after
provide sites for bases to support opera- noon. Seven days later it was complete
tions farther west and would strengthen and 3,000 feet of Marston mat was in
the lines of communications from Hawaii place. The runway was adequate for
to the Southwest Pacific. Before the fighters, and soon an Army fighter
Gilberts could be attacked, certain pre- squadron moved in. Bombers taking
liminary operations were necessary. In off from this field could reach the
August, Nimitz ordered the occupation western Marshalls, a feat hitherto impos-
of three small islands east and southeast sible from any Allied base.40
of the Gilberts and the building of air-
fields on them. They were Nukufetau 40
(1) Philip A. Growl and Edmund G. Love,
and Nanomea in the Ellice chain, and Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, UNITED
Baker, a lone islet some 500 miles east STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,
1955). PP. 52-53. (2) Ltr, Lt Col George E. White,
Jr, to CG CPA, sub: Outline Rpt on Ldg and Cons
39
(1) Ltr, Leavey to C EHD, 21 Jun 61. EHD Opns at Baker Island. EHD Files. (3) Participa-
Files. (2) Memo, Brig Gen John E. Hull, Actg tion of USAFICPA in GALVANIC Opn, p. 145. 98-
ACofS for G-1 and G-3, 22 Dec 43. OPD 384 PTO USF3-03(23507). (4) Final Close-out Rpt on Baker.
sec. III Cases 57-89. 98-BC4-0.1 (19840) Master.
AFTER MIDWAY 381
to meet light resistance. Those coming The infantry advancing eastward from
ashore at the lagoon pushed across the the lagoon landing area ran into the
island and then veered to the east and island's most strongly fortified area; it
west. Here too opposition was unex- consisted of a system of pillboxes and
pectedly light. Only a few defense shelters, a number of them connected by
works—antitank gun positions, machine passageways, some underground and
gun emplacements, pillboxes, and air some above ground. Shelters and tun-
raid shelters—were encountered. The nels had a covering of logs and earth up
infantry bypassed the strongest of these, to six feet thick. One tunnel, some 100
leaving a few riflemen to cover them. feet long, had machine gun emplace-
The 102d engineers then moved up and ments at both ends; various well-
demolished them with explosives.44 concealed openings were just large
Some of the troops moving westward enough for a man to squeeze through.
from the lagoon area were stopped by a Nearby taro pits served as moats, and
concrete shelter, about thirty feet long. kept tanks from approaching. Artillery,
It had blastproof entrances at either end. bazookas, and hand grenades were
When the men tried to reduce the ob- largely ineffective, and the flame throwers
stacle by tossing in hand grenades, the on hand were too wet to be of value.
occupants threw them out again. A tank The infantry commander directed the
moved up, firing 75-mm. shells, but with- engineers to reduce the obstacle. They
out effect. A new maneuver was tried. dropped TNT charges into the machine
The tank, followed by 2 infantrymen gun positions at both ends; when the
with automatic rifles and 4 engineers, 2 Japanese emerged from the openings
with rifles and 2 carrying a flame thrower with bayonets drawn, they were shot
and pole charges, moved up slowly to one down. Having been delayed about four
of the entrances and stopped within a hours, the advance eastward was resumed.
few feet of it. While the riflemen cov- On the third day the east tank barrier
ered the opening, the 2 engineers with was taken without opposition; the west
flame thrower and pole charges crept tank barrier had been taken the day
toward the shelter. The flame thrower, before. Makin was in American hands.
still wet from the landing, failed to The island was captured easily—in con-
function. One of the men, taking about trast to the bloody battle the marines
a minute, placed a pole charge with a were waging on Tarawa.46
15-second fuze attached just inside the On the fourth day, the 804th Aviation
entrance. The group scrambled for Battalion began work on the airfield.
cover. The explosion killed the occu- Plans called for a fighter runway, sur-
pants.45 faced with Marston mat, to be extended
44
eventually for bombers; if possible, a
(1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and
Marshalls, pp. 70-72. (2) Lt Col S. L. A. Marshall,
Hist Br G-2 27th Div, Notes on Makin Opn (20-25
46
Nov 43), p. 182. OCMH Files. (1) Makin Opn, 2-3.7A AFA, MA (Notes).
45
(1) Marshall, Notes on the Makin Opn (20-25 OCMH. (2) Marshall, Notes on the Makin Opn
Nov 43), pp. 180-81. (2) Crowl and Love, Seizure of (20-25 Nov 43), pp. 101-03. (3) Crowl and Love,
the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 91-93. Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 99-100.
384 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
first fighter planes arrived four days Coral, made up of the skeletons of
later. The aviation engineers were well minute spherical animals, was chemically
on the way toward completion of their similar to limestone. About one-eighth
first combat mission in the Central of an inch in diameter, the animals could
Pacific.47 live only in tropical or subtropical
waters. Most species grew only in salt
Coral water. They flourished best if the salt
content was between 2.7 and 3.8 percent
Makin was one of the many coral atolls and the depth of the water less than 150
the engineers would encounter on the feet, with temperatures ranging from
road to Tokyo. From now on, the little- 66° to 100°F. Coral fed on plankton
known islets of the Central Pacific were washed toward them by the waves and
to acquire a tremendous significance. currents of the ocean. On an island's
They were the steppingstones, the "sta- windward side, where food was plentiful
tionary aircraft carriers" on the way to and the water well aerated, coral grew
Japan. For the constructing engineers rapidly. Reefs proliferated and were
they were almost ideal "aircraft carriers" found from a few yards to several miles
because they furnished a valuable, and offshore. Approaching an island on this
up to this time little-known, construction side was, as a rule, dangerous, as the reefs
material—coral. The great quantities were almost invariably numerous and
of this material, so readily accessible, rocky. On the leeward side, the reefs
would make possible the rapid construc- were generally flat, had few rocky
tion of runways and roads. Coral had patches, and were often submerged at
long been used in some tropical countries high tide. Coral islands, encircling a
for construction, but little was known in lagoon, formed an atoll which usually
the United States regarding its use before opened to the sea on the leeward side.
the outbreak of World War II. The In the central Pacific, coral islands were
Engineers had had little information re- low and flat, being only four or five feet
garding either coral islands or construc- above sea level. In the volcanic islands
tion with coral. They had learned from of the western Pacific, upward thrusts of
experience on Canton and Christmas land accounted for the presence of hills
and on the islands of the South Pacific, or cliffs of solid coral.49
and they collected additional data. The Whether dead or alive, whether taken
studies made yielded much information from the top of a cliff or the bottom of
not only about construction with coral the sea, coral was suitable for roads and
but also about the formation and struc- runways. The surface of an island usu-
ture of coral atolls, information of vital ally consisted of coarse coral sand packed
importance in preparing and making hard when dry. In the interior, the soil
amphibious assaults.48 was often a sandy loam. Coral could be
47
Of of Engr, Hq Seventh Air Force, Rpt, Avn
Engr Mission at Makin.
48 49
John R. Perry, "Coral: Our Pacific Lifesaver," (1) Ibid. (2) Hobart E. Stocking, "Coral Reefs
The Military Engineer, XXXVII (May, 1945), 168- of the South Pacific," The Military Engineer,
75. XXXVI (August, 1944), 249-53.
386 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
50 51
Perry, "Coral: Our Pacific Lifesaver," The Mili- Of of Engr, Hq Seventh Air Force, Rpt, Avn
tary Engineer XXXVII (May, 1945), pp. 168-75. Engr Mission at Makin.
CHAPTER X
were to help the Chinese improve the $125,000,000. Part of this money was
world-famous Burma Road linking being used to buy materiel and rolling
China with northeastern Burma, and stock for a railroad the Chinese and
were to take sole charge of constructing British were building from Kunming,
the Ledo Road from northeastern India in southwestern China, to Lashio, in
across northern Burma to a junction northeastern Burma, where it would
with the Burma Road. connect with the Burmese railroad sys-
By the time of the QUADRANT Confer- tem. In June the United States set
ence at Quebec in August 1943, the aside a hundred new fighter planes for
development of the B-29 bomber had China to form the nucleus of a modern
opened up the possibility of long-range air force. The War and Navy Depart-
air assaults against the Japanese home- ments released over a hundred pilots to
land from bases in China. The engi- fly these planes as members of the Ameri-
neers in CBI were consequently the first can Volunteer Group (AVG) being or-
to build airfields overseas for the big ganized in China by retired Air Corps
bombers. As a further consequence of Capt. Claire L. Chennault.1 In July the
the decisions made at Quebec, the engi- War Department established the Ameri-
neers were called upon to link eastern can Military Mission to China to advise
India and southwestern China with the the Chinese in Washington and Chung-
most extensive military pipeline system king with regard to the procurement,
ever constructed—to supply the airlift shipment, care, and use of American
to China, facilitate combat in Burma, equipment. That same month General
and supply American air units in China. Schley sent an officer expert in railway
Many of the engineer feats in CBI construction to the Far East to act as
actually contributed little to defeating adviser to the Yunnan-Burma Railroad
Japan. But the fact remains that engi- Authority, which was building the Chi-
neer projects in the CBI because of their nese section of the railroad between
sheer magnitude were among the most Kunming and Lashio. To provide the
impressive of the war. In no other the- first of the approximately 30,000 tons of
ater were engineer officers to fill so many rails needed, the Corps of Engineers pro-
key positions in the chain of command. cured and started dismantling a 125-mile
stretch of abandoned narrow-gauge rail-
Priority on Airfields way of the Denver, Rio Grande, and
2
Western in New Mexico and Colorado.
Prewar Efforts To Help China
1
(1) Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland,
The United States began to support Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED STATES
China in her fight against Japan well ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953),
pp. 13-32. (2) Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and
before Pearl Harbor. In April 1941, Early Operations, pp. 484-89.
President Roosevelt approved sending 2
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission
lend-lease aid; by late spring the War to China, pp. 26-32, 47. (2) Rpt, Maj John E. Aus-
land to Brig Gen John Magruder, C Mil Mission to
Department was administering a pro- China, 12 Sep 41. (3) Memo, C Railway Sec OCE,
gram of assistance totaling nearly for Maj Haydon L. Boatner, 28 Sep 41. Last two in
390 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
In September the Shell Oil Company, The Japanese moved swiftly into Malaya
which had just perfected a light, "inva- and Burma, and Singapore fell on 15
sion-weight" petroleum pipeline, inter- February 1942. After entering southern
ested the military mission in having such Burma in mid-January, the Japanese
a line installed between Kunming and drove hard for Rangoon. If they cap-
Bhamo in northern Burma. In agree- tured that key port, China would be
ment with the mission, the oil company isolated.
sent one of its specialists to Burma to At the ARCADIA Conference in Wash-
prepare a plan for constructing the pipe- ington Roosevelt and Churchill agreed
line. General Kingman, Assistant Chief that China should constitute a separate
of Engineers, had an investigation made theater and as such be under Generalis-
of the proposed route. He reported in simo Chiang Kai-shek, head of the
October that such a line appeared to have National Military Council governing
"sufficient merit ... to justify further Free China. Because he was also the
investigation." 3 head of a state, Chiang would not be
under the Combined Chiefs. Churchill
Help for China After and Roosevelt proposed that he estab-
Pearl Harbor lish a planning staff to include American,
British, and Chinese officers. Chiang
After Pearl Harbor all these efforts to agreed and asked that a high-ranking
strengthen China were in jeopardy. American general be sent to Chungking
The course of the war soon threatened to act as chief of the Allied staff. Stim-
to bring all of southeast Asia under son and Marshall conferred the post on
Japanese control. The capitulation of Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who had
Thailand in mid-December enabled the served for many years in China as mili-
enemy to make gargantuan strides to- tary attache. On 2 February the War
ward attainment of his two main objec- Department appointed him Command-
tives, one of which was to seize the ing General of the United States Army
British naval bastion of Singapore, and Forces in the Chinese Theater of Opera-
the other to capture southern Burma and tions, Burma, and India. Stilwell was
cut the railway running northward from to go to the Far East with about thirty
Rangoon to Lashio. The latter was American officers composing the U.S.
not only an important railhead, but also Task Force in China.4
the southern terminus of the Burma As his engineer, Stilwell chose Col.
Road, a narrow, graveled highway wind- William H. Holcombe. In late Decem-
ing 700 miles northeastward to Kun- ber 1941, the War Plans Division had
ming—China's last line of surface designated Holcombe, at that time
communication with the outside world. assistant commandant of the Engineer
School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to serve
AMMISCA 617, Yunnan-Burma RR, WW II Rcds
Div.
3 4
Memo, Magruder for CofEngrs, 18 Sep 41 with For a detailed account of the events leading up
Ind, 3 Oct 41. AMMISCA 679, Pipelines for China, to Stilwell's appointment see Romanus and Sunder-
World War II Rcds Div. land, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 61-76.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 391
as engineer adviser to Stilwell in the plans for this road in the office of Maj.
planning for the invasion of North Gen. Richard L. Bond, Wavell's
Africa. When Stilwell received his as- engineer-in-chief.6
signment to serve with Chiang instead, On 3 March Stilwell flew to Chung-
he transferred Colonel Holcombe from king to set up his task force headquarters
the North African project. On 11 there. Three days later Chiang an-
February, Stilwell and his staff left Newnounced that Stilwell would head the
York by plane for India.5 Chinese Expeditionary Force, which
On the 25th Stilwell and his group during the past week had been moving
reached New Delhi. To the ensuing into Burma to bolster the British forces,
round of conferences with the British consisting for the most part of Burmese
commander-in-chief in India, General and Indian troops. All available hands
Wavell, and his officers in General Head-were needed now in southern Burma,
quarters (India), Stilwell brought an where the situation was growing more
impressive catalog of American plans. serious by the hour. On 6 March the
He emphasized that his major missions Japanese occupied Rangoon. The Brit-
were to modernize and rearm the Chi- ish retreated northward toward Manda-
nese Army and to step up American lay. Completing his staff assignments
participation in the air war over China. and command arrangements, Stilwell
To carry out his plans, he intended to hastened to Lashio to assume control of
increase lend-lease tonnages moving up the six Chinese divisions there. He had
the railway from Rangoon to Lashio. certain definite strategic aims. His
Should Rangoon fall, he hoped to fly most cherished plan was to drive the
supplies from the Royal Air Force Japanese out of Rangoon and reopen the
(RAF) fighter field at Dinjan, in Assam, supply line to Kunming. Failing this,
to Myitkyina, in northern Burma, barge he hoped to dig in around Mandalay to
them from there down the Irrawaddy protect the future line of communica-
River to Bhamo, and then truck them to tions from India across northern Burma
the Burma Road and China. This to China.
roundabout way could possibly be short- Meanwhile, the War Department had
ened. Work was already in progress on begun sending some air reinforcements.
a road to extend eastward from the coal On 22 February Col. Clayton Bissell,
mining community of Ledo, in eastern selected as Stilwell's air adviser by Lt.
Assam, across northern Burma to link Gen. Henry H. Arnold, commanding the
up with the Burma Road. The Chinese Army Air Forces, left Washington for
and British had agreed to co-operate in India to handle arrangements for receipt
its construction when Chiang visited in the theater of several consignments of
India the first week of February. Stil- aircraft for the Tenth Air Force and for
well instructed Holcombe to help the Chennault's volunteers, about to be in-
British and Chinese who were preparing
6
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission
to China, pp. 76-77, 93-94. (2) Craven and Cate,
5
Ltr, Brig Gen W. H. Holcombe to C EHD, 22 eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 497-98. (3)
Nov 54. EHD Files. Ltr, Holcombe to C EHD, 22 Nov 54.
392 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
ducted into the U.S. Army. In an inde- fields capable of handling transports—
pendent action approved by Marshall, particularly in Assam and in Yunnan
General Brett, Deputy Chief of Staff, Province in southwestern China. To
ABDA Command, ordered General accommodate American aircraft which
Brereton to evacuate doomed Java and would help to defend India, either
re-establish the remnants of his FEAF bomber fields would have to be built in
task force at Karachi.7 Here, early in the central and eastern parts of the
March, Brereton activated his base and country or British fields taken over and
training center. General Marshall made improved. Providing adequate facilities
Brereton commander of the Tenth Air for the Air Forces in the Indian subcon-
Force and directed him to provide com- tinent would necessitate a major con-
bat air support to Chiang in China and struction effort. Holcombe worked in
to the British in Burma and at the same Brereton's office, helping to draw up
time make plans for supplying China plans for a headquarters for the Air
by air. He was to be directly subordi- Forces at Willingdon Airdrome near
nate to Stilwell, although as regards the New Delhi, expansion of Karachi Air-
campaign in Burma the War Department drome, construction of five bomber
expected him to "cooperate with the fields near Calcutta, construction of an
British as [they] requested." 8 air depot at Agra, and the building of
four airfields in Assam for the airlift to
Engineer Work Begins China. Holcombe gave his preliminary
layouts to the airmen for their approval.
Soon after arriving at Lashio, Stilwell As soon as satisfactory drawings were
directed Holcombe to join him. While ready, they were forwarded to the archi-
waiting in his hotel room at New Delhi tects in British General Headquarters
9
for a plane to take him to Burma, Hol- (India), who put them in final form.
combe got word that Stilwell had made Since there were no U.S. engineer
him temporarily engineer of the Tenth troops and none could be expected soon,
Air Force. In his new assignment he the Americans had to turn to the British
would have to advise Brereton as to the for construction. The reverse lend-lease
most feasible way of providing the facil- procedure, as worked out between Brit-
ities the airmen needed. He and Brere- ish and American headquarters in India,
ton had to deal with several fundamental provided that major U.S. Army com-
problems. Organization of a port of mands would send their requests for con-
debarkation and of a training base at struction to General Headquarters
Karachi would require major improve- (India). General Bond would then call
ments in facilities there. The 2,000- upon the Royal Engineers to "put the
mile supply line to China would necessi- work in hand" or would ask the govern-
tate building or improving numerous ment of India to assign the projects to
7
See above, p. 118.
8 9
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission (1) Ltr, Holcombe to C EHD, 22 Nov 54. (2)
to China, pp. 78-80. (2) Craven and Cate, eds., Brereton Diaries, pp. 97, 99, no. (3) Craven and
Plans and Early Operations, pp. 396-97, 502-04. Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 511-12.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 393
the Central Public Works Department tween Karachi and Assam, rail gauges
or some other civilian government changed four times. Nowhere in India
agency. Whether civilian or military were there long stretches of highway
organizations controlled a particular capable of sustaining high-speed truck
project, the work was usually done by traffic the year around. The scanty
Indian contractors employing their own Burmese road and rail net was not con-
labor gangs.10 nected with the transportation system of
Brereton and Holcombe could not fail India. The long and virtually un-
to be impressed by the immensity of the charted mountainous frontier between
Asian scene and its challenge to the engi- the two countries was an almost impene-
neers. In China, Burma, and India trable jungle haven for primitive tribes.
lived nearly half the human race— In China, the Japanese were in firm con-
900,000,000 people—largely undernour- trol of all the modern highways and
ished, unlettered, and indifferent to the most of the railroads of the country.
issues which had brought the war to Such control as Chiang's government
their homelands. The towering Hima- exercised was confined to the under-
layas isolated the Indian subcontinent developed part of the country.12
from China, and spurs of that range, In attempting to have bomber bases
called the Hump by the airmen, shut off and transport fields constructed, Brere-
Burma from China. Throughout the ton encountered almost insurmountable
year, malaria, typhus, intestinal infesta- obstacles. It seemed to him and to
tions, and other serious endemic diseases other Americans that GHQ (India), de-
sapped the vitality of native and new- spite the threat of invasion, did not shake
comer alike. The monsoon rains, last- off its peacetime routine. The govern-
ing from May to October, drenched ment of India, fearful of provoking
Burma and much of India annually; the Indian nationalist outbursts by stepping
world's heaviest rainfall, more than 400 up demands on the country's agrarian
inches a year, fell in the Khasi hills of economy, appeared to show little energy
Assam.11 In various ways the summer in meeting requests for construction and
downpours would create engineering materiel for the American forces. In a
problems. Constant repair of the water- diary entry for 20 March, Brereton
logged roads would be necessary. fumed, " . . . practically nothing had
Workmen would be scarce because they been done in the northeastern area on
would be needed in great numbers for airfield construction. No one has shown
work on the rice and tea plantations. any initiative in assembling labor.
13
In general, land communications were . . ." A month later he complained
far from ideal. In the 1,800 miles be- to Stilwell of the ". . . lack of central
10 12
(1) GHQ (India), Provision Sec Routine Order (1) Anon., "The China-Burma-India Theater of
No. B-37, 19 Jul 42. (2) Ltr, CG SOS CBI to QMG Operations," The Military Engineer, XXXVI (June,
(India), 2 Sep 42. Both in Reverse Lend-Lease Sup 1944), 188-89. (2) Irving B. Crosby, "Physiography
File, Constr Serv Files, KCRC. and War in Burma," The Military Engineer,
11
In most of the United States rainfall averages XXXVII (February, 1945), 43-48.
13
between 15 and 45 inches a year. Brereton Diaries, p. 112.
394 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
of the Iranian mission, Maj. Charles F. east of the city. Other projects under-
B. Price, flew to Kunming to establish taken during the late spring of 1942 were
Advance Section 3, which was to include extensions to the wharves and warehous-
the southern half of China. Only Base ing in the port, remodeling of hotels to
Section 2, with headquarters at Calcutta provide additional billets in the city, and
and including most of southeastern construction of a cantonment for 20,000
20
India, was not commanded by an engi- men at Malir.
neer. Its chief was Col. Edwin M. There was a great need for engineer
Sutherland of the Infantry. In each work in northeastern Assam. Arriving
section, the commander, directly subor- at his post in May, Byroade set out to
dinate to Wheeler, would control all organize the SOS effort to support the
engineer supply and construction activi- airlift across Burma to China. He
ties. Although shortages of personnel found the British engaged in improving
made it impossible for the field com- four airfields, known as the Hump fields.
mands to organize adequate engineer The area assigned to him, so crucial for
staffs, this lack was offset somewhat by the supply line to China and the defense
the fact that engineers headed SOS and of India, was a scene of confusion. The
four of its major subdivisions.19 Japanese forces were approaching India.
Retreating and disorganized Chinese
Construction Progress troops were straggling over the frontier
mountains; the natives were panic-
Work was urgently needed at Karachi. stricken. The Royal Engineers and the
This city had become the major port of Central Public Works Department,
entry for the American forces, since supposedly co-operating to prepare the
British shipping had already overtaxed needed airfields, were engaged in a bitter
harbor facilities at Bombay, and Calcutta struggle for the control of construction.
was too exposed to enemy attack. When Fortunately, soon after Byroade's arrival,
Major Johnson left his job as Engineer, General Headquarters (India) inter-
SOS, on 27 May he became engineer of ceded and placed the Royal Engineers
Base Section 1. He had the task of ex- firmly in charge of work at the air-
pediting a variety of projects designed fields. "The change," Byroade in-
to make Karachi an efficient base and formed Wheeler, "has been entirely for
port of entry. With contractors and the better, as the military has many more
native laborers working under him and means at its disposal." Byroade was not
the Royal Engineers, construction went alarmed by the absence of personnel
forward on a 5,600-foot concrete run- with which to man his engineer section.
way at the former civil airdrome and on He believed his participation in the
two outlying fighter strips. Various im- airfield program should be "solely
provements were under way at the New a matter of liaison ... in clearly es-
Malir and Landhi airports, twelve miles 20
(1)Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation
Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 559-61. (2) Engr
19
(1) Memo, Kohloss for Wheeler, 21 May 42. (2) Sec Base Sec 1 Prog Rpts, 2 May-2O July 42. AG
Hist of Engr Sec SOS CBI. 600.9CBI.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 397
tablishing the needs of United States sibilities under Wheeler. Colonel Hoi-
Forces . . . ."21 combe, seriously ill with dysentery, to
At Calcutta and in central India work which was added malaria contracted
made little headway. The exposure of during the harrowing, 3-week trek out
Calcutta to enemy sea and air assaults of Burma, went on convalescent leave to
obliged Wheeler to mark time there. Kashmir. Stilwell left Holcombe's post
Matters were critical in central India. vacant with the understanding that on
Brereton was especially anxious to his return to duty he would be assigned
complete the large depot field at Agra to the Services of Supply.22
and the bomber bases across northern
India at Cawnpore, Fyzabad, Allahabad, The Broadening of Stilwell's
and Gaya. Contractors were far behind Mission
schedule. The onset of the monsoon
rains made it difficult to keep laborers Since the plan for keeping China in
on the job. Supervisors seemed lax the war would require efforts much
about informing contractors as to speci- greater than those contemplated earlier,
fications and priorities. Critical mate- Stilwell was faced with the necessity of
rials did not arrive either on time or in broadening the scope of his mission. By
desired quantities. American airmen, the latter part of June he had begun
forced to live in tents while awaiting referring to his command as a "theater"
completion of their barracks, became instead of a task force. On 6 July he
increasingly irritated over the slowness formally set up a theater-type organiza-
of the British effort. tion. He established a forward head-
The campaign in Burma had in the quarters in Chungking and a rear
meantime come to its disastrous end. headquarters in New Delhi. Wheeler
By the time Stilwell emerged onto the and Brereton were his two major subor-
plains of eastern India late in May, the dinate commanders. Although General
Japanese had overrun all of Burma ex- Marshall approved the reorganization,
cept the northern tip and had occupied no formal orders were ever published by
part of China's Yunnan Province west the War Department concerning it. By
of the Salween gorge. Contact between mid-July Stilwell's command was gener-
Stilwell's elements in India and his ally known as the China-Burma-India
bases in China was impossible except by Theater. For that part lying in India
air. All supplies, fuel, guns, ammuni- and Burma, Stilwell was under Wavell.
tion, and men needed in China would For the part in China, he was under
henceforth have to be flown in. The Chiang, who, as ruler of China, was ac-
critical lack of air facilities in India and countable to no one. Stilwell had other
China would necessitate a major con- responsibilities. When he took over the
struction effort. Early in June, Stilwell personnel and the responsibilities of the
decided to consolidate engineer respon-
22
(1) Craven and Cate, eds, Plans and Early
21
Ltrs, Byroade to Wheeler, 18 May, 1 Jun 42. Operations, pp. 508-12. (2) Interv with Wheeler,
AG 600.9 CBI. 5 Mar 53. (3) Ltr, Holcombe to C EHD, 22 Nov 54.
398 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
American Military Mission to China, he Wheeler's hands, the 823d was assigned
came under the direct command of Gen- to the Tenth Air Force; its first job was
eral Marshall. He also served as Presi- the construction of a bomb shelter at the
dent Roosevelt's military representative Karachi air base. Within a few days
in Chungking. Stilwell's diverse and ex- Wheeler's staff had worked out plans for
acting responsibilities imposed on him deploying the rest of the men. The
numerous and sometimes conflicting ob- dump truck company was placed on
ligations; the resulting confusion made transportation detail at the port. Ar-
more difficult the work of the engineers rowsmith's regiment was split. The 1st
and hampered the development of an Battalion was held in reserve at Karachi
23
effective engineer organization. to be sent wherever it would be needed
in central and eastern India. The 2d
First Engineer Troops Arrive Battalion was kept in Base Section 1 to
improve roads, erect buildings, and
Fortunately for Stilwell's construction provide camouflaging. Since the engi-
program, engineer troops were on the neer units arrived without their equip-
way. At the end of July, two units, the ment, SOS was obliged to give them
45th General Service Regiment under machinery from lend-lease stocks ear-
Col. John C. Arrowsmith and the 823d marked for China. Most of these items
Aviation Battalion under Maj. Ferdi- were of nonstandard types and in most
nand J. Tate, disembarked at Karachi. categories ill suited to the tasks ahead.24
Soon thereafter the 195th Engineer On 1 August Colonel Arrowsmith be-
Dump Truck Company, commanded by came Wheeler's chief engineer. Bor-
Capt. Clyde L. Koontz, arrived. The rowing officers from his own regiment,
landing of these units coincided with the Arrowsmith filled out the undermanned
heightening of domestic tensions in SOS Engineer Section for the first time.
India, where nationalist firebrands were He organized the office into four main
urging the natives to violence against branches, with seven officers usually
British rule. With a minimum of fan- present for duty. The Administrative
fare, the SOS port authorities issued and Supply Branches had the duties
ammunition to the nearly 2,000 engi- customarily assigned to such units. The
neers, loaded them on trucks, and sped Planning and Operations Branch carried
them to Malir Cantonment through the out supervision and analysis of all con-
streets of Karachi, lined with "Amer- struction in the field. The Utilities
icans, Quit India" signs. If the natives Branch had purely local jurisdiction
were not happy to see the newcomers, over construction and utilities in the
Wheeler and Brereton were. In a tem- New Delhi area. The vastness of the
porary departure from Stilwell's policy theater and the almost complete depend-
of concentrating engineer resources in
24
(1) Histories of the 45th Engr GS Rgt, 195th
23
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission Engr Dump Truck Co, and 823d Engr Avn Bn. (2)
to China, pp. 86-90, 191-207. (2) Interv, Anders Interv, Anders with Tate, 3 Nov 53. EHD Files.
with Col Frank Milani, AG CBI, 1942-44, 16 May (3) Ltr with Incls, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12 Feb 54.
52. EHD Files. EHD Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 399
ence on the local authorities made the Capt. Robert A. Hirshfield, who re-
task of Arrowsmith and his staff difficult.25 placed Major Johnson as base section
Soon after his appointment, Arrow- engineer at Karachi late in July, was
smith set out to inspect many of the soon able to report fairly constant prog-
projects for which the engineers were ress. Civilian contractors had under
responsible. At New Delhi itself, the way a large number of projects, including
British were improving housing and workshops and parking areas at the port,
hangar facilities for the Tenth Air 38 mess halls and 175 ammunition sheds
Force's section of Willingdon Airdrome. at Malir, and parking aprons and an
The work was a month behind schedule operations building at the civil air-
and the Tenth Air Force representatives drome. Early in August, the 2d Bat-
were growing increasingly concerned. talion of the 45th Engineers was assigned
Arrowsmith took to the air to visit other to Hirshfield. He thereupon expanded
projects. Across northern India, the his construction effort to include a 20-
Royal Engineers were continuing their mile road westward from Karachi to the
expansion of RAF fields into bomber radar station on Cape Muari, wire en-
bases; in southern India they were de- tanglements and camouflaging at the
veloping the field at Bangalore and in various airfields in the area, and refrig-
central India the fields at Guskhara, eration and electric power plants.27
Nawadih, and Pandaveswar, near Cal- There were, to be sure, dark spots in the
cutta. Brereton had chosen Ondal, picture, such as shortages of cement and
north of Calcutta, as his air service center inadequate transportation. The local
and Agra, near New Delhi, as his main representatives of the Tenth Air Force
air depot. Progress at most projects was registered their dissatisfaction with the
not satisfactory. At Agra, work was far quality of the concrete work and the
behind schedule. The British stated flimsiness of the roofing put in by the
that the incessant summer rains, the fre- native contractors. Nevertheless, of the
quent Moslem and Hindu holidays, and critical areas in India, Karachi was, by
the slow procurement of cement—which the late summer of 1942, the least source
the British insisted on using for run- of concern to the Americans.28
ways since they believed only concrete To expedite work at Agra, Arrow-
would stand up under the monsoon smith on 23 August asked Wheeler to
rains—had retarded construction. Ar- send the 1st Battalion and half of Head-
rowsmith returned to New Delhi in mid-
August, convinced that engineer troops
18 Sep 42. Agra Air Depot Folder, Constr Serv
would have to be concentrated in the Files. (2) CBI Hist, sec. III, app. IX. (3) Ltr, CO
most vital areas—Karachi, Agra, and Tenth AF Serv Comd, to Wheeler, 24 Jul 42. Agra
Assam.26 Air Depot Folder, Constr Serv Files. (4) Interv,
Anders with Arrowsmith, 12 Mar 53.
27
(1) Engr Sec Base Sec 1 Prog Rpts, 27 Jul-12
25
(1) Hist of the 45th Engrs. (2) Interv with Sep 42. AG 600.9 CBI. (2) Hist of the 45th Engrs.
28
Arrowsmith, 12 Mar 53. EHD Files. (3) Memo, (1) Ltr, CG Karachi Air Defense Area to CO
Arrowsmith for Wheeler, SOS, 17 Dec 42. Opns Br Base Sec 1, 17 Aug 42. (2) Memo, Hirshfield for
File, Constr Serv Files. Arrowsmith, 5 Sep 42. Both in Specs File, Constr
26
(1) Memo, Arrowsmith for Wheeler and Kohloss, Serv Files.
400 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
quarters and Service Company of the point out that their efforts suffered from
45th to supplement the efforts of the the inadequacy of materials and trans-
contractors. The men arrived on 5 Sep- portation. On 18 August Brig. Gen.
tember to take over construction of ware- Clayton Bissell, who had just succeeded
houses, repair shops, and steel hangars. Brereton as commander of the Tenth
Work was by this time about six weeks Air Force, took the 823d off bomb shelter
behind schedule. The assumption by construction at Karachi and ordered
the 45th Engineers of all trucking de- them to Assam. By the end of Septem-
tails for American forces at Agra some- ber most of the men had arrived at their
31
what relieved the British transportation new location.
problem. But the Royal Engineers con- Byroade welcomed Tate and the 823d,
tinued to have trouble obtaining the for there was no end of work. About
necessary labor and materials to keep half of Company A was put on camou-
work going on the runways and other flaging the airfield at Chabua. The
operational facilities remaining under other half and Company B took over the
their jurisdiction. Because of the In- loading and unloading of air freight at
dian nationalists' sabotage campaign, one Chabua and the other three Hump fields
engineer company had to be kept con- at nearby Mohanbari, Dinjan, and Sook-
stantly on guard duty at a time when erating, from which planes took off for
every man was badly needed for con- China. While such use of the aviation
struction.29 engineers was not to the liking of
Most critical of all was the situation Byroade and Tate, there were compen-
in Assam. By late July Byroade's En- sating factors; the 823d could be counted
gineer Section had acquired two officers upon for efficient loading and unloading
and two enlisted men, but the section's with a minimum of pilferage and break-
many responsibilities made it impossible age, and the assumption of freight
to spare more than one officer to prepare handling by the Americans released large
layouts and inspect work at the four numbers of natives for return to airfield
fields. Byroade found himself increas- construction. Meanwhile, Company C,
ingly concerned with the details of air- encamped at nearby Dibrugarh, began
field construction, as the Royal Engi- assembling urgently needed trucks. The
neers turned to him time and again for surveyors, draftsmen, and truck drivers
decisions on the phasing of various por- of Headquarters Company were also
tions of the airfield program. Con- welcome reinforcements to Byroade's
tractors and laborers continued to make hard-pressed Engineer Section. One re-
disappointingly slow progress during curring discordant note was the insistence
the long rainy season. Byroade could do of the Royal Engineers upon concrete
little except to resort to friendly per- runways. Byroade held out for asphalt,
suasion.30 The British did not fail to which was procurable not only from
29
(1) Hist of the 45th Engrs. (2) Ltr, CO Adv and 26 Jul 42 (Adv Sec 2, Admin File, Constr Serv
Sec 1 to AdminO Central Com Agra 14 Nov 42. (3) Files).
31
Ltr, Hq SOS CBI to Air Hq India, 28 Nov 42. Last (1) Ltr, Maj James W. Sloat, CO Adv Sec 2, to
two in Agra Air Depot Folder, Constr Serv Files. Arrowsmith, 20 Oct 42. Adv Sec 2, Admin File,
30
Ltrs, Byroade to Wheeler, 1 Jun (AG600.9 CBI), Constr Serv Files. (2) Hist of the 823d Engrs.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 401
modations than those they would have to lend the Americans considerable
gotten under War Department specifica- numbers of trucks and trailers. Lesser
tions for theater of operations construc- amounts of supplies and equipment were
tion.34 gotten through local procurement, di-
verted shipments, and distress cargo.
Equipment and Supplies But it simply was not possible to build
up large stores. By the fall of 1942 the
Engineer troops assigned to construc- engineer supply officer of Base Section
tion were hampered by the scarcity of 1had succeeded in assembling in the
supplies and the lack of equipment. general depot at Karachi a small and un-
The units that had arrived in July had balanced assortment consisting mostly of
not received their machinery by fall. pioneer-type equipment and drafting
SOS had to provide them with make- supplies—the only stockpile of engineer
shift allowances to enable them to get materials and equipment belonging to
36
their work under way. For months, the American forces in India.
most of their equipment and a good part
of their supplies came from the stock- The Engineers in China
piles of lend-lease materiel scheduled for
China. This source furnished trucks, There was little activity in Advance
trailers, rock crushers, air compressors, Section of SOS in China. The Engineer
road rollers, generators, power shovels, Section, set up by Major Price on 4 July,
pneumatic drills, and concrete mixers. consisted during the next few months of
However, each diversion of lend-lease Lt. Francis C. Card. Card gave most of
machinery was a major operation, his attention to finding ways of improv-
requiring Chiang's personal approval. ing the airfield at Kunming and plan-
Besides, the engineers had to put forth ning new fields near the city. He per-
much effort just to find the equipment suaded the local officials of the Commit-
stored haphazardly at various points tee on Aeronautical Affairs, a department
across India.35 The British were able of Chiang's government, to extend the
runways at the Kunming field to about
6,800 feet, begin expansion of hangar
34
(1) Hq SOS CBI, Hist of SOS CBI, 11 Jun 42- and storage facilities, and construct a
24 Oct 44, p. 137. OCMH Files. (2) CBI Hist, sec.
III, app. IX. (3) Brig. Gen. Stuart C. Godfrey, "The
headquarters for Chennault's airmen,
Airfields of the Far East," The Military Engineer, now known collectively as the China Air
XXXVII (January, 1945), 17-23. (4) Ltr, Chakulia Task Force. By September the Amer-
Area Engr to Works Liaison Gp RAF Calcutta, 29
Dec 42. Admin File, Constr Serv Files. (5) Ltr,
icans had worked out plans for two new
Bissell to CG Rear Ech Hq USAFCBI, 5 Jun 43. transport fields, one to be built at
AG 322 CBI. (6) Memo, Chakulia Area Engr for Chengkung, just outside Kunming, and
CG SOS CBI, 16 Mar 43. Last two in Admin File,
Constr Service Files. (7) 1st Ind, CO Base Sec 1 to
Wheeler, 2 Mar 43, on Ltr, CG Karachi American (3) ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, 1942-1943
Air Base Comd to CO Base Sec 1, Mar 43. Base (MS), pp. 257-58. OCMH Files.
36
Sec 1 Admin File, Constr Serv Files. (1) Rad, 136, Wheeler to Stilwell, 14 Oct 42.
35
(1) Intervs, Anders with Arrowsmith, 12 Mar 53, AG 600.9 CBI. (2) Memo, Hirshfield for Arrow-
and Tate, 3 Nov 53. (2) Hist of the 45th Engrs. smith, 12 Sep 42. Specs File, Constr Serv Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 403
another at Yangkai, forty miles to the 200 miles west of Calcutta, to house
north. Chinese civilian and military Italian prisoners taken in the North
agencies were to be in charge of con- African campaign. Here he assembled
struction, and the Chinese Government the Chinese survivors of the retreat from
was to pay for the work. Such non- Burma and filled out their ranks with
operational features as housing and rec- raw replacements flown in from China.
reational facilities would be paid for by Taking over Ramgarh in August 1942,
reverse lend-lease. The hiring of con- the Americans found that much work
tractors and the direction of work at the had to be done to put it in shape. SOS,
fields was to be the responsibility of the organizing the station complement, es-
Committee on Aeronautical Affairs or of tablished an Engineer Section under
the Military Engineering Commission, a Capt. George J. Mason to build access
subordinate office of the Ministry of roads, firing38
ranges, utilities, and
Communications, also a department of housing. One officer and 42 enlisted
Chiang's government. The Yunnan- men of the 195th Dump Truck Com-
Burma Railroad Authority, idle since the pany were at Ramgarh from August on,
fall of Burma, was now given the job of providing transportation and helping
helping to build the airfields. The with the engineer phases of the training
first two organizations were to employ program worked out between Stilwell
civilian contractors; the Railroad Au- and the Chinese officers there.39 For the
thority was to use both contractors and training program, Stilwell set up an
peasants, the latter to be conscripted by Engineer Section under Lt. Col. Edwin
Governor Lung Yun of Yunnan. By B. Green, who would give basic and unit
October 1942 work was under way on training. The program included a
the airfields at Chengkung and Kun- course for Chinese engineer officers on
ming.37 bridges, road construction and mainte-
nance, mine warfare, battlefield recovery
Training of materiel, rigging, knots, lashings, ex-
plosives, river crossing, engineer recon-
Having won Chiang's consent for the naissance, camouflaging, field fortifica-
organization of a Chinese corps in India tions, mapping, water supply, and assault
to be used eventually for the recapture tactics. Green's staff, consisting usually
of Burma, Stilwell planned to provide of over a dozen engineer officers, also
the corps first of all with adequate train- helped organize a Chinese task force by
ing. He got from the British a camp setting up and training pioneer-type
which they had built at Ramgarh, about engineer units modeled after German
pioneer organizations described in Chi-
37
(1) Hq SOS in China Theater, Hist Background nese field manuals paraphrasing Ger-
of Engr Sec, Period Ending 31 May 43. Admin Div
File, China Theater, SOS Engr Files. (2) Oliver man training literature. Chinese officers
LaFarge, The Eagle in the Egg (Boston, 1949), p. 112.
38
(3) Stilwell Papers, pp. 152-53. (4) Capt Paul J. (1) Hist of Engr Sec SOS CBI, 1 Oct-31 Dec 42.
Sampson, Hq 1339th AAF Base Unit, Hist of 319.1 CBI. (2) Ltr, CO Camp Ramgarh to CG
Chengkung Air Base, Jul 42-Jun 45. Air Univ Lib SOS CBI, 18 Sep 42. Specs File, Constr Serv Files.
39
Maxwell AFB Ala. Hist of the 195th Engrs.
404 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
trained the Chinese troops, applying land communications across the foothills
precepts conveyed, often through inter- of the Himalayas had hung fire mainly
preters, by Green and his assistants.40 because domestic turbulence in India
The close of October found the engi- was casting grave doubts on that coun-
neers at work in an area stretching from try's usefulness as a base for military
Karachi some 2,200 miles eastward into operations. On 25 August 1942 Gen-
Yunnan. Numbering only 14 in late eral Marshall gave an impetus to
spring, their strength had risen to 1,986 planning for an offensive by warning the
by 1 October 1942. But even this force Combined Chiefs that only by reopening
was hardly adequate to meet the demands land communications across northern
of an airfield construction program Burma could China be kept in the war
embracing seven transport fields in and the Pacific front spared the disas-
eastern India and southwestern China trous consequences of a total collapse of
and about twenty bomber fields scattered Chinese resistance. During September,
across northern India. Although the the War Department worked out a plan
greater part of the work was being done for a combined Chinese-British advance
by the Indians, British, and Chinese, into Burma. By the beginning of Oc-
U.S. engineer troops were applying their tober, the plan had developed to the
efforts in the most crucial links of the point where it could be referred to the
chain—Karachi, Agra, and Assam. Far theater for detailed arrangements among
too weak in personnel and equipment American, British, and Chinese com-
for the tasks at hand, the engineers had manders. On 14 October, after receiv-
at least achieved an organization which ing a radio from President Roosevelt
was making the best possible use of stressing the need for operations to open
available resources. the Burma Road, Chiang directed Stil-
well to take the lead in planning for a
Ground Communications for a concerted Allied drive to achieve that
Campaign in Burma objective. In mid-October, Stilwell flew
to New Delhi to confer with Wavell
Campaign Plans and arrange a series of conferences to
work out a strategic plan, with 1 March
While the engineers were striving to 1943 as the date for the opening of the
build airfields for Stilwell's expanding attack. Wavell informed Stilwell almost
air establishment, high-level planners in at once that, mainly because of logistical
the War Department gave them an addi- difficulties, the British could do no more
tional mission—that of constructing than occupy the western fringes of
ground communications to support a Burma during the first part of 1943.
future offensive in Burma. Since the The conferees consequently prepared a
close of the campaign in Burma, Allied plan for clearing only northern Burma.
strategic planning for developing over- As finally developed, the plan of cam-
paign called for the brunt of the fighting
40
(1) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. V. (2) Ltrs, Green to
to fall on the Chinese. Stilwell's
C EHD, 3 Feb, 20 Feb 55. EHD Files. Ramgarh-trained Chinese, organized as
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 405
in the offensive should the British Navy theater. Only part of the equipment of
fail to demonstrate a "dominance" of the the 823d and 45th engineers had arrived,
Bay of Bengal sufficient to prevent sea- and only that of the 823d was heavy
borne reinforcements from reaching the enough for efficient road construction.
Japanese in Burma. Anxious to get During the first week of November
repair of the Burma Road started, Stil- Arrowsmith asked Wheeler to request
well called Wheeler to Chungking in from the United States, among other
mid-November to open discussions with units, a general service regiment, a
the Chinese high command looking to- maintenance company, and a depot
ward formation of a services of supply company. He sent a lengthy requisition
for the Y-Force in addition to the de- to the supply depot at Karachi for items
velopment of a line of communications.44 that would be needed. He suggested to
Wheeler that the War Department be
Preparation for Work asked for several thousand tons of equip-
on the Ledo Road ment, including 40 D-7 bulldozers, 30
H-20 steel bridges, and a 6-month supply
Wheeler took immediate steps to get of spare parts—all to reach Ledo by1
work started on a road from Ledo. On March 1943. On 5 November Arrow-
29 October, he placed Arrowsmith in smith flew to Assam as a member of a
command of the Ledo base and road British-American reconnaissance party
projects and instructed him to draft a to collect data with regard to construct-
plan of construction for Stilwell's ap- ing the road and a base at Ledo. He
proval. Arrowsmith made determined soon formulated his general plans for
efforts to put "the show on the road." building the road. On 7 November, his
He spent five days in New Delhi in con- operations officer flew to Chungking to
ference with members of Wheeler's staff hand Stilwell a copy of the road
in order to get information regarding construction plan. The theater com-
the project and the problems involved. mander approved it at once and radioed
Little was known about routes which Wheeler's requests for troops and equip-
might be followed. The plan was to use ment to the War Department.45
the "refugee route," which the British Implementing the plan would be
had used in withdrawing from Burma. more difficult than drawing it up. The
It was roughly the same as the one sug- 45th and 823d engineers were alerted for
gested by Merrill. The road when fin- movement to Ledo early in November;
ished would be all-weather and one-lane the work they were doing on airfields
with turnouts. In estimating troop re- was to be taken over by the British. It
quirements and the amounts of materials
and equipment needed, Arrowsmith 45
(1) Ltr with Incls, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12
found the situation bleak. There were Feb 54. (2) Material from Diary of Lt Col James
still but three engineer units in the W. Sloat Covering the Early Days of the Ledo Road
Project (cited hereafter as Sloat Diary). EHD Files.
(3) Memo, OPD for CG SOS, 14 Dec 42. 400.312
44
(1) CBI Hist, pp. 61-62. (2) Stilwell Papers, p. (CBI). (4) Rad, Wheeler to Arrowsmith, 8 Nov 42.
166. LAC Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 407
would, however, be about a month be- party and prepared to "arrange the de-
fore the American units would arrive at tails" of getting the work started. The
Ledo. To get the project started, the British exhibited little enthusiasm for
British in the middle of November put Stilwell's plans for an offensive or for the
several hundred natives on the job of construction of a road out of Ledo
extending the existing road out of Ledo. through the jungles of northern Burma.
Later that month, part of an Indian Wavell's staff believed that the British
excavation company arrived to help. military establishment in India could
Arrowsmith directed Lt. Col. James W. not spare the engineering and transpor-
Sloat, executive officer of the 45th Engi- tation resources even to tide the Amer-
neers, and Maj. Robert A. Hirshfield, icans over until March, when reinforce-
Base Section 1 engineer, both members ments from the United States would
of the reconnaissance party, to initiate arrive. The British stated they had
work on the road and base. On 19 been taxed to the limit during 1942 to
November he returned to New Delhi build or modernize 222 airfields, develop
with the report of the reconnaissance training centers and other installations
408 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
for the expanding Indian Army, and, at because of the shipping shortage. The
the same time, furnish materiel to the engineer contingent would be substan-
hard-pressed Eighth Army in Egypt. tially intact, but other categories would
Weather, terrain, and disease would be be drastically reduced or eliminated.49
formidable obstacles to any road con- Stilwell likened himself and Chiang to
struction project in Assam and Burma.46 two men "on a raft, with one sandwich
To the British staff's insistence that mud between . . . [them] and the rescue
and malaria would drive the Americans ship . . . heading away from the
50
out of Burma, Arrowsmith bluntly re- scene."
torted on 24 November that he intended Despite the rather discouraging out-
to carry out the road project "even if he look, General Wheeler concentrated on
had only one man." 47 The Ledo Road organizing a communications zone for
was started with a minimum of planning the Y-Force. After extensive confer-
and few resources. As Arrowsmith ob- ences with the Chinese War Ministry, he
served later, "It was a case of kicking a decided on 26 November to place his
cat out the door and telling him to chief of staff, Colonel Kohloss, in com-
scat." 48 mand of the new Eastern Section.
Kohloss' headquarters would be in Kun-
Preparation for Work in China ming. He was to work with the Y-Force
headquarters wherever it operated. His
Meanwhile, the Chinese showed little primary mission was that of advising
inclination to get on with preparations Y-Force in the organization and opera-
for an offensive beyond the Salween or tion of its SOS. Arriving in Kunming
for improving the Burma Road. Un- with his staff at the end of November,
known to Stilwell, they had become Kohloss directed his engineer, Maj.
enamored of Brig. Gen. Claire L. Chen- Louis Y. Dawson, Jr., to work with the
nault's new plan for a vigorous air Yunnan-Burma Highway Engineering
offensive aimed at destroying Japanese Administration, the Chinese agency re-
air power in eastern China and com- sponsible for rehabilitating and recon-
pelling the enemy to evacuate Chinese structing the Burma Road in the rear of
soil. This line of thought appealed to the Chinese divisions which would be
the Chinese because it involved little or moving southward against the Japanese
51
no effort on their part and put off indefi- in Burma.
nitely the politically explosive task of
modernizing the army. During the last Work Begins on the Ledo Road
week of November, Stilwell learned that
the War Department was cutting in half General Marshall, in steering the Ledo
his request for troops and equipment Road project through to its final ap-
46 49
(1) Memo, Wheeler for Stilwell, 9 Aug 43, sub: (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission
Notes on Construction of the Ledo Road. Engr Sec to China, pp. 250-52. (2) Leighton and Coakley,
File, LAC Files. (2) Sloat Diary. Global Logistics and Strategy, p. 540.
47 50
Merrill, Notes on Joint Staff Mtg, 24th Nov. The Stilwell Papers, pp. 170-71.
51
Opns Br File, Constr Serv Files. (1) Interv, Anders with Kohloss, 1 Dec 52.
48
Interv, Anders with Arrowsmith, 12 Mar 53. EHD Files. (2) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. XII.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 409
Delhi offices almost entirely in the hands the road builders switch to the higher
of assistants. Since the frontier area was ground of the refugee trail.57
largely uncharted, several officers and By late December, the road team had
men of the 823d were sent to Arrow- taken shape. Out in front, a group of
smith's headquarters to produce much- Tate's 823d engineers were in charge of
needed maps. Maj. James A. Walker, reconnaissance. Several Royal Engi-
Arrowsmith's supply officer in SOS, set neer surveyors helped to select the exact
up a supply depot in a group of brick course the route was to follow. Most
godowns at Likhapani, four miles north- of the 823d followed close on the heels
east of Ledo. Major Hirshfield took of the surveyors, clearing a roadhead
over as base engineer and started convert- through the jungle. The unit's six bull-
ing Ledo into a major supply point and dozers, the only available machines with
staging area. Working closely with the power and traction to clear a trail,
British civil affairs officers, he took over had arrived in India without blades,
houses and tea sheds for use as quarters, which were being sent from the United
offices, and depots. The Chinese divi- States on another ship. Four months
sions and American service units ex- after the 823d arrived in India the blades
pected soon would be bivouacked on the had still not come. To get work started,
tea estates. Hirshfield hired native Tate had borrowed a blade from a
labor to build more administrative build- British engineer unit on the road. It
ings and warehouses and enlarge the rail- was attached to the lead tractor. When
head facilities at Likhapani.56 the machine was returned to the rear for
Of the various routes that might be servicing or repairs, another was moved
followed, the refugee trail appeared up and the blade attached to it. In back
best, since it reportedly had been used for of the 823d, the 45th did final grading
many years as a caravan route and would and graveling. A British excavating
therefore probably follow the easiest company and a mechanical equipment
way into Burma. An alternative was the section worked briefly on the road before
route of a proposed railway which had withdrawing to British projects. Prog-
been surveyed about twenty years earlier. ress was gratifying to the Americans.
This was eliminated as a possibility be- The 823d advanced a fresh graded trace
cause of the large tunnels and long river five miles during the last week of
crossings which would be required. December.58
Arrowsmith decided to follow the refugee By mid-January 1943, the lead dozer
trail wherever possible. The British in was thirty miles from Ledo and nearing
building their highway out of Ledo had the mountains. A more rapid advance
followed the railroad route; soon after was possible after Arrowsmith got two
taking over, Arrowsmith directed that more blades from a training school in
Lahore. Chinese troops moved in to
56
(1) Hist of Engr Sec SOS CBI, 1 Oct-31 Dec 42.
57
(2) Hist of the 823d Engrs. (3) Memo, Engr SupO (1) Sloat Diary. (2) Ltr, Sloat to C EHD, 22
for Staff Depot, Likhapani, 28 Jan 43. Engr Sec Dec 52.
58
File, LAC Files. Interv, Anders with Tate, 3 Nov 53.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 411
protect the road force; a battalion of in- Shingbwiyang. The slowdown was
fantry and a battery of field artillery caused mainly by the rugged terrain of
took up positions beyond the Patkais the Patkais. Earthmoving was espe-
near Shingbwiyang, and other Chinese cially troublesome. The engineers had
troops were ordered to remain at least a to apply greater and greater efforts to
day's march ahead of the engineers. widening the road and sloping the high
The road was rather winding. This was banks. In mid-March, a brief rainy
inevitable because of the way it was be- spell—the "early monsoon"—tempo-
ing built. The method was to bulldoze rarily halted work. An 8-mile stretch of
a narrow path through the jungle, move the road in the mountains soon became
up all additional equipment to clear out so sodden that trucks could not get
trees and underbrush on both sides, and through. Tate had to use natives to
then fit the road into the best part of the carry supplies to the 823d. After the
clearing. Because the light D-4 bull- weather cleared, operations were back to
dozers of the 45th could not always cope normal. By the end of the month, the
with the rugged terrain, detours had to leading elements were 48 miles from
62
be made around the many large stumps Ledo and still 70 miles from their goal.
which the machines could not pull out. The monsoon season was approaching.
The men put temporary timber bridges Arrowsmith hoped to receive his first re-
across the major streams and installed inforcements before it struck. Early in
culverts at the minor water courses. In March Shipment 4201 landed at Bom-
the flat sections, the road could easily bay; it included the 330th Engineer
take two lanes of traffic, but on the sides General Service Regiment, the 479th
of hills it was quite narrow.59 On 21 Engineer Maintenance Company, and a
January Wheeler reported to Stilwell platoon of the 456th Engineer Depot
that graveling had reached Mile 26.60 Company. Only the depot platoon was
The theater commander was jubilant, on the road by the end of the month.
but agreed with Wheeler's suggestion It took over operation of the engineer
that satisfaction be kept "in the Ameri- depot at Likhapani. General Wheeler
can family" to avoid embarrassment persuaded Chiang to send in the loth
should the units on the road be unable Chinese Independent Engineer Regi-
to maintain their pace.61 ment, a crack outfit which reported di-
Progress continued during February, rectly to the Generalissimo. The Chi-
but at a much slower pace. By the end nese engineers, who arrived in mid-
of the month, the roadhead had reached March, cleared the jungle and did pio-
Pangsau Pass on the Burmese border, 38 neering ahead of the 823d. During
miles from Ledo, still some 80 miles from March and April the 823d's blades and
the D-7 tractors and other heavy equip-
59
(1) Hist of the 823d Engrs. (2) Interv, Anders ment on order since November arrived
with Tate, 3 Nov 53. at Calcutta and began moving up the
60
Rad, Wheeler to Stilwell, 21 Jan 43. Engr Sec rickety railroad to Assam. Whether the
File, LAC Files.
61
(1) Rad, Stilwell to Wheeler, 25 Jan 43. AG
62
Files, CBI. (2) Ltr, Sloat to C EHD, 22 Dec 52. Hist of the 823d Engrs.
412 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
blades and equipment would arrive soon reinforce the 823d at the roadhead. The
enough before the rains to be of much 1st Battalion of the 45th Engineers then
63
good was doubtful. turned to road maintenance while the 2d
Early in April Stilwell visited Ledo. Battalion moved back to Ledo to repair
As he looked over the various projects the vital access roads before they disinte-
with Arrowsmith, doubts rose in his grated completely. By May, the engi-
mind. In a letter to Wheeler, he ex- neers were struggling to restore or save
pressed the view that the buildings con- more than 120 miles of roads in and out
structed for the base were not sturdy of the base. The rains did not cause as
enough and suggested that a greater much damage to the bridges as had been
effort be made to provide better housing. feared. Some of the temporary struc-
He believed Arrowsmith was concentrat- tures turned out to be too low for the
ing too much on pushing the road, when swollen streams and a number were
he should be expanding the system of washed away, but by the time the rains
access roads in the base and preparing began, the permanent bridges were
supply trails for jeeps through the nearly ready. American and British
jungles to Chinese outposts along the engineers put steel spans over the larger
eastern slopes of the Patkais. In order rivers, while the Chinese loth Engineer
to have this additional work done, Stil- Regiment built hand-hewn timber
well was willing to accept the "sacrifice bridges over the smaller streams.65
of a little progress on the road." But, The monsoon struck just as the condi-
after considering the critical shortage of tion of the equipment on the road was
troops and equipment, he conceded that nearing an all-time low. There were
"there has been so much done here, and almost no spare parts. A few pieces of
everybody is so willing and interested machinery did arrive from Calcutta in
that I have no business to criticise any- April and May, but by far the greater
thing. So I won't." 64 part of Shipment 4201 would not be
The monsoon, unusually early, was in available until summer. In the mean-
full swing by the first week of April. time, the winter-long operations had
Viewing the extreme difficulties with taken their toll. By the end of April a
mud slides and drainage in the Patkais, third of the 823d's tractors and trucks
and realizing that his meager force was were awaiting repairs. A month later
stretched too thin, Arrowsmith on 8 two-thirds of its tractors and half its
April instructed Colonel Tate to give trucks were out of service. The 45th
top priority to sloping, widening, and Engineers fared no better.66 The rains
ditching. Late that month, advance ele- were not so severe that all work had to be
ments of the 330th Engineers came up to
65
(1) Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, pt V. OCE
Lib. (2) Hist of the 45th and 823d Engrs. (3) Rad,
63
(1) Ltr, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12 Feb 54. (2) Arrowsmith to Wheeler, 27 Feb 43. AG Files CBI.
Memo Hq Base Sec 3 for Secs and Units, Base Sec 3, (4) Ltr, Sloat to C EHD, 22 Dec 52. (5) Interv,
18 Mar 43. Engr Sec File, LAC Files. (3) Hist of Anders with Tate, 3 Nov 53.
66
the 456th Engr Depot Co. (4) CBI Hist, p. 83. (1) Ltr, Harrison to Smith, Sup Div OCE, 8 Mar
64
Ltr, Stilwell to Wheeler, 6 Apr 43. Stilwell 43. 400.312 CBI. (2) Hist of the 823d and 45th
Pers Files, Ltrs, World War II Rcds Div. Engrs.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 413
stopped, but with their equipment in Dawson's main job was to help the
such a poor state the engineers would Yunnan-Burma Highway Engineering
not be able to extend the roadhead much Administration improve the Burma
beyond Mile 50 during the remainder of Road. As his first order of business, he
the monsoon.67 set out in December 1942 on a trip down
the road as far as the Salween to gather
Engineer Work in China the data necessary for making intelligent
plans and estimates. He discovered that
In China, likewise, work on the all- the celebrated Burma Road, started by
important roads was the main concern the Yunnanese administration in the
during the first months of 1943. Chi- 1920's and completed by the central
nese and American officers were gen- government in 1940, was not a highway
erally agreed that the main Chinese drive in the American sense of the word.
beyond the Salween would follow the Construction had proceeded without
route of the Burma Road toward Lashio. benefit of specifications, with the result
A secondary thrust would be made along that each "hsien" or local district had
the partially completed right-of-way of built its section as economically as pos-
the Yunnan-Burma railway. The latter sible. The road was two-lane in some
route left the Burma Road near Mitu sectors, but poorly surfaced, and partially
some 225 miles west of Kunming and demolished as a result of the defensive
wound south through the mountains east measures carried out the previous spring.
of the Burma Road. Kohloss believed With a surface consisting for the most
the Chinese should establish depots along part of crushed rock and clay, with some
the Burma Road—their main supply sections asphalted but in poor condition,
route—and put the road itself in shape. the road was dusty when dry and slippery
They should also build a highway from when wet. Dangerous hairpin curves
Mitu into Burma along the right-of-way were frequent, grades were steep, and
of the railroad. At the same time, shoulders were eroded.69 There were
Kohloss strove to persuade General Chen fourteen passes with an elevation of more
Cheng, the Y-Force commander, to or- than 7,000 feet. The bridges, as a rule
ganize a services of supply. In the one-lane and usually lower than the level
winter of 1942-43, Kohloss and Dawson of the road, consisted of fairly sound
set themselves the task of achieving these masonry abutments, but some had super-
primary goals, despite such obstacles as structures of rotting wood. The more
official apathy in Chungking and Kun- he saw, the more Dawson was convinced
ming, the runaway inflation of the Chi- that only a major construction effort
nese currency, and the technological could put the Burma Road in shape
backwardness of the Chinese.68
Br File, Constr Serv Files. (3) YOKE Rpt 5, Kohloss
67
Ltr, CO Base Sec 3 to Wheeler, 29 May 43. AG to Stilwell, 18 Apr 43. Kohloss Pers Files.
69
611 CBI. Original plans for the Burma Road called for a
68
(1) Ltr, Kohloss to Lt Gen Chen Chin-chieh, maximum grade of 8 percent; actually many grades
7 Feb 43. Kohloss Pers Files. (2) Rpt, Dir Yunnan- were close to 15 percent; a few, as high as 30
Burma Hwy Engrg Administration, 9 Jan 43. Engr percent.
414 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
either as a supply route for the coming In the latter part of February Dawson
campaign or as the Chinese portion of a and the officials of the Highway Admin-
truck highway from Ledo to Kunming.70 istration completed their estimates of
Fortified with Dawson's description of how much it would cost to transform the
the road and his recommendations for Burma Road into an all-weather, two-
improving it, Kohloss succeeded in get- lane highway. Dawson brought to the
ting Lt. Gen. Chen Chin-chieh, com-meetings with the Chinese engineers his
mander of the SOS of Y-Force, to make estimate of 79,823,400 Chinese dollars
an inspection tour of the road from for improving the 370-mile stretch be-
Kunming to Paoshan, some 40 miles east tween Kunming and the Mekong River
of the Salween. The first week in and 37,601,000 dollars for restoring the
February, Chen, accompanied by Koh- 226 miles of demolished roadway beyond
loss, Dawson, and Dr. Lee Wen-ping, a the Mekong to the Burmese border, a
senior engineer of the Highway Admin- total of 117,424,400 dollars, equivalent
istration, set out on the 430-mile trip. to $5,871,220 in American money at the
Thus, the Americans had at last been official rate of exchange which fixed the
able to get key Chinese officials "on the Chinese dollar at 5 cents. The uncer-
road"—two months after the Eastern tainties caused by the runaway inflation
Section was established. Kohloss dis- in China were difficult to contend with.
cussed with Chen and Lee Major Daw- It was impossible to determine what the
son's role in the proposed improvement purchasing power of the money might be
of the Burma Road. The Chinese even in the near future. The Chinese,
agreed to accept Dawson's participationtherefore, almost tripled Dawson's esti-
in their planning work. At the same mates. Believing that their figures
time, the Highway Administration, com- would not be accepted in Chungking, he
plying with American urging, ordered a persuaded the Highway Administration
thorough road survey, the first in the to reduce them by about 25 percent.
road's history.71 Having discovered that The figure eventually agreed upon was
the Highway Administration had about 295,566,000 Chinese dollars. Late in
a dozen pieces of mechanical equipment, February, this estimate was sent to the
including three American tractors, two Ministry of Communications at Chung-
German air compressors, and a British king with a request for an early allotment
power shovel—all in poor condition— of funds.73 There was nothing to do
Dawson got the Chinese to promise that but wait.
they would assemble this machinery and A long period of inaction ensued. A
have it repaired.72 few laborers remained on the road per-
forming desultory maintenance. When
70
(1) Dawson, Rpt on Burma Road, Kunming to the April rains started, they withdrew to
Hsia Kwan, Dec 42, Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.
(2) Ltr, Dawson to C Mil Hist, 2 Aug 60. EHD
their homes. It was Dawson's unpleas-
Files. ant duty to report periodically to Koh-
71
(1)Ltr, Kohloss to Chen, 7 Feb 43. (2) CBI
Hist, sec. II, app. XII.
72 73
Dawson, Rpt 2, Yunnan-Burma Hwy, 26 Jan 43. (1) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. XII. (2) Engr Memo
Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files. 76, Dawson for Kohloss, 20 Oct 43. 400.312 CBI.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 415
loss on the progressive deterioration of ming, he could not get the Chinese to do
the Burma Road. In May, the Highway anything toward organizing a supply
Administration, in the throes of merging service.
with the Yunnan-Burma Railroad or- Underlying the official apathy was the
ganization, acquired a new director, C. C. Chinese disagreement with the basic
Kung, who promptly installed his own American strategy for the theater, a
group of railway-construction specialists. strategy that emphasized the need for a
They had almost no knowledge of mod- successful campaign in Burma to make
ern road machinery and little desire to possible the establishment of ground
see it used. Dawson encountered only communications between India and
indifference when he importuned the China. The Chinese, far more inter-
Chinese to have their rusty equipment ested in aerial supply and air power,
repaired. The road survey, for which displayed an altogether different attitude
funds had been borrowed against future toward airfield construction. Back in
appropriations, was being carried out November and December 1942, Yunna-
with neither centralized direction nor a nese authorities had impressed thousands
common benchmark; the data gathered of laborers to enable the Yunnan-Burma
would represent an almost complete Railroad organization to complete the
waste of time and money. In spite of airfield at Chengkung. Chiang himself
Dawson's insistence that final plans be ordered a bonus paid to the conscripted
formulated for the best utilization of the laborers. By late January 1943 Advance
coming appropriation for improving the Section 3 had three transport fields in
road, the engineers of the Highway Ad- operation at Chengkung, Kunming, and
ministration declined to bestir them- Yangkai. By spring Capt. Harry F.
selves on the grounds that Chungking Kirkpatrick, Advance Section engineer,
would never make the appropriation. and his staff began making improvements
It would appear that the only solid engi- at two fields near Kunming formerly
neering achievement of the first half of used by Chennault's volunteers—Chanyi
1943 was a 160-mile reconnaissance of and Yunnanyi. Each field originally
the route for the road out of Mitu to a had a runway and small hostel. Kirk-
point 50 miles west of the Mekong, patrick extended the runway at Yunnanyi
carried out during April and May by an and put in more taxiways and hardstands
infantry officer, one of Kohloss' depu- at both fields. By 31 May major con-
ties.74 The Americans, trying to per- struction at Yunnanyi was complete.
suade the Chinese to prepare Y-Force for Progress was less spectacular at Chanyi,
action, were frustrated at every level of but this field had been in better shape
command. While Kohloss was able with from the start.75
his own small organization to construct
and stock depots at Yunnanyi and Kun- 75
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission
to China, pp. 350-53. (2) Memo, Kohloss for Brig
74
(1) Rpt, Dawson to Kohloss, 27 May 43. (2) Gen Thomas G. Hearn, CofS CBI, 29 Aug 43.
Engr Memo 8, Dawson for Kohloss, 4 Jun 43. (3) Kohloss Pers Files. (3) Hq SOS in China Theater,
Engr Memo 35, Dawson for Kohloss, 21 Jun 43. All Hist Background of Engr Sec, Period Ending 31 May
in Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files. 43. Admin Div File, China Theater SOS Engr Files.
416 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
channels to grant adequate priorities was mixers were out of order. Maj. John
largely responsible for slowing construc- P. Nolting, Hirshfield's successor as base
tion. Local British headquarters per- engineer, explained that he stopped
sisted in diverting resources away from work at nightfall because of insufficient
the airfields. On 3 March Byroade lighting, and he would not allow mixing
stated that it was "very doubtful if more concrete by hand because indifferent
than about 75% of the . . . work will native labor might unwittingly cause a
be completed in time.79 Holcombe ex- runway failure at a key airfield. He
pressed American dissatisfaction in a was fortified in his stand by the clause
letter of 28 April to the new engineer-in- in the contract that, he declared, specifi-
chief, Maj. Gen. Horace L. Roome, in cally called for a "2-minute mix." At
which he urged the British to make the Karachi air base the airmen at-
"every effort ... to expedite comple- tempted to "constitute themselves addi-
tion of these airfields."80 Expressions tional inspectors of construction." They
of dissatisfaction came from other quar- constantly needled the engineers about
ters. Col. Frederick S. Strong, who construction standards, made surprise
arrived from the United States in April inspections, tried to get possession of
to take over as Engineer, SOS, so that blueprints, and on one occasion invaded
Arrowsmith could give full attention to the base section engineer's drafting room
the Ledo Road, soon became aware of to alter a set of drawings.82
the lack of progress on the airfields.
"Those jobs," he wrote to Somervell on Chennault and the Air War
15 May, "were a British responsibility
and they fell down. At the same time As 1943 wore on, there were few signs
we lacked sufficient engineer personnel that an offensive in Burma was near.
to keep in close touch with the Stilwell thought that General Headquar-
work. . . ." 81 ters (India) showed an "extremely
Things seemed no better at Karachi. pessimistic and obstructionist" attitude.
There were many differences of opinion Chiang, hoping to avoid committing his
between the engineers on the one hand inadequately prepared troops to a
and the airmen and the British on the ground campaign in Burma, had written
other. In January 1943 the local Public to President Roosevelt in January sug-
Works officials charged the SOS engi- gesting that Chennault be allowed to
neers with slowing construction at the conduct an all-out air war against the
local civil airdrome by stopping work at Japanese as a substitute: Neither Stil-
sunset and by refusing to allow the mix-
ing of concrete by hand when mechanical 82
(1) Ltr, Hq SOS to CO Base Sec 1, 11 Jan 43,
with Inds, 16 Jan, 18 Jan 43. Specs File, Constr
Serv Files. (2) Ltr, ExecO Karachi Air Base to Hq
79
Memo, Byroade to All Units in Adv Sec 2 Area, SOS CBI, 19 Feb 43, with Inds, 21 Feb and 1, 6, 8
3 Mar 43. Adv Sec 2, Admin File, Constr Serv Files. and 17 Mar 43. (3) Ltr, ExecO Karachi Air Base to
80
Memo, Holcombe for Roome, 28 Apr 43. Specs CG Karachi American Air Base Comd, 3 Mar 43,
File, Constr Serv Files. with Inds, 4, 5, 6, 8 Mar 43. Last two in AG 600.1
81
Ltr, Strong to Somervell, 15 May 43. Somervell CBI. (4) Ltr, Engr Base Sec 1 to CO Base Sec 1,
Files, CBI 1942-43. Natl Archives. 1Mar 43. Base Sec 1 Admin Files Constr Serv Files.
418 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
well nor Marshall would give up his teenth Air Force could get 10,000 tons of
plans for an offensive at the earliest pos- supplies a month by air from India.
sible time. At the Casablanca Confer- Stilwell's prosaic plans for the reform of
ence in January 1943, Marshall had the Chinese Army and the reconquest of
earnestly argued for an early resched- Burma failed to fire the President's
uling of the invasion of Burma. At imagination. Roosevelt went to the
the close of the conference the Combined TRIDENT Conference apparently com-
Chiefs approved intensified planning mitted to the program Chennault had
for a campaign to begin in November outlined. On 9 May he sent direct or-
1943. Meanwhile, Chiang kept up his ders to General Wheeler to rush the con-
pressure to place the main burden of the struction of airfields in Assam "to the
war in China on Chennault's airmen. limit." 85 Given the President's pre-
Roosevelt gave strong support to disposition toward Chennault's views, it
Chiang's views, despite the opposition should have occasioned little surprise to
of Marshall and General Arnold. He Stilwell that the TRIDENT Conference
directed establishment of an air force ordered air facilities in Assam developed
under Chennault "to see that . . . [he] to permit an increase in deliveries to
gets his chance to do what he believes he 10,000 tons a month by September.
can do." On 3 March, Roosevelt nomi- TRIDENT approved reducing the cam-
nated Chennault for the rank of major paign in Burma to a vigorous and aggres-
general. Eight days later Stilwell ac- sive air-ground action to take place after
tivated the Fourteenth Air Force and the 1943 rains and to be limited to the
placed it under Chennault's command.83 northern part of the country. Stilwell
Wheeler thereupon set up Advance Sec- disgustedly concluded, ". . . everything
tion 4 with headquarters at Kweilin, 525 was thrown to the air offensive." 86
miles east of Kunming. Major Price
headed the new organization, with the Renewed Priority on Airfields
mission of building half a dozen bomber
fields for Chennault in the region around The decisions made at the TRIDENT
Kweilin.84 Conference meant that the airfields
In mid-April, Stilwell and Chennault would again require a major effort.
went to Washington to advise Roosevelt Having finished with them, the engi-
and Marshall at the TRIDENT Confer- neers would be called upon to support
ence, scheduled to begin 12 May. Two an offensive in northern Burma, to be
weeks before the conference began, staged the following November, pro-
Chennault greatly impressed the Presi- vided men and materials were available
dent when he told him that he could to give such an undertaking a good
"sink and severely damage more than a
million tons of shipping" if his Four- 85
(1) Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault (USA Ret.),
Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee
Chennault (New York, 1949), pp. 225-26. (2) Robert
83
Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York,
China, pp. 277-84. 1948), pp. 730-31.
84 86
Hist of the Engr Sec SOS CBI, 1 Jul-so Sep 43. Stilwell Papers, p. 205.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 419
contractors in prison, and the resident his tour that Wavell's staff was "mar-
engineer had to cancel his agreements shalling additional resources and placing
with them. He found he had no re- a top-flight Engineer in charge." He
course except to deal with the duly noted further, ". . . we are reorganizing
certified local contractors and pay the our own engineer service there, and, by
higher price necessitated by the squeeze. robbing other places, are getting a good
Work began in September at Kanchow officer at each field. . . ." 90 British
but was suspended until the following officials at New Delhi suggested to
spring at Sincheng.88 Wheeler that they would like to with-
draw from the airfield projects in Assam
Airfields in Assam if the Americans would bring in enough
men and equipment. But Wheeler re-
After TRIDENT, one of the main frained from exercising more than a
objectives of the War Department was nominal command over these projects,
the construction of some twelve trans- thus giving the British no pretext for
port and fighter fields in Assam. Mar-leaving. He strove to meet the goals set
shall's personal instructions to Wheeler by TRIDENT by borrowing men from the
on 22 May were that the four fields upon 330th Engineers, and bulldozers, carry-
which so much effort had already been alls, graders, and trucks from units on
expended were to be ready by i July to the Ledo Road. While the rate of
make possible flying 7,000 tons monthly progress moved steadily upward as com-
from then on.89 Such a goal could be pared with that of earlier months, the
reached only by the most strenuous work never caught up with the schedules.
efforts; still, there was some optimism By 1 July three of the runways had been
that it could be achieved. Colonel completed to specifications; four needed
Strong, after inspecting the water-logged additional steel plank, and three others
fields of Assam in May, expressed hope had only gravel.91 Hampered by inade-
that the airfield projects would soon be quate airfields and poor weather, the
"on their feet." The War Office in transports flying the Hump could deliver
London had just sent a harsh radiogram no more than 4,500 tons in July.92
to GHQ (India) directing an immediate
acceleration, of the work in Assam. Preparations for the Offensive
Consequently, Colonel Strong found on in Burma
88
Stilwell, returning from the TRIDENT
(1) Hist of Engr Sec SOS CBI, 1 Jul-30 Sep 43.
611 CBI. (2) Rad, Stilwell to Marshall, CM-IN-
Conference in mid-June, set out to
9875, 14 Jul 43. 611 CBI. (3) Ltr, CO Adv Sec 4 to
90
CG Fourteenth AF, 30 Jun 43. Air Engr File, China Ltr, Strong to Somervell, 15 May 43. Somervell
Theater of Opns, KCRC. (4) Memo, Byroade for Files, CBI 1942-43.
91
Wheeler, 31 Aug 43. AG 686 CBI. (5) Ltr, Engr (1) Byroade, Notes for Rcd on Airdome Constr
Adv Sec 4 to CG USAFCBI, 17 Sep 43. Opns Br and Cargo Availability for India-China Freight Line,
File, Constr Serv Files. 23 Jun 43. Somervell Files, CBI 1942-43. (2) Rad,
89
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission Wheeler to CG ATC, CM-IN 540, 1 Jul 43. 611 CBI.
92
to China, pp. 341-45. (2) Min, Mtg at Engr Off Adv Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, p.
Sec 2, 20 May 43. Specs File, Constr Serv Files. 443.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 421
reorganize and unify the American effort self felt obliged to intervene in Chung-
in support of the Y-Force. On 18 June king. On 6 July he succeeded in getting
he organized the Y-Force Operations Dr. Tseng Yang-fu, Chiang's Communi-
Staff (Y-FOS) at Kunming. This was a cations Minister, to agree to begin work
group of American officers who were to at once on the Burma and Mitu Roads
advise the Chinese in planning for with a view to opening them to trucks,
operations in Burma, train native troops, at least part way, by October. No ac-
expedite the flow of supplies and equip- tion had been taken in Chungking on
ment, and help improve lines of the request for funds made in February.
communication. While Stilwell was Tseng promised to ask Chiang for 350
nominally the commander of the Y-Force million dollars for work on the two
Operations Staff, his responsibilities roads. In mid-July, Chiang acted. His
were actually exercised by the chief of decision was a great disappointment to
staff, Col. Frank Dorn. Colonel Dorn the Americans. He authorized only100
made Kohloss his G-4 and Dawson his million dollars, to be used solely for the
engineer. Kohloss and Dawson con- improvement of the Burma Road. How
tinued their attempts to get the Chinese much could be accomplished with this
to improve their logistical setup. The sum was questionable; the Chinese dol-
two succeeded in getting them to com- lar of July was worth only a third of that
plete the building of the general depots of February, and its value was continu-
94
at Kunming and Yunnanyi early in ing to decline rapidly. Chiang's allot-
August, but they had few illusions about ment took the Highway Administration
the future. The Chinese continued to unawares. C. C. Kung, the director,
display almost no interest in an offensive called the members of his staff and his
beyond the Salween—Chiang even pro- six district engineers to Kunming for
posing that the advance be held off until conferences on how to get the work on
January 1944 at the earliest—and there the Burma Road under way by early
were no signs during the summer that August. Dawson tried to persuade
he was organizing the Y-Force for a Kung to approve a plan for widening
campaign in Burma.93 the road. Widening would be more de-
sirable than surfacing during the coming
The Road Projects dry season, for it would interfere less
with military traffic. Kung agreed.
Despite the overriding priority now But he allotted the funds in what
given to Chennault's air war, and the seemed a most haphazard manner. As
discouraging prospects with regard to Dawson put it, it was "by guess and not
the campaign in Burma, the engineers based on any definite plan or estimate—
continued to push their road projects.
Since it appeared the Chinese would
continue to procrastinate, Stilwell him- 94
(1) YOKE Rpt No. 36-B, 6 Jul 43. Kohloss Pers
Files. (2) YOKE Rpt No. 45, 1 Aug 43. Both in
Kohloss Pers Files. (3) Memo 76, Dawson for Koh-
93
(1) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. III. (2) YOKE Rpt No. loss, 20 Oct 43. Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.
50, 16 Aug 43. Kohloss Pers Files. (4) CBI Hist, sec. II app. III.
422 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
construction placed the Ledo Road all the obstacles encountered on the
project in a precarious position. Its construction of the Ledo Road, it is
loss of priority in troops and equipment progressing," Styer concluded, "and
in May 1943 could scarcely have oc- General Wheeler and his force deserve
curred at a worse time. With the road- a great deal of credit for what they have
head at the crest of the Patkais, the mon- accomplished under the conditions im-
soon storms created endless problems. posed upon them." 99 Shortly after-
Torrential rains swept out bridges and ward, an Air Corps officer inspecting the
culverts and undermined the roadway. road at Stilwell's personal request found
Rain-soaked embankments collapsed that "the officers and men are doing a
without warning and blocked the road good job under the circumstances." 100
with massive slides. Disabled equip- But others had different opinions. Col.
ment piled up as the small force of me- Frank D. Merrill, theater G-3, had in-
chanics struggled against forbidding spected the road only a few days before
odds to make the necessary repairs. The Styer's visit. He had come away highly
men working on the road saw their ranks critical. While many of the resources of
dwindling away as malaria rates rose Base Section 3 had admittedly been
steadily. It is small wonder that work drained away to the airfields, Merrill be-
went into low gear and the once-high lieved that commanders in SOS were
morale declined.98 Nevertheless, the making too much of the effect of such
engineers continued improving the road diversions on the rate of progress on the
insofar as possible, although little could road. Merrill particularly blamed the
be done to extend the roadhead through situation at Ledo on Arrowsmith, re-
the jungle. cently promoted to brigadier general.
Early in July Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. He asserted that Arrowsmith's leadership
Styer, Somervell's chief of staff, made an was not sufficiently energetic for such
101
inspection of the road. In a detailed trying circumstances.
report to Somervell of his impressions, In mid-July, Stilwell hastened to Ledo
he urged, among other things, immediate for a firsthand look. Finding him "vin-
shipment of five general service regi- egary," Wheeler and Arrowsmith tried
ments. Referring to earlier British to mollify him and give him a clearer
statements that work would be impos- understanding of the difficult situation.
sible during the summer, he reported Wheeler again emphasized that Base
that the British still seemed "to think Section 3, "milked daily" of troops for
. . . we are crazy for trying." There
was much to justify their views. Among
the American troops, the malaria rate 99
Styer, Notes on Ledo Road Being Constructed
had reached 955 per 1,000 per year; in N.E. Assam Into Northern Burma by U.S. Forces,
2, 3 Jul 43. Somervell Files, Ledo Road, 1943.
among the Chinese, 2,200. "In spite of 100
Ltr, Col Thomas D. Campbell to Maj Gen
George E. Stratemeyer, CofS AAF, 14 Jul 43. 312.-
lE, AAF Central Files, WW II Rcds Div.
98 101
(1) Ltr, Sloat to C EHD, 22 Dec 52. (2) Hist of (1) Excerpts from Ltr, Merrill to Stilwell, 29
the 45th Engrs. (3) Base Sec 3, Prog Rpts, 29 May, Jun 43. OCMH Files.(2) Rad, Merrill to Stilwell,
5 Jun, 9 Jul, 23 Jul 43. AG 611 CBI. 25 Jun 43. Stilwell Pers File, Rads.
424 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
other projects, could use "thousands" of and remarks at the meetings and confer-
engineers. Stilwell, staying on at Ledo ences appeared "more or less routine"
for three days, made no specific com- and seemed to indicate no displeasure
plaints.102 After he left, Wheeler con- with the way the project had been man-
tinued to point out to him the difficulties aged. Nevertheless, that night, Stilwell
on the road. In a memorandum of 9 sent a radiogram to Wheeler ordering
August, he stated that Base Section 3 Arrowsmith's relief. Criticizing Arrow-
had shipped to the airfields in Assam, smith in terms reminiscent of Colonel
5,612 carloads of gravel, "enough . . . Merrill's report of 29 June, he stated he
for over 30 miles of single-track road. could not "take chances on that project."
. . ." The 330th Engineers, who should Branding the rate of progress on the road
have been sent directly to the road, had as a threat to the "whole operation" in
been put to work as stevedores in Cal- northern Burma, Stilwell asked Wheeler
cutta until July, and, upon arriving at to look into the possibility of getting a
Ledo, the greater part of the regiment "top-flight man" from the States.106
had to be held at the base to work on Wheeler reluctantly recalled Arrow-
access roads and in gravel quarries.103 smith the next day and placed a Quar-
Wheeler further emphasized that prog- termaster colonel, Ellis F. Altman, tem-
ress on the road had suffered consider- porarily in charge of work on the road.
ably from the failure of the British to On 23 August Arrowsmith's command of
provide sufficient laborers.104 He might the project, on which 90 percent of the
have added that Arrowsmith had been engineers in the theater were engaged,
obliged during the summer to rotate the came to an end. As he departed for
823d and 45th engineers to rest camps temporary duty with Wheeler's head-
in Calcutta to forestall exhaustion quarters, before leaving for the United
from their continual around-the-clock States, Arrowsmith was deeply disap-
efforts.105 pointed. "We knew what we were up
Anxious to get the road to Shingbwi- against. . . ." he wrote later. "We
yang before fall, and stung by the know- proved that we could not only overcome
ing smiles of the British, Stilwell was the physical difficulties . . . but we also
not disposed to give much weight to ex- held up against the mosquito. . . . We
tenuating circumstances. On 21 August were nearing the end of the long uphill
he again visited the road for a 1-day in- pull." 107 Arrowsmith was relieved just
spection. He held a series of meetings as better times were almost in sight.
culminating in a night session with Gen- The dry season was approaching and
eral Arrowsmith. Stilwell's questions engineer reinforcements were on the
102 106
Rads, Wheeler to Stilwell, G78, 10 Jul, E183, (1) Ltr, with Incls, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12
13 Jul 43. AG Files, CBI. Feb 54. (2) Stilwell Papers, p. 218. (3) Rad, Stil-
103
Memo, Wheeler for Stilwell, 9 Aug 43. Engr well to Wheeler, 21 Aug 43. Item 681, Stilwell Pers
Sec File, LAC Files. File, Rads.
104 107
Memo, Wheeler for Stilwell, 10 Aug 43. (1) Memo, Wheeler for Arrowsmith, 20 Oct
105
Ltr with Incls, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12 Feb 52. Copy in EHD Files. (2) Ltr with Incls, Arrow-
54. smith to C EHD, 12 Feb 54.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 425
way. With the end of the rains the completed by 1 September, only three
natives would be more inclined to work were ready. Logistical difficulties in
on the road, and the British would have China were equally serious. The five
less trouble in mobilizing them. The large and well-kept fields in Yunnan
Anglo-American high commands, meet- were no problem, but the inefficiency of
ing at Quebec, had just a few days before the line of communications eastward
resolved to support a redoubled Allied from Kunming to Chennault's forward
effort to open northern Burma and build bases left much to be desired. Even if
a supply road to China. the airline from Assam to western China
had met its tonnage targets, it seems
Chennault's Air Offensive unlikely that Chennault's position would
108
have been noticeably improved.
Meanwhile, Chennault's offensive, de- The approaching end of the monsoon
spite the support given it, was flounder- season found engineer work in a dis-
ing. During May, June, and July his couraging state. Progress on the Ledo
flyers destroyed only 3,300 tons of Jap- Road had come to a virtual standstill.
anese shipping and appeared to be Almost nothing was being done to im-
making no headway in driving the enemy prove the Burma Road. The airfields
out of the Yangtze Valley, as Chennault in Assam were not being put in shape as
had promised the President he would do. rapidly as had been hoped, and the pros-
The logistical structure supporting his pects of finishing the fields in eastern
effort was unable to meet the demands China were disheartening. Unless high-
made on it. Deliveries from India had level changes in policy were soon made,
fallen short in July and no great im- the engineer effort in the theater might
provement was in sight. In September, bog down completely.
when the airlift was to have attained the
goal of 10,000 tons a month, it carried 108
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission
but 5,000. Many obstacles had arisen to China, pp. 336-47. (2) Craven and Cate, eds.,
to hamstring the supply efforts, one of Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 443-49. (3) Memo,
the most serious being the inadequate Marshall for Roosevelt, 4 Oct 43. WDCSA 452.1
(China). (4) Rad, Somervell to Marshall, 20 Oct 43.
number of airfields in Assam. Of the Somervell Files, Wires, Round-the-World Trip, Sep
seven fields the British were to have 2-Nov 1, 1943.
CHAPTER XI
4 5
( 1 ) Memo, C Opns and Tng Br OCE for Dir of John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of
Opns ASF, 29 Jul 43. 678 (CBI.) (2) See also above, the Army Service Forces, UNITED STATES ARMY
p. 390. IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), p. 71.
428 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
some 3,000 volunteers who would serve would have to work out the details in
with the Chindits. General Arnold the next few months. Roosevelt be-
promised to supply pilots from the AAF lieved that if the plan could be carried
to fly the planes Wingate said he needed. out as Arnold proposed, there would be
He directed Air Force Col. Philip G. a material improvement in Chinese
Cochran to go to India in the autumn to morale and an early end of the war with
organize these men into the 5318th Air Japan.7
Unit, which would be a "custom-made"
aggregation of bombers, fighters, trans- Theater Reorganization
ports, gliders, and helicopters. It would
be up to the engineers to provide the The decisions at Quebec were under-
landing fields for the air commandos taken simultaneously with two basic
behind the enemy lines. Wingate would changes in the Allied command struc-
carry on guerrilla warfare in Burma ture in the theater designed to promote
while the Chinese under Stilwell more effective use of resources. Hoping
launched their full-scale offensive.6 to eliminate some of the confused rela-
General Arnold announced a project tionships of the existing "loose coali-
at the conference which was destined to tion of Allied headquarters," Roosevelt
have a tremendous impact on the engi- and Churchill agreed to set up the
neer mission in CBI. The Army Air Southeast Asia Command. Vice Adm.
Forces had almost perfected the B-29 or Lord Louis Mountbatten was named com-
"superfortress" bomber, which was to be mander. With his main forces based in
capable of delivering 10 tons of bombs India, he would control Anglo-American
on a target 1,500 miles away. Arnold operations in Burma. Stilwell's posi-
informed the Combined Chiefs that the tion in the new setup was not clear. He
first B-29's would be ready during the would be under Mountbatten insofar as
coming winter. If bases could be pro- operations in Burma were concerned,
vided in the Changsha area of China, and it was generally assumed he would
midway between Kunming and Shang- be Mountbatten's deputy, but there was
hai, the Air Forces would be ready to no official confirmation of this assump-
launch a massive assault on Japan by tion. Arnold's chief of staff, Maj. Gen.
October 1944. This plan of over- George E. Stratemeyer, was to go to CBI
whelming Japan with fleets of super- as Stilwell's air adviser. He was ap-
bombers appealed to the imagination of pointed commanding general of U.S.
the President. The number of fields to Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector,
be built was left rather indefinite and and as such was the ranking American
methods of providing logistic support air officer in the theater. Under him
were not clearly formulated. Planning
staffs in Washington and in the theater 7
(1) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate,
eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol V,
The Pacific—Matterhorn to Nagasaki: June 1944 to
6
(1) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1945 (Chicago: The University of Chicago
pp. 494-95, 503-07. (2) Romanus and Sunderland, Press, 1953), pp. 16-22. (2) Henry H. Arnold,
Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 366. Global Mission (New York, 1949), pp. 476-80.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 429
was Tenth Air Force, commanded, after tion was charged with supporting the
General Bissell's return to the United Tenth Air Force in India and the Four-
States in mid-August, by Brig. Gen. teenth in China. Col. Lyle E. Seeman,
Howard C. Davidson. Stratemeyer, ar- who arrived from the United States in the
riving in the theater in August, set up summer of 1943, became the first engi-
his headquarters near Calcutta. He neer of the new organization. At the
soon learned that he would have little same time he became theater air engi-
control over Chennault. Roosevelt had neer under Stratemeyer. Like Schull in
assured Chiang that Stratemeyer would China, Seeman, with his small staff,
not interfere with the operations of the maintained liaison with SOS on airfield
Fourteenth Air Force, and Stilwell ex- construction in India.9
empted Chennault from Stratemeyer's
operational control. To most observers, Planning for New Operations
command relationships in CBI remained
as involved as before, and the complexi- Because of the shortage of planning
ties of the engineer organization as great staffs in the theater, Army Service Forces
8
as ever. in Washington had to assume the main
The growing emphasis on air power burden of planning for the line of com-
led to the organization of engineer offices munications projects the Combined
in the Air Forces in CBI for the first Chiefs had approved. This responsi-
time. On 15 August Col. Herman W. bility Somervell and his staff accepted
Schull, Jr., organized an Engineer Sec- with enthusiasm. Styer wrote that the
tion in Chennault's Fourteenth Air "development of the line of communica-
Force headquarters at Kunming. Schull tions from India to China bids fair to be
and his one assistant were henceforth the greatest engineering undertaking of
responsible for maintaining liaison with the war. . . ." 10 Early in September,
the Services of Supply regarding the Somervell established the India Com-
building or maintenance of five airfields mittee. It included specialists from the
in Yunnan and ten in eastern China, to- technical services. The committee's job,
gether with a dozen reserve fields in Somervell said, was to keep ASF "in a
widely scattered localities. A similar position at all times to back up and even
development took place in India. On anticipate the demands which are made
20 August Stilwell activated the CBI Air on us in the way of men and materials."11
Service Command with headquarters
9
near Calcutta, to succeed the X Air Force (1) Hq Fourteenth AF Engr Sec, Office Diary, 15
Aug 43-3 Apr 44, p. 1. Air Force Files, CT. (2)
Service Command. The new organiza- CBI Hist, sec. III, app. IX. (3) Ralph G. Hoxie,
Frederick J. Ericson, and Robert T. Finney, Hist of
8
(1)Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Bos- the Fourteenth AF (MS), pp. 109-13, 312-22. Air
ton: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 89. (2) Univ Lib Maxwell AFB. (4) Hist of CBI Air Serv
Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. Comd, pp. 28-32. Last two in Air Univ Lib Max-
45-54. (3) CBI Hist, sec. III, app. IX. (4) Ltr, well AFB. (5) Ltr, Seeman to EHD, 29 May 53.
Arnold to Stilwell, 28 Aug 43. Stilwell Pers Files, EHD Files.
10
Ltrs. (4) Ltr, Maj Edward E. Voynow to Hq AAF, Quoted in ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, p.
4 Jan 44. AAF Central Files 312.1—H Opns, Ltrs, 41.
11
Nov 43-Feb 44. Ibdi,.pp. 88-89.
430 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
give him support, Chennault in October bulldozer had advanced nearly seven
20
was able to make a more effective show- miles and was beyond Mile 60. By
ing. Deliveries of supplies over the this time there were on the road 2 gen-
Hump increased, and two additional eral service regiments, 3 aviation bat-
fighter squadrons arrived. After the talions, and one engineer maintenance
failure of his trial offensive in August company, about 5,250 engineers in all.21
and September, Chennault now found On 17 October a new chapter began in
the going much easier. He began to the history of the road. Col. Lewis A.
take the initiative in China's eastern Pick, Missouri River Division engineer,
skies. In the last quarter of 1943 his arrived to take command of Base Section
22
flyers carried out highly successful strikes 3. He lost no time in inaugurating a
against Japanese shipping on the Yangtze new order of things. On the evening of
18
and off the China coast. his arrival, he bluntly told his assembled
staff, "I've heard the same story all the
The Ledo Road way from the States. It's always the
same—the Ledo Road can't be built.
Meanwhile, the engineers in Base Too much mud, too much rain, too
Section 3 labored to provide the over- much malaria. From now on we're for-
land communications indispensable for getting this defeatist spirit. The Ledo
expanded operations in China and Road is going to be built—mud, rain,
Burma. Inasmuch as Arrowsmith's suc- and malaria be damned!" 23 Pick set up
cessor was a Quartermaster officer, super- his command tent near the roadhead.
vision of work on the road now rested He reinstituted the around-the-clock
largely with Col. Robert E. York, road schedule that General Arrowsmith had
engineer since 21 May. The return of been forced to abandon five months be-
the 45th Engineers from their rest camp fore with the onset of the rains. Pick
near Calcutta early in September and the was determined to brook no obstacle to
tapering off of the monsoon gave Colonel the speedy advance of the road. He
York a chance to push road construction sought to provide adequate lighting for
once more. With the 330th Engineers work at night by stripping the base of all
breaking the trail and doing the ad- generators, wiring, sockets, and bulbs
vance grading and the 45th Engineers that could possibly be spared. He told
doing the final grading and graveling, the troops that if necessary they were to
the Ledo Road inched southward put flares in buckets of oil. Work would
through the jungle and defiles of north- have to go on without interruption.24
western Burma, despite the 23 inches of Pick believed that one of his first jobs
rain that fell during the remainder of
the month.19 By 15 October the lead 20
Rad, Hirshfield to Stilwell, 16 Oct 43. AG Files
CBI.
18 21
Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. C, p. 42.
22
pp.19529-36. Hq Base Sec 3 GO 20, 17 Oct 43. AG File, LAC
(1) Hist of the 45th and 330th Engrs. (2) Ltr, Files.
23
CO 330th Engrs to CO Base Sec 3, 11 Oct 43. Engr Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. F, p. 22.
24
Sec File, LAC Files. Ibid., p. 23.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 433
a detailed insight into the planning be- interested in a line over the mountains
hind each phase of the work. The in- by way of Fort Hertz. Early in October
genuity of maintenance crews made up the Chief of Engineers had recom-
somewhat for the scarcity of spare parts mended against using the light, invasion-
but was not equal to the task of prevent- weight pipe in the high elevations of the
ing entirely the continual deterioration China-Burma divide. Consequently, on
of the heavy equipment, too long in con- the 16th Stilwell had gone back to the
stant use. At any rate, by making the original plan of putting the pipeline
best use of the equipment they had and along the road. Because materials could
by throwing fresh grading parties from be moved forward more easily there,
the recently arrived 1905th Engineer construction would be simplified. Pick
Aviation Battalion to create new road- had a considerable stock of 4-inch pipe
heads, Green pushed his trace to within in his warehouses, but no troops to build
eleven miles of Shingbwiyang by 23 De- the line were scheduled to arrive before
cember. The engineers now pressed January.29 Determined not to waste
forward through the remaining stretch. two months of good construction
Green split the 330th to put in advance weather, he decided to use men from the
roadheads and organized two more grad- 330th Engineers and from the recently
ing parties. Shortly before noon on 27 arrived 209th Combat Battalion and
December, the 330th engineers connected 382d Construction Battalion. On 27
their traces 3 miles north of the town. October he put the men to work laying
Pick flashed the word to New Delhi that pipe from the refinery at Digboi, toward
the 117-mile road from Ledo to Shing- Ledo, fourteen miles to the south.
bwiyang was open. He then rode into Early in November Col. Kenneth Mac-
town at the head of a convoy of jeeps Isaac, who had recently arrived from the
and trucks. He had beaten his target United States with a staff of four petro-
date of 1 January by five days. Fin- leum engineers, took charge of the
ished grading and graveling remained to project. Almost totally inexperienced
be done, but the road from Ledo to in this type of construction, the troops
Shingbwiyang, which Stilwell wanted, under MacIsaac caught on quickly.
was open.28 The line was soon complete to Ledo and
Soon after his arrival in the theater, was being extended down the road.
Pick had taken steps to begin work on The men were laying an average of 1.2
that part of the pipeline system for which miles of pipe a day. The rate slowed
he was responsible. Wheeler had in- down when they reached the mountains,
formed him that Stilwell was no longer where they rarely laid more than half a
mile a day. By the last week of Decem-
28
ber, the pipeline crews had almost caught
(1) Hist of the 330th Engrs. (2) Memo, ExecO
330th Engrs, for Bn CO's, 5 Dec 43. Engr Sec File, up with the graveling details at Mile 60.
LAC Files. (3) Rad, Pick to Wheeler, 9 Dec 43.
AG Files, CBI. (4) Memo, CO 1st Bn 330th Engrs,
29
For All Concerned, 17 Dec 43. Engr Sec File, LAC (1) Rad, Somervell to Stilwell, 13 Oct 43. 678
Files. (5) Rad, Pick to Covell, 27 Dec 43. AG Files (CBI). (2) Memo, OCE for CG ASF, 20 Oct 43.
CBI. 320.2 (CBI).
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 435
Thereafter, MacIsaac slowed the pace of ground forces was practically nonexist-
the advance to that of the gravel-head in ent, Hicks declared, and the air-raid
order not to hamper the forward ele- warning system was totally inadequate
ments on the road.30 insofar as his forward elements were con-
Stilwell's campaign in northern Burma cerned. On 30 December Hicks reiter-
had gotten off to a premature start on 16 ated his fears, but by the time his letter
October. The tactical plan called for reached Ledo the Chinese had scored a
the Chinese to advance from Shingbwi- signal victory at Yupbang Ga. This
yang to the Tarung River, which flowed triumph clinched their hold on the line
in a southerly direction about twenty of the Tarung.32
miles to the east. From the Tarung,
Stilwell's forces were to drive southward The Burma Road
on 1 December toward the town of
Myitkyina, some 140 miles away. Myit- Prospects in late 1943 for opening a
kyina was the main operational base for line of communications in Assam and
the Japanese forces holding northern Burma appeared brighter, but such was
Burma. Astride the route planned for not the case in western China. Colonel
the Ledo Road, it was a key rail terminus. Dawson could report but slight progress
Near the outskirts of the town was a on road work there. By the end of
vitally important airfield. Operations October, funds allotted for the repair of
against the Japanese did not develop as the Burma Road east of the Mekong
planned. On 30 October the Chinese were exhausted. West of the river the
ran into unexpectedly strong enemy Chinese did some work on bridges, but
formations on the west bank of the since they were still haunted by the
Tarung. What was to have been a quiet spectre of a Japanese crossing of the
"forward displacement" became a see- Salween, it was impossible to get them to
saw struggle.31 The possibility of a resurface the demolished portions of the
counterattack against Shingbwiyang and road within thirty-five miles of the river.
the roadhead had loomed large in the In December Stilwell proposed a fur-
minds of the engineers near the front. ther allotment of 480,000,000 Chinese
Writing to Pick on 14 December, Lt. dollars for widening, surfacing, and re-
Col. William E. Hicks, executive officer ducing grades, but the likelihood of
of the 330th Engineers, complained that getting the money appeared slight.
his forward battalion, approaching Shing- Little work was accomplished. The
bwiyang, had only piecemeal informa- Burma Road, Dawson disclosed late that
tion on the location and status of the month, was "still essentially a one-track
front. Liaison of the engineers with the road. . . ." Nor could he report any
real progress on the Mitu Road. Hav-
30
(1) Hist of the 209th, 330th, and 382d Engrs. ing appropriated 168,000,000 dollars in
(2) Constr Serv SOS CBI, Informal Progress Rpt for September for construction of the first
Jan 44—4" Pipeline (Digboi-Kunming). Opns Br
File, Constr Serv Files.
31 32
Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Ltrs, Hicks to Pick, 14 and 30 Dec 43. AG File,
Problems, pp. 122ff. LAC Files.
436 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
300 kilometers, the Chinese Government theater by January 1944 a large number
organized a makeshift Mitu Road Au- of heavy construction items. Included
thority. Despite Dawson's repeated pro- were 100 D-7 tractors, 40 shovels, 70
tests, the Chinese ignored the graded scrapers, 75 graders, and no rock crush-
and generally satisfactory roadbed of the ers. Somervell assured Wheeler that on
Yunnan-Burma Railroad; they planned his return to Washington he would
instead to turn a nearby supply trail into institute changes in tables of equipment
a one-lane, dry-weather road. This trail for general service regiments to provide
occasionally followed stream beds, which machinery of greater earth-moving ca-
meant that monsoon rains would wash a pacity. Noting that local sources of
road out altogether. In February the engineer material were almost exhausted,
director of the road authority quit. His particularly in the categories of electrical
successor refused to take over because and water distribution systems and
the agency's funds were exhausted. By builder's hardware, Somervell directed
this time American hopes for the Mitu his subordinates to begin shipment by
Road had been dashed to pieces by Chi- January 1944 of a 6-month supply of
nese indifference and mismanagement.33 such materials.34
In reviewing the troop situation with
Supplies Somervell, Wheeler emphasized the fact
that units from the United States were
Engineer supply for the theater was an not reaching Base Section 3 on time.
immense problem by the latter months The causes were varied—insufficient
of 1943. In October General Somervell, shipping, the relatively low position of
on a worldwide inspection trip, visited the engineers on the theater priority list,
Base Section 3. His observations and and the frequent unreadiness of units in
his talks with General Wheeler and the United States for overseas movement
Colonel Strong convinced him that when they were scheduled to go. The
Army Service Forces would have to in- troop basis for pipeline companies, which
tensify its efforts even more if Stilwell's Somervell proposed to expand from ten
vital supply line across Burma was to be to seventeen, was a case in point. Three
completed before the monsoon began in companies were needed at once, but for
1944. The engineers' most common the reasons given above none would be in
complaint about their equipment was the theater before January 1944.35
that the D-4 tractors and 1/2-yard shovels Commenting on the over-all engineer
were too small for the work the general troop situation in a radiogram to Styer
service regiments had to do. On 21 on 22 October, Somervell stated that it
October Somervell radioed Styer, direct- was impossible "to over-emphasize the
ing him to procure and ship to the importance of getting these units here at
33 34
(1) Engr Rpt 6, Dawson to Dorn, 27 Dec 43. (1) ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, p. 205.
Engr Br File, Const Serv Files. (2) Ltr, Dawson to (2) Rad, Somervell to Styer, 21 Oct 43. Somervell
CofS Y-FOS, 16 Feb 44. 611 (CBI). (3) Memo 95, Files, Wires, Round-the-World Trip. (3) Ltr,
Dawson for Dorn, 29 Feb 44. Engr Br File, Constr Somervell to Reybold, 27 Nov 43. 400 CBI.
35
Serv Files. ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, p. 117.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 437
the earliest . . . date." "Adequate Strong, who was to return to the United
shipping should be secured," he directed. States. General Godfrey was scheduled
In addition Styer should insure "that to become Stratemeyer's engineer, with
these units are ready to meet new pri- Colonel Seeman as his deputy. More
orities . . . and all delays due to defects officers were now available. Between
in equipment, training, or other causes mid-November and mid-December about
should be avoided at staging areas." fifty arrived from the United States to
Also needed in order to "strengthen the staff the engineer structure in the
general situation" were maintenance, theater.
heavy shop, depot, and parts supply com- At this time Chennault and Strate-
panies.36 Stilwell's staff agreed to im- meyer were making vigorous attempts to
prove the engineers' position on the take airfield construction away from the
theater priority lists. The rest was up Services of Supply. Seeking control of
to Army Service Forces.37 airfield construction in China, Chennault
criticized, as contrary to established
Problems of Organization policy, the arrangement of having fields
built under the direction of SOS. "If
The latter part of 1943 saw far-reach- the present system were working well, it
ing changes in the assignments of key might be best to let it ride," he declared
officers in the theater. Wheeler was on 9 October 1943, but, he stated, SOS
transferred from the Services of Supply, engineers were in many instances unpre-
CBI, to the Southeast Asia Command to pared to do the work which the Air
become Mountbatten's chief administra- Forces wanted. Moreover, he felt the
tive and supply officer. Mountbatten's presence of SOS in the chain of command
engineer-in-chief was British Maj. Gen. merely served to extend the interval be-
Desmond Harrison; his deputy engineer- tween the request for and the start of
in-chief was Col. Walter K. Wilson, Jr., construction.38 Stratemeyer, hoping to
recently arrived from the United States get control over construction of the B-29
along with Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wede- fields, had placed his aviation engineers
meyer, who had been selected as Mount- on preliminary planning early in No-
batten's deputy chief of staff. As vember. Wheeler pointed out that the
Wheeler's successor in SOS, Stilwell ac- proposals of the airmen, if carried out,
cepted Somervell's choice of Brig. Gen. would result in the formation of two
William E. R. Covell, an Engineer offi- competing engineer services. The Serv-
cer, at that time head of the Fuels and ices of Supply was already critically short
Lubricants Division in the Office of The of engineers, and things would only be
Quartermaster General. Colonel Far- worse if the few that were available had
rell of ASF's India Committee went to to be shared.39 Upon taking up his
CBI as Engineer, SOS, to replace Colonel duties as commander of SOS, General
36 38
Rad, Somervell to Styer, 22 Oct 43. Somervell Ltr, Chennault to Stratemeyer, 9 Oct 43. AG
Files, Wires, Round-the-World Trip. 322 CBI.
37 39
Ltr, Hq SOS CBI to CG Rear Ech USAF CBI, Memo, Wheeler for DCofS Rear Ech CBI, 8
13 Nov 43. AG 322 CBI. Nov 43. AG 322 CBI.
438 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
work on the B-29 fields west of Calcutta, construction in China. Colonel By-
just getting under way. District 12, roade was transferred from Advance
placed under Col. William C. Kinsolv- Section 4 and assigned temporarily to
ing, a petroleum engineer, formerly the area command as project engineer.
general manager of the Sun Pipeline In early 1944 the area command organ-
Company and recently arrived from the ized three districts. The first had charge
United States, had the task of laying the of work on the eight fields near Kun-
two 6-inch pipelines from Calcutta to ming, the second was to build the B-29
Assam. District 11 had charge of all fields, and the third was to build more
remaining projects, located principally fields for Chennault in eastern China.47
around Calcutta. Outside the divisional
area and reporting directly to Colonel The B-29 Fields
Farrell was District 9, which was responsi-
ble for construction in the New Delhi Late in 1943 work on the B-29 fields
area. Pick was in charge of Division 2, began. The amount of construction re-
which included most of Assam and part quired was considerable, for the size and
of Burma. He had two districts. Dis- weight of the B-29 were unprecedented.
trict 20 was to do all construction and The craft's wing span was 141 feet as
maintenance at the Hump airfields in compared to the 104 feet of the B-17, or
Assam. District 22 was in charge of Flying Fortress, the next largest bomber;
building the pipelines along the Ledo its loaded gross weight of approximately
Road. Pick remained in command of 70 tons was twice that of the Flying
Base Section 3, which included the Ledo Fortress. Its wheel load was 34 tons as
Road. He retained firm control of all against the 19 tons of the B-17. Accord-
construction for which he had been re- ing to estimates made in the United
sponsible; work on the Ledo Road was States, the B-29 required a runway 8,500
not under Farrell's jurisdiction.46 feet long and 200 feet wide, an area
In view of the transfer of airfield con- almost twice that of the 6,000 by 150 foot
struction in China from the Services of runway used by the B-17.
Supply to the Air Forces, Covell and In India, the engineers set out to pro-
Stratemeyer in December prepared a vide the runways for the B-29's by en-
plan for reassigning engineer personnel larging and improving five existing fields
on duty there. All engineer officers as- in the flatlands west of Calcutta. Little
signed to airfield work in Advance Sec- could be done unless help was forthcom-
tions 3 and 4 were transferred to the CBI ing from the government of India.
Air Service Command. At the close of Much of the impetus for getting work
the month, the latter organized the started came from the engineers on
5308th Air Service Area Command, with Mountbatten's staff. The SOS engi-
headquarters at Kunming. The new neers appealed to General Harrison and
organization was to direct all airfield
47
(1) Ltr, Covell to Hq Fwd Ech CBI, 24 Dec 43.
46
Hq Constr Serv SOS CBI GO No. 1, Dec 43. Covell Ltr File, Constr Serv Files. (2) CBI Hist, sec.
AG 325.455 CBI. Ill, app. IX.
440 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Colonel Wilson for help. They in turn By late 1943 work on the B-29 fields in
appealed to Mountbatten, whose influ- China was also under way. Byroade and
ence on the government of India was his staff had begun planning during the
considerable, and help was promised. last week of November. To find sites
In mid-December, Stratemeyer's engi- for the fields, Byroade personally rec-
neers turned over to Covell the pre- onnoitered the plains around Cheng-tu,
liminary construction plans already 150 miles northwest of Chungking. He
prepared. Company A of the 653d believed the area to be the best in Free
Topographic Battalion began to survey China. The terrain was similar to that
the fields in order to determine how the of the American midwest, and in the
extensions could best be made. So that Cheng-tu Valley a number of fields al-
the runways could be made operational ready existed, the runways of which
at an early date despite the shortages of could be easily lengthened for the big
men and materials, the SOS engineers bombers. After studying his report of
persuaded the airmen to accept, for the 8 December,49 Chinese and American
time being, runways 7,500 feet long and commanders worked out an agreement
150 feet wide. Since the aviation engi- to get construction started. The Super-
neers who were to build the fields would fortresses would be based at four sites—
not reach India until February, the engi- Kwanghan, Pengshan, Kiunglai, and
neer-in-chief of the British Eastern Hsinching. (Map 21) There were to be
Command agreed to furnish local con- seven fighter fields. The Chinese Mili-
tractors to begin work at the sites. In tary Engineering Commission would
December, District 10 borrowed 170 control construction; American engi-
equipment operators from various engi- neers would do mainly staff work. The
neer units, together with 300 trucks. By responsibility of Lt. Col. Waldo I.
the end of the month the district had Kenerson, head of District 2, would be
provided each field with a project engi- limited to drafting specifications, prepar-
neer to serve as a liaison officer with the ing layouts, making inspections, and
Royal Engineers supervisor. In Janu- assisting with the organizing, administer-
ary Pick released the 382d Construction ing, and paying the hundreds of thou-
Battalion temporarily to rush work on sands of peasants who would be
the field at Kharagpur.48 These various conscripted for work on the airfields.50
makeshift arrangements would have to Since the runways would have to be built
do until the aviation engineers arrived. largely by hand and probably could not
be brought up to required standards, the
48
(1) Hq Constr Serv SOS CBI, Final Rpt, 8-29 full length of 8,500 feet was authorized
Bases, India, Nov 44, pp. 1-11. 686.61 (CBI). (2)
Memo, CG Air Serv Comd CBI to Farrell, 26 Nov 43.
(3) Rad, Arnold to Stratemeyer, 4 Dec 43. Last two
49
in Constr File, Constr Serv Files. (4) Hist of the Ltr, Byroade to Chennault, 8 Dec 43. Air Engr
653d Engr Topo Bn. (5) Memo, Off C Engr SOS File, CTO.
50
CBI to Air Engr AAF IBS CBI 11 Dec 43. Constr (1) Memo, Hq AAF China Theater for Bd of
File, Constr Serv Files. (6) Ltr, Covell to CG Hq Offs, 8 Sep 45, sub: Chengtu Constr Program. AAF
Rear Ech, 25 Jan 44. Specs File, Constr Serv Files. 319.1 CTO. (2) Craven and Cate, eds, The Pacific—
(7) Hist of the 382d Engrs. Matterhorn to Nagasaki, pp. 65-70.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 441
MAP 21
to lessen the chance of serious mishaps in December when the Chinese came up
takeoffs and landings. with a preliminary cost estimate of two
Particularly irritating to the engineers to three billion Chinese dollars. "Ap-
was the radical departure from existing palling," wrote Stilwell on 18 December,
financial arrangements whereby the Chi- suspecting that "squeeze" accounted for
nese had paid for building operational a large share of this astronomical figure,
facilities, and the Americans had sup- which at the official rate of exchange
plied quarters, recreational facilities, and amounted to $100-150 million in Ameri-
51
other nonoperational features. Presi- can money.
dent Roosevelt had promised Chiang By early 1944 the engineers were mak-
reimbursement for all labor and mate- ing progress in providing the logistic
rials expended on MATTERHORN in
China. How far Roosevelt had com- 51
Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command
mitted himself became evident in mid- Problems, p. 77.
442 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
ward for about 50 miles through the ward more easily. This area was so near
Hukawng Valley to within ten miles of the enemy troops that patrols from both
Shingbwiyang, where it made an abrupt the 330th and the Chinese units had to
turn to the south. The Tarung River, be kept on both flanks. On 6 January a
its source in the northern hills, flowed route to the Tarung was open to jeeps.
southward into the Tanai in the The engineers then graded and widened
Hukawng Valley at a point about 18 a 12-mile-long, dry-weather road leading
miles southeast of Shingbwiyang. An eastward from Shingbwiyang, to be used
53
oxcart trail led from Shingbwiyang east- as a supply line for the Chinese.
ward across the Tarung and then south The attack was soon under way. On
across the Tanai to the village of 13 January the Chinese crossed the
Mogaung, 30 miles southwest of Myit- Tarung and came to grips with the main
kyina. This trail was the main supply body of the enemy. The regimental
route for the Japanese. Stilwell wanted combat team which crossed the Tanai
to move a Chinese force across it some southeast of Shingbwiyang, hoping to
30 miles southeast of Shingbwiyang in envelop the enemy left flank, encoun-
order to envelop the Japanese believed tered unexpectedly strong resistance on
to be along the north bank of the Tanai the south bank. Although it managed
east of the Tarung. While the main to push the enemy eastward beyond the
body of the division would assault the confluence of the Tanai and Tarung, it
enemy frontally along the Tarung, a Chi- had to pause to root out pockets of re-
nese regimental combat team would slip sistance and consequently could not put
across the Tanai south of Shingbwiyang any serious pressure on the main enemy
and proceed along the river's left bank. force north of the Tanai. The envel-
At the same time, a Chinese infantry opment of the Japanese flank failed.
regiment, assembled 25 miles southwest Elsewhere, the Chinese made reasonable
of Shingbwiyang, would move eastward progress. During the first" week of
into the upper Hukawng far behind the February, they reached the village of
Japanese. If this plan of campaign Taihpa Ga located at the point where the
could be carried out successfully, the oxcart trail crossed the Tanai, four miles
Japanese would be trapped and destroyed east of the Tarung.54 The stubborn
in the Hukawng Valley. After that, the Japanese resistance halted progress on
march on Myitkyina would be virtually the Ledo Road. Pick had to keep al-
unopposed.52 most all of his men north of Shingbwi-
While the Chinese were preparing for yang, where they were engaged in grad-
the offensive, Stilwell detached two com- ing and widening the stretch of road
panies of the 330th Engineers to clear already put in.
trails through the ten miles of jungle Stilwell had decided that as soon as
between Shingbwiyang and the Tarung Taihpa Ga had been captured, he would
so that the infantrymen could move for-
53
Hist of the 330th Engrs.
52 54
Romahus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command
Problems, 129-38. Problems, pp. 134-38.
444 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
send Col. Rothwell H. Brown's Chinese combat trail.56 Ten bulldozer operators
tank group down the oxcart trail toward from the 330th General Service Regi-
Mogaung. He directed Pick to send in ment volunteered to support Brown's
engineers to improve and hold open this forces with their machines. On 3 March
"combat trail," as it was henceforth usu- they went into action with the tankers
ally called. This would mean a serious at a point thirteen miles southeast of
diversion of Pick's engineers from the Taihpa Ga. The engineers' mission
Ledo Road. The combat trail, lying was to hew a trail through the jungle to
dangerously below the flood levels of the the southeast and help get the tanks
Hukawng Valley, had already been re- across numerous streams so that they
jected as a possible route for the road. could make a surprise assault on the
A great deal of work would be needed to Japanese at the hamlet of Walawbum,
make it passable for military vehicles. twenty-two miles southeast of Taihpa
Pick, bowing to tactical necessity, put a Ga. Three of the engineers were
strong engineer force on the job of im- wounded the first night. Three were
proving the trail and bridging the rivers. subsequently awarded the Silver Star,
Men of the 1st Battalion, 330th Engi- and the entire group was commended, as
neers, worked long and hard to make the Stilwell put it, "for resolute conduct
trail passable for military vehicles. under very difficult terrain conditions
They were joined by the 76th Light and while frequently in contact with
57
Ponton Company and Company A of the enemy opposition."
1883d Aviation Battalion. Early in Feb- As infantry and tanks closed in on
ruary a detail from the 330th built a dry- Walawbum from the northwest, a new
weather transport strip at Taihpa Ga, threat to the Japanese appeared from
despite the frequent shelling from Jap- the east. The American infantrymen
anese artillery south of the Tanai. In originally scheduled at QUADRANT to
the first half of the month the 76th serve under Wingate were, upon arrival
pontoniers put a 470-foot pneumatic in the theater, diverted to Stilwell to be
ponton bridge across the Tarung. The used as a hit-and-run force. Merrill,
over-all situation was encouraging.55 now a brigadier general, was in com-
During March Pick, now a brigadier mand. Correspondents dubbed the
general, had to lend a number of his force "Merrill's Marauders." On their
engineers to the infantry to provide first mission, the Marauders suddenly
support for the forward movement. At appeared at Walawbum on 3 March and
the beginning of the month, at Taihpa threatened the Japanese there with en-
Ga, the 71st and the 77th Light Ponton trapment. The enemy commander on
Companies built a 470-foot ponton the same day ordered a general retreat to
bridge across the Tanai over which the south. By 9 March the Japanese
58
Brown's Chinese tankers and infantry- were gone.
men passed and then moved down the Early in March Wingate was ready to
56
Hist of the 71st and 77th Engrs.
55 57
(1) Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. G, pp. Hist of the 330th Engrs.
58
16,37. (2) Rpt, Hirshfield to Pick, 24 Jan 44. LAC Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command
Files. (3) Hist of the 76th, 330th, and 1883d Engrs. Problems, pp. 130-31, 148-57.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 445
begin his airborne offensive. He had unforeseen difficulties. The field was
assembled Colonel Cochran's Air Com- crisscrossed with ruts, which, overgrown
mando unit, 4 brigades of Chindits, and with grass, had been invisible to the
the 900th Engineer Airborne Aviation reconnoitering parties. The ruts tore
Company at 2 airfields, 300 miles north- off the landing gear of some of the craft
east of Calcutta. The engineers were to and caused a number of crashes. With
prepare strips in the Burmese jungle for so many craft coming down at once,
the Chindits to land on. Engineers in several pile-ups resulted. Some of the
other theaters had already carried out gliders rammed into the trees surround-
airborne missions; this one would be the ing the clearing. The glider in which
first mission in which they would travel Captain Casey and an engineer enlisted
to their destinations in gliders. Airmen, man were riding came in too high. At-
reconnoitering at low altitudes over the tempting to circle the clearing for a
Burmese forests, had come upon two landing, the pilot lost control of the
fairly level clearings near the western craft; it plunged into a tree, and the
bank of the Irrawaddy, eighty miles occupants were killed. All told, about
south of Myitkyina. Engineers flown in 5 percent of the landing force was lost.
with the first infantry detachments were A bulldozer and a scraper were wrecked.
to prepare the clearings for the large The first infantrymen to land dis-
number of planes to come in later. persed to guard against possible enemy
Aerial photographs made shortly before infiltration. The engineers began to
the scheduled takeoff showed that trees prepare the landing strip. Their main
had been dragged onto one of the clear- job was to level the clearing as rapidly
ings to block a landing. All the gliders as possible with their machinery. Some
would therefore have to be flown to the of the infantry, using hand tools, filled in
other clearing despite the congestion ruts and cut grass. The soil, with a
likely to ensue. high clay content, would be satisfactory
On the evening of 5 March men, for dry-weather operations. The next
planes, and gliders were ready to take off night, about seventy C-47's safely
for their destination, 250 miles deep brought in troops and supplies on a
in enemy-held territory. Accompanying runway already provided with lights,
the infantry were Capt. Patrick J. Casey, radios, and radar. That same night an-
commander of the 900th engineers, with other detachment of the 900th was flown
13 of his men. They had four bull- to a glade fifty miles farther south. This
dozers, two scrapers, a grader, a jeep, and landing was made without mishap.
hand tools. The men loaded the bull- Using their bulldozers, the engineers
dozers, with blades attached, on the smoothed the surface of the clearing
gliders. The air fleet took off, the sufficiently to enable transports to
planes towing the gliders in tandem. land without serious damage. Chindits,
Crossing the 7,000-foot-high mountains flown to these two fields, set out to
59
of the Indo-Burmese border, the fleet dynamite the Burma Railway.
soon approached the clearing. The
heavily loaded gliders came down at high 59
(1) Lowell Thomas, Back to Mandalay (New
speed. Some of the first ones ran into York, 1951), pp. 198-225. (2) Hist of the 900th
446 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Harassed from the front and rear, the The extent of the Japanese offensive
Japanese in the Hukawng Valley with- suggested to Mountbatten the need for
drew southward, hoping to make a stand stronger measures against the enemy's
on a ridge at the southern end of the lines of communications. Additional
valley. On 19 March the Chinese upset airborne troops would have to be flown
these plans by seizing the ridge. They into Burma. To place his last two
then pushed on, while the Marauders Chindit brigades across enemy lines of
repeatedly hit at the enemy's rear and communications and to supply his more
flanks. In late March, with his forces or less isolated units already in Burma,
only seventy-five miles from Myitkyina, Wingate called upon the airborne engi-
Stilwell planned a bold stroke to seize neers to prepare a landing strip in a
the city and its important airstrip before clearing about eighty miles southwest of
the monsoon closed in. The Chinese Mogaung. At dusk of 21 March a third
were to continue the advance in such detachment of the airborne engineers
strength as to lead the Japanese com- was flown to Burma. Construction of
manders to believe that Mogaung, not this landing field was a race against time.
Myitkyina, was their goal. While the Wingate's staff believed the Japanese,
Japanese moved troops from Myitkyina who would undoubtedly learn of the
to defend Mogaung, two Chinese regi- landing, would attack within twenty four
ments and the Marauders would slip over hours. The engineers would have to
the Kumon Range and descend on prepare the strip so that the Chindits
Myitkyina from the northwest.60 could land before the enemy arrived.
Meantime, the Japanese began an The race was won by two hours; this
offensive of their own against the British was the length of time it took the first
Fourteenth Army near Imphal on the Chindits to make contact with the ap-
Indian-Burmese border. The British proaching Japanese. Personally direct-
had been expecting an attack for months ing this new assault, Wingate was killed
and had their plans ready for meeting it. in a plane crash on 24 March. He left
At the first enemy attacks, they intended to his successor, Maj. Gen. W. D. A. Len-
to retire from the mountainous frontier taigne, the problem of coping with the
and draw the Japanese into the Manipur desperate situation of those Chindits
Plain. When the Japanese reached holding the railroad block at Mawlu
Imphal, British ground troops with the against frantic Japanese attempts to
62
help of airborne reinforcements would break their grip.
turn on them. But the enemy struck On the plains of Manipur, things con-
with much greater speed and strength tinued to go badly for the British. By
than expected, and the British position 30 March the Japanese vanguard had
soon appeared to be precarious.61 reached the highway leading north from
Imphal to Dimapur, about 170 miles
Engrs. (3) Rpt, Godfrey to Stratemeyer, 28 Mar southwest of Ledo. The British Four-
44. AAF, Central Files, Folder for Gen Davidson.
60
Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command
62
Problems, pp. 118, 185-88, 200-205. (1) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Sai-
61
Ibid., pp. 172-75. pan, pp. 507-08. (2) Hist of the 900th Engrs.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 447
teenth Army, 70,000 strong, found itself the 45th and 330th General Service
cut off from contact with friendly forces. Regiments and four aviation battalions
In an emergency meeting on 3 April at graded and graveled the road north of
Jorhat with Mountbatten and his prin- Shingbwiyang. The beginning of March
cipal subordinates, Stilwell was relieved saw the resumption of sustained work on
to discover that the British were confi- the roadhead. The 1st Battalion of the
dent of ultimate success because of the 45th Engineers took the lead. Hardly
logistical overextension of the Japanese had it finished its clearing and grading to
forces. In fact, for the first time, Stil- the Tarung during the last week of
well's British colleagues seemed really March, when Stilwell directed it to move
enthusiastic about his offensive against south of the Tanai to help maintain the
Myitkyina.63 combat trail. Moving up to the fore-
Because of the desperate plight of the front on the Ledo Road, the 1883d Avia-
Chindits at Mawlu, Lentaigne sent the tion Battalion began pushing through
commandos and the engineers on a the forests and marshes beyond the
rescue mission. On 4 April the com- Tarung. The unit did both grading
mandos landed five gliderloads of engi- and graveling. In April, to speed the
neers with equipment in a clearing near work, General Pick sent the 1905th
the roadblock. The men prepared a Aviation Battalion and Company A of
landing strip at the foot of the high hill the 330th Engineers ahead of the 1883d
upon which the Chindit stronghold was to put in a finished and separate four-
located. Additional troops and supplies mile stretch of road. At the same time,
flown in enabled the Chindits to keep details of engineers built a number of
the Burma Railway blocked until the landing strips along the road so that
monsoon rains began one month later.64 supplies could be flown in and defense
65
of the road facilitated.
Progress on the Ledo Road It had been recognized from the first
that one of the biggest jobs on the Ledo
During the first months of 1944 work Road would be bridging the turbulent
on the Ledo Road lagged. Because of rivers of northern Burma. Materials
the unfavorable tactical situation east of had been requisitioned early and had
the Tarung, nothing was done on the begun to reach the theater in the first
roadhead east of Shingbwiyang until 26 months of 1943. The engineers in the
January. Between then and early Feb- theater had decided that the H-20 bridge
ruary, the engineers cleared twelve miles would be best. This bridge consisted
beyond the city. Work stopped. The of decking, supported by two trusses
proximity of the Japanese and the diver- made up of rectangular, latticed steel
sion of troops to the combat trail made sections, each 12 1/2 feet long, 6 feet high,
it advisable to halt. For the time being, and 2 feet wide, weighing nearly a ton
63
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Com-
65
mand Problems, p. 192. (2) Stilwell Papers, p. 287. (1) Constr Serv, Progress Rpts, 12 Feb, 5 Apr,
64
(1) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. IX. (2) Hist of the 5 May 44. 611 CBI. (2) Hist of the 45th, 330th,
900th Engrs. and 1883d Engrs.
448 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
apiece, and bolted together. The maxi- Named after its British inventor, Sir
mum span, made up of ten sections on a Donald Coleman Bailey, it was based on
side, was 125 feet; it could carry loads an entirely different principle from that
up to 15 tons. With shorter spans and of the H-20. Its basic unit was a flat
more than two parallel trusses, the panel 10 feet long and 5 feet high, weigh-
capacity of the bridge could be increased ing about 600 pounds. The panels were
to 54 tons. Early in March, General connected by pins to form trusses, which
Pick placed the main responsibility for were joined beneath by transoms to
bridging on the 209th Combat Battalion. support the decking. Multiple trusses
One company of the battalion, helped and multiple stories of panels made it
by the 76th Light Ponton Company, possible to erect spans of 30 to 220 feet
built an H-20 bridge, 960 feet long, over that could carry loads from 10 to 100
the Tarung in 27 days, completing it tons. The panels could also be used to
early in April. The other companies of build piers. One great advantage of
the 209th bridged the lesser streams be- the Bailey was its adaptability to various
yond the Tarung. In mid-March, Com- loads. Another type of bridge which
pany A of the 209th started to build an might be used was the I-beam bridge,
H-20 over the Tawang. This bridge, produced commercially, the decking of
together with its wooden trestles over the which rested on steel beams from 30 to
67
swampy approaches, was 1,200 feet long. 60 feet long. Confronted by a short-
The major accomplishment of Company age of engineering data within and
F of the 330th Engineers during the dry without the theater, the Chief's Office
season was the erection of a third H-20, sent a team of bridging specialists to
607 feet long, over the Tanai. This job CBI in January 1944 for firsthand con-
was completed early in May.66 sultations with engineers in the theater.
As a result of the QUADRANT Confer- As a result of investigations and discus-
ence, bridging for the Ledo Road had sions held at Ledo and New Delhi during
become a major subject for planning in February and March, the theater engi-
the Office of the Chief of Engineers and neers chose the H-20 bridge as still the
in Army Service Forces in the fall of best for the Ledo Road. This decision
1943. During the following winter created something of a stir in Washing-
OCE sponsored various study projects ton, since the H-20's during the past year
in order to find the most suitable types had been replaced by Baileys in the
of bridges for the major river crossings. Engineers' catalog of standard equip-
Since the structures for the road would ment. Attempts by the Office of the
be built far behind the front lines, vari- Chief of Engineers to get Pick and Far-
ous types of military bridges and even rell to accept substitutes were to no avail.
commercial bridges could be considered. Bailey bridge panels would require more
At this time a new type of structure, the cargo space for a given bridge capacity
Bailey bridge, was replacing the H-20. than would the H-20, and I-beams were
67
For a fuller discussion of the characteristics and
66
(1) Ltr, CG SOS CBI to OPD, 17 Apr 44. OPD relative merits of the various types of bridges in use
400 CTO, Case 150. (2) Hist of the 76th, 209th, at this time, see Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, Troops
and 330th Engrs. and Equipment, pp. 483-97.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 449
too long for shipment on the diminutive from the United States and took over
cars of India's railways. Faced with construction of the 4-inch line along the
these irrefutable logistical arguments, road. The 699th and 706th Petroleum
OCE accepted the theater's decision and Distribution Companies, joined by the
reinstituted procurement of H-20 bridg- 775th in February, strove to complete
ing in late April 1944.68 the line from Ledo to Shingbwiyang as
The longer the finished portion of the soon as possible without getting in the
Ledo Road became, the greater was the way of the graveling crews. Having ar-
effort needed to keep it open to traffic. rived without their equipment, the
Pick systematically turned over to vari- troops had to borrow hand tools, welding
ous engineer battalions the responsibility machines, bulldozers, and trucks from
of maintaining each new section of the units at Ledo and on the road. They
road as soon as the forward troops fin- soon discovered what troops on the road
ished compacting the final layer of had long known—that constant hauling
gravel or crushed rock. On 29 April, he and rough roads gave trucks a merciless
set up a road maintenance division under beating and burdened drivers and me-
Lt. Col. Donald L. Jarrett, to direct the chanics with ceaseless maintenance
work of engineer troops who were to chores. As if to climax their trials, the
keep completed sections in repair.69 By 699th engineers had hardly gotten
mid-May, Jarrett had three aviation bat- pumping operations under way early in
talions working full time on maintaining March when a 1,000-barrel tank of gaso-
the road between Ledo and Shingbwi- line at Logai, fifty miles down the road
yang. They built and repaired bridges, from Ledo, burst into flames and had to
resurfaced poor sections, eliminated be junked. Nevertheless, by mid-
some of the worst curves, reduced March the line was through to Shingbwi-
grades, and installed better drainage. yang. Thereafter, MacIsaac moved the
Since Jarrett's organization was directly 706th and 775th forward as rapidly as
under Pick, Colonel Green as road engi- the tactical situation permitted.71
neer was able to concentrate his attention Colonel Kinsolving, head of District
almost entirely on road construction.70 12, had hoped to begin construction in
January on the first standard-weight 6-
Progress on the Pipelines inch line, which would extend from Cal-
cutta to the Assam Oil Company's stor-
During the first months of 1944 age tanks at Tinsukia, 30 miles west of
Colonel MacIsaac began to make more Ledo. The diversion of troops to build
rapid progress on the pipelines. Late in a 6-inch line to the MATTERHORN fields,
January specially trained troops arrived and the delay in the arrival of salvaged
standard-weight pipe from British depots
68
(1) Leslie Anders, "Bridges on the Ledo Road," in the Middle East forced Kinsolving to
The Military Engineer, XLV (July-August, 1953),
293-95. (2) Memo, Madsen for Farrell, 19 Apr 44. mark time until mid-February. Then,
Opns Br File, Constr Serv Files. (3) Memo, OCE for
CG ASF, 25 Apr 44. 823 CBI.
69 71
Hq Base Sec 3 GO No. 6, 29 Apr 44. Engr Sec (1) Hist of the 699th and 706th Engrs. (2) Hq
File, LAC Files. Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 5 Mar, 5 Apr
70
Hist of the 823d, 849th, and 858th Engrs. 44. 678 CBI.
450 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
to Byroade.76 The air force engineers Even at this late date work on the
had their work cut out for them. Hump airfields was continuing in Assam
District 3 in eastern China inherited to enable them to handle bigger loads
all the harassments and irritations Ad- for Chennault. As head of District 20,
vance Section 4 of SOS had experienced Lt. Col. Karl M. Pattee had a staff of
with Chinese officials and contractors. twenty officers and the 848th Aviation
The lieutenant-governor in South Battalion at his disposal. Most construc-
Kiangsi, who had tied up construction at tion and maintenance continued to be a
Kanchow and Sincheng during the win- responsibility of the Royal Engineers.
ter because of a dispute over the certifi- But Pattee was able through his control
cation of contractors, finally had the of his aviation battalion to exercise a
situation sufficiently under control to more than nominal control over the
permit construction to start early in course of airfield work in Assam. As
March. "He has merged all the con- before, airfield construction conformed
tractors in the area into a company of to British specifications at all of the eight
his own," one engineer wrote to Byroade, airfields regularly used by the Air Trans-
"and has jacked prices for earthwork, port Command in Assam. By the spring
paving, etc., up 200% at Sincheng and of 1944 the airlift was beginning to real-
79
100% at Kanchow."77 Merchants sup- ize its potentialities.
plying materials for American projects, While the Fourteenth Air Force was
informed that local officials expected gen- unable during the first quarter of 1944
erous kickbacks on each sale, adjusted to carry out all of Chennault's claims,
prices accordingly. In many instances the successes that it did achieve were
work was held up, specifications were such that the Japanese high command
flouted, and schedules disrupted by the was compelled to act in the spring.
paramount importance of "face." The Shipping on the Yangtze River had be-
engineers learned that the Chinese could come so unsafe that the enemy deter-
easily lose face if they took orders from mined to reopen the Peiping-Hankow
foreigners, admitted their ignorance, or railway as an alternate supply line. Be-
dealt with officials of lesser rank. In cause of Chennault's crippling attacks on
China, ways and means had to be found to the sea-lanes linking Japan to her south-
remove even the most minor incompetent ern conquests, the high command
officials without affronting their dignity. ordered its mainland armies to overrun
But progress was made on the airfields. Chennault's eastern airfields and open
By 1 April 1944 Engineer District 3 was railroad communications from the
maintaining eight major fields in eastern Yangtze Valley to Canton and French
China, and construction was well under
way on eight more.78
AF for CG XX Bomber Comd, 5 May 44. Both in
Air Engr Files, CTO.
76 79
CBI Hist, sec. III, app. IX. (1) Hq USAF CBI, G-4 Periodic Rpts for the
77
Ltr, Capt R. D. Hunter to Byroade, 24 Feb 44. Quarters Ending 31 Mar and 30 Sep 44. WW II
Air Engr Files, CTO. Rcds Div. (2) Rad, Covell to Somervell et al., 26
78
(1) Ltr, Resident Engr Sincheng, to CO Dist 3, Jul 44. 678 CBI. (3) Hist of CBI Air Serv Comd,
1Mar 44. (2) Memo, with Incls, Engr Fourteenth PP. 34-42.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 453
Indochina. The first phase of this oper- neer office in New Delhi and maintained
ation, starting in April, was to be the a forward echelon in Chungking under
conquest of a large pocket north of Colonel Seedlock. The office of theater
Hankow. In May the Japanese began engineer assumed no more importance
to move south from their base at Han- under O'Connor than it had under
kow to drive the Fourteenth Air Force Newcomer.81
off its advanced bases around Kweilin.80
Over-all Progress in Burma During
The Theater Engineer the Early Monsoon
what the conditions are. . . . Our equip- pleted that far, would enable transports
ment to a very great extent is just about to refuel there and thus conserve valu-
shot. Our troop strength has been re- able cargo space for supplies for China.
84
rains set in, Mountbatten began with- reported 71 enlisted men killed and
drawing the Chindits. Early in May 179 wounded; the 236th engineers, 4
engineer detachments were flown to two officers and 52 enlisted men killed
villages some thirty miles south of and 142 wounded. All of the 209th
Myitkyina to prepare the fields from and elements of the 236th Battalion
which the air commandos were to fly the received high praise for their action
86
Chindits back to eastern India.85 at Myitkyina.
During June and July the fighting at One hopeful development in the
Myitkyina showed no signs of abating. Burma campaign was that the Chinese
The engineers continued with their forces in Yunnan were at last on the
missions in support of the siege. By move. On 11 May the Y-Force attacked
early June all the 879th Airborne Avia- along the Salween, sending spearheads
tion Battalion was at work on the air- of three divisions across the river above
field. The detachment of the 504th and below the demolished bridge of the
Ponton Company, having established a Burma Road. The Chinese engineers
boat landing on the Irrawaddy three of the Y-Force now had an opportunity
miles below Myitkyina, was busy ferrying to show how much they had profited
Chinese troops across the river and carry- from instruction in river crossings given
ing Gurkha riflemen far downstream for at the Kunming Training Center by
reconnaissance missions. In the lines American engineers serving with the
being drawn ever tighter around the Y-Force. From nightfall of 11 May
town were the two combat battalions. until the next morning Chinese engi-
After combining the engineers into a neers ferried the infantry across the
provisional regiment early in June, Brig. turbulent Salween in pneumatic assault
Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, Stilwell's boats and makeshift rafts, with the loss
field chief of staff, brigaded them with of but one Chinese infantryman. Once
the Marauders on the northern ap- across the Salween, the Chinese infantry
proaches to Myitkyina. Their baptism engaged the Japanese in a battle that
of fire proved costly and painful because raged back and forth for many weeks
of their unfamiliarity with the ways of in the rugged mountains along the west
the enemy and the peculiar demands of bank. Eventually, the numerical pre-
the battlefield. Like the incoming re- ponderance of the Chinese began to tell.
placements for the Marauders, they were During late May they made a two-
at first lax in security measures and too pronged attack. One force advanced
prone to panic when surprised. Within yard by yard down the Burma Road to-
a short time, however, experience and ward Lung-ling, thirty-five miles west of
behind-the-lines training enabled the the Salween, and another moved toward
engineers to fight like veterans. Cas-
ualties were heavy—the 209th engineers 86
(1) Anders, "The Engineers at Myitkyina" The
Military Engineer, XLIV (November-December,
85
(1) Leslie Anders, "The Engineers at Myitkyina," 1952). (2) Memo, Capt Leo A. Vecellio, Airfield
The Military Engineer, XLIV (November-December, Engr Myitkyina, to Col. Manuel J. Asensio, 6 Jun
1952), 446-50. (2) Hist of the 209th, 236th, 504th, 44. Air Univ Lib Maxwell AFB. (3) Hist of the
and 879th Engrs. 209th, 236th, 504th, and 879th Engrs.
456 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Teng-chung, thirty-five miles to the seven tons of spare parts on ships sailing
north. On 8 June the Chinese laid in June and July. He had parts flown
siege to Lung-ling and on 2 July attacked in from Calcutta for Pick's 73 tractors
Teng-chung. Repeated attempts to take and other machines deadlined at the
the cities were repulsed.87 beginning of June.90 Farrell's repre-
By late spring the work of the engi- sentatives at Calcutta made special efforts
neers on MATTERHORN had begun to pay to expedite the shipment of new ma-
dividends. The rock and gravel fields chinery, an undertaking favored by the
in western China were ready on 15 May. rising efficiency of the Bengal-Assam
During the following weeks, the engi- Railway. During the first three weeks of
neers accelerated work on the paved June, the Engineer Supply Officer of
fields in India. Kharagpur, a field Base General Depot No. 2 at Calcutta
"barely operational" in mid-March, was sent 39 tractors, 27 graders, nine shovels,
the one nearest completion by June. nine scrapers, and many other pieces of
The 7,500-foot long runway and fifty much-needed equipment to Ledo.91
hardstands were complete. Hangars, Pick wrote Farrell on 24 June that he
salvaged from the Mediterranean theater, was as "pleased as a two-year-old at his
operational buildings, and housing were first Christmas tree. I believe with the
88
almost finished. On the 5th of the equipment which you are getting up to
month the 382d Construction Battalion us we are going to be better off than I
standing beside Kharagpur's concrete ever dreamed we could be. Most of us
runway, saw the first B-29's leave for here have worn out our patience, and I
Bangkok to bomb railway shops there. might say our lifetime good looks, try-
On 14 June the Superfortresses took off ing to make this old equipment go." 92
for the first time for Cheng-tu, from Equipment was more plentiful, but
where they flew to the Japanese home attempts to get more troops attained
island of Kyushu to bomb the steel mills little success. On 1 June 1944 there
of Yawata.89 were still only 7,200 on the road. The
The monsoon had brought an end to most critical need was for more shop and
the forward progress of the Ledo Road. parts supply companies. Since early
But efforts were under way to bring up 1943 the struggle to obtain more such
men and machinery so that work could units had been going on. The basic
start with redoubled vigor in the fall. difficulty had always been CBI's low
Assuring Pick that he would make cer- priority. In the United States there
tain "no one spares the horses in supply- was, moreover, a serious shortage of
ing your needs," General Covell got trained mechanics and parts supply
from the Los Angeles Port of Embarka- specialists. The War Department found
tion a promise that it would load thirty-
90
Ltr, Covell to Pick, 18 Jun 44. Constr Serv
87
CBI Hist, sec. II, app. HI. Files.
88 91
Hq Constr Serv Progress Rpts, MATTERHORN 12 Ltr, Farrell to Pick, 21 Jun 44. Engr Sec File,
Feb, 5 Mar, 5 Apr, 9 May, 7 Jun 44. 678 CBI. LAC Files.
89 92
(1) Hist of the 382d Engrs. (2) CBI, sec. III, Ltr, Pick to Farrell, 24 Jun 44. Engr Sec File,
app. IX. LAC Files.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 457
it impossible to organize and train new Digboi into Burma. The pace was re-
units to keep up with demands of even tarded by such problems as reluctant
those theaters overseas with the highest laborers, flooded areas, washed-out
priorities. The most Washington could bridges, and delayed pipe shipments
promise Covell was that it might allot from Calcutta. Meantime, in District
one parts supply and one heavy shop 12, Colonel Kinsolving's men were push-
company to the theater late in the sum- ing ahead with determination. On1
mer of 1944.93 Such reinforcements as July they coupled the last pipe in the
Pick was able to get for his projects dur- first 6-inch line from Calcutta to
ing the summer months consisted of but Tinsukia. The longest invasion-weight
three pipeline companies, one construc- pipeline in history was ready to carry
tion battalion, and a depot company 250,000 barrels of gasoline a month
organized at Ledo in May 1944 from two from Calcutta to Assam.95
platoons of the former 456th Depot
Company and casual personnel.94 Maps
Despite the downpours of the mon-
soon, the troops laid additional miles of Both the campaign in Burma and the
pipeline. On 8 June the 706th and work on the Ledo Road had been handi-
775th engineers connected their lines capped by the lack of adequate maps.
along the Ledo Road. With this con- The Americans had to depend mainly
nection, 180 miles of 4-inch pipe were in on maps of British or Chinese origin,
place from Digboi. Since Myitkyina many of which were out of date and
was under siege, Stilwell deemed it inaccurate. Wavell's General Staff Geo-
inadvisable to extend the line further. logical Survey, responsible for mapping
As construction on the line came to a India and Burma, did not have the re-
halt, work began on the second 4-inch sources to carry out adequately its
line along the road. MacIsaac had re- responsibilities of revising maps and
ceived three additional petroleum dis- distributing them. The Chinese were
tribution companies, the 778th, 779th, too disorganized to carry on a mapping
and 780th. He put the 778th to work effort. In the autumn of 1942 General
hauling pipe from the engineer depot at Reybold had sent three officers and three
Likhapani down the Ledo Road for the enlisted men to New Delhi as a liaison
future construction drive. He assigned group. Headed by Maj. Frank N. Gun-
the 779th the job of putting in an under- derson, they were to get from the British
ground line from Digboi to the tank such maps as the Americans needed.
farm under construction at the railway Early in 1943 Gunderson's group was
terminal in Tinsukia, twenty-two miles directed to include liaison with the Chi-
to the west. To the 780th he gave the nese in Chungking in order to obtain
job of laying the second 4-inch line from data that might enable the Army Map
93 95
Ltr, OPD to CG SOS CBI, 2 May 44. Admin (1) Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 7 Jun,
File, Constr Serv Files. 4 Jul, and 4 Aug 44. Opns Br File, Constr Serv
94
Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 22 May 44. Admin Files. (2) Hist of the 699th, 706th, 778th, 779th, and
File, Constr Serv Files. 780th Engrs.
458 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
job was to rebuild the bridge across the As the Chinese continued to drive the
Salween, since rafts and pneumatic boats Japanese back west of the Salween,
had great difficulty in coping with the American engineers supported prac-
swift and treacherous river. The pre- tically every phase of the advance.
vious span had been a suspension bridge Through the efforts of the Y-Force engi-
with stone towers and a steel trussed neers, explosives and hand tools went
deck. The Chinese had left the south forward to the Chinese at the front, and
tower with its two anchorages intact but each Chinese field army had a few Ameri-
had completely destroyed the north can engineers as advisers to help locate
tower. Dawson's engineers set out to mines and find the best sites for air-
design an improvised steel suspension strips. An outstanding example of U.S.
bridge similar to the suspension bridges engineer co-operation with the Y-Force
the Chinese had been building out of came with the formation of the Burma
vines for centuries. Unable to find any Road Engineer Detachment in June
materials salvaged from the original under Dawson, now a lieutenant colonel.
structure and informed by SOS that no The detachment, consisting initially of
supplies could be sent from India, Daw- 27 officers and 46 men picked by Daw-
son's men searched Yunnan for likely son from the engineers of the Y-Force
substitutes. They found some 1¼-inch operations staff, was, in effect, a con-
wire rope, a few iron plates and rope struction group headquarters, modified
clips, and fairly ample supplies of wood. to meet the peculiar needs of the lo-
With these materials, Dawson's Chinese cality. Attached for operations were
engineers first set out to build a suspen- various types of units, including engi-
sion footbridge. They erected a wooden neer, ordnance, signal, medical, and
tower on the north bank to replace the antiaircraft artillery.98
destroyed stone tower. They then Beyond the Salween, the engineers had
stretched two cables across the river, an- a great deal of work to do. Rising to a
chored them to the towers, and along the height of 3,000 feet above the west bank
cables hung V-shaped stirrups, about five of the river was Sung Shan Mountain.
feet apart. They then placed 2-inch Japanese artillery emplaced on it com-
boards along the bottom of the stirrups. manded thirty-six miles of the Burma
The footbridge was soon improved with Road's winding approach west of the
the installation of four cables from an- river. In their drive on Lung-ling the
chorage to anchorage and 3-inch planks Chinese had bypassed this strongpoint.
along the bottom of the stirrups. The During late June and early July, Chinese
bridge could safely take loaded jeeps. cannoneers exchanged shots regularly
The entire job required little more than with the enemy. During late July and
97
a month.
98
Ltr, Hq USAF CBI to General Marshall, 26 Jul
44. Engr Br File, CSF. (2) Hq and Hq Det Burma
97
(1) Memo, Engr Adv Sec 1 SOS to CO Adv Sec Road Engrs GO No. 1, 1 Jul 44. Burma Road Engr
1, 21 Aug 44. GED Files, CTOSOSEF. (2) Ltr with Files, China Theater Engr Files. (3) Engr Memo
Incls, Dawson to C of Mil Hist, 2 Aug 60. EHD No. 116, Dawson for CO Adv Sec 1 SOS, 20 Jul 44.
Files. CTO 611 Burma Road Engrs.
460 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
A WORKMAN STRINGS A FERRY CABLE ACROSS THE SALWEEN while men in the
foreground build the ferry.
early August the Chinese made repeated neers in the theater believed the Ledo
assaults up the mountain but could not Road should be built along this trail.
dislodge the 1,200 Japanese." In the summer of 1944 a heated contro-
Favorable developments along the versy developed over the relative merits
Salween in July, especially the siege of of this route as against the one Pick
the city of Teng-chung, had repercus- wanted, which ran 80 miles farther south
sions in headquarters at Ledo. The fall through the town of Bhamo. The
of Teng-chung, 100 miles east of Myit- origins of the dispute went back to
kyina, would clear an old caravan trail March 1944, when Stilwell thought he
which linked Myitkyina with the Burma would have to limit his advance in
Road at Lung-ling. A number of engi- northern Burma to a line including the
Teng-chung trail but not the Bhamo
99
(1) Ltr with Incls, ExecO Theater Engr Sec
area. In late March, CBI commanders
USAF CBI to OCE, 11 Oct 44. 370.2 CBI. had begun to press Chiang to make a
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 461
THE FOOTBRIDGE AND FERRY ACROSS THE SALWEEN, during Chinese advance.
positive contribution to lifting the than one by way of Bhamo.100 The Chi-
blockade of China by constructing a mili- nese agreed in June to adopt the Ameri-
tary highway from Lung-ling through can proposals and to survey the route
Teng-chung toward Myitkyina as soon as preparatory to calling out laborers and
101
the Y-Force drove the Japanese from initiating construction. Stilwell felt
that part of Burma. In April Colonel construction along the new route was
Dawson made an analysis of the project urgent. "Essential that route and work
and reported that building the road be started from the China side with-
would be feasible from an engineering out delay," he radioed to O'Connor.
standpoint. In July General O'Connor
approved construction of a road along 100
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Com-
the trail on the grounds that the region mand Problems, p. 435. (2) Ltr, Dawson to C EHD,
10 Jun 53.
would be cleared of the enemy sooner and 101
Rad, Hearn to Sultan, 27 Jul 44. Engr Br File,
a road there would be 200 miles shorter Constr Serv Files.
462 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
at the site of the mining, and the capture ground efforts to come, Colonel Mac-
of the city was only a matter of time.105 Isaac launched District 22 on a strenuous
On 3 August the Japanese lost Myit- effort to extend the first of the 4-inch
kyina, and their forces retreated south- pipelines into Myitkyina by 1 October.109
ward. The fall of the city doomed the With the coming of dry weather in the
enemy hold on northern Burma. A fall, engineer work could once more be
turning point had been reached in the undertaken in earnest.
long American struggle to help China.
The rest of Stilwell's Chinese troops The CBI Is Cut Back
now came out of the Mogaung Valley to
assemble at Myitkyina in preparation for The Decision to Reduce the
the next phase of the offensive—down Engineer Effort
the road toward Bhamo. General Pick
began moving in engineer and other Since the fall of 1943 Anglo-American
service troops to convert Myitkyina into planning circles had been increasingly
the key Allied base for the final drive to reluctant to give their support to exten-
open northern Burma; at the same time sive military undertakings on the Asian
he took back from Stilwell his decimated mainland. Many factors in late 1943
engineer combat battalions, which had and in the first months of 1944 had
suffered nearly 500 casualties, and flew encouraged a shift of interest toward
106
them to Ledo for recuperation. operations in the Pacific. Among them
With the collapse of enemy resistance, were China's interminable delay in re-
Col. Manuel J. Asensio, Tenth Air forming its military forces, British aver-
Force engineer, prepared to carry out sion to campaigning in the Burmese
Stratemeyer's plan for a ring of airfields jungles, the victory over the Japanese in
around Myitkyina, capable of making the Gilberts in November, the Russian
this area a vital hub for transport and air promise at Tehran in December to at-
combat operations.107 The existing air- tack Japan after the surrender of Ger-
field at Myitkyina, with a plane landing many, and a growing desire in the spring
or taking off every two minutes, was of 1944 to avoid frittering away military
108
already the busiest in the theater. By resources that might be needed in the
1August the engineers had extended the coming invasion of the Philippines or
110
second four-inch line from Digboi to Formosa.
Ledo. To provide the all-important Such was the feeling when General
petroleum installations for the air and Stilwell asked the War Department on
21 April 1944 for additional service
105
Ltr, with Inch, ExecO Theater Engr Sec USAF 109
CBI to OCE, 11 Oct 44. 370.2 CBI. Hq Constr Serv, Status Rpt, Pipelines, 7 Sep 44.
106
(1) Anders, "The Engineers at Myitkyina," The (2) Hq Engr Div 2, Constr Serv, Status Rpt, Pipe-
Military Engineer, XLV (November-December, 1952), lines, 30 Sep 44. Both in Opns Br File, Constr Serv
pp. 449-50. (2) Hist of the 209th and 236th Engrs. Files.
107 110
Engr Sec Tenth AF, Burma Diary, 25 Jun 44. (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Com-
Air Univ Lib, Maxwell AFB. mand Problems, pp. 79-82. (2) Craven and Cate,
108
Ltr, Godfrey to O'Connor, 31 Jul 44. O'Con- eds.,Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 495-97. (3) Church-
nor Ltr File, Constr Serv Files. hill, Closing the Ring, pp. 560-61.
464 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Chinese city of Teng-chung or continued troops to meet any demands which might
south through Bhamo. Despite the be made on him.
enthusiasm of the engineers in China In the first week of October, work
and of General O'Connor for the under- began once more. Elements of the
taking, Pick insisted that the Ledo Road 330th Engineers and of the 1304th Con-
should go 116 miles south by way of struction Battalion, together with the
Bhamo and then east to connect with the Chinese 12th Engineer Regiment, started
Burma Road at Mong Yu.115 Aware of to build a dry-weather road along the
the developing controversy, Stilwell late trail leading southward from Mile 178
in August approved construction of both to Myitkyina, to make possible sending
routes. The Chinese would build a trucks into the town as soon as possible.
road over the 135 miles from Teng- At the same time the Chinese loth Engi-
chung to Myitkyina; at the same time, neer Regiment began to clear the right-
Pick's engineers would build the road via of-way of the Ledo Road itself beginning
Bhamo.116 Pick's reconnaissance party, at Mile 178. Behind the Chinese were
sent out in the summer, returned early grading parties of the 330th to do fin-
in September and confirmed his original ished grading, surfacing, and mainte-
adverse opinion of the Teng-chung proj- nance. The 1304th was responsible for
ect by singling out the paucity of timber bridge building. On 10 October it be-
and gravel in some sections and the need gan work on a 560-foot Bailey bridge
for excessive excavation in others.117 over the Mogaung River, using materials
As the end of the monsoon season ap- supplied by British depots in India. In
proached, Pick redoubled preparations mid-October, with the opening of the
for resuming work on the road. During offensive by Chinese troops from Myit-
the summer months he had moved up kyina into eastern Burma, the 209th and
heavy equipment and stockpiled it in the 236th Combat Battalions began to repair
Hukawng Valley. In August Colonel the road running east of the Irrawaddy
Hirshfield began building a supply depot from Myitkyina to Bhamo.118
at Myitkyina not only for the road but
also for combat, using men from engi- The Burma Road
neer units in the area together with
several thousand Burmese laborers re- The Burma Road engineers, com-
cruited by the British. By the end of manded by Colonel Seedlock after
the monsoon, Pick had approximately Colonel Dawson left for the United
14,000 engineers ready for work on the States in September, got ready to help
road. He felt he at last had enough the Highway Administration build the
road from Teng-chung to Myitkyina.
115
On 2 October Seedlock set up Burma
(1) Ltr, Covell to Sultan, 28 Aug 44. (2) Ltr,
CO Adv Sec 1 SOS to Farrell, 28 Aug 44. Both in Road Engineer Division 2, with head-
Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.
116
Ltr, Farrell to Pick, 1 Sep 44. Engr Br File,
118
Constr Serv Files. (1) Progress Charts, Ledo Rd., 1 Oct, 1 Nov 44
117
Rpt, Maj James H. Kaminer to Pick, 9 Sep 44. in Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. C. (2) Hist
Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files. of the 209th, 330th, and 236th Engrs.
466 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
for two 6-inch pipelines from Calcutta to had the 777th and the 138th Petroleum
125
Assam. The first, built entirely with Distribution Companies at work along
invasion-weight pipe, had been in opera- the railway from Chittagong to Tinsukia.
tion since the last week of August. Three thousand Indian laborers were
Kinsolving planned to start work in clearing the route and digging the
October on the second, to be standard- ditches.126
weight throughout. A heavier line
could be operated at greater capacity to Airfields
meet the great demand for aviation and
truck gasoline in upper Assam. Since By the fall of 1944 few airmen set a
the line would pass through heavily very high value on the advantages of the
populated areas, it would, like the first, MATTERHORN airfields to the American
have to be put underground. The im- war effort. Between June and October
proving tactical situation in Burma in the B-29's made four raids on steel and
the late summer of 1944 enabled Kin- aircraft plants on the Japanese island of
solving to shift the southern terminus of Kyushu, three attacks on a major steel
the second line from Calcutta to the plant in Manchuria south of Mukden,
Burmah Oil Company's port facilities at one on an aircraft factory on Formosa,
Chittagong, 180 miles to the east across and another on an oil refinery on Su-
the Ganges estuary. The Chief's Office matra. It was logistically impossible to
in July 1944 expressed misgivings about increase the rate of attack beyond an
this move, pointing out that construction average of two sorties monthly for each
and operation in the rugged lands north B-29. The craft could not be supplied
of Chittagong would require a much with sufficient gasoline to make their
larger number of troops. Besides, sorties profitable. Gasoline and muni-
Chittagong's shallow harbor would neces- tions for each strike against Japan had to
sitate building a costly offshore mooring be flown to Cheng-tu by transports or by
127
together with a submarine unloading B-29's working overtime. On 3 Octo-
line. But Farrell and Kinsolving knew ber 1944 Secretary of War Stimson
that the eastern route would require 180 observed that the drain of transports to
miles less pipe, would obviate crossing CBI ". . . bids fair to cost us an extra
the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, and winter in the main theater of war." 128
would lessen the dangers implicit in con- It was expected that the B-29 fields being
centrating so many storage facilities at built in the Marianas, much closer to
Calcutta. By mid-October, Kinsolving Tokyo, would soon be ready. After a
few more raids on Formosa and Kyushu
in support of the American drive in the
125
The early planning papers place the northern
126
terminus of the 6-inch lines at Dibrugarh, a barge (1) Memo, ACofS OPD for CG ASF, 10 Jul 44,
landing on the upper Brahmaputra connected by a with Inds, 14 Jul and 19 Jul 44. 678 CBI. (2)
short stretch of meter-gauge railway with the Digboi Theater Engr Staff Journal 26 Jun, 4 Aug 44.
refinery and the Ledo Base. By the spring of 1944 Admin File, Constr Serv Files. (3) Hq Constr Serv,
Construction Service planning had changed the Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 6 Oct, 6 Nov 44.
127
terminus to a tank storage "farm" under erection by Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Matterhorn
engineer troops at Tinsukia, a key railway junction to Nagasaki, pp. 94-118.
128
just west of Digboi. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 538.
468 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Philippines and after several strategic The 930th and 1877th engineers arrived
bombing missions in southeastern Asia, during September and October. By the
the B-29's in CBI prepared to transfer to latter month, Asensio's projects were
the Pacific. By late 1944 the main engi- well under way.130
neer job on the fields in India and China
was maintenance only.129 The Tactical Situation
The airfields now of most concern in
CBI were those around Myitkyina. After their victories on the Manipur
While the siege was still in progress, Plain and at Myitkyina, the Allies made
Colonel Asensio's men had begun work fairly steady progress along their fronts.
on the runways there. According to The Japanese were being constantly
plans which had been worked out with forced farther south in Burma. In Sep-
Godfrey's representative in June, Asensio tember General Sultan, having taken
was to complete by 1 October 1944 a the field as Stilwell's deputy, sent the
6,000-foot all-weather field at the orig- British 36th Division on a long, south-
inal Myitkyina airstrip, now called ward drive along the Burma Railway
Myitkyina South. A similar field was from Mogaung to Mandalay. At the
to be built just above the town— same time the newly organized and
Myitkyina North. Ten miles south of American-trained Chinese Sixth Army
Mogaung, Asensio was to build a fair- moved out of the Mogaung area and
weather strip by 15 November to sup- pushed southward over hills and through
port the British offensive rolling south- jungles toward a crossing of the Irra-
ward toward Mandalay. At the same waddy west of Bhamo. In mid-October
time, six miles southwest of Myitkyina, the Chinese 1st Army advanced from
he was to have a fair-weather runway Myitkyina along the road to Bhamo.
capable of taking B-29's. Finally, to The military picture in Burma grew
support the Chinese advance into eastern constantly brighter for the Allies.
Burma, there was to be a fair-weather But it was darkening in eastern China.
strip, just across the Irrawaddy, to be Disaster had begun in the spring of 1944,
known as Myitkyina East, and to be as the Japanese bestirred themselves to
finished by 1 January 1945. During seize the airfields that the Fourteenth Air
July the Tenth Air Force flew in the Force was using in its strikes against
1888th aviation engineers so that they enemy shipping. A major Japanese
would be ready to begin work on Myit- drive had begun on 26 May with a
kyina North as soon as tactically feasible. thrust in the direction of Changsha. On
When, after capture of Myitkyina, it 18 June the Chinese abandoned the city.
became clear that the Ledo Road would Before the end of the month the Japa-
not reach the town before November,
Asensio began bringing in by air the
rest of his units and their equipment. 130
(1) Engr Sec Tenth AF, Burma Diary, Oct 44.
(2) Ltr, Godfrey to Byroade, 23 Aug 44. AAF 312.2
CTO. (3) Ltr, Godfrey to Stratemeyer, 8 Oct 44.
129
Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Matterhorn O'Connor Ltr File, Constr Serv Files. (4) Hist of
to Nagasaki, pp. 126-30. the 930th, 1877th, and 1888th Engrs.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 469
nese had reached Heng-yang, where they had strict orders from Chungking to
at last encountered a Chinese force de- employ the classic but futile stratagem
termined to hold. After a staunch but of retiring within the city's walls. This
hopeless defense that lasted nearly two news convinced Stilwell that Kweilin
months, the Chinese surrendered the city was destined to become "another rat
on 8 August. At the beginning of Sep- trap." 132 He gave the order that after-
tember the invaders started their advance noon to destroy the three heavy bomber
from Heng-yang. While one column fields near the city. The engineers com-
moved westward out of the valley to- plied during the night. They buried
ward the bomber field at Shao-yang, the and detonated bombs in the taxiways and
main body advanced toward Ling-ling. runways, while air force personnel
Meanwhile, a Japanese expedition, mov- burned the buildings. Eleven days
ing west from Canton, threatened the later the process was repeated 120 miles
bomber fields in the region to the south to the south at Tanchuk, just before a
of Kweilin. As Stilwell had feared, the Japanese column from Canton arrived.133
Chinese armies in the eastern provinces The loss of airfields in eastern China
were incapable of stemming the enemy's created a need for new ones in the central
drives. It became the painful duty of and southern part of the country. Leav-
Chennault's engineers to undertake the ing some of his planes in the eastern
task of destroying the airfields which pocket around Kanchow and Sui-chuan,
would soon be overrun by the enemy. Chennault planned in October to rede-
On 4 September the resident engineer at ploy the bulk of his force to fields along
Ling-ling applied the torch and dynamite a north-south axis running through
to the field there, four days before the Chungking.134 Thus Byroade, who re-
Japanese arrived. On 14 September the turned to Washington in September,
field at Shao-yang was destroyed.131 bequeathed to Col. Austin W. Betts, the
As the Japanese were advancing rap- new Fourteenth Air Force engineer, the
idly along the 100-mile road from Ling- task of beginning construction and im-
ling to Kweilin, the Americans had to provement of several fields north and
decide quickly what to do about the east of Chungking and east of Kunming.
major airfields clustered around the During October Betts arranged with the
latter city. Stilwell himself went to Chinese to build a medium bomber base
Kweilin on 14 September to canvass 180 miles northwest of Kweilin and
possibilities for holding the area. He another 400 miles west of that city, to-
found that the Japanese were only gether with several fighter fields in these
seventy miles away. Equally ominous areas.135
was the fact that the local commander
132
CBI Hist, pp. 198-99.
133
Ltr, Resident Engr, Li Chia Chen, to Dist 3
131
(1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Com- Engr China Air Serv Area Comd, 1 Oct 44. Air
mand Problems, pp. 371-73, 399-401, 405, 433. (2) Engr Files, CTO.
134
Fourteenth AF Hist, pp. 433, 456-60. (3) Rad, CO Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 81-82.
135
Kweilin Air Base to Hq China Air Serv Area Comd, Ltr, Betts to Godfrey, 13 Nov 44. AAF 312.2
6 Sep 44. Air Engr Files, CTO. CTO.
470 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
This bridge was apparently the third Work continued in eastern Bengal and
longest ponton structure built by U.S. Assam on the second 6-inch line. Tak-
Army Engineers up to this time.140 ing advantage of the proximity of the
After the engineers had completed the pipeline's right-of-way to the railroad
first 4-inch pipeline to Myitkyina on 27 from Chittagong northward, Colonel
September, emphasis turned to running Kinsolving made up work trains for his
the line through to Kunming. Parties men. Each train, with cars for troops,
worked toward each other from these equipment, and supplies, moved forward
two points. On 26 October Colonel as needed from siding to siding. From
Morse established an advanced head- the outset his work was hampered be-
quarters at Yunnanyi and assigned to it cause much of the salvaged British pipe
the 779th, 780th, and 1381st Petroleum made available under reverse lend-lease
Distribution Companies; a fourth unit, had been seriously damaged in transit
the 1382d, arrived in December. Pipe from the Middle East. As was the case
was flown in from Assam. Lt. Col. with the first 6-inch line, Kinsolving had
Frank H. Newnam, Jr., SOS engineer in to change specifications while construc-
the China Theater, making an inspection tion was in progress. Despairing of
on 27 November, was favorably im- getting enough new standardweight pipe
pressed with the work of the "well- from the United States in time to com-
equipped, well-manned, and efficient" plete the project on 1 April 1945, he
units. Meanwhile, two petroleum dis- decided in late December to convert the
tribution companies, the 709th and the northernmost 150 miles to invasion-
775th, were laying pipe out of Myitkyina. weight, which would mean a reduction
The two groups were expected to meet in the line's capacity from 13,000 to
in 1945. Three other companies were 10,000 barrels a day. For the northern
operating the lines from Tinsukia to reaches of the line he used some of the
Myitkyina. On 19 November the sec- pipe intended for the 6-inch line across
ond 4-inch line was complete to Myit- Burma. At times, Kinsolving had diffi-
kyina, eleven days ahead of schedule.141 culty in getting cargo space on British
vessels operating between Calcutta and
140
It was exceeded in length by the bridge laid Chittagong, and the scarcity of workmen
by Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's engineers across the was a problem at first. One obstacle
James River in June 1864 and by the demonstra- appeared well out of the way by Christ-
tion bridge put across the Rhine by Third Army
engineers in 1919. See James A. Huston, "Grant's mas; the Indian Navy had by then agreed
Crossing of the James," The Military Engineer, XLV to install the offshore mooring at Chitta-
(January-February, 1953), 18-22, and the R.O.T.C. gong's harbor, and the Burmah Oil Com-
Manual, Engineers (Harrisburg, Pa., 1941), vol. III,
pp. 347-48. pany had agreed to connect this mooring
141
(1) Hq Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 6 to its tank farm with two underwater
Nov and 9 Dec 44, 28 Jan 45. (2) Plng Div ASF, The unloading lines.142
Ledo Road, app. E. (3) Ltrs, Covell to Somervell,
142
18 Oct, 20 Nov 44. Admin File, Constr Serv Files. (1) Hq Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 6
(4) Hist of the 706th, 709th, 776th, 779th, 780th, Nov, 6 Dec 44, 9 Jan 45, 6 Feb 45. (2) Ltr, Welling
1381st, and 1382d Engrs. (5) Memo, Newnam for to Farrell, 27 Dec 44. Specs File, Constr Serv Files.
Maj Gen Gilbert X. Cheves, 25 Nov 44. GED File, (3) Ltr, Kinsolving to Mgr Burmah Oil Co, 26 May
CTSOSEF. 45. Opns Br File, Constr Serv Files.
472 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Colonel Asensio pushed work on the delayed a full month before conscripting
airfields around Myitkyina. Additional labor in large numbers. Parties work-
engineer troops and equipment came in ing eastward from Myitkyina were show-
by air from India during November. ing encouraging progress. They were
Between July and November the Tenth comparatively well supplied with ma-
Air Force had flown in 149 2½-ton chinery. Pick's depots had sent them 4
trucks, 66 tractors, 32 scrapers, 30 motor- D-7 bulldozers, 4 motor graders, 4 air
ized graders, 27 rollers, 9 power shovels, compressors, and 4 trucks; during the
4 cranes, and great quantities of lesser latter part of November, the Air Trans-
equipment. Impressed by the ingenuity port Command flew in additional ma-
of Asensio's subordinates in preparing so chinery. Still, by early December it was
much heavy machinery for air transporta- obvious that the target-date for comple-
tion, General Stratemeyer declared on 5 tion of a one-lane, surfaced road would
October that it was impossible to "give have to be moved back from 15
too much publicity" to this significant January.144
operation. The opening of the Ledo Work was going ahead on the Ledo
Road's cutoff near Mogaung made it pos- Road, although Japanese forces were still
sible to bring into Myitkyina the avia- astride the route in eastern Burma.
tion engineers' 12-yard Tournapulls, D-8 Until mid-December work east of the
tractors, and 4-ton trucks during Novem- Irrawaddy was designed primarily to
ber. Asensio's work was now in high maintain a supply line for the troops
gear. He strove not only to meet the besieging Bhamo. Thereafter, the
operational target dates for all fields 1875th Aviation Battalion moved across
but also to bring them to all-weather the river to begin in earnest the construc-
standards before the next monsoon.143 tion of a military highway. While
With regard to the Teng-chung Road, Company C built a 14-mile, all-weather
the Chinese displayed their usual mix- link eastward from the Irrawaddy cross-
ture of enthusiasm and procrastination. ing to the dry-weather track to Bhamo,
The Central Government held back the the major part of the battalion under-
first allotment of funds until mid- took regrading, widening, and surfacing
November; Mr. Kung, director of the of the track south of its projected junc-
Highway Administration, then made a tion with the Ledo Road. The 209th
concerted effort to organize his laborers Combat Battalion worked on fixed
and to get hand tools. Work began in bridges; the 71st Light Ponton Company
earnest in the latter part of the month, erected and maintained ponton bridges
but prospects for rapid construction
were not encouraging. Governor Lung
144
(1) Memo, Seedlock for CO Adv Sec 1 SOS
CBI, 16 Sep 44. Engr Br Files, Constr Serv Files.
(2) Rad, Maj Gen Thomas G. Hearn, CofS CBI, to
Covell, 5 Oct 44. Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.
143
(1) Asensio to Godfrey, n.d., Rpt of Movement (3) Memo for Rcd, C Engr SOS China Theater, 25
by Air of Heavy Engr Equip. Air Univ Lib, Max- Nov 44. GED, CTSOSEF. (4) Rad, Cheves to Hq
well AFB. (2) Engr Sec Tenth AF, Burma Diary, USF 1 BT 19 Dec 44. Engr Br File, Constr Serv
passim. (3) Hist of the 1891st Engrs. Files.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 473
over the many streams. By January the mand and China Theater flashed to the
236th Combat Battalion, working closely world the news that the blockade of
146
behind the advancing Chinese infantry, China was broken.
was improving the 72-mile blacktop road General Pick had his own plans for a
from Bhamo to its junction with the "first convoy." Early in January he had
Burma Road at Mong Yu. The work assembled at Ledo a caravan of "jeeps,
consisted mostly of widening the road, weapon carriers, ambulances, [and] heavy
putting in culverts, and repairing the cargo trucks"—113 vehicles in all—
145
bridges. loaded with enough artillery and am-
munition to equip two Chinese batteries
Two Roads to China and one weapons company. The driv-
ers had been selected from all the engi-
Meanwhile, Seedlock's Burma Road neer units which had worked on the
engineers, now 500 strong and assisted by road. Among the civilian passengers
nearly 12,000 Chinese laborers, made un- were 65 radio, magazine, and newspaper
expectedly rapid progress in pushing a correspondents. At Ledo, the convoy
road along their route from both ends. passed in review before General Sultan.
Initially the job had seemed an "im- On 12 January, Pick led the procession
possible" one. The road reached eleva- out of the city. Three days later it
tions of 8,500 feet, skirted towering reached Myitkyina, where it was forced
cliffs, and in places had to be cut through to halt because the Japanese were still
deep jungle; parts of the area were so in control of the area around Namhkam,
inaccessible that food and supplies had seventy miles east of Bhamo. While
to be brought in by mule pack or waiting, Pick received the news that the
dropped from planes. Nevertheless, a Myitkyina-Teng-chung Road was open.
100-mile-stretch of virgin trail was He gave it a frosty reception. On the
pushed through in 60 days. In the be- 23d the convoy resumed its forward
lief that the road to Teng-chung would movement. When it reached Namhkam
soon be open, China Theater on 6 Janu- three days later, it had to halt again
ary approved the departure from Myit- because of the fighting near Mong Yu.
kyina of a "convoy" consisting of two The next day, the Chinese drove the
trucks and an 11-ton wrecker; in com- Japanese from the city. Company B of
mand was 1st Lt. Hugh A. Pock. On 20 the 236th Combat Battalion rushed to
January Seedlock's engineers met in the Mong Yu to connect the Ledo and Burma
mountainous frontier region. (Map 22) Roads; at the same time, the 71st Light
A one-lane, unsurfaced track was open Ponton Company hastily put a 450-foot
from Myitkyina to China. Pock's con- ponton bridge across the Shweli at
voy continued on to Kunming and
reached the city on the evening of 22 146
(1) 1st Ind, Seedlock to Offs and Men of the
January. The Southeast Asia Com- Burma Road Engrs, 28 Jan 45, on Ltr, Cheves, CG
SOS China Theater, 23 Jan 45. CTO 611 BRE. (2)
Ltr, Seedlock to Covell, 14 Mar 45. Covell Ltr File,
Constr Serv Files. (3) Romanus and Sunderland,
145
Hist of the 71st, 209th, and 236th Engrs. Time Runs Out in CBI, p. 140.
474 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MAP 22
the 4-inch pipeline to Kunming. Now fore, and all construction projects re-
that the major engineer missions in Asia lated to the supply of China remained in
were certain of fulfillment, a policy of full force. Additional troops and equip-
retrenchment, particularly in the India- ment arrived at Calcutta to insure the
Burma Theater, was well under way. earliest possible completion of the line
Some units were transferred to China. of communications across India and
The organization in India-Burma was Burma. Nevertheless, the favorable
reduced, and a number of officers re- progress of the war against Japan in other
turned to the United States. General theaters meant a decline in the impor-
O'Connor and General Farrell left in tance of CBI.148
December; in January, Col. Alvin C.
Welling was given the triple responsibili-
148
ties of Theater Engineer, SOS Engineer, Time Runs Out in CBI, chs. I, IV. For a brief
resume of engineer activities in China, Burma, and
and Commanding Officer, Construction India in 1945 to the end of the war, see below,
Service. Work continued much as be- pp. 662-66.
CHAPTER XII
MAP 23
and warehouses on Kwajalein and had joint Navy-Army affair. The Army
constructed an airfield on Roi and a pier component, made up of elements of the
and warehouses on Namur. On 20 July 7th Infantry Division, under Maj. Gen.
1943 the Joint Chiefs directed Nimitz to Charles H. Corlett, was to seize Kwaja-
begin planning for an assault on the lein Island. The 4th Marine Division
Marshalls to be made the following would take Roi and Namur.2
January. On 1 September they set the Extensive engineer planning was
date for the initial attack as 1 January; necessary for operations in the Marshalls.
this was postponed in October to 31 Most of it was required for Kwajalein
January. Kwajalein was to be taken
first. Thereafter, Majuro, in the south- 2
(1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and
eastern part of the Marshalls, and Eniwe- Marshalls, pp. 166ff. (2) Lt Gen Robert C. Richard-
tok, in the northwestern part of the son, Jr., Rpt, Participation in the Marshall Islands
Opns by USAFICPA, Jan-Feb 44 (cited hereafter as
archipelago, were to be captured. The USAFICPA, Marshall Islands Opn), p. 27. 98-USF3-
attack on Kwajalein atoll would be a 0.3 (23498). (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 322.
478 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Island. Three combat units were as- employed on Makin. Two Army de-
signed to the assault phase and their fense battalions were organized—the 3d
functions clearly defined. The 13th and the 4th. Company D of the 34th
Engineer Combat Battalion, under Lt. Combat Regiment was assigned to the
Col. Harold K. Howell, as the divisional former; the 1st Battalion of the 47th
engineer unit, would go in with the 7th General Service Regiment, the 854th
Division. Each of the battalion's three Aviation Battalion, and a provisional
lettered companies was attached to a engineer headquarters, to the latter. If
regimental combat team; in turn, each necessary, elements of the garrison force
platoon was attached to a battalion land- engineers were to go in with the assault
ing team. Engineers and infantry of the troops and help the 50th engineers with
4
battalion landing teams were trained to shore party work.
work together in special assault groups. The troops spent considerable time
Each engineer platoon was broken down in training. Combat engineers received
into three provisional squads, each of training in assault landings and co-
which, including specially attached per- ordination with the infantry. The men
sonnel from platoon headquarters, had assigned to the garrison force got instruc-
about fifteen men. A squad supported tion in removing mines, operating equip-
a reinforced rifle company. Equipped ment, installing refrigeration, using
with explosives, flame throwers, and water distillation units, and fighting fires.
hand tools, the engineers were to give Much attention was given to planning
close support to the infantry in the re- for the air base on Kwajalein. The
duction of enemy strongpoints; since this engineers of Headquarters, Seventh Air
would probably be their only function, Force, and in General Kramer's office
they were to bring in no machinery ex- prepared most of the layouts. Those of
cept bulldozers during the first days. the air engineers called for facilities for
The 50th Engineer Combat Battalion, four medium bomber squadrons and
under Lt. Col. Leonard L. Kingsbury, if their servicing units. Final plans were
not needed in combat, was to turn at based on standard drawings modified to
once to shore party work. In reserve fit the conditions expected. The com-
was Company B, less one platoon, of the manding officer of the 4th Defense Bat-
102d Combat Battalion of the 27th Divi- talion spent much time and effort in
sion, which was to be ready for either helping to put plans for base construc-
combat or shore party work.3 tion in final shape. Engineer supply
To garrison the island, the same type required a great deal of effort. Kramer's
of organization was set up as had been staff prepared detailed lists of materials
which were then reviewed by unit engi-
3
neers and the base commander's staff.
(1) USAFICPA, Marshall Islands Opn, pp. 85ff.
(2) Maj C. N. Shaffer, Rpt on the Kwajalein Opn
Three shipping priorities were set up.
(cited hereafter as Shaffer Rpt). EHD Files. (3) The first included 221 prefabricated
Ltr, Kramer to Reybold, 13 Apr 44. 98-USF3-20.0 portable buildings, mostly kitchens and
(2590)M. (4) Memo for Rcd, Col Wayne C. Zimmer-
man, 17th Inf, n.d., sub: The Infantry-Engineer
4
Team. (2687) 9-1.2405/44. USAFICPA, Marshall Islands Opn, pp. 87-8
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 479
mess halls, to be shipped with the assault the beach. It was especially difficult to
forces. The second and third included, get jeeps, trucks, and trailers to shore.
for the most part, materials for building Bulldozer operators helped pull the
warehouses, shops, and hangars.5 vehicles to the beach and then went to
work to clear positions for the artillery.
The Assault on Kwajalein By 1600 the job was finished, and soon
thereafter the 105's had completed their
During the last week of January a task registration fires.6
force of more than sixty vessels was on Soon after 0800 the next day, the land-
its way to the Marshalls. An engineer ing craft lined up in waves for the
observer, Maj. C. N. Shaffer, aboard one assault on Kwajalein. Infantry and
of the transports loaded principally with engineers clambered down the ships' nets
engineers, infantrymen, and tankers, re- to their boats and, protected by a power-
ported that "the trip . . . was uneventful, ful naval bombardment, sped toward the
the morale of the men was noticeably beaches in orderly formations. There
high, and their spirit on the evening was little enemy fire aside from a few
prior to D-Day . . . was at a peak." antiaircraft shells. At 0930 the first
Dawn of the 31st found the armada six to troops came ashore. The preliminary
ten miles west of its objective. The bombardment had been effective. Forti-
four islets to the northwest of Kwajalein fications near the water's edge had been
were attacked first, and, by midday, the pounded into rubble; a seawall under
two outermost ones were secured. Few construction had been smashed. The
Japanese were found on them. At the plan of attack called for two regimental
same time the two islands nearest combat teams to land abreast and move
Kwajalein were under assault. The first up the length of the island. Protected
waves of infantry and elements of the by a heavy naval and air bombardment,
13th engineers, expert with rocket the landing teams advanced inland for
grenades, explosives, flame throwers, and 150 yards before meeting resistance.
wire cutters, had come ashore soon after Then, amidst piles of rubble, they came
0900. Major Shaffer, landing on one of upon a few small pillboxes, which the
the islands shortly before noon, found infantry-engineer teams, in their first
the assault had met with no resistance. test on such installations, easily elimi-
The fifty or so enemy soldiers had been nated.7
evacuated the night before. The first Soon after the first elements had
waves of landing craft had crossed the landed, the first shore party engineers
coral reefs without mishap, but several came in with Col. Brendan A. Burns, the
of the later waves had a hard time. By
6
early afternoon a number of boats were (1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and
Marshalls, p. 223. (2) Shaffer Rpt.
stuck and were forced to unload supplies 7
(1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and
and equipment some sixty yards short of Marshalls, pp. 235ff. (2) Samuel Eliot Morison,
"History of United States Naval Operations," vol.
VII, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls (Boston,
5
(1) USAFICPA, Marshall Islands Opn, pp. 85, 1957), pp. 257ff. (3) S. L. A. Marshall, Island Vic-
93. (2) Ltr, Kramer to Reybold, 13 Apr 44. tory (Washington, 1945), pp. 48ff. (4) Shaffer Rpt.
480 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
75-mm. guns point-blank at the installa- placed fire on the pillbox while the engi-
tion under attack, thus enabling the engi- neers moved forward with satchel
neers and infantry to close in on it. charges and flame throwers. In some
Though barbed-wire entanglements cases, the occupants of an installation,
were rare, the infantry-engineer teams only stunned, would come to hours later
had been trained to deal with them also. and reman their guns. Infiltrators
If the advancing troops were held up by would reoccupy some of the pillboxes
small arms fire aimed at the barbed wire that had been left intact. After the
from a pillbox, the infantry "buttoned second day on Kwajalein, clean-up de-
up" the pillbox while the engineers ran tails were organized to reduce all fortifi-
or crawled to the wire, placed bangalore cations to rubble.10
torpedoes, and withdrew. The ensuing The engineer shore parties were carry-
explosion, with its noise and smoke, was
10
the signal for the infantry to rush (1) Shaffer Rpt. (2) Ltr, Kramer to Reybold,
13 Apr 44. (3) Engr an. to G-3, USAFICPA, Rpt on
through the opening in the obstacle. Kwajalein Opn. 307-20 (3492). (4) Memo for Rcd,
Once safely past, the infantry again Zimmerman, The Infantry-Engineer Team.
482 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
ing on equally important if less dramatic boxes, machine gun emplacements, earth
work. As his staff, Colonel Burns had a and log bunkers, and barricades against
provisional group headquarters of sixty- tanks—all of them still formidable even
two officers and men. Under his com- though they had been heavily pounded
mand were the 50th Battalion, one by naval guns, artillery, and aerial bom-
battalion of the 47th General Service bardment. Enemy resistance was tena-
Regiment, and one company of the 34th cious; the fighting, savage. To the
Combat Regiment. Each company sup- troops the action seemed "indescribably
ported one battalion landing team. At chaotic; it was like trying to fight your
the two original beaches on the western way across the landscape of a night-
and southern shores of the island, reefs mare." 12 Nevertheless, the advance
interfered considerably with unloading. continued. At four in the afternoon
Engineers making a reconnaissance of General Corlett radioed Rear Adm.
the lagoon side of the island discovered Richmond K. Turner, commander of the
an excellent place for bringing in sup- Joint Expeditionary Force: "All organ-
13
plies, and by noon of the second day all ized resistance . . . has ceased."
shore party activities had been diverted
to it. Rather slow at first, unloading Majuro
speeded up on the third day, when
cranes, trucks, and bulldozers were The assault on Majuro, in the south-
brought in. The shore parties were eastern Marshalls, made on 31 January,
soon handling supplies faster than land- began with the disembarkment on the
ing craft could transport them. About atoll of a battalion landing team of the
300 yards inland, the engineers set up 106th RCT, 27th Division. Two engi-
supply dumps and cut roads to them neer units went in with the assault
from the unloading sites. They con- forces—the 2d platoon of Company B
structed eight causeways in the lagoon to of the 102d Combat Battalion to support
unload the heavier supplies and equip- the infantry, and Company B of the
ment. Enemy interference was slight. 104th Combat Battalion to do shore
After the third day work went on with- party work. The BLT commander
out interruption even at night on the with a special staff, including the com-
brightly lighted beaches.11 mander of Company B of the 104th
By the morning of 4 February more engineers, went ashore on the major
than three-fourths of Kwajalein was in island of the atoll for a reconnaissance.
American hands. The enemy, bottled The party found large quantities of
up in a litter-strewn area 1,000 yards construction supplies and explosives,
long and 400 yards wide, was in a hope- including many 5-inch and 8-inch naval
less position. But this part of the island shells. There were no booby traps
abounded with defenses—shelters, pill- or mines. Japanese installations were
11 12
(1) Shaffer Rpt. (2) Ltr, Capt John S. Hassell, Marshall, Island Victory, p. 93.
13
Prov Hq Engr Combat Group, to Kramer, 21 Feb 44. Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and
Engr AGF PAC. Marshalls, p. 289.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 483
fairly extensive, but only one enemy neers, most of them organized in squads
soldier was found. The engineers de- of sixteen men, had been teamed with
stroyed the unexploded naval shells, infantry platoons as on Kwajalein and
began clearing away the wreckage, and equipped with flame throwers and de-
prepared to rehabilitate the facilities of molitions. Progress was slow against
the island.14 such enemy pillboxes and fortifications
as remained after the bombardment.
Eniwetok Eniwetok was one of the highest islands
in the Marshalls. Because underground
Some 325 miles northwest of Kwaja- defenses were deep and "well-recessed,"
lein, Eniwetok atoll consisted of about few of them had been detected on aerial
thirty islets arranged in an almost per- photographs. Infantry-engineer teams
fect ring, twenty miles in diameter. again destroyed pillboxes, emplace-
Plans called for an assault by Army and ments, and dugouts with demolitions
Marine units on three of the islets, and flame throwers. Operations on
Eniwetok and Parry in the south and Parry Island, to the northeast of Eniwe-
Engebi in the north, and the subsequent tok, were similar. Parry was cleared in
construction of a naval base. After the one day.16
unexpectedly rapid capture of Kwajalein, Shore party work was carried on as on
Admiral Nimitz decided to move up the Kwajalein. The 104th Battalion went
assault on Eniwetok, originally sched- in early on Eniwetok. Company C, the
uled for about 1 May. Begun on 3 first unit to hit the beach, came ashore
February, preparations for the stepped- six minutes after the initial wave of in-
up attack were completed twelve days fantry landed; it was quickly evident
later and the assault force set out for its that the engineers had arrived too soon.
destination; exact planning in this short Since the Japanese were putting up
time had not been possible.15 unexpected resistance in back of the
The marines came ashore on Engebi beaches, congestion of troops and sup-
on 17 February. Two days later the plies at the landing points was marked.
106th Regimental Combat Team, less a Only after more than two hours had
battalion landing team, arrived off passed was any cargo brought in for the
Eniwetok. Company B, less one pla- shore party to handle. The engineers
toon, of the load Combat Battalion, cut ramps through the high banks in
provided combat support, and the 104th back of the beaches so that tanks and
Combat Battalion, less one company, trucks could move inland more easily.
served as shore party. The 102d engi- They set up water points, collected dis-
carded equipment, and buried enemy
14
dead. On Parry Island, Company C of
(1) 104th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl, 5 Jan-14 Nov 17
44. ENBN 104-0.7. (2) Memo for Rcd, Capt Ray- the 104th performed similar duties.
mond W. Beggs, CO Co B 104th Engr Combat Bn,
sub: Opn: SUNDANCE, 31 Jan-28 Feb 44. Engr AGF
16
PAC. (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 318ff. Hist of the load Engr Combat Bn. (2) 104th
15
Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Engr Combat Bn, Jnl, 5 Jan-14 Nov 44.
17
Marshalls, pp. 333ff. Ltr, Lt Col John R. Sharp, CO 104th Engr Com-
484 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Defense Battalion, the garrison force for camp for themselves, including screened
the island, included the 1st Battalion of mess halls, kitchens, latrines, and a floor
the 47th Engineers, numbering about for each tent.19
1,800 men. They were to start work on On Majuro, meanwhile, the engineers
the airfield and continue with the job continued to be busy. They helped
until relieved by a naval construction the infantry unload supplies, cleared and
battalion. The Japanese airstrip, with repaired a road running from the north
a reinforced concrete runway four inches to the south of the island, and, within a
thick, was repaired, and by 25 February few days, had established supply dumps,
a 3,000-foot fighter strip was usable. waterpoints, and camps. They then
Progress was not as rapid as it might aided the Seabees in building a minor
have been for a number of reasons. base. They remodeled and repaired a
The engineers had to remove a large Japanese pier, resurfaced roads with
number of unexploded bombs because coral and sand, built causeways between
ordnance personnel was lacking. There a number of islands, and helped in the
was also a serious shortage of supplies, construction of the airfield. The Army
partly because of a difference of opinion engineers left Majuro at the end of
over who should supply the island— February for Oahu; the base was hence-
one of the consequences of the speed-up forth operated by the Navy.20
in operations. Kwajalein Island remained the scene
After a naval construction battalion of greatest activity. On the lagoon
reached Eniwetok, some of the 102d and side near the northeast end of the island,
104th engineers remained to help con- the engineers rebuilt Nob Pier, 1,600
struct the naval base. They were at feet long, where five LST's and numer-
first used in an inefficient manner. ous smaller craft could unload at one
Their main jobs were to straighten out time. They also rebuilt a small pier,
supply dumps for the infantry and bury 250 feet long, near the center of the
enemy dead. The engineers pointed island on the lagoon side. By June
out to the naval commander that little 1944 they had provided storage for
work was being done on the naval base 800,000 barrels of gasoline, extensive
and that they could help in base con- camps, numerous administrative build-
struction with their heavy equipment. ings, and hospitals. A network of
The atoll commander agreed, and the coral-surfaced roads crisscrossed the
combat engineers set out to help the island.
Seabees. Early in March they began an Construction was not carried on with-
extensive construction program on an out some difficulties. Engineer plan-
around-the-clock basis with 12-hour
19
shifts, erecting Quonset huts, clearing (1) Memo, Kramer for Richardson, 16 Mar 44.
Engr AGF PAC. (2) Memo, Kramer to DC/S-R, 20
areas for runways, taxiways, and roads, Apr 44. Engr AGF PAC. (3) Building the Navy's
blasting coral for surfacing, and build- Bases, II, 324ff.
20
ing revetments. The naval commander (1) Memo for Rcd, Beggs, CO Co B 104th Engr
Combat Bn, sub: Opn: SUNDANCE, 31 Jan-28 Feb
gave the engineers tentage and lumber 1944. Engr AGF PAC. (2) Building the Navy's
to enable them to build a semipermanent Bases, II, 318ff.
486 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
begin. A continuing problem was the tory explanation of his actions, which
deterioration of the roads in the islands, appear to be direct and clear violations
particularly at Oahu. Conferences were of the original contract, the change
held, but, as before, little or nothing orders and supplemental agreements
23
was done to improve the roads. approved by the War Department in
Washington, D.C. ..." The contractors
The Hawaiian Constructors went on to say that, in their opinion,
" . . . the action of the Contracting
Negotiations between the Honolulu Officer is so arbitrary and obviously
District and the Hawaiian Constructors erroneous that we must construe it as an
to arrive at a final settlement of the act of bad faith motivated by bias and
contract dragged on. By late 1943 the prejudice and intended to injure the
Engineers had been able to show addi- contractor." 25 General Richardson ex-
tional progress. In mid-October, agree- pressed the view that ". . . it would
ment had been reached as to the com- appear that there does not obtain be-
pletion status of the work on 31 January tween the respective parties that degree
1943 and the estimated cost of the of mutual confidence which is deemed
projects not covered by the contract. essential to an early settlement of the
In January 1944 substantial agreement contract." He directed Kramer to
was reached on the estimated cost of the confer with the contractors' representa-
changes made in the basic contract and tives and, having done so, explain why
the first forty-three supplemental agree- settlement of the contract was "so un-
ments. Still a bone of bitter contention duly prolonged." The contractors were
was the fee. The contractors continued permitted to tell their side of the story
to feel they were entitled to special at the meetings held early in March.
compensation because the government Late that month the Office of the Chief
had terminated the contract just when of Engineers, at General Richardson's
they were making strenuous efforts to request, sent two experts in cost-plus-a-
fulfill their obligations. The engineers, fixed-fee contracts—Harry W. Loving,
particularly Kramer and Wimer (the head of the Price Adjustment Branch,
contracting officer), thought their de- and Col. Clio E. Straight, chief of the
mands unreasonable. In mid-February, Contract and Claims Branch—to Hawaii
negotiations reached an impasse.24 The to review the Hawaiian Constructors'
contractors believed they were not contract.
being treated fairly and voiced their On their arrival in Honolulu, one of
complaints to General Richardson, Loving and Straight's first jobs was to
stating they had "not been able to obtain examine the records in the Hawaiian
from the Contracting Officer a satisfac- offices of the inspector general, the judge
advocate, the Federal Bureau of Inves-
23
(1) Memo, AirO Seventh Air Force, to D/C CPA,
tigation, and the Military Governor.
18 Feb 44. Engr AGF PAC. (2) Interstaff Routing General Kramer had voiced the sus-
Slip, Richardson to CofS HD, 19 May 44. Engr
AGF PAC.
24 25
Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44. Engr As quoted in Ltr, Richardson to Kramer, 22
AGF PAC 160, Contracts, vol. 1. Feb 44. Engr AGF PAC, 160, Contracts, vol. 1.
488 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
picion that the contractors might have work was set at $112,031,375. The
been guilty of fraud, having arrived at fixed fee was $1,215,597, plus a supple-
this view because cost estimates for many mentary fee of $1,060,000 resulting
jobs, for no apparent reason, had been from termination. Purchases of equip-
increased by 10 and sometimes even 20 ment by the government were con-
percent. Loving and Straight immedi- sidered binding. The contract was
ately and thoroughly studied the possi- exempted from renegotiation.
bility of fraud but found no evidence of By this time interest in the contract
it. On 5 April Kramer, Wimer, Loving, of the Engineers with the Hawaiian Con-
and Straight held a meeting. "We have structors had become nationwide. It
come to the conclusion," Loving and was touched on by a number of govern-
Straight reported, "that the situation mental committees delving into the
here is not extraordinary, not entirely background of the Pearl Harbor attack.
unusual in that a lot of fixed fee con- It was thoroughly reviewed by the Army
tracts were confused [and] disagreements Pearl Harbor Board, the principal mem-
resulted . . . the contractor in many bers of which were Lt. Gen. George
such cases comes to the conclusion that Grunert, then commanding general of
the contracting officer has acted in bad the First Army and Eastern Defense
faith, . . . contractors many times, not Command; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell,
having previously worked under fixed an infantry commander; and Maj. Gen.
fee contracts, don't always understand Walter H. Frank, of the Army Air
their rights and there is sincere disagree- Forces. From 20 July to 20 October,
ments on all sides."26 Loving and members of the Army board heard testi-
Straight spent several weeks more in mony from civilians and officers in Wash-
their investigations. Early in April, ington, San Francisco, and Hawaii.
they went to Canton and Christmas with Colonel Wyman, then commanding offi-
Capt. C. D. Baker to inspect the work cer of Cherbourg Base Section in France,
which had been done on those islands. testified at Fort Shafter on 14 September
Early in May, they flew to Port Moresby, and Col. Bernard L. Robinson, who had
New Guinea, where they talked with flown in from Hollandia, was heard the
Sverdrup and Robinson and learned of next day. Many others who had worked
the difficult conditions the contractors in the Honolulu District were ques-
27
had had to contend with in Hawaii. tioned.
Meanwhile, progress was made toward The Army board, in its report made
a settlement. In May, the Engineers public after the war, did not deal gently
and the Hawaiian Constructors reached with Wyman as Honolulu District engi-
a final agreement. The total cost of the
27
(1) Min of Mtg Held in ... U.S. Engr Off
26
(1) Min of Mtg Held in ... U.S. Engr Off Honolulu ... at 1930, 5 Apr 44, p. 4. (2) Memo
Honolulu ... at 1930, 5 Apr 44, p. 4. (2) Memo for Rcd, Robinson, 5 May 44. (3) Contract No.
for Rcd, Robinson, 5 May 44. (3) Contract No. W- W-414-engr-602, Supplemental Agreement No. 53.
414-engr-602, Supplemental Agreement No. 53, 17 17 May 44. All in Engr AGF PAC, 160, Contracts,
May 44. All in Engr AGF PAC, 160, Contracts, vol. 1. (4) Pearl Harbor Hearings, Testimony of
vol. 1. Col Theodore Wyman, Jr., pts. 28-29, pp. 1735, 1742.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 489
neer, nor with the Hawaiian Construc- man was quite close, and that "Colonel
tors. It charged Wyman with poor Wyman acted unwisely in permitting this
administration, with causing inexcusable close association to continue during the
delays in construction, and with showing progress of the work." This, together
favoritism toward the grossly inefficient with Wyman's undiplomatic handling of
Hawaiian Constructors. Much was some people, unnecessarily added to his
made of the fact that Hans Wilhelm difficulties, which would undoubtedly
Rohl, president of the Rohl-Connolly have been only a fraction of what they
Company when the original contract was were had they occurred in an inconspicu-
signed, was a German alien and did not ous place or at a less critical time.29
become an American citizen until a few Many in the Army considered Wyman a
weeks before Pearl Harbor.28 Addi- capable officer. In 1942 he was recom-
tional investigations and a judicious mended for the Distinguished Service
review of the evidence raised doubts that Medal for his services in Hawaii and
the charges of the board could be sub- subsequently he received the Legion of
stantiated. Secretary Stimson stated that Merit for his services in Europe.
nothing indicated "that any conduct on
the part of Colonel Wyman or of Rohl Maps
or of any of the other contractors in Ha-
waii contributed in any way to the Pearl Mapping units had an increasing work
Harbor disaster." It was not illegal to load in 1944. "We have been putting
give a defense contract to a firm, one or out a tremendous number of maps here
more of whose officers was an alien; the lately . . . ," Kramer wrote in late 1943
law merely prohibited showing secret to Col. Herbert B. Loper, head of the
plans and specifications to an alien. No Military Intelligence Division of the
evidence was adduced that Rohl ever saw Chief's Office. "Both the 64th Engi-
such plans or specifications before he be- neers and the old Department reproduc-
came a citizen. There was no convinc- tion plant are sorely taxed." Still, with
ing proof that Wyman had shown undue only small islands to be mapped, the
favoritism to the Hawaiian Constructors Central Pacific did not require a great
or had awarded them contracts against the number of mapping units. Late in
best interests of the United States. There 1943, Kramer had asked for a GHQ
was no evidence of fraud. The confu- topographic battalion, a type of unit
sion, waste, and slowness in defense con- which had substantial amounts of equip-
struction that existed before and after ment and could produce and reproduce
Pearl Harbor could not be blamed on one large quantities of maps. The Corps
arm or service, much less on one man. had only four such units and could spare
Stimson conceded that Wyman was guilty none for the Central Pacific. Loper
of indiscretion, adding that there was
"creditable evidence" that the social and 29
WD, Bureau of Public Relations, Press Br,
personal relationship of Rohl and Wy- Statement of the Secretary of War Relative to
Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Corps of Engineers,
for release Saturday a.m., 6 Oct 45. Copy in EHD
28
Rpt of Army Pearl Harbor Bd, ch. V. Files.
490 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
suggested that Kramer take one of the set of maps of all Japanese-held islands
Army topographic battalions instead. in the Central Pacific, mostly at a scale
These units, with less equipment, some of 1 to 50,000, containing a wealth of
of it mobile, produced fewer maps, but hydrographic and topographic detail.
they had recently been reorganized to These maps could be compared with
meet more adequately the demands of aerial photographs of the Marianas, par-
modern war. Their photomapping ticularly of the islands of Saipan and
platoons had been expanded into com- Tinian, just coming in. The 29th was
panies and the survey companies cut to given the job of making maps for the
platoons. The Office of the Chief of Central Pacific. Using aerial negatives
Engineers decided the 651st Topographic received from Hawaii, the men compiled
Battalion, Army, would best meet the preliminary topographic maps of the
needs of the Central Pacific. Kramer islands of the Central Pacific, then sent
wanted the 651st to merge with the 64th the drafts to the 64th Topographic Bat-
Topographic Company and take the lat- talion, which put them in final form,
ter's number because of the 64th's fine making use of the latest intelligence data.
record. The 651st arrived in Honolulu The engineers could do little to deter-
in April and was thereupon absorbed mine what specifications would be used
into the 64th, which was then reorgan- for aerial photography, since Navy
ized as a battalion. The new and en- squadrons took practically all the pic-
larged unit of 451 men, under the tures. But the engineers and naval
operational control of Brig. Gen. Joseph fliers did try to work out a plan whereby
J. Twitty, chief of J-2 of the Joint Staff, photographs would be available for maps
went to work on maps of the Marianas sufficiently far in advance of scheduled
and the Carolines.30 assaults to ". . . insure the availability
In February 1944 Colonel Loper sug- of adequate detailed maps for planning,
gested that the 29th Topographic Bat- as well as for operations." 31
talion, GHQ, stationed at Portland,
Oregon, help make maps for the Central Training
Pacific. He believed this unit could be
of substantial aid in the preparation of By 1944 training schedules for engi-
some of the badly needed large-scale neer units in Hawaii were rather exten-
maps of the Marianas and Carolines. sive. Since the troops in the Islands
The Navy would supply the photo- might be sent to any part of the western
graphs. Kramer thought Loper's sug- Pacific, all divisional engineer units re-
gestion an excellent one. It proved, ceived a week's training in jungle war-
moreover, timely. The troops on Kwa- fare. Included were scouting and pa-
jalein had just found a fairly complete trolling, working with dogs, close-
30 31
(1) Ltr, Kramer to Loper, 5 Nov 43. Engr AGF (1) Ltr, Loper to Kramer, 4 Feb 44. Engr AGF
PAC, 016. (2) Ltr, Loper to Kramer, 8 Oct 43. PAC, 370.09 (Mapping). (2) Ltr, Kramer to Loper,
Engr AGF PAC, 370.09 (Mapping). (3) Hist of the 13 Feb 44. Engr AGF PAC, 061. (3) Ltr, Kramer
64th Engr Topo Bn. to Loper, 8 Mar 44. Engr AGF PAC, 061.01.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 491
cept Guam—a U.S. possession since 1898 sion in the Marianas was the building of
—had been held by the Japanese since airfields for the B-29's. On Saipan and
World War I. Information about Guam, the engineers were to construct
Saipan was meager. No aerial photo- six runways for the long-range bombers.
graphs were to be had. The engineers On Tinian, Navy engineers were to build
studied German maps made before six more with materials furnished by the
World War I, when the Marianas (except Army. Runways were to be 8,500 feet
Guam) were a German possession; they long and surfaced with asphalt. Plan-
analyzed information found in the rec- ning was involved and time consuming.
ords of the Japanese Diet; and they After the planners in Hawaii had deter-
interviewed people who had lived on mined airfield requirements, they began
Guam, since it was known that the ter- estimating other construction needs,
rain features of Guam and Saipan were such as camps, hospitals, and warehouses.
similar. Unlike the flat coral islands Kramer's staff prepared construction an-
to the east, the Marianas were of vol- nexes for the base development plan for
canic origin. Saipan, about twelve Saipan, with layout plans showing the
miles long and five wide, was moun- tentative location of all major installa-
tainous, with a line of low peaks running tions to be built. Because of the few
in a north-south direction. (Map 24) aerial photographs of the islands, the
The highest, Mount Tapotchau, near engineers had to make their layouts some-
the center of the island, rose to an alti- what flexible. After Kramer's engineers
tude of 1,554 feet. The eastern side of had completed their work on the Base
the island had steep wooded hills border- Development Plan, they turned it over
ing the ocean. On the western side, to Colonel Burns, who had served as
the high points sloped gradually to level head of the shore party on Kwajalein,
areas cultivated principally with sugar- and was to be garrison force engineer on
cane. On the western coast were two Saipan. His staff prepared detailed de-
major towns, Garapan, the capital, to signs and layout maps and computed
the north, and Charan Kanoa, to the supply requirements. Civilians from
south. The western side of the island the Honolulu District office, aided by a
was most promising for an amphibious special staff of officers, worked on the
assault. In late February the first extensive engineer supply needs. The
photographs of Saipan, taken from car- effectiveness of the Joint Staff had in-
rier planes, came in. They were rather creased constantly; the Marianas opera-
poor because many of the features were tion was the first in which its new pro-
obscured by clouds and the flight lines cedures were to be fully applied. For
were irregular.35 one thing, ships carrying supplies from
The most important construction mis- the United States were to bypass the
Hawaiian Islands and go directly to the
35
(1) USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, pp. 63ff. (2) Marianas. The engineers planned to
Building Saipan, the Engineer Mission, 20 Jun 44-2 send 150,000 ship tons to the islands by
Sep 45 (cited hereafter as Rowland, Building Sai-
pan), prepared for the 2233d Engr Constr Serv Sec 1 October 1944 and 350,000 tons more
by Maj James C. Rowland, 98-USF4-0.3.0 (30757). by the following April. If supplies
494 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MAP 24
were sent directly from the United States, ness in planning persisted: task force
requisitions would have to be submitted commanders, after receiving their final
to the ports of embarkation at least three, directives, had too little time to finish
months before the date the items were their own planning and found that when
to be delivered. Very important was they needed additional supplies, the
proper echeloning of the shipments. items were almost impossible to get.36
The engineer liaison officer at the San Engineer troop requirements for
Francisco Port of Embarkation had the Saipan were similar to those for Kwaja-
authority to load engineer cargo for each lein. Although Saipan was considerably
base as he thought necessary in order to larger and enemy forces stationed there
fill engineer tonnage allowances. Meet- were estimated to total many thousands,
ing supply needs in the Marianas would Army troop requirements were not so
not be easy because construction dead-
lines would require great quantities of 36
(1) USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, pp. 75ff. (2)
materials at an early date. One weak- Ltr, Leavey to C EHD, 21 Jun 61. EHD Files.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 495
great as originally expected because the gaged in planning, troop units were
marines were to participate in the as- undergoing intensive training. The
sault. As part of the 27th Division, the 102d engineers were alerted for FORAGER
102d combat engineers, under Lt. Col. in the latter part of February. They
Harold F. Gormsen, their experiences were given considerable training in at-
on Makin and Eniwetok behind them, tacking fortified positions; some of the
were scheduled to take part in the attack. men attended specialist schools. The
Headquarters and Headquarters Com- three battalions selected for shore party
pany of the 1165th Combat Group, re- operations were familiarized with un-
cently split off from the 34th Engineers loading and storing supplies and in us-
when that unit was converted to a bat- ing demolitions; classroom instruction
talion, and commanded by Col. Horace was followed by rehearsals at the beaches.
L. Porter, was to supervise the shore Units assigned to the garrison force were
party work of three combat battalions— trained in their specialties by working
the 34th, 1341st, and 152d; all shore on construction jobs. The men worked
party personnel were attached to the 27th with well-drilling rigs, hot-mix asphalt
Division. After the assault phase of the plants, and quarrying equipment; some
operation, the shore party was to be got additional training in civilian shops
transferred to the Saipan Garrison Force. and factories in Honolulu. To insure
It was believed that the terrain which around-the-clock operations in the Mari-
would be encountered and the nature of anas, extra operators were selected and
the operation did not require bridging, trained on earth-moving and other con-
topographic, depot, or maintenance units struction equipment. Plans for base
during the combat phase. Army engi- development could be prepared with
neer units of the garrison force would be greater accuracy in April, when B-24's
directly under the Headquarters of the operating from the newly constructed air-
1176th Construction Group, which had fields in the Marshalls obtained com-
been formed from the 47th General plete photographic coverage of Saipan.
Service Regiment when that unit was By early May the base development plan
converted into a battalion. Colonel was complete.38
Burns, commander of the 1176th, was to
be responsible to Maj. Gen. Sanderford The Assault on Saipan
Jarman, commander of the garrison
force. Engineer units assigned to Late in May a task force with the 2d
Burns's command were principally avia- and 4th Marine Divisions and the 27th
tion and construction battalions and Division sailed from Hawaii for the
elements of supply and maintenance Marshalls. Somewhat earlier a similar
companies.37 force carrying the III Amphibious
While headquarters staffs were en- Corps, including the Marine 3d Division
and the 1st Provisional Brigade, had left
37
Guadalcanal for the same destination.
(1) Hist of the 1165th Engr Combat Group. (2)
Hist of the 1176th Engr Constr Group. (3)
38
USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, p. 67. USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, pp. 68ff.
496 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
The two fleets met near Kwajalein, the carried satchel charges, one had a Brown-
staging base for the operation. FORAGER ing automatic rifle, and one carried a
was by far the largest assault yet under- flame thrower. The groups remained
taken in the Central Pacific. For at or near company headquarters to be
Saipan alone, plans called for transport- assigned to rifle platoons as needed.
ing 78,000 men and 100,000 tons of Engineer company and platoon head-
supplies from Hawaii. The Fifth Fleet, quarters had the job of bringing in re-
commanded by Admiral Raymond A. serve supplies of tools, equipment, ex-
Spruance, was the largest American naval plosives, Bangalore torpedoes, mine
force so far assembled in the Pacific. detectors, and liquid for flame throwers.
The combat engineers spent their time From the engineer standpoint, the
en route to the fighting zone in listening beach defenses of southwestern Saipan
to orientation lectures, doing physical were poor. They consisted for the most
exercises, practicing loading and unload- part of hastily constructed trenches and
ing supplies and equipment, and just foxholes and a few log obstacles to stop
relaxing. Meanwhile, planes and war- tanks. In the advance toward the air-
ships were pounding the island. "Sai- field, named Aslito, the combat engineers
pan was smoking when we arrived. . . . " had to destroy only a few pillboxes, caves,
wrote General Holland Smith.39 and dugouts. Their biggest job was to
On 15 June the 2d and 4th Marine find their supplies and equipment,
Divisions landed near Charan Kanoa. dumped indiscriminately on the beaches
Enemy troops and defenses near the and "hopelessly scattered."40
beaches were few. But the Japanese, One of the first tasks of the shore party
skilfully using the guns they had em- engineers was to make a reconnaissance
placed on hills and in ravines farther of the beaches. On the third day of the
back, put enough fire on the landing landing, at 0830, three officers and two
forces to hold them to a half-mile deep enlisted men from headquarters of the
beachhead during the day. Early on 1165th Group set out on a survey of one
the morning of the 17th, two regimental of the beaches and its offshore coral reef
combat teams—the 105th and the 165th to determine if it would be possible to
—of the 27th Division landed to the unload palletized supplies from LCM's
south of the Marine positions. Com- and LST's, move them across the reef,
pany A of the 102d engineers came and then have Alligators haul them from
ashore with the 105th; Company C, with there to the beach. Ninety percent of
the 165th. Again combat engineers and the cargo and supplies of the 27th Divi-
infantry had been organized into fight- sion had been palletized. The recon-
ing teams. Each RCT came ashore with naissance party had a rough time.
its company of engineers, part of which Caught in an enemy air raid and unable
had been formed into assault groups, to return to their ship, the group had to
each consisting of one noncommissioned
40
officer and five men. Three of the men (1) Hist of the 102d Engr Combat Bn. (2)
Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 99ff. (3) Mc-
Meekan, Rpt on Visit as Engr Observer to Central
39
Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 158. Pac, Aug-Sep 44.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 497
spend the night in an LCVP. "With The chances were that construction on
our tow boat, we floated about until a the airfield would not get started on
Jap plane came into view and began time.42
strafing various boats around us," the The Japanese had begun too late to
men reported in their diary. "We build up the island's permanent defenses.
hopped into the tow boat and dodged At the time of the American landing,
about until the plane had gone, then their program was only about 25 percent
returning to our own LCVP. There complete. "We found coastal defense
was much confusion and firing. When- guns up to 200 mm. crated, or uncrated
ever one boat would open up at some and not installed, and large quantities of
target, fancied or otherwise, every other equipment and materiel waiting to be
would join in and bullets were thick in used," General Smith wrote.43 The
the air." Unloading began as planned Japanese had, however, set up strong
but could be carried out only with diffi- makeshift defenses by cleverly exploit-
culty. Dukws and Buffaloes, clamber- ing the natural features of the island.
ing over the reef, brought in the first Artillery and mortars had been placed
supplies; landing craft with stores for all in advantageous positions in the moun-
three divisions used a single narrow tains and trained on the roads and defiles
channel in the reef.41 leading inland. Army and Marine units
Shore party operations in the 27th pushed forward against stubborn and
Division area were entirely under engi- sometimes skilfull resistance. Yet the
neer control. The engineers were re- defensive positions with which the engi-
sponsible for organizing the beachhead, neers had to deal were few. The troops
selecting sites for dumps, hauling sup- came across a number of pillboxes with
plies to the dumps, and providing sides of palm logs and roofs of sheet
security. Men from other arms, naval metal topped with sand. There were
beach parties, members of the Signal and some blockhouses, generally with walls
Medical Corps, and other troops in the of weak concrete, 2½ to 4 feet thick,
shore party area were subject to engineer usually with 4 ports and mounts for
shore party command. The plan was 20-mm. guns. Most of the emplace-
that supplies of all the arms and services ments were either just finished or under
would be landed at the appropriate construction. The combat engineers,
beaches, near their dumps. But unload- sometimes with the help of shore party
ing was haphazard from the first. For engineers, knocked out cave emplace-
the engineers it was almost disastrous. ments and pillboxes with demolitions
Units searched for days for their equip- and flame throwers. The few mines
ment; some items were never found. that were found revealed a "complete
lack of thought" with regard to their
41
(1) Diary of the 1165th Engrs in Saipan Opn.
42
Engr AGF PAC. (2) McMeekan, Rpt on Visit as 1165th Engr Combat Group, FORAGER Opns,
Engr Observer to Central Pac, Aug-Sep 44. (3) Hist Questions and Answers on Shore Party Opns as
of the 152d Engr Combat Bn. (4) Hist of the 1341st requested by Hq V Amphib Corps. EHD Files.
43
Engr Combat Bn. (5) Hist of the 34th Engr C Bn. Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 159.
498 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
placement, concealment, and tactical first. A roadway was smoothed over the
use.44 reef and through shallow water to the
By 18 June Aslito airfield, together bluff at the water's edge; a blasting crew
with the southern part of the island ex- charged the bluff's 50-foot-high face with
cept a pocket at Nafutan Point, was in dynamite. After blasting, dozers and
American hands. The next day the 4th carryalls completed a road up to the
Marine Division reached Magicienne plateau of the island; construction equip-
Bay on the eastern side of the island. ment and personnel poured ashore
The 2d Marine Division was north of "through chest-deep water." The avia-
Garapan. The two divisions re-formed tion engineers took over from the Sea-
their lines and advanced northward. bees and continued improving the air-
Despite the makeshift Japanese defenses, field for fighters. The men graded the
it was apparent that the capture of shoulders and approach zones to make
Saipan would take longer than antici- the strip safe for fighters and provided
pated. Naval and military commanders parking facilities for four squadrons of
held a conference on shipboard and de- planes. They then began work on
cided to prepare for a three weeks' storage for aviation gasoline.46 The
campaign. 804th engineers were the first of the units
After Aslito airfield was captured, it assigned to the 1176th Construction
was renamed Isley in memory of a naval Group to reach Saipan. The advance
aviator 45 killed during one of the pre- echelon of group headquarters arrived
liminary strikes on the island. On 19 on the 25th, and, under Colonel Burns,
June a naval construction battalion who had landed a week before, set up
reached the field and began filling in camp just west of Isley.47
craters and smoothing one of the run- As the Americans advanced northward,
ways. The next day a strip 4,500 feet they came upon a series of cliffs and deep
long was usable. At this time the 804th ravines, pitted with caves, from which
Aviation Battalion, under Maj. John W. the Japanese fought back stubbornly.
Paxton, arrived, having been delayed two The enemy, astride Mount Tapotchau,
days because of the unfavorable tactical had a full view of the battlefield, which
situation and the haphazard unloading. gave him a considerable advantage.
The three LST's carrying the battalion Company B of the 102d Combat Bat-
had beached on a coral reef, partly sub- talion was active around Mount Tapot-
merged at high tide, about 600 feet from chau. The men had a rough time.
shore. Heavy dozers were unloaded They had to reduce innumerable ma-
chine gun positions and neutralize a large
44
(1) Hq 1165th Engr Combat Group, Hist Rcd.
(2) Diary of the 1165th Engrs in Saipan Opn. (3)
46
Hist of the 1341st Engr Combat Bn. (4) Hist of (1) Hq 804th Engr Avn Bn, Rpt on Air Base
the 34th Engr Combat Bn. (5) 1 165th Engr Combat Constr, Saipan, Mariana Islands, 3 Feb 45. Engr
Group, FORAGER Opns, Questions and Answers on AGF PAC. (2) Ltr, Paxton to Air Engr Hq AAF,
Shore Party Opns. 22 Nov 44. Engr 804-SU-RE Mar 44. Air Univ
45
Comdr. Robert H. Isely. For reasons unknown, Lib Maxwell AFB.
47
the spelling of the aviator's name and that of the (1) Hist of the 1176th Engr Constr Gp. (2)
field differ. USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, p. 454.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 499
number of enemy caves. They used a major base began. In General Jar-
their bulldozers to close the mouths of man's words, "I knew the primary job
caves which were so located that the was to push the very long-range [bomber]
machines could be used effectively. program as rapidly as possible. There
Sometimes the operators pushed dirt and were three things we had to do. First,
other material down a slope over a cave we had to build the strips for the Super-
entrance or inched their machines along fortresses; second, we had to have docks
a shelf of the hillside to the cave's mouth. to unload the equipment to build the
When the Japanese fired at approaching airstrips; third, we had to have the roads
dozers, they aimed, as a rule, at the from the docks to the fields to bring the
driver, protected by his armored cab and equipment. Everything else was sec-
raised blade, instead of at the vulnerable ondary." 49
parts of the engine. The engineers Work began first on the B-29 runway,
could reach some caves located in sheer to be 8,500 feet long and surfaced with
cliffs only by following goat tracks on asphalt. It was to be built at Isley. On
which enemy weapons were trained. 20 June, when the original Japanese run-
They usually demolished these hideouts way was rehabilitated sufficiently to take
by lowering satchel charges from above, fighters, work began on the B-29 run-
putting them in place in accordance with way. Survey parties of the 804th made
directions from observers stationed at a experimental profiles to determine run-
distance. After the explosion, the in- way directions, sometimes under rifle
fantry went in with rifles, grenades, and fire. Intelligence reports had indicated
flame throwers. Sometimes large charges the topsoil was about two feet deep, but
were set off above the cave, causing the it turned out to be only a few inches.
roof to collapse. The Japanese had laid Underneath was hard coral rock, which
their mine fields clumsily, without plan, required much blasting. The aviation
and did not cover them with fire. A engineers used about five tons of dyna-
field of about seventy-five mines was dis- mite a day. During the first week and a
covered alongside a road near Mount half, work was slowed by Japanese bomb-
Tapotchau. These mines, apparently ers overhead, usually at night, The
laid in haste, were easily rendered harm- engineers were forced to impose black-
less. A few booby traps were found near outs and all work stopped.50
a radio station; poorly concealed, they Base development plans called for
48
were quickly deactivated. putting in a fighter field north of Charan
Kanoa, where the Japanese had been at
Base Construction on Saipan work on an airfield. Late in June the
805th aviation engineers, just in from yards above the Tanapag seaplane base,"
Panama, surveyed the site. They re- the 102d Combat Battalion historian re-
garded the area as unsuitable because of ported, "and kept pushing in and in.
the strong cross winds and operational All the weapons of the BLT's were used
hazards. The local air force commander to stop them, and as a last resort flame-
decided to build a field on the eastern throwers were used." The attack lasted
side of the island at Kagman Point. On for two and a half hours. The first
3 July, when the enemy was cleared from platoon of Company A, hit hard, lost
the area, construction began. The engi- several men killed and wounded in
neers used their earth-moving equip- action. Some of the engineers, after
ment on a 24-hour basis, and on 8 July, firing their last rounds, escaped by
they put the first coral from a nearby pit swimming out to destroyers in the har-
on the runway. Rapid progress had bor. Many of the surviving Japanese
meanwhile been made on storage of avia- committed suicide, as did the commander
tion gasoline on Saipan. On 1 July the of the enemy garrison on the island. On
804th Aviation Battalion began the re- 9 July organized resistance came to an
habilitation of the Japanese storage fa- end. There had been twenty-four days
cilities. Materials were beginning to of fighting. A large number of Japa-
arrive for the additional tanks to be nese had retreated to the caves and jungle
constructed.51 of northern Saipan, where mop-up opera-
The Japanese were being slowly forced tions continued for months.52
back to the northern tip of the island. With the island secure, work on air-
On 30 June a platoon of Company A, fields and base facilities progressed at a
102d Combat Battalion, was attached to more rapid pace. Additional units of
BLT 3 of the 105th Regimental Combat the 1176th Construction Group arrived.
Team and continued the attack, using Progress continued on the B-29 runway,
flame throwers and dynamiting caves and but more slowly than had been expected.
dugouts. Fighting was savage. U.S.In some places the engineers had to cut
troops suffered 25-percent casualties. coral down to a depth of fifteen feet; in
The Japanese commander on Saipan others they had to fill as much as twenty-
ordered a last desperate counterattack two feet. Good coral rock for the base
for the night of 6-7 July. At 0300, the course came from a quarry about two
enemy attacked just north of Tanapag miles away. To speed up work, the men
harbor. Armed with rifles, grenades, built a road from quarry to runway, to
and knives, several thousand Japanese be used only by trucks hauling coral;
advanced shoulder to shoulder. They stoplights at intersections gave the trucks
overran and wiped out two American the right of way at all times. To build
infantry battalions and a number of field this road, the engineers discontinued
artillery units. "They came along the work on the runway for four days, but in
road adjacent to the beach about 1000 about two days the increase in the
amount of coral hauled made up for the
51
(1) Hist of the 805 Engr Avn Bn. (2) Rowland,
52
Building Saipan. Hist of the 102d Engr Combat Bn.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 501
time spent on constructing the road. sunken ships and debris offshore and
In building the runway, the engineers doing dredging. Saipan had one well-
placed a coral base from twelve to eight- developed port—Tanapag, on the west
een inches deep. Asphalt for surfacing coast, north of Garapan. A 200-foot-
was produced at two plants located near wide channel, 22 feet deep, led to three
the field. The rehabilitated Japanese piers. The 47th engineers, organized as
runway crossed the B-29 strip near the a construction battalion in April 1944,
middle. In order not to interfere with were slated to carry out the Army's re-
the flights of the fighter planes, the men sponsibilities at Tanapag. The unit
worked on the two ends of the B-29 run- arrived on 25 June and bivouacked in a
way and left the fighter strip untouched cane field near Isley. Early in July, it
in between. Heavy rains in July slowed moved to a hillside near Tanapag, pre-
construction somewhat. Drainage re- pared to work on docks and storage
quired little attention. The runways areas. Harbor facilities were a shambles.
were constructed to drain to the shoul- The three piers were wrecked. The
ders, and from there the water percolated 47th would have to repair them as
down through the coral. Early in July quickly as possible. The northernmost
the 804th engineers began rehabilitation one, an L-shaped structure built of large
of the Japanese aviation gasoline fueling concrete blocks, with 200 feet of water
system. They had one of the tank farms along its northern face, appeared best
in operation by the 12th; work on a suited for immediate repair. The other
second was under way.53 two were in water too shallow for Ameri-
Working conditions on Saipan can transports. The engineers could
were not ideal. "Tropical downpours make all three suitable by lengthening
drenched the men, the heat was intense, them with floating piers. They began
water was scarce," wrote war corre- work by clearing debris from the L-
spondent Clinton Green. "The flies shaped pier; the plan was to lengthen it
pressed unmercifully against sweaty to 570 feet and provide berthing facili-
bodies and had to be pried from one's ties on both sides. The center pier
eyes, ears, and nostrils. Yet the work could be similarly extended for about
went on—twelve to eighteen hours a 460 feet. The third pier was to be im-
day." There were heavy, almost con- proved with the construction of an 800-
tinuous rains from the middle to the end foot-long marginal pier, from which four
of July, but by this time enemy air raids floating finger piers were to be extended.
were becoming less frequent.54 When the engineers went to work, they
The Army and Navy were jointly re- found Japanese riflemen still present in
sponsible for rehabilitating ports and the area. On the loth of July guards
harbors. The Army was charged with posted by the 47th engineers on a dredge
building piers and clearing areas for stor- in Tanapag harbor found seven Japanese
ing cargo; the Navy, for removing soldiers in the boiler room, and that
53
same day two enemy soldiers were caught
Rowland, Building Saipan.
54
Clinton Green, "Our B-29 Base: An Epic Job,"
prowling in the 47th's camp area. The
New York Times Magazine (December 10, 1944), p. 38. presence of enemy soldiers, while some-
502 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
what nerve-racking, did not slow con- The roads on Saipan were in deplor-
struction.55 able condition. The Japanese had built
Saipan was to be not only an impor- about fifty miles of roads, many of them
tant air base but also an important sup- not much better than oxcart trails. The
ply, staging, and rehabilitation center. one highway that could support Ameri-
The number of installations was in- can military traffic was the 20-foot-wide
creased so many times that the original thoroughfare from Garapan to Charan
base development plan had to be dras- Kanoa. During the fighting the roads
tically revised. Extensive covered stor- almost disappeared. "Under the mill-
age was required. Because of the danger ing of thousands of feet and hundreds of
of an enemy landing, the engineers at heavy-tracked vehicles, the dirt roads had
first built only small frame warehouses; disintegrated into a fine, penetrating
some of this construction was done by dust," General Holland Smith observed,
troops from other arms and services, sup- and added, possibly with some exaggera-
plied with materials and supervised by tion, "a passing jeep could put up a
the engineers. The larger warehouses, smoke screen more effective than our
built later, were standardized structures chemical services could produce and blot
304 feet long, 100 feet wide, and 16 feet out the sun. . . ." "When it rained,"
high, designed to withstand winds with General Smith continued, "jeeps became
velocities up to 60 miles an hour. At amphibians caught in quagmires that
the same time the engineers began work had been roads a few hours before." 57
on hundreds of hardstands and igloos for The engineers found it more profitable
ammunition. The main housing area to build a new system of roads than to
for the troops was placed on the narrow try to rehabilitate the old one. They
coastal plain south of Isley. Pup tents built a perimeter road along the shores of
or pyramidal tents with floors provided the island and put in three main cross
the first living quarters for the troops; connections. They made most of the
these gradually gave way to prefabricated main roads thirty-two feet wide and
barracks and Quonset huts. The first paved them with coral. An unusual
hospitals, also, were in tents. Operating job was rehabilitating the railroad. A
rooms were put in Quonset huts. Sta- narrow-gauge line, which the Japanese
tion and general hospitals of Quonset used mainly for hauling sugarcane and
huts and prefabricated buildings were military supplies, circled the island.
built around these operating rooms. The shore party engineers, soon after
Added later were water, sewer, and elec- landing, went to work on it. They put
tric systems, air conditioning, asphalt one diesel and three steam locomotives
roads, and concrete sidewalks. By the back in use and repaired 100 flatcars.
beginning of September, 6,000 beds were The 1398th Engineer Construction Bat-
in Quonset huts or prefabricated build- talion operated the railroad and by the
ings; 3,000 were still in tents.56 end of July was hauling 350-ton miles a
58
day on it. Since the railroad was not,
55
Hist of the 47th Engr Constr Bn.
56 57
(1) USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, p. 460. (2) Smith, Coral and Brass, pp. 182-83.
58
Rowland, Building Saipan. (1) Hist of the 1398th Engr Constr Bn. (2)
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 503
on the whole, a practical form of trans- base construction was well under way,
portation, the tracks were taken up and preparations went ahead for the capture
a road built along the right of way. of Guam and Tinian. Plans had orig-
Two of the locomotives made excellent inally called for an assault on Guam on
sterilizers for garbage cans. 18 June; when it was learned late on the
The all-out effort on the airfields con- first day of the landing on Saipan that a
tinued. By 6 August the engineers had Japanese task force was headed for the
extended the heavy bomber strip at Isley Marianas, the assault was postponed in-
to 6,000 feet and had lengthened the definitely. After the defeat of the Japa-
B-29 runway to nearly 7,000. The hard nese force in the Battle of the Philippine
coral, which required so much blasting, Sea, 19-24 June, preparations for Guam
was still the principal hindrance to rapid were further delayed by the stubborn
construction. Heavy rains in August resistance on Saipan. With the end of
added to the problems. It had been fighting on that island, preparations for
hoped initially that a second B-29 field the attack on Guam, and Tinian as well,
could be built on the west coast to the were resumed.60 Plans now called for an
north of the field the Japanese had been attack on Guam on 21 July and on Tin-
building. The site looked good on ian three days later. Marine units were
aerial photographs, but it proved to be to be mainly responsible for combat on
unsuitable because of extensive marshes; both. The 3d Marine Division, the 1st
part of the area was below sea level. Provisional Marine Brigade, and the
Reconnaissance indicated the second Army's 77th Infantry Division, includ-
B-29 field could be built northwest of ing the 302d Engineer Combat Battalion,
Isley. Construction was authorized, and were to take Guam. The 2d and 4th
the 1878th Engineer Aviation Battalion Marine Divisions would capture Tinian.
got the job of building the field. Stor- Engineer combat and shore party units
age tanks for aviation gasoline were were to go into Guam, but only engineer
being completed rapidly. The first job, shore party units would take part in the
the erection of four 5,000-gallon tanks, assault on Tinian.
was finished on 12 July. The second— The 77th Division arrived off the west
the erection of twelve 1,000-barrel tanks, coast of Guam on 21 July; the marines
begun on 10 July—was finished on 7 had already secured beachheads to the
August. It would still be some time north and south of Orote Peninsula.
before the B-29 base would be com- (Map 25) Early in the afternoon the
59
pleted. 305th RCT, with part of the 302d Com-
bat Battalion, began to debark; the
The Assaults on Guam remaining elements of the division com-
and Tinian pleted their landing by dusk. A lettered
company had been attached to each of
While the Japanese were being the division's regimental combat teams.
mopped up on Saipan and airfield and The landing was unopposed, since the
preliminary bombardment had driven
Comments by Col Brown on draft of this chapter,
EHD Files.
59 60
Hist of the 1878th Engr Avn Bn. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 314-15.
504 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
GUAM LANDING
stable, coral and rubble were hauled in The Japanese, as they withdrew to the
for surfacing.62 "It is readily seen," the northern plateau, put up a strong and
302d engineers reported, "that the above skillful resistance. The 3d Marine Di-
system violated good road building prac- vision was on the right, the 77th Division
tice. The road was in general below on the left. The enemy concentrated
the surrounding ground, and side drain- his forces at the two peaks of Mount
age was not provided for. As the road Santa Rosa and Mount Barrigada.
rutted, bulldozers shoved off the mud Northern Guam was a limestone plateau
until a firm base was found farther about 400 feet above sea level. Except
down." 63 This system, apparently the for Mount Santa Rosa and Mount
best one possible in the deep clay of Barrigada, it was gently rolling and
southern Guam, assured rapid supply of offered excellent sites for airfields. On
the division. The low parts of the road this part of the island, the combat engi-
had to be filled in with logs or rocks. neers were engaged mainly in maintain-
ing old roads and trails and building
62
Fairbank, "Division Engineers, Part 1, Guam," new ones. Here their task was some-
The Military Engineer, XXXIX (January, 1947), 2-3.
63
Memo for Rcd, 302d Engr Combat Bn, 8 Sep 44.
what easier than in the south because
377-Engr-3 (28973)M. only about a foot of clay covered the
506 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
limestone. The jungle was heavy, but beach. Working about an hour with
there were no streams. An engineer bulldozers, they had cleared the beach
bulldozer operator, protected by his ar- sufficiently to permit tanks to land at any
mored cab and closely supported by point. Soon the entire unit was engaged
riflemen, usually moved ahead of each in typical shore party activities. The
infantry column, opening a passageway engineers selected dump areas in accord-
through the dense growth. A second ance with prearranged plans; by 1500
dozer, behind the first, widened the trail they had completed access roads to them,
to 20 or 30 feet. Little work was needed and soon supplies were coming in on
on surfacing because the limestone base amphibious trucks and LVT's. On 6
held up under all kinds of weather. August, the 1341st reverted to the con-
Maintenance required only filling in trol of the 27th Division, and the next
shell craters and potholes, shaping up day returned to Saipan. Seabees were
the crown, and, if necessary, constructing responsible for base construction on
drainage ditches.64 Tinian.66
Assault of fortified positions was a Meanwhile, on Guam, Seabees and
negligible task for the 302d engineers on Marine engineers had begun build-
Guam. The only instance of demolition ing three airfields. Marine engineers,
work was the destruction of an elaborate helped by Seabees, extended the 4,500-
Japanese underground headquarters, foot runway at Orote field another 1,000
which required three-quarters of a ton of feet. From early August on, the field
TNT. On 10 August all organized was in constant use. A 5,000-foot strip
enemy resistance was at an end. Mop- which the Japanese had almost com-
ping up continued, however, and for pleted near Agana was lengthened to
many months it was necessary to search 7,000 feet, and on 23 August, the first
for enemy troops entrenched in caves and plane landed on this strip. To the
in isolated mountain areas.65 north of Agana Field, the Japanese had
On 24 July at 0730 the 2d and 4th completed clearing for a third runway.
Marine Divisions made the assault on This location was chosen for Depot
Tinian. The 1341st Engineer Combat Field, which was to be used for the re-
Battalion, assigned to shore party work, pair of B-29's. The engineers were not
landed in Alligators and Buffaloes in the to begin work on the big B-29 fields
67
third and subsequent waves. While the until fall.
beach was still under heavy enemy fire
the men carried on their tasks, partly 1944 Draws to a Close
protected by coral ledges. Their main
job was to gouge out exits from the beach The last months of 1944 saw great
for tanks. The men removed mines and progress made in the Central Pacific.
filled in craters on the right flank of the The theater was reorganized in prepa-
66
Hist of the 1341st Engr Combat Bn.
64 67
Fairbank, "Division Engineers, Part 1, Guam," Lt. Col. Herbert E. Brown, Jr., "Aviation Engi-
The Military Engineer, XXXIX (January, 1947), 3-4. neers on Guam," The Military Engineer, XXXVII
65
Ibid, p. 4. (October, 1945), 398-99.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 507
ration for the final drive against Japan, pected to have about 10,000 engineer
and the engineer setup was likewise troops, together with 12,000 civilians,
geared for the last stages of the war. assigned to engineer projects. To pro-
Work in the Marianas moved ahead. vide Wimer with a staff, the district
Islands in the western Carolines were organization, which had been part of the
seized. In Hawaii, the engineers con- Office of the Engineer, Central Pacific
tinued their efforts in support of opera- Area, since August 1943, was transferred
tions in the forward areas. It all meant to the new command. At the same time
unrelenting pressure against the enemy. the department engineer organization,
likewise part of the Office of the Engi-
Reorganization neer, CPA, since August 1943, was
transferred to USAFPOA, where it
On 1 August U.S. Army Forces in the constituted the major part of Colonel
68
Pacific Ocean Area (USAFPOA) was set Loper's office.
up as a theaterwide Army command un-
der General Richardson, who was Construction—Hawaii
directly responsible to Admiral Nimitz.
General Richardson appointed Colonel The construction still required in the
Loper as his engineer. Central Pacific Hawaiian Islands was of a minor nature.
Base Command became a logistical or- On 28 June General Richardson stated
ganization of USAFPOA. In the South that the most important jobs of the
Pacific Area, USAFISPA was reconsti- engineers were to ready troops for com-
tuted as a second logistical command bat and construction in the forward
with the designation South Pacific Base areas, make minor improvements at John
Command (SPBC). Few changes were Rodgers, Hickam, and Mokuleia air-
necessary to transform USAFISPA into a fields, complete the depot for the Seventh
logistics organization; the South Pacific Air Force, finish the underground air-
Area was now of diminishing impor- plane repair shop, and construct camps
tance, and most of its troops were being for prisoners of war. Other work was
transferred to the Southwest Pacific. secondary. The Construction Service
Since the Central Pacific Base Command let a few lump-sum contracts, which it
was a new organization, a considerable awarded on the basis of competitive
effort was necessary to set it up. On 10 bidding. New construction, almost en-
August an Engineer Section was organ- tirely of a minor nature, included mainly
ized and designated the Construction barracks, warehouses, and shops. The
Service. Headed by Colonel Wimer, it biggest construction project, still to be
was authorized 106 officers and 62 en- undertaken, was the building of the new
listed men. Wimer was responsible for Tripler General Hospital. The engi-
construction in the base command area,
procuring and distributing supplies, pro- 68
(1) U.S. Army Forces, Mid Pac and Predecessor
viding maps, furnishing intelligence Comd, vol. 3, pp. 436ff. (2) Hist Review Covering
Activities of Constr Serv, CPBC, 1 Jul 44 Through
data, and acquiring real estate. 15 Sep 45 (cited hereafter as CPBC, Hist Review),
The new logistical command was ex- p. 1. Engr AGF PAC.
508 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
neers began planning for this installation Branch went to the engineer office in
in August 1944.69 Headquarters, USAFPOA.
Despite so many efforts made to reduce Long-range planning, while simpler
it, minor and miscellaneous construction than in some other theaters, was no
was still so extensive that warnings again longer the easy thing it had been earlier.
had to be issued. In October General This was in large measure the result of
Richardson informed the Commanding the limited quantities of supplies in the
General, CPBC, that Colonel Wimer United States, and the consequent need
had numerous projects on his books, to ration them to meet the heavy de-
which, when they were finished, would mands from overseas theaters. The
be of little, if any, value to the war effort. greatest difficulties by far were encount-
As before, he warned, "It is the intention ered in allocating Class IV stocks. Ever
of this headquarters that the construction since overseas construction had first be-
effort shall be directed to the completion gun in 1939, a number of systems had
of those facilities which have an immedi- been successively set up to deal with this
ate, as well as a permanent, value to mili- troublesome problem. In peacetime,
70
tary operations in POA. . . ." Spe- requisitions had been prepared for the
cifically, this meant adequate facilities Class IV supplies needed for a particular
for the supply services, training and project and the items then purchased in
recreational facilities for the troops, and the open market. Early in the war,
the repair and improvement of utilities supply requisitions were prepared for all
at the permanent installations. projects to be constructed by a particular
task force being sent overseas and the
Supply items purchased. In 1943 the War De-
partment instituted the operational
Now that combat forces based on project system under which each theater
Hawaii were engaged in operations as was required to plan its construction one
far west as Saipan, supply became more year ahead, estimate the amount of sup-
complicated. At the end of June, the plies it needed, and forward to Wash-
Supply Division of the Office of the Engi- ington a tabulation of its requirements,
neer, CPA, included two major subdivi- together with construction plans of the
sions: the War Plans Branch, responsible various projects. This system was un-
for long-range planning and determining satisfactory because theater planners
general supply needs, and the Engineer found it impossible to determine with
Depot, charged with requisitioning and sufficient accuracy what projects would
distributing stocks. When the Con- be built during the coming year. In
struction Service was set up, the depot 1944 the War Department instituted the
was transferred to it; the War Plans quarterly estimates. Under this pro-
cedure, theater engineers estimated their
supply needs five quarters in advance
69
(1) Memo, Engr to G-4 USAFICPA, 28 Jun 44. but were not required, in order to jus-
Engr AGF PAC. (2) CPBC, Hist Review, p. 47.
70
Ltr, Richardson to CG CPBC, 10 Oct 44. Engr
tify their supply needs, to give as much
AGF PAC, 600.12. detailed information regarding their
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 509
proposed projects. Both the operational Supply units were noticeably short by
project and the quarterly estimate sys- mid-1944. A need existed especially for
tems required too much meticulous depot companies to handle the steadily
long-range planning by theater engineer increasing numbers of items arriving
staffs and neither could be carried out as from the mainland. During the sum-
intended. What the planners usually mer of 1944, because of the shortage
did under the quarterly estimate system of such units the Class II depot on Oahu
was to calculate approximately how was being operated by the 1399th Con-
much construction would be required to struction Battalion, an understrength
support the operations planned for the organization, made up largely of Jap-
coming year and how much could be anese Americans, many of whom were
accomplished with the number of men experienced in construction, but few of
and the amount of equipment likely to whom knew anything about supply or
be available. Striking a balance be- spare parts. Maintenance units were
tween these two estimates, they tried to noticeably lacking. In July Wimer in-
arrive at a reasonable figure as to the formed Loper that 2 heavy shop com-
amount of supplies needed.71 panies and 2 maintenance companies
By mid-1944 the Central Pacific had were attempting to meet the needs of
set up a well-functioning system of some 50 combat, construction, aviation,
requisitioning and distributing supplies and general service battalions and a
and equipment. Engineer units sent civilian construction force of 15,000.
their requests directly to the engineer On the basis of one maintenance com-
depot in Honolulu, which requisitioned pany for 200 pieces of heavy engineer
supplies from the United States, or, if equipment, the theater should have had
possible, secured them by purchase in 17 maintenance companies.72 Small
the Islands. The depot stored its sup- wonder that 500 pieces of engineer
plies in seventeen base yards in and equipment were deadlined.
around the city. Insofar as possible, all By 1944 the Central Pacific was beset
items of one kind were stored in one by most of the troubles in spare parts
yard—one had electrical materials, an- supply which had plagued other theaters,
other, plumbing supplies, and a third, particularly the Southwest Pacific, al-
lumber. The engineers reviewed sup- most from the start of the war. There
ply levels for the theater each month and were too few units to store and distribute
reset them every three months. spare parts, together with too few men
trained or experienced in spare parts
supply; shipments were not received
71 from the mainland until months after
(1) Engr CPA, Periodic Rpt, Quarter Ending 30
Jun 44. (2) Engr CPBC, Periodic Rpt, Quarter
Ending 30 Sep 44. Both in Engr AGF PAC. (3)
Memo for Rcd, Harry F. Kirkpatrick, 20 Dec 45,
72
sub: Development of Sup Plng for Engr Class IV (1) Memo, MIL Amph Tng to MIL ExecO CPA,
Sups. EHD Files. (4) Memo, Lt Col Joseph Mat- n.d., sub: Use of 1394th Engr Constr Tr Assigned to
son, Jr., Asst to Honolulu Dist Engr, to Kramer, n.d., Engr Depot. Engr AGF PAC, 370. (2) 1st Ind,
sub: Notes on Sup Matters Pertaining to Requisi- Wimer to Loper, 15 Jul 44, on Ltr, OCofEngrs to
tioning Against HD Projs Engr AGF PAC, 400. Loper, 21 Jun 44. Engr AGF PAC.
510 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
requisitions were sent in from Hawaii; maps, and distributing copies to units in
diverse makes of equipment required the field. Fortunately for the map mak-
unnecessarily large quantities of parts; ers, General Twitty, J-2 of the Joint
inefficient and careless equipment oper- Staff, continued to handle policy matters
ators further increased the need for and priorities for the theater. He had
scarce parts; and stock control was in- the theater photographic officer under
adequate. In 1944 construction of a his "immediate control" and maintained
spare parts depot at Schofield Barracks close liaison with Colonel Loper. This
and the transfer to it of the spare parts partly explains why photographic units
stored in the base yards on Oahu made of the Navy and Air Forces were gaining
for better stock control and improved a better understanding of the needs of
distribution, but the shortage of trained the map-making units and accepted the
personnel remained. The spare parts fact that "Photographic coverage is never
depot was manned by the parts supply obtained by procrastination." A major
platoon of the 452d Depot Company, problem had at first been the great dis-
helped occasionally by details from tance from the Hawaiian Islands of the
construction battalions. In October areas to be photographed. In the early
1944 two parts supply platoons (separate) days, the engineers were heavily depend-
were assigned; the two units had only ent on naval planes based on carriers.
one officer and one enlisted man with any With the Marianas under American
experience in spare parts supply.73 control, land-based aircraft could reach
most of the islands of the western Pacific,
Maps and more systematic photographic cov-
erage was possible. Because of clouds
When Colonel Loper arrived in the over the islands, oblique pictures were
theater in June, he found that his map- sometimes the best the airmen could
ping duties required more than merely provide. During the summer the 64th
making and supplying maps for the Topographic Battalion was busy making
Army. The Navy and Marine Corps maps of the western Carolines and the
had no adequate map-making units; con- Palau Islands, working on a two-shift,
sequently, the engineers had to "take on 24-hours-a-day basis. With the B-29's
the lion's share of production for those about to take off from the Marianas,
arms as well." This continued to be most of Japan would soon be within
74
the case. When the Construction Serv- range of the cameramen.
ice was set up and responsibilities for
map production for forces in the theater
were transferred to it, Colonel Wimer's 74
(1) Hq CPBC, Rough Draft of Circular, Aug 44,
mapping section was charged with con- sub: Engr Mapping Functions. Engr AGF PAC.
(2) Hist of the 64th Engr Topo Bn. (3) Memo,
ducting surveys, making and reproducing Engr CPBC, for G-4, G-2, and G-1 CPBC, 19 Aug
44. Engr AGF PAC. (4) Memo for Rcd, Lt Col
H. E. Thomas, Of of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 25 Oct 44.
73
Ltr, EngrO AFMIDPAC to CofEngrs, 17 Oct 45, Engr AGF PAC, 061.20 Intel Rpts. (5) Ltr, Col
sub: Engr Spare Parts Sup in the Mid Pac Theater. John Donoghue to Col Herbert Milwit, 20 Jan 45.
SWPA File M13. Engr AGF PAC.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 511
important naval and air bases in the On 17 September the 321st and 522d
Palaus. American forces would have to Regimental Combat Teams of the 81st
seize them or at least neutralize them Division landed on Angaur. Divisional
before beginning an invasion of the and shore party engineers went in with
Philippines. In addition to capturing the landing forces. The 306th Engineer
the Palaus, Admiral Nimitz planned to Combat Battalion had combat missions;
seize Ulithi atoll and Yap, as well as a the 1138th Combat Group, including the
number of other islands in the western 52d and 154th Combat Battalions, was
Carolines. Atolls and islands not seized responsible for shore party work. The
would be isolated and neutralized assault troops landed at two places on the
through bombing attacks. The Army's eastern side of the island. Company A
81st Infantry Division, together with of the 306th came ashore with the second
Navy and Marine units, was assigned to and third waves of the 321st RCT to
operations in the western Carolines. the south; Company B, with the 522d
Little was known about these far-off RCT, to the north. The southern beach
places. It was assumed their terrain was had firm sand which held up well under
similar to that of the other coral atolls vehicles. The northern one, narrow
or volcanic islands of the western Pacific. and steep, was flanked by limestone
Plans were made to capture Babelthuap cliffs; here the engineers first had to cut
and Peleliu, the two major islands in the a road from the water's edge to high
Palaus; both had airfields which could ground. Moving inland, the troops
probably be rehabilitated quickly. Sub- found the bombardments had turned the
sequent studies showed that both were island's jungle into an almost impene-
almost completely surrounded by a dan- trable tangle of broken trees and debris.
gerous barrier reef; to make matters The combat engineers' main job was to
worse, mountainous Babelthuap was clear roads through the wreckage.
believed to have a sizable Japanese gar- The next day Company C and Head-
rison. Angaur, six miles south of quarters Company of the 306th landed.
Peleliu and outside the barrier reef, and They cleared a center line so that the
with an area of three square miles, could surveyors could plot the airstrip, con-
probably be taken fairly easily. In the structed a perimeter road on the western
plan of campaign which was finally side of the island, and manned beach
developed, Angaur was substituted for defenses. Meanwhile, the shore party
Babelthuap. Two regimental combat engineers were unloading supplies and
teams of the 81st Division were scheduled establishing supply dumps. During the
to seize Angaur; the marines, supported first night the Japanese put beaches and
by elements of the 81st Division, were storage areas under small arms and
79
to take Peleliu. mortar fire, causing some casualties
among the shore party.
79
(1) App. 2 to An. B, Intel to Accompany FO No. With the retreat of the defenders,
7, 81st Inf Div, 5 Aug 44. 381-32.1 (8958). (2)
Robert R. Smith, The Approach to the Philippines,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II Base Comd Status Rpt on Angaur Island, an. A.
(Washington, 1953), pp. 452ff. (3) Hq Western Pac 98-BC5-0.3.0 (19843)M.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 515
after a few days, into the rugged north- later, the rear echelon arrived. No
western part of the island, the primary enemy troops were found. The men of
mission of the combat engineers was the 155th, landing on a number of islets,
that of working with the infantry in de- helped with unloading and did shore
stroying fortifications. The Japanese party work. Part of them prepared to
had hollowed out numerous caves and begin work on the airfield. Apparently
had built many pillboxes; the latter, con- the most suitable site was on Falalop
structed of reinforced concrete, coconut Island in the eastern part of the atoll.81
logs, coral, or earth, were of various sizes
and shapes. Caves and pillboxes were, Construction in the Western
as a rule, mutually supporting and ex- Carolines
pertly camouflaged. The 306th was
heavily engaged in assaulting these posi- By late September the engineers were
tions. The men advanced under cover- building airfields on Angaur and Ulithi.
ing fire, using flame throwers and Plans for Angaur called for a long-range
demolitions. Once again, the D-8 bull- bomber runway of 6,000 feet, to be
dozer with armored cab was a most valu- lengthened eventually to 8,000 feet.
able piece of equipment. This machine The site selected ran in a northeast-
could be used on many projects subject southwest direction on the eastern side
to sniper fire. The engineers also used of the island. Construction was delayed
it to ram dugouts and pillboxes or to because advance elements of the two
80
cover them with earth. aviation battalions, the 1884th and the
About 300 miles east of the Palaus was 1887th, could not disembark until three
Ulithi, one of the atolls in the western days after the assault began because the
Carolines scheduled for capture. The harbor facilities had been destroyed.
island was to be provided with a fleet The men, moreover, arrived without
anchorage, a seaplane base, and an air- their equipment. Borrowing two bull-
field. Capture of the atoll and initial dozers from the combat engineers, they
construction were assigned to the 323d hacked out a center line for the airfield
Regimental Combat Team, the engineer through the tangled jungle, which had
component of which included the 155th trees up to 90 feet high. Enemy inter-
Combat Battalion and a detachment of ference during the first ten days made
Headquarters and Headquarters Com- night work impossible. By 15 October
pany, 1138th Combat Group. On 21 a 4,500-foot runway, coral surfaced, was
September the advance echelon of the ready, and the next day the first plane
323d RCT reached the island; two days landed. The men completed the re-
maining 1,500 feet during the next five
80
days. The original intention was to
(1) 81st Div, Opn Rpt, Ulithi Atoll and Other
Western Caroline Islands. 381-33.4 (21579) 21 Sep
surface the strip with steel mat, but this
44-4 Jan 45. (2) 154th Engr Combat Bn, Opns on
Angaur and Peleliu Islands. (3) 52d Engr Combat
Bn, Opns Rpt, Angaur Island. (4) Ltr, Capt Bonn
81
H. Wagner, C.E., Observer, Angaur Opn, to Richard- 81st Div, Opn Rpt, Ulithi Atoll and Other
son, 23 Oct 44. Engr AGF PAC. Western Caroline Islands.
516 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
turned out to be unnecessary because the tion was necessary. At first, unloading
coral provided a satisfactory surface.82 facilities were provided on both the
On Ulithi, construction of the airfield eastern and the western shore. Subse-
was complicated by a number of factors. quently, a landing pier for LCT's was
The map of Falalop, based on aerial built on the eastern side. On the west-
photography, indicated there was ample ern side, the engineers constructed a
room for a 3,500-foot runway, but the floating dock 350 feet long, held in place
island turned out to be smaller than ex- by steel piles. The men of the 1887th
pected. Reconnaissance on the ground deepened and widened the harbor chan-
indicated the map was in error by as nel, completing this job in seven days,
much as 6 percent. The runway would even though they had had no experience
have extended over the eastern and in underwater demolitions and were not
western beaches. Much of the island properly equipped for such work. On 9
was swampy, with a spongy vegetation October the 52d and 306th Combat Bat-
about five feet high; the terrain, together talions took over harbor development.
with the heavy rainfall, made proper They continued dredging and con-
drainage highly important. The 155th structed a causeway over 500 feet long.
Combat Battalion started to put a narrow Additional work included building stor-
road through the swamps of the airfield age for 32,000 barrels of gasoline and a
site. Using power saws, the men cut camp for the troops, maintaining a net-
down the trees on either side of the road work of coral-surfaced roads, and re-
and dynamited the stumps; bulldozers habilitating a narrow-gauge railway. On
pushed trees, stumps, and brush to one 14 October the 57th Naval Construction
side or the other. With coral obtained Battalion landed on Ulithi and took over
from nearby pits, the men widened and most of the work on the airstrip and
lengthened the road, gradually trans- other facilities from the 155th Combat
forming it into a runway. Probably Battalion. The latter continued work
their major problem was to extend the on the cribbing and taxiways until 26
strip over the eastern beach, awash at October, when it left for Peleliu. The
high tide. To hold back the strong next day the first plane landed. In gen-
waves, the men built a protective wall of eral, the 155th engineers had been
coconut logs in a series of cribs, which handicapped by a shortage of personnel
they filled with coral.
83
and of heavy equipment.84
Much additional work was done on A number of additional atolls and
Angaur and Ulithi. Since the prelimi- islets in the western Carolines were
nary bombardment had destroyed the seized, including Ngulu, Pulo Anna,
piers on Angaur, extensive reconstruc- Kayangel, and Faie. Elements of the
155th, 52d, and 306th Combat Battalions
82
(1) Army Garrison Force Hist, APO 264, Angaur 84
Island. World War II Rcds Div. (2) 1887th Engr (1) Army Garrison Force, Hist, APO 264, Angaur
Avn Bn, Hist of Opns on Angaur Island. (3) Hist Island. (2) Hist of the 1887th Engr Avn Bn. (3)
of the 1884th Engr Avn Bn. (4) Ltr, Wagner to 52d Engr Combat Bn, Opns Rpt, Angaur Island.
Richardson, 23 Oct 44. (4) 306th Engr Combat Bn, Rpt on Angaur and
83
Hist of the 155th Engr Combat Bn. Peleliu Opn, 10 Oct 44. 381-43.2 (21135).
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 517
took part in these landings, which were engineering section, including three well-
under way from mid-October on. These armed survey parties, went to the north-
operations had various purposes: to find ern part of the island to start the arduous
sites for naval anchorages, to establish task of surveying the sites. When the
loran stations, or simply to reconnoiter men reached the area selected for North
the islands and destroy any enemy troops Field, they found a small clearing with
thereon. Not many troops were found. a barbed-wire enclosure in which a radio
Only on Pulo Anna were any installa- signal detachment was already estab-
tions erected. Here, following the lished. They welcomed this addition
initial landing made on 20 October, one to their reinforcements. A drafting
company of the 52d constructed a loran room was built within the enclosure and
station, together with defensive installa- the initial development of the new air-
tions.85 field was under way. Each of the three
survey parties was equipped with a D-8
Construction on Guam bulldozer to clear a pathway; each had
two submachine guns and a half-track for
The Army's base development plan protection.87 Building the airfield was
called for two B-29 fields on Guam's not going to be easy. "Mother nature
northern plateau. On 7 October the made this construction job a hard and
854th Aviation Battalion disembarked, gruelling grind in the sticky heat . . .
its officers and men recent veterans of together with the ever-present dengue-
Kwajalein. Before turning to the B-29 infested mosquitoes," wrote Colonel
fields, the aviation engineers helped the Brown. ". . . the northern part of
Seabees, who were having difficulty in Guam was still a ... mystery to the
meeting their completion dates on Depot engineering world. Aerial photographs
Field; providing repair facilities for the that were on hand failed to show con-
big bombers was urgent, since many tours or even the few native trails
would undoubtedly be damaged during obscured by thick tropical growth."88
the attacks on Japan. From 9 October Meanwhile, one company with about a
on, most of the battalion was engaged in third of the battalion's heavy equipment
building facilities at this field. Al- had started on 12 October to build six
though the site was in a cultivated and miles of access road to the new airfield
fairly thickly populated part of Guam, from the existing one-way island thor-
Japanese riflemen were still a menace to oughfare. Road construction went on
the construction crews.86 twenty-four hours a day.89
Work soon began on the first B-29
field. On 15 October the 854th's entire
87
Hist of the 854th Engr Avn Bn.
85 88
81st Div, Opn Rpt, Ulithi Atoll and other Ltr, Brown to Time Magazine, 30 Aug 45, sent
Western Caroline Islands. to CG AAF WD, for forwarding, in Rpt of Opns,
86
(1) Hist of the 854th Engr Avn Bn. (2) Brown, 854th Engr Avn Bn, Kwajalein and Guam. Air
"Aviation Engineers on Guam," The Military Engi- Univ Lib Maxwell AFB.
89
neer, XXXVII (October, 1945), 398. (3) Building Brown, "Aviation Engineers on Guam," The
the Navy's Bases, II, 351-52. Military Engineer, XXXVII (October, 1945), 398ff.
518 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
B-29's Take Off From Saipan moment that another set of bombs would
let go from the . . . adjacent hardstands
On 12 October the first B-29 landed due to the intense heat." By 0230 the
on the still unfinished runway at Isley, fires were under control, and the engi-
and in a little over a week additional neers "were cleaning up the mess." 90
Superfortresses came in from the United The B-29's were soon pounding Japan
States. The time had come to blast with growing strength, and reconnais-
Tokyo. On 24 November the first sance planes from Saipan were taking
bombers took off for the Japanese capital photographs of south central Honshu for
and made a successful raid. Retaliation maps to be used for the invasion of the
was to be expected. On the 27th Zeros Japanese home islands. Saipan was be-
bombed Isley during daylight hours. ing developed into the most powerful
The 804th engineers claimed they shot base in the Pacific. The whole appear-
down one enemy plane as it was strafing ance of the island was being changed.
their bivouac area. During the night of "Saipan," wrote Clinton Green, who
the 29th, the Zeros returned. This had landed with the first Army troops
foray caused considerable damage. along the beaches south of Charan
Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.,Kanoa, ". . . is something out of an en-
91
commander of the XXI Bomber Com- gineering dream book."
mand, in a letter to General Arnold, gave From January to October 1944 forces
an eye-witness account of the attack. He of the Central Pacific had advanced to a
and his party were coming up a hill near point 4,800 miles west of Honolulu.
Isley at about 0115 as the B-29's were The Palaus, only about 550 miles from
being loaded for their takeoff at 0515. the Philippines, had been captured. On
The Japanese scored a lucky hit on one all the captured islands, base and airfield
of the bombers. "There was the most construction was progressing rapidly.
violent explosion I have ever seen. . . ." In the Marianas, B-29 fields were being
General Hansell wrote. "There were built from which the Japanese home
bombs all over the place, and the ground islands would shortly be subjected to
was covered with small antipersonnel crippling air raids. In the Central
fragmentation bombs dropped by the Pacific, as in the Southwest Pacific, engi-
Japanese planes." The engineers, Gen- neer base construction was vital to the
eral Hansell went on to say, moved in westward advance and required the
with bulldozers and scoops to keep the major share of the Engineer effort. To
fires from spreading. They piled the support the movement across the Central
still burning wreckage into two heaps, Pacific, a growing Army force was avail-
which they partially covered with earth, able. Army troop strength in the Cen-
and then drove their bulldozers over the
flaming mounds. "The flames came up
through the tractors and all around the 90
(1) Craven and Cate, eds., Matterhorn to
drivers but it didn't stop them . . . ," Nagaski, pp. 546-48, 558. (2) Ltr, Arnold to Rey-
bold, 21 Dec 44. Engr AGF PAC, 330.1.
General Hansell continued. "All of 91
Clinton Green, "Our B-29 Base: An Epic Job,"
this when most of us were expecting any New York Times Magazine (December 10, 1944), p. 8.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 519
tral Pacific rose from 389,706 on 1 Janu- South Pacific, rose from 31,547 to 46,714
ary to 412,618 on 1 October. During men.92
the same period, the number of engineer
troops in the Pacific Ocean Areas, even 92
AGO, Statistical and Accounting Br, Strength
with the dwindling strength in the Rpts of the U.S. Army.
CHAPTER XIII
preparations to support the drive along tion. One of the most pressing prob-
the New Guinea coast. Additional lems of a task force commander and his
units were arriving from the United engineer was how best to carry on combat
States; among them was the 3d Engineer support and undertake base construction
Special Brigade, under Brig. Gen. David at the same time. This was true even
A. D. Ogden, which reached Milne Bay though procedures for construction in
soon after the first of the year. The the combat zone had been fairly well
elements of the brigade began a period of standardized. Responsibility for con-
orientation, and some participated in struction within a specified area was
reconnaissance missions or in minor usually assigned to the task force com-
landings on the coasts of New Guinea mander. GHQ SWPA, through chan-
and New Britain in preparation for a nels, furnished him with a layout map,
major assault.2 construction requirements, and specifi-
It was the engineers of Sixth Army cations. The task force engineer's
who were to play a most crucial part in staff prepared detailed layout plans,
the move up the New Guinea coast. established priorities, and prepared plans
They would be responsible both for for using engineer construction units
combat support and for starting work assigned to the task force in the most
on new airfields and bases. Task force effective manner. The task force com-
commanders would have immediate re- mander was responsible for the initial
sponsibility for these two major missions phases of base development. GHQ
at various points along the route of SWPA determined the final extent of
advance. One of the most important construction. Though directives and
duties Colonel Sturgis and his staff procedures might be clear enough,
had to assume was the selection of a whether or not they could be carried
capable task force engineer for each out in the midst of combat was a ques-
operation. As regards engineer organi- tion not so easily answered. Casey
zation within a task force, there was worked closely with Sturgis in these
little in the way of experience to go on operations. He passed on information
except what had been learned in the through technical channels and con-
operations of the previous year. There sulted with Sturgis ". . . even to the
were no standard tables of organization extent," Casey wrote later, "that we both
and equipment or standing operating sometimes trod on Command preroga-
procedures (SOP). Each task force en- tives." 3
gineer would have to try to organize his
staff in the way best suited to carry out The Admiralty Islands
his particular mission. Nor were there
any rules to indicate how many units The Admiralty Islands were the scene
should be assigned to a particular opera- of the first major assault of 1944. About
2
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,
3
115-20. (2) Brig Gen Lewis T. Ross, Personal (1) Engr Sec Sixth Army, Engr Hist, ch. XI (Draft
Recollections of the CE (MS). (3) 3d ESB, Our MS). Sturgis File 32. (2) Ltr, Casey to Sturgis, 14
Business Is Beachheads. Both in SWPA Files. Aug 50. SWPA Files.
522 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
200 miles northeast of New Guinea and The Admiralties included one large
350 miles northwest of Rabaul, they island—Manus—about sixty miles long
were of great strategic importance. On from east to west and twenty miles wide.
13 February MacArthur directed Krue- (See Map 27.) To the east, separated
ger and Halsey to seize them and the from Manus by a 1,000-foot wide strait
enemy base at Kavieng on the northern about three miles long, was small Los
tip of New Ireland about 1 April. Negros Island, whose irregular coast line
Krueger would be responsible for seizing enclosed two bays, Seeadler Harbour on
the Admiralties; Halsey, for capturing the northwest, and Hyane Harbour on
Kavieng. Using Navy construction bat- the east. The northern part of Los
talions and Army engineer units fur- Negros, known as Mokerang peninsula,
nished by Halsey, Krueger was to begin had numerous coconut plantations and
work on a major naval base in the Ad- swamps. In a flat stretch south of Hyane
miralties and improve two Japanese- Harbour, the Japanese had built Mo-
built airfields there. General Krueger mote airfield. The southern part of the
selected the 1st Cavalry Division, rein- island was hilly and densely wooded.
forced, designated the Brewer Task Jungled Manus, never thoroughly ex-
Force, for the assault. A square division plored, appeared from aerial photo-
of two brigades, the 1st Cavalry had been graphs to have little more than native
dismounted and reorganized to fight as villages and a few trails. On the
infantry. Its engineer component was northern shore, the Japanese had built
the 8th Engineer Squadron under Lt. a landing strip near the village of
Col. Marvin C. Ellison. Each of the Lorengau. The plan was to have two
two brigade combat teams had an engi- combat teams land on D-day—one on
neer troop, supplied with additional Los Negros on the west side of the
equipment, including 7 bulldozers, 6 Mokerang peninsula and the other on
carryalls, 2 road graders, a crane, and a Manus near Lorengau.5
sawmill. Troop A supported the 1st By mid-February, as signs became
Brigade Combat Team; Troop C, the fairly numerous that Japanese air
2d. In reserve were Troop B and Head- strength in the area around the Bismarck
quarters and Service Troop. Since the Sea was weak, General Kenney pressed
Navy was especially interested in de- for moving up the attack. In the last
veloping airfields and a base in the Ad- week in February MacArthur, acting on
miralties, Krueger assigned airfield Kenney's suggestion, decided to change
construction initially to naval construc- his plans. In place of a full-scale am-
tion battalions. An Army engineer, phibious assault on the islands on 1
Col. William W. Wanamaker, was
named task force engineer.4 TEACUP, 13 May 44. Sturgis File 39. (4) USAFFE
Bd, SWPA Rpt 18, Opns of Divl Engrs, Admiralties
Campaign (cited hereafter as USAFFE Bd Rpt 18).
4
(1) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of World War II Rcds Div, 4-2/118/114.
5
Rabaul, pp. 316-17. (2) 8th Engr Squadron, Hist of (1) Historical Division, War Department, The
Activities in the Admiralty Campaign (Brewer Task Admiralties; Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division,
Force). 901-ENG-0.3 (2997)M 29 Feb-18 May 44. (3) (Washington, 1946), pp. 4-7. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt
Col William N. Leaf, Task Force Engr Rpt, Opns at 18.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 523
unable to do it. There was confusion vance echelon of the 57th Combat Bat-
even over the administration of Army talion arrived; the last elements came in
units.13 "Upon arrival this station the on 9 January 1944. Part of the 131st
usual existed," the chronicler of the and all of the 57th joined the 117th
836th reported. "We knew not to Combat Battalion in supporting the in-
whom we were assigned." 14 Early in fantry. The men cut roads and trails
April the construction battalions were through the heavy jungle, built timber
placed directly under the operational bridges, and strengthened perimeter de-
control of the task force engineer. Con- fenses. Part of the 131st Engineers
ditions improved greatly. Confusion went to work in the service command
and delays in getting orders to construc- area. This site was a tangle of jungle
tion units were noticeably reduced. A interspersed with swamps; the growth
considerable source of friction was the was so dense that the first clearing had to
slowness of the Seabees in getting started be done by hand and drainage ditches
on construction. Sverdrup reported, dug to lower the water table. Engineers
"The 104th . . . spent the first 9 days with bulldozers then moved in and took
after arrival in unloading their gear and out more growth. Others followed with
equipment and setting up their camp. clamshells, which dug wider and deeper
In contrast . . . the 836th went to work drainage ditches. After the ground had
immediately upon arrival, and 36 hours been cleared and drained, construction
after the ship arrived at Seeadler Har- of the major projects began. The engi-
bour, the entire unit was working on a neers started work on supply dumps for
24-hour basis." 15 all sections of the command. The
largest jobs by far were the storage areas
Bougainville for quartermaster, ordnance, chemical
warfare, and air forces units.
Meanwhile, in the Solomons, the engi- By early March, the signs were un-
neers continued to be heavily engaged mistakable that the Japanese were pre-
on Bougainville, both in combat and in paring an all-out counterattack. The
base construction. On 15 December 57th engineers increased the number of
1943 responsibility for combat on the guards, strung barbed wire, and mounted
island had passed from the Marines to machine guns in the bivouac area. On
the Army's XIV Corps. That same day the 8th, enemy artillery opened fire; the
the Army had organized a service com- counteroffensive was on. The 117th
mand for base construction and logistic and part of the 131st engineers were
support. Elements of the 131st Engi- heavily engaged in combat duties. On
neer Combat Regiment landed from 15 11 March two companies of the 57th
to 21 December. On the 25th the ad- were committed as infantry to be used in
case the enemy attacked in their sector.
13
Leaf, Task Force Engr Rpt, Opns at TEACUP,
On the 12th regular engineer work was
13 May 44. suspended by the remainder of the bat-
14
836th Engr Avn Bn, Hist Narration for 1944. talion and the men put to work carrying
15
Memo for Rcd Sverdrup, 21 Apr 44. SWPA
File 164. It should be noted that it was SOP for
ammunition, rations, and water, and
the Seabees to build their camps first. evacuating the wounded. The enemy
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 527
attacks, continuing for two weeks, had Hollandia, the name of a small settle-
spent themselves by the end of the ment on the northern shore of New
month. The engineers' main task Guinea, also denoted an area just west
henceforth was base construction.16 of the Netherlands New Guinea boun-
dary, extending about 50 miles along the
Hollandia—Planning coast and stretching inland for some 40
miles. (Map 27) Here were two large
With the Admiralties captured a bays—Humboldt in the east and Tanah-
month ahead of schedule, the campaign merah, 25 miles to the northwest. Ex-
in the Southwest Pacific could be speeded tending along the coast was the Cyclops
up. On 12 March the Joint Chiefs di- Range, a lofty chain, the dominating
rected General MacArthur to cancel the feature of the region. South of the
attack on Kavieng and accelerate base mountains was a fairly level, well-
and airfield construction in the Admiral- drained plateau, in the center of which
ties. In line with suggestions previously was Lake Sentani. Except for the area
made by MacArthur, they further di- around the lake, the terrain was rugged.
rected him to bypass Hansa Bay and According to intelligence information,
Wewak and seize Hollandia, 200 miles there were good, if small, landing beaches
west of Wewak. Bombers taking off at Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bays.
from fields at Hollandia would be able Plans called for transforming the Hol-
to reach western New Guinea and the landia region into a sizable air base and
Palau Islands, and thus could strike at a supply base, the latter to handle 180
bases deep in enemy-held territory. days of supply for 200,000 men. Re-
MacArthur, anticipating the Joint quired would be six airfields, an air
Chiefs' directive, had, a few days before depot, about four million square feet of
its arrival, ordered his staff to discontinue covered storage, 200 miles of road, tanks
preparations for the attacks on Hansa for 118,000 barrels of gasoline, 16
Bay and Wewak and plan instead for an Liberty ship docks, and numerous
assault on Hollandia. The attack was camps and administrative buildings. At
set for 22 April. Simultaneously, there Aitape, the coastal area seemed fairly
was to be a landing near Aitape, some level, and there appeared to be no
100 miles to the east, to forestall any obstructions to hinder movement inland.
overland attack by enemy forces bottled A landing could probably be made
up at Wewak and other points along the easily; base construction would be
New Guinea coast.17 minor.
18
MAP 27
small engineer staffs had started plan- staffs were consolidated at Sixth Army
ning for an amphibious attack at Hansa headquarters and continued work there;
Bay and construction of a base there. subsequently some of the planners
One, made up of Sixth Army engineers, worked at nearby I Corps headquarters
working in Sixth Army headquarters at under General Eichelberger, who had
Finschhafen under Colonel Robinson, been chosen task force commander.
the task force engineer, was engaged in Additional men were added from time
planning for the assault and initial base to time. Just before D-day, the task
construction; the other, working in force engineer staff totaled ninety-one
USASOS headquarters at Brisbane, was officers and men, most of them taken
preparing more elaborate plans for base from USASOS engineer units. This
construction. Soon after word was re- was a most logical arrangement; transfer
ceived on 10 March that the objective of the base after the combat phase from
area was changed to Hollandia, the two Sixth Army to USASOS would be rela-
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 529
19
lively easy. The importance of the set up construction schedules for the
Hollandia operation from the engineer- thirty-three units to be assigned to the
ing standpoint is shown by the fact that operation. Equally detailed was plan-
GHQ operations instructions for that ning for supply. After the engineers
operation, issued on 28 March, included had completed construction schedules,
a separate engineer annex. Previously, they calculated supply needs, then broke
engineer requirements for an operation them down into priorities for shipment
had been contained in the G-4 annex.20 to Hollandia.21
The task force engineers made elabo-
rate calculations to determine how units Hollandia—Assault
assigned to base construction might be
employed most effectively. They tried RECKLESS Task Force, together with its
to estimate not only when each facility supporting Allied naval and air units,
would be required, but also the type and constituted the largest assemblage of
number of units needed to finish it on ships, planes, and men organized for any
schedule. Calculations along these lines operation in the Southwest Pacific up to
could now be made with some degree of this time. Commanded by General
accuracy because Sturgis' staff had pre- Eichelberger, and assigned the mission
pared tables setting forth the construc- of seizing the Hollandia area and initiat-
tion potential of experienced engineer ing construction of Base G, RECKLESS
units, based on their records in the the- Task Force included the 24th and 41st
ater. A fully manned and equipped Divisions (the latter less the 163d RCT)
aviation battalion was taken as the and twenty-eight attached combat and
standard construction unit. "Fully service units, totaling approximately
manned and equipped" meant that the 60,000 men. The engineer component
work force of the battalion totaled ap- amounted to about 41 percent, the high-
proximately 500 men, working eight est for an amphibious operation so far
hours a day, six days a week, on a 3-shift conducted in the Southwest Pacific; most
basis. The amount of work the bat- of this percentage represented construc-
talion could do in a month was called a tion units. By mid-April, preparations
battalion month and its work potential for the assault were complete. The 24th
was arbitrarily rated as 1. An experi- Division staged at Goodenough Island,
enced general service regiment was rated 1,000 miles from Hollandia; the 41st
as 1.2; a newly arrived construction bat- Division, at Finschhafen, 700 miles from
talion, 0.8; a combat battalion, 0.6; a the objective area. The naval convoys
naval construction battalion with three carrying these two divisions and their
months' experience, 1.2. The planners
21
(1) USAFFE Bd Rpt 31. (2) Comments by Gen-
19
(1) USAFFE Bd SWPA, Rpt 31, Engr Opns, eral Sturgis on draft chapter. SWPA Files. (3) Ltr,
RECKLESS (Hollandia) Task Force (cited hereafter as Lt Col Leonard L. Haseman to Staff Br, 28 Nov 50.
USAFFE Bd Rpt 31). World War II Rcds Div, 4- SWPA Files. (4) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, developed
2.131/44. (2) RECKLESS Task Force, Hist of the slightly different percentages for engineer unit capa-
Hollandia Opn, p. 52. bilities. See Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Admin Hist,
20
Ltr, Casey to Sturgis, 14 Aug. 50. SWPA Files. 6 Apr 45-31 Dec 46, p. 11. SWPA Files.
530 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
supporting units sailed for the Admiral- supplies piled up on shore. As intelli-
ties, which they reached the first night; gence reports had indicated, the beaches
thereupon, the combined task force were narrow; to the rear were mangrove
turned westward.22 swamps, some of which had not shown up
On the morning of 22 April under on aerial photographs because of the
excellent sea and weather conditions, the dense growth of trees in the water. Exits
assault was made as scheduled. The 2d were far more restricted than had been
Brigade's support battery was active. anticipated. Red Beach 2 had such an
Besides its 4 rocket LCVP's, 4 rocket extensive swamp in back of it that mov-
Dukws, and 2 flak LCM's, the battery ing supplies into the interior was out of
had 43 Buffaloes to carry troops across the question; during the first night, large
reefs and shallow waters near the beaches. amounts were shuttled across Tanah-
The battery's craft were about equally merah Bay to the other beach. Nor did
divided for the two assaults. When the everything go smoothly at Humboldt
24
naval bombardment ceased, rocket Bay. A lone Japanese plane coming
LCVP's and Dukw's and flak LCM's over on the second day dropped a num-
moved to about 100 yards from shore ber of bombs near an ammunition dump.
and loosed their barrages on the beaches. For three days explosions rocked the
Waves of landing craft brought in troops area, and fires raged out of control. The
and supplies.23 amphibian boatmen, bringing their craft
The 532d Boat and Shore Regiment, close to shore, rescued many of the men
less two companies, landed men and sup- trapped on the beaches by the flames.
plies for the 41st Division on the three Soon after the first landings, the com-
White Beaches at Humboldt Bay. Only bat engineers began to advance inland
a few of the amphibian craft, upon ap- with the infantry. The 116th Combat
proaching shore, were hit by enemy rifle Battalion (less Company A) of the 41st
fire; most of the Japanese had fled in- Division came ashore at Humboldt Bay
land. Ships had to be unloaded on on D-day. Enemy resistance was negli-
D-day so that they could get away that gible. The men widened the trail lead-
night; stacked higher and higher on the ing from the beaches to the native village
beaches, supplies were in a vulnerable of Pim, making it passable for trucks.
position. At Tanahmerah, the 542d They then began to improve a Japanese-
Boat and Shore Regiment helped land built road running from Pim to the air-
the 24th Division on Red Beaches 1 and dromes. This road, which intelligence
2. Except for random rifle fire, enemy sources had indicated was in fair condi-
interference was lacking. As at Hum- tion, turned out to be little better than
boldt Bay, complications began when a trail, which at most could take 2½-ton
trucks in dry weather. In swampy areas
22
(1) RECKLESS Task Force, Hist of the Hollandia
24
Opn, pp. 5-6. (2) Maj R. M. Little, 1st Aust Corps, (1) 532d EBSR, Unit Rpt No. 5, 15 Mar-7 Jun
Rpt on Engr Opns at Hollandia and Aitape, Dutch 44. SWPA Files. (2) RECKLESS Task Force, Hist of
New Guinea, 22 Apr-4 May 44. SWPA File 128. the Hollandia Opn, p. 54. (3) Heavey, Down
23
2d ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt of Opns, Apr 1-30, Ramp!, pp. 116-17. (4) Ltr, Heavey to Reybold,
44. SWPA File E-20-4. 30 Jun 44. SWPA File 73.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 531
ENGINEERS OF THE 1881ST WITH FULL JUNGLE EQUIPMENT move along a Hollandia
beach.
it became a quagmire largely because of trail leading inland was too narrow and
the heavy, continuous traffic. The steep even for jeeps. For days, the men
116th engineers, helped by the 79th had to carry supplies forward. Added
Combat and the 1881st Aviation Battal- to these difficulties were the rains, which
ions, had to make a major effort on this began on the second day of the landing,
25
road. the lack of gravel or rock for surfacing,
At Tanahmerah Bay the 3d Combat the inadequate number of hand tools,
Battalion (less Company B) of the 24th and the small number of natives in the
Division landed on D-day. The effort region willing to work. The most fa-
required to support the infantry in the vorable element was the ineffectual
advance to the airdromes was more la- enemy resistance. By 26 April the three
borious than at Humboldt Bay. The airdromes were in American hands.26
25 26
Rpt, Col Herbert G. Lauterbach, CO 116th (1) Tanahmerah Bay Landing Force, Hist Rpt.
Engr Combat Bn, to Krueger, 28 Jun 44. SWPA SWPA Files. (2) 3d Engr Combat Bn, Hist Rpt,
Files. an. 1. (3) USAFFE Bd Rpt 31.
532 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
As soon as the infantry reached the and a squadron of fighters was stationed
airfields—named Sentani, Cyclops, and there.27
Hollandia—the engineers began the job The unsatisfactory roads in the Hol-
of rebuilding them. The three runways, landia area made it hard to get supplies
satisfactorily located, considering the to the airfields and the area around
terrain, were poorly constructed; they them where the base was being con-
were of earth, and drainage was inade- structed. Japanese-built Tami airfield
quate. The subbase at Sentani was so near the coast southeast of Humboldt
poor that the Japanese had placed the Bay, if improved, could be used to airlift
runway surfacing on bamboo matting. supplies into the interior. Accordingly,
Allied bombings had damaged the fields General Krueger directed the engineers
heavily. Four aviation battalions, work- to lengthen the grass runway at Tami to
ing under the direction of headquarters, 4,000 feet and surface it with steel mat.
931st Aviation Regiment, began the job By 3 May the engineers had improved
of reconstruction. The aviation engi- the strip sufficiently to make landings
neers' main job was to find a suitable and takeoffs by C-47's possible. In the
material for surfacing. In nearby next few days C-47's made almost 500
streams they came upon sufficient quanti- trips from Tami to the fields at Hol-
ties of rock and gravel. They graded landia, bringing in gasoline, supplies,
the Sentani and Cyclops runways and and troops. Useful in the early days of
placed crushed rock to a depth of about the Hollandia operation, Tami was not
six inches; after rolling the rock into a further developed because of its swampy
compact layer, they dampened it slightly location.28
and topped it first with an asphalt cut-
back and then with a coat of pure asphalt Aitape
and limestone chips. They surfaced the
Hollandia runway with iron ore which The assault at Aitape by PERSECUTION
they took from a nearby deposit, mixing Task Force resembled the one at Hol-
the ore with equal parts of sand. The landia, but on a reduced scale. Naval
most troublesome job was providing ade- and aerial bombardment killed or drove
quate drainage. The water table was away most of the Japanese in the beach-
high because of the many swamps and head area; the troops on landing met
streams. The men dug three-foot deep only occasional rifle fire. This was the
ditches, which helped considerably to first major landing in which units of
lower the ground water level. On the General Ogden's 3d Engineer Special
whole, the work of making the airdromes
serviceable progressed rapidly, despite the 27
(1) Dudley and Staggs, "Engineer Troops on
terrain, which was poorer than expected. Airdrome Construction," The Military Engineer,
By 29 April 4,000 feet of the Cyclops XXXVII (October, 1945), 386-88. (2) Engrs of
runway was ready for dry-weather use by —SWPA, VI, 230. (3) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road
to Tokyo, p. 113.
transports, and by 3 May the Hollandia 28
(1) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Sai-
strip had been completed to 5,000 feet pan, pp. 609-10.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 533
Brigade participated. The 593d Boat graded, and almost entirely overgrown
and Shore Regiment, less two boat com- with kunai grass. The Australian units,
panies, furnished the boat and shore all three of them ashore by D+1, worked
teams. Despite the exposed beach with around the clock with motor graders,
its heavy surf, the amphibian engineers dozers, and sheepsfoot rollers. On 24
carried on more or less routinely their April, before 1000, the first fighter plane
tasks of unloading LST's and establish- landed. Soon the heavy rains turned
ing supply dumps. Moving inland, the the runway into a quagmire, unusable
27th Combat Battalion and Company A except in emergency. The Australians
of the 116th Combat Battalion encoun- then set out to cover the strip with
tered no Japanese, mines, or obstacles. pierced plank; they finished this job on
The combat engineers worked mainly the 28th. The field was again service-
on roads and bridges, the 27th widening able but not altogether satisfactory be-
the road leading to the enemy-built air- cause of its poor drainage. To the south
fields and the 116th constructing roads lay the enemy-built bomber runway, in
along the beach. Since the light Japa- the same state of neglect as the fighter
nese-built bridges and culverts would not strip and pitted with bomb craters. On
hold up under M4 tanks, the troops the third day of the landing, the Aus-
constructed temporary spans of coconut tralians began filling in the craters but
logs and put in culverts made of gasoline were not able until the 28th to transfer
drums covered with sand, which proved any equipment from the fighter strip.
to be satisfactory expedients.29 The two American airborne aviation
With sizable enemy forces at Wewak battalions, arriving on 4 May, joined the
and Hansa Bay, construction of airfields Australians working on the bomber
at Aitape was urgent. Three mobile strip. Poor terrain slowed construction.
works squadrons—the 5th, 6th, and 7th Coral surfaced, the runway was ready for
—of the Royal Australian Air Force and fighters on 27 May, but not for bombers
two American airborne aviation battal- until early in July.30
ions—the 872d and 875th—had the
mission of rehabilitating the three A Smaller Base at Hollandia
Japanese-built runways at Aitape, known
collectively as Tadji Drome. The units Problems had developed at Hollandia.
were to work under the supervision of Although the engineers were able to re-
Wing Comdr. William A. C. Dale, the construct the airfields fairly rapidly for
task force engineer. A few hours after fighters and transports, they could not
the landing, Dale and members of his
staff investigated the strip nearest the 30
(1) Little, Rpt on Engr Opns at Hollandia and
beach. It was 400 feet long, fairly well Aitape, Dutch New Guinea, 22 Apr-4 May 44. (2)
Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 25 Apr 44, sub: Inspection
at Aitape. SWPA File 511. (3) Task Force Engr
29
(1) Task Force Engr Rpt on PERSECUTION Opn. Rpt on PERSECUTION Opn. (4) Hist of the 872d Air-
SWPA File A165. (2) 3d ESB, Hist Rpt, 3-30 Apr borne Engr Avn Bn. (5) Hist of the 875th Airborne
44. SWPA File E-32-1. Engr Avn Bn.
534 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
readily develop runways for heavy bomb- Islands together with the nearby New
ers because of the swampy terrain. Guinea coast, about 125 miles northwest
Representatives of the major commands, of Hollandia, and the island of Biak,
making a survey of the Hollandia area, some 200 miles still farther west. After
concluded that construction of a base of the detailed survey of the Hollandia area
the size outlined in GHQ's operations had shown conclusively that the develop-
instructions would be impracticable. ment there of heavy bomber fields was
The unfavorable terrain, the poor roads, not advisable, the capture of Wakde and
and the impossibility of developing ade- Biak was all the more compelling.
quate harbor facilities at either Tanah- Until adequate fields could be built on
merah or Humboldt Bay within a rea- these islands, heavy bombers would have
sonable time were all hard facts that to operate from the Admiralties, over
militated against building a base large 400 miles east of Hollandia. On 27
enough to support 200,000 men. Maj. April MacArthur issued operations in-
Gen. James L. Frink, commanding gen- structions calling for an assault on 15
eral of USASOS, advised construction of May on the Wakde Islands and a 25-mile
a smaller base. General Kenney can- stretch of the nearby New Guinea coast
celed plans for an air depot and directed from Sarmi to Toem. The 41st Divi-
the building of minimal air facilities sion was to make the landings. The
only. Over-all plans for base and air- division's 163d Regimental Combat
field construction were revised. Mac- Team was to capture the Wakde Islands;
Arthur reduced the number of airfields the remainder of the division, the area
to be built from six to three, cut covered along the coast. The attack on Biak
storage from four to three million square was tentatively scheduled for early June;
feet, and directed that supply facilities the precise date would be determined
be built for 140,000 instead of 200,000 later. While plans and preparations for
men. Despite these reductions, con- the assault on Wakde were being made,
struction needs were still tremendous, aerial photographs coming in of the
and would necessitate a sustained effort coastal area indicated that it was a poor
by all engineer units assigned to the place for airfield construction and that
operation.31 concentrations of Japanese troops near
Sarmi might make the job hazardous as
Wakde well. MacArthur decided to revise his
strategy, and on 10 May issued new
Even before the assault on Hollandia operations instructions. The 163d RCT
and Aitape, plans and preparations for was to seize the Wakde Islands and a
amphibious strikes against points farther smaller nearby coastal strip, while the
west were well along. MacArthur's remainder of the 41st Division would
planning staffs were concentrating on prepare for the assault on Biak. The
two places in particular: the Wakde landing at Wakde was now scheduled for
32
31
17 May; the one on Biak, ten days later.
(1) Craven and Cate eds., Guadalcanal to Sai-
pan, pp. 608-09. General Kenney Reports, pp. 394-
32
95. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt 31. (1) TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt. Sturgis File
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 535
About two miles off the New Guinea The amphibian engineers consisted of
shore line, the Wakde Islands included the shore battalion of the 593d Boat and
Insoemoar, usually called Wakde by the Shore Regiment and Company A of the
American troops, and smaller Insoe- boat battalion of the 542d Boat and
manai. Relatively flat Insoemoar, about Shore Regiment. Shallow water and
one and three-fourths miles long, had heavy surf were the main obstacles; both
limestone cliffs and terraces along its were so troublesome that a major effort
southeastern edge. The Japanese-built was necessary on the landing jetties.
airstrip extended almost from the west- The shore engineers, using their bull-
ern to the eastern tip of the island. dozers, had the beach in fair condition
Insoemanai was too small for base devel- in about an hour. Enemy resistance was
opment. Colonel Sturgis had little time slight; apparently the Japanese had not
to organize a task force engineer section expected a landing at this point. The
and assemble units for the assault. combat engineers, including the 27th
Nevertheless, Lt. Col. Sherwood E. Liles, Combat Battalion and Company A of
Jr., the task force engineer, and his staff the 116th, veterans of the recent Aitape
of four officers and twenty-one enlisted landing, had as their initial mission un-
men from Headquarters, 1112th Combat loading LST's. After finishing this task,
Group, after being briefed on the opera- two companies of the 27th improved the
tion, and making a fairly detailed study coastal road and repaired the Japanese-
of terrain reports, aerial photographs, built bridges. One of the companies
and maps of the objective areas, were supported the infantry in its drive west-
able to piece together quite an accurate ward toward Japanese-built Maffin
picture of the airstrip, the nature of the Drome, some six miles from the landing
soil, the conditions at the beaches, and beach. As the troops moved forward,
the extent of the road net on the Wakde enemy resistance stiffened noticeably;
Islands and the mainland. Before the engineers frequently had to repair
D-day, Colonel Liles and his staff had roads and bridges under fire or while
prepared a layout of the runway, taxi- harassed by enemy patrols and, at times,
ways, and dispersal areas to be con- had to fight as infantry to ward off
structed on Wakde. Eight engineer attacks.34
units, hastily assembled from bases on Meantime, a major amphibious assault
the New Guinea coast, were assigned to was under way against the Wakde
the task force for airfield and base Islands. In the initial landing, on 18
construction.33 May, Company A of the boat battalion
TORNADO Task Force arrived at its of the 542d Boat and Shore Regiment
objective area at dawn on 17 May. After and the shore battalion of the 593d Boat
the bombings, the assault waves made and Shore Regiment went in with the
their landings on the New Guinea coast. infantry. The amphibian engineers ran
34
42. (2) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Sai- (1) TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt. (2) 3d ESB,
pan, p. 620. Our Business Is Beachheads. (3) 3d ESB, Hist Rpt,
33
TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt. 1-31 May 44. SWPA File E32-2.
536 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
into surprisingly strong enemy resist- were holed up in caves from which they
ance. Despite the preinvasion bombard- could not easily be dislodged. Combat
ments and the shelling from guns em- engineers and infantrymen attacked the
placed on the mainland the day before, hideouts with hand grenades, bazookas,
many of the defenses, particularly those and flame throwers and lowered ex-
in the limestone cliffs, were not severely plosives through the cave entrances.
damaged. The Japanese had fortified Most of the enemy not destroyed by the
the beaches skilfully. They had even grenades and flame throwers were killed
taken turrets from disabled planes and by the concussions of the demolition
partially buried them in the sand, with charges. The Japanese fought stub-
the guns trained on the shore. The bornly from caves, foxholes, pillboxes,
amphibian craft on approaching the and concrete emplacements. Every
island ran into heavy fire. No infantry- strongpoint had to be reduced.36
men were wounded until the ramps were Construction began soon after the first
lowered, but many of the boatmen, who troops landed. While Wakde was under
had to stand in exposed positions as their bombardment, the transport carrying the
craft neared the beach, were hit; three 836th Aviation Battalion arrived off-
were killed. Still, every boat reached shore; the men, lined up along the ship's
shore. One LCVP showed the marks of rails, watched guns and planes pound the
more than sixty bullets and shell frag- island. Disembarking while fighting
ments. For its part in this landing, was still in progress, the aviation engi-
Company A received the Distinguished neers came under fire, and several men
Unit Citation.35 were wounded. During the afternoon
The shore engineers, also, had a hard of their first day ashore, the troops,
time. The beach was littered with digging in along the beach and setting
debris. Strong enemy resistance and up their perimeter defense, could plainly
artillery and rifle fire hampered the men hear the sounds of battle; fighting was
in clearing areas for supply dumps. By going on only 900 feet away. The next
the end of the first day, the beachhead, day, with the end of organized resistance,
200 yards wide, extended inland only the men began repairing the airfield,
300 yards. During the next two days, which though badly torn up by the
enemy infiltrators set fire to ESB ma- bombing and fighting, proved to be an
chinery, trucks, and gasoline, and slashed excellent, coral-surfaced strip. Within
truck tires with bayonets. The combat forty-eight hours the runway was ready
engineers—Company A of the 27th Engi- to take American planes. Thereafter,
neers—functioned almost entirely as in- the Japanese did not interfere with work
fantry during their first two days on on the airfield, except for occasional
Wakde. Many of the island's defenders night bombings, which caused little
35 36
(1) 2d ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt of Opns, May i- (1) 3d ESB, Our Business Is Beachheads. (2) 3d
31, 44. SWPA File E-20-5. (2) Heavey, "Amphib- ESB, Hist Rpt, 1-31 May 44. (3) TORNADO Task
ian Engineers in Action," The Miliary Engineer, Force Engr Rpt. (4) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Engr
XXXVII (July, 1945), 256. Tech Info Bull No. 1, 10 Aug 44. SWPA File M163.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 537
damage. On 25 May the last pocket of The 41st Division, reinforced, less the
enemy resistance was destroyed.37 163d RCT, originally scheduled to seize
the New Guinea coast off Wakde, was
Biak designated the HURRICANE Task Force
for the Biak operation. With the three
One of the Schouten Islands, situated Japanese airstrips the initial objective,
in Geelvink Bay, Biak had an area of the tactical plan called for a landing
about 950 square miles. (See Map 27.) near Bosnek, the point closest to Mok-
A coral island, partly of volcanic origin, mer where the cliff rose sufficiently far
it was rugged, with no streams of any back from the beach to give the landing
size. Roughly paralleling the southern forces fairly adequate room to maneuver.
coast, from a few hundred yards to 2 Upon landing, the troops were to move
miles inland, was a coral cliff, rising in westward on the coastal shelf and seize
some places to a height of 300 feet; the airstrips. The rather abrupt change
largely a series of precipitous ridges and of the task force's assault area from
terraces and heavily forested, it was Toem-Sarmi to Biak gave Colonel Lau-
honeycombed with caves and tunnels terbach, the task force engineer, and his
hollowed out by the action of water. staff, assembled during the first week of
Between the cliff and the beach was a May, little time for planning. Studies
coastal shelf, 10 to 50 feet above sea level. of Biak's terrain indicated that bringing
Offshore were dangerous coral reefs. in supplies and equipment over the coral
The Japanese had built a number of reefs would probably be a complicated
installations on the island, most of them matter. Even though Biak appeared to
in the coastal area between cliff and sea. have a sizable Japanese garrison, no un-
Aerial photographs showed that Mokmer usual problems were anticipated in
airfield, about 300 yards from shore, had combat support. More difficult was
a runway about 4,500 feet long, with an planning for base development, largely
extensive dispersal area. Two other the responsibility of Col. David W.
fields, Borokoe and Sorido, were not Heiman, commander of the 1112th Com-
operational in early May 1944, but ap- bat Group, and assistant task force engi-
parently the Japanese were working on neer in charge of construction. Eight
them. On the southern coast, extending officers and forty-three enlisted men in
from the shore to the outer edge of the group headquarters (all those who had
coral reef, were four jetties, which pre- not been assigned to Colonel Liles and
sumably could take barges, probably the Wakde operation) worked with
only at high tide. What appeared to be Colonel Heiman on plans for the air-
an excellent motor road followed the fields and the base. Information on
coast from the native village of Bosnek what to build was vague. MacArthur's
west to the airfields, a distance of 10 operations instructions of 10 May had
miles.38
ments of Terrain, 24 May 44. SWPA Files. (2)
37
(1) 836th Engr Avn Bn, Hist Narration for 1944. USAFFE Bd SWPA, Rpt 49, Rpt on the Defense of
(2) TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt. Biak, 29 Aug 44. (Cited hereafter as USAFFE Bd
38
(1) Hq 162d Inf, an. 1-a to FO 1 Essential Ele- Rpt 49). World War II Rcds Div, 4-2, 149/44.
538 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
morning the infantry had reached the tion battalion on the island, unable to
eastern end of Mokmer. Enemy resist- work on Mokmer, was building jetties,
ance was so strong the troops were forced widening the road along the beach, un-
to withdraw a distance of about half a loading ships, carrying water to the
mile, where they were pinned down by infantry, and maintaining trails to the
machine gun and mortar fire and front lines. On 6 June, General Fuller,
harassed by enemy infiltrators. Re- commander of the 41st Division, directed
peated Japanese frontal attacks were re- construction of a field on Owi. That
pulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.41 same day Company B of the 864th was
On 30 May the 864th Aviation Battal- sent over to begin work. The re-
ion, under Lt. Col. E. L. Griggs, Jr., mainder of the battalion arrived during
arrived at Mokmer. The men were to the next five days.43
reconstruct the strip as a fighter, and General Fuller had meanwhile de-
eventually, a bomber field. The Japa- cided to capture Mokmer by an envelop-
nese, entrenched in various places in the ing movement. He directed the 186th
coral cliff, were able to prevent any kind Infantry, at that time in the Bosnek
of work from being done. Since the beachhead, to drive westward along the
Americans had been ashore for three top of the coral cliff. On 1 June Com-
days and still had no airfield and slight pany B of the 116th Combat Battalion
prospects of getting one soon, another was attached to the infantry for support.
location had to be found. General As the infantry advanced, the engineers
Krueger thought a field might be built built a road in the rear to bring up
in the interior of the island north of supplies; from the 2d to the 5th of June,
Bosnek, but engineers sent out on recon- they completed seven and one-half miles.
naissance reported it would take at least The advance met strong resistance. At
three weeks to construct one there. Sev- night, the engineers bivouacked within
eral small islands off Biak's southern the infantry perimeter; but during the
coast were a possibility. Engineers, air- day, unable to maintain continuous con-
men, and naval personnel, surveying the tact with the infantry, they had to
islands during the first days of June, furnish their own protection. On one
agreed that Owi offered a good site. occasion, a group of Japanese attacked
Construction was urgent. It was ru- a working party, tried to cause panic by
mored that the Japanese were planning "screams and fiendish laughter," and
to send in reinforcements and that an killed one man and wounded three. A
enemy fleet "had been sighted five hours few days later, a Japanese threw an ex-
off Biak." 42 Meanwhile, the one avia- plosive charge at the windshield of a
moving truck, the driver stepped on the
41 accelerator, and the charge bounced off,
(1) Rpt, Co C 116th Engr Combat Bn to CO
116th Engr Combat Bn, 18 Aug 44. (2) Rpt, Hq exploding harmlessly.
116th Engr Combat Bn to CG 41st Div, 20 Sep 44.
43
Both in SWPA Files. (1) Hq math Engr Combat Group, Hist Rcd of
42
Hq 864th Engr Avn Bn, Narrative Rpt of Biak Opns at Biak Island, 7 May-15 Jul 44. (2) Memo,
and Owi Islands Opn, Covering Period 11 May-20 Sturgis for Casey, 12 Sep 44. SWPA File 73. (3)
Aug 44, dtd 31 Aug 44. Rpt Mulliken to Krueger, 29 Aug 44.
540 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
A severe handicap was the shortage of ing up, should the enemy become aware
water, unusual in the Southwest Pacific, of what was going on. A 6-foot tide
where, as a rule, sources were plentiful. came in so rapidly that nearly all equip-
Each man of Company B was allowed one ment was swamped; it had to be pulled
canteen daily for drinking; there was ashore and left to dry out. "We had to
none for washing or cooking. A drench- work fast and in the darkness on a strip
ing rain on 6 June kept operations from of beach that was strange to all of us,"
coming to an almost complete standstill. Colonel Heiman wrote. "We were
The men were so eager to get water that lucky." 46
they spread their ponchos to serve as The situation at Mokmer had not im-
catch basins to direct water into their proved. Engineers, making a reconnais-
helmets. On the 7th the infantry de- sance of the field soon after dawn, came
scended on the coral ridge to the north under enemy machine gun fire; during
of Mokmer. The Japanese were forced the remainder of the day shelling was so
to retreat westward.44 heavy that no work could be done. The
On 8 June two aviation battalions, the next day conditions were just as bad.
860th, under Lt. Col. Benjamin E. Since improvement of the airfield was
Meadows, and the 863d, under Lt. Col. impossible, most of the aviation engi-
Raymond J. Harvey, landed at Bosnek. neers were assigned to providing combat
The former was scheduled to help the support for the infantry driving west-
864th engineers on Owi; the same day ward toward Borokoe. On 12 June,
Company B went to the island; Com- when fire on Mokmer slackened consid-
panies A and C followed shortly. The erably, some of the aviation engineers
mission of the 863d was to make Mokmer once more began to work on the field.
operational within a day and a half.45 This time their efforts were not seri-
The big problem was getting the men ously interrupted, and by nightfall they
to Mokmer. General Fuller and Colonel reported to Colonel Lauterbach that the
Heiman, discussing the matter, agreed runway could receive fighter planes.
the most expeditious way would be to But during the next two days enemy fire
transport them by LCT. on the field was again so strong that little
During the night of 9-10 June Com- could be done. Most of the aviation
pany A set out from Bosnek. Colonel engineers were again put to work sup-
Heiman helped bring in the first ele- porting the infantry. 47
ments near the airfield. The landing A major job was destroying the enemy
was made across a coral reef, 200 yards in the caves and tunnels in the coral
wide, before dawn, under blackout con- cliff. Helping the infantry blast the
ditions, with the continual threat of enemy out of their hideouts was one of
Japanese mortar and artillery fire open- the most strenuous tasks of the 116th
Combat Battalion. On one occasion, a
44
Rpt, Co B 116th Engr Combat Bn to CG 41st
46
Inf Div, 10 Jul 44. SWPA Files. Ltr, Heiman to Staff Br, 6 Oct 50. SWPA Files.
45
(1) Ltr, Meadows to Krueger, 28 Aug 44. SWPA 47
(1) Task Force Engr Rpt on Biak Opn. (2) Hq
Files. (2) 863d Engr Avn Bn, Rpt on Biak Cam- 864th Engr Avn Bn, Narrative Rpt of Biak and Owi
paign. Islands Opns.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 541
voluntary detail from Company C went from Mokmer. Work was coming along
into the caves near the airfields and well on Borokoe and Sorido, and plans
spent two days cleaning out enemy were being prepared for the construction
troops. With rifles, grenades, bazookas, of base facilities. The airfields on Biak
and flame throwers, infantry and engi- had fallen behind schedule, mainly be-
neers entered the intricate network of cause of enemy interference. On Owi,
caves and tunnels. In some cases they enemy action was limited to air attacks
lowered explosive charges into cave en- which caused little damage, but a major
trances and detonated them. The en- concern was scrub typhus. The 864th
gineer-infantry teams considered the had 64 cases; one officer and two enlisted
flame thrower especially useful, since it men died of the disease. Many were
either burned the Japanese or drove sick of fevers, the exact cause of which
them out of the cave so that they could be was unknown.
dealt with by rifle fire. Combat, am-
phibian, and aviation engineers at times Progress by Midyear
helped the infantry. Destroying the
Japanese not only in the cliff but also By the end of June the Allied forces
in other areas of the island was a labori- were solidly entrenched at various
ous task and required three weeks of points on the New Guinea coast and
continuous effort. 48 nearby islands as far west as Biak. Com-
On 15 June General Eichelberger bat was largely over. In the Admiral-
temporarily took command of HURRI- ties, the combat phase had ended on 18
CANE Task Force. Three days later May, when the Navy took over respon-
reinforcements, requested before he took sibility for airfield and base construction.
over, reached Biak. Eichelberger fol- Although Hollandia and Aitape were to
lowed the tactical plan already in effect. remain under Sixth Army control until
The Japanese withdrew from the two late in August, construction was now the
westernmost airdromes and at the same only concern there. Early in June,
time retreated northward from the coral Japanese resistance was broken at Toem,
cliff. Interference with work on Mok- and Maffin Drome fell into American
mer lessened noticeably. On 18 June hands. Wakde and Biak were still un-
the 863d Aviation Battalion had a run- der Sixth Army, but there was no fighting
way, 5,000 feet long, in excellent shape on Wakde and little on Biak; on these
for fighters; the same day a 4,500-foot islands, the major tasks were airfield and
coral strip, finished on Owi, was able to base construction. In the South Pacific,
take several P-38's, which made forced where combat was a thing of the past for
landings, and a B-25. Three days later U.S. forces, troops were being trans-
planes began using Owi regularly, and ferred to more active theaters. The only
on the next day P-40's began operating area where fighting still seemed likely
was to the east of Aitape along the
48
(1) Ltr, CO Co C 1 16th Engr Combat Bn to CO Driniumor River. Here a Japanese
116th Engr Combat Bn 18 Aug 44. SWPA Files.
(2) Ltr, Co E 542d EBSR to CG 2d ESB, 17 Aug 44.
build-up was in progress and an enemy
SWPA Files. drive westward seemed probable. For
542 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the engineers there had been little differ- for combat missions, were at the same
ence between the combat phase and the time responsible for starting work on air
logistics phase of operations; from the and supply facilities. Conditions in the
start, their major tasks had been building South and Southwest Pacific, especially
airfields and bases. in the latter theater, were thus greatly
different from those in the European
Logistical Support theater of World War I, upon which
much of the pre-World War II concepts
Combat Versus Construction and planning had been based.50
In both theaters tasks of the combat
"As usual, the Engineers up here are engineers were surprisingly light. In
way out in front," Colonel Sturgis had the operations along the New Guinea
written on 13 September 1943. "That's coast, divisional engineers landed, as a
what makes this war so different." 49 rule, in the third and fourth waves, pre-
This statement was equally true of the pared to meet strong resistance, but in
campaign along the New Guinea coast the first six months of 1944, tenacious
in 1944. The struggle in the South and enemy opposition had been encountered
Southwest Pacific was a war of bases. only in the Admiralties and on Wakde
The engineers had to devote by far their and Biak. At most landing places, the
greatest efforts to building logistic facili- overpowering bombardments had driven
ties as quickly as possible in one of the the Japanese away from the beaches.
world's most underdeveloped regions. Such defenses as were found were not
The rugged terrain of Netherlands New formidable, with the exception of those
Guinea and the nearby islands was on Wakde and Biak. Many were de-
similar to that of Papua, Northeast New molished or made useless by explosives.
Guinea, and the Solomons. On prac- Engineers, with bulldozers, destroyed
tically every island where the engineers numerous pillboxes and roadblocks.
had to build, the interiors were moun- The Japanese rarely used mines, and
tainous; the narrow coastal areas, jungled when they did, it was in an incompetent
and swampy. Construction had to start manner. The engineers themselves sel-
from scratch and be carried forward with dom laid any because the advance was so
all possible speed. The progress of the rapid and the enemy rarely counter-
Allied forces toward Japan was to a large attacked. There was little need for
extent dependent on the rapidity with bridging, either temporary or permanent.
which the engineers could build bases River crossings were infrequent because
and airfields, which meant that extensive of MacArthur's strategy of leap-frogging
construction had to be done during the along the New Guinea coast and across
combat phase of operations. Task force the nearby islands. When overland
commanders of Sixth Army, responsible movements were made, bridging opera-
49 50
Ltr, Sturgis to Mr. H. B. Deal, H. B. Deal Constr (1) Ltr, Lane to C Staff Br, 28 Jul 47. SWPA
Co, 13 Sep 43. Sturgis File, Personal Corresp, 1943- Files. (2) Col Girard B. Troland, Notes on Army
44. Engr Opns in SWPA. SWPA File 104.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 543
tions had to be restricted. The sudden manders generally expected their staff
heavy rains of the region quickly pro- engineers to direct the work of the engi-
duced swollen streams and rivers, in neer units, and, as a rule, staff engineers
most cases precluding the use of ponton did exercise command functions. The
bridges. The only noteworthy instance fact that so much heavy construction had
of such bridging up to this point had to be performed in the combat zone and
been the Australian crossing of the sometimes in the midst of fighting neces-
Markham River near Nadzab. There sitated resort to numerous administration
were no American bridging units in the procedures that were hardly orthodox
South or Southwest Pacific. One esti- according to prewar planning. Yet there
mate was that in the campaign along the seemed to be no other way of doing the
52
New Guinea coast, combat support made construction quickly. Giving to task
up only 10 percent of the effort of the force commanders the responsibility for
51
divisional engineers. initiating base construction was, in
In contrast, construction tasks during Casey's opinion, ". . . definitely the cor-
the combat phase were heavy; by the rect procedure under the conditions
time USASOS took over, a vast amount which prevailed in the Southwest
53
of work had already been accomplished. Pacific."
Task force engineers faced numerous
problems. Their staffs were generally The New Bases
too small to handle extensive construc-
tion missions adequately. They fre- Engineer work went on apace, whether
quently found it difficult to assemble under Sixth Army or USASOS. By
adequate staffs because task force com- mid-1944, work in the Admiralties was
manders, as a rule, did not think in far along. After the friction between
terms of base construction being done Army engineers and Seabees had been
during the combat phase of operations. eliminated early in April with the reor-
Even when staffs were adequate insofar ganization which placed the Seabees
as numbers were concerned, time was directly under the task force engineer,
usually too short to build up an efficient operations were much improved. On
organization or to plan carefully. Partly the 21st of the month Sverdrup, after a
because of the shortage of shipping, task visit to the islands, had reported that
force engineers found it hard to get Momote and Mokerang were opera-
enough men and equipment early in an tional. "Meeting the deadlines, is in
assault. No definite rule existed as to my opinion the finest construction
whether the task force commander or achievement yet accomplished in
his engineer should command the engi- SWPA," Sverdrup wrote. "It was ac-
neer units of the task force. Com-complished by a tremendous amount of
52
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,
51
(1) Ltr, Maj John E. Brewer to The Comdt The 122-23. (2) Ltr, Brewer to The Comdt The Engr
Engr School Ft. Belvoir, 30 Sep 44. EHD Files. (2) School Ft Belvoir, 30 Sep 44. (3) Ltr, Sturgis to C
Of C Engr SWPA, Engr Tech Intel Bull, 20 Sep 44. Staff Br, 7 Aug 50. SWPA Files.
53
SWPA File M163. Ltr, Casey to Sturgis, 14 Aug 50. SWPA Files.
544 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
55
(1) Task Force Engr Rpt, Opns at TEACUP, 13
54
Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 21 Apr 44. SWPA May 44. Sturgis File 39. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt 31.
File 164. (3) TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt. Sturgis File 42.
HOLLANDIA DEVELOPMENT, 1944. Above, General MacArthur's quarters. Below, a
water purification unit.
546 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Espíritu Santo, and Guadalcanal were gaps, men were transferred to engineer
being dismantled.57 units principally from the infantry and
artillery; but until they were at least
Troop Shortages and Reorganization partially trained for their new assign-
of Units ments, they could do little to speed up
construction. One hopeful sign during
Still one of the most critical problems the later phases of the New Guinea Cam-
in the building of bases was the chronic paign was that gradually a proportionally
shortage of engineer units, particularly greater number of engineer construction
those needed for heavy construction. units and replacements were arriving in
59
Many Sixth Army engineers considered the Southwest Pacific.
the inadequate number of construction The "nontraditional" kind of warfare
units as their most frustrating problem. in the Southwest Pacific necessitated
Various ways were devised to get the changes in the organization of some types
work done. The policy of not giving of engineer units. The combat battal-
the Army Air Forces exclusive control ions, in particular, seemed to stand in
of the aviation battalions was now show- need of changes in organization. These
ing its worth; task force commanders put units were called upon to do a great deal
the battalions on many types of work of construction; in fact, generally speak-
urgently needed in the forward areas. ing, their primary mission was construc-
Many units, such as combat battalions, tion. The battalions were inadequately
with no jobs to do for which they were organized and equipped for their tasks.
trained, were assigned to construction To make them really effective units
projects. A number of nondivisional they needed a substantial amount of
combat battalions and camouflage com- additional equipment. At Casey's re-
panies were reorganized as construction quest, MacArthur asked the War Depart-
units. Engineer units, no matter of ment for more machinery for the
what type, were often put on any job battalions, but no action was taken in
which needed doing. "Aviation bat- Washington. In 1944 the theater as-
talions have built docks," Major signed additional personnel and equip-
Brewer wrote, "combat battalions . . . ment to the battalions. Certain types
airdromes, and Seabees have built army of construction units also needed changes
headquarters." 58 in organization to make them more
As exasperating as the shortage of suitable for the theater. As has been
units was the failure to receive enough seen, the units early found unsuitable
replacements to bring the depleted units for the far-flung operations of the South-
up to authorized strength. To fill the west Pacific were the general service
regiments. They were of unwieldy size
57
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I,
and inadequately equipped for construc-
196. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, Annual Rpt for tion jobs at widely separated places in a
1944 (Draft MS). SWPA Files.
58
(1) Ltr, Brewer to The Comdt The Engr School
59
Ft. Belvoir, 30 Sep 44. (2) Engr Sec Sixth Army, Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,
Engr History, ch. XI. 120ff.
548 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
fast-moving campaign. It was often direct the activities of the often large
necessary to split them into battalions, numbers of units charged with construc-
companies, and detachments. In 1943 tion. The engineers had no organiza-
the War Department had organized the tion higher than a regimental headquar-
construction battalion. This unit, with ters to command construction units.
some 900 officers and men, was the They had, however, adopted the brigade
equal of an aviation battalion in earth- type of organization for amphibious
moving capacity and of a naval construc- operations. Other arms and services had
tion battalion in equipment and grades likewise adopted this type of organiza-
for enlisted men. After 1 April 1944 tion for supervising a number of units
the War Department sent only construc- engaged in similar activities. Casey and
tion battalions to the Southwest Pacific. others believed that engineer construc-
The theater converted a number of its tion units should be similarly supervised
general service regiments into construc- to make possible better direction and
tion battalions. Airborne aviation bat- control. In March 1944, MacArthur
talions, successfully used in the Markham requested the War Department to au-
Valley, subsequently proved to be thorize the activation of two construction
impractical in the Southwest Pacific be- brigades. The War Department in-
cause their equipment was too light. formed MacArthur that he could activate
Elements of an aviation or construction the two units, and in June two were
battalion flown to an assault area with organized—the 5201st and 5202d—the
regular equipment could accomplish far former under Colonel Robinson and the
more. Late in 1944, the airborne bat- latter under Col. Orville E. Walsh.
talions in the Southwest Pacific were Each brigade headquarters would have
converted into aviation battalions or 21 officers and 88 enlisted men; for oper-
aviation service companies.60 ations in a forward area, engineer units
As the scope of base construction would be assigned to a brigade as needed.
along the New Guinea coast increased, The plan was to use the brigades for the
a need became apparent for some kind first time in the coming campaign in the
61
of engineer headquarters to function Philippines.
under the task force commander and be
responsible for planning engineer work Construction Standards
and supervising the activities of engineer
units in a newly seized area. The task Construction in the Southwest Pacific
force engineer's staff was too small and continued to be on a hand-to-mouth
sometimes too preoccupied with combat basis. A great deal of it was required
duties to be able to give sufficient time quickly, and there were relatively few
to supervising construction units under troops, meager amounts of materials,
the task force commander's control. and inadequate quantities of equipment
Even at rear bases, there was a need for with which to do it. "Military engi-
some kind of engineer headquarters to 61
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,
144-46. (2) Ltr, Lane to C Staff Br, 28 Jul 47.
60
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, SWPA Files. (3) Memo, Klinke for Casey, 12 May
143ff. 44. SWPA File 42.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 549
of adequate drainage. Coral, while lumber were needed for the sides of the
plentiful in most coastal areas, was not warehouses. To cut down on the
as extensively used as in the Central or amount, several of the smaller structures
South Pacific. At some fields, the engi- would be combined and interior posts
neers laid steel mat. Most often it used to support the roof—one large ware-
would be a field that needed some kind house would, of course, require less
of surfacing quickly or was so located siding than a number of small ones con-
that it was difficult to send in materials taining the same amount of space.
and equipment. If steel mat was used, Roofs were of corrugated iron or sisal-
the field would in all likelihood be a craft; floors were usually graveled. Ex-
temporary one and would not be de- cellent as shop buildings were native-
veloped further. In most of the areas type structures, their framework lashed
seized along the New Guinea coast, the together with vines and their roofs and
Japanese had already built one or more sometimes their sides covered with
fields at the most favorable sites, but kunai grass or sago palm. Because of
these fields were so poorly constructed the fire hazard, such structures were not
that they could seldom be used without much used as warehouses.
being extensively rebuilt. The runways Hospital wards were at first usually
were too short, and their substructures under canvas or in native-type buildings.
not solid enough for heavily loaded The latter had wide, overhanging eaves
planes. If practicable, the engineers and no sides. Sago palm was generally
would improve the runways. Pursuit used for roofing. Kunai was not suit-
planes could usually land on a captured able because it contained quantities of
field in two or three days, but at least two grit and sometimes not a few insects
weeks of additional work would be re- including ticks that transmitted typhus.
quired before a plane heavier than a The 20-foot-wide prefabricated build-
C-47 could safely land.65 ings were used as surgeries, clinics,
At a new base, supplies were initially messes, and warehouses. As soon as pos-
stored in the open or under canvas. sible, wards were transferred to prefab-
Later they were transferred to newly ricated buildings.
erected prefabricated warehouses, most Construction of piers followed uni-
of them of the standard widths of 20, 44, form procedures. Design had been
or 88 feet, and all of light construction. standardized. At a new base, the
Since winds in the combat zone of the Navy's ponton floating wharves would at
Southwest Pacific seldom exceeded 15 first be used. Meanwhile, the engineers
miles an hour, such buildings were would construct timber wharves as
adequate. Considerable quantities of rapidly as possible so that the ponton
65
structures could be moved forward.
(1) Troland, Notes on Army Engr Opns in
SWPA. (2) Ltr, Haseman to C, Staff Br, 28 Nov 50.
Specifications for Libertys, for example,
SWPA Files. (3) Ltr, Kenney to Arnold, 24 May called for a pile structure, 300 by 30 feet,
44. AAF, RG-501, Central Files, 312. 1-J. (4) parallel to the shore. Sets of materials,
Ltr, with Incls, Casey to Col B. M. Harloe, C Engrg
and Development Div, Of CofEngrs, 17 Apr 44. including piling, were shipped from
SWPA File 104. rear bases. If the troops building a
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 551
By 1 July, the number of personnel had Topographic Battalion and five topo-
67
risen to 54. graphic companies. The 650th, which
Under the operational control of had arrived at Finschhafen in May, was
GHQ SWPA and subject to the technical placed under Sixth Army and began to
supervision of the Intelligence Section produce maps for planning and combat.
was the 648th Topographic Battalion, The topographic companies, engaged
which continued operations in Mel- primarily in producing hasty maps for
bourne. Under the 648th's technical combat, were moved as far forward in
supervision were all military map- the fighting zones as conditions would
making organizations in the Southwest permit. The 648th still produced most
Pacific, including the Australian topo- of the maps for the theater. To give the
graphic units. By 1 July, there were in troops a better idea of the terrain they
the theater, besides the 648th, the 650th would encounter, models of the objec-
tive areas were needed. In April, a
67
The information in this and succeeding para- model-making detachment of one officer
graphs, unless otherwise indicated, is from Office of
the Chief Engineer, GHQ SWPA, Annual Rpt for
and twenty-one enlisted men arrived at
1944, Intelligence Section. Brisbane, was placed under the Intelli-
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 553
68 69
648th Engr Topo Bn, Interim Rpt, 10 Oct 43- Memo, Sverdrup for Ross, 20 Oct 44. SWPA
31 Dec 44. SWPA File 15. File M168.
554 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
posed numerous problems. For maps to operating level and a 120-day reserve.
reach units as scheduled, officers respon- In the Southwest Pacific, few engineer
sible for distribution in the map depots stocks could be built up as prescribed.
had to follow up on shipments con- As before, fortifications materials were
stantly; at times, even hourly checks plentiful. Hand tools were up to about
were necessary. Still, many shipments 80 percent of demand. Landing mat
went to the wrong places. Partly re- was ample, since sufficient amounts were
sponsible were the "unbelievable apathy arriving from the United States and
and carelessness" of the personnel han- much of the mat at the older airfields
dling the shipments. was being taken up, reconditioned, and
Since there was a growing need for shipped forward. Australia continued
more information on the terrain of the to be an important supplier of cement,
New Guinea coast and the offshore lumber, construction materials, prefab-
islands, the Research and Reports Sub- ricated buildings, and certain types of
section had increasing responsibilities. equipment. During 1944 about 25 per-
More men were needed to interpret cent of the stocks the engineers received
aerial photographs, now by far the prin- came from Commonwealth sources. But
cipal source of information on enemy- numerous items needed for construction
held territory. A great deal of data was remained in chronically short supply.
required on landing areas and airfield The most severe shortages were in corru-
sites. The civilian specialists who ar- gated iron, lumber, electric and welding
rived in June were from the United supplies, nails, and bolts. As before,
States Geological Survey; they were shortages were partly the result of the
experts in geology, soil analysis, and the lack of shipping from the United States.
structure of coast lines and beaches. On 1 May the backlog of engineer cargo
The data supplied by aerial photographs awaiting shipment from the United
and information brought back by men, States totaled about 300,000 ship tons.
including the geologists who had been Backlogs piled up in the theater also; by
on reconnaissance in forward areas, were the end of May, 32,000 ship tons had
analyzed and written up in a variety of accumulated in Australian ports, and the
reports. amount was increasing. These develop-
ments were partly the result of inade-
Supply quate docking and unloading facilities
at many of the New Guinea ports for
Engineer supply gave rise to more and handling the quantities of supplies now
more problems despite the fact that the arriving from the United States and
War Department adopted a somewhat Australia. One encouraging sign, dur-
more realistic policy with regard to ing 1944, was the increase in the amounts
supply levels. In January 1944 it re- of supplies in the theater. Gradually
duced the requirements for Class II and engineer depots were becoming better
70
Class IV items for the South and South- stocked.
west Pacific from a 90-day operating 70
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VII,
level and a 90-day reserve to a 90-day 124ff., 129ff.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 555
With increasing shipments from the tribution all the more difficult. In the
United States and the continued forward opinion of many engineer officers, a
movement of the Allied forces, prob- central depot was necessary. "Stock
lems of distribution became acute in records, location of stock and inventories
the Southwest Pacific. As has been must be kept by a centralized agency,"
seen, the engineers had no central sup- Col. Charles H. McNutt, executive
ply depot in the theater. Up to officer of the Chief Engineer, USASOS,
1944 units requisitioned from various stated. "No depot can know what the
USASOS engineer depots. One of the others may have from day to day and in
chronic shortcomings of this system was any case cannot handle supply distribu-
71
the lack of stock control. No engineer tion." During the first half of 1944
office had over-all knowledge of what efforts were made to improve procure-
items were in the theater, how many
there were, or where they were. Short- 71
1st Memo Ind, McNutt to Casey, 3 Sep 44 on
ages of supplies and the enormous Memo for Rcd, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 30 Aug 44.
distances within the theater made dis- SWPA File 223.
556 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
ment in the theater and provide better the engineer supply depots for informa-
stock control. On 1 January General tion as to the quantities of items on
73
Frink set up the Procurement Division at hand.
Sydney. It was to co-ordinate the pur- It took time to get things organized.
chase of all supplies in Australia. Its Col. Charles R. Bathurst, who upon his
Engineer Branch at first had seven offi- arrival in the theater in December 1943
cers and one enlisted man. On1 became Casey's supply officer, visited the
February General Frink established the Engineer Branch of Distribution Divi-
Distribution Division at Sydney and sion late in March. He reported that
Distribution Branch, Base A, at Milne the organization, with 20 officers and 89
Bay; these two offices would supervise the civilians, was "understaffed and over-
distribution of supplies in the theater. worked." Many of the civilians were
The Engineer Branch of Distribution inexperienced, and considerable effort
Division, with a staff of about thirty, had to be made to train them. In the
including military and civilian person- two months since it began work, the
nel, began operations in February; the branch had sent out 60,000 inventory and
Engineer Section at Milne Bay, with an requisition forms, and it had organized
initial staff of fifteen, began work at a file index of some 15,000 stock control
72
about the same time. cards. Estimates were that 200,000
New theaterwide procedures for req- cards would eventually be required and
uisitioning and distributing were estab- that a force of 240 civilians would be
lished. Henceforth, all requests for needed.74 The small section at Milne
supplies from engineer units went to the Bay did not really get started with its
Engineer Branch of the Procurement work until 15 April, when it settled
Division. The branch prepared lists of down to furnish engineer supplies for
items that might be purchased in Aus- Base G at Hollandia. This first major
tralia and forwarded them to the project could be accomplished only by
general purchasing agent for submission extraordinary efforts because the organi-
to the Australian Government. Sup- zation was new and the staff too small.
plies not available in Australia were "The Engineer supply requirements for
requisitioned on the United States. operation G," General Casey wrote to
More troublesome than requisitioning the Deputy Chief of Staff, USAFFE, on
was getting supplies to the units. The 21 April, "will virtually deplete all
engineers of the Distribution Division available resources in this theater. . . .
began the monumental task of setting if requirements for immediate subse-
up a file of stock control cards for all quent operations are to be provided,
engineer items in the theater. Once a special action must be taken to procure
month, they sent out questionnaires to and ship engineer construction materials
72 73
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, (1) Ibid. (2) Hq INTERSEC USASOS Distr Br
II, 64. (2) Ltr, Engr Br Distr Div USASOS to Dir Engr Sec, Sec Diary, 17 Feb-30 Jun 44, 17 Jul 44.
Distr Div USASOS, 26 May 44, sub: Hist Rpt, Period World War II Rcds Div.
74
Covered 1 Feb 44-31 Mar 44. World War II Rcds Memo, C. R. B[athurst] for Casey, 22 Mar 44.
Div. SWPA File 163.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 557
and equipment aggregating a very large rule, one platoon of a depot company
quantity in tonnage."75 In order to went in with a task force to store and
have supplies within a reasonable time, distribute supplies. A common com-
the chief of the Engineer Section at plaint was that supplies were sent for-
Milne Bay was getting ready to take the ward without adequate ships' manifests.
requisitions to the United States and At Wakde, the only means of locating
follow through in person. certain materials was dependent on the
Steady progress was made. Stock memory of the ship's crew that unloaded
control cards at Milne Bay increased the materials. Changing needs at some
from 3,000 in mid-March to over 6,000 bases, as, for example, Biak, made it hard
by 1 July. By this time requisitions had to analyze supply requirements. Ship-
been processed for 150,000 ship tons of ping bottlenecks further slowed de-
supplies and equipment for Hollandia, liveries. The supply situation at Hol-
Wakde, and Biak. There were inter- landia appeared to be an exception.76
ruptions to the work, however. Late in There, Casey reported, " . . . the urgency
June the Milne Bay Distribution Branch and importance of the priority for un-
was moved to Oro Bay. Since USASOS loading engineer supplies required for
installations still in Australia were soon port facilities is fully understood by the
to be moved to New Guinea, plans now Task Force Commander." Colonel
called for moving Distribution Division Robinson, the task force engineer, Casey
from Sydney to Oro Bay and consolidat- continued, " . . . has had most detailed
ing it with Distribution Branch. Such information as to where all Engineer
a move would mean the loss of the Aus- supplies and equipment are and when
tralian civilians, who had now become they may be expected." The chief engi-
settled in their jobs, since the Australian neer went on to say that this was due
Government would not permit them to solely to the "excellent work" of
go to New Guinea. Operations of the Colonel Sturgis and his staff, who se-
branch would suffer. cured detailed data on where engineer
Task force engineers were fortunate supplies were loaded on ships bound for
if they received supplies on time and in Hollandia and sent it promptly to
sufficient amounts. Procedures for se- Colonel Robinson.77
curing supplies had been standardized.
A task force engineer sent a list of his Spare Parts
needs to the Sixth Army Engineer
Section, where it was edited and, if ap- The spare parts situation remained
proved, was forwarded to the engineer extremely critical. Requirements con-
depot at Finschhafen. That depot sup- tinued to be exceptionally high and ship-
plied as many stocks as it could and sent ments from the United States meager.
a request for the remainder to the Dis-
tribution Branch at Milne Bay. As a 76
(1) Memo for Rcd, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA,1
Sep 44. SWPA File 105. (2) TORNADO Task Force
Engr Rpt.
75 77
Memo, Casey for Dep CofS USAFFE, 21 Aug 44. Memo for Rcd, Casey, 26 May 44. SWPA File
SWPA File 104. 164.
558 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
It was repeatedly stated that the many way to fit out ships with bins for spare
makes of equipment in the theater only parts, "floating warehouses" as they were
made a bad situation worse. An added called, which would expedite distribu-
aggravation was the chronic shortage of tion in forward areas; the first was ex-
men trained in stocking and distributing pected to be ready in November.
the many types of parts. There had With the shortage of spare parts, main-
been no parts supply companies in the taining equipment was no easy task. To
theater throughout 1943. The first one make matters worse, during the first six
arrived in January and went to Milne months of 1944 there was still only one
Bay, where it began the job of processing maintenance company in the theater,
about 8,000 cases of spare parts and stor- and additional companies were not sched-
ing them in the recently completed ware- uled to arrive until after the middle of
house. In April, a second one arrived the year. There were three heavy shop
and went to work on setting up a spare companies, generally stationed in rear
parts depot at Finschhafen. A survey areas. A heavy burden was placed on
made in the Southwest Pacific in May engineer construction units, especially
showed that spare parts were completely those in the combat zone; most had to do
lacking for pipeline pumping stations, their own third and fourth echelon
airborne equipment, refrigeration equip- maintenance.79
ment, jungle warfare equipment, and Efforts were made to better spare parts
over forty other major items. Stocks supply for the amphibian landing craft.
were much too low for twenty-three addi- In March 1944 the Engineer Branch of
tional important items. "The statement the Distribution Division set up a
that parts for all important items . . . Marine Supply Section. The amphibian
are critically short or nonexistent is not engineers henceforth forwarded their re-
an exaggeration," Casey wrote on 6 June quests through channels to this office,
to Brig. Gen. Raymond F. Fowler, and from there the requests were sent
Assistant Chief of Engineers for Supply. to the Navy's spare parts distribution
"It is not a question of keeping stocks center at Brisbane. Marine supply sec-
within prescribed levels but of reaching tions were organized at a number of
and maintaining a satisfactory operating bases and staffed by amphibian engineers
level." 78 insofar as possible to help expedite the
The shortages of parts and the enor- supply of spare parts for landing craft.
mous distances within the theater ren- USASOS organized a special marine
dered efficient distribution of utmost supply service of fast nonconvoyed boats
importance. Distribution was normally which made the run from Milne Bay to
accomplished by water, but in emergen- Oro Bay, each boat carrying about 300
cies air shipments were sometimes made. tons of spare parts. Despite all efforts,
During June 1944, for example, 650 tons shortages remained as severe as ever, and
of parts were shipped by water and 50
tons by air. Preparations were under 79
Conf, WD, Washington, D.C., Relative Engr
Equip Spare Parts Sup Situation, SWPA, ... 14 Jun
78
Ltr, Casey to Fowler, 6 Jun 44. SWPA File 223. 44. 319.1 SWPA.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 559
numerous craft were deadlined. As be- like General Casey . . . and General
fore, there were many reasons for this Sturgis . . . [which] kept the engineer
situation—the Navy's Distribution Cen- supply situation from becoming a verita-
ter at Brisbane was too far from the ble shambles." 81
forward areas where the amphibian engi-
neers were operating; the Navy had Camouflage
underestimated the quantities of spare
parts required; production in the Camouflage was of little importance
United States was inadequate; and dis- in the South and Southwest Pacific.
tribution to the widely scattered units Higher headquarters never developed an
within the theater was in itself a tre- over-all camouflage program since there
mendous task.80 was no need for one. The troops
neglected camouflage almost entirely.
Attitude Toward Supply By mid-1944 the overwhelming Allied
air superiority made concealment seem
The serious problems which plagued superfluous even in the most forward
engineer supply were at least in part the areas. Japanese planes came over mostly
result of the attitude of many officers at night and struck mainly at airfields,
toward this important responsibility. which could not be effectively camou-
In the Southwest Pacific, most engineers flaged in any case. In the Southwest
were apparently not fully aware of the Pacific, a small unit organized initially in
importance of logistic support and of its the Office of the Chief Engineer,
complexity. Many engineers made de- USASOS, subsequently transferred to the
termined efforts to avoid supply jobs. Engineer Section in USAFFE and in Sep-
"Our best officers," wrote Col. Miles M. tember 1943 to Casey's office in GHQ, was
Dawson, Casey's supply officer from responsible for formulating the theater-
August 1944 on, "avoided supply duty wide camouflage program. It sent litera-
like poison." Most engineers preferred ture to the troops, conducted experi-
combat or wanted to be in charge of con- ments, and supervised the production of
struction projects where they could point camouflage materials in Australia.
to "tangible" evidence of their work and Three camouflage teams, each consist-
where the experience gained would prob- ing of two noncommissioned officers,
ably stand them in good stead later on in visited units in the field and advised
the Army or in civilian life. Long hours mainly on camouflaging radar installa-
spent on supply jobs brought little praise. tions and artillery positions. In July
A supply officer was more apt to receive two camouflage companies, the 641st and
severe criticism. In Colonel Dawson's the 642d, each with some seventy officers
opinion, supply was frequently on the and men, arrived in the Southwest
verge of breaking down, and it was only Pacific and were assigned to Sixth Army.
". . . the constant effort of a few officers During their first few months in the
80 81
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, Memo, Dawson for Casey, 24 Jun 46. SWPA
142-43. Files.
560 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
theater they were engaged mainly in Engineers were brought up on the his-
trying to find ways and means of being tories of divisional Engineers." There
82
useful to the combat units. was little emphasis on the duties of engi-
neers attached to the Services of Supply
Training and "no real analysis and study of the
work of the SOS Engineers" engaged in
By 1944 it was increasingly apparent providing logistic support.84 Lane's ob-
in the Southwest Pacific that some im- servations were fully supported by other
portant aspects of engineer training in engineer officers in the Southwest
the United States had not been suffi- Pacific. Unfortunately, the pressure of
ciently stressed insofar as operations in work in the theater kept the units from
SWPA were concerned. The most strik- receiving additional training. The offi-
ing deficiencies were found in construc- cers with adequate backgrounds had to
tion. To begin with, too many officers help carry those whose engineering back-
and men lacked engineering back- grounds were deficient.
grounds, and the few months of training As in previous years, Australian
they received in the States did not offset schools continued to train a small num-
their lack of knowledge. Many officers, ber of specialists. Several new schools
too little versed in the principles of earth- were opened. In February 1944 the
moving, compaction, and drainage, could RAAF opened one in Richmond, New
not plan projects properly. Too many South Wales, to teach maintenance of
enlisted men were not well trained in radar equipment, and assigned a student
operating equipment or in how to do quota to the engineers. In March and
their work. Training for combat had April the LeTourneau Company con-
apparently been satisfactory, but in the ducted two schools in Sydney, one of
Southwest Pacific it was not the combat which taught welding, and the other how
units but the construction units which to operate Tournapulls. Sydney Tech-
were under pressure. The fact that con- nical College gave a course in the opera-
struction requirements were so much tion of diesel engines, which fifteen engi-
greater than had been considered "nor- neers attended. An additional United
mal" undoubtedly explains in part why States Army Engineer school was organ-
training deficiencies of the construction ized in the first half of 1944 to provide
units showed up so glaringly.83 "After specialist instruction; this was the school
World War I," Colonel Lane wrote, "all in refrigeration mechanics, which opened
in Melbourne in February to teach spe-
82
(1) Engr Sec Sixth Army, Engr History, ch. XI
cialists how to operate and repair the
(Draft MS). (2) Memo for Rcd, Col Emil R. Klinke, various types of refrigerators being used
Opns Of C Eng GHQ SWPA, 7 Sep 44. (3) Memo in the theater. Two technical colleges
for Rcd, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 1 Sep 44. Last
two in SWPA File 105.
in Melbourne provided facilities and
83
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, instructors. Payment was by reverse
II, 151. (2) USAFFE Bd SWPA, Rpt 28, Comments lend-lease. The bomb disposal school at
on Tng of Engr Units. SWPA File 86. (3) Of C
Engr USASOS, Tech Memo, 17 Jun 44. SWPA File
84
14. Ltr, Lane to C Staff Br, 28 Jul 47. SWPA Files.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 561
Bonegilla was discontinued in the spring Western New Guinea and the
because it was believed a sufficient num- Moluccas
ber of men had been trained to meet
theater needs by this time. Small de- The remaining operations along the
tachments of American personnel, New Guinea coast, while important in
known as mobile bomb disposal schools, the drive toward the Philippines, were
traveled from unit to unit and gave re- of a minor nature insofar as engineer
fresher courses in bomb disposal. By operations, especially combat support,
midyear, plans were under way to open were concerned. Additional areas had
two additional schools, one at Oro Bay to be captured in order to bring Mac-
to teach equipment maintenance and Arthur's air forces within striking dis-
another at Finschhafen to continue the tance of the Philippines. The same
work of the soils mechanics school set up procedures were followed as before
85
at Port Moresby the year before. against steadily weakening enemy re-
Specialist schools could train relatively sistance. Capture of enemy areas was
few men. Commanding officers were followed by the construction of fighter
frequently averse to sending men away and bomber fields and the development
to such schools because they believed of minor base facilities.
they needed all available hands in their
units. General Casey was of the opinion Noemfoor
that it would be best to combine the
various specialist schools into one, to be Since mid-May MacArthur's planners
set up at a central location in the theater. had had under consideration an assault
The engineers of the lower echelons on Noemfoor, an oval-shaped, coral
agreed that a theater school that would island, about 15 miles long, located in
provide an adequate program in spe- Geelvink Bay, some 90 miles west of
cialist training for all units would be Biak. Seizure of the island would be
desirable but were of the opinion that followed by the construction of airfields
provision of sufficient students, staff per- and minor base facilities. General
sonnel, and equipment was beyond the MacArthur ordered an amphibious as-
resources of the theater if operations sault for 2 July. The attack was to be
were to be supported to a maximum made by CYCLONE Task Force, made up
degree. Since deficiencies in training of the 158th Regimental Combat Team
were becoming more pronounced, the and supporting units, including the 27th
question of whether to organize a school Engineer Combat Battalion. Australian
to teach specialists was one which would Group Capt. William A. C. Dale was task
have to be resolved soon.86 force engineer. Two aviation battalions
and three RAAF airfield construction
85
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,
squadrons were assigned for work on the
II, 152-53. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, Annual base and airfields. Enemy troops on the
Rpt for 1944 (Draft MS).
86
island were believed to total around
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,
II, 209. (2) Memo, L[eif] J. S[verdrup] for G-3
3,000. While its terrain was not as
GHQ SWPA, 11 Nov 44. SWPA File 52. rugged as Biak's, Noemfoor was densely
562 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
forested and had coral terraces. The which the Japanese had buried with the
Japanese had built three airfields, which nose fuses even with the surface of the
could probably be improved without ground. The mines, though numerous
much effort.87 as compared with the quantities found
The landing was made as scheduled at other landings in the Southwest
on the northwestern shore near Kamiri Pacific, had no effect on the operation.
airstrip. Units of the 2d and 3d Special Most were not armed, and the Japanese
Brigades, including the shore battalion had marked the location of many with
of the 593d Boat and Shore Regiment, a sticks, so that little probing was required.
boat company of the 543d Boat and Demolition teams of American and Aus-
Shore Regiment, and the 2d Brigade's tralian engineers quickly deactivated and
support battery took part in the land- removed the mines. Eastward of Ka-
ing. Operations were routine. The miri, along the shore, the infantry found
only interference from the Japanese was pillboxes, caves, and barbed wire en-
light rifle fire. All troops were trans- tanglements designed to repulse landings
ported in Buffaloes and Dukws until and prohibit movement along the coast;
naval demolition crews blasted passage- these defenses were not manned. Few
ways through the wide coral reef fringing Japanese were in evidence. Most had
the beach. The shore engineers re- retreated into the jungles of the central
ported no unusual hindrances. About and southern parts of the island. On
800 yards long, the beach was a fairly only two occasions were the 27th engi-
smooth coral ledge which, about 150 neers called on to use flame throwers to
yards inland, rose abruptly to a bank flush the enemy out of caves and dug-
from 6 to 8 feet high. Because the land- outs. While there were isolated in-
ing was made at the site of the airfield, stances of fanaticism, Japanese resistance
it was not necessary to build roads. The on Noemfoor was negligible.89
shore engineers transferred supplies to The first job of the engineers was to
dumps easily. Flak LCM's patrolled the rebuild Kamiri. Requirements called
coastal waters, strafed beaches where the for a runway 5,000 feet long. On the
Japanese might be lurking, and launched first day of the landing, with the field
rockets into the interior of the island.88 still under intermittent enemy rifle fire,
In the advance along the northern the men of the 27th Battalion, dragging
coast, the 27th engineers found about lengths of Japanese rails behind trucks,
400 mines. Most were aerial bombs filled in bomb craters and smoothed the
runway. The 1874th Aviation Battal-
87
(1) Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. ion and the 5th Airfield Construction
397ff. (2) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Sai- Squadron arrived within a few days and
pan, p. 642. (3) Hq Sixth Army FO 19, an. 3, 21 set out to rehabilitate the strip. They
Jun 44. SWPA File A290. (4) Task Force Engr's
Rpt on TABLETENNIS Opn. Sturgis File 44. (5)
Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt on Noemfoor Opn.
89
SWPA File 74. (1) Rpt, Hq 27th Engr Combat Bn to CG U.S.
88
(1) 3d ESB, Hist Rpt, 1-31 Jul 44. SWPA File Forces APO 704, 31 Aug 44. SWPA Files. (2) Rpt
E-32-4. (2) 2d ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt of Opns, Hq 27th Engr Combat Bn to CG U.S. Forces APO
Jul 1-31, 44. SWPA File E-20-7. 704, 17 Jul 44. SWPA Files.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 563
finished putting in the coral base in Klamono, thirty miles to the southeast of
about two weeks. On 20 July the run- Sorong, and develop them to provide
way and minimum facilities were ready fuel and thus cut down on requirements
to base one fighter squadron. Higher from the United States. Casey's staff did
headquarters wanted Kamiri lengthened considerable planning for the develop-
an additional 500 feet, but this could not ment of the oil fields. In the United
be done because both ends of the runway States, the Army Service Forces, with
were too close to the sea. To the east, the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the engineers improved a partially fin- likewise did a good deal of planning, and
ished field called Kornasoren. Here by April some 2,000 Engineer troops
they built two bomber strips 7,000 feet were being trained and supplied with
long. The first was usable on 25 July; equipment for operations at Klamono.
the second, early in September. A third With the speedup of the campaign after
strip was started at the site of Namber the bypassing of Wewak and the landing
field, but work was discontinued because at Hollandia in April, MacArthur re-
the location did not permit extending vised his schedule for the advance along
the runway to more than 4,500 feet. the New Guinea coast and called for an
Namber was used only for emergency acceleration of operations. In July the
landings. In addition to the airfields, plan of developing the oil fields at
the engineers built tanks for gasoline, a Klamono was abandoned, since they
fueling jetty, and a pipeline sufficient to could not be made to produce soon
support air operations.90 enough. Air reconnaissances made that
same month indicated there were few if
Sansapor any suitable sites on Waigeo Island for
an air base. MacArthur's planners then
From the time he first planned to directed their attention to the northern
advance along the New Guinea coast, coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula—the
MacArthur had reasoned that one or Sansapor-Mar area. A reconnaissance
more airfields would have to be built on group sent out by Sixth Army recon-
the Vogelkop Peninsula at the western noitered the area, including two offshore
end of the island to provide adequate air islands, Amsterdam and Middleburg,
support for an attack on the Philippines. during the last week in June. They
During late 1943 and early 1944 Mac- found no enemy troops. The beaches
Arthur's planners had centered their at- were good, but poor terrain might make
tention on the Japanese base at Sorong, the construction of airfields anything but
on the western coast of the peninsula. easy. On 30 June MacArthur directed
Along with Sorong, MacArthur planned Krueger to seize the Sansapor-Mar area
to seize Waigeo Island, sixty miles to the on 30 July.91
northwest, and develop an air base there.
He also planned to seize the oil fields at
91
(1) Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 425-
28. (2) Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt on Sansapor
Opn. SWPA File 74. (3) Hq, Sixth Army FO 20,
90
Task Force Engr's Rpt on TABLETENNIS Opn. an. 3, 10 Jul 44. SWAP File A 291.
564 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
To seize the area, Krueger organized the airdromes accordingly and assigned
the TYPHOON Task Force, made up of the engineer units on a tentative basis.92
6th Infantry Division, reinforced, less Since all indications pointed to no
one regimental combat team. The 6th combat but much construction at Sansa-
Engineer Combat Battalion would pro- por, the engineers at all command levels
vide combat support; eleven additional stressed the importance of sending men
engineer units were assigned, their work and equipment to the objective area as
to be supervised and directed by Head- soon as possible. At a planning confer-
quarters, 1112th Engineer Combat ence with MacArthur and Krueger, Casey
Group, under Colonel Heiman, the task urged sending in engineer troops and
force engineer. The 836th, 1881st, and machinery at the earliest possible time.
1897th Aviation Battalions, the 43d Con- A schedule for shipping engineer equip-
struction Battalion, and the 96th General ment forward was finally agreed upon.
Service Regiment were the most im- Eight LST's of supplies for the task force
portant construction units. They were were to go in with each echelon up to
to build two airfields, one for fighters D plus 28. The engineers were given
and one for bombers, the first to be 5 of those scheduled to go in on D-day,
ready in twenty days; the second, in 4.6 of those scheduled for D plus 2, and 5
thirty-five. Colonel Heiman's staff, after of those scheduled for D plus 4. The
studying the data available on the target engineers put major emphasis on moving
area, including the information brought equipment forward. The units them-
back by the reconnaissance party, con- selves would arrive "piecemeal." Half
cluded that combat operations would of the 6th Combat battalion, 30 percent
probably be negligible; the construction of the 836th Aviation Battalion, and 10
of airfields, difficult. The site for an percent of the 617th Engineer Base
airfield on the mainland chosen by the Equipment Company were to come in on
air forces was in a narrow coastal rain D-day. On D plus 2, another 10 percent
forest in back of which was a swamp. of the 6th Combat Battalion, 60 percent
Amsterdam was too hilly. Middleburg of the 836th Aviation Battalion, and 20
was flat, but possibly too small for an percent of the 617th would land. Some
airfield; long enough for a fighter strip, units would arrive in as many as five
it was only 240 acres in area. Colonel echelons. It was believed that the ad-
Heiman recommended that the fighter vantage of getting the equipment to
runway be built on the latter island, Sansapor early would more than offset
small as it was, because completing such the piecemeal arrival of the units.93
a strip on the mainland on schedule The assault, made as scheduled, en-
would be impossible. The airmen
agreed that construction should proceed 92
Task Force Engr Rpt, GLOBETROTTER Opn.
as Heiman suggested, if a reconnaissance Sturgis File 45.
93
made after the landing showed his as- (1) Task Force Engr Rpt, GLOBETROTTER Opn.
(2) 836th Engr Avn Bn, Narration for 1944. (3)
sumptions regarding terrain were correct. Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 434, 446.
The engineers prepared layout plans for (4) Hist of the 1112th Engr Constr Group.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 565
Sturgis File 45. (2) Ltr, Sturgis to Casey, 13 Oct 44. Japanese had begun work on a runway
SWPA File 74.
Incl with Ltr, Heiman to C Staff Br, 6 Oct 50. but had abandoned the project. Surf
96
coast, and the many coral reefs made the New Guinea coast and on nearby
navigation hazardous. The Gila Penin- islands.98
sula, jutting out in a southwesterly direc- Unexpectedly, the landing was one of
tion, helped protect the beaches on the most difficult in the Southwest
Morotai's western coast from high surf. Pacific. What had appeared on aerial
On the basis of available information, photographs as beaches of white sand or
the western shore near the base of the coral proved to be gray mud three feet
Gila Peninsula appeared to be the best deep. The shallow water forced LST's
97
place for a landing. to unload far out from land; many of
For the assault, General Krueger or- the men had to wade to shore in water
ganized TRADEWIND Task Force, includ- up to their necks. Particularly trouble-
ing Headquarters, XI Corps, the 31st some were submerged coral heads and
Infantry Division, and the 126th RCT potholes in the ocean floor. The men
of the 32d Division, together with a large could not get much of their equipment
number of supporting troops—all told, to the beach; on the day of the landing,
about 40,000 men. The engineer com- the 534th's shore battalion managed to
ponent included twenty-six units. As- bring in only three of its eight bull-
signed were a headquarters and dozers. Conditions improved after the
headquarters company of an aviation shore engineers built ramps and piers out
regiment, three aviation battalions, a into the water. The excellent loading
headquarters and headquarters company plan which the 534th had worked out
of a construction group, two construc- and put into operation helped save the
tion battalions, and two RAAF airfield situation in these first days. It was
construction squadrons. For the first fortunate that the Japanese did not inter-
time, elements of the 4th Engineer Spe- fere with the landing. Combat engineer
cial Brigade were to take part in a major tasks were light. The 106th Engineer
assault. The brigade, headed by Combat Battalion was occupied mainly
Colonel Hutchings, had reached the with sweeping the beaches for nonexist-
Southwest Pacific the previous March. ent mines, clearing jungled areas for
At Morotai, the 544th Engineer Boat tactical units, building supply roads, and
and Shore Regiment, less one boat com- reconnoitering. Since the island's coral
pany, and a shore battalion of the 534th surface held up well under traffic, road
Boat and Shore Regiment were to handle construction was easy. There were no
boat and shore missions. Colonel mines or obstacles. Most of the Japa-
Bathurst, the task force engineer, re- nese had retreated a good distance into
ported that while he and his staff had the jungle.99
ample time for planning, a major prob-
98
lem was assembling the various task force (1) Task Force Engr Rpt, INTERLUDE Opn. Stur-
gis File 46. (2) 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, Sep 44.
engineer units, widely scattered along SWPA File E-45.
99
(1) 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, Sep 44. SWPA
File E-45. (2) Hopkins Rpt, "INTERLUDE Opn,"
97
Rpt, Brigadier R. N. L. Hopkins, Austr Liaison Morotai Island, 15 Sep 44. (3) Rpt, 106th Engr
Off with Seventh Force, sub: INTERLUDE Opn, Moro- Combat Bn to Engr XI Corps, 20 Oct 44, sub:
tai Island, 15 Sep 44. SWPA File B192. INTERLUDE Opn.
568 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MacArthur had directed the construc- entirely new construction was required,
tion of three runways on Morotai—one securing an adequate amount of suitable
for fighters to be ready as soon as possible coral had taken longer than expected,
and two for bombers, the first to be rains had to some extent slowed con-
usable by the 10th and the second by the struction, the shortage of spare parts had
30th of October. Since the partially deadlined much equipment, and, lastly,
completed Japanese strip near the land- the schedules set by planning staffs had
ing beaches was unsuitable for rehabili- undoubtedly been somewhat optimistic.
tation because of poor drainage, the Yet, within forty days three engineer
engineers began work on a fighter strip aviation battalions and two RAAF con-
in the coconut groves near the southern struction squadrons had constructed a
coast. The three aviation battalions fighter runway and a bomber runway
and the RAAF units were assigned to the and had completed 90 percent of the
construction of Wama Drome, as the work on a second bomber strip. They
strip was called. Despite heavy under- had provided, in addition, storage for
brush and tree roots which extended sev- 40,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, to-
eral feet underground, they made fairly gether with a fuel jetty, and were rapidly
rapid progress. Wama received a 6-inch completing storage for another 40,000
coral base and was surfaced with landing barrels. They had installed two floating
mat. On 3 October the 5,000-foot run- wharves capable of taking three Liberty
way was operational. Reconnaissance ships and had almost completed work on
had shown that just to the north was an a pile dock. Construction on camps,
area well suited for the construction of covered storage, hospitals, and access
the two bomber runways. Two of the roads was complete.101
aviation battalions and a construction
battalion went to work, clearing the The South Pacific
trees, stripping the top soil down to the
coral substratum, cutting and filling While the forces in the Southwest
where necessary, and then compacting. Pacific made giant strides toward the
Surfacing was pierced plank. The first Philippines, the dwindling forces in the
runway, named Pitoe, was ready for South Pacific were reorganized. As al-
operations on 17 October.100 ready indicated, on 1 August USAFISPA
The engineers were not able to pro- was redesignated South Pacific Base
vide airfields on Morotai as rapidly as Command and made subordinate to the
MacArthur's operations instructions had newly activated United States Army
specified. This delay was the result of Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area. SOS
various causes—the existing Japanese SPA was inactivated and its personnel
field could not be rehabilitated so that transferred to SPBC. There was no
change in the mission of Army forces in
(1) Task Force Engr Rpt, INTERLUDE Opn. the South Pacific, except that responsi-
100
Sturgis File 46. (2) Hq, 931st Engr Avn Regt, Opns
Rpt—INTERLUDE. SWPA File, M15. (3) 836th Engr
101
Avn Bn, Hist Narration for 1944. (4) Ltr, 841st (1) Hq, 931st Engr Avn Regt, Opns Rpt—INTER-
Engr Avn Bn to CG XI Corps, 14 Oct 44. SWPA LUDE. (2) Ltr, Col J. H. Dudley to C Staff Br, 19
File M15. Jul 50. SWPA Files.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 569
bilities for training were discontinued. gainville was "well developed" and at
SPBC henceforth had only the two pri- the same time was a good example of
mary missions of providing logistic sup- "the essential simplicity of Army con-
port for operations in the Central and struction." On the whole, Lane con-
Southwest Pacific and rehabilitating and sidered the ". . . general aspect of the
staging a number of divisions assigned to SOPAC area" a "tribute" to the Seabees,
those two theaters. but added that he found the commanders
As engineer operations declined in of the aviation engineer units, in par-
scope, the engineer organization in the ticular, ". . . very weary of trailing the
South Pacific was changed to conform Construction Battalions and doing house-
with the over-all reorganization of the keeping work for the Air Force." They
theater. The Engineer Sections of were " . . . anxious to come to SWPA
USAFISPA and SOS were combined as where, although not under Air Force
the Engineer Section, SPBC. Colonel control, they [would] be employed on
Beadle and Colonel Murrow had re- essential construction in the front
turned to the United States; Col. Peter lines." 103
P. Goerz became the engineer of the
South Pacific Base Command. Engi- Progress by 1 October
neer missions remained much as before.
They included principally technical From the end of February to the
supervision of Engineer units, formula- middle of September 1944 Allied forces
tion of policies, planning, and furnish- in the Southwest Pacific had advanced
ing technical advice to the commanding from the Admiralties to Morotai and
general of the South Pacific Base Com- were within striking distance of the
mand. Engineer troop strength, which Philippines. By 1 October American
had reached a peak in April 1944, of engineers in the Southwest Pacific Area
some 20,000 men out of approximately numbered 100,000 in a total troop
245,000 US Army troops, had by July strength of 700,000; U.S. Army engineers
dropped to 11,000.102 Engineer work in that theater totaled 54 percent of all
now consisted mainly in helping the Sea- American engineers in the theaters en-
bees to maintain the base installations gaged in the war against Japan. Engi-
still remaining on New Caledonia, neer units had been moving forward
Espíritu Santo, Guadalcanal, and Bou- continuously; one-third of the total were
gainville. Colonel Lane, after a visit to now in Netherlands New Guinea, in-
the South Pacific in July, wrote to cluding the staffs in GHQ, USASOS, and
General Godfrey, "New Caledonia and Sixth Army, which had moved to Hol-
Espiritu Santo are well developed and landia in August and September. Long
comfortable rear bases and of little in- before the conclusion of the New Guinea
terest to Engineers." Guadalcanal was campaign, these staffs and numerous
being used as a major supply base despite engineer units had begun preparations
the shortage of harbor facilities. Bou- for the recapture of the Philippines.
102 103
AGO, Statistical and Accounting Br, Strength Ltr, Lane to Godfrey, 20 Jul 44. SWPA File
Rpts of the U.S. Army. 74.
CHAPTER XIV
General MacArthur's staff had begun The first assaults on the Philippines
preliminary planning for the recapture were assigned to Sixth Army. In many
of the Philippines early in 1943. This respects, operations would be similar to
early planning was repeatedly revised in those in New Guinea. The objective
accordance with changing tactical devel- areas would be softened up through
opments and instructions from the Joint aerial and naval bombardments, am-
Chiefs of Staff. By March 1944 the war phibious landings made, the Japanese
in the Pacific was going well for the destroyed or driven away from the
Allies. The Marshalls had been seized beaches, and airfield and base construc-
and were being converted into a power- tion begun. Early in July, Sturgis and
ful forward base. The Admiralties were his staff, recently moved from Finsch-
under attack, and the weak Japanese hafen to Hollandia, were briefed on the
resistance indicated that capture of these KING or K series of operations, scheduled
islands was merely a matter of time. for the southern and central Philippines.
On 12 March the Joint Chiefs directed At this time, little up-to-date information
MacArthur to prepare detailed plans for was to be had on those areas. The
an attack on Mindanao, southernmost of photography of Sarangani Bay was far
the major islands of the Philippines, from complete and ". . . as for Leyte
tentatively setting 15 November 1944 as . . . , there was no photography at all
the date for the first landing. In mid- from which local conditions could be
June MacArthur issued his plan for a determined and construction plans
return to the islands. He called for a based." 2
small-scale attack at Sarangani Bay, on A most important matter was the
the southern coast of Mindanao, on 25 weather. While temperatures in the
October and construction of a minor air Philippines varied little, most of the
base there as soon as possible. On 15 islands had two pronounced seasons, a
November a major amphibious attack dry and a wet, determined to a large
would be launched against Leyte in the extent by the prevailing winds, the
central Philippines and an extensive base
built on that island to support an attack Philippines, U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
on Luzon.1 (Washington, 1954), pp. 1-3.
2
Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., "Engineering Operations
in the Leyte Campaign, Part I," The Military En-
1
M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the gineer, XXXIX (November, 1947), p. 458.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 571
lar base, and part of them, transferred to 15th ASCOM was transferred to Sixth
ASCOM later on, were to be responsible Army, where it was placed on a corps
for operating it. The latter, together level; Casey would be directly responsi-
with a number of units, would return ble to General Krueger.6
to USASOS when the combat phase was
over and the base passed to USASOS. The Assault Schedule Revised
As soon as a base was a going concern,
those responsible for planning would From the 10th to the 14th of Septem-
begin to make plans and preparations for ber Admiral Halsey's carrier fleet made
the next one. A hindrance to early a number of strikes against the central
planning was that ASCOM was at Bris- and southern Philippine islands. The
bane and Sixth Army headquarters at weak resistance his flyers encountered
Hollandia. Co-ordination was difficult.5 was quite convincing evidence that Japa-
On 27 August MacArthur announced nese strength in those parts of the archi-
a schedule of operations which called for pelago was fairly well depleted. Halsey
attacks on dates later than those he had informed Nimitz that the area was "wide
set in his plan of mid-June. There was open." On the 14th he recommended
to be an assault on the Talaud Islands, that the operations planned against Yap,
half-way between Morotai and Min- Talaud, and Sarangani Bay be canceled
danao, on 15 October; on Sarangani Bay and that Leyte be seized immediately.
on 15 November; and on Leyte on 20 Nimitz radioed Halsey's suggestion to the
December. While the later scheduling Joint Chiefs of Staff, then meeting with
of operations would give the engineers the British Chiefs of Staff at the
more time for planning, they would still OCTAGON Conference in Quebec. Mar-
have to build the extensive base on Leyte shall immediately asked MacArthur for
during the rainy season. Planning was his views regarding the speeding up of
moving ahead satisfactorily. Since con- the attack schedule; MacArthur replied
struction and logistic support were ex- two days later, agreeing to cancellation
pected to be generally of far greater of the operations as Halsey recom-
importance than combat, Casey's staff mended. The Joint Chiefs at once in-
had to do comprehensive planning. structed MacArthur to move directly
Early in September ASCOM moved to against Leyte and set the 20th of October
Hollandia, where major theater head- as the day for the attack.7
quarters were located, and better co-
ordination, particularly with Sixth Army Intensified Planning for Leyte
engineers, was possible. By the second
week of the month, planning was prac- Concentrating henceforth on planning
tically complete. Requisitions for all for the Leyte (K-2) operation the engi-
classes of supplies and equipment had
been submitted to USASOS. On the 6
(1) Cannon, Leyte, pp. 7-8. (2) Ltr, Casey to
CG USASOS, 12 Feb 45. (3) Hist of ASCOM.
5 7
(1) Ltr, Casey to CG USASOS, 12 Feb 45. (2) Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the
Hist of ASCOM From 23 Jul to 26 Dec 44. SWPA United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945,
File A155. to the Secretary of War, p. 71.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 573
neers had numerous problems to deal 28} Mountainous and, for the most
with. Not only had the target date been part, heavily wooded, it had two prin-
moved up sixty days but the new objec- cipal lowlands. The first, Leyte Valley,
tive area was some 350 miles more stretching across the northeastern part of
distant. Leyte, about 600 miles north of the island from Leyte Gulf on the east to
the airfields on Morotai and 1,000 miles Carigara Bay on the north, had many
northwest of those on Biak, was, for all streams and numerous rice paddies; it
practical purposes, beyond fighter and would not be suitable for extensive con-
medium-bomber range. The risks inci- struction, except perhaps during the dry
dent to carrying on extended operations season. The second, the Ormoc plain,
without land-based air support were con- on the west coast, would in all prob-
siderable. It was of the utmost impor- ability not be the scene of decisive fight-
tance that the engineers have airfields ing or of a great deal of construction.
ready as soon as naval air support was Most of the island's roads were in the
withdrawn; since the assault was sched- northeast, and radiated from the capital,
uled for the beginning of the rainy Tacloban, located in the Leyte Valley on
season, this might not be easy. To the east coast. The island's few paved
make matters worse, only sketchy infor- thoroughfare's had only a thin and nar-
mation was to be had regarding the row surface of bitumen. Facilities for
island's terrain. Leyte was still too far supporting modern war were few. No
from the most forward bases for land- definite information was on hand regard-
based reconnaissance planes. Flyers ing the number of airfields or their
with Halsey's carrier fleet were the first condition, but it was known that the
to photograph the target area, but the Japanese had been working on several.
films brought back, when developed, The most important, Tacloban, a 5,000-
showed important terrain features ob- foot prewar commercial field on the
scured by clouds. Pictures taken dur- Cataisan Peninsula, two miles southeast
ing the subsequent weeks were not much of the capital, was undoubtedly opera-
better.8 tional. In central Leyte, located near
Fortunately, a considerable amount of the dirt road running west from the
information was available in topographic coastal town of Dulag to Burauen were
studies made before the war; the United four fields—Dulag, San Pablo, Bayug,
States Coast and Geodetic Survey had and Buri. San Pablo, overgrown with
prepared hydrographic studies of beach weeds, was not in use; the other three
areas which contained especially valu- seemed to be operational. There were
able data. The eighth largest island of apparently additional fields but little was
the archipèlago, Leyte was some 115 known about them. Most of the island's
miles long, 43 miles wide at the north, population lived on farms or in small
and 16 miles wide at the center. (Map villages, called barrios.9 Even Taclo-
9
(1) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte
8
(1) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, Part I," pp. 459-60. (2) Cannon, Leyte,
Campaign, Part I," p. 459. (2) Of C Engr GHQ pp. 10-13, 124. (3) Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte
AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 286. Opn, 20 Oct 44-25 Dec 44, p. 231. 106-0.3 (20430).
574 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MAP 28
ban, according to Sturgis was ". . . merely up operations. The Central Pacific's
an overgrown village with a few dilapi- XXIV Corps, scheduled for the assault
dated warehouses and public buildings on Yap and already en route to its desti-
and limited berthing facilities for two nation, was diverted to Leyte. The
10
Liberty ships." engineer units of that corps, prepared for
Neither combat nor service engineers a landing on a small Pacific island, had
had enough time for adequate planning. to be supplied with more equipment,
Insofar as combat was concerned, a major and eventually more engineer units
obstacle arose from the fact that XIV would have to be sent in to support
Corps, assigned to operations on Leyte, XXIV Corps. A second matter of im-
had to be kept on Bougainville for mop- portance was bridging. Combat on
Leyte, unlike that on New Guinea,
10
Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte Cam- would probably require numerous
paign, Part I," p. 460. stream crossings, since the American
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 575
forces would most certainly have to move quarters for various commands. Port
inland to destroy the Japanese. There facilities were to include floating docks
were not enough bridging units or suffi- for four Libertys, to be ready within 30
cient amounts of bridging equipment in days. Eventually, ASCOM was to com-
the theater to support an extensive over- plete six fixed wharves for Libertys, each
land advance. On hand were one heavy to take two ships; the first wharf was to
ponton battalion—the 556th—and three be ready within 45 days. Seventeen
light ponton companies—the 506th, lighter jetties were to be built. ASCOM
510th, and 530th—and all four had only was to provide 12,000 hospital beds, most
a minimum of equipment. Of these of them in tents. Initially, gasoline was
units, the 556th and 530th were assigned to be furnished by barges anchored off-
to Sixth Army; the 506th, to X Corps. shore; meanwhile, ASCOM was to build
The 510th was already committed to two small fuel jetties and begin work on
support the operations on Morotai. bolted tanks of 2,000-barrel capacity each.
Bailey bridging, ideal for semipermanent Northern Leyte and southern Samar
fixed spans, was in short supply; only a Island were, in addition, to be the site of
few hundred feet of it were in New an extensive naval base. To accomplish
Guinea. Most of this was collected and his construction program, Casey had a
loaded on Leyte-bound vessels which sizable number of engineer units. He
happened to be handy. Sturgis believed had, among others, 15 aviation battal-
that the ponton units, at least part of the ions, 3 construction battalions, 2 port
time, would have to be put to building construction and repair groups, and 7
fixed bridges on Leyte so that floating dump truck companies. Of the 43,183
equipment could be moved forward as men assigned to ASCOM, 21,097, or
rapidly as possible to support the advance approximately 47 percent, were engi-
of the infantry.11 neers. Supply posed one of the most
ASCOM engineers were likewise vexing problems. There was less than
pressed for time for adequate planning. a month left to finish planning for Leyte,
Their immediate responsibility was the submit requisitions, and load the sup-
all-important one of building the criti- plies on transports. Many items sched-
cally needed airfields. They were to uled for Talaud and Sarangani Bay had
construct four. One runway, 5,000 feet to be diverted willy-nilly to Leyte,
long, was to be ready for fighters within whether needed there or not.12
5 days after the first landing. But air-
fields were only one of many responsibili- Amphibious Operations—Planning
ties. ASCOM was to build a base to
provide logistical support for 200,000 air Of all the amphibious assaults made
and ground troops, including port facili- in the Pacific, the Leyte operation was
ties, warehouses, hospitals, and head- the only one in which both the engineer
special brigades of the Southwest Pacific
11
(1) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte
Campaign, Part I," pp. 459. (2) Sturgis, "Engineer
12
Operation in the Leyte Campaign, Part II," The (1) Ltr, Casey to CG USASOS, 12 Feb 45. (2)
Military Engineer, XXXIX (December, 1947), p. 518. Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 159.
576 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
and the shore party organizations of the beaches south of the Cataisan Peninsula
Central Pacific were to be used. Two and north of the Palo River. XXIV
major landings were planned for the Corps, made up of the 7th and 96th
island's east coast—one just below Divisions, was to come ashore near the
Tacloban, the other, some fifteen miles town of Dulag. One RCT of the 24th
farther south near the town of Dulag. Division was to land at Panaon Island
The 2d Special Brigade, less one boat southeast of Leyte and secure the narrow
and shore regiment, was to help land the strait to enable motor torpedo boats to
1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Divi- proceed into Sogod Bay and the Min-
sion of X Corps near Tacloban. Gen-danao Sea. The major assaults were to
eral Heavey made arrangements with be made on beaches near the two air-
VII Amphibious Force to transport 290 drome areas—the early capture of
LCM's, 57 LCVP's, and 38 auxiliary craft Tacloban airdrome and the four fields in
14
to the target area; 130 LCM's and 42 central Leyte was essential. The plan
LCVP's were to participate in the A-day of campaign called for X Corps to ad-
landings. This was to be by far the vance northwest towards Carigara Bay
largest movement of small craft in any and thence - southward through the
operation made in the Southwest Pacific mountains toward Ormoc on the west
up to this time. At Dulag, two combat coast. XXIV Corps was to drive across
group headquarters with three combat the narrow waist of the island and then
battalions each were to do the shore advance northwest toward Ormoc to link
party work for the 7th and 96th Infantry up with X Corps.
13
Divisions of XXIV Corps. On the morning of the 20th the assault
began as scheduled. The weather was
The Assault ideal. The sea was calm, with the surf
between one and two feet high. In the
On 19 October two naval task forces X Corps area, landings were made at
of the Third and Seventh Fleets ap- White Beach to the north and Red Beach
proached the east coast of Leyte. Three to the south. No mines or underwater
islands in Leyte Gulf had been occupied obstacles were encountered. Japanese
a few days before and rather extensive opposition was unexpectedly light, the
mine sweeping operations carried on to principal interference being fire, at times
make the offshore waters safer for am- fairly heavy, from five 75-mm. guns em-
phibious operations. As already indi- placed in jungle southwest of Red Beach.
cated, the tactical plan called for the Four LST's received direct hits and a
landing of two corps on the east coast. fifth was set on fire; shell fragments
X Corps, comprising the 1st Cavalry damaged four engineer LCM's.
Division and 24th Division (less one It was soon evident that Red Beach
RCT), was to land on the three miles of was poor, with water so shallow that only
13
(1) Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44. SWPA
14
File 75. (2) 1st Lt G. J. Pavia, Constr Serv CPBC, (1) Cannon, Leyte, pp. 31-34. (2) Krueger,
Observers Rpt on Leyte Island Opn. Engr AGF From Down Under to Nippon, p. 150. (3) Seventh
PAC, 319.1. Amphib Force, Rpt on Leyte Opn. SWPA File 75.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 577
one LST could get close enough to make The shore parties at Red and White
unloading practicable. Hydrographic Beaches had a hard time moving supplies
charts of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, off the beach. Inland, 100 to 300 yards,
used extensively in planning, had clearly was a series of swamps, and between them
indicated shallow water, as well as the Japanese had constructed antitank
swampy terrain between the shoreline ditches. These obstacles, together with
and Highway 1, which paralleled the the lack of roads from the beaches, caused
coast. But the tactical plan, which not a little congestion. Work was,
called for X Corps to advance northwest moreover, interrupted by frequent air
from the beaches, required a landing raids and alerts, as the Japanese mustered
north of the Palo River; obstacles at the their dwindling air strength in a deter-
beaches would simply have to be over- mined effort to disrupt the landing.
come in one way or another. The Navy, The raids caused no serious damage, but
also aware of the unsatisfactory condi- the many alerts meant lack of sleep and
tions offshore, had planned to build near exhaustion for the shore parties.
ponton causeways but could not get the Some of the men were ordered to sup-
ponton cubes in time to transport them port the combat troops, which put an
to Red Beach; plans were then made to added burden on those remaining on the
transfer cubes from the Dulag area, if beaches. A major problem was getting
necessary. To add to the confusion, a road through from Red Beach to High-
naval beach parties, reconnoitering off- way 1. Under orders from the corps
shore the day before the landing, had commander, the 339th Construction Bat-
erroneously reported the water deeper talion was attempting to build one across
than it was. Ponton cubes, urgently re- a swamp 600 feet wide, beyond which lay
quested from Dulag on the morning of a mile of flooded rice paddies. Going
A-day, did not arrive until that evening. ashore on A plus 1, Sturgis, recently
Early the next morning, 21 October, un- promoted to brigadier general, found
loading began over the floating piers, but bulldozers and other equipment stuck in
only one LST was able to unload that mud and water. Making a quick recon-
day. Some transports were transferred naissance with the S-3 of the 339th, he
to White Beach, where all vessels had found a fairly dry though somewhat
unloaded and retracted by the end of the longer route a short distance to the south.
second day. Others proceeded to the He had the unit transferred to this loca-
beaches on the Cataisan Peninsula, where tion, where it built a 3-lane road to the
they unloaded thousands of tons of sup- highway in a few days.16
plies, which the shore parties piled up on Despite the obstacles, unloading sched-
15
the airstrip. ules were satisfactorily met, including
those for Green Beach on Panaon Island,
15
(1) Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44. (2) where no difficulties were encountered.
Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, p. 150. (3)
Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt on Leyte Opn. (4)
16
Samuel Eliot Morison, vol. XII, Leyte, "United States (1) Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44. (2) Hist
Naval Operations in World War II" (Boston: Little, of the 339th Constr Bn. (3) Comments by General
Brown and Company, 1958), pp. 134-35. Sturgis on draft of this chapter. SWPA Files.
578 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
When they hit their full stride on the result of lessons learned in the course of
Leyte beaches, the amphibian engineers actual landings. In all assault opera-
were unloading approximately 100 tons tions, the amphibious brigades had been
of cargo an hour, probably a record for under the control of Seventh Fleet.
SWPA up to that time. On the average, Landing craft operated by Navy per-
they unloaded an APA (transport, at- sonnel usually carried the first waves of
tack), which carried some 1,300 troops infantry to shore. In the long forward
and 450 tons of supplies, in four and movements, the Seventh Fleet trans-
one-half hours; the unloading of some ported the amphibian engineers' craft.
Libertys, with their larger cargoes, took The fact that the amphibian engineers
considerably longer.17 brought in part of the troops and sub-
Efficient operations were in part the sequently engaged in resupply missions
result of steadily improving teamwork along the shore or from island to island
of the engineers and the Navy. The was of distinct advantage to the Navy.
apprehensiveness with which Navy men Probably the major benefit was that the
had regarded amphibian engineer opera- Seventh Fleet could withdraw its as-
tions when the 2d Brigade first arrived sault forces from a forward area at a
in the theater a year and a half earlier relatively early time.20
was by now largely a thing of the past. At Dulag, also, the weather was fair
"The 7th Amphibious Force and 2d and the seas calm on A-day. Demolition
Engineer Special Brigade," wrote Rear crews easily removed the few underwater
Adm. Daniel E. Barbey, commander of obstacles found along the beaches.
VII Amphibious Force, "have been asso- There were no coral reefs, and offshore
ciated in numerous amphibious opera- slopes were steep enough to permit
tions . . . complete understanding has expeditious unloading—LST's, LCM's,
been achieved through this close associa- LCVP's, and Dukws carried men and
tion and was reflected in the smoothness supplies from ship to shore with little or
with which the Leyte landing prog- no trouble. Firm sandy beaches held up
ressed." 18 General Heavey was of the well under truck traffic. Japanese oppo-
same opinion. He pointed out that the sition was lacking at the beaches, but
successful results at Leyte could at least here, as at Red and White beaches, con-
in part be ascribed to "the fact that this gestion became something of a problem.
Brigade has been associated with Seventh Because of the danger of air attacks, the
Amphibious Force in numerous preced- Navy wanted its ships unloaded and out
ing operations and knew its methods and of Leyte Gulf as soon as possible; at the
many of its beach personnel . . . ." 19 same time, the infantry, beginning to
Responsibilities of naval and amphib- meet stiff resistance inland, was not able
ian engineer units assigned to task forces to advance as rapidly as had been hoped.
had become more clearly defined as the Nevertheless, work proceeded satisfac-
torily. Dozers of the shore party bat-
17
talions, landed early in the operation,
Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44.
18
Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt on Leyte Opn. 20
19
Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44. Ltr, Lane to C Staff Br, 28 Jul 47. SWPA Files.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 579
were used to cut trails from the beaches house near Tacloban, set up tents on
and prepare dump areas. One company the grounds for overflow personnel, and
from each combat battalion provided organized a system of perimeter defense
security for the battalion as far as 800 to guard against Japanese infiltrators.
yards inland. Neither occasional enemy He had organized two subordinate com-
rifle fire nor rainy weather later on mands: the Construction Command, to
interfered seriously with the work of build the airfields and base facilities,
the shore parties. The shore party bat- and the Base K Command, to be respon-
talions of the 7th and 96th Divisions, in sible for the operation of the base facili-
the words of one observer, "worked at ties. The former was given three con-
such speed and efficiency that all passen- struction areas on eastern Leyte—Taclo-
ger ships were unloaded of their equip- ban, Palo, and Dulag—in each of which
ment in 25 hours and all cargo ships were a construction group headquarters was to
unloaded in 44 hours, enabling them to supervise the work. As many native
22
leave Leyte Gulf." 21 workers as possible were to be recruited.
Tacloban was the first field to receive
ASCOM—Initial Operations attention; orders were that it was to be
improved sufficiently to take a fighter
ASCOM's most important task—the group within five days. The 46th Con-
building of airfields—had to be begun struction Battalion reached the site on
as soon as possible in view of the fact A-day. On narrow, mile-long Cataisan
that the American forces on Leyte were Peninsula, the strip would have to be
without land-based air support and the realigned about 10 degrees if it were to
Japanese fleet was known to be operating be lengthened eventually to 6,000 feet
in Philippine waters. Urgently needed for bombers; realignment alone would
were four all-weather fields. The one require a considerable additional con-
at Tacloban and the three in central struction effort. Doing any work on
Leyte were to be improved as quickly as A-day was next to impossible because of
possible. All, except Tacloban, would the great quantities of supplies and
require much work to bring them up to equipment being dumped on the runway
minimum standards. from LST's transferred from Red Beach.
ASCOM personnel and units arrived Strenuous efforts to get supplies off the
early in the operation. Casey with some runway caused such congestion of traffic
members of his staff came ashore on at the neck of the peninsula that the
A-day; two days later the advance eche- engineers could haul little or no coral
lon of ASCOM headquarters arrived. from the nearby pits, and work on the
Since the Japanese at this time still held runway was set back at least two days.
the area at Palo allocated to headquar- On A plus 3 the 1881st Aviation Battal-
ters, Casey installed his staff in a large ion and part of the 240th Construction
Battalion joined the 46th; the three units
21
(1) Maj Douglas F. Thomson, Of of Engr Tenth bivouacked on the peninsula alongside
Army, Rpt [Observer's Rpt on Leyte Opn]. Engr
AGF PAC. (2) Pavia, Observer's Rpt on Leyte
22
Island Opn. Hist of ASCOM.
580 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the runway to be near their work, despite battle with a Japanese naval force off the
the exposed position. They strove to southeast coast of Samar. The engineers
put down a coral base solid enough to dozed some twenty-five wrecked planes
support steel mats. By the fifth morning into the ocean. That night, between
after the landing, the situation was alerts, they worked continuously on the
critical. Enemy bombings were fre- brilliantly lighted runway. By evening
quent; there were about twelve attacks of the next day, it was ready for fighters.23
that morning alone. "The sky was Meanwhile, ASCOM units under
notably devoid of our own fighters," Colonel Heiman of the 1112th Construc-
Sturgis wrote, "but Zeros and Bettys tion Group had begun work on the air-
were whizzing down from the low over- fields in Central Leyte. The Dulag strip
cast like hornets. . . . " Rumors were was captured on the second day of the
abroad of a giant naval battle off Leyte, landing; the other three, during the next
as the Japanese fleet made a last desperate five days. San Pablo was to be developed
gamble to destroy the American task into a bomber field; the others were to
force and drive the Americans from be improved to take fighters and trans-
Leyte. Many U.S. planes came in for ports. Men sent out on reconnaissance
crash landings; most cracked up on the by Sturgis and Casey reported that work
loose coral and sand of the runway. 23
(1) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte
The pilots explained that their carriers Campaign, Part I," pp. 462-63. (2) General Kenney
had been sunk or disabled during the Reports, pp. 453-56.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 581
on the fields, located in the midst of rice had had a narrow escape; a study of the
paddies and swamps, would be laborious battle reports indicated that if just one
enough during the dry season and well- of the Japanese warships, only a short
nigh impossible in wet weather. Supply distance away, had sailed into Leyte
would be an almost insuperable problem, Gulf, it could have shot up the naval
since the fields were near the one-lane transports and the beachhead and caused
road which ran from Dulag to Burauen incalculable damage. Kenney agreed to
and which was already choked with take over responsibility from the Navy
traffic to support the combat units. for air support on A plus 7, even though
Work began first on Dulag. The he had no planes on Leyte because there
808th Aviation Battalion, landing on were no adequate fields on which to base
the morning of 23 October, headed them. He was apparently not greatly
straight for the field, captured two days concerned since he was already convinced
previously. It was about 300 yards south that the Japanese air force could no
of the Dulag-Burauen road and parallel longer do any serious damage; at the
to it. The Japanese had hauled gravel most, it could merely delay the American
in pushcarts from a nearby stream and advance.26 Nevertheless, the lack of
spread it over the runway to a thickness American air power on Leyte enabled
of about one inch. The 808th, working the Japanese to send in sizable reinforce-
around the clock, smoothed the runway ments via Ormoc, including two com-
and built roads to the river to enable plete divisions and parts of three more
trucks to haul gravel.24 Two days later, in the hope of making a decisive stand on
at about 0930, the men ". . . were sur- the island. In return, the Americans
prised to see a couple of strange looking committed the reserve 32d and 77th In-
planes circling the field. . . . " They fantry Divisions, the nth Airborne
turned out to be Navy fighters, which Division, elements of the 38th Infantry
could not return to their carriers. Division, and the 112th Cavalry RCT.
About fifty planes landed; several Despite the lack of sufficient air cover,
cracked up. The dry weather of the the campaign on Leyte developed gen-
next few days made a good deal of prog- erally as planned. Enemy opposition
ress possible on the runway. On the was light, although stubborn pockets of
27th, the 821st Aviation Battalion joined resistance developed in some areas.
the 808th. Heavy rains at the end of While the Japanese reinforcements did
the month turned the whole area into a not alter the planned strategy, they did
sea of mud. The fields in central prolong the fighting.27
Leyte could not be made operational
within a predictable time.25 Combat Engineers—Roads
The news had come on the morning and Bridges
of the 26th that the Japanese fleet had
been defeated. The forces at Tacloban Although the fighting on Leyte was
24
more or less in the nature of a conven-
Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, p. 513.
25 26
(1) Ibid., p. 514. (2) Sturgis, "Engineer Opera- General Kenney Reports, p. 461.
27
tions in the Leyte Campaign, Part II," p. 515. Cannon, Leyte, p. 306.
582 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
tional overland advance, combat support with the road leading west from Dulag
was much like that in New Guinea in to Burauen, the main corps supply
that road and bridge construction and route. This thoroughfare, which passed
maintenance accounted for almost the through a number of low, swampy areas,
entire effort. Roads required the most required a great deal of corduroy. The
work by far. The island's thoroughfares constant stream of traffic made any real
disintegrated rapidly under military job of improvement or even maintenance
traffic. To make matters worse, five almost impossible. The combat battal-
days after A-day, heavy rains began—the ions in both parts of the island had an
first of the season. In both corps areas, especially heavy burden with regard to
long stretches of road became morasses. road construction because of the insuffi-
During the first three weeks, X Corps cient number of corps engineer troops.
had only three combat battalions to Some shore party engineers were put on
maintain roads in the Leyte Valley; they road work in the XXIV Corps area and
could not cope with the rapid disintegra- a number of ASCOM units were sent to
tion of the supply routes. The amphib- both corps, but few such men or units
ian engineers saved the situation by could be spared.28
moving supplies along the northern The main roads on Leyte had about
coast. The combat engineers continued 300 bridges, some 30 of which could be
to have trouble with roads in the valley. regarded as of critical importance.
Since most of the roads were built above Were the Japanese to destroy any one of
the surrounding rice paddies, they were the latter, the main supply routes might
extremely difficult to restore, once they be blocked for days. The astonishing
broke down. After the troops got out thing is that the Japanese left all the
of the valley, conditions were just as principal bridges intact. They did de-
critical. The advance through the stroy a number of minor structures,
mountains from Pinamopoan on north- most of them built of wood, and guer-
ern Leyte to Ormoc came almost to a rillas had wrecked an additional number
standstill because of the poor roads. In of smaller spans. Neither Japanese nor
some places, the troops had to be sup- guerrillas destroyed bridges in an expert
plied by air drop or by native carriers manner; as a rule, they left piers and
because constructing roads into these abutments in place, so that the combat
regions was virtually impossible. The engineers could easily replace most spans
few combat battalions on northern with timber trestles. Bailey bridging,
Leyte had to maintain long stretches of scarce on Leyte, was especially valuable
supply routes; a single battalion might in areas of extensive rice paddies, where
be responsible for as much as thirty or little timber was available. The 556th
forty miles. Many routes could not have Heavy Ponton Battalion was directed
been kept open had it not been for the to establish a "bridge park" where all
help of native workmen. In the XXIV
Corps area in central Leyte, the 13th and 28
(1) Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte Opn, p. 232.
321st Engineer Battalions of the 7th and (2) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte Cam-
96th Divisions were especially concerned paign, Part II," p. 518.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 583
Bailey parts were concentrated. From As it was, no use was made of these
30
the miscellaneous tonnages shipped to devices.
Leyte, a total of some 600 feet of double-
lane Bailey bridging was assembled and ASCOM—Airfields and Base
distributed as an Army-controlled item.29Mines,
Construction Fortifications, and
Dulag, was firmly of the opinion that With only two all-weather fields—
meeting the construction deadlines for Tacloban and Dulag—on Leyte, another
the fields in central Leyte was out of the was urgently needed, even though the
question. Shortly before Thanksgiving Japanese Air Force was no longer the
Day, he met with Generals Kenney and threat it had been. The only desirable
Whitehead at the Dulag strip. They sites for additional fields were along the
wanted to know when a parallel taxiway eastern coast. Many miles of flat, sandy
would be ready so that a fighter group beaches extended southward from the
could use the runway "with facility." Cataisan Peninsula. Eight miles from
Colonel Heiman later wrote that his Tacloban, near the town of Tanauan,
reply at the time was, "As long as the was a site, which, from the engineering
rains continue as they have, I can give no point of view, was almost ideal. Even
estimated dates of completion for the in rainy weather construction would not
strip, taxiways or hardstands." Heiman be difficult. From the point of view of
explained to Kenney and Whitehead the air forces, the area was not very de-
that even if the weather cleared, progress sirable, because any field built there
on the airfield would be slow because would have the southern end of the
engineers would have to be diverted runway quite close to a hill some 250
from the airfields to keep the important feet high. A further complication was
supply roads open. Heiman had in- that the site was already occupied
formed Colonel Sturgis about the condi- by Headquarters, Sixth Army. The
tion of the roads, and Sturgis had engineers nonetheless recommended con-
directed that additional engineers be struction there. General Kenney con-
put to work on them. General Kenney sented, and General Krueger agreed to
pointed out that the plans for the Luzon move his headquarters. Three aviation
campaign were in jeopardy, and that he battalions began work on 28 November;
needed a date at least for the completion within two and one half weeks, a fighter
of the Dulag strip. Heiman thereupon runway, 6,000 feet long, surfaced with
asked Kenney and Whitehead to take a steel mat, was ready.33
ride with him on the Dulag-Burauen ASCOM engineers were providing
road. It was so bad they could not get numerous additional facilities on Leyte.
through. They were nevertheless very A serious problem from the first was the
much concerned about the diversion of allocation of sites.. Because the maps
engineer strength to the road. On used in planning had been so inadequate,
Thanksgiving Day, Heiman recom- the areas selected were not what had
mended that plans for constructing been expected. Two of Sturgis' engi-
facilities at the three strips west of neers, Col. William J. Ely, his executive,
Dulag be abandoned. Most other engi- and Col. John C. B. Elliott, his opera-
neers were of the same opinion and many tions officer, reconnoitering close behind
had already made similar recommenda- the advancing infantry, found, in
tions. Late in November, work on the
three western fields was stopped.32 Files. (2) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the
Leyte Campaign, Part III," pp. 17-18.
33
Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte
32
(1) Ltr, Heiman to C Staff Br, 11 Sep 50. SWPA Campaign, Part III," p. 18.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 585
Sturgis' words, that ". . . nearly all of They found that men and materials
the proposed sites for depots were located scheduled for the work had to be di-
in rice paddies and swamps. . . . There verted to combat areas for road and
was very little available space that would bridge construction. Also, they en-
not become a quagmire when the rains countered unfavorable offshore condi-
started. . . ." 34 The situation was ag- tions, such as rock bottoms, precipitous
gravated by the fact that so many major underwater slopes, and, in some places,
headquarters, all in need of space, shallow water. Still, dock and jetty
moved into Leyte in the first days of the construction completed by late Decem-
assault, and for the most part encamped ber was impressive. ASCOM had
on the beachhead. At Sturgis' sugges- finished a floating and a fixed dock for
tion, Krueger organized a board made Libertys and had a second fixed dock
up of two officers from each major com- about one-third done. Six fixed and
mand—its purpose to allocate space. four floating lighter jetties were in
Meanwhile, about twenty officers and operation. Construction was continu-
men had the job of traveling about in ing. The dredge Raymond arrived in
jeeps in search of dry areas. the first days of the operation to deepen
In order to do the required construc- Tacloban harbor, but because of a
tion, ASCOM needed large numbers of shortage of spare parts, the dredge was of
native workers. Contrary to expecta- little use until the combat phase of
tions, they were at first hard to recruit. operations was almost over. The Ray-
Many, having acquired ample stocks of mond then pumped sand from the har-
food from looted warehouses, were not bor bottom to Tacloban airdrome to
much interested in working; large num- make up for the shortage of coral.36
bers were not eager to go to areas likely ASCOM engineers had many other
to be bombed; and many could not work construction responsibilities. One was
because there was no transportation from to provide storage tanks for gasoline,
their homes. Gradually, and with the together with distribution systems at the
help of local government officials and airfields. At Tacloban, they had in
the encouragement of their priests, the operation by 28 October a temporary
natives began to register for employ- system, consisting of a 500-barrel tank
ment. By the end of October, 2,500 had on the shore, connected by pipeline with
been recruited but their usefulness in a fuel barge. The permanent system
the early stage of the program was im- subsequently installed there included
paired by the high rate of absenteeism.35 storage tanks for 11,250 barrels of avia-
The construction of docks had high tion gasoline, 5,500 barrels of motor fuel,
priority; work was to be completed in and 5,500 barrels of diesel fuel, together
sixty days, that is, by 18 December. with pipelines and jetties. At Tanauan,
ASCOM engineers in charge of the they completed a tank farm with a
project ran into unexpected difficulties. capacity of 2,000 barrels. Dulag was
served by a fuel barge, connected by pipe-
34
line with the tank farm at the airfield.
Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte
Campaign, Part II," p. 515.
35 36
Hist of ASCOM. Ltr, Casey to CG USASOS, 12 Feb 45.
586 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
37 38
(1) Ibid. (2) Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte Opn, Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI.
pp. 234, 231. 314.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 587
On 28 December, seven days ahead of miles and extending 100 miles from
schedule, the 7,000-foot San Jose dry- Lingayen Gulf to Manila, were the most
weather strip was ready for use. On1 vulnerable part of the predominantly
January Eighth U.S. Army took over mountainous island. It was down them
operations on Mindoro. Engineer tasks that the Japanese had launched their
continued. The aviation engineers be- major attack in 1941. The campaign
gan work on two additional all-weather of 1945 would be the campaign of 1941
fields, which would be needed when the in reverse, with the Americans the at-
rainy season set in. The fields on Min- tackers and the Japanese the defenders.
doro assured more adequate air support The initial assault, the drive down the
for the planned invasion of Luzon.39 Central Plains and the capture of Manila
"The success of the work at Tanauan —the M-1 operation—was to be the re-
and the ease (logistics not considered) sponsibility of two corps: I Corps, with
with which the dromes at Mindoro were the 6th and 43d Infantry Divisions, and
shaped accelerated the loss of interest in XIV Corps, with the 37th and 40th
Leyte," Colonel Heiman wrote later. Infantry Divisions. The 158th Regi-
"By New Years, 1945, it was evident that mental Combat Team, the 13th Ar-
Leyte would soon be a backwash." 40 mored Group, and the 6th Ranger
Infantry Battalion were to provide
Luzon: The Drive to Manila additional support as needed. In re-
serve were to be the 25th Division and
Tactical the 1st Cavalry Division. The Luzon
operation was at first scheduled to begin
Once Leyte and Mindoro had been on 20 February 1945, but the date for
secured, Luzon was to be attacked. The the landing was later moved forward to
struggle for this island would be a crucial 20 December 1944, and then back to 9
one. The plan of campaign for the January. 41
MIKE series of operations, which were
scheduled for Luzon, included a landing Engineer Planning: Sixth Army
at Lingayen Gulf, a drive down the and ASCOM
Central Plains toward Manila, seizure of
the capital, capture of the fortified Engineer long-range planning required
islands in Manila Bay, and then a mop- for M-1, the most extensive overland
up of the Japanese who had retreated to campaign in the Southwest Pacific, in
the outlying parts of Luzon. Probably which some 250,000 men were to be en-
the most critical part of the campaign gaged, was considerable. Every possible
would be the drive down the Central angle of terrain intelligence had to be
Plains. From a military point of view,
the plains, with a maximum width of 40 41
(1) See Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the
Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, 1963), Chapter II, for a dis-
39
Ibid., pp. 315ff. cussion of the over-all plan of the invasion of Luzon.
40
Ltr, Heiman to C Staff Br, 11 Sep 50. SWPA (2) Engr, Sixth U.S. Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign,
Files. p. 1. SWPA Files.
588 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
studied; maps, and especially aerial terrain close to shore. All things con-
photographs, had to be scrutinized with sidered, the most favorable landing area,
great care. The fact that the Philippines from the tactical point of view, included
had been an American possession was a that part of the gulf which stretched
decided advantage. But almost all the from San Fabian to the mouth of the
engineers who had firsthand knowledge Agno River. The beaches had draw-
of the terrain of Luzon were prisoners of backs, but these were more than offset by
the Japanese. Except for Casey, Sturgis, the fact that intelligence information
and a few others who had served in the indicated the Japanese would probably
Philippines before the war, Luzon was offer little resistance to a landing made
unknown country to the men who had there, whereas they would almost cer-
to plan and prepare for the coming drive tainly make a determined stand along the
to Manila. eastern shores of the gulf.42
Members of the Engineer Section, For the engineers, the plan of assault
Sixth Army, assisted by a number of had advantages and disadvantages. The
men from Col. Orville E. Walsh's 5202d beaches from San Fabian to the mouth of
Construction Brigade, began preliminary the Agno, the most favorable from the
planning on 19 September for a landing tactical point of view, had decided draw-
at Lingayen Gulf and a drive down the backs, the most serious of which were
Central Plains. A study of the Lingayen shallow water and heavy surf. The ter-
Gulf area indicated that the best beaches rain in back of the shoreline was hardly
by far were on the eastern shore to the more promising. Inland, for a distance
south of San Fernando. But behind of from two to five miles, were meander-
them was a narrow coastal plain, and, in ing rivers, tidal estuaries, rice paddies,
back of it, stood precipitous mountains. fish ponds, and swamps. But once past
(Map 29.) Not only could that part of these hindrances and on dry ground, an
the gulf be easily defended, but also an invading force would encounter few
invading force would have great difficulty natural obstacles on the way to Manila.
in maneuvering on the plain, which at On the western side of the central Luzon
its southern end narrowed to a width of range, the Central Plains had their dry
less than a mile. Farther south, near season from November to mid-May.
the town of San Fabian, the beaches ap- The engineers would not have to contend
peared to be less desirable but still fairly with excessive rains as on Leyte; if any-
adequate. LST's could probably make thing, dust would be a nuisance. Lines
dry landings at a number of points. of communications, while not plentiful,
Southwest of San Fabian, the beaches were probably adequate. Highway 3, a
were poor. Aerial photographs showed two-lane, all-weather road, partly con-
waves breaking from 300 to 500 feet crete and partly asphalt, as well as a
from shore, indicating either that shoals number of one-lane, dry-weather, grav-
existed or that the surf was heavy. The eled roads, led from the gulf to the
western shores of Lingayen Gulf could
not be considered as possible sites be- 42
Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.
cause of reefs, poor beaches, and rocky 7-8.
590 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
in "half the usual minimum time." ". . . to conform generally" with that
Sturgis believed this procedure would "employed for the K-2 operation. . . ."
serve to get the Army across the Agno, On 6 October ASCOM sent Sixth
but thereafter engineer units would be Army a "tentative plan outlining
under considerable strain to replace [ASCOM] responsibilities in the opera-
46
floating bridges with semipermanent tion." Sixth Army approved it with
bridging fast enough to keep up with slight modifications. Thereafter, plan-
the advancing infantry. Matters would ning was largely a matter of filling in the
become especially critical when the details. ASCOM was to be responsible
troops reached the Pampanga and the at Lingayen Gulf for the construction of
major rivers beyond it; a severe shortage Base M, which was to support the drive
of floating bridging might easily develop. of the combat forces to Manila. The
Sturgis asked Krueger to request more base's operations would be of short dura-
bridging units from the United States. tion; after the capital city was taken, a
Sixth Army engineer plans called for one more permanent base would be built in
47
light ponton company assigned to each the Manila Bay area.
corps and one heavy ponton battalion, A question arose with regard to the
together with one light ponton and one 5202d Construction Brigade. Casey
treadway bridge company, assigned to wanted it assigned to ASCOM, as the
army; eventually, more units would be 5201st had been on Leyte; Sturgis be-
needed. MacArthur requested addi- lieved it would be advantageous to have
tional units, but it was realized the the brigade with its numerous construc-
chances were they would not arrive for tion units assigned to army, so that it
three or four months and then perhaps could be used in direct support of a
without their equipment. The insuffi- rapid drive on Manila. Since Base M,
cient number of bridging units and in any event, was soon to be superseded
equipment, the delay in airfield con- by the Manila base, construction require-
struction on Leyte, and the Navy's ments for the former would probably not
request for more time to make prepara- be so extensive as for Base K on Leyte.
tions were the principal reasons for the Asked to decide the matter, Krueger
postponement of M-1 from 20 Decem- placed the 5202d under army.48 With
45
ber to 9 January. the Japanese Air Force already in a
ASCOM began planning for M-1 at seriously weakened condition, airfield
Hollandia on 25 September, when a requirements, in particular, were less.
number of Leyte planners were reas- On Leyte, ASCOM had been charged
signed to the new operation. They with building four all-weather fields.
were scheduled to remain at Hollandia, At Lingayen, it was to have a temporary
in order to continue work on M-1 after runway, 5,000 feet long, ready six days
the rest of ASCOM left for Leyte. Gen- after the landing, and it was to have two
eral Casey directed that planning was
46
1st Lt John Mussachio, CAC, Hist of ASCOM,
26 Dec 44-13 Feb 45, pp. 2-3. SWPA File A154.
45 47
(1) Ibid. (2) Smith, Triumph in the Philip- Ibid., p. 3.
48
pines, ch. II, pp. 12-14. Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 7.
592 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
which made the construction of roads The amphibian engineers at this beach
inland difficult. On the second day, the were handicapped by their lack of
seas became so heavy that a number of ponton cubes for causeways and bull-
53
LCVP's were broached and the unload- dozers for the building of ramps.
ing of landing craft became almost In the I Corps area, the problems were
impossible. The beach was so unsatis- of a somewhat different nature; the surf
factory that a new one had to be found; was not so high, but the water, in most
after some reconnoitering, the 544th places, was too shallow for satisfactory
discovered a likely site along the banks unloading. On the right were Blue
of the nearby Dagupan River and trans- Beaches 1 and 2. Here the 543d EBSR
ferred its unloading operations to that brought in the 6th Division. The Jap-
point.52 anese at first did nothing to oppose the
To the west was Orange Beach. Here landing except to put some ineffectual
the 594th EBSR landed the 40th Divi- rifle fire on the beach. Shallow water
sion. Some random rifle fire was re- prevented LCM's from coming close to
ceived from the shore and during the land; most were grounded about 300
first night several air raids occurred in feet offshore. The Japanese Air Force
the course of which enemy planes went into action and strafed the beach,
dropped a few bombs. More hamper- inflicting some casualties among the
ing than the enemy was the surf. LST's amphibian engineers. On the second
could get no closer than 200 feet from day the seas became rough, with waves
shore. Causeways of ponton cubes up to six feet high, and many landing
placed from the LST's to the beach made craft floundered. During the succeed-
dry landings possible, but the seas be- ing days, as the surf subsided, supplies
came so rough that the causeways could could be brought ashore in large
not be kept in place. Orange Beach quantities.
was abandoned and the 594th sent its To the left, at White Beaches 1, 2, and
landing craft to discharge cargo along the 3, the 533d and 543d ESBR's found land-
banks of the Calmay River, which ing conditions favorable except on the
paralleled the coast about two miles right. Attempts to land LST's and
inland. On the far right of the XIV LSM's here were futile because of the
Corps landing area was Green Beach, shallow water and fairly heavy surf.
which was reserved for service units and Unloading had to be shifted to the left
the unloading of bulk cargo such as part of the beach. Japanese resistance
landing mat. On the second day two was more in evidence at the White
companies of the 594th came ashore and Beaches. On the first day a number of
began unloading LCM's and LCVP's, boats were hit by mortar shells, and dur-
but shallow water made the job hard. ing the following days the enemy laid
down mortar and 75-mm. and 240-mm.
artillery fire, in the course of which the
52
(1) 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, 1 Dec 44-31
Jan 45. (2) Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military
53
Engineer, XXXVIII (December, 1946), 519-25. (3) Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military Engineer,
Rpt, Engr Sixth Army, Luzon Campaign, pp. 22, 28. XXXVIII (December, 1946), 519-25.
594 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
56
54
4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, 1 Dec 44-31 Jan 45. (1) Ltr, Heavey to Trudeau, 30 Jan 45. SWPA
55
Ibid. (2) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of Files. (2) 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, 1 Dec 44-31
SWPA,IV, 542-43. Jan 45.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 595
supply lines or expose itself to a flank Division had reached the town of Bam-
attack.57 ban, sixty miles from Lingayen Gulf and
On the far right, the 40th Division, somewhat more than halfway to
supported by the 115th Combat Battal- Manila.58
ion, was scheduled to advance south from On the left in the XIV Corps area, the
Lingayen Gulf to Highway 13 and thence 117th Combat Battalion supported the
to Highway 3, which led directly into 37th Division in its drive southeast from
Manila. Resistance to the landing was Lingayen Gulf to Highway 3. The first
completely lacking. The movement major obstacle again was the Calmay,
from the beach was easy; the combat about a mile south of the landing area.
engineers broke down a bank, about The river did not prove the hindrance it
three feet high, beyond which roads led might have been. The bridge which
to the town of Lingayen, where the the division was to use, some 600 feet
streets, but slightly damaged, easily car- long, had 3 spans of 150 feet each and
ried military traffic. Within a distance one span of 120 feet, the latter on the
of two miles south of the town, two major near shore. The first troops to reach the
rivers had to be crossed—the Calmay site found the Japanese had destroyed the
and the Agno; the bridges over both had 120-foot span but had left the other 3
been destroyed. The combat engineers intact. The combat engineers on 13
took the troops over in assault boat January easily replaced the missing span
ferries constructed by Companies A and with a Bailey bridge. The 37th Divi-
B and in landing craft borrowed from sion was scheduled to cross the Agno
the 594th EBSR. Within three days some twelve miles to the south at Bayam-
most of the division was across the Agno bang, where the 300-foot railroad bridge
and advancing down Highway 13. over the river was only slightly dam-
Great expanses of wet rice paddies forced aged. The engineers on 14 January re-
the troops to stay close to the road. paired the piers and placed decking on
Since smaller bridges, though usually in- the bridge so that it could take 15-ton
tact, could seldom take more than 3-ton wheeled traffic. Two days later the
loads safely, the 115th engineers strength- 117th battalion constructed a ponton
ened them to take thirty-five tons. Only bridge capable of taking 13-ton loads.
one large bridge on Highway 13—at San During the night of 15 January seven-
Clemente—was completely destroyed. teen men of the 530th Light Ponton
On Highway 3, a most important bridge Company and twenty-five men of the
—the one over the Tarlac River—had 117th engineers put a ponton bridge to
twenty spans, two of which were partly take 8-ton traffic across the Agno at
demolished; they were repaired in two Wawa. Construction was difficult; the
hours. Complete destruction of this men had no time for a reconnaissance,
bridge would have seriously slowed the and it turned out that a sandbar in the
division. Within two weeks the 40th
57 58
Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, pp. (1) Hist of the 115th Engr Combat Bn. (2)
226-28. Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 28.
596 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
middle of the river forced the engineers across the Agno on Highway 3 near
to put up two bridges. Carmen. Here was the bridge of thir-
From the Agno to the Pampanga, teen spans, each 160 feet long, one of
bridging for the 37th Division was fairly which the retreating American and Fili-
easy. The troops used fords extensively. pino forces had demolished during the
Where necessary, the combat engineers, withdrawal of 1941. The Japanese had
using local material, repaired or con- replaced the destroyed span with a tim-
structed timber trestle spans to carry ber structure; American bombers sweep-
loads up to sixteen tons; this work, they ing over Luzon before the Lingayen
reported, constituted up to 75 percent of Gulf landing had destroyed more or less
their effort during the first two weeks. completely four of the concrete spans.
The men built some bridges at night, To get the first troops across the river,
using lights, sometimes as much as ten the engineers hired about 250 Filipinos
miles ahead of the main line of resist- to build bamboo rafts; the natives put
ance, and without infantry protection. 70 together, but none were needed be-
Very little effort was required on roads. cause the Japanese did not oppose the
Highway 3 had many holes but was crossing. The 506th Light Ponton
usable for all military traffic. The com- Company and one platoon of the 6th
bat engineers expended time and effort engineers got the job of putting a ponton
on developing a two-lane graveled road bridge across the river and preparing the
east of Highway 3 into a parallel sec- approach roads. Before construction
ondary route.59 began, Japanese forces reached the
It was much the same story in the I opposite bank and held up work for
Corps area. The 6th Combat Battalion, about twenty hours. As at Wawa, a
supporting the 6th Division in its ad- sandbar in the middle of the river bed
vance from the beaches to the town of required the men to build two floating
Urdaneta on Highway 3, had no trouble bridges. The advance elements of the
at first, even though, as maps and aerial 6th Division crossed over on 20 January.
photographs had correctly indicated, the Beyond the Agno, the most important
beachhead was something of an island. jobs were improving and maintaining
To the south was the Binloc River, lined the roads as far as the towns of Guimba
with fish ponds, to the east the Bued, to and Cabanatuan.60
the west the Dagupan. LVT's carried Farther to the east, the 118th Combat
the assault troops across the waterways. Battalion of the 43d Division reported
For the supply and support of the troops that it had little trouble. The roads
the 6th engineers had to bridge the rivers from the beach crossing swamps and
in the line of the advance. They con- ponds were "intact." Farther inland,
structed a 150-foot Bailey across the the main roads were in "excellent condi-
Binloc, a major problem being the tion." The bridges were too flimsy to
marshy ground near the river's banks. take division loads, but railroad bridges
The next big job was getting the troops
60
(1) Hist of the 6th Engr Combat Bn. (2) Hist of
59
Hist of 117th Engr Combat Bn. the 506th Light Ponton Co.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 597
and embankments, almost everywhere in Japanese than any other combat battal-
excellent shape, were quickly prepared ion. The unit came ashore at 1830 on
to take all traffic, and fords were easily11 January; about 8 hours later the
found. The engineers had no difficulty enemy began shelling the ships as the
developing and maintaining an adequate, troops were unloading them. Six men
even if heavily traveled, road net. The of the 186th were killed and two
men, called upon to destroy occasional wounded; enemy fire was so heavy that
obstacles such as pillboxes and barbed unloading had to be postponed till morn-
wire entanglements, some of them mined ing. Since the 13th Armored Group
and boody-trapped, dealt with them moved into bivouac, the 186th engineers
handily. Sometimes enemy infiltrators had no immediate combat missions.
tried to disrupt work by planting mines They improved and maintained some
at the job sites. "The Japs would come roads near their bivouac area and
in at night and lay a few mines at random spanned a nearby stream with a Bailey
on a portion of road just constructed and bridge.63
aside from the harassing effect accom- The combat battalions had an addi-
plished little," the 118th reported.61 tional construction task which at times
On the far left were the 65th Combat was of considerable importance—the
Battalion, supporting the 25th Division, building of temporary landing strips
and the 186th Combat Battalion, sup- needed by artillery liaison planes for
porting the 13th Armored Group; both courier service and by transports for the
combat battalions landed on S plus 2. evacuation of casualties. The men pre-
The 158th RCT, which came ashore the pared most of these strips with bull-
same day, had no engineer unit. The dozers. Since the Central Plains had
65th engineers were active in the San many level, cleared areas, little earth-
Manuel-Santa Maria-Umingan area at moving was required. Large expanses
the northeast edge of the Central Plains. of dry rice paddies offered the best sites.
They developed about 100 miles of new In a short time, the troops leveled off
roads and trails and strengthened about irrigation dikes and prepared a smooth
fifteen timber bridges. The men surface. "Dry weather airdromes across
spanned the Agno, no more than a small rice paddies," Sturgis wrote to Somervell,
stream in this area, with an infantry "was the easiest thing that we have had
support bridge 150 feet long and pre- fall in our lap in the last two years. . . ." 64
pared a ford 400 feet wide nearby for
heavier loads. Since fords were readily Mines and Obstacles
found at all streams, road maintenance
was a far more time-consuming task than The troops found few mines at the
62
bridging. beaches or on the routes leading inland
The 186th engineers, in landing, en- to the main highways of the Central
countered more opposition from the
63
Hist of the 186th Engr Combat Bn.
64
(1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.
61
Hist of the 118th Engr Combat Bn. 79-80. (2) Ltr, Sturgis to Somervell, 28 Jan 45.
62
Hist of the 65th Engr Combat Bn. Sturgis File 84.
598 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Plains. No units except the 118th engi- The combat troops ran into only a
neers reported encountering any in few roadblocks or similar obstacles, and
quantities. It was only after the troops most of these, almost invariably consist-
had advanced far down the Central ing of logs or wrecked equipment, had
Plains that they ran into fairly large been hastily put in place. Some ma-
numbers of mines in some areas. Quite chine gun emplacements covering stra-
a few were found near Clark Field and tegic road intersections or bridges had
Fort Stotsenburg. At Clark, the 117th been constructed, but they were not
engineers had to deal with approximately manned. On the whole, the obstacles
1,300 buried aerial bombs, buried just encountered on the Central Plains were
deep enough to put the nose fuze even ineffectual. In the hills west of Fort
with the ground. Locating these mines Stotsenburg, the Japanese had built
was easy; not only were the shipping well-entrenched positions. They had
boxes scattered about in the mined area constructed elaborate defensive installa-
but also the plugs were on the ground tions, including caves, many of them
nearby. In a few instances, the mined blasted in vertical cliffs and intercon-
areas were covered by enemy fire. In nected by tunnels. These positions
that event, the infantry-engineer-tank were extremely difficult to reduce.
teams went into action. Fire from the Since they were located on the flank of
infantry and tanks covered the engineers the route to Manila, they had more of a
probing for mines. The men, as a rule, nuisance value than anything else and
disarmed the aerial bombs by hand. did not slow down the advance to the
They turned down the arming collar on capital.66
the fuze spindle, unscrewed the nose
fuze, and inserted the bomb plug in the ASCOM
nose-well. Using an A-frame or truck
winch, they pulled the bomb out of the The first elements of ASCOM came
ground. In the few cases where the ashore on S plus 1. General Casey,
detonaters were jammed, the bombs scheduled to land on S-day, was delayed
were blown in place with explosives. until the next afternoon because the
Troops in the foothills on the east side destroyer on which he was aboard had to
of the Central Plains found a number escort a crippled transport. Upon land-
of mines, including artillery shells, flower ing, he went to Lingayen airstrip, situ-
pot and tape measure mines, and some ated between the town of Lingayen and
improvised box mines made of wood or the sea, where he met Col. Reginald L.
tin. None were placed in any identi- Dean, chief of ASCOM's Construction
fiable pattern, and most were so poorly Section. Aircraft carrier support was to
camouflaged that they were easily de- be withdrawn seven days after the first
tected.65 troops hit the beach; this meant an air-
field would have to be ready within 5
65
Memo for Rcd, 117th Engr Combat Bn, 2 Feb
66
45. SWPA File B78. Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 79.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 599
days; immediately required was a 5,000- Lingayen, Casey and Dean found the
foot runway.67 turf runway badly torn up by the pre-
Special efforts had been made to invasion bombings. Because of delays
prevent the confusion that had arisen at in unloading and congestion on the
Tacloban, where the thousands of tons beaches, work on the strip could not
of supplies dumped on the runway had begin until the second day of the landing.
made rapid rehabilitation of the airstrip At that time 400 Filipino civilians went
impossible. Kenney had prevailed on to work to remove bomb fragments and
MacArthur to call a special conference fill craters with sand from the beach.
shortly before the convoy set sail from Three days later one company of the
Leyte for Lingayen Gulf. Among those 836th Aviation Battalion began work;
present were Kenney, Krueger, Casey, the next day, the remainder of the unit,
and Sturgis. The conferees agreed that two companies of the 1879th Aviation
three fast supply ships loaded with steel Battalion, and a number of men from
mat were to accompany the assault the 43d Construction Battalion arrived
echelon and land as close to Lingayen with a few pieces of heavy equipment.
airstrip as possible on S-day, that one Little earth-moving was required. As
construction battalion scheduled to land soon as troops and civilians had smoothed
on White Beach 2 was to be shifted to the surface of the runway, they covered
Orange Beach near the airstrip, that a it with palm fronds and placed steel mat
group of ASCOM engineers assigned to on top of these. Since the strip was to
the leading assault wave was to go at once be used only temporarily and the sub-
to Lingayen airfield and stake out the grade was sand, no drainage system was
construction area, and, finally, that the installed. Seven days after the landing,
commanding general of XIV Corps was a 5,000-foot steel mat runway, with
to see to it that troops, vehicles, and undispersed parking areas, was in use.
supplies were kept away. These ar- Without the help of the Filipino civil-
rangements were for the most part being ians, the target date could not have
carried out. However, landing condi- been met.
tions, the nature of the soil at the air- On 13 January Filipino civilians,
strip, and the degree of enemy resistance supplied with hand tools, began work on
that might develop were unknown a second runway about two miles south
factors; how rapidly construction would of Blue Beach near the town of Dagupan.
progress was, at least partially, dependent The next day the 828th and 864th Avia-
on them. If soil conditions were not tion Battalions disembarked and, while
satisfactory, four additional days might waiting for their equipment to be un-
be needed to make the strip operational.68 loaded, did some work by hand on the
Making a quick reconnaissance of strip. Two days later, with all their
machinery at the site, the men began
67
Unless otherwise indicated, this account of construction in earnest. It was soon
ASCOM activities in the Luzon Campaign is based evident that a high water table, together
on History of ASCOM, 26 December 1944-13 Febru-
ary 1945. with spongy soil, made the location
68
Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter. undesirable, even for dry-weather opera-
600 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Central Plains and the imminent capture to the brigade were three bridging units
of Manila were sufficient indication that —the 556th Heavy Ponton Battalion,
Base M would not be needed long. For the 506th Light Ponton Company, and
28 days, ASCOM functioned as the con- the 1011th Treadway Bridge Company
struction agency of Sixth Army. On —and five aviation battalions, the latter
13 February it was transferred to units responsible for building both run-
USASOS and redesignated Luzon Base ways and fixed bridges. Lauterbach and
Section. Casey returned to his post of Smith were to ask for army engineer sup-
Chief Engineer, GHQ.70 port if needed; they kept abreast of
general developments through their
Army and Corps Engineers liaison officers in the army engineer
section. In the first days of the M-1
A substantial number of engineers operation, Colonel Walsh sent recon-
were assigned to army and the two corps naissance parties into the corps areas to
—about 8,100 to army and 8,000 to each get intelligence information, locate con-
of the corps. The primary mission of struction brigade units as they landed
army and corps engineer units was to and issue orders to them, and co-ordinate
provide facilities of a more substantial the distribution of floating bridge equip-
nature than those supplied by divisional ment. Since important engineer infor-
combat battalions. Corps units followed mation was frequently not sent in time
closely behind divisional units, improv- over the Sixth Army radio net, Sturgis
ing such construction projects as was had arranged to have the Signal platoon
necessary, thereby enabling divisional of the 4th Special Brigade set up its own
units to move on in direct support of radio net and operate it to secure data
their combat elements. Since corps promptly from corps and divisions—an
engineer staffs were small, the two corps arrangement which was to prove highly
engineers, Col. W. D. Smith of XIV advantageous. In the rapid advance
Corps, and Col. Herbert G. Lauterbach down the Central Plains, most of the
of I Corps, were each given an engineer more complicated jobs, particularly
group headquarters to function as an bridging, begun under corps direction,
operations section staff. To help get the were soon transferred to army. Increas-
troops across rivers, each corps had been ing numbers of Filipino civilians were
given a bridging unit: XIV Corps, the hired to help the troops, particularly in
530th Light Ponton Company, and I the army area, where the most extensive
Corps, the 510th Light Ponton Com- construction was necessary. "Between
pany. As soon as possible, army units the corps rear boundary and the Army
took over from corps units, thus enabling Base boundary is where the big slug of
the latter to keep up with the divisions. work on the communication lines, roads,
In the army area, construction units bridges, and railroads lies," Sturgis wrote
were under Colonel Walsh's 5202d Engi- Brig. Gen. Francis K. Newcomer in late
71
neer Construction Brigade. Assigned January.
70 71
Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 34. (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.
602 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Most bridges required one or more new loads up to thirty-five tons. The avia-
spans. If a concrete structure had been tion engineers often repaired smaller
but slightly damaged, the engineers, as a bridges with timber trestle spans; for the
rule, restored the abutments, realigned larger structures they used Baileys to
the piers, if necessary, and poured new replace the demolished sections. In
slabs, utilizing as much of the reinforcing some instances, they built entirely new
steel as possible. Little concrete was timber trestle bridges. The 1876th
used because of the lack of time and a Engineer Aviation Battalion from 14 to
shortage of cement. More often the 18 January put in a new 274-foot long
engineers replaced missing spans with pile-trestle bridge across a waterway
wooden trestles; a standard design for a between San Fabian and San Fernando,
35-ton timber trestle span had been de- using salvaged timbers and coconut logs
veloped before the M-1 operation began. cut on the spot; the 340th and 118th
Since the Central Plains had practically Combat Battalions furnished the pile
no trees, materials consisted generally of drivers. More often, however, the engi-
timbers salvaged from the wrecked neers repaired, as quickly as possible, the
structures or taken from local stocks. partially wrecked bridges left by the
Most wooden bridges required addi- Japanese. The 841st Aviation Battal-
tional bracing. Bailey bridging was ion, for example, repaired two large
preferred on long narrow spans, where structures on Highway 3, one north, the
the height of the bridge or the condition other, south of Bamban. The battalion
of the stream had made the use of piling restored the bridge across the Cutcut
uneconomical. Bailey bridging was very River north of the town by putting in
effective and made for "great economy two 75-foot trestle approaches and erect-
of time and effort." The troops had no ing a 90-foot Bailey; south of the town,
serious trouble launching such bridging, it spanned the Bamban River with a 410-
even though most of them had had no foot Bailey, making use of the piers,
experience with it except in training. which had been left in place. North of
Since the Japanese frequently destroyed Angeles, the 841st Engineers repaired
a highway bridge, but left a nearby rail- existing concrete spans and constructed
74
road bridge intact, numerous railroad a 350-foot H-20 bridge.
bridges were reconstructed or repaired One of the major jobs was the recon-
with additional decking to permit both struction of the badly damaged bridge
trucks and trains to cross within a short across the Agno near Carmen, the long-
time.73 est in the Philippines, which the 6th
The five aviation battalions assigned Division had bypassed. The 1876th
to the 5202d Construction Brigade were and 1913th Aviation Battalions got the
mainly responsible for building semi- task on 21 January; the 1913th was as-
permanent bridges or repairing demol- signed the northern half, the 1876th, the
ished structures to permit them to take
74
(1) Hist of the 1876th Avn Bn. (2) 5202d Engr
73
Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp. Constr Brigade, M-1 Opn, pp. 54-55. SWPA File
55, 63. B95.
604 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
southern. Plans called for a good deal span with additional bracing; the chief
of work. The four demolished spans bottleneck here was getting the timbers.
were to be replaced with Baileys, and Repairs were completed on schedule on
the pile-bent span was to be reinforced 4 February, and the ponton bridging was
75
to carry thirty tons. Eight of the other immediately sent forward.
spans needed new members welded in Another of the bigger jobs assigned to
and old ones reinforced. One cracked army engineer units was the restoration
pier had to be strengthened; the severely of bridges on the Manila Railroad.
damaged concrete decking had to be re- "Demolitions accomplished by our own
paired. The 1876th and 1913th first air force bombers during the earlier days
salvaged as many parts of the bridge as of the campaign were very effective,
possible and sent out parties to scour the especially in the destruction of railway
countryside for additional material; they truss bridges," the 117th Combat Bat-
found some as far as forty miles away. talion reported. Rehabilitation of the
The four fallen spans posed a consider- main line and the restoration even of
able problem, because, partly in the way, partial traffic would help relieve con-
they prevented the launching of the gestion on the overtaxed highways.
Baileys. Short of oxygen and acetylene ASCOM, assigned this mission initially,
for their blow torches, the engineers used had to limit its efforts, because of high
explosives to remove the wreckage; the priority construction at Base M, to re-
flying debris endangered the pneumatic pairing bridges on feeder lines near
floats of the nearby ponton bridge. Pre- Lingayen Gulf, but it put a railroad
paring to do extensive blasting one night, company to work to restore the tracks
76
the men disconnected the 273-foot long from Lingayen Gulf to Manila.
floating bridge from its abutments and Aviation engineer units assigned to
let the current carry it 600 feet down- the 5202d restored most of the bridges
stream; the next morning, they returned on the main line of the Manila Railroad.
it to its original position. In the mean- The retreating Japanese had left many
time the obstructing wreckage had been of the short spans intact but had partly
blasted away. To fill the two gaps left demolished the larger structures. A
by the wrecked spans, the men launched bridge that required a substantial effort
two Baileys, each 330 feet long and sup- was the one across the Agno at Bayam-
ported on a center pier. Repair of the bang, which the 117th Combat Battalion
damaged truss members was a complex had quickly repaired on 14 January to
undertaking; 74 of the truss members, take fifteen tons. The 841st Aviation
including 20 stringers, had to be re- Battalion began work on this structure
placed, and 32 needed major repairs.
The 1913th engineers reinforced the 75
(1) Col. John H. Dudley, "Bridge Repairs on
cracked pier by wrapping a ¾-inch cable Luzon," The Military Engineer, XL (October, 1948),
around it. Much work was required on pp. 456-58. (2) Hist of the 1876th Avn Bn. (3)
the decking. The men cleaned out the 931st Engr Constr Group (Avn), Rpt, Use of Sixth
holes and filled them with new concrete. Army(1)Engr
76
Trs on M-1 Opn. SWPA File B88.
Hist of the 117th Combat Bn. (2) Engr
The 1876th reinforced the timber trestle Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 80.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 605
seven days later. A pier, consisting of south, the bridge at Bamban required
two concrete columns, had been severely considerable effort. The Japanese had
damaged. One of the columns was destroyed three spans at one end of the
cracked below the water line; the other structure but had left the piers and the
badly sheared. The aviation engineers abutment intact. The 841st replaced
constructed coffer dams of sandbags one of the spans with a Bailey and the
around the damaged columns and other two with a timber trestle structure,
poured in reinforced concrete. They 144 feet long. The hardest task was
strengthened damaged girders by weld- driving the piles into the rocky stream
ing steel plates to them. Trains began bed. The work on the railroad bridges
crossing the bridge on 30 January. A and tracks produced results. By 29
second large structure needing repair was January the railroad was open from
some thirty-five miles to the south over Lingayen Gulf to Tarlac. "The most
the Cutcut River near the town of Capas. the railroad has gotten behind is about
Here Company A of the 1879th Aviation thirty miles where we had a bad bridge
Battalion on 29 January began the job job over the Agno River which required
of replacing three 60-foot wrecked spans repairs to the piers and foundations,"
with timber trestles. Company B took Sturgis wrote to Newcomer on 28 Janu-
over on 5 February and finished the ary, ". . . tomorrow this work will be
work a week later. Five miles to the completed and we will be up within five
606 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
miles of the front lines with railroad the Central Plains. Sixth Army engi-
77
trains." neers had two depot companies, two-
Engineer units assigned to the 5202d thirds of a parts supply company, and
Brigade and the two corps had numerous some special service detachments to take
miscellaneous, but time-consuming, con- care of supply. Approximately 400
struction jobs. A good deal of work was Filipino civilians were hired to help with
necessary on airstrips. Army engineers the work. Army dumps were in opera-
further developed four runways which tion by S plus 4; soon thereafter depots
had been started by divisional engineers; began functioning in the Base M area.
intended for dry weather use only, they Each depot, covering an area of around
required no drainage or crowned sur- 600 acres, received, stored, and issued
faces. Probably the major airfield reha- about 1,500 tons of supplies daily. Each
bilitation job was the restoration of the advance army depot required some 75
concrete runway at Clark Field. This acres. The average distance from army
runway was patched up and made suit- supply points to regiments and smaller
able for fighters and transports in short units was about fifty-six miles. As a
order. Temporary facilities were devel- rule, trucks and trailers hauled supplies
oped nearby, including a 7,000-foot run- forward, but the Manila Railroad was
way with a soil-stabilized subgrade and used to some extent. Sections or pla-
asphalt surface. One aviation battalion toons of depot companies moved forward
completed this job in ten days. As far by truck. Stocks in depot areas were
as possible, construction in the army area dispersed but not camouflaged. While
was held to a minimum. Extensive organization was much improved and
road repair was not necessary, and tents stocks were more adequate, deficiencies
and existing buildings were widely used, in training were still pronounced, being
so that little new construction was especially noticeable with respect to
necessary. Civilian workmen were em- handling large quantities of supplies,
ployed in increasing numbers.78 loading heavy materials, and planning
space requirements. For the tasks as-
Supply for Combat signed, the number of parts supply
platoons was inadequate.79
One of the important responsibilities
of army and corps engineers on Luzon Maps for Combat
was getting supplies to the engineer
units. In contrast to most previous Providing enough satisfactory maps
supply operations, this responsibility was for combat on Luzon was even more
fairly well handled in the drive down difficult than providing them for opera-
tions in New Guinea, a situation partly
77
(1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p.
explained by the comparatively extensive
80. (2) Hist of the 187th Avn Bn. (3) Ltr, Sturgis overland advance which was now neces-
to Newcomer, 28 Jan 45. Sturgis Files.
78
(1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.
79
79-80. (2) Check Sheet, Sverdup to CofS et al. Pacific Warfare Board Rpt, No. 33, 13 Aug 45.
GHQ SWPA, 20 Jan 45. SWPA File M203. SWPA File E123.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 607
sary. The number of map-making units the initial landing; the same was true for
was not increased for operations in the the assault landing at Lingayen Gulf.81
Philippines but remained what it had To help provide maps for the drive
been in mid-1944. The 648th, the one down the Central Plains, the Army Map
base topographic battalion in the South- Service (AMS) in Washington sent re-
west Pacific, continued to produce maps production material based on prewar
at its plant in Melbourne. It was surveys. Theater mapping units, since
scheduled to move to Luzon in April. they had so few aerial photographs,
Sixth Army had an army-type topo- could do little in the way of producing
graphic battalion—the 650th—for the more up-to-date maps. Almost all maps
hasty production of maps. It had, in which Sixth Army used in its drive to
addition, a survey liaison, a map depot, Manila were supplied in one form or
and a model-making detachment. Each another by Army Map Service. Map-
corps had its topographic company for ping units in the theater were engaged
hasty photomapping and map produc- chiefly in preparing maps from material
tion in the field. Both army and corps furnished by AMS or in reprinting
units had enough stocks of equipment existing sheets. Many of the maps fur-
to permit them to produce maps from nished to combat units were more or less
negatives supplied by the base map inaccurate because of changes in vegeta-
plant.80 tion, in the areas under cultivation, and
From a theoretical standpoint, the in the courses of streams. Still, the
mapping organization in the Southwest maps the Engineers provided proved to
Pacific was adequate, but the war was be adequate for the first thirty days of
being fought in an unusual manner. the Luzon Campaign.
Even though working under great pres- By early February the fighting was
sure, map-making units in the theater taking some of the forward elements out
fell considerably short of meeting their of the Central Plains and into mountain-
requirements. As in the New Guinea ous areas, many of which, particularly on
Campaign, one of the major difficulties northern Luzon, had not been mapped.
was the short time available for making "Much of the heaviest fighting is now in
maps before the date set for an attack. blank areas on the AMS 1:50,000 series,
It was still the case that aerial photo- and the trend of operations is toward
graphs could not be obtained in time. other unmapped or incompletely mapped
As a rule, a mapping unit, after receiving areas . . . ," Lt. Col. H. E. Thomas of
aerial photographs, needed from four to Casey's Intelligence Section wrote on 7
six months to produce accurate maps in February to Col. Ernest A. Dunbar,
sufficient quantities for target areas as chief of the section. Mapping units of
large as those in the Philippines. For Sixth Army worked assiduously to make
the Leyte operation, aerial photography hasty overprints of the blank areas to
was not received until thirty days before show topography, streams, roads, and
trails in red, but this was admittedly only
80
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,
81
199. Ibid., p. 198.
608 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
a stopgap procedure which did not result insufficient time was allowed for com-
in good maps. Sixth Army was faced pilation of adequate maps from aerial
with the prospect of stopgap maps all the photography, there have been obvious
way to the northern shores of Luzon. tactical advantages in early attack, which
"To say that we have been disturbed, have outweighed the unsatisfactory
83
perturbed and alarmed over the Luzon mapping situation."
mapping picture would be a most modest
statement," Dunbar wrote on 11 Febru- Landings at Subic Bay
ary to Maj. Harold F. Drury, commander and Nasugbu
of the 1679th Engineer Survey Liaison
Detachment. By this time mapping To support Krueger's Sixth Army
units in the theater, working under great drive down the Central Plains, Mac-
pressure to compile maps from aerial Arthur directed Eichelberger's Eighth
photographs to support imminent opera- Army to make two landings on western
tions in the Visayas and Mindanao, could Luzon, one at Subic Bay, northwest of
devote little time to the preparation of Bataan Peninsula, and the other near
adequate maps of the more remote parts the town of Nasugbu, about forty miles
of Luzon. At the same time there were southwest of Manila. The purpose of
too few depot detachments to distribute the landing at Subic Bay was twofold: to
the great quantities of maps the troops cut off the Japanese troops already on
82
needed. Bataan Peninsula and to prevent those
In the Philippines campaign, mapping on central Luzon from retreating to that
units were asked to accomplish missions area. The landing at Nasugbu was to
they could not fulfill. By late 1944 the be diversionary; it would draw off enemy
inadequate number of maps and the troops from the defense of the northern
poor quality of some, together with in- approaches of Manila and at the same
stances of unsatisfactory distribution, time pose a threat from the south for the
prompted Brig. Gen. George H. Decker, Japanese troops in the city. Both op-
General Krueger's chief of staff, to write erations, to be planned and initiated by
to General MacArthur about the state Eighth Army, were to pass to Sixth Army 84
of affairs. MacArthur did not regard the control soon after they got under way.
situation as critical. General Suther- Units of XI Corps—the 38th Infantry
land in a letter to Krueger explained, Division and the 34th RCT of the 24th
"The Philippines campaign, and the Division, together with supporting
New Guinea campaign before it, were troops—made the landing at Subic Bay.
planned with a full realization of the The 592d EBSR provided amphibian
inadequacy and unreliability of existing support. On 29 January, at 0800, the
maps of the operational areas." He
went on to say, "In each operation where 83
(1) Ltr, Decker to MacArthur, 24 Dec 44.
SWPA Files. (2) 1st Ind on above, Sutherland to
82
(1) Memo for Rcd, Thomas, 18 Feb 45. SWPA Krueger, 18 Jan 45.
84
File I15. (2) Ltr, Thomas to Dunbar, 7 Feb 45. (1) CG Eighth Army, Rpt on the Nasugbu and
SWPA File I16. (3) Ltr, Dunbar to Drury, 11 Feb Bataan Opns, p. 1. SWPA Files. (2) Smith, Tri-
45. SWPA File I15. umph in the Philippines, pp. 222, 313.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 609
first troops hit the beach. There was no strengthened or replaced. Highway 7,
opposition. The only obstacle was a the main supply route, required a great
sandbar, which the boatmen negotiated deal of maintenance. Eventually, in the
by ramming their craft into it at full first days of February, the enemy posi-
speed and sliding over it. The beaches, tions at ZigZag Pass were bypassed, and
about 100 feet wide, were poor, and most the troops of XI Corps headed for
wheeled vehicles had to be pulled across Dinalupihan, six miles to the east and
because of the loose sand and steep near Manila Bay.
banks. After the vehicles got beyond The landing at Nasugbu was the mis-
the beaches, they had no trouble reach- sion of the 11th Airborne Division, rein-
ing Highway 7, at this point only a few forced by a small number of service
hundred feet from the coast. The next troops. Organic to the 11th was the
day, when control of the operation 127th Engineer Airborne Battalion.
passed to Sixth Army, the troops were Though airborne troops participated in
already well on their way to ZigZag Pass the assault, the landing actually was an
to the east, where it was believed the amphibious one. On the morning of 31
major enemy defensive installations January the assault troops came ashore
would be encountered. This view was unopposed on the beach at Nasugbu.
correct. In the formidable terrain of Though the men found no mines or
the pass area, the Japanese had for obstacles, the landing was difficult be-
months been preparing their positions, cause the beaches were so poor. Ini-
which proved to be expertly sited, care- tially grounded on a sandbar in from 5
fully concealed, and well supplied.85 to 12 feet of water, the LST's, by repeat-
To drive the enemy from these posi- edly retracting and ramming the beach,
tions would take prolonged, bitter finally managed to get to within 50 feet
fighting. Japanese resistance was excep- of shore, where sand ramps were dozed
tionally stubborn. The 113th Engineer out to them. Since no amphibious
Combat Battalion had to reduce an engineers were assigned to this operation
unusually large number of defensive until five days later, the division engi-
positions, including hundreds of caves, neers had the mission of unloading
scores of pillboxes, and innumerable supplies. The 127th Battalion, less one
wooden box and magnetic mines and company, did this work, providing
bombs used as mines. The combat en- dumps and exit roads as planned.
gineers were so overburdened with the As the troops advanced toward Manila,
reduction of fortifications that a con- they encountered an increasing number
struction battalion and a dump truck of mines, obstacles, and pillboxes. One
company had to be placed on combat stretch of road had five heavy barricades
missions. All bridges except a few of made of steel roof trusses and wooden
the concrete culvert type had to be posts about ten feet high; each barricade
extended across the road and about 100
85
This account of the operations at Subic Bay and yards beyond on either side to join up
Nasugbu is based on the Report, Engineer Sixth
Army, Luzon Campaign, pages 86-101, unless other-
with buildings. The five obstacles were
wise indicated. entangled and interlaced with discarded
610 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
equipment and barbed wire, and adjacent committed to action—the 1st Cavalry
areas were mined. The engineers re- Division, a veteran element of Sixth
duced the obstacles under fire by winch- Army, "its leaders indoctrinated with
ing the discarded equipment to the side the concept of sweeping maneuver and
of the road and using explosives to cut aggressive attack." Debarking at Lin-
off the steel and wooden posts even with gayen Gulf on 26-27 January, the divi-
the ground. The closer the troops came sion had moved to Guimba, where
to Manila, the greater the number of Krueger held it in reserve, planning to
mines. Most were either buried aerial commit it when the time came to make
bombs or antiboat mines with acid vial a quick thrust into Manila. That time
electric detonators. As was almost in- arrived when the 37th Division was
variably the case with Japanese mine crossing the Pampanga at Calumpit.
fields, camouflage was poor. In fact, the The 1st Cavalry Division, farthest to the
enemy had made no real effort to conceal left in the XIV Corps area, was directed
the mines. Removing them was easy, to make a rapid advance down Highway
but patrolling the fields was an arduous 5. Meantime, the I Corps divisions were
task, because Japanese infiltrators tried advancing toward the southeast in an ef-
to place additional mines. Even though fort to capture San Jose and secure the line
the Japanese had demolished most of the Cabanatuan-Bongabon-Rizal. On the
large bridges, no serious road or bridging right flank of the XIV Corps area, the
problems occurred. No portable bridg- 40th Division was attacking enemy posi-
ing was required. If a bridge was out, tions in the Zambales Mountains west
a ford could usually be found; it was of Fort Stotsenburg. On 2 February
more often the case that the ineptly patrols of the 1st Cavalry and 37th
wrecked structures could be quickly re- Divisions met at Plaridel. Beyond this
paired and traffic routed across. The point, the 37th Division, driving ahead
127th airborne engineers quickly pre- along Highway 3, was slowed by the
pared two cub strips by marking off many demolished bridges, but the 1st
sections of highway and removing nearby Cavalry Division continued south rapidly
telephone and electric wires. The oper- on the east flank.87
ation continued under Eighth Army In this final dash to Manila, the
control until 10 February.86 tasks of the 117th Combat Battalion of
the 37th Division were particularly
Approaching Manila heavy. The rapid advance brought the
capture intact of several bridges south
The rapid advance down the Central of Bamban, but it was more often the
Plains continued. By 31 January the case that the bridges were, at least in
37th Division had occupied Calumpit, part, destroyed. As the 37th Division
and its patrols were well beyond that neared Calumpit, it was stopped by an
town. An additional unit had been
87
(1) Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter.
86
Hist of the 127th Airborne Engr Bn. SWPA (2) Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, pp.
File B33. 239-44.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 611
unexpected waterway not shown on any Skerry's engineers had blown up early on
maps. Intelligence information avail- New Year's Day in 1942. They had not
able showed a drainage ditch at this been repaired. To get the first troops
point with pools of stagnant water, and supplies across the river, men of the
spanned by a double-tracked railroad 1279th Combat Battalion in the after-
bridge. According to the maps, High- noon of 1 February constructed an M-3
way 3 crossed to the east of the railroad raft of 18-ton capacity and built a dock
bridge. The new uncharted waterway on the far shore, 75 feet out into the
was spanned by a bridge carrying both a shallow water. Later that afternoon
highway and a single-track railway line. they constructed four infantry support
Apparently, the Japanese during the rafts and built two docks on the near
occupation had diverted water into the shore and two more on the far shore.
drainage ditch and rerouted Highway 3 The five rafts, while efficient, could take
across the previously double-tracked rail- only lightly equipped troops. Heavy
road bridge. Two of the spans had traffic was stalled. XIV Corps staff
been wrecked. Something would have engineers rounded up as many cargo
to be done to get the troops across the trucks as possible to haul the treadway
Sulipan Canal—the name soon given to bridge spanning the Agno at Bayambang
this new obstacle. Company B of the to the Pampanga, a distance of about
556th Heavy Ponton Battalion was as- ninety miles. The first trucks inched
signed the job. The heavy ponton their way across the ponton bridge over
bridging which spanned the Bued River the Sulipan Canal while the bridge was
near Lingayen Gulf was sent for and still under construction. Company A of
arrived at the Sulipan Canal at 0100 on the 556th meanwhile began work on the
2 February. The next morning at treadway from the far shore of the
1030, a ponton bridge, 240 feet long, was Pampanga. After all the dismantled
open to 16-ton traffic. Two days later material had arrived, a check showed it
the 1879th Aviation Battalion arrived to was too short by 24 feet to span the
begin work on a semipermanent bridge. river, even though estimates had indi-
Plans called for repairing the slightly cated there was enough. On 3 Febru-
damaged span and replacing the 160-foot ary four men of the 530th Light Ponton
center with Bailey bridging for the high- Company set to work to fill in the 24-foot
way half of the bridge and for the build- gap with M-3 light ponton equipage.
ing of a timber trestle structure for the The men connected the two bridges by
railroad half.88 submerging the riverward end of the
A few miles to the southeast, Highway light ponton bridge and placing the ex-
3 crossed the Pampanga at Calumpit. tended treadways from the other bridge
Here were the two bridges Colonel onto the decking. They placed infantry
assault bridge treadways on the ponton
88
(1) Ltr, Robert R. Smith, OCMH, to Col Skerry, bridge, connecting them with the ex-
22 May 53. Copy in EHD Files. (2) Ltr, Skerry to tended treadways to provide a level
Smith, 19 Jun 53. Copy in EHD Files. (3) Hist of
556th Heavy Ponton Bn. (4) Hist of the 1879th
roadway. They lashed balk, treadways,
Avn Bn. and rings of the floats together.
612 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Brig. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Krueger's the city. The Japanese, preparing to
G-3, to have the unit continue in direct make a last-ditch stand in Manila, were
support of the 1st Cavalry Division. expected to turn much of the metropolis
On 1 February, the 1st Cavalry Divi- into rubble. Buildings, streets, bridges,
sion crossed the Pampanga on the re- utilities, and port facilities would be a
paired wooden trestle bridge on Highway shambles. Sturgis and his staff began to
5 two miles north of Cabanatuan. Be- make plans and preparations to deal
yond the Pampanga, the Japanese with the many problems bound to arise.
offered only light and scattered opposi- A special engineer task group, called the
tion. The troops crossed many streams construction command, was to be organ-
at fords and captured a number of ized. Sturgis conferred with Colonel
bridges before the Japanese could de- Walsh, who proposed that his executive
stroy them. The one major obstacle was officer, Colonel Liles, be put in charge.
the Angat River at Baliuag. Company The construction command could op-
A of the 556th Heavy Ponton Battalion erate as the advance echelon of the
was directed to bridge the river with 5202d. Sturgis asked Colonel Dean of
a treadway. The ponton engineers ASCOM to select first-class units from
reached the site at 0200 on 2 February his organization which might be avail-
and, aided by the 8th engineers, finished able. Manzano made his way back to
the job at 0930. "The entire division is Manila and worked with the American
waiting to cross," the company com- intelligence services to help key em-
mander reported, adding that the men ployees of the municipal facilities escape
of Company A had not had any sleep in from the capital and go to Sixth Army
forty-eight hours. The advance of the headquarters at Calasiao.92
1st Cavalry Division from Cabanatuan On 1 February Colonel Liles was
to Manila was merely a matter of days.91 ordered to Calasiao to take charge of the
Preparations were already under way new command. His staff consisted of 11
for the rehabilitation of Manila, a task officers, 8 enlisted men, and 2 Filipino
for which Sixth Army engineers were civilians. Eight engineer units were as-
mainly responsible. About a month be- signed to him, among them the 43d Con-
fore the landing at Lingayen Gulf, struction Battalion, the 1876th Aviation
Colonel Manzano, a survivor of Bataan, Battalion, the 1504th Water Supply
and engaged in intelligence activities Company, the 963d Maintenance Com-
during the occupation, had been con- pany, and elements of the 556th Heavy
tacted in the Philippine capital and as- Ponton Battalion. Plans were made to
signed to the personnel section of deal with a wide range of jobs which
ASCOM. Late in January he arrived at might have to be done, including the
Sixth Army headquarters at Calasiao, installation of floating bridges, clearing
near the gulf, to report on conditions in and opening the city's main streets, re-
91 92
(1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. (1) 1st Ind, Krueger to MacArthur, 2 May 45, on
101. (2) Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter. Ltr, Liles to Sturgis, 20 Apr 45. Sturgis File 28. (2)
(3) Hist of the 556th Heavy Ponton Bn. Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter.
614 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
habilitating and operating the water and American forces approached, the demoli-
electrical systems, furnishing power to tions were set off. By 6 February the 1st
refugee centers and hospitals, fighting Cavalry and 37th Divisions had gained
fires, preparing emergency airstrips, de- possession of northern Manila up to the
molishing unsafe structures, and remov- river. "[No] . . . sooner had the leading
ing mines. Special efforts were to be elements of the 37th Division reached
made to save the key installations in the the Pasig River," Sturgis wrote, "than
city's water supply system, especially the entire town in the general region of
Novaliches and San Juan Reservoirs to the Escolta broke into flames and Jap
the northeast of the capital, Balara snipers and saboteurs opened up almost
Filters to the east, and the aqueducts and everywhere in North Manila out to
pipes carrying water into the city.93 Grace Park." 95 The fires were brought
under control before extensive damage
The Capture of Manila and the had been done. Meanwhile, the nth
Islands of Manila Bay Airborne Division had entered the
capital from the south. It met heavy
North of the Pasig opposition in the Nichols Field area, but
nevertheless pushed slowly forward.
The foremost elements of the 1st Enemy defenses north of the Pasig
Cavalry Division reached Grace Park in were not strong. Mines and obstacles
northern Manila on the evening of 3 were rare. Hastily prepared, they were,
February. The Japanese plan of de- in general, not effective. An elaborate
fense was almost immediately apparent. mine field was found in Laloma ceme-
While offering only light resistance in tery. Along the roads and in between
the northern part of the city, the Japa- the graves, the Japanese had placed about
nese would withdraw across the Pasig, 120 depth charges, twenty to thirty feet
destroy all the bridges, and make a apart; they had also mined a road near
strong and, if necessary, suicidal stand the cemetery in the same way. Re-
south of the river in the modern rein- sembling an ashcan, each of the impro-
forced government buildings and in the vised mines, with about 250 pounds of
old walled section of the city, known as explosives, had a fuze in a tube in the
Intramuros. Operations of the Japa- center and an improvised pressure plate
nese north of the river were therefore of wood directly in contact with the
only a delaying action, the purpose of firing pin mechanism. The weight of a
which was to enable most of the troops to man would be sufficient to set the charge
get across the Pasig. Demolition charges off. Some of the mines were camou-
had been placed several weeks before on flaged with sod, burlap, or earth. To
all bridges and in some important public cover the mine field, the Japanese had
and commercial buildings.94 As the erected pillboxes armed with 25-mm.
93
(1) 1st Ind, Krueger to MacArthur, 2 May 45,
on Ltr, Liles to Sturgis, 20 Apr 45. (2) Ltr, Liles XIII, for a discussion of the Japanese plans to de-
to Sturgis, 20 Apr 45. fend the city.
94 95
See Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, Chapter Ltr, Sturgis to Tyler, 4 Mar 45.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 615
naval guns and had emplaced larger guns nearby Quezon City the 8th completed a
in various strategic positions. The pill- strip in one and one half days. Though
boxes, expertly blended with their sur- short and rough, the runway could take
roundings, were hard to detect. Some transport planes.97
of them, resembling mounds of earth,
were even sodded and had flowers grow- Crossing the Pasig
ing on them and a few were mounted
with crosses. There were many trenches On 7 February at 1000, the 117th
within the cemetery; dugouts and mauso-Combat Battalion was ordered to recon-
noiter the Pasig for sites for an assault
leums were filled with quantities of am-
munition. Expertly constructed, these crossing. Reconnaissance parties made
various strongpoints were of no value numerous attempts to find likely places,
because they were not manned. De- and despite the rather intense enemy fire,
activating the mines was no problem. found several. At noon Company C re-
The engineers disarmed them by remov- ceived instructions to support the 148th
ing the wooden pressure plates, taking Infantry of the 37th Division in a cross-
out the striker through the well opening, ing scheduled for 1400 near Malacanan
and then lifting out the firing mech- Palace. To get enough equipment on
anism and detonator. The 11th Air- such short notice was not easy. Never-
borne Division, entering Manila from theless, by the prescribed time the
the south, had similar experiences. In 117th had rounded up thirty assault
the Nichols Field-Fort McKinley area, boats and had them ready for launching.
in particular, mines were numerous, During the next hour the artillery tried
though most of them were placed in no to silence enemy guns on the south bank.
pattern. Only one regular mine field At 1500, men of Company C ferried the
was encountered, about 300 by 1,000 first infantrymen across. In five trips
yards in area, but the mines were easily under strong enemy fire, the thirty boats
deactivated.96 carried the assault troops over. As soon
The combat engineers were con- as the first men reached the opposite
cerned not only with demolitions, but shore, the engineers built two infantry
also with construction and rehabilitation support rafts powered by outboard
of airstrips. The first engineers to enter motors. The rafts would be in con-
the Manila metropolitan area went to tinuous use until a floating bridge could
work to rehabilitate existing strips and be put across the river. On mid-
ready new ones as quickly as possible. morning of 8 February M-3 ponton ma-
As soon as the 1st Cavalry Division had terial arrived; sixty men from the 530th
taken Grace Park airstrip, elements of Light Ponton Company and fifty from
the 8th Engineer Squadron began work the 117th engineers were to put a bridge
on it to make it usable for C-47's. In across the river but were unable to do so
because of the enemy's intense mortar
96
Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp. and machine gun fire. Construction was
118, 124. (2) Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 18,
p. 33. SWPA Files. (3) CG Eighth Army, Rpt on
97
the Nasugbu and Bataan Opns, pp. 22ff. Hist of the 8th Engr Squadron.
616 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
again started late that day and work the footbridge began. The engineers
continued under cover of darkness. placed anchor cables and had the bridge
The bridge was completed at 0100 on partly assembled when Japanese troops
the 9th.98 suddenly opened up with heavy fire, in
By this time the first elements of the the course of which a number of men
1st Cavalry Division were ready to cross were wounded and some of the equip-
the river. On 9 February the 530th ment was destroyed. Further work on
engineers were ordered to construct a the bridge was impossible, and the
footbridge near the Philippine Racing cavalrymen made no more attempts to
Club to enable the assault troops of the cross the river that day. The next mor-
division to get to the south bank. The ning they again crossed over in assault
materials arrived at the site at 1500. boats. Because of the continued heavy
The first cavalrymen crossed the river in concentration of enemy fire, the engi-
assault boats on the morning of the 10th. neers made no further attempt to bridge
Immediately thereafter construction of the Pasig at this point."
98
(1) Hist of the 117th Engr Combat Bn. (2) 99
Hist of the 530th Light Ponton Co. (3) Engr Sixth (1) Ibid. (2) Hist of the 530th Light Ponton
Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 118. Co.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 617
100 101
Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 21, pp. 13, 19. (1) Hist of the 117th Engr Combat Bn. (2)
SWPA Files. Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 21, pp. 13, 19.
618 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
the 43d Construction Battalion, 963d Juan Reservoir nearby, with a capacity
Maintenance Company, 1504th Water of 50 million gallons, and being used as
Supply Company, and one platoon of a fish pond, was intact. Tests indicated
the 439th Depot Company, had moved the water was satisfactory, and although
into the northern part of the city and set filters would have to be installed, this
up temporary headquarters near Grace source could be used and the new San
Park. Reporting to General Griswold, Juan Reservoir bypassed for the time
commander of XIV Corps, Liles pre- being. The water lines from the reser-
sented his plans for rehabilitation; they voirs to Manila were found unimpaired.
were approved at once and the engineer Japanese infiltrators had not given up
troops of the construction command be- trying to damage the installations.
gan work. Early in the morning of 11 February an
One of their biggest jobs was rehabili- enemy group destroyed a small section
tating Manila's water supply system. A of the aqueduct running from Nova-
major effort had been made to capture liches Dam to Balara Filters. Subse-
intact the most important installations, quently, two breaks were found in
all of them located to the northeast of the mains feeding the city from San
the city. Ipo and Montalban Dams and Juan Reservoir. Repairs were begun
Reservoirs, farthest from the capital, and promptly. Casey informed MacArthur
in mountainous areas occupied by the on 18 February that the repair of the
enemy, were not taken in the first dash lines from the old San Juan Reservoir to
to Manila, but a third reservoir, Nova- the city would be completed that day,
liches, holding twelve billion gallons, releasing the 20 million gallons remain-
some ten miles southwest of Ipo, while ing in the reservoir.102
heavily mined, was captured intact. Since so many water mains within the
The 13-mile aqueduct from Ipo to city had been damaged, distributing
Novaliches was running full, which water was no easy task. A number of
probably meant that Ipo was also un- water supply points were set up. By the
damaged. The water gauge on Nova- evening of 11 February, the 1504th
liches showed 5 billion gallons, enough Water Supply Company had 3 in opera-
to take care of Manila through the dry tion, each providing some 30 gallons a
season. Water from these three reser- minute, and plans called for setting up
voirs flowed through aqueducts to Balara three more immediately. Navy ponton
Filters, which the 1st Cavalry Division cubes, mounted on 2½-ton trucks, were
took just 30 minutes before the enemy used to carry water to storage tanks in
could set off the demolition charges. various parts of the city. By 18 Febru-
The filters were dirty but undamaged.
From the filters, water flowed into the 102
(1) Memo for Rcd, Chaffin, 11 Feb 45. SWPA
new San Juan Reservoir, which had a File M175. (2) Memo for Rcd, Chaffin, 12 Feb 45.
capacity of 56 million gallons. Here an SWPA File M175. (3) Check Sheet, Casey for Mac-
intake and an outlet valve had been Arthur, 14 Feb 45. SWPA File M203. (4) Of C
Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 362. (5)
blown; estimates were that repair would Check Sheet, Casey to CofS SWPA et al., 18 Feb 45.
require about a week. The old San SWPA File M179.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 619
ary Manila had 31 water points. Be- the Pasig was secured near the Jones
tween 400 and 500 employees of the Bridge, two 200-foot Baileys, capable of
Municipal Water Department were re- taking 35-ton loads, were put across the
hired. Manila south of the Pasig posed river at this point. Liles's units in addi-
a most difficult problem, since all mains tion opened up innumerable roads,
crossing the river had been wrecked. cleared some of the dock areas, re-estab-
Fortunately, that part of the city had lished the city fire department, and
some twenty artesian wells. A job of helped clear mines and booby traps.
first priority was to restore the water Because of the work of the Construction
mains across the Pasig. The old siphon Command, ". . . General Griswold had
under the river was being repaired, and little to worry in this respect and could
some 20,000 feet of 4-inch invasion devote his energies to the rugged tactical
weight pipe was on order for the repair situation." 104 The work of the task
of the water mains across the river.103 force was well in hand by 4 March, when
Colonel Liles and his men had many the fighting for the city was virtually
other important jobs. The Japanese, over.
in contrast with their ineffectiveness in
destroying the water supply system, had Corregidor
almost completely demolished the elec-
trical utilities which supplied light and The capture of the capital city and its
power to the capital and its suburbs. port would mean little unless the islands
They had in the words of one report, at the entrance to Manila Bay were under
concentrated on the most "critical units American control. Consequently, soon
in the best possible manner." The task after the attack on Manila began, the
group set to work to provide temporary islands came under assault. First to be
sources of power. They rehabilitated attacked was Corregidor. Highly devel-
the generating units of a brewery to oped as a fortress before the war,
make available some 140 kilowatts and Corregidor would undoubtedly be
rehabilitated a manufacturing company's strongly defended by its Japanese occu-
generating plants to produce an addi- pants. Its capture was assigned to XI
tional 900 kilowatts. Liles's men re- Corps, already responsible for operations
habilitated those parts of the electrical at Subic Bay and on Bataan Peninsula.
distribution system which were needed Troops of the corps were to make an
to distribute the power generated by the amphibious landing at Mariveles, at the
temporary power plants. Under fire at tip of Bataan Peninsula, and, with that
times, the 556th Heavy Ponton Battalion point as a base, were to make both an
constructed two treadway bridges over amphibious and a parachute landing on
the Pasig, a third over the Mariquina, Corregidor. The parachute landing was
and a fourth over an estero in south to be made by a company of the 503d
Manila. As soon as the section south of
104
(1) Memo, Sturgis for Sutherland, 23 Apr 45.
Sturgis File 28. (2) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engr
103
(1) Memo for Rcd, Chaffin, 12 Feb. 45. (2) Tech Info Bull No. 15, 20 Jun 45, pp. 14-16. SWPA
Check Sheet, Casey to CofS SWPA et al., 18 Feb 45. Files.
620 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
was so rocky and littered with debris negligible; in two days the island was
that, as a rule, the only weapons that overrun. During the next week the
could be used were those the individual attackers, using flame throwers and ex-
soldier could carry. The reduction of plosives, tried in vain to dislodge the
caves was a time-consuming process, de- Japanese holed up in the underground
spite the fact that caves and tunnels, forts. Most of the enemy appeared to
seldom mutually supporting, could be be in what was known as the "mortar pit
reduced one at a time, and enemy area," a fortification with a number of
weapons had only limited fields of fire, guns and several bombproof chambers.
in most cases but a few feet wide. An The rocky terrain forbade using tanks,
effective way to reduce a cave was to fire and aerial bombing was out of the ques-
rockets or grenades into it, which either tion because of the danger to the troops.
forced the Japanese to come out or re- A new plan was tried. The 113th engi-
treat to the rear. The demolition neers fastened two Navy ponton cubes
parties would then place the charges at to an LCM and, attaching a pump with
the entrance. Flame throwers could a hose, filled the cubes with diesel oil
seldom be used to advantage. If the and gasoline. The amphibian engineers
terrain was such that a tank could took the LCM to Caballo where, despite
maneuver in front of the cave, it would mortar fire, they brought it to shore not
fire point-blank into the opening, while a far from the mortar pit area. The com-
bulldozer gathered a large load of earth bat engineers laid about 600 feet of
with its blade. As soon as the tank 4-inch invasion-weight pipe from the
stopped firing, the dozer pushed the LCM up the cliff and into an opening of
earth into the mouth of the cave. This the pit. They pumped in some 2,500
procedure was repeated until the mouth gallons of gasoline and fuel oil and set
of the cave was closed.107 the mixture on fire. The flames con-
tinued for two hours; from time to time,
Caballo small explosions were heard. The next
day, as the American troops approached,
Two miles south of Corregidor, on they came under fire from the pit. Ap-
small, rocky Caballo Island, was Fort parently the Japanese had left the pit
Hughes, occupied by an estimated 350 before the gasoline was ignited and had
Japanese. On 27 March elements of returned after the fires burned out.
the 38th Division, with a platoon of The combat engineers laid the pipe to
Company B of the 113th Combat Bat- another opening in what was known as
talion, made an amphibious landing on the west pit. Before gasoline could be
Caballo, supported by Naval gunfire and pumped in, enemy small arms fire broke
land-based artillery. Resistance was the pipe. It was repaired and gasoline
and fuel oil were then pumped in and
107
(1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. ignited; fires and explosions lasted for
146. (2) Engr, XI Corps, Rpt, Fortifications, Mines, three hours. The next day the Japanese
Booby Traps, and Demolitions on Corregidor. (3)
Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 21, pp. 21-22. continued to fire from this pit also.
SWPA Files. The engineers thereupon lowered a 500-
622 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
FORT DRUM, JUST BEFORE THE EXPLOSION. At left, engineers are pulling away from
the fort.
line. The same LCM would be used; The assault was made on 13 April.
in addition, an LSM, equipped with a As the LSM moved up alongside the fort,
drawbridge, would be needed; it was to the drawbridge was swung into place;
proceed to Fort Drum and swing its infantry and engineers crossed over.
drawbridge to the top of the fort to Occasional small arms fire from the Japa-
permit the men to cross over. Once on nese inside the fort was of no moment.
top of the fort, the men were to pack the The demolition party placed 600 pounds
TNT and insert the pipe into the turrets of TNT in the after starboard stairwell,
or other openings in order to pump gaso- tamped it with sandbags, and attached a
line into the interior. The Navy fur- fuze of primacord. The oil and flame
nished an LSM for which the engineers party considered the after port stairwell
devised a drawbridge. Thirteen men of as best for their purpose. The men
the 113th Combat Battalion made up an signaled the LCM to come up alongside
"oil and flame" party, and thirteen more the fort. They hauled up the hose and
formed a "demolition" party. The 38th inserted the nozzle in the stairwell, sand-
Division again furnished the covering bagging it in position. The LCM be-
force and the 592d Boat and Shore Regi- gan to pump gasoline and fuel into the
ment the crew for the LCM. fort. Lighting the fuzes for the mixture
624 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
available were so apportioned that each and enemy fire all slowed down con-
operation would have amphibian and struction. Maintenance of the roads,
combat units and either aviation or con- most of them unsurfaced and rough, was
struction battalions.3 complicated by the constant traffic.4
On Luzon the first attack began on 20 The attack against the Japanese on
February when the 1st Cavalry Division northern Luzon began on 21 February.
and the 6th Infantry Division of XIV By that date, I Corps held a line across
Corps launched an assault against the the narrow waist of the island from
Japanese who had retreated into the Damortis on Lingayen Gulf in the west
Sierra Madre Mountains in the east cen- to Baler Bay in the east. The Cagayan
tral part of the island. In this rugged Valley, a major food-producing area,
and inhospitable region, where roads stretched more than 200 miles to Aparri.
were few, the terrain greatly favored the Bounded on the east, west, and south by
defenders. Here the Japanese had broad and rugged mountain ranges, it
under their control Ipo Dam, and ten had two approaches from the south
miles to the southwest, Montalban Dam, feasible for military operations: one
two important elements of Manila's from Bambang; the other from Baguio,
water supply system which had to be fifty miles to the west. Bambang could
captured intact, if possible. The engi- be reached by two routes. One was by
neers were in continual demand to sup- way of Highway 5 running from San
port the infantry in the drive through Jose, at the edge of the Central Plains,
the mountains. Tasks of the 8th Engi- up the Tulavera River valley to Balete
neer Squadron and the 6th Combat Pass. The enemy positions at the pass
Battalion were similar. Mines were nu- were considered the key to the southern
merous along the narrow and primitive defenses of the Cagayan Valley. Once
roads. In many places, the Japanese had they were taken, the forward movement
set up roadblocks and covered them with down the valley would be relatively easy.
fire. Some were of the abatis type; Another possible route was by way of the
others were blasted out of the steep Villa Verde Trail, a path for foot travel-
slopes on both sides of the road or path. ers and carabao, which began to twist
Engineer demolition teams helped de- through the mountains 25 miles west of
stroy caves, bunkers, and pillboxes in Highway 5 and joined it just north of
which the enemy were hiding. A major Balete Pass. Baguio had four ap-
task was building and maintaining proaches. Highway 11, also known as
roads. Often the infantry had to wait the Kennon Road, was the most direct.
until the engineers could fashion a trail. From Rosario it ran northeast and then
Steep grades, large outcroppings of rock, north through the Cordillera Central
3 4
CG Eighth Army Rpt on Panay-Negros and (1) Hist of the 6th Engr Combat Bn. (2) Engr
Cebu Opns, pp. 4-11, 136-37. SWPA Files. Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 194.
628 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Mountains. A longer route was by way side roads through the rocky terrain to
of coastal Highway 3 and then inland by make possible flank attacks on enemy
way of Highway 9. Two trails to positions. Because the roads would be
Baguio cut through the rough triangle abandoned after the troops had won the
formed by the three roads. From area, bridges were not put in; the engi-
Baguio, dirt roads and trails led east- neers either found fords or constructed
ward through the Cordilleras to the temporary crossings of steel culverts.
Cagayan Valley. The 25th and 32d In- The men had to be continually on the
fantry Divisions were to take Bambang; alert for mines. It was standard prac-
the 33d Infantry Division was to capture tice for the enemy to sneak back and
6
Baguio and then assist the other two in replant an area previously cleared.
the drive up the Cagayan Valley. Prog-
ress of the drives through the moun- The Villa Verde Trail
tainous terrain of northern Luzon
would depend in large measure on the When the 25th Division began its
success of the engineers in overcoming drive toward Bambang, the 32d Division
natural and man-made obstacles.5 with its 114th Combat Battalion was at
the lower end of the Villa Verde Trail
The Advance to Bambang at Santa Maria. The infantry was to
advance along the trail; at the same time
The 25th Division, with its 65th Com- the 114th engineers were to transform the
bat Battalion, moving north from San pathway into a combat road. Winding
Jose along Highway 5, got off to a good some 25 miles through mountains and
start. By mid-March, that is, in about over hogback ridges and reaching an
three weeks, it was nearing Balete Pass. elevation of 4,800 feet, the trail con-
The engineers kept pace with the in- nected two points only 11 miles apart by
fantry, developing the highway, a two- air. The surface was hard-packed clay.
lane graveled road, as the main supply Because fairly rapid construction was
route for the division. Most of the men necessary, the engineers decided to dis-
were engaged in repairing and reinforc- pense with some of the basic principles
ing bridges. They cleared three mine of road building. In widening the foot-
fields and spent much time probing for path, which in places clung to the sides
additional mines which the enemy had of the steep hills, the men began cutting
scattered about in haphazard fashion. from the bottom of a hill instead of the
Just to the south of Balete Pass, the road top. The overhangs sometimes caved in,
ran through a deep defile. The nearer burying equipment. Dozers, slipping
the troops approached the pass, the over the precipitous slopes, went down
greater became the enemy's resistance. as much as 400 feet and could be re-
Since a frontal attack would be costly, covered only with difficulty; in a number
the engineers had to put in numerous of instances, roads had to be built to
5
G-3 Sixth Army, Combat Notes. SWPA File
6
M30. (1) Ibid. (2) Hist of the 65th Engr Combat Bn.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 629
them to get them back on the trail. the 114th engineers continued to push
Although the infantrymen were well forward slowly on the road and to im-
ahead of the engineers most of the time, prove the part to the rear. Dreary
the enemy infiltrated the rear areas on weeks passed while the enemy continued
several occasions. At Kilometer 19, one to hold at the pass.7
of the dozers came under enemy fire;
eighteen 47-mm. shells landed near the The Drive to Baguio
machine. Shell fragments tore many
holes in the blade and body of the dozer, Meanwhile, during the first part of
but caused no casualties. March, the 33d Division was advancing
On 5 March the infantry reached on Baguio. Here, also, the work of the
Salacsac Pass, where the Villa Verde 108th Engineer Combat Battalion was
Trail turned east toward Santa Fe and largely road construction, but, as else-
Highway 5. The Japanese, waiting where, many other jobs had to be done.
there, made determined efforts to halt The Japanese had placed numerous mine
the advance; enemy machine gun fire fields, most of them poorly camouflaged
was so heavy that no progress could be and some so hastily laid that they were
made for days. The Japanese had built wholly ineffective. Still, the combat
numerous caves in the pass area. The engineers could not take any chances
engineers brought up armored dozers to and cleared twenty-five fields. The
prepare firing positions for tanks. Pro- Japanese, in retreating, had destroyed
tected by their cabs, the men kept on most of the bridges. Wherever possible,
working despite minor wounds received the engineers located fords or repaired
from bullets that found their way the ruined structures, salvaging such ma-
through the portholes. One armored terials as they could. At one point on
dozer, working its way around a bend, the Kennon Road, the Japanese had de-
ran into fire from a machine gun about stroyed an 80-foot span over a gorge
twenty feet away. The operator, slightly forty feet deep. The site was at a horse-
wounded, charged the gun with his shoe bend, with sheer cliffs on one side,
dozer. The bullets cut the cable and where only a 30-foot horizontal clearance
dropped the blade. The operator with- at the abutment was left in which to
drew to make way for a tank, which maneuver. Instead of the usual two
proceeded to destroy the machine gun. hours, the men needed sixteen to swing
The cable was quickly repaired and a Bailey into place.
the bulldozer operator resumed work in One of the urgent missions of the
forty-five minutes. The next day he 108th engineers was to seize intact the two
buried three Japanese in caves. On the concrete and steel bridges across the
whole, working with armored dozers on
the precipitous slopes of the Villa Verde
Trail was dangerous because the visi- 7
(1) 32d Inf Div, Rpt After Action, M-1 Opn,
bility of the operators was so severely an. 8, Engr Rpt. SWPA File A149. (2) 114th Engr
Combat Bn, Tech Rpt of Villa Verde Trail, 8 Feb-
restricted. While the infantry vainly 26 May 45. SWPA File B75. (3) Hist of the 114th
attempted to get control of Salacsac Pass, Engr Combat Bn.
630 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Bauang River near its mouth on the from the stringers of the south span; it
west coast of Luzon. The two spans had had just finished the job when it was
to be taken undamaged if the troops attacked by the enemy. One engineer of
were not to be unduly delayed. It was the platoon was killed in the skirmish in
known that the bridges were mined and which the Japanese were repulsed. The
that the Japanese occupied positions bridges were captured undamaged.
north of the river commanding the struc- Late in March the 37th Division was
tures. At night an infantry battalion, sent from its garrison in Manila to re-
preceded by a platoon of combat engi- lieve the 33d Division in its coastal
neers and a mine detection detachment, positions. Everywhere, progress was
moved to the south bank. The infantry painfully slow.8
forded the river to attack enemy forces
in Bauang. Meanwhile, the engineers 8
crept up to the bridges. One detail re- 79. (1) 33d Inf Div, Opnl Highlights. Sturgis File
(2) Hist of the 108th Engr Combat Bn. (3)
moved about 400 pounds of explosives WD GO No. 29, 30 Mar 46. SWPA File A80.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 631
FILIPINOS HELP CONSTRUCT A ROAD ACROSS A FORD in the Santa Cruz River, Luzon.
tions that lasted almost a week and that breaking down under heavy traffic, was
cleared the enemy from Calumpan resurfaced and repaired. In the Baguio
Peninsula between Balayan and Batangas area, where Highways 3 and 11 required
Bays in southwestern Luzon. extensive work, the engineers raised road-
With the transfer of the 1st Cavalry beds above the level of the surrounding
Division from central Luzon to the Bicol countryside, widened one-lane sections,
Peninsula on 23 March, the 8th Engineer and installed drainage facilities. In east
Squadron also transferred its activities to central Luzon, the 1112th Construction
that area. The men carried on their Group worked on supply routes and
usual tasks. While constructing two bridges. At the end of March, when
ponton bridges, they encountered an un- most of the group was transferred to
usual problem. Lily pads came floating Sixth Army for construction in rear
downstream in such tremendous num- areas, responsibility for engineer work
bers that they threatened to wreck the in the XI Corps area was transferred to
bridges. The men stretched cables the combat engineers of the two divi-
from bank to bank to catch the pads sions. On southern Luzon, the 1129th
before they reached the bridges. By the Engineer Combat Group under XIV
end of March southern Luzon, except Corps direction furnished support to the
the Bicol Peninsula, had been cleared of combat units. Among its tasks were the
the enemy.9 repair of the pier at Batangas, rehabili-
tation of the airstrip at Lipa, and opera-
Corps and Army Engineer Units tion of a sawmill and an ice plant.10
Behind the front lines, engineer units The Eighth Army Campaign—
assigned to corps and army were at work. Palawan
Road maintenance, improvement of
bridges, elimination of pockets of enemy Meanwhile, Eighth Army had begun
resistance, and some base construction its campaign in the central and southern
were the major jobs. Close behind the Philippines. Palawan was the scene of
combat forces moving towards Bambang the first landing. On 28 February a task
and Baguio were units of the 1136th force, made up mainly of the 186th RCT
Construction Group, working under I of the 41st Division, disembarked on the
Corps. The corps engineers kept sup- eastern shore of the island. Engineer
plies flowing to the two fronts near units included two companies of the
Bambang and Baguio, operated sawmills, 532d Boat and Shore Regiment, elements
and built camps for the troops to use in of the 116th Combat Battalion, and the
the coming rainy season. Because the 1897th Aviation Battalion. The assault
fighting was expected to drag on well waves came ashore at the three desig-
into the wet months, the group's prin-
cipal job was to develop main supply 10
(1) 1136th Engr Constr Group, Opns Rpt, Luzon
routes for all-weather use. Highway 5, Campaign. SWPA File B92. (2) 1112th Engr
Constr Group, Opns Rpt, 15 Feb-Jul 45. SWPA
File B89. (3) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Cam-
9
Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 194. paign, pp. 196, 202, 214, 221, 228.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 633
nated beaches, amid some confusion, in were fought. Nevertheless, the Ameri-
the course of which a number of the can forces continually expanded the area
engineer craft missed their proper land- they held. Combat engineer operations,
the mission of elements of the 116th
ing points; but all of this was not serious,
since enemy opposition was nonexistent. engineers, were considerable on the pen-
The beachhead was quickly consolidated. insula, where well-camouflaged pillboxes,
No real resistance ever developed, and mine fields, barbed wire entanglements,
the last Japanese elements were wiped and fortified caves and tunnels were
out in about a month. Little combat numerous. The combat engineers de-
engineering was required. The 1897th stroyed about 50 caves and pillboxes and
engineers began to rehabilitate the air- removed nearly 2,000 mines. They
strip at Puerto Princesa, badly damaged built about 50 miles of roads and re-
by bombing, and in 19 days had it ready habilitated or constructed 16 bridges,
for fighters.11 each capable of taking 35 tons.
The 370-odd islands of the Sulus, the
The Zamboanga Peninsula and the southernmost ones in the Philippines,
Sulu Islands were mostly small, uninhabited, and un-
important. Three were of strategic signif-
After bringing Palawan under control, icance—Basilan, Jolo, and Tawitawi.
troops of Eighth Army seized the The campaign began with the landing of
Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu elements of the 41st Division on Basilan
Islands. One hundred and fifty miles on 16 March. Other islands were seized
long, the peninsula was connected with later, including the main one, Jolo,
the major part of Mindanao by a narrow where the only enemy resistance worth
isthmus, and, together with the Sulus, mentioning was encountered. In these
formed a series of steppingstones to operations, elements of the 543d Boat
Borneo on the southwest. On 10 March and Shore Regiment helped land the in-
a naval task force began a bombardment fantry, and the 116th engineers carried
of the coastal areas east and west of out combat missions. Except on Jolo,
Zamboanga City, forcing the Japanese to little combat support was needed. On
abandon their beach defenses. Shortly that island the engineers destroyed some
after 0900, the infantry, assisted by ele- enemy fortifications, removed mines, re-
ments of the 543d Boat and Shore Regi- paired and constructed bridges, and built
ment, landed west of Zamboanga City about twenty miles of road. Construc-
and was ashore in half an hour, encoun- tion units did additional work in the
tering only light machine gun fire. Sulus and on Mindanao. The 873d
Zamboanga City fell the first day. Sub- Aviation Battalion rehabilitated airfields
sequently, enemy resistance stiffened and on the Zamboanga Peninsula and the
a number of bitterly contested battles Sulus, and other engineer units began to
12
rehabilitate numerous local facilities.
11
(1) CG Eighth Army, Rpt on Palawan and Zam-
12
boanga Opns, pp. 114ff. SWPA Files. (2) Ltr, Hq CG Eighth Army, Rpt on Palawan and Zam-
532d EBSR to Heavey, 3 Mar 45. SWPA File E92. boanga Opns, pp. 114-18.
634 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
impractical because of the high surf, the "The engineer problem on ... Min-
rugged shore line, and the almost im- danao began with bridges and ended with
passable mountains farther inland. The roads," said one engineer report. The
north coast had many good beaches, in story of the 3d engineers of the 24th Di-
particular at Macajalar Bay, but high vision, almost from the time they landed
ground farther inland would give the de- until they reached Davao was one of " . . .
fending forces a decided advantage. A by-passed bridges, rebuilt bridges and
major handicap on the southern coast newly constructed bridges, of frantic ef-
would be inadequate communications forts to get bridge timber and Bailey up
with the remainder of the island. On forward . . . ." The 106th engineers of
the west coast were many good beaches the 31st Division likewise were occupied
and anchorages, and from this part of the mainly with roads and bridges. Their
island the interior was most accessible. first job was to improve the road net in
Consequently, the initial assault was the vicinity of the landing area. When
planned for that coast. the 31st Division started up the Sayre
On 17 April two divisions of X Corps, Highway from the Fort Pikit-Kabacan
the 24th and the 31st, landed near Pa- area, the 106th engineers, transferred to
rang. The 24th Division, with the help the highway a company at a time, fur-
of guerrillas, advanced eastward along nished increasing support.16
the highway leading to Davao. At the In worse shape than the roads were the
same time the 533d Boat and Shore Regi- bridges. Between Kabacan and the first
ment of the 3d Special Brigade, together gorge, twelve miles to the north, demol-
with naval units, moved some of the ished structures spanning shallow streams
troops up the Mindanao River to secure were either bypassed or hurriedly re-
the Fort Pikit-Kabacan area in the cen- paired to make rapid progress possible.
tral part of the island, through which ran The first real gorge, 120 feet across and
the Sayre (North-South) Highway. On 35 feet deep, with the bridge in ruins at
26 April elements of the 24th Division the bottom, was a more serious obstacle.
reached Davao Gulf, not far south of Stringing a cableway downstream from
Davao, turned northward, and occupied the site of the bridge, the engineers got
their objective on 2 May. Meanwhile, jeeps, ¼-ton trailers, and howitzers
the 31st Division had started up the Sayre across. Heavy vehicles would need a
Highway to split the Japanese forces in bridge. Because of the depth of the
the northern part of the island. On 10 gorge, construction of a timber trestle
May, at Macajalar Bay, at the northern was not practicable, and erection of a
terminus of the highway, a second am- Bailey would be laborious, if not impos-
phibious force came ashore and headed sible. The men solved the problem in
south. Everywhere Japanese troops were an ingenious way. They blasted out the
forced to retreat into the almost im- sides of the gorge at the two approaches;
penetrable jungles of the interior.15 the debris filled the gorge and made a
crossing possible. The job was finished
15
(1) CG Eighth Army, Rpt on the Mindanao
16
Opn, pp. 145ff. SWPA Files. (2) 533d EBSR, Engr Opnl Hist, Mindanao Campaign (Draft
Opns Rpt, V-5, 1 Mar-7 May 45. SWPA File E59. MS). SWPA File A164.
636 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
in two days and two nights. The com- ior. Royal Australian Engineers had
bat engineers had numerous chores in combat and construction duties.
support of the infantry, arising from the At the Brunei Bay landing on 10 June,
fact that the Japanese had fortified stra- the task force included units of the 9th
tegic points with systems of caves and Australian Division. After the naval
pillboxes and that enemy camouflage was bombardment, landings were made un-
excellent. Base construction was kept opposed. In view of the fact that the
to a minimum, but as elsewhere, airfields Brunei Bay landing would sever north-
and other facilities were rehabilitated.17 south communications, enemy reaction
in this area was remarkably weak, being
Borneo limited to only a few harassing air raids.
The amphibian engineers were ham-
As early as October 1944 the Allies had pered somewhat in unloading operations
planned to seize certain areas of Borneo on Labuan Island by the narrow roads
to deprive the enemy of vital oil supplies and swampy conditions near the beaches.
and to construct bases from which to cut Elsewhere at Brunei Bay, landings were
Japanese communications with the easily made. It was expected that the
Netherlands Indies. Plans called for landing at Balikapan would be equally
three attacks, the first against Tarakan successful.18
Island on 17 May, the second against
Brunei Bay on 10 June, and the third The End of Organized Resistance
against Balikpapan on 1 July. These on Luzon
assaults were assigned to Australian and
Dutch troops, supported by American Meanwhile, on Luzon the Japanese
naval forces and elements of the 3d Spe- were being compressed into smaller and
cial Brigade. The 26th Australian smaller areas. In mid-April the four
Brigade and a company of the Royal divisions striving to reach Baguio and
Netherlands Indies Army took part in Bambang were still stalemated. Those
the operations against Tarakan. The on the Bambang front were tied down at
first troops were put ashore on 30 April Balete and Salacsac Passes, while in the
without opposition on Sandau Island off Baguio area, the 33d's advance had prog-
the east coast after withering naval and ressed only a few miles up the strongly
air bombardment had blasted the main defended Kennon Road, and the 37th
landing area. Engineers and naval per- Division was having just as hard a time
sonnel went in and breached offshore ob- moving in from the coast. Engineer
stacles in twelve places to permit LST's tasks in support of the infantry were as
to land. The Japanese did not try to de- strenuous as before. The first break-
fend their beach positions, and, after at- through in the Baguio area came on 21
tempting to make a stand about 1,500 April when the 37th Division cracked re-
yards inland, were driven into the inter- sistance on Highway 9 at the Irisan River
18
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I,
17
Ibid. 290-92, 297.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 637
gorge, and together with the 33d Divi- later, it turned west onto the trail and
sion, took Baguio five days later. On 5 headed toward Salacsac Pass. Mean-
May the 37th Division was transferred to time, after a 3-month struggle, the 32d
the Bambang area, where the Japanese Division broke through enemy strong-
were still holding up the 25th and 32d points at the pass. On 29 May the two
Divisions. The job still requiring the divisions met. Further engineer work
greatest effort was the Villa Verde Trail, on the trail had been halted three days
where the rains which began in late April previously, and all effort was henceforth
compounded the difficulties. In May, spent on keeping open the part that had
the downpours increased in intensity, been improved.19
and work on the trail became impossible. The stage was now set for the final
The engineers reported, " . . . dozers dug drive down the Cagayan Valley. The
themselves in as their tracks revolved plan was to have the 25th and 32d Di-
without traction. . . ." On 13 May the
25th Division finally captured Balete 19
114
h
t Engr Combat Bn, Tech Rpt of Villa
Pass. Reaching Santa Fe twelve days Verde Trail.
638 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
visions remain at Bambang and most of 200 vehicles to reach its goal. Two
the 33d Division at Baguio to clear out platoons of the 339th Construction Bat-
pockets of resistance. The 37th Division talion went ahead of the main force, by
was directed to pass through the 25th Di- road and by LCT, to repair bridges, re-
vision and spearhead the drive north on move landslides, and widen the road.
the highway. It left Santa Fe on 31 May The engineers also erected two hospital
and made good time, averaging five or six ward tents, built an all-weather airstrip,
21
miles a day. The 117th Engineer Com- and installed and operated ferries.
bat Battalion had to move forward every In east central Luzon, the advance was
two or three days to keep up with the in- slow. Early in March the 43d Infantry
fantry. Highway 5 was in fair condition, Division replaced the 1st Cavalry Di-
but most of the bridges were out. The vision, which had been transferred to
company farthest forward operated tread- southern Luzon. On the 14th of the
way ferries until permanent crossings month XI Corps assumed command of
could be built, put in bypasses and cul- the operation. An engineer company of
verts, and made minor road repairs. the 6th Battalion had an unusual task on
The next one along made major repairs Mount Pacawagan, one of the numerous
to bridges, put gravel on bypasses, and peaks on which fighting took place, and
occasionally built new bridges. The where the only possible route for a trail
men put a floating bridge over the Magat was along a hogback ridge. The men
River at Bagabag, some twenty miles managed to get motorized compressors
north of Bambang. The 117th en- up the steep sides to drill holes in rock
gineers also built several airstrips. At outcroppings, and then placed explosive
Bayambang, they blocked off a portion charges in the holes to blow up the rock
of a graveled roadway to serve as a run- and make a roadway. They used 100
way; at Bagabag one hundred natives re- smoke pots to screen their work from the
moved grass from an existing strip and enemy close by.
filled small shell holes. The engineers Early in May the final push began.
were favored by the terrain in the flat, The 38th Division with the 113th Com-
open valley, but the heavy rains were a bat Battalion headed for Montalban Dam,
major hindrance.20 while the 43d was deployed from the
To keep the enemy from escaping by rear to take Ipo Dam. Road improve-
way of Aparri, a small group of Filipinos ment continued to be the major job in
and Americans—called the Connolly support of the infantry. With the seiz-
Task Force—had been organized to go ure of Ipo Dam on 17 May and the cap-
rapidly up Highway 3 along the western ture of Montalban on the 28th, both of
and northern shores to Aparri. En- them intact, the campaign in the Sierra
gineer reconnaissance parties learned Madres was virtually over. The engi-
that much work would have to be done neers, even though they had not always
on the highway to permit the convoy of been able to keep the infantry on the
20 21
Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 179. Ibid., p. 181.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 639
move, had contributed much to final vic- RCT and the 1st Cavalry Division met at
tory.22 San Augustin, and on 16 June, the Bicol
Fighting continued in southeastern Peninsula was declared secure.23
Luzon. On 1 April units of the 2d Spe- Before the end of June the Japanese on
cial Brigade landed the 158th RCT with- Luzon were almost completely crushed.
out opposition at Legaspi, near the tip of On the 8th of that month, with organized
the peninsula. Squads of the 1279th enemy resistance in the east central part
Combat Battalion cleared the beach of of the island at an end, the 6th Division,
mines which had not been detonated by including the 6th Combat Battalion was
the preinvasion air assault. The infan- transferred to the Cagayan Valley. The
try started inland but was soon halted by 6th Division started up the highway be-
the enemy near Daraga, a few miles hind the 37th. At Bagabag the two di-
northwest of Legaspi. While fighting visions turned northwest on Highway 4
raged, the combat engineers set about re- toward Kiangan, where remnants of the
conditioning the airstrip at Legaspi for enemy were gathering. Fighting was ap-
evacuation of the wounded. Under proaching an end in northern Luzon.
enemy fire the first two days, the men On 21 June Connolly Task Force, which
cut grass, dug drainage ditches, and filled had moved up the west coast, reached
twenty large bomb craters with wreckage Aparri. Reinforced by one battalion of
from the port. The strip was ready for the 11th Airborne Division, it started
operations on 6 April. Two days before, south on Highway 5 two days later, and
the engineers had started rehabilitation on 26 June its patrols met advance ele-
of the railroad. About 600 Filipinos, ments of the 37th Division at Alacan,
using hand tools supplied by the engi- twenty-five miles south of Aparri. The
neers, restored the shops and replaced two units then started east to search for
tracks while the troops concentrated on the enemy in the mountains. There
bridge construction. On 10 April resist- were still some 65,000 Japanese left in
ance at Daraga collapsed. The advance northern Luzon, but they were largely
continued northwest on the Bicol Penin- unorganized and scattered. On 1 July
sula, where there were many well situated Eighth Army relieved Sixth Army to
but poorly camouflaged mine fields and carry on mop-up operations. Eighth
numerous roadblocks. On 12 April the Army also continued with mop-up oper-
158th attacked the main Japanese force ations in the southern Philippines. The
in the Cituinan Hills near Camalig; the operation against Balikpapan was carried
same day the 1st Cavalry Division en- out as scheduled on 1 July.24
tered the Bicol Peninsula from the north-
west. On 2 May elements of the 158th
23
Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.
194 and 196.
24
(1) Ibid., pp. 179-81. (2) Of C Engr GHQ
22
(1)Ibid., p. 188. (2) Hist of the 6th Engr Com- AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I, 277, 297-8. (3) Smith,
bat Bn. Triumph in the Philippines, p. 579.
640 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MAP 31
planners was obtaining enough engineer consisting of the 1st and 6th Marine Di-
troops to provide adequate support for visions. In reserve were the 2d Marine
the initial amphibious assault and sub- Division, afloat, and the Army's 27th Di-
sequent overland movement. Because vision at Ulithi. The plan of campaign
only about 70 percent of the units re- was a model of simplicity. Prior to the
quested were available, some adjustments attack, Tenth Army's 77th Infantry Di-
had to be made.28 vision was to seize a number of small
Planning for base construction on islands to the west—the Kerama Islands
Okinawa was a complex matter. Since —where naval anchorages would be pro-
both the Army and the Navy wanted vided. Landing on the west side of
numerous facilities, the engineers in Okinawa near Hagushi, both corps, the
Hawaii had to make detailed calculations III Amphibious on the left and XXIV on
regarding location and size. The air- the right, were to drive eastward clear
field program alone was tremendous. across the island. Then the III Am-
Six B-29 runways were to be built, to- phibious Corps was to turn north and
gether with a depot field, for the long- destroy Japanese forces in the northern
range heavy bombers. Also planned part of Okinawa; XXIV Corps would
were 6 heavy bomber, 2 medium turn south, and drive the enemy forces
bomber, and 2 fighter runways, all to be toward the southern tip of the island
constructed of coral. To support such until they surrendered or were destroyed.
an airbase storage tanks for about 1,800,- Since the Okinawa operation was to be
000barrels of gasoline, 6,000,000 square carried out by Pacific Ocean Area forces,
feet of warehousing, 12,500 hospital beds, the island command or garrison type of
housing for 375,000 men, 700 miles of organization for base construction was
road, and extensive harbor facilities at set up. Engineer units assigned to the
Naha would be needed. Estimates were garrison force for base construction were
that ninety engineer units would have to scheduled to land early.30
be sent to Okinawa to finish this construc-
tion on time. Higher headquarters also Planning for
considered it advisable to put base facili- Amphibious Operations
ties on small nearby islands. Those on
Ie Shima, about two miles off the north- The landings in this assault would
western coast of Okinawa, would be the differ from those in the Central Pacific
most extensive.29 Area in that an engineer special brigade
For the assault on Okinawa, two corps organization was to be used. This was
were assigned—the Army's XXIV Corps, the Headquarters and Headquarters
including the 7th and 96th Divisions, and Company of the 1st Brigade, redeployed
the Marine Corps III Amphibious Corps, in late 1944 from France, and now under
the command of Colonel Talley, for-
28
(1) Bradley, Rpt on Engr Opns, ICEBERG. (2)
Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Cam-
30
paign, pp. 11-XI-1-30. EHD Files. Navy Dept Of of CNO, Rpt, Amphib Opns—
29
USAFPOA, Participation in the Okinawa Opn, Capture of Okinawa, 27 Mar-21 Jun 45. 9-1.0001/
I, 77. EHD Files. 46 (26670).
644 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
merly in charge of construction in Alaska. landed on the west coast of Okinawa near
The 1st Brigade differed considerably Hagushi. Weather and sea conditions
from the special brigades of the South- were almost perfect. The only obstacle
west Pacific. It was a shore organization was a coral reef extending along the en-
only and had been converted from an tire length of the 6-mile-long assault
amphibious-type unit while it was still in beach. Since the heavier landing craft
England preparing to engage in the 1942 could not cross over, men and cargo were
North African campaign. Later, the only transferred to LVT's and Dukws, but in
part of the brigade to be retained per- some places even Dukws had difficulty
manently was the Headquarters and crossing the barrier until the engineers
Headquarters Company. For each oper- prepared passageways with explosives
ation, engineer combat battalions, and and bulldozers. Japanese resistance was
quartermaster, signal, ordnance, and surprisingly light, the enemy laying down
medical units were attached. The or- only occasional artillery and mortar fire,
ganization of the 1st Brigade thus fitted which caused few casualties and did
in well with the Central Pacific's shore little damage. As was so often the case
party type of organization. The plan elsewhere, infantry intrenchments, pill-
was to place the shore parties of XXIV boxes, and other defensive positions near
Corps and III Amphibious Corps under the beaches were not occupied. About
the headquarters of the 1st Engineer 2,000 posts had been placed along the
Special Brigade.31 southern part of the reef; apparently
they were to have been strung with
Operations to Mid-April barbed wire, but no wire was found and
the posts were easily removed. Once
The Okinawa campaign began on 26 more, natural obstacles were more for-
March. On that day, elements of the midable than the enemy. Reefs, bluffs,
77th Division landed on five of the and seawalls caused the troops to be
islands of the Kerama group. The 302d jammed along the shore. Colonel
Combat Battalion supported the division; Talley and his staff, initially using the
a company or a platoon was attached to shore party units of XXIV Corps and
each of the battalion landing teams. others assigned to the Island Command,
Missions were easily accomplished, in- were soon busily engaged in directing the
cluding the provision of the usual sup- unloading of supplies and moving them
port for the infantry and the destruction to dumps. Because the organization had
of enemy installations, equipment, and too little time to work together as a team,
supplies.32 there were some difficulties. Confusion
On the morning of 1 April at 0830, in unloading was the result, in part, of
XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps the limited time available for planning
31
and for integrating the organization.
(1) 1st ESB, Action Rpt, Okinawa Campaign 9
Apr-31 May 45. SWPA File E4. (2) William F. There was a noticeable shortage of
Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military Engineer, Dukws and LVT's to haul supplies over
33
XXXIX (February, 1947), 65-66. the reef.
32
(1) Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus
Campaign, pp. 11-XI-3ff. (2) Hist of the 3020!
33
Engr Combat Bn. (1) Navy Dept Of of CNO, Rpt, Amphib Opns—
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 645
able, but also day and night air raids, in- machine guns, mortars, and even artillery
cluding attacks by kamikaze dive bomb- would be emplaced in the open to cover
ers, and assaults by suicide boats and cave entrances. The various weapons
even swimmers harassed the American were, as a rule, so cleverly camouflaged
forces. In late April the 77th Division that they were difficult to find. In the
relieved the battle-weary 96th, and the last desperate effort to prevent the de-
27th Division relieved the Marine 1st struction of caves by American forces, the
Division. On 8 May the latter returned Japanese would engage in grenade duels
to the lines and the Marine 6th Division and hand-to-hand combat.
was also sent in. There was now a two- A number of weaknesses in cave warfare
corps front.37 remained. For one thing, the small en-
Combat engineer tasks on southern trances greatly restricted the defenders'
Okinawa had been fairly easy up to now, field of fire. The lack of communica-
but this was not to be the case henceforth. tions between caves limited the defend-
Only through hard fighting and with con- ers' ability to maneuver, counterattack,
stant support of the combat engineers or withdraw. Japanese commanders
could the infantry make any headway at cautioned their troops not to be trapped
all. The enemy's defense tactics were in caves. At the proper time at least
among the best encountered so far. One one-third of the men were to leave and
of the principal elements in the defense help cover the cave mouth from emplace-
was cave warfare. On southern Okin- ments. But the defenders had little suc-
awa the Japanese developed this type of cess in carrying out such orders. The
fighting to the highest degree in the war. Japanese were aware of the weakness of
Many of their caves and other fortifica- cave warfare, but had adopted it because
tions were on the sides of hills and cliffs of the overwhelming U.S. fire power and
away from the approaching American because of the chance cave warfare pro-
forces. The openings from which vided for slowing down the advance of
weapons were fired were so small as to the U.S. forces. The Japanese were
be almost invisible. The enemy placed making every effort to improve cave war-
machine gun and mortar fire on the tops fare and at the same time overcome its
of the hills and ridges over which Amer- disadvantages.
ican troops had to advance to reach the The U.S. infantry-tank teams de-
mouths of the caves. Probably the great- stroyed innumerable caves by using
est improvement made by the Japanese direct fire and flame throwers. The
was to cover cave openings by fire. This8-inch howitzers of the artillery, and, at
was done in various ways. The most times, bombardment by aircraft proved
successful tactic was to make caves mu- very effective. The combat engineers
tually supporting, with the entrance of were widely used to reduce caves and
each cave covered by fire from others lo- fortifications that could not be destroyed
cated to the front and flanks. Sometimes by direct infantry assault, artillery fire,
or aerial bombardment, but had to be
37
Navy Dept Of of CNO, Rpt, Amphib Opns eliminated by hand-placed explosive
Capture of Okinawa, 27 Mar-21 Jun 45. charges. Engineer demolitions person-
648 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
nel were organized in much the same the smoke of the first had cleared away.
way as in previous assaults in the Central The aim was the complete destruction
Pacific. Usually a squad of from six to and sealing of the fortification. Moving
twelve men was responsible for front-line in rapidly on the target and getting away
demolitions for an infantry unit as large fast were essential. Operating in this
as a battalion. If intelligence indicated way, the engineers in the support of one
numerous caves, pillboxes, and block- front-line infantry battalion often used
houses in an area, an entire engineer more than a ton of explosives to destroy
platoon might be directed to support one about forty pillboxes, caves, bunkers, and
infantry battalion. The battalion com- ammunition dumps. Casualty rates
mander usually kept his engineer demo- were high. The Japanese brought in-
lition teams near his command post in tense fire to bear on demolition teams.
order to have them readily available During one 3-week period, for example,
should the infantry need help. While one engineer combat battalion suffered
38
waiting to be called forward, the men 20 percent casualties.
prepared 24-pound satchel charges, which The defenders of southern Okinawa
were the ones mainly used on Okinawa. made extensive use of mines. The
Pole and shaped charges were, as a rule, American forces found no fields laid in a
too unwieldy or too heavy. regular pattern, but standard and im-
Called forward, an engineer squad provised mines were scattered about in
operated in a more or less standard man- great profusion. The only new type was
ner. The man in the lead advanced the antipersonnel fragmentation mine.
toward the cave with the charge and All mines, including those that were
phosphorous grenades, followed by one booby-trapped, were removed by 4-man
or two others with spare satchels; the engineer teams, one team being assigned
remainder of the group took up positions to each tank platoon. Long demolition
as directed by the squad leader. The "snakes" attached to tanks were used in
infantry was in readiness to deliver pro- a few instances to clear paths through
tective fire. Reaching the mouth of the mine fields. Armored bulldozers were
cave, the lead man threw in phosphorous extensively used to clear roads of
grenades to blind the occupants. Next, obstacles. Booby traps were found in
the satchel charge was thrown in—as far caves and sometimes in abandoned tanks.
as possible toward the rear of the cave— Road maintenance in southern Oki-
to get the maximum blast effect. Ten- nawa was an arduous task for the engi-
to-fifteen-second delayed fuzes gave the neers because the poorly surfaced
men a chance to get away from flying thoroughfares broke down rapidly
debris. The use of multiple fuzes, some under the heavy traffic. From 10 to 12
of which were dummies, made it difficult feet wide, most of the main highways
for the occupants, already at least were coral surfaced. During the pro-
partially blinded by the phosphorous
grenades, to pull the proper fuze out of 38
This account of engineer participation in the
the charge before it exploded. Some- reduction of enemy defenses on Okinawa is based
times a second charge was thrown before on Bradley, Report of Engineer Operations, ICEBERG.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 649
longed rains in May, maintenance be- engineers in the rear areas were already
came critical; in the XXIV Corps area, building up bases and developing air-
the engineers could keep but one main fields from which U.S. forces were to
supply route open, and even this was launch the final assault on Japan. Two
possible only because corps and divi- theaters, the Southwest Pacific and the
sional engineers worked on the route Pacific Ocean Areas, were to be jointly
continuously. After the rainy season, responsible for the final assault. The
maintenance problems on roads were less major construction, by far, was being
serious, but bridging remained a major done in the Philippines and on Okinawa.
task. Bridges and culverts, almost in- In the meantime, finishing touches were
variably built of stone or reinforced being put on work in Hawaii and other
concrete, and with a capacity of thirty- islands of the central Pacific to support
five tons or more, were adequate for the attack on the Japanese home islands.
much of the military traffic, but most Elsewhere, construction had slackened
bridges were only one lane. Baileys, off greatly or stopped entirely. Some
used extensively on southern Okinawa, work was still in progress in the CBI
proved very satisfactory. There was theater, but in the South Pacific, the
little need for ponton bridges, and only engineers were mainly dismantling bases.
three were put in place.39
Over-all Organization in the Pacific
The End of the Okinawa
Campaign Despite changes in the tactical com-
mands, no great modifications were made
Bitter fighting continued during May, in the engineer organization in the
and casualties were heavy as the defend- Pacific in late 1944 and 1945. The
ers were pushed back slowly to the tip greatest changes resulted from the Joint
of the island. In June enemy resistance Chiefs' activation of Army Forces,
crumbled more rapidly. By the end of Pacific (AFPAC), on 6 April 1945, under
that month the Japanese position was the command of General MacArthur.
hopeless. As the Americans pressed into Henceforth, all Army units in the Pacific,
the southernmost part of Okinawa, some except those of the Strategic Air Forces,
of the defenders made last-ditch charges were under MacArthur's direction. For
against American positions; many com- the time being, the new command was
mitted suicide. On 2 July the Okinawa only a nominal one since no immediate
campaign was declared officially ended. changes in organization were made. In
the Southwest Pacific Area, GHQ SWPA
Base and Airfield Construction for the continued to function as MacArthur's
Assault on Japan headquarters for that theater, and Mac-
Arthur and Nimitz agreed that U.S.
While fighting was still in progress in Army units in the Pacific Ocean Areas
the Philippines and on Okinawa, the would remain under Nimitz' control
39
Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Cam- until he released them to MacArthur.
paign, pp. 11-XI-9ff. Admiral Nimitz did not transfer the first
650 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
POA units to AFPAC until 31 August vance echelon was already at Tacloban,
1945, when MacArthur assumed com- Leyte; thereafter, additional elements
mand of all Army units in the Ryukyus, moved forward, and by February 1945
except those assigned to the Strategic Air the entire office was settled in Leyte.
Forces. General Ross was now making prepara-
tions to move forward again, this time
Engineer Organization— to Manila. An advance echelon, headed
SWPA and AFPAC by Col. O. N. Rinehart, arrived in the
Philippine capital in February. In
When AFPAC was established, the April Col. Louis J. Rumaggi and the
forward echelon of Casey's office was Operations Division, together with sup-
located in the Manila City Hall; the rear plies and equipment, were flown there.
echelon was in the midst of moving from They took over the third floor of one of
Leyte to the Philippine capital. Au- the buildings of Far Eastern University
thorized strength of the office was 65 and in a short time "were carrying on
officers and 114 enlisted men. In April business as usual." That same month
Casey's request for an increase of 50 OCE USASOS was officially set up in
percent in personnel strength was Manila.41
granted. As Chief Engineer, SWPA and
AFPAC, Casey had theoretical technical Engineer Districts
supervision over all U.S. Army and
Allied engineer units in the Pacific. Since construction in the Philippines
Probably his major task in his new was to be so extensive and vitally im-
position was to co-ordinate the activities portant, proper organization would be
of units insofar as possible in order to highly essential. Especially in and around
prevent duplication of effort. Co-ordi- the metropolitan area of Manila, an im-
nation was especially necessary with mense amount of construction and recon-
regard to map-making organizations. In struction was necessary. As in Australia
both the Pacific Ocean and Southwest and New Guinea, General Frink, the
Pacific Areas, they were already at work commander of USASOS, organized bases
on or were about to be engaged in an to decentralize operations. He set up
extensive mapping program of the Japa- five, one on Leyte (Base K), three on
40
nese home islands. Luzon (Base M at Lingayen Gulf, Base
X at Manila, and Base R at Batangas),
OCE USASOS and one on Cebu (Base S). To supervise
their operations, he had redesignated the
The office of General Ross, Chief Army Service Command, recently trans-
Engineer, USASOS SWPA, had finished ferred from Sixth Army to USASOS, as
moving from Brisbane to Hollandia in Luzon Base Section, made it an inter-
November 1944. By this time, an ad- mediate headquarters, and placed it over
40 41
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Admin Hist, 6 Apr Of C Engr AFWESPAC, First Semiannual Rpt,
45-31 Dec 46, pp 1-3, 5-7. SWPA Files. p. 6. SWPA File A201b.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 651
the bases. In April Luzon Base Section such a move in late 1944 and early 1945.
was renamed Philippine Base Section. Such an organization would be in line
In Australia and New Guinea, where with the War Department's policy of
engineer construction had been the re- centralizing control of major technical
sponsibility of base section and base activities in Headquarters, SOS, rather
commanders, staff engineers exercised than delegating control of them to com-
only technical supervision over engineer manders of bases and advance sections, a
work. In the Philippines, engineer con- policy the CBI theater had already im-
plemented early in 1944.43 Sverdrup,
struction, initially the responsibility of
the base commanders, was subsequently made a major general on 5 January 1945,
entirely divorced from their activities. was especially interested in setting up
It was assigned to engineer districts, such a command; it was generally as-
which were similar to such organizations sumed he would head it after Casey
in the United States. To accomplish returned from the Army Service Com-
construction on Leyte, General Frink mand to his position as MacArthur's
set up the Leyte Engineer District in chief engineer. On 20 February 1945,
February 1945 and made it directly re- Sverdrup wrote Casey that it was
sponsible to General Ross. That same "... rather obvious that a concentration
month, General Frink organized the of all construction forces within one
Luzon Engineer District (LUZED) under organization is advantageous as central-
Col. Alexander M. Neilson, placed it ized control properly exercised means
under Luzon Base Section, and made it far greater efficiency." Sverdrup had in
responsible for USASOS construction on mind a construction command which
Luzon. Both districts differed from would have under it various engineer
similar organizations in the United districts. Two were already in existence
States in only one major respect—engi- and Sverdrup thought perhaps three
neer troops and not contracting firms more should be created. All would use
or civilian workers did the actual troop units or contractors to get the work
42
construction. done. A fourth, organized along simi-
lar lines, would make use of Filipino
The Engineer Construction workmen for rehabilitating Manila.44
Command A major question was whether to place
such a command in GHQ, in USAFFE,
For some time considerable thought or in USASOS. It was finally decided to
had been given to putting all engineer put it directly under General Frink,
construction in the USASOS area under since, as commanding general of
one command to be headed by an engi- USASOS, he was responsible for con-
neer. Generals Casey and Sverdrup struction in the communications zone.
and other members of MacArthur's staff On 6 March the Engineer Construc-
had discussed the desirability of making
43
See above, p. 438.
42 44
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, Memo, Sverdrup for Casey, 20 Feb 45. 323.41,
189-90. SWPA Files, KCRC.
652 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
cations caused by the conflict. Colonel ment closely resembling that of the for-
mer Civilian Conservation Corps bat-
Hunter had to rely at first on hired labor.
He had the usual difficulties of organiz-talions in the United States. Recruit-
ing and supervising such a large work ment was slow, and by 1 June, CONCOR
force. Fortunately, many of those hired had only one battalion. Thereafter, ex-
had been employed by the U.S. Army pansion was more rapid, four battalions
before the war and so had gained experi- being activated in June. Including
ence for the work they had to do. Be- both skilled and unskilled workers, the
cause of the vast amount of destruction, battalions became quite efficient in all
however, Hunter, contrary to original types of construction, except possibly
plans, soon had to use large numbers of those requiring much earth moving.
troops.48 They built barracks, warehouses, and
hospitals, and maintained roads and util-
Construction Corps of the ities. Labor turnover was of serious
Philippines concern at first but became less so as the
organization was improved. Though
Although Sverdrup had considered wages were low, many Filipinos were
organizing a number of additional sub- attracted to the organization mainly be-
ordinate commands, only one more was cause it provided meals at cost and per-
formed—the Construction Corps of the mitted employees to buy scarce articles
Philippines (CONCOR), organized to in the Army's post exchanges.49
make further use of Filipino workmen.
It was set up on 25 April, under Col. Changes in ENCOM
Samuel N. Karrick, to undertake recon-
struction in the Philippines, especially In the rapidly changing conditions in
in and near Manila. Workmen, re- the Philippines, Sverdrup's staff, and
cruited on a voluntary basis for a mini- his subordinate commands as well, under-
mum period of six months, would be went almost continuous modification.
directed by American and Filipino offi- During the first months the number of
cers. This type of organization was men in ENCOM headquarters fluctuated
expected to make possible a more effi- greatly. In June the War Department
cient use of the Filipinos by providing authorized a staff of 114 officers and 652
better organization and supervision and enlisted men. Meanwhile, Sverdrup
reducing labor turnover. The work- found himself directing the construction
men were to be organized into labor efforts of a larger and larger engineer
battalions. At full strength, each would force. Late in April, he had acquired
have 92 officers and enlisted men from an additional unit. This was the Boat
the U.S. Army, the Philippine Army,
and the Philippine Scouts, and 1,037 49
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Admin Hist, pp. 23-
civilians. A CONCOR battalion had a 26. (2) Memo, 2d Lt Warren D. Curds, Opns Sec
special table of organization and equip- Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, for Colonel Lane et al, 4
May 45, with Incl, Staff Study, Constr Corps of the
Philippines, 20 Apr 45. SWPA Files M75. (3)
48
Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Admin Hist, pp. 22-23. Of C Engr AFWESPAC, First Semiannual Rpt.
654 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Building Command, which had been and base commanders, was merely an-
established in mid-1944 at Milne Bay to other headquarters that had to be dealt
direct the activities of the boat assembly with. From the standpoint of many
units in the theater. In early 1945 the engineers, ENCOM had the great ad-
command was transferred to Batangas, vantage that it was an engineer com-
Luzon, where the men rebuilt their as- mand. Engineer units of such a
sembly plants and were soon putting command were more likely to receive a
landing craft together again. The sympathetic understanding of their
Luzon Engineer District also expanded problems than they could get from non-
rapidly, and by the end of April, Colonel engineer base and base section command-
Neilson had about 250 military and civil- ers. ENCOM consequently improved
ians on his staff. Within the next few the morale and efficiency of engineer
weeks, he had some 30,000 engineer units. It further raised morale by giv-
troops and over 20,000 Filipino civilians ing a number of promotions that could
working on various projects. The Gen- not be granted earlier because of limita-
eral Engineer District likewise grew tions in the tables of organization.51
rapidly. When the Leyte Engineer
District was inactivated in May, GENED Army Forces, Western Pacific
took over its projects, and it took over
LUZED's when that organization was On 7 June USASOS was redesig-
inactivated in July. By then, the nated Army Forces, Western Pacific
General Engineer District had under its (AFWESPAC) and placed under the
control most of the military construction command of Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer.
in the USASOS area in the Philippines.50 Somewhat expanded in functions over
The type of construction organization its predecessor, AFWESPAC was to pro-
that many engineers had wanted since vide logistic support for U.S. Army
the early days in Australia, one headed troops in SWPA and AFPAC as directed
by an engineer officer, was now a reality. by higher headquarters. On 10 June,
Nevertheless, many of the difficulties General Worsham, formerly division
previously experienced were still preva- engineer of the Northwest Service Com-
lent, undoubtedly because they were too mand in Canada and Alaska, became
basic to be easily eliminated by a change Engineer, AFWESPAC. His staff was
in organization. Shortages of men and one of considerable size, by the end of
supplies were still the rule, as were the June consisting of 144 officers, 435 en-
problems generally encountered in co- listed men, and 33 civilians—a total of
ordinating a construction effort over a 612. AFWESPAC had more than 200
vast area in a short time. Some felt that engineer units numbering about 65,000
ENCOM, directing work formerly men, and within a month the figure had
handled well enough by base section risen to 90,000. Engineers made up
50 51
(1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,
II, 188-89, 196. (2) Ltr, Heiman to Staff Br, 13 II, 198. (2) Ltr, Sverdrup to Staff Br, 28 Aug 50.
Oct 50. SWPA Files. SWPA Files.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 655
one-fourth of all the troops under Philippines. The one at Puerto Prin-
AFWESPAC's command. Worsham's cesa, Palawan, was rebuilt and length-
staff was before long concerned primarily ened to 7,000 feet; on Mindanao, the
with the construction and maintenance fields at Zamboanga and Malabang were
of bases needed to support the invasion improved and enlarged; two all-weather
of Japan and with making plans and fields were built on Mindoro; four were
preparations to furnish the engineer developed in the Visayas. All told, the
troops and supplies required for that engineers rehabilitated and newly con-
assault.52 structed forty-five runways in the Philip-
pines during the first six months of
Construction in the Philippines 1945.53
The engineers generally provided new
Rehabilitation and construction in the facilities for storing gasoline. At the
Philippines surpassed anything hitherto same time they constructed or rehabili-
attempted by the engineers in the Pacific tated fueling jetties and laid more than
in a comparable period of time. Air- 500 miles of pipeline. One of the major
fields had high priority and twenty on new storage installations was the large
Luzon were repaired, improved, or tanker terminal near Mariveles on
newly constructed during the first six Bataan, from which pipelines were ex-
months of 1945. One of the fields tended to Clark and nearby airfields;
which received a great deal of attention construction progressed rapidly during
was Clark. The engineers first put the the spring of 1945, despite unfavorable
two existing runways in temporary op- weather. Before the battle for Luzon
erating condition and then began work ended, storage for 160,000 barrels had
on two new 7,000-foot runways for bomb- been erected at Mariveles and over fifty
ers. At Porac, eight miles south of miles of 6-inch pipeline installed, with
Clark and at Floridablanca (formerly aviation gasoline flowing through the
Del Carmen), four miles still farther line at the rate of 412 barrels an hour.
south, they put in new strips for bomb- The 40,000-barrel welded steel tanks at
ers, also. A great deal of effort was Mariveles, the first of which were com-
necessary to rehabilitate Nichols and pleted in August 1945, were the largest
Nielson Fields in the Manila area and to storage tanks of this type erected in the
provide them with additional facilities Southwest Pacific.
such as gasoline storage and hangars. In an extensive hospital building pro-
Most other runways on Luzon, rehabili- gram, major installations were erected
tated or constructed to meet current at Manila, San Fernando in northern
operational requirements, were not de- Luzon, and Batangas in southern Luzon.
veloped to any great extent. The engi- One of the largest projects, built on the
neers did rather extensive work on a
number of fields in the southern 53
The information in this and the following para-
graphs on the rehabilitation in the Philippines is
taken from Office of the Chief Engineer, GHQ
52
Of C Engr AFWESPAC, First Semiannual Rpt, SWPA, Annual Report for 1945. (Draft MS).
pp. 7-8. (2) Engrs of SWPA, II, pp. 176-80. SWPA Files.
656 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
site of a Japanese airfield in the Manda- The harbor was cluttered with some 600
luyong area in southeastern Manila, was sunken vessels. Reconstruction and
the first in SWPA to use prefabricated clearing began on 1 March. Floating
steel units. The main members were ponton piers were again invaluable and
prefabricated; an assembly line was used the engineers used them extensively at
to preassemble wall panels, floor joists, first to provide facilities rapidly, but
roof girders, and posts. The steel units, since these piers required a great deal of
made of special lightweight metal, were maintenance and could be used success-
20 feet wide and varied in length from fully only in well-protected harbors, the
48 to 240 feet. The floors were made of engineers rehabilitated existing facilities
plywood, the walls and ceilings of beaver- and undertook some new construction.
board, the windows of plastic. Some of They built two new fixed piers, which
these units were also erected at Fort Mc- provided eight additional berths in
Kinley Hospital. The steel units could South Harbor, and lengthened two exist-
be dismantled and then re-erected with ing piers. Pier 13 (formerly Pier 7), one
only a 5-percent loss of material, but re- of the longest covered piers in the world,
erection required considerably more was rehabilitated with the help of about
effort than putting up the wooden ones. 1,800 troops and 2,000 civilians and pro-
Warehousing was extensive. Most vided berths for six Libertys. During
storage was in the Greater Manila area, the reconstruction period, five Army
where the engineers supplied about 9 dredges excavated 3,250,000 cubic yards
million square feet of covered storage of material from North and South Har-
and some 34 million square feet of open bors and the Pasig River. The Navy,
storage. They made about 2 million meanwhile, was clearing a path through
square feet of covered storage available the wreckage in Manila Bay. The port
by rehabilitating existing buildings. was made serviceable in a relatively short
One of the largest projects was the time, the first Liberty docking on 17
quartermaster depot built on the site of March. The engineers also did harbor
the old Zablan Airfield, just east of the work at San Fernando, Subic Bay, Mari-
capital. It consisted of 31 prefabricated veles, Puerto Princesa, Zamboanga, and
buildings, each of which, measuring no Cebu City.
by 405 feet, covered slightly more than Along with the reconstruction of
an acre, and took about a week to erect. Manila Harbor, a major undertaking was
Floors were of steel mat, wood, concrete, the rehabilitation of the city itself.
or crushed stone, depending upon the Engineer construction units under
type of supplies to be stored. Bases M ENCOM took over this work from
and R also had fairly large storage Colonel Liles's command in March.
facilities. One of the first jobs to be completed was
Port areas had been severely damaged, the restoration of the water supply
especially at Manila, where the Japanese system. With the capture of Ipo and
had systematically destroyed the prewar Montalban Dams, the prewar water
berthing facilities, particularly those of pressure in north Manila was restored.
South Harbor; none were usable when By putting a 16-inch water main across
the Americans captured the dock area. the Pasig at Ayala Bridge, the engineers
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 657
partly restored water service in south Army terms a garrison force, was organ-
Manila. They were at the same time ized and made responsible for the con-
repairing the sewerage system, which was struction of the base and airfields and for
expected to be turned over to the civilian the supply of combat and garrison
authorities in the fall. The electric troops. The island commander on
power system had been so badly damaged Okinawa was Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wallace.
that large-scale reconstruction was neces- His engineer, a naval officer, was re-
sary. Power resources remained low; for sponsible for construction for the Army
a time a destroyer escort in Manila and the Navy; an Army engineer, with
Harbor was fitted up to provide 3,500 the rank of colonel, was deputy engineer.
kilowatts for the city. Work on the The Engineer Section was staffed with
electric plant and power lines was a officers and men from the 1181st Con-
time-consuming job. The engineers struction Group and from the Naval
cleared and repaired about ninety miles Construction Office, Tenth Army.
of streets. They put temporary bridges Under the command of the island engi-
across the Pasig to replace the five de- neer were Army engineer units and naval
stroyed during the fighting. They construction battalions, which were to
pulled 200 sunken boats out of the har- build the Army's and Navy's projects,
bor. In short, Manila was again made respectively. Constructing units, as-
habitable. signed to the Island Command and
Engineer units did much additional scheduled for early landings on Okinawa,
construction in various parts of the were attached to XXIV Corps and III
islands. They provided staging areas Amphibious Corps. The first engineer
for 350,000 troops and replacement units of the Island Command landed on
depots and disposition centers for D-day. Within the first month, nineteen
125,000. They successfully carried out Army engineer units and naval construc-
railroad rehabilitation, and by 11 March tion battalions had come in; more ar-
service was restored on the Manila Rail- rived in May and June. In late May
road from Lingayen Gulf to the capital. 16,000 tons of construction materials
An engineer combat battalion with the arrived for the Navy—the first large ship-
158th RCT placed sixty-five miles of the ment of such supplies to reach the
railroad on the Bicol Peninsula in opera- island. The first large shipment for the
tion. Other engineer efforts included Army was unloaded late in June. The
quick repair of seventy-four miles of slow arrival of supplies, partly caused by
railroad on Panay and a short stretch on the bitter Japanese resistance, delayed
Cebu, and attempts to speed up rehabili- airfield and base construction. The un-
tation of sawmills and cement plants. expectedly tenacious resistance also
meant that some of the engineer con-
Construction on Okinawa struction units had to be diverted to
army and corps to provide engineer sup-
The organization established on Oki- port. Tactical operations within the
nawa for construction was similar to Island Command area itself involved
those set up on other islands of the mainly elimination of snipers and skirm-
central Pacific. An island command, in ishes with small enemy groups. The
658 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
donia. The number of troops continued neer work was largely of a routine
to decline. The base command had nature.61
some 13,000 engineers in January; the The logistical build-up in support of
number was down to 1,072 by mid- the China Theater would be of little
August.60 avail if the Chinese armies proved too
weak to drive the Japanese back. Wede-
Declining CBI meyer detailed additional American in-
structors and liaison officers to Chinese
In Burma and China, engineer work armies and divisions as training activi-
was still considerable, for in early 1945 ties were stepped up. Meanwhile,
there was a possibility that fairly exten- Chennault's engineers continued work
sive operations would be undertaken on a growing number of airfields to
against the Japanese on the Asian main- replace the eastern ones overrun by the
land. The military outlook became enemy after August 1944. Resident
more favorable in the first months of the engineers supervised the building or im-
year. With the capture of Lashio by proving of nine fields east of Kunming
the Chinese on 7 March, all of northern and seven more north of the Yangtze
Burma was free, and British and Indian River and east of Chungking. When
troops continued their advance south- fighting broke out between the Japanese
ward. The Chinese armies in Burma and the Chinese in April, Chennault's
began to return to their homeland for a airmen controlled the skies. In May
showdown with the Japanese; Wede- the Japanese began a general withdrawal,
meyer hoped to strengthen them suffi- preparatory to the evacuation of southern
ciently to enable them to fight their way China. As the Chinese moved eastward
to the coast by fall. The India-Burma in June and July, they recaptured several
Theater, under Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, of Chennault's airfields which the Japa-
would for all practical purposes function nese had demolished. With the recap-
as a communications zone. Major jobs ture of Liuchow at the end of June,
for the engineers on the Asian continent Chennault flew in a detachment of the
were building additional airfields in 930th Aviation Regiment to take charge
China, improving the Ledo and Burma of restoring the heavy bomber field
Roads, and completing the system of there.62 At the same time, the engineers
pipelines. As the war progressed, it be- were increasingly engaged on a program
came apparent that decisive operations of road improvement in southern China.
would not take place in China. In the Late in April Wedemeyer directed the
last months of the war, therefore, engi- Burma Road engineers to help their
61
(1) Ltr, Col Craig Smyser, Actg Eng IBT to Gen
60
(1) Hq Constr Serv CPBC, Rpt, Summary of Johns, Of CofEngrs, 29 Jun 45. Theater Engr Ltr
Inspec, SPBC. Engr AGF PAC. (2) (Hist) Rpt, File, Constr Serv Files. (2) Charles F. Romanus and
SPBC Engr Sec. 319.1 (Misc) U.S. Army Forces in Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, UNITED
New Caledonia, KCRC. (3) Ltr, Hq SPBC to CG STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washing-
AFMIDPAC, 18 Aug 45, with Incl, Engr Tr Dis- ton, 1959), ch. V.
62
position Rpt, 15 Aug 45. 319.1 U.S. Army Forces in (1) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 344-45.
New Caledonia. (2) Hist of the 930th Engr Regt.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 663
Chinese Army counterparts rehabilitate Bhamo to Namhkan is two track and the
roads in the Anshun-Kweiyang area, and remaining portion between Namhkan
in June SOS, China Theater, detailed the and Wanting is also two track. By 15
1880th Aviation Battalion to help im- June a two track all-weather highway
prove the 600-mile post road from will exist between Ledo and Wanting." 65
Kunming eastward to Chihchiang. In The most spectacular feature of con-
June, also, the 858th Aviation Battalion struction on the road in 1945 was the
and the 71st Light Ponton Company erection of a number of bridges, particu-
arrived from Burma to help the Yunnan- larly those over the Irrawaddy, Taping,
Burma Highway Administration im- and Shweli. Pick planned to build a
prove the Burma Road. Meanwhile, the combination bridge over the Irrawaddy
191st Light Ponton Company took up to replace the ponton bridge at Myitkyina
ferry operations 260 miles east of completed in early December 1944. The
Kunming.63 new bridge was to be erected some 20
Work went ahead on the Ledo Road. miles downstream from Myitkyina at a
It will be recalled that in August 1944 point where the river was about 60 feet
the War Department had authorized deep during low water and rose as much
construction beyond Myitkyina of a one- as 40 feet during floods. Pick decided to
lane paved road only. General Pick, use H-20 girders resting on steel barges
convinced that continuous traffic could to form an 850-foot long center span.
not be maintained over such a thorough- Timber trestles would be used for the ap-
fare during the monsoon season, set out proaches. The barges, knocked down,
to widen the Ledo Road to two lanes were already in the theater, having been
throughout its length. When General sent from the United States to transport
Farrell sounded out the War Department gasoline and other supplies on the Brah-
in Washington in January 1945, he maputra. The steel parts for the center
learned that the Operations Division span, on order from the United States,
would not object to widening the road were not expected before the end of
after all. Somervell started procure- March, by which time the Irrawaddy
ment of additional H-20 bridges to make would be in flood stage. The only feasi-
possible two-way traffic beyond Myit- ble solution was to fabricate steel parts
64
kyina. Work progressed, but slowly. from such scrap metal as could be found
Early in April, Lt. Col. W. S. Chapin, of in Advance Section. In mid-January
Headquarters, Construction Service, 1945 the race against the flood waters be-
after a personal inspection of the road, gan. To assemble and launch the barges,
wrote Colonel Welling: "The highway the engineers set up a marine ways on the
from Myitkyina to Bhamo is now two river a short distance upstream from the
track. A considerable portion . . . from bridge site; at the same time, they manu-
factured on the spot the vital steel parts
63
(1) Movement Order, Hq Burma Road Engrs, 65
28 Apr 45. GED, CTSOSEF. (2) Hist of the 71st, (1) Memo, Chapin for Welling, 3 Apr 45. Opns
858th, and 1880th Engrs. Br File, Constr Serv Files, (2) Work on the Teng-
64
Memo, Kaminer, S-3 Adv Sec 3, to Pick, 6 May chung route was discontinued soon after the open-
45. Engr Sec File, LAC. ing of the Ledo Road.
664 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Myitkyina and turn over to the Chinese were putting an increasing effort into
theater the cargo space thereby released. the maintenance of airfields and the con-
Morse pushed his various projects to struction of warehouses at various fields
completion. On 7 June the first gaso- supporting the airlift to China. And
line reached Kunming through the 928- this drive was paying off. The Air
mile 4-inch line, and nine days later the Transport Command delivered more
6-inch line from Tinsukia to Myitkyina than 70,000 tons of supplies to Chinese
was complete. Twelve of the seventeen fields in July 1945. More and more,
pipeline companies in the two Asian engineer units were moving on to China,
theaters were thereafter engaged in where they were sorely needed to assist
pumping and maintaining the lines in training Chinese engineers, restoring
from Assam to Yunnan.69 the eastern airfields, improving the
Although the pipelines built were not Burma Road, holding open the roads,
as extensive as had been originally and operating ferries in the wake of the
71
planned they still made up the greatest Chinese advance toward the coast.
military pipeline system in history.
(Map 32) Counting the spur lines from Maps
Calcutta to the B-29 field in West Bengal
and the lines from Kunming to the air- Supplying the great quantities of maps
fields in Yunnan, the engineers had built, of the target areas needed for an attack
in India, Burma, and China, a continu- on the Japanese home islands was the re-
ous pipeline system, with some 3,300 sponsibility of the engineers of the
miles of pipe and 148 pumping stations. Southwest Pacific and the Pacific Ocean
During the last two years of the war, Areas, the two theaters charged with the
engineer troops operating this enormous final assault on Japan. When AFPAC
network handled over 15,600,000 barrels was formed, in April 1945, the number
of gasoline and diesel oil. Most of this of mapping units in the Pacific was fairly
fuel was consumed either in port activi- adequate for the amount of work to be
ties at Calcutta or in aerial operations done at that time. In the Southwest
from B-29 Bases in West Bengal or at Pacific, the mapping organization had
the transport fields in Assam. The two reached a strength of approximately
6-inch lines delivered some 3,600,000 6,000 men. All tactical units had their
barrels to the Tinsukia tank farm. normal complement of topographic
From there, about 2,600,000 barrels troops, except Eighth Army, which had
went to various points along the Ledo only a corps topographic company. From
Road and approximately 462,000 barrels mid-February to mid-April, the 648th
to points inside China.70 Topographic Battalion, together with its
By mid-1945, the engineers in India base map plant, moved from Melbourne
to Manila. The battalion was installed
69
(1) Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. E,
71
p. 17. (2) Hq Constr Serv Pipeline Progr Rpts, 1 (1) Ltr, Covell to Pick, 26 Apr 45. Admin Br
May and 3 Jun 45. 678 (In). File, Constr Serv Files. (2) G-4, IBT, Weekly Rpts,
70
(1) Hq IBT, Hist of IBT, app. 10. (2) Leslie 29 Jul, 5 Aug, 12 Aug, and 19 Aug 45. (3) Ltr,
Anders, "American CBI Pipe Lines," The Military Welling to Johns, 2 Aug 45. Admin Br File, Constr
Engineer, XLV (May-June, 1953), 618-71. Serv Files.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 667
MAP 32
U.S. Geological Survey had arrived in ments of the Fourteenth Air Force, op-
Honolulu, their job to prepare terrain erating from China. Among the lesser
studies of areas in the Pacific likely to contributors were Navy fliers who ob-
come under attack. Their assignments tained photographs while making strikes
were similar to those of the teams of against the Japanese home islands.
geologists who had gone to the Southwest Lack of co-ordination among so many
Pacific earlier that year. Responsible to sources hampered efforts to secure ade-
Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Loper, the Engi- quate photographic coverage of Japan
neering and Terrain Intelligence Team, proper and to distribute the photographs
as the group was called, prepared studies promptly to the map-making units.
as needed by tactical commanders. The To improve this state of affairs, repre-
first request was for data on the beaches sentatives of the various theaters and of
and offshore conditions on Iwo Jima. agencies in the United States concerned
In preparation for the Okinawa cam- with mapping held a conference in Ha-
paign, about twenty-five studies were waii in May. Among those represented
prepared for Tenth Army. Thereafter were AFPAC, CINCPOA, the Army Air
the intelligence team devoted its efforts Forces, the Strategic Air Forces, the Of-
mainly to gathering information on the fice of the Chief of Engineers, and the
terrain of southern Kyushu, one of the Army Map Service. Agreements were
Japanese home islands. Peak strength of reached on all important matters, in-
the team was 13 and included 10 geolo- cluding the areas of Japan to be mapped,
gists, 2 soil scientists, and a highway en- the types of maps to be made, the scales
gineer.74 to be used, and the priorities in which
Maps made before the war gave a fairly maps were to be produced. Specifications
good coverage of Japan, but the need to for aerial photographs were defined.
bring them up to date was urgent. The Responsibilities for the compilation, re-
most pressing need was to co-ordinate ef- production, and distribution of maps
forts of the photographic units which were assigned. MacArthur was to have
were bringing back aerial photographs primary responsibility for the control and
of the Japanese home islands. Numer- co-ordination of the mapping of the
ous sources were supplying photography. Japanese home islands, since he was to
The four main ones were squadrons of be primarily responsible for combat in
the Far East Air Forces, based in the any invasion. Co-ordination of mapping
Philippines; units of the Strategic Air in the Southwest Pacific and the Pacific
Forces, which took off from the Marianas Ocean Areas was brought about by mak-
and Okinawa; Marine photographic ing Loper, engineer of USAFPOA, the
squadrons, which likewise took off from head of Casey's Intelligence Division.
the Marianas and Okinawa; and ele- Meanwhile, the mapping of the Jap-
anese home islands was proceeding satis-
factorily. By early June accurate maps
74
(1) Hist of Engrg and Terrain Intel Team. of the four main islands, based largely
SWPA File I19. (2) Memo, Sherman K. Neuschel,
C Geological Surveys Br U.S. Geological Surveys, for
on prewar material, were available. Re-
C Staff Br, 16 Nov 48. SWPA Files. visions, based on aerial photography,
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 669
tion.77 Interest in depot groups was not with block and tackle.79 A second ves-
strong, and few engineers seemed to be sel, the Armand Considere, a concrete
aware of their value. "As I have said steamship operated by civilians, helped
several times," General Ross wrote to supply Eighth Army engineer units in
Sverdrup on 19 February, "I am still of the southern Philippines. Spare parts
the opinion that the Corps of Engineers were also shipped by air.80 Two marine
is not yet supply minded. . . . The need spare parts depots were opened—one in
for construction groups, brigades . . . Tacloban and another in Manila. The
and other supervisory groups is well rec- "floating warehouse" system was also
ognized and pushed . . . the need for used for marine parts. A barge, the
supply supervisory groups is even more Douglas Fir, operated by a crew of men
necessary. . . ." 78 from the 2d Special Brigade, supplied
81
The distribution of spare parts im- spare parts to amphibian units.
proved during the Philippine campaign, The maintenance of equipment im-
due partly to the arrival of larger quan- proved considerably during the Philip-
tities from the United States and partly pine campaign, mainly because the
to better distribution in the theater. To number of maintenance companies was
facilitate distribution to units in forward increased. An engineer "service center"
areas, the engineers used ships stocked was opened in Manila, where a number
with spare parts and known as "floating of heavy shop and maintenance com-
depots." A Liberty ship, the Robert panies were installed and given the job
Louis Stevenson, the first floating depot of putting equipment back in shape. To
to be used by the engineers, was ready in facilitate repair in the forward areas dur-
time for the Leyte operation. Three of ing operations in the Philippines, a
the holds were assigned to the engineers heavy shop company was installed on a
and two to ordnance. Bins between the concrete barge and did fifth echelon
decks of the three hatches held loose maintenance.82
items and boxed spare parts were In the central Pacific, most of the diffi-
stored in the holds. Since there had culties that had plagued the engineers
been little time for remodeling, certain in 1944 continued on into 1945. Al-
deficiencies were more or less to be ex- though the quantity of stocks arriving
pected. There was no ventilating sys- from the United States increased, prob-
tem between decks and no stairwell be- lems of distribution remained. Still all
tween the top deck and the section of too common, especially in the forward
the ship where the binned parts were areas, were the shortage of trained per-
kept. All parts had to be handled by sonnel and inadequate stock control.
ships tackle or an improvised A-frame
79
Memo, Dawson for Sverdrup, 8 Oct 44. SWPA
File 166.
80
Memo, Capt Ralph Hartzler, Sup Div Of C Engr
77
GHQ AFPAC Pac Warfare Bd Rpt No. 33, 13 SWPA, for Dawson, 7 May 45. SWPA File M135.
81
Aug 45, AGF Questionnaire—Engr Sec. SWPA File Memo, Sup Div Of C Engr GHQ SWPA for
E123. Sverdrup, 9 Dec 44. SWPA File 223.
78 82
Ltr, Ross to Sverdrup, 19 Feb 45. SWPA File Of C Engr GHQ, SWPA, Annual Rpt for 1945,
M306. Sup Sec. (Draft MS). SWPA File A33.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 671
ment would mean the withdrawal of men Planning for the Invasion of Japan
and equipment from active operations,
but since the total would be less than 1 Preliminary Planning for Kyushu
percent, the effect on operations would
be negligible. The chief engineer of Planning for the invasion of the Japa-
USASOS and the engineers of Sixth and nese home islands was first undertaken
Eighth Armies and FEAF were not in by the engineers of the Southwest Pacific
favor of setting up the school because of late in 1944. On 12 December, General
the pressure of operational responsibili- Whitlock, MacArthur's G-4, asked Act-
ties. They felt it would be preferable ing Chief Engineer Sverdrup for a pre-
to continue the engineer schools already liminary estimate of engineer needs to
in progress and possibly expand further support a force of more than 500,000
the Equipment Maintenance School al- men who would land on Kyushu, south-
ready functioning at Base B as part of ernmost of the four main islands of
the USASOS specialist training center.85 Japan. After the assault, the engineers
General Casey's office, however, began would construct three bases on Kyushu
planning in late 1944 for a central theater to support subsequent operations in the
school. The object was to organize the Japanese home islands. No date was set
school in New Guinea as soon as possible for the assault.87
and establish it in the Philippines, pref- At that time, the engineers had little
erably near Manila. Organization pro- information on Kyushu aside from what
ceeded slowly. A commandant was they could get from maps and the
appointed who prepared a curriculum sketchy published data on hand. They
and obtained instructional material from therefore had to estimate their require-
the United States. By 15 March 1945 a ments from the size of the invasion force.
tentative course of instruction had been The construction required would be the
worked out, and in July a site for the most extensive for any operation in the
school was found at Clark Field, about Pacific so far. Estimates, prepared in
fifty-five miles from Manila. Actual in- about a week, called for eleven runways
struction did not begin until 3 Septem- to support thirty air groups. Exact in-
ber 1945. The engineer school was thus formation on Japanese airfields on south-
a long time in getting under way. The ern Kyushu was lacking; the assumption
differences of opinion regarding the ad- was that existing fields would be almost
visability of having the school, the diffi- completely destroyed and that new con-
culties in getting qualified instructors struction would amount to approxi-
and suitable training equipment, and the mately 90 percent of the total. Two
shortage of facilities to transport the 4,000-foot dry-weather strips for fighters
students to the school all had delayed its could probably be provided from exist-
establishment.86 ing fields in three days; three 6,000-foot
85
(1) Check Sheet, Sverdrup to G-3 GHQ SWPA, USAFFE, 26 Jan 45. SWPA File 50. (2) Of C Engr
11Nov 44. SWPA File 52. (2) Of C Engr GHQ GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 210-11.
87
AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 209-10. Check Sheet, G-4 GHQ SWPA for Sverdrup, 12
86
(1) Memo, Sverdrup for AG GHQ and G-3 Dec 44. SWPA File T19.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 673
89
runways for six groups of aircraft, by the sary for American aircraft. It ap-
end of two weeks. Storage for 576,000 peared that amphibious operations
barrels of aviation gasoline could prob- would be moderately difficult on the
ably be readied in four months. Esti- assault beaches tentatively scheduled for
mates were that repair and improvement landings near the town of Kushikino on
of some 500 miles of roads would be Kyushu's western coast and near the town
necessary. A port capacity of between of Shibushi on Ariake Bay on the island's
500,000 and 600,000 long tons a month southeastern coast. Extensive use of
would probably be needed, with port floating piers would probably be neces-
facilities consisting of either wharves or sary at both places. Southern Kyushu
lighter jetties. Widespread destruction had few good harbors. Casey recom-
would result if the Japanese made their mended that the industrial city of Kago-
usual suicidal stand; probably few sup- shima, about 20 miles southeast of
plies would be available locally and great Kushikino, and at the head of Kagoshima
quantities would have to be shipped in. Bay, be developed to provide a port
Perhaps 20 percent of needs could be capacity of about 6,500 long tons a day.
procured in Japan. USASOS would be Information on roads and railroads was
responsible for logistic support and meager, but it was believed the road net
would use one or more service com- would be adequate if it could be main-
mands.88 tained. The single-track railroad had
Planning progressed slowly during the many tunnels and would probably be
winter. On 17 February Casey, just re- blocked in many places.
turned to his post as MacArthur's chief
engineer, wrote General Whitlock that a Preliminary Planning for Honshu
terrain study of southern Kyushu was
under way, with a view to determining Two days after reporting to General
general locations for facilities and the Whitlock on the engineers' progress in
feasibility of construction. The task planning for the invasion of Kyushu,
was difficult since no aerial photography Casey received a request for a similar
was available and all conclusions had to estimate for requirements to support an
be based on maps and published data, assault against Honshu in the Tokyo-
which, Casey stated, did not ". . . permit Yokohama area, the industrial heart of
accurate location of existing installations Japan. Tentative plans called for a
or possible sites for construction, par- landing at Sagami Bay, southwest of
ticularly with reference to airfields, of Tokyo, and on Honshu's Pacific coast
which a large number will be neces- east of the capital. The attacking forces
sary. . . ." Although a considerable would advance northeastward and north-
number of airfields were reportedly in westward, isolate Tokyo, and then drive
the area, many were believed to be too the Japanese armed forces to the outlying
small to be expanded to the sizes neces- parts of the island, where they would
88 89
Check Sheet, Sverdrup for G-4, 20 Dec 44. Check Sheet, Casey for G-4 GHQ SWPA, 17 Feb
SWPA File T19. 45. SWPA File T19.
674 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MAP 33
trial heart of Japan." AFWESPAC was and moved to Kyushu as soon as possible.
to furnish all supplies for Army units The date for the operation was set for
mounted from the Philippines; Army 1 November 1945.
Forces Middle Pacific was to supply units Estimates called for a sizable engineer
mounted from the central Pacific area.94 force to support OLYMPIC. The engi-
AFWESPAC's Logistic Instructions No. neers were to number 117,570 out of a
1 for the OLYMPIC operation provided total assault force of 549,503 men, or
for the organization of an army service about 21.4 percent of the total. Am-
command from AFWESPAC personnel phibian engineers, including the 2d, 3d,
who would be transferred to Sixth Army and 4th Special Brigades, and combat
engineers would total approximately
94
(1) USAFPOA was redesignated AFMIDPAC in 50,159 men out of 252,150, or 20 percent
July. (2) AFWESPAC Logistic Instructions No. 1 of the total combat troops. Service and
for the OLYMPIC Opn, 16 Jul 45. SWPA File T15.
(3) Hq AFWESPAC, Engr Base Development Plan,
Air Forces engineers would total 67,408
17 Jul 45. SWPA File T30. men out of 297,353, or 22.6 percent of the
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 677
total service troops. These figures were east coast would probably mean that
95
exclusive of the marines. Tokyo and Yokohama would be cap-
As far as the engineers were concerned, tured later—possibly not till ninety or
the most important part of the plan for more days after the first landing. This
OLYMPIC pertained to construction of would mean that more extensive tempo-
the three bases. Kushikino, to support rary port facilities would have to be built
400,000 men, was to be the largest. Here during the first days of the landing—two
the engineers were to build berths for artificial harbors might even have to be
ten Liberty ships, storage for 205,000 constructed. With regard to the lines
barrels of gasoline, 220 miles of roads, of communication, no great changes were
7,500,000 square feet of storage, three anticipated. Probably only the phasing
hospitals with 13,250 beds, and two all- would have to be altered. The eastern
weather runways. The second largest highways and railroads would have to be
base was to be at Shibushi, to support rehabilitated first, but the effort required
185,000 men; it would have similar but would probably not be so great initially
less extensive facilities. The third and because of the fewer roads and railroads
smallest base was to be at Miyazaki, to east of Tokyo. A larger number of air-
support 135,000 men.96 fields would have to be built east of the
capital, and construction problems there
Additional Planning for Honshu would probably be more complicated be-
cause of the many rice paddies. More
Meanwhile, work was continuing on storage would have to be provided in the
the plans for the invasion of Honshu, eastern areas. The total engineer ton-
which had received the code name nages sent in would undoubtedly remain
CORONET. A major problem was revis- more or less the same, but the phasing of
ing engineer estimates to keep pace with shipments would have to be radically
the changing concepts of the operation. changed. Three special brigades would
In late June plans called for making two take part in the CORONET operation.97
landings on the Honshu coast east of On 7 August Casey's planners finished
Tokyo on Y-day, one by an army, the a preliminary draft of the Engineer an-
other by at least two corps. A landing nex to the CORONET operations instruc-
would be made at Sagami Bay thirty days tions. Though estimates were not final-
later. For the engineers these changes ized, an idea of the vast scope of the
meant that estimates regarding port con- contemplated program may be derived
struction and reconstruction would have from a partial enumeration of the
to be revised. An initial attack on the planned facilities. Eleven all-weather
runways were to be completed in 3
95
months; 171 lighter berths, seven float-
(1) Memo for Rcd, Lt Col John H. Ericson,
Opns Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 31 July 45. SWPA ing Liberty berths, and 7,800,000 square
File T20. (2) Check Sheet, Casey to G-4 GHQ
SWPA, 28 May 45. SWPA File T19. (3) Of C Engr
97
GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, IV, 692-93. Memo, Maj R. S. Kramer, Opns Of C Engr
96
GHQ SWPA, Basic Plan for OLYMPIC Opn, an. GHQ SWPA for Col Buehler, C Opns, 27 Jun 45.
4, Basic Logistic Plan. SWPA File T18. SWPA File T20.
678 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
98 99
(1) Draft Annex (Engr) for CORONET Opn. GHQ AFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for BLACKLIST
SWPA File T33. (2) Memo for Rcd, Ericson, 31 Opns to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea After Sur-
Jul 45. SWPA File T20. render or Collapse. SWPA File T36.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 679
Atsugi airfield on 30 August, the occupa- and general service regiments were such
tion of the Japanese home islands began units as special shop battalions, pipeline
and the BLACKLIST plan went in effect. operating detachments, model-making
Three days later, the official surrender detachments, foundry teams, photomap-
ceremony took place aboard the battle- ping teams, technical intelligence teams,
ship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. dredge crews, and port construction and
repair groups. But even with the great
Conclusion expansion in personnel and the multipli-
cation of specialized units, there were
The long war against Japan was over. never enough engineer troops. To do
In few conflicts had military engineers the great amount of work for which they
played so important a role as in this one. were responsible, the engineers wherever
Engineers of the United States Army possible used civilians as well as troops.
had been active in an immense area. Within the United States and its pos-
From the barren reaches of Alaska to sessions they engaged contractors and re-
the deserts of Australia, from remote cruited workmen. Overseas, foreign
islands of the South Pacific to China and governments employed local contractors
India, they had furnished the engineer and furnished workmen to do the build-
combat and logistic support necessary ing for the U.S. Army behind the front
for victory. Thousands of miles from lines, while the engineers furnished the
the United States, they had worked and technical supervision. In some areas
fought in regions consisting for the most natives, scarcely out of the stone age and
part of deserts, jungles, coral atolls, sub- little acquainted with modern civiliza-
arctic wastes, and isolated areas cut off tion, helped build the facilities the Army
from the outside world by lofty moun- needed.
tain chains. They had been an integral The absence of modern industry in
and vital part of a complex and far- much of the world where the war with
flung organization. Japan was fought, the vast extent of the
The story of the engineers in World theaters of operations, and the lack of
War II is one of greatly expanded activi- long-range planning for a struggle in
ties and unprecedented growth. In numerous overseas theaters greatly com-
1939 the Corps had 12 units, 10 of them plicated the most important of all engi-
combat, 2 of them topographic. By mid- neer tasks—construction. One of the
1940 the number of units had risen to most exasperating problems, particu-
25, of which 18 were combat. By the larly in the Southwest Pacific, was the
time Japan surrendered, there were, in shortage of building materials, a shortage
the Pacific alone, 700 units, totaling arising from the inadequacy of such sup-
235,764 men in an army of 1,458,911. plies in the United States, the shortage
Many of the new organizations were of shipping to overseas theaters, and the
highly specialized and responsible for inadequate amounts of materials in the
missions which new technological devel- overseas theaters themselves. In an at-
opments had made necessary. Along- tempt to make up for deficiencies in the
side the traditional combat battalions many theaters, the engineers had to use
680 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
materials locally available and resort ex- India, and Burma. This was sometimes
tensively to improvising. Designs were a complex matter, calling for a good deal
simplified, and flimsier, though still ade- of ingenuity and a better than average
quate, types of construction were used. understanding of the national back-
More efficient designs were developed ground and character. Even with the
for many kinds of installations—runways great technological advances, men were
were not crossed but built in parallel, still important; the success of the war
more suitable oil pumping machinery effort depended on the co-operation of
and pipelines were devised for the com- many millions.
bat zones, and, to a greater extent, pre- The war was not fought without cer-
fabricated buildings were used. Local tain shortcomings, notably in organiza-
materials, some of them little known tion, becoming manifest. A continual
before the war, were utilized to the handicap was the shortage of units, espe-
greatest extent possible. Coral was a cially in the combat areas, where civil-
godsend on the islands of the Pacific and ians, even if available, could not be
native-type thatched roof huts served employed to bolster the work force.
many a useful purpose. In their battle Shortages of troops existed everywhere,
to furnish the facilities the Army needed except on the Alcan Highway and pos-
not the least of the Engineer tasks was to sibly in the Hawaiian Islands, during
curb unnecessary and sometimes extrava- the first two years of the conflict. They
gant construction, which various ele- were particularly severe in the China-
ments of the Army, for one reason or Burma-India theater and in the South-
another, insisted on having. west Pacific, where a number of
Of great importance was obtaining the engineers cited the continual shortage of
co-operation of other organizations to troops as their greatest problem.
accomplish the Engineer mission. In Equally difficult was the getting of indi-
the Pacific Ocean Area, for example, a vidual replacements to bring up to
continuing problem was the co-ordina- strength the depleted units in the over-
tion of Army engineer and Navy con- seas theaters. It was even harder to
struction activities, a co-ordination, on secure qualified, well-trained replace-
the whole, successfully accomplished. ments. The big cry was for great num-
Highly important, too, was winning the bers of well-qualified men and units—a
co-operation of the engineers of the goal difficult, if not impossible, of
Allied armies, a feat achieved with vary- achievement in modern war.
ing degrees of success. It was easiest to Since the war against Japan was
secure by far with the armed forces of the fought over a much larger area than had
members of the British Commonwealth; been anticipated and in regions where
more difficult, if the national back- so much unexpected engineer work had
grounds were quite different from the to be done, it is hardly surprising that a
American. Of equally great importance "balanced" engineer force was seldom
was making the best possible use of the attained. There were sometimes too
available civilian forces—particularly in many units of one type and more often
rear areas, as, for example, Australia, not enough of another; on the whole,
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 681
there were more than enough combat theaters where a great variety of work
and camouflage units but far too few had to be done was how best to assign
construction and supply units. This engineer units to the various commands;
being the case, units were put on con- the problem was particularly difficult
struction and supply jobs, even though with regard to the aviation engineer
not trained for or experienced in such battalions, considered theoretically a
work—this was especially true in the component part of the Army Air Forces.
South and Southwest Pacific. A make- Engaged in vital construction as the avia-
shift arrangement, it was the best one tion battalions were, it was sometimes
possible under the conditions, but did debatable whether they should be as-
not make for efficient operations. signed to the Air Forces exclusively or
In a war of rapid movement over great to other commands as needed, particu-
expanses, particularly the kind being larly the Services of Supply. The basic
fought in the Southwest Pacific from policy, on the whole, was that under
Australia to the Philippines, various emergency conditions, where there was
problems in organization arose, one of much work with few troops to do it, all
the most important being to achieve engineer units should be utilized and as-
flexibility of organization. To provide signed as the theater commander thought
such flexibility the group type of organi- best, regardless of the regulations auto-
zation—exemplified by construction bri- matically assigning certain types of units
gades, construction groups, and combat to certain commands. Another problem
groups—was developed and used to an was whether to put engineer construction
ever greater extent. Each type of group and supply activities in the field under
had a headquarters to which units were base commanders and have the engineers
assigned for a particular task; upon exercise only technical supervision or
completion of the task some units were whether to set up a separate engineer
transferred out and others were assigned construction command as was done in
for the next, and somewhat different, the Southwest Pacific and in part of the
task. Such relatively large, stable, and China-Burma-India theater. Here a
unwieldy units as the general service comparison of results appeared to be in-
regiments were not well suited for a conclusive. Having engineer construc-
war of movement on an extensive scale. tion and supply in the field carried on
In addition to the fluid group type of under the direction of base commanders
organization, which could be adapted to seemed to be a satisfactory arrangement,
the work at hand, the Southwest Pacific provided such commanders had a broad
made use of the army service commands understanding of their mission and gave
designed to begin extensive construction adequate support to the construction
and logistical support in the forward effort. While a separate engineer com-
areas at any early date; here again service mand would assure adequate support to
units were assigned to a large and flexible construction, it was sometimes difficult
organization for work in a combat zone to co-ordinate the responsibilities of such
in accordance with needs. a command with those of the base
A matter of continuing controversy in sections and combat elements.
682 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
capacity she was roughly the equal of engineer after action reports stated that
Belgium. The plan of the Japanese the terrain was more of an obstacle than
leaders was to wage a limited war. They the enemy. From the engineer stand-
did not propose to invade the American point, the war was as much a conquest
mainland or even the Hawaiian Islands. of geography as of the Japanese.
It was their intention to destroy the Despite deficiencies, which were more
U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor, defeat the or less unavoidable, the Engineer mis-
Allied forces in the western Pacific, get sion was successfully accomplished.
control of the islands there, and trans- The amount of work done was tre-
form them into powerful defensive mendous. That so much was done was
barriers. The Japanese hoped the Allies in no small measure due to the courage
would not be able to break through the and skill of all ranks. Morale was gen-
barriers, even after long and bitter fight- erally high; as in the rest of the Army,
ing. A compromise peace would result. there was an overriding determination to
This might have been the course of the defeat Japan. Officers and men alike
war had it not been for the overwhelm- worked long hours, made the best use of
ing technological superiority of the the resources at hand, and adapted them-
United States, a superiority that became selves to new ways of doing things.
more marked as the conflict continued. Once the tide of war had turned at the
The battleship, the aircraft carrier, the Battle of Midway in 1942, there was
airplane, and the bulldozer made scarcely any doubt as to the outcome of
Japan's defeat inevitable. Innumerable the conflict.
Appendix A
U.S. ARMY AND ARMY ENGINEER PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN OVERSEAS THEATERS
a
1 JANUARY 1942-1 OCTOBER 1945
a
The top figure for each month indicates over-all Army strength; the lower figure, Engineer strength. Figures are for the first of
the month.
b
Theaters for which the figure 0 is given may have had some U.S. Army and Engineer personnel, but if so, the number was too
small to appear on War Department statistical tables.
c
Personnel strengths of the U.S. Army and the Engineers in the Philippines on 1 January and 1 April 1942 are not included
in the Southwest Pacific figures.
d
Combined figures for Central Pacific and South Pacific Theaters.
e
Combined figures for Central Pacific, South Pacific, and Southwest Pacific Theaters.
Appendix B
TYPES OF ENGINEER UNITS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS
29 officers, 501 enlisted men.1 Equip- 66 officers, 1 warrant officer, 2,160 en-
ped with light machinery, this unit pre- listed men. This large unit was organ-
pared captured airdromes, usually ized, trained, and equipped in the early
located behind enemy lines, for early use days of the defense build-up. It con-
by Army Air Forces. It was sometimes structed, repaired, maintained, camou-
flown in to clear landing strips when flaged, and defended airfields wherever
regular aviation battalions, because of such work was concentrated in a small
their heavy equipment, could not be area. The battalions of the regiment
used. were the same as regular aviation
battalions.
Aviation Battalion
Headquarters and Headquarters
33 officers, 744 enlisted men. The Company,
basic engineer construction unit of the Base Depot Group
Army Air Forces. It was completely
equipped to construct an airfield and all 11 officers, 2 warrant officers, 62 en-
its appurtenances. It might also be listed men. Provided the overhead
called upon to camouflage, maintain, and needed to supervise the operations of an
defend airfields. engineer base depot group. Normally
such a group was at or near a port of
Aviation Company, Separate debarkation. The headquarters and
headquarters company with its attached
5 officers, 171 enlisted men. Similar troops operated either the engineer
in organization to a company of a combat section of a general base depot or an
battalion, but with more machinery for engineer base depot. One or more of
runway construction. the following units were attached: base
depot company, heavy shop company,
base equipment company, parts supply
1
Since most engineer units underwent reorganiza- platoon or company, gas generating unit,
tion during the war, the strength figures for officers quartermaster truck company.
and enlisted men are approximate and are, as a rule,
those in effect in the closing months of the war.
Information is based on data contained in Engineer Base Equipment Company
Field Manuals FM 5-5, 31 January 1941 and 11
October 1943, with changes; Office of the Chief Engi-
neer, GHQ SWPA, Engineer Estimating Data, 1 June 5 officers, 168 enlisted men. This
1945; and TOE's published during World War II. unit, usually located at or near an engi-
686 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
neer depot, made various types of heavy the operations of corps and army combat
construction equipment available to engineer troops. The composition of
engineer units on a loan basis. Skilled the group was determined by the engi-
operators were sometimes sent with the neer mission and the units and facilities
equipment. available.
6 officers, 185 enlisted men. A mobile 7 officers, 209 enlisted men. The pri-
unit, the maintenance company had as its mary mission of this unit was to design,
primary mission third echelon mainte- construct, operate, and maintain military
nance of all equipment, including that pipeline systems for transporting, dis-
used by other arms and services, for tributing, and storing gasoline in a the-
which the Corps of Engineers had ater of operations.
APPENDIX B 689
18 officers, 803 enlisted men. Oper- 19 officers, 3 warrant officers, 404 en-
ated trains and yards of a railway divi- listed men. This unit had the mission
sion, maintained tracks and structures, of furnishing adequate map information
and repaired equipment. A battalion for tactical and strategical requirements
might also be assigned the operation and for an army and established and ex-
maintenance of a large railway terminal tended horizontal and vertical control
or regulating station. Railway battal- for army and corps requirements. It
ions were transferred to the newly organ- was the organization trained and
ized Transportation Corps in November equipped to prepare and reproduce
1942. photomaps, maps of limited areas, over-
690 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
World War II, were received from Islands, Engineer files of the Southwest
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Caribbean, Pacific Area which are not in the custody
Fort Amador, Canal Zone, and are at of the Engineer Historical Division, files
present in the custody of the Engineer of G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Engineer files of
Historical Division. the South Pacific Area, Engineer files of
6. Alcan Files include original reports, the Caribbean Defense Command and
letters, and various papers or photostatic of Panama and the surrounding areas,
copies thereof pertaining to the con- and files of the CBI.
struction of the Alcan Highway, ob- 10. The U.S. Air Force Historical
tained, for the most part, from the Office Division, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala-
of the Chief of Engineers. These files bama, has custody of Army Air Force
are at present in the Engineer Historical Unit Historical Reports for the war
Division. period.
7. Canol Files include original reports, 11. The Office, Chief of Military His-
letters, and various papers or photostatic tory, Washington, D.C., has a number of
copies thereof pertaining to the con- documents and narratives in manuscript
struction of Canol, obtained, for the most form pertaining to Engineer operations
part, from the Office of the Chief of overseas during World War II.
Engineers. These files are at present in 12. The Hawaii War Records Deposi-
the Engineer Historical Division. tory, University of Hawaii, Honolulu,
8. The National Archives and Records contains a few documents not found else-
Service is the depository for unit his- where pertaining to activities of the
tories, after action reports of units Corps of Engineers in Hawaii during
which served overseas, files of Engineer World War II.
offices in the United States and the out-
lying territories, Army Air Forces Cen- Published Works
tral Files, files of the War Plans Division
and the Operations Division, G-4, files, A number of published works which
files of the Alaska Defense Command, shed light on Engineer operations, par-
and some files of the China-Burma-India ticularly their interconnection with other
theater (CBI). Material containing file Army and other service activities, have
designations but for which no depository been used in the preparation of this
is given is located in National Archives volume. Listed here are those of a spe-
Records Service. cial value, but this list is by no means
9. The Federal Records Center, Gen- all-inclusive.
eral Services Administration, Kansas 1. UNITED STATES ARMY IN
City, Missouri, contains retired files from WORLD WAR II—various volumes of
all types of Engineer offices and units this series (some of them in manuscript
which served overseas and in the United form) dealing with the War Department,
States in World War II. Included are the defense of the Western Hemisphere,
files of the Engineer, Army Ground the war in the Pacific, and the China-
Forces, Pacific, consisting of the files of Burma-India theater, have been exten-
the Engineer offices in the Hawaiian sively used to furnish background mate-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 693
Pacific War (New York: Duell, Sloan and with the war in the Pacific (Boston:
Pearce, 1949). Little, Brown and Company, 1948-60).
8. Krueger, Walter, From Down 11. Smith, Holland M., Coral and
Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Brass (New York: Charles Scribner's
Army in World War II (Washington: Sons, 1949).
Combat Forces Press, 1953). 12. Stilwell, Joseph W., The Stilwell
9. Marshall, S. L. A., Island Victory Papers (New York: William Sloane As-
(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, sociates, 1948).
1944). 13. Wainwright, Jonathan M., Gen-
10. Morison, Samuel Eliot, "History eral Wainwright's Story (New York:
of United States Naval Operations in Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946).
World War II," nine volumes dealing
List of Abbreviations
AAF Army Air Forces
ABDA American, British, Dutch, Australian
AC Air Corps
ACofEngrs Assistant Chief of Engineers
ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff
ADC Alaska Defense Command
Adj Adjutant
Admin Administrative
Adv Advance
AF Air Force
AFB Air Force base
AFMIDPAC Army Forces, Middle Pacific
AFPAC Army Forces, Pacific
AFWESPAC Army Forces, Western Pacific
AG Adjutant General
AGF Army Ground Forces
AGO Adjutant General's Office
AIF Australian Imperial Forces
ALF Allied Land Forces
AMF Australian Military Forces
AMMISCA American Military Mission to China
Amphib Amphibious
AMS Army Map Service
ANMB Army and Navy Munitions Board
an. Annex
APA Transport, attack
Appns Appropriations
AreaO Area officer
Arty Artillery
ASF Army Service Forces
ATC Air Transport Command
ATIS Allied Translator and Interpreter Service
Aust Australian
AUS Army of the United States
AVG American Volunteer Group
Avn Aviation
AWC Allied Works Council
AWS Aircraft Warning Service
Bd Board
BLT Battalion landing team
Br Branch
C Chief
696 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
CA Coast Artillery
CAA Civil Aeronautics Authority
CBI China-Burma-India
CCC Civilian Conservation Corps
CDC Caribbean Defense Command
CE Corps of Engineers
CG Commanding general
Chmn Chairman
Cmte Committee
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CO Commanding officer
Co Company
CofAC Chief of Air Corps
CofEngrs Chief of Engineers
CofS Chief of Staff
Com Communications
Comd Command
Comdr Commander
COMINCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
CONCOR Construction Corps of the Philippines
Conf Conference
Cong Congress
Constr Construction
Corresp Correspondence
COSC Combined Operational Service Command
CPA Central Pacific Area
CPBC Central Pacific Base Command
CPFF Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee
CQM Constructing quartermaster
DCofAS Deputy Chief of Air Staff
DCofS Deputy Chief of Staff
Dep Deputy
Dept Department
DF Disposition form
Dir Director
Dist District
Distr Distribution
Div Division
Dukw 2½-ton 6x6 amphibian truck
EBSR Engineer boat and shore regiment
Ech Echelon
EHD Engineer Historical Division
EinC Engineer in charge
EM Enlisted men
ENCOM Engineer Construction Command
Engr Engineer
ESB Engineer special brigade
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 697
ExecO Executive officer
FEAF Far East Air Force
FEC Far East Command
FO Field orders
FWA Federal Works Agency
FY Fiscal year
G-1 Personnel section of divisional or higher staff
G-2 Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff
G-3 Operations section of divisional or higher staff
G-4 Supply section of divisional or higher staff
GENED General Engineer District
GHQ General headquarters
GO General orders
GS General Service
H House
HD Hawaiian Department
Hist Historical; history
Hq Headquarters
HR House of Representatives
IB India-Burma
IBT India-Burma Theater
IG Inspector General
IGD Inspector General's Department
Incl Inclosure
Ind Indorsement
Inspec Inspection
Instal Installation
INTERSEC Intermediate Section
Interv Interview
Intl International
J-1 Personnel Section of Joint Army-Navy Staff
J-2 Intelligence Section of Joint Army-Navy Staff
J-3 Operations Section of Joint Army-Navy Staff
J-4 Supply Section of Joint Army-Navy Staff
JB Joint Board
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jnl Journal
KCRC Kansas City Records Center
LCI Landing craft, infantry
LCM Landing craft, mechanized
LCT Landing craft, tank
LCVP Landing craft, vehicle, personnel
Legis Legislative
LHQ Allied Land Headquarters
LST Landing ship, tank
LUZED Luzon Engineer District
Maint Maintenance
698 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
MID Military Intelligence Division
Mil Military
Min Minutes
Mtg Meeting
n.d. No date
NGF New Guinea Force
NLF North Luzon Force
NPD North Pacific Division
OCAAF Office of the Chief of the Army Air Forces
OCE Office of the Chief of Engineers
OCG Office of the commanding general
Of Office
Of C Engr Office of the Chief Engineer
Off Officer
OI Operations instructions
OinC Officer in charge
OPD Operations Division
Opns Operations
Orgn Organization
OUSW Office of the Under Secretary of War
Pan Panama
PCD Panama Canal Department
Pers Personnel
Phil Philippine
Plng Planning
POA Pacific Ocean Area
PRA Public Roads Administration
Prelim Preliminary
Proc Procurement
Prog Program
Proj Project
Prov Provisional
pt. Part
PT Motor torpedo boat
QM Quartermaster
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
Rad Radiogram
RAE Royal Australian Engineers
RAF Royal Air Force
RAN Royal Australian Navy
Rcd Record
Rcn Reconnaissance
RCT Regimental combat team
Rpt Report
Rqmts Requirements
Rqn Requisition
S-3 Operations and training section of a unit
not having a general staff
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 699
China-Burma-India Theater: 387, 389, 390, 392, 393- Civilians, employment of—Continued
99, 426, 427-29, 430, 431, 436-39, 442,453,456- Assam: 400
58, 463-64, 466, 470, 475, 649, 651, 680. See also Australia: 112, 120, 142-44, 154-55. 158, 215, 239,
Assam; Burma; Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo; 557, 680
China; India; Stilwell, General Joseph W.; Burma: 465, 680
Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Raymond A. Burma Road: 414-15, 422
China-India road, proposed: 405 Canol: 320-25, 327, 335
Chindits: 427-28, 445-47, 454-55 Central Pacific: 509
Chindwin River: 462 China: 403, 415, 431, 440
Chinese Army. See also Chiang Kai-shek, Generalis- Fiji: 268-69
simo; China, Guadalcanal: 208-09
and Burma offensive: 408-09, 420-21, 442, 453-56, Hawaii: 23-25, 341, 353-55, 369, 486
458-63 Hollandia: 531
and Burma Road: 408, 458-59 India: 392-93, 396, 399, 401, 416-17, 440, 680
German influence on: 403-04 Ledo Road: 406, 409-11, 424-25
India, troops in: 403, 416 Leyte: 579, 585
Kunming Training Center: 455 Luzon: 596, 599, 601, 606, 638-39
on Ledo Road: 410-12 Manila: 651-52
supply system: 413-15, 421 New Guinea: 181, 198, 202, 231, 235-37, 248, 254,
training program: 403-05, 420-21, 426, 455-56, 463, 268
662 in Philippines, 1941-42: 73, 75, 77, 79-82, 101-02
X-Force: 405 Philippines, 1944-45: 635, 653
Y-Force: 405, 408, 413-15, 421, 442, 454-56, 458-62, POA: 507
470, 662 Solomons: 235, 268-69
in Yunnan Province: 462-63 SWPA: 554, 556
Chinese Engineer units: 411, 431, 465, 470 USASOS: 268-69, 653-54
Chittagong: 467, 471 Civilians, evacuation of: 163, 165, 285, 658
Chittagong-Tinsukia railway: 467, 471 Civilians, Japanese, in combat: 646
Chorrera Airfield: 31, 50 Clagett, Brig. Gen. Henry B.: 115
Christmas Island: 45-47, 161, 162, 164-65, 385 Clark, Barney: 64
Chungking: 389, 391, 397, 413, 453, 458, 469-70 Clark Field: 59-60, 63-66, 72-73, 598, 655, 672
Churchill, Winston S. Clatterbos, Maj. Louis J.: 355
and Alaska defenses: 328 Clay, Maj. Gen. Lucius D.: 549
at ARCADIA Conference: 107 Climate, effect of. See also Ice formation problem;
at Casablanca Conference: 225, 328 Permafrost; Rainfall, effect of; Snowfall, effect
and China as theater: 390 of; Temperature, effect of; Weather, effect of;
and Germany—first policy: 107 Winds, effect of.
and guerrilla operations: 427 on air ferry routes: 168
and Rabaul, isolation of: 255 Alaska: 291-92
and SEAC: 428 Alcan Highway: 307
and U.S. role in Pacific: 128 Burma: 393
Cituinan Hills: 639 Guadalcanal: 208-09
Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA): 12, 19, 28, 33-34, India: 393
37, 39-41, 46, 51, 59, 66, 278, 281, 283, 287, 292, New Guinea: 151, 157-58, 186, 191, 220, 235
296 Clipperton Island: 8
Civil Constructional Corps, Australia: 142-43, 154, Cloncurry: 137, 141
236 Clowes, Maj. Gen. Cyril A. (Australian): 175, 177
Civil disturbances: 398, 400, 404, 431 Coal mines, operation of: 289
Civil engineering missions: 5-6, 20 Coast Artillery Brigade, Hawaiian Separate: 23
Civilian Conservation Corps: 19, 22, 35, 653 Coast Artillery Corps: 348-51
Civilian defense, Hawaii: 342, 344-46 Coast defenses construction: 7
Civilian Defense Director, Hawaii: 342, 345 Alaska: 287, 291
Civilians, employment of: 679-80. See also Labor Canal Zone: 50
forces, difficulties with; Labor forces, mobiliz- Hawaii: 42, 52-53, 346, 349-52,365-66, 661
ing; Labor forces, shortages in; Labor forces, naval guns: 349-52, 374, 661
strength. Panama mounts: 58
Alaska Highway: 300-301, 305-07, 310-18, 334 Philippines, 1941-42: 57
ASCOM: 585, 599 Cochran, Col. Philip G.: 428, 445
INDEX 717
Defense Battalions, Army—Continued Department of the Interior: 13, 19, 288. See also
4th: 478 Ickes, Harold L.
Defense battalions, CPA: 381 Department of Public Works, New Caledonia: 163,
Defenses, build-up of 223
Alaska: 7-8, 12-14, 16-19, 28, 35-36, 276-78, 298 Depot construction and operation. See Base con-
Australia: 109-11 struction and operation; Base construction and
Burma: 391 operation, Japanese; Storage facilities, construc-
Canal Zone: 6-15, 20-21, 27-28, 32-33 tion and operation.
Canton Island: 162, 164-65 Depot Field: 506
China: 387-90 Derby, Maj. George T.: 112-14, 117, 120
Christmas Island: 162, 164-65 Derra: 115
Corregidor: 57, 619-20 DeWitt, Lt. Gen. John L.: 276
Fiji: 162, 164, 232-33 and air build-up: 276
Hawaii: 6-16, 19-20, 27-28, 341-42, 362 and airfield construction and repair: 18-19, 22-23,
New Caledonia: 160, 162, 164-66 28, 34-36, 284
New Hebrides: 169-70 and Alaska defenses: 11, 33, 331
Panama: 12, 15 and construction, control of: 20, 25-26, 28, 34, 282
Philippines, 1941-42: 55 and construction programs and progress: 34-37,
SOPAC: 169-71 276-78
Del Carmen Airfield: 63-66, 73, 79, 655 and engineer units, strength: 276-78
Del Gallego: 81 and port facilities, construction and repair: 281
De Longe, Maj. Merrill E.: 270 and storage facilities, construction and repair: 37,
Del Monte: 61, 65, 71 281
Demolition operations and threat to Alaska: 284
Admiralties: 523-24 Diamond Head: 351
Australia: 138-39, 216 Dibrugarh: 400, 427, 467n
Bataan: 100-01 Digboi: 434, 457, 463, 467n
Biak: 540-41 Dimapur: 446
Burma: 445 Dimond, Anthony J.: 299
Burma Road: 455 Dinalupihan: 79, 609
Carolines: 515-16 Dingalan Bay: 594
Central Pacific: 382-83 Dinjan: 391, 400
China: 469 Diseases, effect of: 393, 423-24, 433, 462, 466, 541
Corregidor: 620-21 Distinguished Unit Citation awards: 455, 536
Guam: 506 Districts, SOS CBI: 438-40, 452
Hawaii: 352-53, 361 Divisions, SOS CBI
Kwajalein: 479-81 1st: 438
Leyte: 578 2d: 439
Luzon: 74-84, 597, 609-12, 627, 632 Dobodura: 156, 193-96, 198-99, 202-03, 205, 235-38,
Manila: 84, 617 245-257-58
Marshalls: 483-85 Dock construction and repair. See Port facilities,
Mindanao: 106 construction and repair.
New Guinea: 146 Dogs, training with: 490-91
Okinawa: 646-48 Dorn, Col. Frank: 421
Philippines, 1941-42: 66-68, 74, 596 Douglas Fir: 670
Philippines, 1944-45: 621-24, 633 Drawings, standard. See Construction design stand-
Saipan: 496-98, 500 ards.
SOPAC: 542 Dredging operations: 501, 516, 585, 656. See also
SWPA: 542 Port facilities, construction and repair; Port
Wakde: 536 facilities, construction and repair, by Japanese.
Demolition operations, Japanese Driniumor River: 541
Leyte: 582 Drury, Maj. Harold F.: 608
Luzon: 590, 595, 602-04, 610-11, 618, 626, 629, 638 Duke River: 311
Manila: 613-14, 619, 656 Dukws: 273-74, 476, 497, 506, 530, 562, 578, 644
Mindanao: 635 Dulag: 573-78
Dengue fever: 186, 517 Dulag Airfield: 573-74, 576, 579-80, 584-86
Denver, Rio Grande and Western Railroad: 389 Dulag-Burauen road: 581-82, 584
Department of Interior, Australia: 121 Dunbar, Col. Ernest A.: 607
INDEX 721
Dunn, Col. Beverly C.: 18, 22, 28, 33-34, 37, 49, 278, Ende, Capt. Carl F.: 48
280-82, 287 Engebi Island: 484-85
Dunne, Col. David M.: 626 Engineer Airborne Aviation Battalions
Dutch Harbor: 12, 16-18, 28, 35-36, 276, 278, 284, 871st: 248-49, 252, 254
287, 288, 290, 308, 322 872d: 248, 254, 533
873d: 633
E. W. Elliott Company: 302, 311
875th: 533
Eagle Farm Air Base: 115, 127, 141, 260 879th: 450, 454-55
Earth Moving Manufacturers Group: 140, 213 Engineer Airborne Aviation Company, 900th: 445
East-West Road, Australia: 114
Eastern Command, British: 440 Engineer Airborne Combat Battalion, 127th: 609-10,
Economic Cabinet, Australia: 215 630-31
Eddleman, Brig. Gen. Clyde D.: 613 Engineer Aviation Battalions
Edmondton: 288, 299-301, 311, 313, 321, 324, 327 802d: 36, 278, 286, 290
Efate Island: 169-70, 212, 214, 222, 662 803d: 63, 69, 73, 79, 93, 95-98, 100, 103, 105
Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L. See also Armies, 804th: 41, 47-53, 162, 340-41, 349, 380-86, 498-500,
Eighth; Corps, I. 518
and Biak: 541 805th: 50, 500
in Buna campaign: 199, 201-03 807th: 281, 284, 297, 331
commands of, 196, 586 808th: 122-24, 127, 148, 153, 157-58, 181-182, 187,
and Hollandia: 528-29 235, 258, 267, 275, 581
El Fraile Island: 57, 104, 622-24 810th: 167, 171, 206, 223, 256
Electric power plants, installation of. See Power 811th: 167, 223, 233, 640
plants, installation and operation. 813th: 283, 289
Electrical fixtures: 261 821st: 71, 232-33, 256, 581
ELKTON plan: 225, 231, 234, 235 822d: 207, 232, 256
Ellice Islands: 380 823d: 398, 400, 406, 409-12, 424
Elliott, Col. John C. B.: 584 828th: 212, 232, 256, 599
Ellison, Lt. Col. Marvin C.: 522 836th: 258, 526, 536, 564-65, 599
Ellison, Maj. William J., Jr.: 258 839th: 264
Elmendorf Field: 10, 12, 14, 16-19, 28, 34-37, 278, 841st: 274, 603-05, 612
283, 287, 296 842d: 235, 265
Ely, Col. William J.: 239, 246, 584 848th: 452
Eman Point: 89 849th: 433
Embessa: 181 853d: 450
Embogo: 195 854th:478, 484, 517
Embogo River: 202 857th: 235, 258
Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos C. See also Hawaiian 858th: 663
Islands. 860th: 275, 540
and air defense measures: 344, 347-48 863d: 275, 539-41, 602
and air ferry routes: 168-69 864th: 264, 274, 538-41, 599
and airfield construction and repair: 361 865th: 634
and ammunition storage plan: 368 930th: 468, 662
and coast defenses: 350-51 1874th: 562
command of: 161, 344 1875th: 450, 472
and construction, control of: 354, 360-61 1876th: 600, 603-04, 613
and construction machinery and equipment, pro- 1877th: 450, 468
curement: 355, 375 1878th: 503
and construction programs and progress: 361, 365, 1879th: 599, 605, 611
367 1880th: 663
and food production: 343-44 1881st: 564-65, 579
and mines, requisition for: 352 1883d: 433, 444-447
and naval guns, emplacement of: 374 1884th: 515
and priority ratings: 346 1887th: 515-16
and road construction and repair: 369 1888th: 450, 468
and storage facilities, construction and operation: 1897th: 564-66, 632
366-67 1905th: 434, 447
Empress Augusta Bay: 255 1913th: 274, 603-04
722 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.—Continued Office of Chief of Engineers (OCE). See Chief of
and Iwo Jima: 640 Engineers.
and Leyte: 572 Officer candidate schools, SWPA: 272
and Marianas: 492 Ogden, Brig. Gen. David A. D.: 521, 532
and Marshalls: 477-78 Ogelbang Airfield: 231
and Philippines, 1944-45: 572 Ohmer, Maj. John F., Jr.: 37
heads POA: 128, 170, 347, 378-79 Oil. See POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants).
Richardson, relationship to: 507 Okinawa: 625, 641, 642-49, 657-58, 659-60, 667-68
and Solomons: 153 OLYMPIC: 674-78
Nisutlin Bay: 315 On Chong's Wharf, Makin: 382
Nob Pier, Kwajalein: 485 Ondal: 399
Noble Drilling Corporation: 325, 335, 337 Operations Division, WDGS: 464, 663
Noce, Brig. Gen. Daniel: 265 Operators, engineer equipment. See Specialists,
Noemfoor Island: 561 shortage of; Specialists, training.
Nold, Brig. Gen. George J.: 19, 21-22, 35, 37, 278-79, ORANGE plans: 3-5, 10, 55, 58, 66, 76-77, 89, 92-94
282, 289-90, 333, 642 Orani: 79
Nolting, Maj. John P.: 417 Orion: 85, 89, 91-93
Nome: 33, 278, 288, 325 Ormoc: 576, 581-82, 586
Norman Wells: 318-27, 335-38 Ormoc Plain: 573
North, Col. Earl: 10-11, 14-15, 21, 29 Oro Bay: 194, 202, 221, 236-37, 257-58, 546, 557-58,
North Africa campaign: 409 561
North Burke Airfield: 219 Orote peninsula: 503-04, 506
North Drome, New Guinea: 251 Ostrand, Capt. James A., Jr.: 44
North Field, Guam: 517 Oua Tom Airfield: 233, 256
North Field, Iwo Jima: 640 Owen Stanley Range: 158, 178-80, 192, 198
North Harbor, Corregidor: 620 Owi Island Airfield: 539-41
North Harbor, Manila: 656
North Island, New Zealand: 222 P-38's: 541
North Luzon Force (NLF): 73-80 P-40's: 541
North Pacific Area: 170, 276, 328, 333, 339 Pacific Commercial Company: 70
North Pacific Division: 11, 18, 33, 36 Pacific Division: 11
North-South Highway, Mindanao. See Sayre (North- Pacific hut: 297
South) Highway, Mindanao. Pacific Ocean Areas (POA): 128, 153, 170, 376, 377-
North-South Road, Australia: 114, 239 79, 380, 383, 507-08, 518-19, 640, 649-50, 668,
North way Airfield: 288, 292, 295 680. See also Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.; is-
Northwest Division, NSC: 316-17 lands or areas by name.
Northwest Service Command (NSC): 313-14, 316-17 Pacific theater: 27, 49-50, 128, 463, 649-50, 667-69.
Northwest Staging Route: 288, 299, 313, 318, 338 See also Central Pacific Area; Pacific Ocean
Norton Sound: 18, 288 Areas; South Pacific Area; Southwest Pacific
Nouméa: 165-66, 212-14, 223, 233, 661 Area.
Novaliches Reservoir: 614, 618 Paez, Jose: 81
Nukufetau Island: 380 Pagbilao: 81
Nurse, Lt. Col. Howard B.: 357-59, 372 Pago Bay: 504
Paint, photo-resistant: 44
Oahu Island. See Hawaiian Islands; Honolulu. Palau Islands: 510, 512-14, 518, 527
Oahu Railway & Land Company: 342 Palawan Island: 626, 632-33
Oakes Construction Company: 315 Pallets, use in unloading: 496-97
Oakland, Calif.: 362 Pallikulo Airfield: 206-07
Obstacles, ground, construction of: 80, 88, 97, 634. Palmerston North: 222
See also Roadblock construction; Roadblock Palo: 579
construction, Japanese; Wire obstacles; Wire Palo River: 576
obstacles, Japanese. Palolo Valley: 345-46
O'Connor, Brig. Gen. James A.: 304, 307, 309, 313, Pampanga River: 74, 76-80, 82-84, 590-91, 596,
325-453, 458, 461,465,475 610-13
OCTAGON (Quebec) Conference: 572 Pan American Airways: 47, 163
O'Donnell Field: 61-64, 71, 73 Pan American Highway: 14-15
Offensive plans. See MacArthur, General of the Panama, Republic of: 12, 15, 20-21, 23, 29-33, 50, 53
Army Douglas; also areas by name. Panama Canal. See Canal Zone.
742 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Panama Canal Department. See Stone, Maj. Gen. Philippine Army Engineer Combat Battalions—
David L.; Van Voorhis, Lt. Gen. Daniel. Continued
Panama mounts: 58, 287 21st: 73, 76, 87
Panaon Island: 576, 577 31st: 73, 76, 87
Panay Island: 105, 626, 634, 657 41st: 80, 87-88, 90
Pandacan District, Manila: 84 51st: 80, 82, 87, 91, 100
Pandasveswar: 399 61st: 105
Pangsau Pass: 411, 433, 466 71st: 73, 76, 87, 95-96
Paoshan: 414 81st: 105
Papua: 156. See also New Guinea. 91st: 73, 76-77, 87
"Papuan Aviation Battalion": 181 101st: 105
Parachute Infantry Regiment, 503d: 252, 619-20 201st: 88, 100
Parang: 635 202d: 88, 100
Park, Col. Richard: 33-35, 279, 282 Philippine Army Engineer Combat Regiment, 301st:
Parker, Maj. David B.: 196, 203 88, 90
Parker, Brig. Gen. George M., Jr.: 73, 80, 87, 89, 100 Philippine Army Infantry Divisions
Parry Island: 483 11th: 89
Pasig River: 69, 614-17, 619, 656-57 31st: 91
Passage Canal: 18 41st: 98
Patch, Brig. Gen. Alexander M.: 164, 167, 170, 206, Philippine Base Section: 651, 669
208-09 Philippine Department. See Philippine Army;
Patkai Mountains: 405, 411-12, 423 Philippines, Commonwealth of; Philippines,
Patnode, Pvt. Jerald F.: 149 1941-42; Philippines, 1944-45.
Pattee, Lt. Col. Karl M.: 452 Philippine Engineer Depot: 69
Patterson, Robert P.: 24-25, 41, 61 Philippine engineer districts: 650-53
Paules, Lt. Col. Earl G.: 300, 302, 311, 314 Philippine Racing Club: 616
Paxton, Maj. John W.: 498 Philippine Scouts: 653
Peace River: 301, 312, 315, 326-27, 334 Philippine Sea, Battle of: 503
Pearl City: 374 Philippines, Commonwealth of
Pearl Harbor: 53-54 airfields, 1940-41: 58-59
Pearl Harbor Board: 488 Bureau of Aeronautics: 66
Peiping-Hankow railway: 452 Bureau of Public Works: 62-64, 66, 73-77, 80-81
Pekoa Airfield: 206-07 independence of: 57n
Peleliu Island: 514 and land acquisition: 60
Pelly River: 337 Philippines, 1941-42: 4, 52-53, 76, 89, 92-93. See also
Pengshan: 440 Grunert, Lt. Gen. George; MacArthur, General
Pennsylvania: 350-51 of the Army Douglas; islands and areas by name.
Penrhyn Island: 169, 171, 233 aircraft warning stations, construction of: 59, 64,
Permafrost: 292-93, 309-12 66
Permanant Joint Board of Defense, Canada-U.S.: 300 airfield construction and repair: 45, 55, 58-59, 63-
PERSECUTION: 532 66, 71
Perth: 119 bridge construction and repair: 64
Pest control: 308, 501, 550 civilians, employment of: 73, 75, 77, 79-82, 88,
Peter Kiewit Company: 327 101-02
Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL). See Pipeline coast defense construction: 57
construction and operation; POL; Storage fa- construction, problems of: 59-61, 64-65
cilities, construction and operation. construction machinery and equipment, procure-
Philippe,1st Lt. Hersel E.: 105 ment: 62-63, 69-70
Philippine Army construction materials, procurement: 69-70
in CONCOR: 653 construction programs and progress: 59-66, 71-72,
Corps of Engineers of: 66, 68-69. See also Philip- 86-87
pine Army Units by name. demolition operations: 66-68, 74, 596
mobilization: 55, 57, 68-69, 72-73 engineer organization: 66, 69
training program: 97-98 engineer units, arrival: 63
Philippine Army Engineer Combat Battalions engineer units, shortage of: 59-60
1st: 87 engineer units, strength: 61, 68-69
2d: 87 guerrilla operations: 106
11th: 73, 76, 87 labor force, mobilizing: 69
INDEX 743
Philippines, 1941-42—Continued Photography, aerial
land acquisition: 60, 65 Admiralties: 522
maintenance and repair, general: 62-63 Alaska: 290
map compilation and distribution: 94 Alaska Highway: 308-09
port facilities, construction and repair: 61, 66, 71 Biak: 538
prisoners, employment of: 65-66 Burma: 445
railroad construction and repair: 78 Carolines: 516
reinforcements for: 55-57, 72, 109 Central Pacific: 490, 510
road construction and repair: 60-61, 64 China: 458
spare parts procurement: 62-63 Guam: 517
storage facilities, construction and operation: 66 Hollandia: 530
troop units, defense organization: 55, 66-69 Japan: 510, 518, 668-69, 673
tunnel construction and repair: 61, 64, 66, 71 Lae: 252
weather, effect of: 61-62 Leyte: 570, 573
5
Philippines, 1944-45:7463, 468, 561, 2 563, 566 ,, Luzon: 588, 596, 607-08
569-70, 586, 619-20, 632, 635, 6
Marianas: 490, 493
Arthur, General of the Army Douglas; islands Marshalls: 483
or areas by name. Mindanao: 570
airfield construction and repair: 625-26, 633-34, by Navy: 668
655 New Guinea: 189, 191, 258, 553
base construction and operation: 625-27, 650-51 Okinawa: 641
bridge construction and repair: 633-34 POA: 382
cement plants, rehabilitation: 657 Saipan: 490, 495, 503
construction, control of: 651-52 Solomons: 250
construction program and progress: 649 SOPAC: 270-71
demolition operations: 621-24, 633 SWPA: 271, 552-54, 567
engineer districts in: 650-53 Wakde: 534-35
engineer missions: 570-71 Photography, trimetrogon: 189-91
engineer organization: 650-54 Photomaps, compilation and distribution: 376-77,
engineer units, arrival: 666-67 607. See also Map compilation and distribution;
enginer units, requirements: 626-27 Photography, aerial.
flame throwers, tactical use: 621 Pick, Brig. Gen. Lewis A.: 433. See also Ledo Road,
floating depot concept: 670 and bridge construction and repair: 444, 448,
fortifications, construction by Japanese: 633-34 663-64
hospital construction: 653, 655-56 and Chinese, supplies to: 472-73
housing construction: 653 commands of: 432, 438, 439, 443
maintenance and repair, general: 669-70 completes Ledo Road: 664
map compilation and distribution: 626, 668-69 and construction machinery and equipment, pro-
pipeline construction and operation: 655 curement: 456, 465, 472
POL, tactical uses: 621-24 and construction program and progress: 434, 453-
ponton cubes, employment of: 621 54, 465-66, 470
port facilities, construction and repair: 655-56 and engineer units, diversity of: 466
railroad construction and repair: 657 and engineer units, strength: 465, 664
reconnaissance, engineer: 626 and engineers as infantry: 444
road construction and repair: 633-34, 653 leads first convoy to Kunming: 473-74
sawmill construction and operation: 657 and Myitkyina base: 463, 466, 473
snipers, Japanese: 622 and Myitkyina-Teng-chung road: 473
spare parts procurement: 669-71 and pipeline construction and operation: 434, 462,
specialists, training: 671-72 466, 664
storage facilities, construction and operation: 653, and reconnaissance, engineer: 462, 465
655-56 and reinforcements: 457, 463
topography: 626 and road construction and repair: 433, 444, 447,
training, deficiencies in: 671 663-64
weather, effect of: 570-71 and route selection: 460, 462, 465
Photo interpretation: 554 and spare parts procurement: 442, 456
Photo Squadrons Pilar: 79, 85-86, 89, 93
1st: 33 Pilar-Bagac road: 90, 93
8th: 189-91 Pilar-Orion road: 95
744 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Port Moresby: 118, 142, 150, 173, 546 QUADRANT (Quebec) Conference: 255, 388-89, 425-
airfield construction and repair: 143, 145-48, 151- 28, 431, 444, 448, 466-67, 664
57, 174-75, 184-86, 188, 220, 236, 259 Quarry Heights: 14
base construction and operation: 174-75, 236, 245, Quarry operation: 152, 188, 223, 500, 511
258 Quartermaster Corps: 6, 9, 12-14, 19, 20
construction programs and progress: 133-34, 181- Quebec Conferences: 255, 388-89, 425, 426-28, 431,
82, 185, 220-22, 235 448, 466-67, 572, 664
hospital construction: 259 Queensland Agricultural College: 114
housing construction: 185 Queensland Island Defense Road: 239
map compilation and distribution: 199-200 Queensland Main Roads Commission: 144, 152, 158
port facilities, construction and repair: 145, 174, Quezon, Manuel L.: 60
182-83, 259 Quezon City: 615
road construction and repair: 259 Quinauan Point: 96, 103
Soils Mechanics School: 272, 561 Quoin Hill Airfield: 232
specialists, training: 271-72 Quonset hut: 267, 297
Porter, Col. Horace L.: 495
Portland, Ore.: 290 R. G. Le Tourneau, Inc.: 140, 272, 560
Portland Roads Airfield: 152, 155 Rabaul
Power plants, installation and operation: 167, 373, air attacks on: 272
399, 502, 619, 657 as air base, Japanese: 143
Prefabricated housing. See Housing construction. air support requirements: 153-54
Press correspondents: 473 Combined Chiefs directive on: 225
Preventive maintenance. See Maintenance and re- engineer mission: 244
pair, general; Spare parts procurement. engineer units, requirements: 234
Price, Maj. Charles F. B.: 396, 402, 418-19 fall of: 118
Prince George, B.C.: 299 JCS directives on: 153, 172, 234
Prince Rupert: 280, 289, 302, 323, 327 offensive, Allied: 150, 153-54, 160, 172, 225, 244,
Prince William Sound: 18, 287 255, 272, 275
Priority ratings task force concentration, by Japanese: 149
air ferry routes: 161 Radar stations, construction of: 250, 283, 347
Alaska: 48-50, 279, 282, 289-90 Radio station, construction of: 315
Assam: 416-17 Ragay: 80
Australia: 121-22, 134-35, 137-38, 215-16, 241-42, Railroad construction and repair
260 Alaska: 18-19, 22, 34, 36, 52, 53, 278, 283, 287-89
Burma: 409 by ASCOM: 600, 604
Canal Zone: 48-49 Australia: 241
CBI: 436, 456 Burma: 389
Central Pacific: 377, 381 Carolines: 516
Hawaii: 48-50, 346, 351, 353-56, 369, 373 China: 389
India: 401 Fiji: 222
Kwajalein: 486 Hawaii: 23
Luzon: 604, 612 Japan, for assault on: 677
Philippines, 1944-45: 70 Ledo Road: 410
POA: 379 Luzon: 596-97, 600, 602-06, 612, 639
USAFFE: 242, 260 Manila: 604-05
Prisoners, employment of: 65-66, 345 New Caledonia: 167
Prisoners of war: 403, 507 Philippines, 1941-42: 78
Propaganda broadcast, by Japanese: 146 Philippines, 1944-45: 657
Prophet River: 308 Saipan: 502-03
Public relations, in Hawaii: 358-60, 363 Railroad systems
Public Roads Administration (PRA): 21, 278, 300- Assam: 393, 471
302, 305-07, 310-17, 334 Australia: 108, 123
Public Works Department, India: 416-17 Burma: 393, 435
Public Works Department, New Zealand: 233 Canada: 302-03, 305
Puerto Princesa: 633, 655-56 India: 393, 471
Puerto Rican Department: 6-7, 28 Japan: 673-74
Pulo Anna Island: 516 Luzon: 74
Punahou Academy: 341-42, 346, 355, 358-59 New Caledonia: 166
Pyron, Brig. Gen. Walter B.: 318-19 Railroads, Japanese control of: 393
746 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr.—Continued Road construction and repair—Continued
commands of: 377, 491, 507 Marshalls: 485
and defense battalions: 381 Milne Bay: 221, 235
and engineer missions: 507, 661 Mindanao: 635
and Hawaiian Constructors: 487 New Britain: 273
Nimitz, relationship to: 507 New Caledonia: 167, 223
Richardson Highway: 33, 278, 290, 303-04 New Guinea: 158, 182, 194, 202, 205, 230, 237-38,
Richmond, Australia: 560 244, 246, 251, 257-59, 274, 533, 535, 546
Riddell-Webster, General Sir Thomas: 426 New Hebrides: 170, 256
Rinehart, Col. O. N.: 650 Okinawa: 643, 645, 648-49, 659
Rio Hato Airfield: 8-9, 11-12, 14, 21, 50 Panama Republic: 50
River crossings. See also Bridge construction and re- Philippines, 1941-42: 60-61, 64
:
pair; Ponton bridges Philippines, 1944-45 633-34, 653
Alaska Highway: 310, 312 POA: 380
Burma: 444, 454-55, 459, 468, 472 Port Moresby: 259
China: 663, 666 Saipan: 498-502
Ledo Road: 470, 472-73 Solomons: 249-50, 255, 526
Leyte: 574-75 SOPAC: 256
Luzon: 590-91, 595-96, 602, 610-13, 615-16, 630, SWPA: 565, 567-68
638 Road systems
New Guinea: 192 Australia: 108, no, 114
SOPAC: 542 Bataan: 85-86
SWPA: 542 Burma: 393
Rivers, development and use. See Waterways, devel- India: 393
opment and use. Japan: 674
Rizal, Luzon: 610 Leyte: 573
Rizal Province: 84 Luzon: 74, 588-90, 627-29
Road construction and repair: 16. See also Burma New Caledonia: 166
Road; Land clearing operations; Trail clearing Roadblock construction. See also Obstacles, ground,
operations. construction of.
Admiralties: 524 Bataan: 100
Alaska: 36, 50, 278, 283, 288, 291, 295-96, 329-33 Hawaii: 352
by Allied Works Council: 239 Luzon: 74, 77
by ASCOM: 585-86, 600 New Guinea: 205
Attu: 329-31 Roadblock construction, Japanese
Australia: 122-23, 128, 138, 239-40 Luzon: 598, 609-10, 627, 639
Bataan: 61, 90-91, 95-97 Manila: 617
Biak: 538, 544 Okinawa: 645, 648
Burma: 391, 413, 430, 443, 464 Philippines,1944-45: 634
Canal Zone: 20-21 Robb, Col. Holland L.: 369
Canol: 321, 325-28, 335-37 Robert Louis Stevenson: 670
Carolines: 514, 516 Robins, Maj. Gen. Thomas M.: 319
Central Pacific: 386 Robinson, Col. Bernard L.: 39
China: 413, 430, 472, 662 and airfield construction and repair: 219
Fiji: 220-22, 232-33, 256 and base construction and operation: 528
Guadalcanal: 208-09, 256 and civilians, employment of: 231
Guam: 504-06 and coast defense construction: 351
Hawaii: 23, 43, 346, 350, 369, 374 commands of: 528, 548, 557
Hollandia: 527, 530-31, 544 and construction machinery and equipment, pro-
India: 393, 398-99, 403 curement: 153
Iwo Jima: 660 and costs of construction: 353
Japan, for assault on: 673, 677 and engineer units, control of: 147
Kwajalein: 480, 482, 485 and engineer units', shortage of: 153
Lae: 244, 258 and Hawaiian Constructors: 356, 969, 488
Ledo: 412, 663 and priority ratings: 215
Leyte: 577-86 reconnaissance, engineer, by: 47-48, 156
Luzon: 594, 596-97, 600, 609, 626-32, 637-39 on SWPA staff: 130, 571
Manila: 619, 657 Rocket fire support: 273-74, 530, 562
Marianas: 506 Rockhampton: 45
748 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Staging areas: 256, 257, 366, 495-96, 529, 544, 546, Stimson, Henry L. See also War Department.
657 and Alaska defenses: 35
Standard Oil Company of California: 320 and Alaska Highway: 299
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey: 318-20, 322, and Australia defenses: 107
338 and Canol: 320, 322, 335-36
Stark, Admiral Harold R.: 35 and China supply: 467-68
State Department: 15 and Hawaii defenses: 27
and Hawaiian Constructors: 489
Steel. See Construction materials, improvised; Con- selects Stilwell for CBI: 390
struction materials, procurement. Stirling Range: 176
Steel units, prefabricated: 656 Stock control: 508-10, 555-58, 669-71, 682
Steele, Maj. Gen. Clive S. (Australian): 131-33, 136- Stone, Maj. Gen. David L.: 8, 12. See also Papama,
37, 139, 143 Republic of.
Stefansson, Vilhjalmur: 318-19 Storage facilities, construction and operation
Stickney, Col. Henry H.: 57, 59-64, 66, 70, 73-74, 79, Admiralties: 544
82, 86, 93-94, 96, 99-100, 103, 105 on air ferry routes: 164
Stilwell, General Joseph W. See also China-Burma- Alaska: 37, 276-78, 281, 283, 287-89, 291, 333
India Theater. by ASCOM: 585-86, 600
activates CBI Air Service Command: 429 Australia: 113-15, 119, 141, 223, 239, 260
and airfield construction and repair: 430-31 Australian Army: 217-18
arrival in Burma: 392 Bataan: 95
arrival in China: 391 Biak: 544
arrival in India: 391 Burma: 457, 463
and B-29 bases: 441 Canol: 323
Brereton, relationship to: 397 Carolines: 516
and Burma offensive: 404-06, 417-18, 421, 434-35, Central Pacific: 386
436, 442-44, 447, 461-62 China: 402
Chiang, relationship to: 397-98 Hawaii: 39-42, 51-53, 350, 365-70,373-75, 486, 507
and China defensive: 469 Hollandia: 527, 544
and Chinese Army training: 418, 420-21, 426 India: 394-96, 400, 402, 467, 666
and Chinese troops in India: 403 Iwo Jima: 660
commands of: 390, 391, 470 for Japan, assault on: 673, 677-78
and construction, control of: 394-95, 397, 438, 451- Kwajalein: 485
52 Lae: 244
construction, transfers to AAF: 438 Ledo Road: 410
and construction program and progress: 394 Leyte: 575, 585
and costs of construction: 441 Luzon: 594, 600, 609
and demolition operations: 469 Manila: 656
and Ledo Road: 407, 411-12, 421, 423-24, 433-34, Marianas: 493
447, 454-457, 460-61, 465 Marshalls: 477-78, 485
and lines of communication: 394 Milne Bay: 257, 265
Marshall, relationship to: 398 New Caledonia: 167, 233-34
mission in CBI: 391, 397-98 New Guinea: 238, 244, 251, 257-58, 265, 546
Mountbatten, relationship to: 428 New Hebrides: 256
Newcomer, relationship to: 416, 453 New Zealand: 233
offensive plans: 391 Okinawa: 643, 659-60
and pipeline construction and operation: 434 Philippines, 1941-42: 66
plans North Africa invasion: 391 Philippines, 1944-45: 653, 655-56
recalled: 470 Saipan: 498-503
as Roosevelt's representative: 398 Solomons: 526, 544
and shipping shortage: 408 SOPAC: 256, 267
and SOS CBI: 438 SWPA: 217-20, 267, 550, 562-63, 568
supply plans: 391 Wakde: 544
and theater status: 397 Stout-type houses: 297
and troop units, requirements: 395, 408-09, 463-64 Straight, Col. Clio E.: 487
Wavell, relationship to: 397 Strategic planning, Japanese: 179
Wheeler, relationship to: 394, 402 "Strategic triangle": 3, 27
INDEX 753
Stratemeyer, Maj. Gen. George E.: 428-31, 437, 463, Supply, hand-carried: 582
472 Supply, measurement tons
Street fighting, Manila: 617 Alaska: 289
Strong, Col. Frederick S.: 417, 420, 436-37 Biak: 557
Strong, Brig. Gen. George V.: 7 China: 391, 418, 420, 426, 431, 464, 666
Sturdevant, Brig. Gen. Clarence L.: 300, 305, 310, Hollandia: 557
313, 322-23, 325 Japan, for assault on: 677-78
Sturgis, Brig. Gen. Samuel D., Jr. Marianas: 493-94, 496
and airfield construction and repair: 525, 573-74, Saipan: 496
580, 583, 597 SWPA: 212, 556-58
and base construction and repair: 238-39, 584-85 Wakde: 557
and bridge construction and repair: 575, 590-91, Supply, overland: 198, 387-88, 391, 404-06, 408-09,
605-06, 612 415, 424-25, 432, 464, 470, 474-75
and communications, signal: 601 Supply, by water, SWPA: 558
and construction programs and progress: 548-49, Supply dumps. See Storage facilities, construction
601 and operation.
and engineer units, control of: 591, 612-13, 626 Supply duty, attitude toward: 559, 682
and Japan, assault on: 675 Supply Mission, New Zealand: 213
and logistical facilities: 542 Supply systems
and Manila, 1944-45: 613-14 Attu: 329-30
and Philippines, 1944-45: 570, 580, 588, 592, 599, Australia: 155, 556
626 Burma: 466, 394-95, 432, 436, 443, 446
and road construction and repair: 577, 584 Burma Road: 473
as Sixth Army engineer: 225, 235, 520 Central Pacific: 508-10, 568-69, 669
and specialists, shoratge of: 590 China: 425-26, 429-30
and supply system: 263, 557, 559 Chinese Army: 413-15
and task force engineers: 521 deficiencies in: 682
and Wakde: 535 India: 394-95, 425, 429
work potential formula: 529 Leyte: 611
Styer, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D.: 423, 429, 436, 654 Luzon: 606
Subic Bay: 656 Marshalls: 485
Subic Bay landing: 57, 608-09 Navy's role in: 265
Submarine threat to Alaska: 280 Philippines, 1944-45: 669-70
Sugar Plantations Association: 343 POA: 378
Sui-chuan: 469 Port Moresby: 263
Suicide attacks, Japanese: 500, 592, 594, 647, 649 SOPAC: 171-72, 214, 233-34, 262-63
Sulipan Canal: 611 SWPA.: 211-14, 262-63, 558, 568-69, 669
Sultan, Maj. Gen. Daniel I.: 466, 468, 470, 473, 662, War Department directives on: 171-72, 211, 261,
664-66 264, 508-09, 554, 669-70
Sulu Archipelago: 626, 633 Supply systems, Japanese: 443
Sumatra: 118, 467 Surrender, by Japan: 678-79
Sung Shan Mountain: 459, 462 Survival training: 491
Superior Oil Company: 222 Sutherland, Col. Edwin M.: 396
Supplies, construction. See Construction materials, Sutherland, Lt. Gen. Richard K.: 179, 187, 234, 608
improvised; Construction materials, procure- Suva: 162
ment. Sverdrup, Maj. Gen. Leif J.
Supply, by airdrop: 157, 180-81, 582 and airfield construction and repair: 46-48, 154,
Supply, by airlift 231, 236, 525
Assam: 471 becomes SWPA acting chief engineer: 571
Burma: 466, 472 and bridge construction and repair: 602
China: 387, 391-92, 396-97, 400-401, 415, 418, 420, commands of: 130-31, 174, 651-52, 653-54
425-26, 431-32, 425-54,467, 472, 666 and construction, obstacles to: 186
Hollandia: 532 and construction deadlines: 543-44
India: 472 and construction reorganization: 174
Ledo Road: 456, 471 and engineer units, control of: 202
SWPA: 558 forms Construction Corps of Philippines: 653
Supply, daily requirements: 554 and Hawaii contractors: 488
754 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Tools, construction. See Construction machinery and TRIDENT (Washington) Conference: 164, 377, 390,
equipment, diversified; Construction machinery 418-20, 426
and equipment, improvised; Construction ma- Trik, Capt. Carl H.: 355-56
chinery and equipment, procurement. Trinidad Base Command: 28
Topographical supplies, procurement: 533 Tripler General Hospital: 374, 486, 507, 661
TORNADO: 535 Troop assignment methods, USAFIA: 124
Torrens Creek: 125 Troop units
Townsville: 150, 158 Japanese strength: 248, 682
airfield construction and repair: 45, no, 115, 119, organization for Philippines defense: 55, 66-69
125, 127-28, 143, 164 shortages of: 509, 670
base construction and operation: 112-13, 153 strength; 68, 210, 243, 496, 518-19, 567, 569
port congestion: 243 Trucks, assembling: 400
port facilities, construction and repair: no, 115, Trudeau, Col. Arthur G.: 227-28
128, 240 Truk Island: 492
reconnaisance, engineer: 46 Truman Committee hearings: 335, 362. See also Con-
road construction and repair: 138 gress.
storage facilities, construction and operation: 260 Tseng Yang-fu. Dr.: 421
TRADEWIND: 567 Tsili Tsili Airfield: 244, 248, 252
Traffic control and congestion: 316-18, 343, 577, 580, Tuguegarao: 66
599, 611, 634 Tulagi Island: 168, 172
Trail clearing operations: 178-80, 231, 443-44, 447, Tulavera River and Valley: 627
470 Tully, Lt. Col. James K.: 51
Training, deficiencies in: 97-98, 330-31, 606, 682 TULSA plan: 153
Training centers, in Australia: 271 Tuna Packers cannery, Honolulu: 340
Training facilities, construction in India: 403 Tundra: 293-94, 329, 331
Training missions, Corps of Engineers: 227 Tunnel construction and repair
Training programs Alaska: 283
amphibious operations: 271, 330-31, 478, 490-91, Bataan: 61, 71, 95
671 China: 462
Australia: 122, 124-25, 136 Corregidor: 66, 101-04
bomb disposal: 271, 560-71 Hawaii: 350, 368-70, 374
camouflage measures: 271-72 Ledo Road: 410
Central Pacific: 478 Philippines, 1941-42: 61, 64, 66, 71
Chinese Army: 403-05, 420-21, 426, 455-56, 463, Tunnel defenses, Japanese: 383, 598, 633. See also
662 Cave defenses, Japanese.
Hawaii: 377, 490-91 Tuol River: 97
India: 403-04 Turnbull, J. Gordon: 320
jungle operations: 156, 490-91 Turnbull Airdrome: 257
with landing craft: 671 Turner, Rear Adm. Richmond K.: 482, 492
Marianas: 495 Twitty, Brig. Gen. Joseph J.: 378, 490, 510
Marshalls: 478 "Two-Ocean Navy Act": 14
night operations: 491 Tydings-McDuffie Act: 57n
on-the-job: 271-72 Tyler, Brig. Gen. Max C.: 6
Philippine Army: 97-98 TYPHOON: 564
Philippines, 1944-45: 671
Saipan: 496 Ulithi Atoll: 514-16
SOPAC: 271-72 Ulupau Head: 351
specialists: 271-72, 560-61, 671-72 Umingan: 597
in survival: 491 Umnak Island: 28, 37, 51, 278, 280-81, 284, 285, 296-
SWPA: 271-73, 560-61, 671-72 98
USASOS: 671-72 Unalaska Island: 37, 281, 285, 296-97
Transporation Corps: 325 Under Secretary of War. See Patterson, Robert P.
Transportation facilities: 320-21, 323-25, 327, 338, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): 27, 35,
365-66, 399-400, 402-03, 476 288, 293, 326, 333, 463, 678, 682
Transports, naval, in CPA: 476 United States Advanced Base, Port Moresby: 174
Trans-Siberian railroad: 293 United States Army, expansion of: 14
Trench obstacles, construction in Hawaii: 344-45 United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA):
Triangle, The, New Guinea: 196, 200-01 109, 113, 117-18, 119, 124, 126, 156, 171,
756 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA)— United States Coast and Geodetic Survey: 94, 376,
Continued 573, 577
189-90. See also Barnes, Brig. Gen. Julian F.; United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP): 99.
Brett, Maj. Gen. George H. See also MacArthur, General of the Army
United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific Douglas; Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M.
Area (USAFICPA): 377 United States Geological Survey: 668-69
United States Army Forces in the Chinese Theater United States Navy. See also Naval construction bat-
of Operations, Burma, and India: 390 talions; Naval gunfire support.
United States Army Forces in the Far East airfield construction and repair: 12
(USAFFE): 57, 60, 78, 230, 242, 260. See also amphibious operations, role in: 577-78
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas. in construction program: 278, 287, 501, 511-12,
United States Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean 541-44, 657
Areas (USAFPOA): 507, 568. See also Richard- fleet expansion: 10-11
son, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr. Hawaii, co-operation in: 370, 374, 376, 661
United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area housing construction: 267
(USAFISPA): 172, 214, 507, 568 intelligence estimates and reports: 284
United States Army Services of Supply. See also at Iwo Jima: 640
Army Forces, Western Pacific; Frink, Maj. Gen. landing craft operation: 578
James L.; Marshall, Brig. Gen. Richard J.; in Luzon, 1944-45: 591-92, 594
Southwest Pacific Area; Styer, Lt. Gen. Wil- in Manila rehabilitation: 656
helm D. photography, aerial: 668
AFWESPAC, redesignation to: 654 and pilots for AVG: 389
Army Service Command (ASCOM) activated: 571 POA, liaison in: 680
ASCOM, assignment to: 601 SOPAC, role in: 160
Australia, transfer from: 557 spare parts procurement: 558
base construction and operation: 236, 245, 256-59, in supply system: 265
262-63, 528 war plan: 4
Boat Building Command: 653-54 United States Task Force in China: 390
camouflage: 559-60 Upolo Field: 348
civilians, employment of: 268-69, 653-54 Urbana Force: 199-201, 205
construction, control of: 229-30, 257-58, 651-54 Urbiztondo: 77
Construction Corps of the Philippines: 653 Urdaneta: 596
Engineer Construction Command (ENCOM): 651- Utiladors: 292
53, 681 Utilities, installation and maintenance: 365, 403
engineer districts of: 650-53
Engineer Intelligence Section: 269 Valdez, Alaska: 303
engineer mission: 521 Van Noy, Pvt. Junior N.: 253-54
engineer organization: 243-44, 257, 520-21, 528-29, Van Voorhis, Lt. Gen. Daniel: 15, 20-21, 28-32. See
571-72, 650-54 also Canal Zone.
and engineer units, control of: 187 Vasey, Maj. Gen. George A.: 193
engineer units, shortage of: 238 Vella Lavella Island: 250
engineer units, strength: 654 Viardo, Capt. Emilio: 68
General Engineer District (GENED): 652 VICTOR plans: 625
Hollandia, move to: 569, 650 Vigan: 72, 74
Japan, assault on: 673, 675 Vila: 170
Leyte, move to: 650 Vila Airfield: 250
logistical system: 570-71 Villa Verde Trail: 627-29, 637
Manila, move to: 650 Visayan Islands: 72, 608, 625, 634, 655
Marine Supply Section: 558-59 Visayan-Mindanao Force: 105-06
mission: 183, 262-63 Viti Levu: 46, 222
morale: 654 Vitiaz Strait: 272
New Guinea, move to: 557 Vogelkop peninsula: 563
and shipping shortage: 186-88 Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC): 109
specialists, training: 671-72
supply divisions activated: 556, 558-59 W. A. Bechtel Company: 320, 325, 327
stock control: 555-56 W. E. Callahan Construction Company: 25, 41, 320,
training program: 671-72 325, 327
USAFIA, redesignated from: 156 Wacol: 115
INDEX 757
Waga Waga: 176-77, 238 War Department General Staff. See also Marshall,
Wahiawa: 23 General of the Army George C.; Operations
Wahiawa Gulch: 368 Division, WDGS; War Department; War Plans
Waianae Amphibious Training Center: 491 Division, WDGS.
Waiele Gulch: 362 Alaska inspection by: 51
Waigani Drome: 157, 186 and Alaska Highway: 299
Waigeo Island: 563 hemisphere defense plans: 7
Waikakalaua Gulch: 40-42, 368, 370 ORANGE plans, changes in: 3-5
Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M.: 73, 75-77, 79, 83, RAINBOW plans, changes in: 10, 14, 19
87, 89, 96, 99, 105, 128 War Ministry, China: 408, 422
Wakde Island: 534-36, 541, 542, 543-44 War Office, British: 420
Wake Island: 45, 161 War plans, U.S.: 4-7
Walawbum: 444 War Plans Division, WDGS
Walker, Maj. James A.: 410 and Alaska defenses: 16, 18, 23, 34
Walker, Lt. Col. Nelson M.: 51 and Alaska Highway: 299
Walkway construction: 502 and Canol: 318-19
Wallace, Maj. Gen. Fred C.: 657 Warazup: 454
Walsh, Col. Orville E.: 239, 246, 548, 588, 601, 613 Ward's Drome: 186
Wama Drome: 568 Warehouse construction and operation. See Storage
Wanamaker, Col. William W.: 522, 525 facilities, construction and operation.
Wanigela Mission: 180-81, 192 Warren Force: 199-200
Wanting: 474, 663 "Washing Machine Charley": 274
War Cabinet, Australia: 216 Washington Conference: 107, 164, 377, 390, 418-20
War Department. See also Chief of Engineers; Mar- Water purification. See Water supply and distribu-
shall, General of the Army George C.; Stimson, tion.
Henry L.; War Department General Staff; War Water seepage problem: 292-93, 316
Plans Division, WDGS. Water supply and distribution
activates SOS, CBI: 394 Australia: 155
and aircraft for China: 391-92 Biak: 539-40
and Alaska defenses: 276-78, 299, 333 Central Pacific: 476
and Alaska Highway: 299-300 Corregidor: 103
and American Military Mission to China: 389 Hawaii: 373
appropriations, prewar: 9 Kwajalein: 483
and Burma offensive: 404, 409 Manila: 614, 618-19, 656-57
and Canol: 318-21, 335-36, 339 Marshalls: 478, 483, 485
and China, supply of: 423 Okinawa: 645
and China defenses: 389, 408 Saipan: 501-02
and China theater status: 390, 397 Solomons: 249-51
and Communications Zone organization: 438 Waterways, Alberta: 319-27
and construction, control of: 360 Waterways, development and use: 288-89, 295, 319,
construction directives: 25, 281-82, 402, 508 321-25, 327-28, 342
and construction machinery and equipment, pro- Waterways systems: 73-74, 312-13, 590, 602, 612-13,
curement: 547, 549 641
and construction units: 547-48, 675 Watson Lake: 299, 301-04, 309, 311, 325-26, 328, 335
and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts: 24 Watut River: 252
and Engineer Construction Command: 654 Wau: 231, 260
and Hawaii defenses: 16, 342-43, 360-61 Wavell, Field Marshal Sir Archibald: 118, 391, 397,
and hospital construction: 486 404-05. See also General Headquarters, India;
and India airfields: 420 India.
and Ledo Road: 463-64, 663-64 Wawa: 77, 84, 595-96, 602, 612
and pilots for AVG: 389 Weather, effect of. See also Climate, effect of; Perma-
and POL surveys: 222, 233 frost; Rainfall, effect of; Snowfall, effect of;
and port facilities, construction and repair: 287 Winds, effect of.
and radar installations: 283 Alaska: 281, 283-89, 291-96, 333-34
and specialists: 265, 270, 456, 463-64 Alaska Highway: 315-18
supply system and directives on: 171-72, 211, 261, Attu: 329
264, 508-09, 554, 669-70 Canol: 324-25, 327-28, 337
758 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Yontan Airfield: 645, 658-59 Yunnan Province: 392, 397, 403-05, 409, 416, 429,
York, Col. Robert E.: 432 455, 459, 462, 666
Young, Col. Gordon R.: 10, 29, 31-33 Yunnanyi: 415, 421, 471
Young Hotel, Honolulu: 340 Yupbang Ga: 435, 442
Yount, Brig. Gen. Paul F.: 395, 664n
Yukon River: 288, 295, 309, 325 Zablan Airfield: 656
Yukon Territory: 305, 312 Zambales Mountains: 610
Yunnan-Burma Highway Engineering Administra- Zamboanga: 633, 655-56
tion: 408, 413-15, 421-22, 465, 663. See also Zamboanga peninsula: 626, 633-34
Kung, C. C. Zamboanga Province: 65-66
Yunnan-Burma railroad: 413, 436 Zero aircraft: 518
Yunnan-Burma Railroad Authority: 389, 403, 415 Zigzag Pass: 609