Common Cause

The Case for Working with our Cultural Values

September 2010

This report is only available electronically, and further copies can be downloaded at: www.wwf.org.uk/change. Additional information on this project, and other related reports, will also be found at this page.

CONTENTS

4. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE:
WORKING WITH VALUES AND DEEP FRAMES

APPENDIX 1: THE ORGANISATION OF LIFE-GOALS AND VALUES

APPENDIX 2: VALUES AND BIGGER-THAN-SELF PROBLEMS

APPENDIX 3: TOOLS FOR ANALYSING FRAMES

REFERENCES

ENDNOTES

WORKING GROUP MEMBERS

FOREWORD

There is an irony at the heart of much campaigning on global challenges – including campaigning on humanitarian and environmental crises: as our awareness of the profound scale of these challenges and the difficulty of addressing them grows, we tend to rely ever more heavily upon a set of issue-specific tactics which may actually militate against the emergence of the systemic and durable solutions that are needed.

Whatever the recent successes of civil society organisations in helping to address such challenges, it seems that current responses are incommensurate with the scale of the problems we confront. It is increasingly evident that resistance to action on these challenges will only be overcome through engagement with the cultural values that underpin this resistance. It also seems clear that, in trying to meet these challenges, civil society organisations must champion some long-held (but insufficiently esteemed) values, while seeking to diminish the primacy of many values which are now prominent – at least in Western industrialised society.

The values that must be strengthened – values that are commonly held and which can be brought to the fore – include: empathy towards those who are facing the effects of humanitarian and environmental crises, concern for future generations, and recognition that human prosperity resides in relationships – both with one another and with the natural world. Undoubtedly these are values that have been weakened – and often even derided – in modern culture. They are not, for example, values that are fostered by treating people as if they are, above all else, consumers. But they are values that have an ancient and noble history within Western thinking, and they still fundamentally inform much public debate. They are there to be activated and strengthened. We believe that everyone – individual citizens, civil society organisations, government and business – can play an active role in strengthening them. Indeed, they are values that *must* be championed if we are to uncover the collective will to deal with today's profound global challenges.

Civil society organisations must not shrink from making the case for strengthening these values, or beginning to work to ensure that their communications and campaigns contribute to this effort. But this process must be transparent, inclusive, and reflexive. Many vested interest groups have long understood the mechanisms by which values are promoted culturally, and many have worked – consciously or unconsciously – to help embed those cultural values that serve their purposes, often without public scrutiny or debate. The approach that we outline here is very different. Rather, in working to strengthen helpful values, civil society organisations can seize the opportunity to openly describe their strategies and why they take these to be important. They can work to include the widest possible range of perspectives in building on the evidence base that science provides. And they can embody the values that they espouse in the design of their communications and campaigns in inspiring ways.

Debates on the consequences of cultural values and the mechanisms by which they evolve must become as vigorous as public debate about the evidence base for government policy, business practice or civil society campaigns. There is a crucial and exciting role for civil society organisations in ensuring that this becomes the case.

Reflecting on these concerns and opportunities led us to convene a small working group to oversee the production of this report.

This is a work in progress in two respects.

First, the extensive research base upon which this report is built, and the conclusions that we draw from this, must continue to develop. Indeed, the report highlights areas where new interdisciplinary synthesis is needed and where important new pieces of work need to be done. But we do not believe that these limitations should distract from the compelling perspective that the report sets out.

Second, it is clear to us that no one organisation – no five organisations – can 'go it alone' in championing values that are given too little prominence in the language and shared culture of modern consumer society. Nor could they hope to effectively open public debate on the importance of these values. Meaningful engagement on the values framework that we begin to outline will require the commitment of a wide range of organisations. So this report is also an invitation – to individual citizens, a wide range of civil society organisations, government departments, public agencies, and aware businesses – to help in refining and then articulating the values that we set out.

We are committed to deepening and extending this initiative. Please, do contact one of us if you would like to join us in this effort.

Adeela Warley
Head of Communications
Friends of the Earth

Neil Sinden
Director of Policy and Campaigns
CPRE

David Norman
Director of Campaigns
WWF-UK

Tim Baster
Executive Director
Climate Outreach and Information
Network (COIN)

Martin Kirk
Head of UK Campaigns
Oxfam-GB

(Contact details will be found on the rear cover of this report.)

WORKING GROUP

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

SUMMARY AND GUIDE

This executive summary is more than a condensed version of the overall document: it also provides a map of the report. The report itself amasses a considerable body of empirical evidence in support of the case that it builds. This evidence is presented both in the main body of the document and in the appendices. This summary provides an overview of the case that the report builds, and a guide to finding particular parts of this argument substantiated in the main text. Concepts and key arguments in bold type are indexed to the relevant sections of the main report.

We are confronting profound challenges

This report is intended to catalyse debate on current approaches to tackling a wide range of challenges – including global poverty, climate change and biodiversity loss. Whatever the success of civil society organisations in beginning to address such challenges, these often seem to be intractable or worsening. Throughout this report such challenges are referred to, collectively, as **'bigger-than-self' problems** *[Section 1.1]*. This is to distinguish them from another class of problem: one that it is clearly in an individual's immediate self-interest to invest energy and resources in helping to tackle (for example, an insensitive development in their neighbourhood). For someone involved in civic engagement in the UK, bigger-than-self problems may include those which face people elsewhere – for example, human rights violations in a distant country. They may also include problems that will affect people in the UK, but where the 'return' on an individual's *personal* effort to help address this problem is unlikely to justify his or her expenditure of resources in helping to tackle the problem.

Bolder leadership from both political and business leaders is necessary if proportional responses to these challenges are to emerge, but active public engagement with these problems is of crucial importance. This is partly because of the direct material impacts of an individual's behaviour (for example, his or her environmental footprint), partly because of lack of consumer demand for ambitious changes in business practice, and partly because of the lack of political space and pressure for governments to enact change.

Our dominant model of human decision-making needs updating

There is mounting evidence from a range of studies in cognitive science that the dominant 'Enlightenment model' of human decision-making is extremely incomplete. According to this model we imagine ourselves, when faced with a decision, to be capable of dispassionately assessing the facts, foreseeing probable outcomes of different responses, and then selecting and pursuing an optimal course of action. As a result, many approaches to campaigning on bigger-than-self problems still adhere to the conviction that 'if only people really knew' the true nature or full scale of the problems which we confront, then they would be galvanised into demanding more proportionate action in response.

But this understanding of how people reach decisions is very incomplete. **There is mounting evidence that facts play only a partial role in shaping people's judgment. Emotion is often far more important** *[see Section 1.3]*. It is increasingly apparent that our collective decisions are based importantly upon a set of factors that often lie beyond conscious awareness, and which are informed in important part by emotion – in particular, dominant cultural values, which are tied to emotion.

It seems that individuals are often predisposed to reject information when accepting it would challenge their identity and values. Campaigning approaches that rely on the provision of information may well work for people whose existing values are confirmed through accepting, and acting upon, that information. But for others, the same information (for example, about the scale of the challenge climate change presents) may simply serve to harden resistance to accepting new government policies or adopting new private-sphere behaviours. This points to the need to incorporate an understanding of people's values into civil society campaigns.

It is inescapably the case that any communication or campaign will inevitably serve to convey particular values, intentionally or otherwise. Moreover, **in conveying these values, the communication or campaign will help to further strengthen those values culturally**.

People's decisions are driven importantly by the values they hold – frequently unconsciously, and sometimes to the virtual exclusion of a rational assessment of the facts. In particular, **some values provide a better source of motivation for engaging bigger-than-self problems than other values.**

The conjunction of these two insights – that communications and campaigns inevitably serve to strengthen particular values, and that a person's values have a profound and usually unconscious effect on the behavioural choices that they make – raises profound ethical questions *[see Section 1.6]*.

The practical response to this ethical challenge cannot be to strive for value-neutral communications (this would be impossible). Rather, it is to strive for *transparency*, communicating to an audience not just *what* values a particular communication or campaign is intended to convey, but also *why* those values are considered important. **In the light of this, if one accepts that there are ethical imperatives for addressing bigger-than-self problems, one is presumably also likely to accept that there are ethical imperatives for conveying some values rather than others – provided that these are conveyed with a high degree of transparency.**

This points to an important role for civil society organisations, which have long focused mainly on examining the *factual* basis for addressing bigger-than-self problems, and engaging in debate about the best practical approaches to achieving this. Now it can be seen that civil society organisations must *also* develop expertise in examining and laying bare the *values* that particular communications promote: starting with their own, and then moving on to begin to examine the values implicit in the communications of a range of participants in public debate – including those of vested interest groups.

Values and behaviour are intimately connected

There is a large body of evidence about the way in which people's values are organised across cultural contexts, and this report reviews some of these results. In particular, two research findings are of importance: First, **people's values tend to cluster in remarkably similar ways across cultures**; second, the relationship between different values is such that **some sets of values can easily be held simultaneously while others oppose one another**. *[This evidence is summarised in the main report, in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. But, because it is of central importance to the subsequent arguments that are constructed in this paper, the research is also examined in more detail in Appendix 1.]* A person's values comprise an integrated and dynamic system, such that activating one particular value affects other values (activating compatible values and suppressing opposing values).

Simplified, the work presented here on values points to a distinction between two broad classes of value: intrinsic or self-transcendent values, and extrinsic or self-enhancing values *[Section 2.1 and Appendix 1]*. **Intrinsic values include the value placed on a sense of community, affiliation to friends and family, and self-development. Extrinsic values, on the other hand, are values that are contingent upon the perceptions of others – they relate to envy of 'higher' social strata, admiration of material wealth, or power**.

These two classes of value act in opposition. For instance, to the extent that a person considers the intrinsic value of 'community feeling' (which includes the desire to improve the world through civic involvement) to be important, they are less likely to place importance on the extrinsic value of 'financial success' (which encompasses an individual's desire for money, possessions and his or her envy of those who have these things). Indeed, these two values are almost perfectly opposed. But note, of course, that this is not to neglect the importance of relative financial success for people who have too little money to live decently *[see Section 2.1 for further discussion of this point]*.

Intrinsic values are associated with concern about bigger-than-self problems, and with corresponding behaviours to help address these problems. Extrinsic values, on the other hand, are associated with lower levels of concern about bigger-than-self problems, and lower motivation to adopt behaviours in line with such concern *[Section 2.3 and Appendix 2]*. The evidence for this is drawn from diverse studies and investigative approaches, and represents a robust body of research results. So, pursuing the example above, experimental studies show that **a strong focus on financial success is associated with: lower empathy, more manipulative tendencies, a higher preference for social inequality and hierarchy, greater prejudice towards people who are different, and less concern about environmental problems. Studies also suggest that when people are placed in resource dilemma games, they tend to be less generous and to act in a more competitive and environmentally-damaging way if they have been implicitly reminded of concerns about financial success**.

Of course, extrinsic values *can* motivate helpful behaviour, but this will only happen where extrinsic goals can be pursued through particular helpful behaviours: for example, buying a hybrid car because it looks 'cool'. The problem is that, in many cases, it is very difficult to motivate helpful behaviours through appeals to extrinsic values, and – even when successful – subsequent behaviour tends to relapse into that which is more consistent with unhelpful extrinsic values. Moreover, such strategies are likely to create collateral damage, because they will also serve to reinforce the perceived importance of extrinsic values, diminishing the importance of intrinsic values and undermining the basis for systemic concern about bigger-than-self problems. So responding to an understanding of the integrated nature of values systems requires that communicators and campaigners should consider *both* the effects of the values that their communication or campaign will serve to activate (and therefore, as will be discussed, also tend to strengthen) *and* the knock-on effects of their campaigns on other values (some of which may be helpful, others unhelpful).

A range of factors (such as a person's upbringing, their exposure to social norms in the media, or the values held by their role-models) determine which of the full range of values are particularly important for an individual (and these can change with circumstances). In determining a person's concern about bigger-than-self problems, it seems that what is important is not whether an individual holds extrinsic values *per se* (this is probably inevitable), but rather the *relative* importance that he or she attaches to extrinsic as opposed to intrinsic values. So it should not be concluded

that bigger-than-self problems will only be properly addressed if extrinsic values are expunged. But it is crucial, from the point of view of concern about bigger-than-self problems, to ask how intrinsic values can be encouraged and extrinsic values discouraged.

Values can be strengthened culturally

Values can be both activated (for example, by encouraging people to think about the importance of particular things), and they can be further strengthened, such that they become easier to activate. It seems that one way in which values become strengthened is through their repeated activation *[see Section 2.5]*. This may occur, for example, through people's exposure to these values through influential peers, in the media, in education, or through people's experience of public policies.

It is sometimes argued that self-interested values are inevitably dominant (perhaps because these are biologically innate, for example). There is mounting evidence that this is not the case *[see Section 2.6]*. But even if it were the case, this would serve to underscore the importance of ensuring, so far as possible, that cultural cues contribute to activating and strengthening intrinsic values.

An understanding of values must be incorporated into civil society campaigns

As discussed, on the one hand, simply conveying information about bigger-than-self problems is likely to leave many people unmoved – or perhaps even more resistant to change. On the other hand, appeals to values that are in opposition to the emergence of widespread concern about bigger-than-self problems are likely to contribute to further strengthening these values culturally. What alternative response might be developed?

This report builds the case that bigger-than-self problems will *only* be systemically addressed through the conjunction of:

- An understanding of the effect of cultural values upon people's motivation to change their own behaviour or to demand change from political and business leaders.

- An understanding of the range of factors that activate and strengthen some values rather than others.

- Widespread public debate about the ways in which government, business and civil society organisations serve to strengthen particular values through their communications, campaigns and policies.

Frames offer a vehicle for promoting values

This report then brings two streams of research alongside one another: i) studies in social psychology and sociology which examine the importance of particular values in motivating concern about bigger-than-self problems (that is, the work discussed in the section above); and ii) research on the importance of **'frames' as vehicles for working to activate and strengthen helpful values** *[See Section 3]*.

Frames are of key importance in thinking about values and how these are activated and strengthened culturally. *[Section 3.1 introduces frames.]* "Frames", writes the cognitive scientist George Lakoff, "are the mental structures that allow human beings to understand reality – and sometimes to create what we take to be reality. [T]hey structure our ideas and concepts, they shape how we reason, and they even impact how we perceive and how we act."

Some cognitive scientists use the term 'deep frames' to refer to cognitive structures held in long-term memory that contain particular values. They tend to be relatively stable *but they are not unchanging or unchangeable.*

Work on framing is often misunderstood: it is sometimes assumed that framing is just about 'getting the message right' – as though a particular choice of language can motivate us, *en masse*, to want to embrace a particular worldview. **'The message' is of course important in activating particular frames, but it is only the beginning** *[Section 3.2]*. Conceptual framing (crafting wording and phrasing to focus on particular issues) will not have an effect unless these messages resonate with a set of deep frames.

So there's an important distinction between processes that lead to the *activation* of frames, and processes that help to *strengthen* frames (that is, make frames more easily activated). *[This distinction is discussed in the context of values in Section 2.5, and in the context of frames in Section 4.3.]*

Deep frames (and therefore the values that these embody) are activated and strengthened through many aspects of our lived experience

'Activation' refers to the process of eliciting particular frames. Once culturally established, a deep frame can be activated very easily through the use of just a few words (for example, the phrases 'War on Terror' or 'tax relief' activate deep frames relating to a whole understanding of security or the proper role of government, respectively). What is of particular interest is how deep frames are strengthened – that is, how a deep frame comes to be more easily activated through the use of simple cues. Crucially, activation of a frame through use of particular language is an important way of helping to strengthen it – repeatedly activating a frame has the effect of making it easier to activate. **But language doesn't stand alone. It is part and parcel of the institutions and policies that we live with and interact with. Deep frames (and therefore the values that these embody) are activated and strengthened through many aspects of our lived experience** – including our experience of living with particular public policies and social institutions.

There is a mutual process by which public policies and social institutions shape our deep frames, which in turn shape our policies and institutions. For example, interacting with particular policies or social institutions such as the electoral system, aid agencies, planning policy, or the national health service, has an effect upon which deep frames come to dominate. Research on policy feedback reveals that – perhaps unsurprisingly – public policy has an impact in shaping dominant public values, which in turn impacts on public support for new policies *[Section 3.2]*.

Deploying an understanding of frames raises profound ethical issues

The power of deep frames to promote particular values-based agendas is well known. It is something to which many political interest groups have responded. For example, George Lakoff argues that American neo-conservatives have assiduously set about establishing "their deepest values into the brains of tens of millions of Americans", by working to strengthen deep frames consistent with their politics. There is some evidence for similar effects in a UK political context *[Section 3.2]*, though not in an analogous party-political way.

An understanding of deep frames can be hugely powerful to political strategists attempting to build public support for their programmes. Unfortunately, the way in which this understanding is deployed is not always transparent, and this lack of transparency may be seen to serve the interests of those designing these programmes: while deep frames provide a set of extremely powerful tools, working

with them can be seen as manipulative – and it is undoubtedly the case that this perception is sometimes justified.

But that is not to suggest that framing can be exposed and then ignored – any more than an understanding of the importance of values in motivating public concern about bigger-than-self problems can be ignored. We think, inescapably, in terms of frames, and any communication therefore necessarily conveys a set of frames – whether it does so deliberately or inadvertently. In the same way, any public policy creates expectations on the part of a citizen – an understanding about their role and that of government, for example – and this, too, serves to activate and strengthen particular deep frames. There is no such thing as value-neutral policy.

So deep frames won't go away – they structure our thinking, and will probably continue to be deployed by political interest groups of all political persuasions. How, therefore, should civil society organisations respond to an understanding of the importance of deep frames? Two responses are needed:

- Civil society organisations should champion public scrutiny of, and debate about, the role of deep frames in activating and strengthening particular values culturally, and the consequences of this.

- Employing utmost transparency, civil society organisations should deploy an understanding of deep frames in their own public-interest communications and campaigns, thus helping to strengthen values that will leave society better positioned to tackle bigger-than-self problems. In doing so, these organisations should take scrupulous care to explain to their audience *what* deep frames a communication or campaign is intended to activate (and therefore strengthen), and *why* this is important.

Examples of frames that may be important in tackling bigger-than-self problems

In this report, **three pairs of deep frames** *[Section 3.5]* are presented that seem likely to be of significance in influencing the cultural importance accorded to the helpful values discussed earlier. Each example was developed by drawing, in part, on the specific survey items used to establish these values *[these survey items are presented in detail in Appendix 2]*.

In time, important frames will need to be identified and validated through empirical methods. To conduct detailed frame analysis would be a major undertaking, beyond the current scope of this project (Appendix 3 outlines some of the techniques that would need to be deployed in the course of such analysis). It is for this reason that this section draws on the judgment of experienced frame analysts. Future work would deepen an understanding of the way in which the frames that are highlighted here – and others that are overlooked – are used in public debate. However, for current purposes – to demonstrate the importance of incorporating an understanding of deep frames into civil society communications and campaigns – this less rigorous approach is adequate.

These three pairs of frames are summarised as follows:

'Self-interest' versus 'common-interest' frame *[Section 3.5.1]*

According to the *self-interest frame*, individuals inevitably and properly pursue their own self-interest, and this interest is to be assessed primarily through individual cost-benefit calculations conducted in economic terms.

There is an analogy between the individual and the nation-state. Nation states will inevitably, and rightly, operate in their own economic self-interest and there is no scope for the morality of shared wealth in international relations. International alliances are therefore inherently unstable, and will begin to break down as soon as the national interests of individual states begin to diverge.

In contrast, the *common-interest frame* views individuals as inherently concerned about both themselves and others, and the value that they place on these things cannot be fully captured in economic terms. People, other living things and nature have an inherent value that is irreducible to economic value. Freedom is to be assessed through the extent to which people are unconstrained in developing as human beings in the manner they desire. Individual nation states are part of an international community with many shared dependencies and responsibilities.

Note that these two frames include two dimensions that are conceptually distinct, but which are very closely associated psychologically: the extent to which people value common interest above self-interest, and the extent to which such interests are to be assessed in economic terms. Of course, conceptually, it's perfectly possible to value common interest and to assess this interest economically. But for psychological reasons *[discussed in Section 3.5.1]* a deep frame that conveys the importance of self-interest is also likely to establish the importance of assessing this interest in economic terms.

'Strict father' versus 'nurturant parent' frame *[Section 3.5.2]*

George Lakoff suggests that there is a direct correspondence between models of family and models of a nation. In particular, he highlights two different ideals for the family – the strict father and the nurturant parent family, and he suggests that these two different models produce deeply contrasting views on individual freedom and the role of government. These two concepts are of course key in Western society, and comprise important frames in relation to action on bigger-than-self problems.

The *strict father frame* emphasises the role of government in exercising authority and control, of establishing moral order, commanding obedience, and punishing dissent. It views social support for people who are less fortunate as morally dubious, because people's misfortunes arise as a result of their own lack of discipline and morality. By comparison, the *nurturant parent frame* stresses the role of government in ensuring social justice (built upon empathy for everyone) and responsibility towards others.

Although these frames were developed as a result of analysis of the deeply partisan American political context, it is nonetheless important to explore them in a UK context: the strict father frame is still of great importance in UK political thought. These frames underscore the importance of *conceptual metaphors* for understanding political visions. Conceptual metaphors project a frame that we know well (for example, 'family' or 'battle') on to something more contested ('the nation' or one's career trajectory) *[Section 3.3]*). Adaptation of these frames to a UK political context would necessarily be less partisan – for example, elements of progressive thinking from both left and right are found in variants of the nurturant parent frames.

'Elite governance' versus 'participative democracy' frame [Section 3.5.3]

The *elite governance frame* holds that political power is properly consolidated in the hands of elites. People cannot be trusted to solve their own problems through deliberative means: strong leaders must take control and act on their behalf. It is important to note that this frame is quite powerful among some sections of the environment movement – with some environmentalists openly questioning whether democracy can respond to environmental problems with sufficient speed.

In contrast, according to the *participative democracy frame*, citizens hold political power, and should exert their influence through effective organisation. The government is of the people, by the people, and for the people – the question becomes one of how to make citizen participation in democratic process more effective.

Implications for how civil society organisations work

An understanding of values and framing has far-reaching implications for how civil society organisations work.

Civil society organisations should develop an explicit awareness of the values that their campaigns serve to activate and therefore strengthen

It is crucial that civil society campaigners and communicators grasp the importance of values and also of frames (as vehicles for promoting particular values). An understanding of values and frames opens up opportunities for important new campaigns and collaborations. First, it implies that **civil society organisations should develop an explicit awareness of the values that their campaigns serve to activate and therefore strengthen, and then strive for complete transparency in acknowledging that they are working to promote these values** *[Section 4.1]*. Having achieved such transparency, civil society organisations should then encourage other organisations (government and business) to work towards similar openness. Only in this way can civil society organisations begin to work to safeguard against the tacit and potentially manipulative use of deep frames, and to begin to open up public scrutiny of, and debate about, cultural values, the influence of these, and the way in which they are shaped.

Civil society organisations should also work towards embodying the values that they seek to promote through their communications and campaigns in the way in which these activities are themselves conducted *[Section 4.2]*. **Even if a campaign is unsuccessful, it will have impacts on the prevalence of particular values and deep frames – because people will see the campaign materials and unconsciously respond to the deep frames that these enshrine.**

Of course, this strategy can be pursued in parallel to more issue-specific campaigning *[Section 4.3]*. Moreover, an understanding of values and frames points to new **opportunities for potentially powerful collaborations across organisations working on disparate issues:** there will be common interest to promote values that will help build public demand for action on a wide range of bigger-than-self problems. *[Some of these opportunities are discussed in Section 4.4.]* So, for example, a wide range of organisations could partner on a campaign to limit commercial advertising, recognising that there is an extensive body of research showing that increased exposure to commercial advertising increases the prevalence of materialistic values, which are in turn antagonistic to public concern about a wide range of bigger-than-self problems.

Values are also shaped by people's experience of public policies

Values are also shaped by people's *experience* of public policies and of interacting with public and private institutions. For this reason, any piece of public policy will have both material impacts (the effect of the policy in directly changing the outside world) and cognitive impacts (the effect of the policy on citizen's values). This is related to a phenomenon, well-known in political science, called 'policy feedback'. Policy feedback refers to the influence of people's *experience* of public policy upon their values and, in turn, the demands they make on the decision-makers they elect *[see Section 4.5 for further discussion]*. It is not sufficient, therefore, to examine the impact of communications upon cultural values: we must also examine the impacts of public policy and public institutions. Public debates about policy should properly reflect not just the likely material impacts of these, but also the 'cognitive' impacts – the effect a policy has on people's values. *[There are a range of implications of policy feedback, discussed in Section 4.5.]*

Ideally, both systemic and specific objectives can be optimally and simultaneously pursued through appeal to the same set of helpful values – although this is not inevitably the case. Responding to an understanding of the importance of values and framing may entail the need for trade-offs: it may sometimes be the case that specific campaign goals are best delivered through appeal to frames that serve to undermine more systemic change (for example, through appeals to social status or financial success). One key implication from this study is therefore that civil society organisations should become far more aware of such potential trade-offs, and work to respond to them in a strategic way. *[Trade-offs are discussed in detail in Section 4.6.]*

Campaigns may serve inadvertently to strengthen unhelpful frames in several ways: through particular communications approaches (for example, what language do they use?), through the mode of engagement with their target audience (for example, how do they encourage people to act? Do they embody principles of public participation?), and through the policies that they demand (for example, if these policies were adopted, what values or deep frames would people's *experience* of those policies help to convey?).

As has been discussed, an understanding of values and deep frames must prompt circumspection before invoking unhelpful frames in the course of motivating particular helpful behaviours. This means that it is short-sighted to conduct audience segmentation exercises and then tailor communications and campaigns to appeal to the values that dominate within a particular segment irrespective of whether or not these values are socially and environmentally helpful. But audience segmentation is still important in order to better understand particular audience segments, with a view to better engaging them in debate about the implications of values and frames, and in order to effectively work to strengthen helpful values *[see Section 4.7]*.

Finally, it is crucially important that all this weighty discussion about values and deep frames should not obscure the importance of fun, compelling, inspiring communications. Many communication organisations have developed particular expertise in this area – and this is expertise that is needed. But care should be taken to ensure that enthusiastic pursuit of particular communication approaches does not lead campaigners to neglect the importance of examining the values which these communications serve to activate and strengthen.

1. CONTEXT

We face a range of profound challenges, many of which are intensifying. Proportional response to these challenges will require ambitious interventions – both nationally and globally. Such interventions may be needed in line with national responsibilities to contribute to international momentum to meet these challenges – as in the case of climate change, global poverty, or species extinction. At the same time, interventions are also needed in response to national manifestations of wider problems – such as the loss of the British countryside.

1.1 Current approaches to tackling global challenges are failing

At present, despite some successes in beginning to address these challenges, the overall picture is worsening in many domains. For instance, here are three examples of primary concern to the organisations that collaborated in putting this report together – two international challenges, and one national challenge:

• According to *The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan:* "To avoid the most dangerous impacts of climate change, average global temperatures must rise no more than 2°C, and that means global emissions must start falling before 2020 and then fall to at least 50% below 1990 levels by 2050" (DECC, 2009: 2). However, real UK emissions have actually increased by 17% since 1990 (Anderson and Bows, 2009).

• The 20th century saw massive improvements in the fight against global poverty, but the progress is still far too slow for the vast majority of the world's population. An estimated 1.4 billion people were still living in extreme poverty in 2005. The perfect storm of increasing resource constraints, climate change and economic turmoil not only threaten to slow progress down, but to turn it around altogether. "It is clear that improvements in the lives of the poor have been unacceptably slow, and some hard-won gains are being eroded by the climate, food and economic crises," UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon writes in the foreword to the Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 (DESA, 2010: 3).

• Despite policy changes in recent years, the declining area of countryside together with damage to landscape character and loss of biodiversity are placing continuing pressure on the natural environment in England. According to UK government land use change statistics, more than 5,000 hectares of greenfield land were lost to urban development each year between 2000 and 2006 (Foresight, 2010). Moreover, the impact of urban development extends far beyond its immediate footprint. CPRE estimates that in 2007, around 50% of England's area was disturbed by the sight and sound of nearby roads, urban areas and other major infrastructure (CPRE, 2007).

But, as will be seen, the questions raised in this report are of central importance to campaigns on a wide range of issues. They extend far beyond those on which COIN, CPRE, FOE, Oxfam-GB and WWF-UK focus.

In many cases, it is likely to be in an individual's self-interest to invest energy in helping to tackle particular issues – particularly where these are more local, or more tractable. Such issues might include moves to site a landfill facility near an individual's house, or the failure of a local council to take proper care of an elderly relative. In other cases, motivation to engage is unlikely to arise through expressions of self-interest. Sometimes this will be because the problem clearly only affects other people – perhaps people living the other side of the world. But when a problem is big or diffuse, then even if a person may personally benefit from moves to address it, it's unlikely that an individual will view the effort that he or she must make in order to effect change to be an 'efficient' use of his or her time or resources.[1] Problems of this

latter type are referred to, throughout this report, as 'bigger-than-self' problems. These may include, for example, human rights abuses, prejudice against particular groups (whether on grounds of age, disability, gender, race, religion and belief, or sexual orientation), or public health concerns. Clearly, there will often be cases where it is difficult to define a problem as solely of one type or the other, but the distinction is still useful.

1.2 Public demand for change is critically important

Public engagement in these problems is crucially important. It is important because our collective choices about the way in which we live have important impacts on many of these challenges. But public appetite and demand for change is also – quite properly – of crucial importance in setting the pace and level of ambition with which governments and businesses respond to these challenges.[2] Both politicians and business leaders claim that their hands are tied through lack of public demand for more ambitious change, with politicians highlighting the barriers to ambitious new policy interventions presented by electoral resistance or apathy, and businesspeople pointing to the possible loss of profit (and therefore central government tax revenues) that could arise as a result of adopting many equity, social, animal welfare or environmental policies. Civil society campaigners are themselves often cautious about the scale of change that they urge – aware of the need to retain public support, to demonstrate pertinence to political debate as this is currently construed, and to respond to the pressures under which business must currently operate.

1.3 In making judgements, feelings are more important than facts

Confronted with constraints such as those outlined above, civil society organisations often attempt to make their communication of the *facts* more effective. But facts are of limited value in influencing people's judgement. Of course, factual accuracy is an ethical (and practical) imperative. Alone, however, the facts of a predicament are often ineffective in motivating public concern and behaviour commensurate with such concern. Presentation of facts can even prove to be counter-productive. The cognitive scientist George Lakoff highlights the dangers of assuming 'Enlightenment reason': the belief that, if people only knew the facts, they would accurately identify where their self-interest lies, and act in line with this. According to this perspective:

"If people are made aware of the facts and figures, they should naturally reason to the right conclusion. Voters should vote their interests; they should calculate which policies and programs are in their best interests, and vote for the candidates who advocate these policies and programs" (Lakoff, 2009:8).

But the practice of many of the most effective politicians, and an understanding of cognitive science, paint a different picture:

"[V]oters don't behave that way. They vote against their obvious self-interest; they allow bias, prejudice, and emotion to guide their decisions; they argue madly about values, priorities, and goals. Or they quietly reach conclusions independent of their interests without consciously knowing why. Enlightenment reason does not account for real political behaviour because the Enlightenment view of reason is false" (Lakoff, 2009: 8).

According to the model of judgement and decision-making that the clinical psychologist Drew Westen and his colleagues propose, "judgements about emotionally meaningful issues (which, in everyday life, include most judgements and decisions) reflect the simultaneous satisfaction of two sets of constraints: cognitive constraints (imposed by data and their logical entailments) and emotional

constraints (imposed by emotional associations and anticipated emotions)" (Westen *et al.*, 2007: 690). Their experiments – for example, examining people's attitudes towards the Clinton-Lewinski crisis, or the dispute over machine ballot counts in the 2000 US presidential election – reveal that "emotional pulls dominate judgement and decision making in high-stakes, emotion-laden political situations, generally overriding even relatively strong cognitive constraints" (2007: 691). In other words, people's grasp of the facts is not irrelevant, but their *feelings* are more important in shaping their judgements on such issues.

Often, if the facts don't support a person's values, "the facts bounce off"

Why are the facts of a predicament of limited value in motivating responses? Because, often, if the facts don't support a person's values, "the facts bounce off" (Lakoff, 2004: 17). The way that people think – including their response to factual information – tends to work to protect their current identity. For this reason, individuals are often predisposed to reject suggestions that they should change aspects of their behaviour where these are important in establishing and maintaining their social roles. This predisposition helps to minimise possible sources of dissonance and threats to people's social identity (Sherman and Cohen, 2006). And of course, at one level, it is psychologically important and protective. But research conducted by Dan Kahan and colleagues at the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School "suggests that this form of 'protective cognition' is a major cause of political conflict over the credibility of scientific data on climate change and other environmental risks" (Kahan, 2010: 297).

So, further pursuing the example of climate change, simply 're-stating the science', or underscoring the 'common sense' of taking mitigating action is unlikely to help much in stimulating involvement of a wider constituency of people in debate about responses to anthropogenic climate change.

"The prevailing approach is still simply to flood the public with as much sound data as possible on the assumption that the truth is bound, eventually, to drown out its competitors. If, however, the truth carries implications that threaten people's cultural values, then... [confronting them with this data] is likely to harden their resistance and increase their willingness to support alternative arguments, no matter how lacking in evidence" (Kahan, 2010: 297).

As will be seen, a different response is needed: one that responds empathetically to an understanding of the challenges that response to information about bigger-than-self problems may present to a person's identity. It should be reiterated that none of this is to suggest that campaigners can afford to be slap-dash with the facts of their case. Factual accuracy is, of course, an ethical imperative.

This understanding, of the limitations of the presentation of facts, is something that effective advertising people, public relations experts and politicians, have long recognised and incorporated into their communications and campaign strategies. Different responses are possible to this understanding – a 'marketing response', and a 'political response'.

The first is the response of understanding the limitations of fact-based argument in marketing products (or behaviours), and instead tailoring advertising campaigns or communications to appeal to the *values* of a particular audience segment. Such communications have the *side-effect* of contributing to strengthening particular values, raising both practical and ethical concerns. When one's concern is simply to sell as many hamburgers as possible, one probably has little concern for the values that one is helping to strengthen in the course of running an advertising campaign. However, when applied to social or environmental campaigning, there is a need to adopt far higher levels of responsibility for the side-effects that a campaign has in promoting particular values. This is discussed further in Section 1.4.

The second response, which is more ambitious, is that made by effective political strategists. These seek to deploy an understanding of *how* particular values come to dominate in public debate, *with the aim of deliberately embedding particular values* (those that it is in the interests of a particular political programme to further embed). Simultaneously, they also work to erode the importance attached to other, competing, values (perhaps those held by political opponents) that do not serve the strategist's political purpose. This is discussed further in Section 1.5.

1.4 Selling hamburgers, selling behaviour change

One response to the problems with fact-based communication is to find ways to understand an audience according to its dominant values, and then to 'sell' a product (or a behaviour) through appeal to these values. This is of course an approach that the marketing industry has honed to near perfection. Hamburgers aren't generally sold on the basis of statistics about their nutritional content. They may be sold to some audience segments, for example, on the basis of an implication that they contribute to the quality of family-life; to other segments on the grounds that they represent an expression of individuality, or simply a cheap meal.

Analogous strategies characterise many campaigns aimed at motivating individuals to adopt different behaviours through appeals to thrift, financial success, or social status.

Such an approach leads, for example, to the assertion that a significant proportion of the UK population are predominantly motivated by appeals to financial success or social status and will remain apathetic – or even antagonistic – towards an agenda for action on bigger-than-self problems unless approaches to addressing these problems can be re-cast as opportunities for individuals to promote their immediate financial interests. There are many ways of attempting to re-cast problems in these ways – for example, in the case of climate change, urging people to install photovoltaic panels on their roofs on the grounds of the social status that this may command, or urging simple domestic-energy efficient steps on the grounds of the savings that can be made in the household energy bill. In the UK, such strategies are typified by the 'values modes' approach (Rose and Dade, 2007).

Writ large, an analogous approach is deployed in advocating reform of national policies. Thus, policies aimed at assisting the economic development of developing countries may focus on the imperative to help create new markets for developed country exports. Or, in campaigning on climate change, appeal may be made to opportunities for 'green growth' and increased national economic competitiveness, the need to avert large numbers of environmental refugees, or the need to achieve better domestic energy security. Policies aimed at facilitating public control of land use may appeal to the imperative to protect existing property values.

Such approaches may well have advantages in driving issue-specific changes. Given the urgency of many of the problems that we face, it is understandable that civil society organisations should often place considerable reliance upon such techniques. But there are problems (Crompton, 2008; Thøgersen and Crompton, 2009; Crompton and Kasser, 2009).

First, while there is often an apparent overlap between these appeals and the wider environmental or developmental challenges that we confront, this overlap is likely to be at best partial. Increased public pressure for national energy security may lead to increased investment in renewables, and yet it may serve as an argument for investment in oil shale extraction, or oil exploration in environmentally sensitive areas. Appeals to the UK's competitive advantage in emerging markets may provide a compelling rationale for targeted development assistance. And yet the narrow

pursuit of national self-interest presents a fundamental barrier to achieving international agreement on reducing global greenhouse gas emissions or a fair international trade regime. (Case Study 1 outlines a case where a campaigning organisation has consistently demanded clarity on the fundamental reasons underlying policy decisions, eschewing a more 'instrumentalist' approach).

Communications and campaigns which appeal to particular values serve both to strengthen these values, and to weaken opposing values

The second problem with this approach is that, as will be discussed later in this report, communications and campaigns which appeal to particular values serve both to strengthen these values among an audience, and to weaken the importance of other opposing values. Fundamentally, appeals to financial success and social status are problematic because a large body of research suggests that strengthening these values serves to weaken opposing values that underpin concern about bigger-than-self problems (this will be discussed in detail in Section 2 and Appendix 1). This might not matter if appeals to financial success and social status *could indeed get us far enough*. If we could develop systemic approaches to tackling the panoply of bigger-than-self problems through appeal to financial success and social status, perhaps there would be no need to appeal to other sources of motivation. But, in practice, there is every danger that strategies which appeal to these values – while sometimes effective in a piecemeal fashion – will actually serve to undermine public concern about the full range of bigger-than-self problems which we face.

This leads us to a third problem: an ethical problem that is encountered in all campaigns – not just those that serve to strengthen values of financial success or social status. All communications and campaigns serve to help strengthen particular values culturally; they each have an impact – often an unconscious impact – on an audience, influencing an audience's values, with implications for an individual's attitudes and behaviour (and, indeed, wellbeing) in other spheres of life. Understanding this confers an ethical responsibility on the communicator – whether an advertising agency, or an environmental organisation – to demonstrate that their audience understands the consequences of such a campaign, and to take steps to establish that there is audience consent for this communication. This is a problem that is explored further in subsequent sections of this report.

In criticising some of the uses to which audience segmentation is put, this report nonetheless recognises the importance of responding to the needs and values of a particular audience. The approach outlined here advocates neither, on the one hand, slavishly following those values that resonate with particular audience segments (irrespective of the wider impacts of such values), nor, on the other, insisting on an alternative set of values with indifference to how these are received by a particular audience.

Rather, it is possible to better understand one's audience – in part, perhaps, by using the segmentation tools developed by the marketing industry – but then to transparently engage this audience in a way that helps to activate and strengthen values which will be of more help in motivating concern about humanitarian and environmental issues.

Thinking about the specific needs of a particular audience is crucial if we are to engage people in debate, but how people are prompted to reflect over the course of that debate is a different matter. It is here that people (and agencies) with talents for marketing and communication will make their key contributions to promoting positive change.

Case study 1
Instrumentalism in countryside protection

Changes in UK planning policy over the course of the last few decades have highlighted the limitations of basing arguments for conservation on the coincidence of conservation concerns with other, more instrumental policy priorities. This box presents an example of the benefits of establishing policy principles that capture a more fundamental reason for conservation concern; namely, the intrinsic value of nature.

Following the second world war, and concerns about maintaining domestic food sovereignty, UK planning policy protected agricultural land from development pressures. As a result, the opportunity arose for countryside campaigners to resist inappropriate development in rural areas through the use of these provisions – even though they reflected government policy on agricultural productivity rather than a more general concern to protect the countryside from damaging development.

In 1987, however, the UK government made proposals to suspend protection for all but the 'best and most versatile' agricultural land, under an initiative called ALURE ('Alternative Land Use and the Rural Economy'). Those concerned about inappropriate development in the countryside had now to find alternative imperatives upon which to base their campaigns.

At that time, CPRE called for the establishment of a principle to promote protection of the countryside 'for its own sake'. It successfully lobbied for the inclusion of this in a Planning Policy Guidance note in 1988, establishing the generality of the importance of protecting the countryside from inappropriate development. This principle focuses on the importance of the intrinsic rather than the instrumental value of the countryside, which accurately reflects CPRE's own motivations for its work. In effect, this provision strengthened the protection of the countryside from inappropriate development by placing the burden of proof on developers to demonstrate how their proposals would outweigh the intrinsic value of the countryside.

In 2004, national planning policy for the countryside was again revised. The imperative to safeguard the countryside 'for its own sake' was replaced in a new Planning Policy Statement with an overall government aim of protecting the countryside 'for the sake of its intrinsic character and beauty, the diversity of its landscapes, heritage and wildlife, and the wealth of its natural resources…' (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004). There is a fear that, despite the reference to 'intrinsic character and beauty', this change could be interpreted as a reassertion of the instrumental value of the countryside. This would shift the burden of proof back to those who seek to protect the countryside from inappropriate development by requiring them to demonstrate the overriding importance of the damage that such development might cause to the character, beauty or diversity of the countryside.

1.5 Politics and values

As seen in Section 1.4 above, marketers, hired to sell units of a particular product, have little interest in the impacts of their campaigns on cultural values. Their interest is to appeal opportunistically to whatever values will help them to sell a product. If, in the course of running an advertising campaign, they also serve to further strengthen particular values culturally, this is not usually considered of particular relevance.

Political strategists, however, must necessarily demonstrate greater concern about the values that their activities serve to embed. As will be seen in Section 3, effective politicians are highly aware of the way in which they can use political communications and, indeed, public policy itself, to further embed those values that resonate with their political convictions and which will therefore serve to build further public support for their political programmes. Within an American political context, George Lakoff (2009) has examined the effectiveness with which neo-conservatives deployed an understanding of cognition to promote public support for their agenda – at the fundamental level of working to further embed neo-conservative values in the public mind:

"What conservatives did was to use language, ideas, images and symbols [and, as Lakoff explains elsewhere, policy] repeatedly to activate the conservative mode of thought and inhibit the progressive mode of thought in individuals who had both… This gradually made people more and more conservative." (p.113). [Note that Lakoff writes here of American neo-conservatives, who have a very different political complexion to British traditional conservatives.]

Political leaders have profound influence over people's deep frames, in important part through the policies that they advocate

Political leaders have profound influence over people's deep frames, in important part through the policies that they advocate. Effective leaders know this intuitively. As Margaret Thatcher said in an interview with *The Sunday Times*, published on 3 May 1981:

"…it isn't that I set out on economic policies; it's that I set out really to change the approach, and changing the economics is the means of changing that approach. If you change the approach you really are after the heart and soul of the nation. Economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul."

While this is of course an understanding that is deployed powerfully by the political left, as well as the right, George Lakoff nonetheless argues that American neo-conservatives have been more effective in responding to an intuitive understanding of cognitive processes than their opponents on the American left: in particular, neo-conservatives have been far more successful in avoiding the trap of thinking that "the facts will win out" (Lakoff, 2004 and Lakoff, 2009).

1.6 Ethics and civil society organisations

The Enlightenment model of human cognition viewed the human brain as performing rational computing operations: input facts, consider alternatives, assess the relative costs and benefits of each, and conduct debate about the optimal course of action. The ethical questions attending such a perspective relate to the honesty with which the facts are presented, and the transparency and inclusivity with which the subsequent analysis is conducted. But new understanding about the way that people think, and the motivations for their behaviour, raises far more complex ethical questions. In particular, an individual's values have an important bearing on how they respond when presented with facts; but their values themselves are subject to influence by many aspects of their lived experience (aspects over which government, business and civil society organisations have considerable influence). Often, these aspects of their lived experience will affect their values without conscious awareness.

Brendan O'Neill, editor of online magazine *Spiked*, has written of the 'politics of the brain':

"[The] idea that people can be 'nudged' into new forms of behaviour by having their brains massaged in a certain way, is built *on the premise that we are not rational beings to be engaged with. Its very foundation is the elite's view of us, not as people to be talked to, argued with and potentially won over, but problematic beings to be remade"* (O'Neill, 2010; emphasis in original).

The concerns that O'Neill raises are real and pressing. The idea that political elites can mould our minds – for which is there far more evidence than O'Neill allows – raises profound ethical questions. But O'Neill's response to this is to insist on the possibility of Enlightenment reason safeguarding against such manipulation. "We should [tell the political elites] that the grey matter inside our heads is off-limits," he continues. Unfortunately, the grey matter cannot be ruled off-limits. It is inevitable that all communications, campaigns and policies effect *how* we think as well as *what* we think.

We can bury our heads in the sand, and insist on the sanctity of Enlightenment reason. Or we can respond to the new understanding of how decision-making processes work, by demanding that there is public scrutiny of the effect that particular communications, campaigns, institutions and policies have on cultural values, and the impact that values, in turn, have on our collective responses to social and environmental challenges.

Working in the public interest, civil society organisations must lead the debate about how to respond to this new understanding of human cognition. In doing so, they must begin to open up debate about how cultural values are shaped, and by whom, and how values influence public responses to the issues that science tells us are of most pressing concern – such as global poverty, climate change, and biodiversity loss.

This represents an additional role for civil society organisations. Civil society organisations properly attempt to represent the public interest in debates that are frequently captured by vested interests. They do so by scrutinising the evidence base and the processes by which decisions are made. But it can now be seen that there is another crucial dimension to this work: identifying and laying bare the way in which communications, campaigns, institutional design and policies shape the values that underpin public support for particular decisions. In undertaking this role, civil society organisations must strive for utmost transparency: first in terms of the effect that their own communications and campaigns have in shaping public attitudes towards tackling bigger-than-self problems; then in terms of the effects of other communications.

1.7 Some crucial questions for civil society organisations to address

The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that it is essential to widen public debate about the values that business practice, government interventions and civil society communications and campaigns serve to promote in society. This raises a number of questions:

• How do we democratise debate not just about policy responses to address material problems, but also about which values become culturally dominant, and the proper role of civil society organisations in this? For example, a civil society organisation working on climate change has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the government adopts policies to adequately reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Does this same organisation also have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the *values* which these policies simultaneously promote also serve to reinforce public commitment to tackling climate change?

• Assuming that a civil society organisation has a legitimate interest in ensuring that cultural values supportive of its aims are strengthened, how does it ensure transparency in this? How can values-based communications and campaigns be delivered in compelling ways, inviting – and achieving – widespread participation, and exhibiting (in their design and execution) those values that they serve to champion?

• What barriers must be overcome in the course of opening up this public debate, and what is the proper role of civil society organisations in helping to address these barriers?

• Much civil society campaigning currently appeals to, and therefore helps to strengthen, societal values that (though perhaps helpful in motivating issue-specific change) may undermine a more systemic commitment to addressing bigger-than-self problems. How should civil society organisations respond ethically to such a challenge?

In the next section, attention is turned to examining the evidence that values are of crucial importance in shaping our responses to bigger-than-self problems: values influence the level of concern we express about these problems, and our motivation to engage to help address them – whether through changes in our own private-sphere behaviour, or more vocal demands for changes in business and government practice.

Summary, Section 1

Current progress in meeting the profound challenges that humanity must confront falls far short of what is needed. There is increasing evidence that simply conveying the *facts* about the scale and urgency of global challenges is unlikely to motivate the levels of public engagement that will be necessary if the political space and pressure to meet these challenges is to be created. Indeed, if facts conflict with a person's values, and thereby pose a threat to aspects of a person's identity, these may well be dismissed.

All too often, in responding to this understanding, campaigners and communicators resort to techniques borrowed from the marketing industry in order to try to 'sell' change by appealing to values that are perceived as dominant – particularly, materialistic values. These approaches create practical problems – because they simultaneously serve to strengthen values that are unhelpful in supporting the emergence of systemic concern about humanitarian and environmental problems. In particular, appeals to economic competitiveness (at a national level), or financial success or social status (at an individual level) are likely to leave an audience less committed to helping address humanitarian or environmental concerns.

Marketers (and campaigners who follow a marketing approach) are not particularly concerned about *what* values they promote in the course of trying to motivate people to buy a product (or adopt a particular behaviour). But effective political strategists, on the other hand, are well aware of the importance of using political debate, and even public policy, to promote those *particular* values that underpin their political beliefs, and therefore serve to build public support for their perspectives. They understand that all communications, campaigns and policies affect *how* we think, as well as *what* we think.

The only proper response to this understanding is to insist on public scrutiny of: (i) the effect that particular communications, campaigns, institutional designs and policies have on cultural values; and, (ii) the impact that particular values have on our responses to the issues that science tells us are of most pressing concern – such as global poverty, climate change, and biodiversity loss.

2. GOALS AND VALUES

Cultural values are of profound influence in shaping our motivation to engage with bigger-than-self problems. The evidence for this, reviewed in this section, is extensive. Because cultural values exert this influence, it is of pressing concern that communications, campaigns and public policies all have an impact on shaping our values.

Research on values is central to understanding our response to bigger-than-self problems, and our appetite and demands for change. As the pioneering social psychologist Milton Rokeach writes, "the value concept, more than any other, should occupy a central position [...] able to unify the apparently diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human behaviour" (1973:3).

Values have a profound impact on a person's motivation to express concerns about a range of bigger-than-self problems

Rokeach was a psychologist, but sociologists and anthropologists have argued the same point (Schwartz, 1992). A large body of empirical research, which is briefly summarised in this section, but discussed more fully in Appendices 1 and 2, suggests that values have a profound impact on a person's motivation to express concerns about a range of bigger-than-self problems, and to adopt behaviours in line with these concerns. This entails that factors which contribute to shaping values at a cultural level should be of central ethical concern, and should be a primary focus of public scrutiny and debate.

This section is structured as follows:

Section 2.1 reviews several different, but related, models of the way in which values are organised; Section 2.2 explores the relationship between values and behaviour; Section 2.3 reviews the empirical evidence for a connection between values and motivation to address bigger-than-self problems; Section 2.4 examines the importance of understanding an individual's value system as an integrated whole, where activation of one value has impacts for other values; Section 2.5 reviews the factors that contribute to activating and strengthening particular values; and finally Section 2.6 discusses aspects of human nature and asks whether some values are innate.

2.1 The organisation of values

Some values are psychologically compatible with one another, others work in opposition to one another

Empirical studies demonstrate that, across a very wide range of cultures, people's values are organised in a remarkably consistent and meaningful pattern. *Some values are psychologically compatible with each other, such that it is relatively easy to think about them at the same time, and to pursue commensurate behaviours simultaneously. Other clusters of values tend to be in psychological opposition to one another, such that most people find it relatively difficult to think about them at the same time, and difficult to simultaneously pursue behaviours that are commensurate with these values.* Understanding this is crucial to grasping the importance of values in shaping behaviour.

Circular maps of the relationship between values are called value circumplexes (see Figures 1 and 2 below, and Appendix 1 for further discussion). These are not theoretical representations – they have been established empirically. Values that are found, empirically, to be compatible, are plotted adjacent to one another on the circumference of the circumplex, while antagonistic values are plotted opposite to one another. So, for example, the intrinsic life-goal *community feeling* includes specific concerns for assisting 'people who need it, asking nothing in return', for doing things that 'will make people's lives better', and for striving to 'help the world become a better place'. This goal is found to be almost perfectly opposed to the goal of *financial success*, which encompasses desire for money, possessions, wealth and

status, and which conflicts with community feeling. Community feeling and financial success are therefore found to be plotted on opposite sides of the circumplex.[3]

It is important to recognise that the partitions between these values (as drawn in Figure 2, for example) are arbitrary: the array of values actually represents a continuum of motivation (Schwartz, 1992). This report draws on work on two streams of empirical investigation: a map of life-goals (discussed in detail in Appendix 1, Section A1.1) and a map of values (Appendix 1, Section A1.2).

Life-goals

Life-goals (henceforth goals) are the aims for which people strive in life. Empirical studies conducted in many countries show that these are consistently organised according to two axes: an extrinsic/intrinsic axis, and a self-transcendence/physical self axis. *Extrinsic goals* are based on the desire to elicit particular responses from other people, in order to obtain some reward or social praise (for example, the pursuit of image). *Intrinsic goals* are goals that are inherently rewarding to pursue (for example, to have satisfying relationships). *Self-transcendence goals* are concerned with the pursuit of something 'higher' than one's own pleasure (for example, benefiting society, or seeking out universal meanings). These goals contrast with *physical self goals*, which are concerned primarily with maintaining and enhancing one's own physical pleasure and survival (Grouzet *et al.*, 2005).

It is psychologically difficult for someone to simultaneously pursue the goals of hedonism and spirituality, or financial success and community feeling

As seen in Figure 1, extrinsic/physical self goals of financial success, image and popularity cluster together. This reflects the empirical finding that if one of these goals is prioritised, people also tend to prioritise the others within the cluster. Goals on opposite sides of the circumplex tend to oppose one another. So, for example, it is psychologically difficult for someone to simultaneously pursue the goals of hedonism and spirituality, or financial success and community feeling. Note in the case of financial success that the survey data demonstrates that, in poorer countries, financial success is found to lie closer to physical health and safety, and further from popularity and image than in richer countries. This probably reflects the fact that in poorer countries, relative to richer countries, financial success is pursued more to establish security and maintain health than as a means to establish status and popularity (Grouzet *et al.*, 2005). This suggests that the opposition between financial success and community feeling – which will be seen to be important later in this report – may be attenuated in poorer countries.

These are empirical results, based on survey data and statistical analysis procedures: in the case of the data presented in Figure 1, a survey of over 1,800 college students from 15 different countries. This study found that the goals were consistently and coherently organised across these cultures.

Values

Goals can be thought of as 'strivings' – what a person is actually trying to do. In contrast, values tend to be more abstract – representing one's conceptions of what is desirable, and relating to the world of thought rather than action. As such, values transcend specific actions and situations.

The work on the structure of values relations, pioneered by Shalom Schwartz, a social psychologist who has studied human values and behaviour over four decades, and since corroborated by many others, reveals what may be a universal structure of oppositions and compatibilities between values. People may differ widely in the *priority* that they attach to different values, but the *relationship between* these have been found to be replicated across nearly 70 countries.

Self-transcendence

Spirituality

Conformity

Community

Extrinsic

Intrinsic

Popularity

Image

Affiliation
Self-acceptance

Financial success

Physical health
Safety

Hedonism

Physical self

Figure 1

Circumplex model of values, based on a study examining how 1,800 students from 15 nations – both developed and developing – rated the importance of a variety of life goals (Re-drawn from Grouzet *et al.*, 2005). Goal contents and descriptions, also taken from Grouzet *et al.* (2005: 802), are described as follows:

1. **Affiliation.** To have satisfying relationships with family and friends

2. **Community feeling.** To improve the world through activism or generativity[4]

3. **Conformity.** To fit in with other people

4. **Financial success.** To be wealthy and materially successful

5. **Hedonism.** To experience much sensual pleasure

6. **Image.** To look attractive in terms of body and clothing

7. **Physical health.** To feel healthy and free of illness

8. **Popularity.** To be famous, well-known, and admired

9. **Safety.** To ensure bodily integrity and safety

10. **Self-acceptance.** To feel competent and autonomous

11. **Spirituality.** To search for spiritual or religious understanding

This work has revealed two pairs of opposing value clusters, referred to as *self-transcendent* values versus *self-enhancement* values, and *openness to change* values versus *conservation* values (see Figure 2). Schwartz writes: "The closer any two values in either direction around the circle, the more similar their underlying motivations. The more distant any two values, the more antagonistic their underlying motivations" (Schwartz, 2006:2).

For the purposes of this report, the self-transcendent/self-enhancement axis is particularly important. Two self-transcendent values are identified: universalism is the value placed on "understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and nature", and benevolence is the value placed on "preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the in-group)". These values are found empirically to be in opposition to the two self-enhancement values: power (the value placed on "social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources") and achievement (the value placed on "personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards").

2.2 Values and behaviour

Many studies have established substantial correlations between people's values and their corresponding behaviours (see, for example, Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Roccas and Sagiv, 2010). There are good reasons for expecting values and behaviour to be correlated – people may strive for consistency between the values that they hold to be particularly important and the behaviours that they adopt (Rokeach, 1973), and they may well feel rewarded when they act in line with their more important values (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003):

"[T]he values that people hold affect their initiation of new goal-directed activities, the degree of effort that they put into an activity, how long they persist at an activity in the face of alternative activities, the choices they make between alternative activities, the way they construe situations, and how they feel when an activity is undertaken either successfully or unsuccessfully according to the standards that are set" (Feather, 1992: 111).

As might be expected, behavioural choices made *after a period of deliberation* are related to a person's values (for example, their voting choice), but there is also strong evidence that values correlate with less deliberative behaviour – when people do not consciously reflect on how a behaviour fits with their values (for example, not opening the door to a stranger, or consuming drinks even when not thirsty) (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003).

Nonetheless, people do not always act in line with the values that they hold to be important – they often fail to practise what they preach. For example, people may profess that personal economic benefit is the most important concern for them in making political choices, and yet vote for a party that will leave them poorer; or people may say that they strongly support fair-trade schemes, but repeatedly choose to buy uncertified coffee and bananas.

Shalom Schwartz highlights that attitudes and behaviour are guided not by the importance a person accords a particular value, but rather as a result of the *trade-offs* within an *integrated system of values*. As discussed above, a particular behaviour may be in line with one value, but conflict with others (Schwartz, 1996). Thus, people may vote for a political party that does not really reflect their values – voting for the party because of loyalty, for example.

Figure 2

Theoretical model of relations among 10 types of values, organised by motivational similarities and dissimilarities (Re-drawn from: Schwartz, 1992). These values are listed by Schwartz (2006:2) as follows:

1. **Self-direction.** Independent thought and action; choosing, creating, exploring.

2. **Stimulation.** Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.

3. **Hedonism.** Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.

4. **Achievement.** Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.

5. **Power.** Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.

6. **Security.** Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.

7. **Conformity.** Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.

8. **Tradition.** Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self.

9. **Benevolence.** Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the 'in-group').

10. **Universalism.** Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.

Responding to an understanding of the integrated nature of values systems requires that communicators and campaigners should consider *both* the effects of the values that their communications will serve to activate (and therefore, as will be discussed, serve to strengthen) *and* the effects of campaigns on other values which may or may not be helpful. This point is discussed further in Section 2.4, below.

But there are other reasons that people often engage in behaviour that appears inconsistent with their personal values. Particular behaviours are influenced by a wide range of factors, many of which are specific to the situation in which a behavioural choice is made. Often, for example, structural constraints intervene in the course of people acting in line with the values that they hold to be important. For instance, a person's values may lead her to express concern about her personal carbon footprint, although, in the absence of a convenient public transport infrastructure, she may nonetheless reluctantly rely on using her car to commute to work. But note that examples of this type, which are sometimes taken to illustrate the limitations of values in determining behaviour, are not as straightforward as they may at first seem. Here the infrastructural constraints that the woman encounters (the absence of an efficient public transport system) *are themselves in important part a reflection of cultural values:* the absence of an efficient public transport infrastructure is itself the result of public policy priorities and pubic support for, or acquiescence with, particular public spending decisions. Thus, at least in a democracy, the quality of a public transport system is something that, in part, reflects the priorities and values of the electorate. More generally, structural constraints, which appear to limit the extent to which people adopt behaviour in line with their values, often themselves arise or persist as a result, in part, of the political expression of particular cultural values.[5]

2.3 Values and bigger-than-self problems

This section provides a brief overview of the very extensive range of work that has been done on the relationship between values, concern about bigger-than-self problems, and motivation to engage in behaviour in line with this concern. A more in-depth review of this body of research is presented in Appendix 2.

Research has examined the relationship between values and a range of attitudes and behaviours, at both personal and cultural levels. Repeatedly, individuals and cultures that attach greater importance to self-enhancement and conservation[6] values (particularly power and security) (see Appendix 1, Section A1.2) are found to be less concerned about global conflict and the abuse of human rights, more prejudiced towards outsiders – whether on the basis of race, religion or gender – and less supportive of arguments for free movement of people. They are also less likely to buy fair-trade products, are less concerned about environmental damage, and are less likely to behave in environmentally friendly ways. Finally, people for whom self-enhancement and conservation values are more important are also less likely to engage politically – either with electoral process, or by engaging in demonstrations or other civic activities.

As anticipated, given the integrated nature of the relationship between different values, research shows that the opposite effects are associated with individuals and cultures that attach greater importance to self-transcendence and openness-to-change values, especially universalism and self-direction. These values, then, are associated with greater concern about bigger-than-self problems, and higher motivation to address these problems – both through changing one's personal behaviour and by becoming more politically active.

A comparable but smaller body of evidence points to the similar effects – again at both the personal and cultural levels – of extrinsic and physical-self goals (especially financial success). Such goals are repeatedly correlated with lower concern about bigger-than-self problems, and lower engagement in behaviours commensurate with such concern. Conversely, intrinsic and self-transcendent goals (especially community feeling) are repeatedly correlated with greater concern about bigger-than-self problems, and higher incidence of corresponding behaviour.[7] (See Section A1.1 for explanation of these goals.)

These results underscore that factors which serve to activate or embed self-transcendence and openness to change values, and intrinsic and self-transcendent goals, will also tend to contribute to building concern about other bigger-than-self problems. For example, activating and embedding universalism values, it seems, will simultaneously promote concern for *both* global environmental problems *and* global poverty. Consistent with this, Shalom Schwartz finds that people's concern for nature is closely associated with their concern for people outside their in-group (for example, people in other countries) (Schwartz, 1992).[8] Conversely, factors which activate or embed self-enhancement and conservation values, and extrinsic and physical self goals, tend to promote concern about social status, popularity, sensual pleasure and safety, and behaviours consistent with these concerns.

2.4 The dynamic nature of value systems

As has been discussed, empirical studies find that values are related to one another in particular ways, with a high degree of cross-cultural consistency. Some values are compatible with one another; others oppose one another.

Further studies have found that activating particular values will tend to promote behaviour associated with these and other compatible values, and to suppress behaviour associated with opposing values

Further studies have found that activating particular values will tend to promote behaviour associated with these *and other compatible values*, and to *suppress behaviour associated with opposing values* (Maio *et al.*, 2009). That is, 'priming' particular values leads to 'bleed over', such that other compatible values (and associated behaviours) are also promoted, whereas opposing values (those on the opposite side of the circumplex) are suppressed.[9] This effect apparently leads to associations between behaviours which at first may appear to be unrelated.

For example, Gregory Maio and colleagues (2009) primed the value achievement (by asking participants in an experiment to sort out words like 'ambitious' and 'successful' from other unrelated words), or the value benevolence (by asking participants to sort words like 'forgiving' and 'honest'). Participants were then asked to complete a word-search. Success at this task was significantly higher among individuals who had been primed for achievement as opposed to benevolence. The experimenter then asked participants if they would be willing to help in future research, without payment. Those participants primed for achievement were significantly less likely to offer to help. In the case of participants primed for benevolence values, these performed less well at the word-search but were *more* likely to offer their help for a subsequent experiment. Control groups who sorted neutral words (nouns describing types of food) scored at an intermediate level both for their performance at the word search, and in their offers to help with subsequent studies.

Other experiments demonstrate that priming people's awareness of money leads them to be less helpful (Burgoyne and Lea, 2006; Vohs *et al.*, 2006), reflecting the empirical evidence that the extrinsic goal of financial success is almost perfectly opposed to the intrinsic goal of community feeling. Similarly, priming achievement leads people to perform better when asked to complete a puzzle, but, reflecting the opposition of this value to benevolence, this also leads people to be less willing to provide unpaid help (Maio *et al.*, 2009). Use of environmentally-friendly products

is associated with willingness to lend things to neighbours: something that is to be expected when it is recalled that universalism and benevolence values are closely associated. Finally, a person is less likely to show modesty about his or her achievements (an expression of tradition values) when relaxing (an expression of hedonism values): consistent with conflict between the values of tradition and hedonism (which are found to be in opposition to one another) (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003).

There are clear practical consequences to these discoveries. First, these results suggest that concern about a bigger-than-self problem may be heightened *either* by increasing the importance attached to values promoting that concern, *or* by diminishing the importance attached to values that oppose motivation to express this concern. Thus, Gregory Maio and colleagues reflect on the importance of benevolence and achievement values in determining prejudice and discrimination towards a diversity of groups, and suggest that:

"[D]iscrimination may be reduced either by increasing the perceived importance of values promoting benevolence or by decreasing the perceived importance of values promoting achievement, because changes in either set of values have reciprocal effects on the opposing values" (Maio *et al.*, 2009: 713).

Focus should be brought to bear on strengthening intrinsic values relative to extrinsic values

Second, these results suggest that it may be counter-productive to attempt to motivate behaviour that helps to address bigger-than-self problems by using strategies that serve to activate unhelpful values. This is because, in activating these unhelpful values, the helpful opposing values (which would need to come to underlie systemic motivation to address bigger-than-self problems) will be suppressed. An example will help to illustrate this important point. Some environmental campaigners may seek to encourage installation of photovoltaic cells as highly visible and desirable status symbols. An understanding of values-systems would lead to recognition that, while such appeals *may* represent an effective way of motivating people to engage with *that particular* behaviour (here, to install photovoltaic cells), such appeals are also likely to create collateral damage. Appeals to prestige and status will serve to suppress opposing values (those on the opposite side of the circumplex, such as community feeling) that must become strengthened if systemic concern about bigger-than-self problems is to emerge (Crompton & Kasser, 2009).[10] Analogous arguments can be made, at a national level, about the effects of appeal to national competitiveness and prestige as an incentive for adopting pro-environmental polices – for example, further investment in the renewable industry.

There is need to incorporate this understanding of the dynamic nature of the 'universal' values structure, and its implications for a person's behaviour, into campaign strategy. Unfortunately, these dynamic aspects of the values-structure are often overlooked in simpler models of values – such as those deployed by some campaign strategists who advocate audience segmentation according to particular values, followed by narrow focus on presenting a message such that it appeals to these specific values.

Most – perhaps all – individuals hold both intrinsic and extrinsic values to be important, but the importance that an individual attaches to particular values will vary as a result of both long-term factors (for example, their upbringing, education, the values held by role-models, or exposure to social norms in the media) and short-term factors (for example, the values that come to the fore as a result of the particulars of a situation or social interaction). In terms of determining concern about bigger-than-self problems, it seems that what is important is not whether an individual holds extrinsic values *per se*, but rather the *relative* importance that he or she attaches to extrinsic as opposed to intrinsic values. By the same token, in

responding to the problems presented by extrinsic values, those concerned about bigger-than-self problems should not be looking to expunge such values (this would anyway be every bit as impossible as it would be to expunge intrinsic values). Rather, interest should focus on how to strengthen intrinsic values relative to extrinsic values. This can be achieved both by strengthening intrinsic values or by diminishing the importance accorded to extrinsic values. Because strengthening intrinsic values also serves to diminish the importance attached to opposing, extrinsic, values, there is a 'double-dividend' associated with this. That is, encouraging intrinsic values *both* strengthens those values associated with greater concern about bigger-than-self problems *and* suppresses the extrinsic values known to undermine such concern.

2.5 What factors serve to strengthen values?

As discussed in the last section, priming values associated with a particular behaviour is found to increase motivation to engage in that behaviour, at least in the short term. But it is important to consider not just those factors that lead to the activation of particular values, but also those factors that contribute to the relative strength of particular values in society – that is, how easily these values are activated. These two considerations are related: it seems that the process of activating particular values *also* works to strengthen these values in people's minds, and in culture generally – making them more accessible, such that they become more easily activated. This understanding raises important practical and ethical questions about cultural values and the impact of factors that contribute to shaping these.

There are many factors that serve to strengthen particular values culturally. Thus, people tend to internalise, and attach greater importance to, the values of those around them – those expressed by their parents, teachers, peers, cultural role-models, and the commercial marketing to which they are exposed and the media they consume (Banerjee and Dittmar, 2008; Flouri, 1999; Goldberg *et al.*, 2003; Kasser *et al.*, 2004; Sheldon *et al.*, 2000). It seems likely too, of course, that civil society communications and campaigns also contribute to strengthening some values and suppressing others. All this is to be expected: values are beliefs about what is important in life, and, like other beliefs, they are learned.

Thus, for example, studies show a repeated correlation, across different age groups, and in different cultures, between exposure to commercial television and the importance people attach to extrinsic values (Buijzen and Valkenburg, 2003; Good, 2007; Kasser *et al.*, 2004; O'Guin and Shrum, 1997; Shrum *et al.*, 1998) and there is evidence that increased exposure to commercial television causes this increase in materialistic values (Greenberg and Brand, 1993; Shrum *et al.*, 2005).[11]

This is perhaps to be anticipated – some marketers are disarmingly candid about the role they see for themselves in engaging and changing cultural values. For example, Guy Murphy, now global planning director for the marketing communications network, JWT, writes of the marketing industry:

"The playground for market brands is, in fact, life. Maintaining market health is a cultural task. Your market has to become more important in our lives to become more robust. [...] Marketers embarking on this journey should see themselves as trying to manipulate culture; being social engineers, not brand managers; manipulating cultural forces, not brand impressions" (2005: 1).

A person's education also has an important impact on their values: studying law apparently increases the priority that students place on appearance values, and decreases the importance they attach to community-service values (Sheldon and Krieger, 2004).

Importantly, people's experience of public policies and institutions also affects their understanding of what is 'normal', and can therefore lead to the strengthening of particular values across a culture. For example, citizens of countries that have adopted more competitive economic systems tend to place more importance on extrinsic values (Schwartz, 2007; Kasser *et al.*, 2007). Of course, such correlations do not reveal the nature of the underlying causal mechanisms, but as will be seen in Section 4.5, there is evidence that public policies do indeed contribute to shaping citizens' values.

So it seems that cultural values are shaped in important part as a result of collective decisions about how society is organised. Moreover, they can exert profound influence over our responses to bigger-than-self problems, often without conscious awareness. The implication of this is that business, public agencies, government and, of course, civil society organisations, must take responsibility not just for the direct 'material impacts' of their activities (what they achieve 'on the ground'), but also the impacts that they have on dominant cultural values.

But all too often, public debate neglects to examine the *inescapable* importance of these factors in shaping cultural values and, therefore, how we come to view and respond to some of the most pressing challenges that we face. There is no such thing as a 'value-neutral' policy, for example, and yet public debate about policy tends to focus far more on the immediate material outcomes of this than on its inevitable impact on cultural values. Of course, this raises the possibility that particular interest groups can – whether deliberately or inadvertently – exert an influence on cultural values in ways that serve to promote their particular agenda, while at the same time avoiding full public scrutiny.

This raises two crucial questions to which this report will return: first, what processes can ensure that both the way in which particular values come to dominate, and an understanding of the social impacts of these values, commands adequate public scrutiny and debate? Second, what role should civil society organisations have in openly and transparently advocating values that, according to the evidence, will underpin public support for the changes that they hold to be important?

2.6 Are people inherently selfish?

At this juncture, it is important to ask whether some values are necessarily and irrevocably dominant. It is frequently argued that people will always inevitably privilege their own short-term interests above those of others, and that, if this is the case, public debate about the possibility of helping to bring more helpful values to the fore is probably futile.

According to this perspective, humans have a biologically innate tendency towards self-interest, the desire to accumulate material things, and to pursue social status. If these are indeed less helpful human tendencies then they are also simply things that we have to learn to live with – perhaps exploiting them where we are able, in order to promote the common good. This is an approach advocated by many social marketers. While humans are capable of displays of enlightened self-interest, we cannot hope that individuals will subjugate their own self-interest to the pursuit of the greater common good. The best for which we can hope, therefore, is to exploit those instances where self-interest and the common good happen to coincide – often called 'win-win' scenarios.

According to an alternative perspective, human temperament – while determined in important part by biological pre-disposition – is something that is also shaped crucially by human culture, which can operate importantly both to accentuate

unhelpful aspects of human temperament, and to bring other more helpful aspects to the fore. People comprise a pastiche of different priorities, shaped by *both* genetic *and* cultural factors. We may at times experience strong tendencies to behave in collectively socially and environmentally damaging ways – and it seems certain that our tendency to identify ourselves through the material things that we own and the social status that we command will always be apparent. But civilization is based on the recognition that, working together, we can take steps to better manage the social costs of such tendencies. Which aspects of our temperaments come to the fore is determined in important part by the cultural decisions that we collectively make: decisions which should therefore properly be the subject of intense public debate.

Let's assume that humans are indeed primarily pre-disposed towards selfishness. Surely this should be taken as evidence of the need to construct cultures that operate, so far as possible, to mitigate this tendency? This is precisely the argument that, for example, Richard Dawkins makes. An understanding that, in his view, we are hard-wired for short-term greed is "not a reason for despair". He continues:

"[N]or does it mean that we should cynically abandon the long-term future [...] and get our noses down in the trough of short-term greed. What it does mean is that we must work all the harder for the long-term future, in spite of getting no help from nature, precisely because nature is not on our side. [...] It is a manifest fact that the brain – especially the human brain – is well able to over-ride its ultimate programming; well able to dispense with the ultimate value of gene survival and substitute other values (Dawkins, 2001; 8-11).

Even the gloomiest of assessments of human nature lead to the conclusion that we should be working to mitigate unhelpful aspects of our biology through cultural interventions

So even the gloomiest of assessments of human nature lead to the conclusion that we should be working to mitigate unhelpful aspects of our biology through cultural interventions. But in fact, Dawkins may not be completely right. There is mounting evidence that empathy and cooperation are *also* innate to humans. This is argued, for example, by drawing on recent neurological evidence for 'mirror neurons' which fire both when an individual acts, and when an individual observes another acting in the same way, allowing a person to *literally feel* what another person is feeling: "The discovery of mirror neurons shows that empathy is a fundamental human capacity that we are born with but which must be strengthened through a nurturant upbringing or it will decay." (Lakoff, 2009: xvi.) There is good evidence for this perspective: Patricia Greenfield, a psychologist at UCLA says that we now "see that mirror neurons absorb culture directly, with each generation teaching the next by social sharing, imitation and observation" (Blakeslee, 2006:3). Similarly, Giacomo Rizzolatti, one of the neuroscientists who first proposed the existence of the mirror neuron, writes that this "shows how strong and deeply rooted is the bond that ties us to others, or in other words, how bizarre it would be to conceive of an I without an us" (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008: xii-xiii). Work on mirror neurons has been taken to corroborate studies of primate behaviour which have themselves challenged the perspective that human altruism is just a "thin veneer" papering over constitutively unpleasant natures (de Waal, 2006).

Equally significant is corroborating evidence from experimental cognitive psychology. Experiments show, for instance, that even abstract moving shapes on a computer screen are immediately interpreted by adults in terms of 'helping' or 'hurting' (Premack and Premack, 1994). Michael Tomasello, working at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, has further demonstrated that young children are predisposed to be helpful. Of course, this is not to suggest that the basic instinct of self-preservation does not exist; rather, Tomasello argues that human cooperativeness and helpfulness is also natural and laid over the self-interested foundation (Tomasello, 2009). What is more, Tomasello also argues,

again drawing on extensive empirical evidence, that humans have a natural disposition to *share* – in particular, to share food (2009). Whatever the evolutionary explanations of the instincts for helping and sharing may be, the evidence points to the importance of these traits in humans. This is of course not the complete story, because cultures vary in the ways they modify natural tendencies. Tomasello draws attention to two kinds of cultural input that work with a child's helping and sharing tendencies. One is the experience of interacting with others and learning to take advantage, while not being exploited. The other is input from the values of the cultural environment: what is right and what is wrong for 'us' the group. This latter input is linked with emotions of guilt and shame. Tomasello's view – and he emphasises the empirical evidence for his claim – is that individuals are innately sensitive to their interdependence with others in collaborative activities, even from a young age (2009).

Humans have biological tendencies towards both altruism and selfishness. It is therefore crucial to ask: which of these values does society accentuate?

It can be argued, then, on good scientific evidence, that people have natural tendencies that can orient them to express concern about 'bigger-than-self' issues: empathy, cooperativeness and sharing. But there is a crucial point to add. Because cultural input is essential and inevitable, a sensitive, cooperative, sharing moral instinct can be nurtured – or inhibited. Such an instinct may exist in some, but not all, spheres of a person's life. It may vary according to circumstances – it can be moderated as a result of insecurity, poverty or a perception of danger, for example. This perspective is entirely in line with an understanding of values systems, as developed earlier in this section. Following this understanding, it is to be expected that humans have biological tendencies towards both altruism and selfishness: both values that are reflected in the values circumplexes (Figures 1 and 2) and which we all express at different times. The key questions are: which of these values does society accentuate? How does it exert this effect? And does it exert this inadvertently, or following public debate?

Summary, Section 2

An individual's values comprise an integrated system, arranged in a way that is highly consistent across many cultures. Some values are mutually consistent, others tend to act to oppose one another. Activating a specific value causes changes throughout the whole system of that person's values; in particular, it has the effect of activating compatible values and suppressing opposing values.

Values are crucially important in motivating behaviour, and the integrated nature of an individual's value system entails that some behaviours will tend to occur together, and others will tend not to occur at the same time. Experiments find that activating a particular value will: (i) motivate behaviour associated with that value; (ii) motivate behaviour associated with other values that are compatible with the value that is activated; and (iii) decrease motivation for behaviour associated with values that oppose the value that is activated.

An extremely extensive body of empirical research finds that behaviour to address bigger-than-self problems is motivated by particular values, and is suppressed by other values. So, individuals and cultures that attach greater importance to self-enhancement and conservation values (particularly power and security) are found to be less concerned about global conflict and the abuse of human rights, more prejudiced towards outsiders – whether on the basis of race, religion or gender – and to be less supportive of immigration. They are also less concerned about environmental damage, less likely to behave in environmentally friendly ways, and less likely to engage politically. The reverse effects are associated with individuals and cultures that attach greater importance to self-transcendence and openness to change values – especially universalism and self-direction.

Similarly, extrinsic and physical-self goals (especially financial success) are associated with greater indifference to bigger-than-self problems, while intrinsic and self-transcendent goals (especially community feeling) are repeatedly correlated with greater concern about bigger-than-self problems, and higher incidences of corresponding behaviour.

A range of factors can serve to activate particular values, and this can have an immediate effect on people's behaviour. It seems that such activation also serves to strengthen these values – making subsequent activation easier. Many factors contribute to activation of particular values – and therefore to strengthening these values culturally. These factors include the values conveyed by the media, the values that are elicited in the course of people engaging with particular institutions and experiencing the effects of particular polices, exposure to commercial marketing, and, almost certainly, the campaigns and communication materials that civil society organisations themselves produce.

The implication of this is that business practice, government policy and civil society communications and campaigns must take responsibility not just for their 'material impacts' (what they achieve 'on the ground'), but also for the effect they have on dominant cultural values. This can only be achieved responsibly by ensuring that public debate is infused by an understanding of cultural values, how particular values come to dominate, and the social impacts of these values.

3. FRAMES AND FRAMING

As seen in the previous section, values have a profound influence on people's motivation to engage with bigger-than-self problems. Yet values often seem abstract and disconnected from the narratives that shape people's everyday perceptions of the world and their place within it. This is where frames – constructs that activate and strengthen particular values culturally – become of crucial importance.

In Section 2, this report drew on two streams of empirical work that offer models for describing the range of life-goals and values that are found across cultures, how they cluster, and how these clusters relate to one another. These models represent an overview from the point of view of the psychologist and sociologist. Attention is now turned to the question of how particular sets of values are carried about in people's minds, and how they are used in communication and social interaction. Of course, it's not possible to look inside people's heads and see them. But there is a great deal of work in cognitive science, cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics that provides strong evidence about how things must work.

3.1 Introduction to frames

It seems that human language and human thinking (or 'cognition') are intimately interconnected. The words we use have meaning for us because they are linked to both our experience of the world and to the way that we conceptualise it. Our experience and conceptualisations are not random; they are stored in structured forms in long-term memory. These structured forms are called 'frames' – a concept that is well established in computer science, cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics and cognitive discourse analysis (see, for example, Andor, 1985; Barsalou and Hale, 1993; Cienki, 2007; Evans, 2009; Fillmore, 1982; Fillmore, 1985; Minsky, 1974).

Although the term 'frame' makes these structures sound static and fixed, they are actually dynamic and can be updated and changed through experience. For example, consider the frame linked to the English word 'home'. What do we mean when we use this word? It is not just a matter of a link between a word and a thing in the real world. 'Home' evokes a whole set of ideas, values and feelings. This set of ideas, values and feelings is a 'conceptual frame' –something that English speakers keep in their long-term memories and deploy when they use, hear or read the word. What exactly 'home' means in any particular instance of course depends on its context. Note that this frame will vary across time and social sectors. Among other things, we understand 'home' in terms of a kind of building: a 'house'. For some people the frame for 'home' is a stereotypical detached residence surrounded by a garden, for others a mansion, for others a terraced one-up one-down with a yard, and so on. For each, there are different implications, attitudes and values. Moreover, when translated into other languages, the frame may also vary with cultures (see Chilton and Ilyin, 1993 and Kövecses, 2005). The Russian word 'dom' is usually translated as 'house' but refers to an apartment block, an altogether different conceptual frame with different implications and 'feel'. All this is significant if, for example, we want to talk about our planet as our 'home'.

Something like frames must be neurally instantiated somewhere in the brain (they can't just be floating around in the air). But we cannot simply look into the brain (even with modern brain scans) and see something that is a frame. Cognitive science, psychology and linguistics use indirect evidence for their existence.

So, for example, it can be demonstrated that, across a society, particular frames repeatedly show up in communication. This can be done by looking at the

distribution of words, and associations between them. Computer programs have been developed to find statistically significant and objectively existing clusters of words in large databases of text. On this basis, analysts can establish recurrent meaning clusters that can be linked with the concepts, propositions and metaphors comprising particular frames. Textual analysis tools are discussed more fully in Appendix 3.

Other approaches to linguistic analysis provide further evidence. For example, in English a person might say '*a* man came in' when this man has yet to be specified. The same person would say '*the* man came in' if he has been mentioned, or if the audience already know he exists. So how can we explain an example like the following? 'John walked into a house. The door had been left open, and there was a burning smell coming from the kitchen'. The reader has not been introduced to '*a* door', or '*a* kitchen' before reading these sentences, so how can we meaningfully refer to '*the* door'? The reason is we have a conceptual frame already for 'house' and in it there are doors, kitchens, windows, a roof, etc. This might seem a trivial example, but it is far-reaching. It shows that 'the' *presupposes* the existence of something, at least as far as our common understanding is concerned. The same principle applies to all kinds of cultural presuppositions, including ones that have to do with values. Conceptual frames are what we take for granted when we communicate with one another; we don't have to mention them or spell them out, unless they become controversial.

This kind of phenomenon is repeated everywhere in the use of language; use of language is rooted in all kinds of frames. There is extensive evidence for such frames, attested by large amounts of linguistic data.

3.2 Frames and political action

Conceptual framing entails careful use of wording and phrasing such that an audience can be encouraged to focus on and communicate about (or obscure!) different aspects of an event, situation or policy

The importance of frames for 'framing' public issues (that is for putting different perspectives on the same set of objective facts or events) has been clear for a long time (Fillmore 1982). For example, Schön (1979/93) made the point that a low-income neighbourhood can be described as 'diseased' (sick, ailing, unhealthy, dying, etc.) or as 'a natural community' and that this is not just a matter of 'mere semantics': different solutions to the problems that such a community faces will seem more or less logical, depending how it is described – that is, the frame that is activated. Note that, in this example, a large part is played by metaphor (here, the metaphor of 'disease'). This is explored further below (see Section 3.3). What is happening here is that the conceptual frame we have that is linked to the word 'disease' is being mapped on to a different frame: 'neighbourhood'.

A distinction can be made between *conceptual framing* (also sometimes called *surface framing*) and deep framing (Lakoff, 2006; Paul Chilton, *personal communication*). The basis of this distinction is not entirely clear, but for the purposes of this report, conceptual frames and deep frames are defined as follows.

Conceptual framing entails careful use of wording and phrasing such that an audience can be encouraged to focus on and communicate about (or obscure!) different aspects of an event, situation or policy. Words always evoke frames: in fact, the meaning of words is their frame. Particular word choices serve to activate frames that may be more (or sometimes less) helpful in terms of motivating behaviour associated with addressing bigger-than-self problems. It is not the precise wording that matters, it is which conceptual frames the wording activates. While a person is unlikely to retain *verbatim* the actual words and phrases she reads or hears (Poppenk *et al.*, 2008), she is likely to retain the conceptual 'gist'. What is 'gist'? It is a conceptual 'model' that a person builds up in her working memory as she reads or

hears something. This model contains links to conceptual frames for things, people, events, places, etc., as well as links to frames for belief and emotions. It is this conceptual model and its linked frames that a person is likely to retain in her long-term memory. Even when the conceptual gist of a particular text fades, some frames may nonetheless have been strengthened durably. In this sense careful wording of messages matters. So, conceptual framing, as used here, is meant to denote the way in which particular wording activates, or 'resonates with', particular linked concepts and values – that is, deep frames.

Deep frames are cognitive structures held in long-term memory that contain particular values

Deep frames, then, are cognitive structures held in long-term memory that contain particular values. They tend to be relatively stable *but they are not unchanging or unchangeable.* Deep framing refers to forging the connections between the use of language in, for example, a debate or document, and a set of *values*. Sometimes the values associated with a deep frame are clear – for example, in the case of the 'rational self-interest' frame. But more usually, the way this works is not so obvious on the surface, as the values are often presupposed, rather than openly stated. So deep framing involves not only particular words that evoke certain values (e.g. 'it is in your own interests to do so-and-so' or 'market mechanisms will ensure equal opportunities') but also *combinations* of lots of conceptual frames. Values are often made concrete and even defined through 'conceptual metaphor'. The role of conceptual metaphor is explored further in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.

George Lakoff describes the distinction between cognitive and deep frames in this way:

"Surface [or cognitive] frames are associated with phrases like 'war on terror' that both activate and depend critically on deep frames. These are the most basic frames that constitute a moral world view or a political philosophy. Deep frames define one's overall 'common sense'. Without deep frames there is nothing for surface frames to hang onto. Slogans do not make sense without the appropriate deep frames in place" (Lakoff, 2006: 29).

To take Lakoff's example, the phrase 'war on terror' was in effect a *choice* of words, just one possible way of framing the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The policy response to the event could have been framed as a crime. Referring to the event as 'war' activates a whole frame – our knowledge of warfare that gives us a meaning for the word 'war'. This frame has implications: a conflict in pursuit of self-defence or national interest; there are bombs, bullets and battles, victory, defeat, and so on. If one frames the event as a crime, and the response as a law-maintaining operation, the implications are different: criminals are detected, caught, and tried according to law. The first frame is linked to national-interest values, and values favouring physical force. It invokes emotions about patriotism and heroism. The second frame is linked to values of justice, cooperation and feelings associated with the pursuit of justice. In both cases, the words used, the values activated, and the emotions stimulated, define and reinforce one another. In both cases, the words frame a policy concept which in turn leads to one kind of action rather than another. Words and frames are crucial.

The 'tax burden' provides another example. Taxes can be framed either as a burden (that is, as an affliction that must be relieved), as an investment, or even as an insurance policy. For example, people pay their National Insurance as a matter of course in the UK. This provides people with a level of confidence that they are safe in the event of having an accident or becoming sick. The 'tax insurance' frame could of course extend beyond personal insurance, because National Insurance contributions pay not only for an individual person, but also their children, neighbours, and even tourists from other countries.

Deep frames are primarily composed of concepts, values or feelings connected to lived experience. As part of our lived experience, language has important influence in building up, activating and re-activating particular frames. Moreover, repeated activation of particular frames helps to embed these, making them easier to activate subsequently – so language is important here, too. *But in general, repetition of words alone is not enough to embed particular deep frames. Language is always integral with our social experience and interaction with others (with families, or with social institutions, for example) and these other aspects of our lived experience are also of crucial importance in strengthening particular deep frames.*

It is important to explore the relationship between lived experience and deep frames further. There is a mutual process by which our social institutions and situations shape our frames, which in turn shape our institutions. Public policy, for example, has important implications for the frames that predominate in society: living with particular public policies such as land use planning policy, or interacting with particular social institutions such as the electoral system, aid agencies, or the national health service, has an effect on which deep frames come to dominate.

Research on policy feedback reveals that – perhaps unsurprisingly – public policy has an impact in shaping dominant public values, which in turn impacts on public support for new policies. Policy feedback is closely related to the concept of *cognitive policy*, developed by George Lakoff and colleagues at the Rockridge Institute. Joe Brewer and George Lakoff distinguish cognitive policy and *material policy* as follows:

"Material policy consists of the nuts and bolts, what is done in the world to fulfil policy goals. Cognitive policy is about the values and ideas that both motivate the policy goals and that have to be uppermost in the minds of the public and the media in order for the policy to seem so much a matter of common sense that it will be readily accepted" (Brewer and Lakoff, 2008b: 2).

Both policy feedback and cognitive policy concepts are discussed in more detail in Section 4.5.

Frames, then, are widely accepted by the scientific community as a necessary theoretical postulate if we are to understand the way humans think, communicate and act. But frames have also been used extremely effectively as vehicles for promoting cultural values – sometimes in ways that seem ethically suspect. It is crucially important to understand the power of frames, and how these are used, if the inevitable and ongoing processes by which particular frames are activated and embedded is to come under public scrutiny.

Political elites contribute to strengthening particular deep frames through political discourse. Thus, for example, Teun van Dijk has extensively argued, on the basis of minutely analysed quantities of evidence (both textual and verbal), that elites (politicians, but also the media) often influence and sanction racist discourse (van Dijk, 1993). Similarly, Paul Chilton has shown how elite discourse can be 'recycled' by individuals who display racism, in order to justify xenophobic talk and actions (Chilton, 2004).

George Lakoff has argued that the American right have assiduously set about embedding "their deepest values into the brains of tens of millions of Americans", by strengthening deep frames consistent with their politics (Lakoff, 2009:3). There is evidence for similar effects in a UK political context. Analysis of British Social Attitudes Survey data finds that the public has taken a "decisive turn to the right" since 1994 (when Tony Blair became leader of the Labour Party) (Curtice, 2010: 25). For example, public support for redistributive polices fell from 51% in 1994 to 32%

in recent years. It seems likely that this change will have arisen in part as a result of public exposure to the discourse of political elites, amplified by the media.

To return to the example of tax, the tax burden and tax as insurance frames convey very different attitudes towards taxation. George Lakoff has shown how the tax burden frame has been efficiently developed in US public debate by political interests opposed to taxation. Use of the tax burden frame suppresses the tax as investment or tax as insurance frames, because the human brain struggles to hold two conflicting frames in mind at the same time.

Because frames are developed and exert their influence in largely unconscious ways, important ethical questions arise about how an organisation that has an interest in countering (or, for that matter, promoting) the tax burden frame should respond ethically to an understanding of values and frames.

One response would be to catalyse public debate about both how tax is framed, and the implications of how it is framed for how we think about it. That is, to direct conscious attention to the framing and its implications, and to propose alternative ways of thinking.

But, in view of the way in which frames work importantly at an unconscious level, there will be limitations to the success of such an approach. Going further, an organisation that seeks to either counter or promote the tax burden frame could: (i) use its communications to re-frame tax in the way that serves its purposes, simultaneously deactivating competing frames; and (ii) as an ethical imperative, make clear in its communications what frames it is invoking, and the reasons for this.

3.3 Frames and conceptual metaphors

The phenomenon of metaphor has been extensively studied in computer science, cognitive science, cognitive linguistics and various types of discourse analysis. Following this analysis, metaphor must be seen as far more than ornamental flourishes in speeches, literature or commercials.

Indeed, metaphor is not primarily a linguistic phenomenon; it is a mental phenomenon that is activated and communicated by language. Metaphor is a human means of understanding reality, extending that reality, and persuading others. Formally, conceptual metaphor is a mapping (or projection) from a 'source domain' of human experience that is easily (often unconsciously) understood by human brains on to a less intuitively understood or difficult-to-communicate domain of experience (the 'target domain').

Source domains can be embodied experiences (called 'image schemas' by cognitive psychologists and linguists).[12] For example, image schemas may include one's physical experience of height and depth, or being inside various sorts of containing enclosures. Source domains are also frequently familiar and largely unconscious frames relating to cultural experience – for example, 'the family', or 'war and conflict'. As will be seen in the examples outlined below, metaphors must be deployed with care. Mapping from 'the family' on to 'the nation' will have different effects, depending on a person's concept of 'the family'. Similarly, mapping 'war' on to an argument may serve to further polarise points of disagreement.

The family as an example of a source domain

Concepts of 'family' (which will vary culturally) are stabilised in the long-term memory as frames (though of course these are open to challenge and change over the course of person's life). This source domain can be mapped on to various target domains. For example, it might be mapped on to 'the nation' (consider 'the father

of a nation', 'his children', 'his care and control of his children'). Such a mapping is easily understood because the source domain is highly embedded – we all have a well-developed concept of 'family'. A specific mapping on to a particular target domain can also become embedded in a society – for example, a particular political regime might use propaganda to seek to embed a patriarchal 'the nation-is-a-family' metaphor as part of a more general deep frame.[13] Note here that whatever is included in the source domain (that is, whatever concept of family one has) will be mapped on the target domain.

War as an example of a source domain

People have fairly detailed culture-based knowledge about warfare. That is, they have a deep frame, linked to values of heroism and patriotism, to which words like 'fight', 'battle' or 'victory' are connected. Even if one has never experienced warfare, or even been in a brawl, there is a frame of stereotypical knowledge about warfare that comes from the surrounding culture. It is well known that this particular source domain is mapped by politicians and others on to various target domains: consider 'the war against drugs' (or poverty, crime or terror). But discourse accesses and activates this source domain by means of various verbal cues. Even the term 'campaign', as used by civil society organisations, has the potential to activate this frame.

There are consequences in mapping a particular source domain (for example, 'war') on to a particular target domain (for example, 'argument') (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). We have conventional expressions relating to arguments, like 'she shot his argument down in flames', or 'we defended our position against the opposition's onslaught'. These are not just fixed conventional expressions (one can think of a great many other expressions that are entailments of this particular source domain/ target domain mapping, and these will convey clear meaning even if they are not in common use). It is the specific consequences that are important. For example, part of the deep frame for warfare is that there are prototypically two, and only two, sides. But 'argument' can involve more than two parties. Further, the war frame conveys the idea that there should be a victor and a loser – yet one might prefer an 'argument' that leads to mutual understanding.

3.4 Frames, conceptual metaphors and values

This report focuses on the ways that a wider understanding of framing can help to bring greater public scrutiny to bear upon how cultural values are shaped. Ultimately, this is in the anticipation that civil society organisations can respond in two ways.

A wider understanding of framing can help to bring greater public scrutiny to bear upon how cultural values are shaped

First, they can work help to create wider public appreciation of the inevitable influence that a range of factors (including public policy, marketing and the media) have on dominant cultural values, and the importance that these values have in shaping responses to bigger-than-self problems. This in turn, should invite greater public demand for the democratisation of the way in which cultural values are shaped.

Second, they can work to promote those deep frames that help to convey helpful values (as identified in Section 2), while simultaneously striving for complete transparency about what frames they are seeking to promote. And, in the light of the empirical evidence from work in social psychology, *why* they seek to promote the helpful values that these frames entail.

It is important, therefore, to develop a deeper understanding of how frames, conceptual metaphors and values relate to one another at a conceptual level.

As discussed, deep frames entail a set of values. They structure our ideas and concepts: they shape our thinking, and they influence our perception and actions. Frames offer a broader perspective than values, while including them. Whereas values arise in response to the questions 'what do I think is important?' or 'what do I think is right and wrong?', frames embed values in the question 'how do I understand the world?'. Frames and values are thus closely related, because a person understands the world in part through those things that he or she thinks are important. As Professor Tim Kasser, who has spent many years researching values and their influence on behaviour, suggests: "any frame which is going to have some appeal to a person is probably going to have to be located somewhere in the circumplex of values [see Figures 1 and 2] and connect with those motivations" (Tim Kasser, *personal communication*). This perspective is corroborated by a large body of work that demonstrates the importance of an individual's values in relation to framing effects (see Chong and Druckman, 2007 for review).

Where do conceptual metaphors come in? Remember that metaphorical expressions are not just persuasive flourishes. They are cognitive operations projecting a frame we know well (for example, 'family') on to something more vague, uncertain or contested that we want to talk about (for example, the nation, humankind or all living species). This is why metaphors are often linked to values in deep frames. For example, in the value circumplex (Figure 2), power and security values may often be conceptually structured – and communicated – by war metaphors (for example, 'life is a battle', 'there are winners and losers', 'one must have a personal strategy'). Values of universalism and benevolence might, for example, be structured and communicated by mapping a family frame on to a target domain that we are interested in (for example, 'humans are a family and must face climate change together', 'poor people in poor countries are our brother and sisters'). Of course, a great deal depends on what exactly is in the 'family' frame, and upon which part a communicator chooses to focus.

As seen in Section 2, values tend to cluster in dependable ways, across many different cultures. Some of these clusters of values act in opposition towards one another – when one set of values is expressed, it is difficult to express some others. Correspondingly, a successful 'deep frame' will appeal to a coherent set of values, while simultaneously 'inhibiting' opposing values. Discourse (i.e. use of language), policies and institutions serve to activate and strengthen particular frames. These will therefore also serve to culturally strengthen corresponding values, and thus reduce the importance attached to opposing values.

3.5 Some examples of deep frames

Drawing on the discussion of values in Section 2 and Appendix 1, and the understanding of frames developed in this section, three examples of pairs of opposing deep frames are now developed. These represent an elaboration of the values previously discussed, and reflect a perspective on some of the ways in which values are articulated and promoted through particular deep frames. In this way, we can begin to map these values on to real-life public debates.

Frames can be identified at different 'levels'. For example, Dryzek (2005) identifies some of the frames that dominate *environmental* debate. Comparable attempts are being made within the international development sphere (Andrew Darnton, *personal communication*). But it is also important to explore the ways in which these 'sector-specific' frames are rooted in shared aspects of other 'more fundamental' deep frames. These more fundamental deep frames will help to convey those values that are of *common* importance in meeting a wide range of bigger-than-self problems.

This section begins, hesitantly, to explore what some of these common deep frames might be. As such, the frames presented here are simply examples of the types of frames that might be developed following further work. The development of these examples has been informed through extensive consultation with two experts in frame analysis and cognitive linguistics (Joe Brewer, director of cognitive policy works in the US, and Paul Chilton, professor of linguistics at Lancaster University in the UK), and an expert in values and behaviour (Tim Kasser, professor of psychology, Know College, Illinois).

There is a high degree of subjectivity to the approach taken in the development of these examples, and future work should shift this frame analysis on to a more empirical basis. These examples are introduced in order to demonstrate the possibility of the development of a set of frames. In practical application, however, more work would be needed in order to develop and refine key frames (using some of the empirical approaches outlined in Appendix 3). But for our current purposes – to demonstrate the importance of frames in strengthening particular cultural values – these examples are adequate.

There are inevitably overlaps between these frames. For example, the self-interest frame is reinforced by the elite governance frame, which denies the scope for collective action to address political problems. Moreover, there is also a clear overlap in the support provided for each of these frames by the empirical exploration of life-goals and values.

In discussing each frame, language taken from specific survey items (used in the social psychology studies discussed in Section 2 and Appendix 1) is included in italics. The particular life-goal or value from which the survey item is taken then follows in parenthesis. These survey items will be found in Tables A1.1 – A1.2, in Appendix 1.

3.5.1 'Self-interest' and 'common-interest' frames

The box below introduces the 'self-interest' and 'common-interest' frames. The self-interest frame has been a dominant frame of Western society, at least for the last 30 or 40 years. But, of course, people *also* have a common-interest frame that is often suppressed because of the way in which the self-interest frame is promoted – for example, educationally, in political discourse, and through the way in which our social institutions operate. Nonetheless, this frame is still very much evident in public debate and underpins general acceptance of a great many social norms.

Self-interest frame

People inevitably and properly pursue their own self-interest, and this interest is to be assessed primarily through individual cost-benefit calculations. Often, but not inevitably, these calculations are conducted in economic terms as people strive to maximise their own economic interests. The value of other people and nature is to be captured by economic assessments, and such assessments provide an adequate incentive for properly valuing these things.

There is an analogy between the individual and the nation-state.[14] National interest, which is to be assessed economically, should not be subjugated to the common interest of the international community. Indeed, nation states always will operate in their own economic self-interest (this invokes realist theories of international relations).[15] There is no scope for the morality of shared wealth in international relations. International alliances are therefore inherently unstable, and will begin to break down as soon as the national interests of individual states begin to diverge.

This frame is associated with the following items in the values surveys discussed in Section 2 and Appendix 1. The goal or value associated with each item is given in parenthesis: *I will be wealthy and materially successful* (financial success); *wealth is a guiding principle in my life* (power)*; I will look attractive in terms of body and clothing* (image).

Common-interest frame

People are inherently concerned about both themselves and others – other people, and other living things. The value that people place on others cannot be assessed solely in economic terms. People, other living things, and nature have an inherent value which is irreducible to economic value – they are valuable 'for their own sake'. People recognise this, and often do things in the interests of others without anticipating personal material benefit. As such, people are led to invest energy and resources in projects that promote the interests of others.

Absolute gains to the interests of all states will be achieved through close cooperation. We are part of an international community with many shared assets including cultural diversity, a global distribution system, planetary climate, and the interdependence these various commons represent.

This frame is associated with the following items in the values surveys discussed in Section 2 and Appendix 1. The goal or value associated with each item is given in parenthesis: *I will assist people who need it, asking nothing in return; the things I do will make other people's lives better; I will help the world become a better place* (community feeling)*; unity with nature (fitting into nature) and broadmindedness (tolerance of different ideas and beliefs) are important guiding principles in my life; social justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak) is an important guiding principle in my life* (universalism)*; to be helpful (working for the welfare of others) is an important guiding principle in my life* (benevolence).

The self-interest frame is underpinned by various traditions of intellectual thought and policy advice, including rational choice theory, which envisages people estimating (consciously or otherwise) which of a number of possible actions will generate the greatest possible benefit to them as individuals. The assumption (which has been challenged by work in many different disciplines) is that it is rational for individuals to focus narrowly on the pursuit of their own interests.[16]

In contrast, the common-interest frame locates an individual's actions in a wider context: to neglect the importance of morality in shaping human choice is seen as leading to an impoverished perspective on humanity. This frame will resonate with the empathic tendencies of human beings, if activated by appropriate linguistic cues or experiences.

In fact, the assumption of the biological pre-eminence of self-interest has been repeatedly challenged on scientific grounds. Evidence is growing that empathy is an important basic human attribute, and that self-interest must therefore be actively perpetuated through social institutions and public discourses that have the specific effect of promulgating the self-interest frame (see Section 2.6). Economic discourse and policy is one area where the self-interest frame is often explicitly promulgated. Wordings and phrasings in many other areas of public discourse also evoke the self-interest frame as a whole, with all its internal content and interconnections. It is important to remember, however, that in discourse it is often what is *unsaid*, but presupposed or taken for granted, that is important. At a certain point, a discourse like self-interest simply becomes naturalised, and is taken for granted. If that is the

case, then any attempt to challenge it probably needs to be done openly and directly by explicitly activating the common-interest frame by means of common-interest discourse. Indeed, as we have seen, for any approach to be ethical, this process must be transparent and reflexive.

Note that the common-interest frame can *include* the argument that common interest frequently includes one's *own* interest, along with that of others, and that helping others can therefore simultaneously promote one's own interests. But the risk in using this argument is that the whole rational-choice frame is simultaneously triggered. Because the rational-choice frame frame is so powerful, there is a risk of this swamping the common-interest frame, such that self-interest is viewed as paramount, and is pursued even where this conflicts with the common interest.

Concepts of choice and freedom are important here. According to the common-interest frame, to neglect the importance of morality in shaping human freedom leads to a particularly impoverished perspective on humanity:

"[T]he most interesting dimension of human freedom is not the ability to maximise individual utility through unconstrained choice, but the possibility of choosing principles by which to determine one's own actions, and principles that may be evaluated in terms of a wider social good" (Dupré, 2001: 132).

Finally, note that these two frames include two dimensions that are conceptually distinct, but which are very closely associated psychologically: the extent to which people value self-interest as opposed to common-interest, and the extent to which such interests are to be assessed in economic terms. Of course, conceptually, it's perfectly possible to value common interest and to assess this interest economically. But a deep frame that conveys the importance of self-interest is also likely to establish the importance of assessing this interest in economic terms: the goal of financial success is defined in terms of *personal* wealth and material success.

Analogously, in terms of the metaphor of nation state as individual, financial success is thought of not as the financial success of the international community, but of the individual nation state (competing with other states in a global economy). Recall that community feeling and financial success are in almost perfect psychological opposition (Section 2.1). To the extent that *my*, or *my country's* financial success is considered of primary importance, I will find it difficult to place value on community feeling. As will be seen, in Case Study 2, this is something that created specific problems for the Stern Review.

Case Study 2
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change

The Stern Review (Stern, 2007) represents a contribution to the climate change debate that undeniably helped to create political traction. However, this traction was achieved, in part, through reliance upon elements of unhelpful deep frames. How might civil society organisations have responded to the Review in a way that served both to capitalise upon the political momentum that it created, while also avoiding the reinforcement of a set of unhelpful deep frames?

Frame analysis of the Stern Review

This analysis focuses mainly on the ambiguities in the Review, in promoting *both* the common-interest and self-interest frames. The Review focused on the

collective benefits, to humanity, of moving to limit greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere. The impacts of climate change will be important for all humans, but they are not evenly distributed – "the poorest countries and populations will suffer earliest and most" (p. xvi). Everyone's interests, but particularly those of the poor, are therefore served by international agreement to limit pollution of the global commons. And the economic impacts are assessed internationally, too: some models "estimate a 5-10% loss in global GDP, with poor countries suffering costs in excess of 10%" (p.161). Our response to this demands international cooperation. "Above all, reducing the risks of climate change requires collective action. It requires cooperation between countries, through international frameworks that support the achievement of shared goals" (p. 644). (There are over one hundred references to 'collective action' in the Review, and almost as many references to 'cooperation').

Hence, the Review conveys the importance of pursuing common interests rather than individual national interests. In this, it confirms the common-interest frame. The nature of the challenge, and the benefits of responding to this, are framed in terms of common interest.

But in discussing the costs of responding to the challenge, the Review inevitably lapses into debating the *competitiveness* impacts for individual countries: "All economies undergo continuous structural change through time. Indeed, the most successful economies are those that have the flexibility and dynamism to cope with and embrace change" (p.282), and "[G]overnments can seek to position their economy to take advantage of the opportunities. Countries with sound macroeconomic management, flexible markets, and attractive conditions for inward investment can hope to win strong shares of the growing clean energy market." (p.306). Here the Review is deploying, and therefore reinforcing, the self-interest frame.

These two frames are incompatible. It is extremely difficult to simultaneously pursue national economic competitiveness concerns and international cooperation, especially when this is based on principles of equity. To have been compelling in building a case for ambitious international action on climate change, the Review should have tackled the problems inherent to international competition. It should have made the case that this was a problem that could only be tackled by transcending a preoccupation with national competitiveness.

Directly raising concerns about national competitiveness is one problem. But these concerns are also inherent to economic cost-benefit analysis, which provides the primary motivation for the Review's recommendations. Concepts of self-interest (here national economic interest) are activated through use of economic cost-benefit analysis, because of the tight association between national interest and economic interest. The one invokes the other; both are elements of the self-interest frame. Of course, there is no reason why costs and benefits shouldn't be assessed at a global level (this is what the Review attempts). But the self-interest frame activated by cost-benefit analysis is one that militates against the prioritisation of the common interest. The closeness of the association of self-interest and economic interest is illustrated by Clemons and Schimmelbusch (2007). They characterise the position of some American opponents of action on climate change as follows:

"If we [the US] clean up our environmental act and the Chinese don't we all die anyway and their economy will outperform ours while we live. If we don't clean up our act, we still all die, but at least we have a stronger economy until then." (p.4)

Here we see the melding of the prioritisation of self-interest (and the perceived impossibility of concerted international action) with assessment of self-interest in economic terms. It is understandable that this should happen: economic models using both cost-benefit analysis and self-interest have been so successful that orthodox economists have come to treat these two things as one and the same (Frohlich, 1974). As characterised by Clemons and Schimmelbusch, the challenge of international action on climate change has the form of the 'tragedy of the commons' – a situation in which the pursuit of individual self-interest leads to the unsustainable exploitation of a shared resource even when this is clearly not in anyone's long-term interest. Empirical studies have found that in simulations of 'tragedy of the commons' scenarios (such as collective management of a forest resource) groups comprised of extrinsically-oriented individuals tend to exploit the common resource more heavily than groups made up of intrinsically-oriented individuals (Sheldon and McGregor, 2000).

Activation of the common-interest frame – which the Review needs to achieve if the recommendations for international cooperation are to be compelling – would have been better attempted through appeal not to economic cost-benefit analysis, but rather the moral imperative to avert dangerous climate change because of its wider impacts on humans and non-human nature.

The irony is that the *economic* analysis presented in the Review was taken by many to complement the compelling *moral* arguments for action on climate change. In practice, it may have served to undermine these. Of course many of the failures of the Review outlined above are inevitable consequences of the terms of reference of the study – which called for an economic assessment. The Review cannot therefore be wholly *blamed* for helping to instil more harmful deep frames. But the *fact* that the Review was unhelpful in these ways still stands, and it was incumbent upon civil society organisations to account for these concerns in responding to the publication of the Review.

Responding to the Stern Review

The challenges that the Review presented to civil society organisations were to: (i) promote the common-interest deep frame associated with socially and ecologically helpful concerns and behaviour; and (ii) help strengthen the political momentum that the Review generated through its use of an economic case to validate the need for immediate action – a case that unfortunately operates to *undermine* the common-interest frame and promote the unhelpful self-interest frame, through its invocation of national economic competitiveness concerns and its use of cost-benefit analysis. How might this have been achieved?

A response to the Review could have incorporated the following messages:

1. Climate change is an emergency and we cannot afford to delay action to tackle it

At the launch of the Review, Nick Stern underscored the importance of immediate and ambitious policy intervention: "Strong, deliberate policy choices by governments are essential to motivate change. But the task is urgent. Delaying action, even by a decade or two, will take us into dangerous territory. We must not let this window of opportunity close" (HM Treasury, 2006:1). This perspective deserved strong support from civil society organisations.

2. It is in all our interests that we work together to tackle climate change

This is the common-interest frame, and this point is easily made, because it is one that the Review itself makes very powerfully. The self-interest frame, that militates against this point, could be made explicit, and then challenged, through messaging that activates the common-interest frame.

For example, messages could have been produced along these lines: "Self-interest is not the only motivation that humans have. They also have moral concerns about their duty to their families, their grandchildren, the children of the world, and the wider natural world. Such concerns are a fact – not merely an elusive moral ideal"; or, "Cooperation among humans is normal and essential: we would have no schools, businesses or hospitals without cooperation. In the same way, nations can cooperate to meet challenges we face together."

These messages could have been supported through passages in the Review, as the following examples illustrate:

The Review likens the failure to give due consideration to future generations to a grandparent saying to their grandchild:

"[B]ecause you will live your life 50 years after mine, I place far less value on your wellbeing than I do on myself and my current neighbours, and therefore I am ready to take decisions with severe and irreversible implications for you" (p.654).

Or alternatively:

"On many dimensions of international relations, governments make and respect international obligations because they are in line with perceptions of responsible and collaborative behaviour, and because domestic public opinion supports both the objectives and mechanisms for achieving them." (p. 523).

3. The Stern Review represents an important stepping stone towards a concerted response to the challenge of climate change

Here, attempt might have been made to subsume the economic argument within a wider set of moral imperatives. For example: "There is a moral imperative to tackle climate change because it threatens the survival of future generations – both future generations of humans and the wider non-human natural world. Different people

relate to this imperative in different ways. Some feel concerned about climate change because of the threat that it poses to the survival of entire species, such as the polar bear; others because of the local impacts of climate change on an environment that they love; others because of concern about the impacts on poor people in developing countries. Nonetheless, many have hesitated in supporting action on climate change because of a concern about the possible social consequences that some people feared such action would create (as a result of the projected economic impacts). But the Stern Review now provides the evidence that action on climate change should be intensified even on economic grounds."

3.5.2 'Strict father' and 'nurturant parent' frames

George Lakoff (2002) develops an understanding of the metaphor of nation-as-family, in an American cultural context. He suggests that there is a direct mapping from models of family to models of a nation (for example, home as the homeland; parent as the government). Accordingly, the government's role is to provide security (protect us), make laws (tell us what we can and can't do); run the economy (make sure we have access to equal opportunity to make money); and provide schools (educate us) (Lakoff, 2006). Lakoff highlights two different ideals for the family – the 'strict father' and the 'nurturant parent' family – and he suggests that these two different models produce deeply contrasting views on the role of government.

In an American political context, these frames have been developed and exploited in a deeply partisan way (contrasting the political programmes of the American 'progressive left' and American neo-conservatives). The use of these frames clearly does not divide neatly along party-political lines in a British context. In the UK, elements of the nurturant parent frame can be found in progressive thinking on both the left and the right of the political spectrum.

Strict father frame

A family requires a strong father to protect it, to compete for resources on its behalf, to exert moral authority, to command obedience, and to punish dissent. Mapped on to a political vision, this model entails the exercise of authority and control. Social security provides things for people that haven't earned them, and is therefore immoral – rewarding people for being desultory. Hierarchy is good.

This frame is associated with the following items in the values surveys discussed in Section 2 and Appendix 1. The value associated with the item is given in parenthesis. *Social power (control over others and dominance) is important as a guiding principle* (power).

Nurturant parent frame

The primary duty of parents is to love and nurture their children, and to teach them to empathise with others and to show responsibility towards others. Mapped on to a political vision, this model entails social justice and equality (because people should feel empathy towards all others).

This frame is associated with the following items in the values surveys discussed in Section 2 and Appendix 1. The value associated with each of the three items is given in parenthesis. *Social justice (correcting injustice and taking care of the weak); equality (equal opportunity for all); broadmindedness (tolerance of different ideas and beliefs) are important guiding principles* (universalism).

George Lakoff has developed a persuasive argument that these two frames have long been active in the mind of American voters (Lakoff, 2002; Lakoff, 2004). The reason this is plausible in the US context is that there is some evidence that these frames are variants of a single deep American frame, one that is well known and indeed inculcated overtly in American schools: the nation as a family. There is an American discourse which uses expressions such as 'founding fathers' or 'daughters of the revolution'. Such expressions only make sense if one postulates a widespread deep frame that includes the nation as a family metaphor. As noted in Section 3.4 above, the meaning of a metaphorical mapping depends on the input into the source domain. In the case of the nation as a family metaphor, there are two potential kinds of input – a strict father frame for the family and a nurturant parent frame, entailing different things in the target domain.

This structure is not so relevant in the UK context, where there is (at least today) no dominant national frame or discourse that metaphorically projects the nation as a family. Although Lakoff's strict father/nurturant parent frames may exist in the minds of British people, they do not seem to have salience in opposition to one another in public or media debate. This does not mean, however, that parenting or familial frames are absent or inactive in UK public discourse, and the remainder of this section focuses on some of the ways in which future work might develop an understanding of these frames for application in the UK.

In a UK context, the family frame might be developed with two other frames that can be metaphorically linked with it, and with one another: the 'house' or 'home' frame, and the 'health' or 'wellbeing' frame. Each of these frames are deep-seated, value-laden and emotionally charged.[17] They are linked conceptually in the following way:

Families (whether framed as traditional two-parent, single-parent, strict-father, or nurturant parent) typically live in a house.[18] Houses, especially when occupied by families, are also conceptually framed as 'home'. Families, whatever their structure, include children, and some kind of parenting frame is almost certainly universal. In the parenting frame there will almost certainly be concepts of protection, health, and wellbeing (including the strict father frame). Perhaps most significantly, any parenting frame will include the value frame 'x is responsible for y'. What one is responsible for, at least within the frame of 'home', is people (children and other relatives) and the house itself, without which there is no shelter for the family. All this looks obvious, but it is a conceptual nexus that is shared across society and across cultures, with variations.

The metaphorical use of these frames could have a range of impacts as they are transferred metaphorically from the family and home to other domains – some of them helpful from the point of view of strengthening values identified as important; some unhelpful. For example, it may be helpful to activate the concepts of responsibility and protection that go with family and parenting. But conceptual framing will be crucial in focusing on particular conceptual elements.

Suppose we were to try to link the concepts, feeling and values associated with 'family' on to 'developing countries'. It would not be helpful to encourage metaphorical entailments that projected the West as 'parents' and the developing countries as 'children'.

Thus, one could focus on 'kinship' (people in developing countries are our 'cousins', 'sisters', 'brothers'…) but this will only work well if the input family frame is a certain kind of family (non-hierarchical and extended). The concept of living in the same 'house', sharing the same 'living space', sharing responsibility for the cleaning up and garbage disposal, the maintenance of the material fabric that is our shelter –

such metaphorical entailments are plentiful, rich in value and affect, and likely to be widely shared.

So it can be seen that the community feeling and universalism values, instantiated in the common-interest deep frame, can be conveyed in domestic experience. But the human propensity for metaphorical transfer could activate and strengthen helpful values in different and wider domains – such as debate about national responsibilities. Here, too, the frames may work in various ways: houses can be framed as private individual places that keep others out. The conceptual framing needs to be creative, but careful, in focusing the conceptualisation and associated values.

Lakoff's (2002, 2004 and 2009) work on metaphorical framing by family metaphors has been extremely influential in political campaigning in the US. But this analysis has been confined to the US national political scene and political culture. Of concern in this report, however, are applications that resonate in the UK cultural and political context, but in such a way that they go beyond the immediate concerns of domestic politics. This is why more work needs to be done on the development of these frames, and their metaphorical projection into campaigning discourse, if they are to be debated as possible routes to help open up public discussion on responses to bigger-than-self problems.

3.5.3 'Elite governance' and 'Participative democracy' frames

These two frames determine the views that people hold about the role of government in public decision-making. Is power properly concentrated in the hands of well-educated elites who are best placed to take decisions in the common interest? Or does the concentration of power risk decision-making processes being captured, such that these serve to promote the interests of particular groups in society?

Elite governance frame

Political power is properly consolidated in the hands of elites. People cannot be trusted to solve their own problems: leaders must take control and act on their behalf. The political world is therefore properly structured as a top-down hierarchy.

Democracy must be carefully managed if governance is not reduced to mob rule, and people must be encouraged to accept the current order. One mechanism for managing democracy is to deflect public agency into the marketplace – with an emphasis on being 'good consumers' rather than 'good citizens' (instead of complaining about the intransigence of political leaders, the electorate is encouraged to express its values through different product choices). In fact, the voting process itself may be heavily influenced by marketing techniques – such that citizens are 'sold' the candidates and policies of the elite. Civil society organisations are unaccountable and their influence should be narrowly circumscribed.

This frame is associated with the following items in the values surveys discussed in Section 2 and Appendix 1. The goal or value associated with each item is given in parenthesis. *I will achieve the 'look' I have been after* (image)*; authority (the right to lead or command), social power (control over others, dominance), and observing social norms (to maintain face) are important guiding principles in my life* (power); *I will be polite and obedient; my desires and tastes will be similar to those of other people; I will 'fit in' with others* (conformity).

Participative democracy frame

People hold political power, and should exert their influence through effective organisation. The government is of the people, by the people, and for the people. Citizens are part of the collaborative decision-making processes, and they grow and struggle together in the process of personal transformation and as they develop a collective sense of the ideals towards which they wish to aspire. Civil society organisations provide one avenue for people to self-organise and express their collective aspirations. Such organisations are essential to ensure that politicians remain accountable, and to push forward community interests.

This frame is associated with the following items in the values surveys discussed in Section 2 and Appendix 1. The goal or value associated with each item is given in parenthesis. *I will choose what I do, instead of being pushed along by life*; *I will have insight into why I do the things I do* (self-acceptance)*; independent thought and action, choosing, creating and exploring are important guiding principles in my life* (self-direction).

─────────────────────────────

Many civil society activists perceive a lack of accountability in the political process. For example, Rob Hopkins, co-founder of the Transition Network writes:

"It appears to me that there is a fracture in politics. The UK government looks to the public and sees them as disengaged, apathetic and uninterested in democratic process. The public often sees politicians as uncaring careerists who don't have any interest in them or what is actually happening in their communities, apart from once every four years when an election comes round" (Hopkins, 2008: 76).

From the perspective of civil society organisations, there are two possible responses to this perceived fracture. Viewing this lack of accountability as an inevitable consequence of contemporary political disengagement leads some organisations to focus narrowly on influencing political decision-makers directly – through political lobbying. This 'command and control' approach to campaigning for change accords little importance to the active engagement of a public supporter base.

The alternative response to the perceived fracture between the electorate and political decision-makers is to build political pressure through active citizen engagement. Many NGOs work in this way, but the Transition Network is a prime example of such an approach: Rob Hopkins foresees communities that have "set out [a vision of] where they want to go", such that "a very dynamic interface is created between communities, local and national government" (Hopkins, 2008: 76). Pursuit of such public commitment to participating in decision-making processes will also require engagement with political elites, because if decision-making is to become less centralised, this process can be expedited by political elites ceding some of their power.

Of course, this process cannot proceed only at a community-level. Decisions frequently need to be taken in the national or international interest (for example, in setting up a protected area, such as a national park, or in taking leadership on climate change). It properly falls to national and international government institutions to make these decisions. What is important is that these institutions are democratically accountable – and transparently so. The universalism value is important here – underpinning both acceptance of collective action in the wider public interest, and public engagement in decision-making processes.

Three opposing pairs of frames have been presented in this section (the self-interest versus common-interest frames; the strict father versus nurturant parent frames; and the elite governance versus participative democracy frames). They have been presented in order to demonstrate the *type* of frames that might be developed, following more extensive and empirical investigation. There is no doubt that such work would lead to significant refinement of these frames, and the identification of other important frames. But they serve as a basis for now turning to ask: how might civil society organisations begin to work with an understanding of values and deep frames, particularly in the light of the ethical challenges that such work presents? This question is addressed in the next section.

Summary, Section 3

Values are abstract concepts, but they are made more concrete by an understanding of frames, and the way in which frames serve as vehicles to strengthen particular values in society. Frames are mental structures that allow us to understand the world. It is important to distinguish 'conceptual' framing and 'deep' framing. Conceptual framing entails careful use of wording and phrasing such that an audience can be encouraged to focus on and communicate about (or obscure!) different aspects of an event, situation or policy. Deep frames are the cognitive structures held in long-term memory that contain particular values. They forge the connection between language and values, and are activated by conceptual frames. Although relatively stable, deep frames change over time.

Other aspects of people's lived experience, besides language, also have an important effect in strengthening particular deep frames – for example, people's experience of social institutions or public policies. Living with particular public policies such as land use planning policy, or interacting with particular social institutions such as the electoral system, has an effect upon which deep frames come to dominate. Repeated activation of particular frames, whether through language or other aspects of people's lived experience, helps to embed these, making them easier to activate. Because these deep frames help to embed particular values culturally, the processes by which they come to dominate should be of intense interest to anyone concerned about addressing bigger-than-self problems.

But this raises important ethical considerations. Today, many organisations deploy an understanding of framing in ways that are far from transparent and (because of the way in which frames operate largely at an unconscious level) sometimes seem ethically dubious. The use and influence of deep frames should become a matter for widespread public debate.

Civil society organisations should not shy from working to strengthen helpful values, through use of appropriate deep frames, and to look right across the spectrum of people's lived experience to see how this might be achieved: it is not just about messaging! But, at the same time, in using deep frames, these organisations should strive for utmost transparency in communicating two things: (i) *what* frames they are using; and (ii) *why* they are using them – explaining this in the light of both their mission and presentation of the evidence for the profound impact of values on our responses to bigger-then-self problems.

This section presented three pairs of opposing deep frames that are likely to strengthen either helpful or unhelpful values: the self-interest versus common-interest frames; the strict father versus nurturant parent frames; and the elite governance versus participative democracy frames. These were developed in part through building on the work on values in Section 2. But they are at this stage purely indicative of the type of frames that might be identified as particularly important, following more extensive and empirical investigation.

4. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: WORKING WITH VALUES AND DEEP FRAMES

Civil society organisations can respond to an understanding of values and framing at two different levels.

First, they can work to develop an explicit awareness of the values that they activate in the course of pursuing their *existing* campaigns and communication concerns, and communicate this to their audiences. This need not imply a shift in terms of the *issues* on which the organisations are working, but would entail a critical reflection on the *ways* in which campaigns are designed and their impacts on cultural values – both the impacts of the campaign communications themselves and the likely impacts of the end goal of the campaign (for example, a change in policy which will, itself, have impacts on cultural values). As a further development of this approach, particular campaign goals might be chosen in awareness of the cognitive impacts of both achieving these goals, and of the way in which the campaign itself is run – but again, maintaining transparency and reflexivity (that is, communicating the values and frames that a campaign seeks to promote, explaining the reasons for the importance of these, and ensuring that the campaign itself embodies these values in the way that it is conducted). This may entail that some current campaign objectives are modified or replaced.

New coalitions of organisations could emerge, campaigning jointly on pieces of policy that will have the effect of reducing the predominance of materialistic and extrinsic values

Second, a civil society organisation may come to realise the importance of engaging on a set of issues which, at a cognitive level, are of common importance to addressing a range of bigger-than-self concerns. For example, as discussed in Case Study 3, there is good evidence that increased exposure to commercial marketing leads to an increased prevalence of extrinsic values, which, in turn, have negative impacts on concern about a range of bigger-than-self problems – including people's concern about global poverty and environmental problems. New coalitions of organisations may therefore emerge, campaigning jointly on pieces of policy that will have the effect of reducing the predominance of materialistic and extrinsic values (for example, further restrictions on advertising to children, or bans on outdoor advertising) or of increasing the predominance of intrinsic values (for example, through promoting new indicators of national progress, based on measures of wellbeing rather than GDP).

Attention is now turned to a series of principles that could come to inform civil society campaigns and communications. Inevitably, some of these will require further development before they can become of direct practical use.

4.1 Principle 1: Be transparent and participatory, and demand the same standard from others

4.1.1 Theory

All communication invokes particular frames and therefore exerts some influence on people's values. Recognising this raises crucial ethical questions. In particular: "are the aims of the communication clear and transparent, or deliberately obscure?"; "is this communication open to public debate – and, crucially – participation?"; "is it manipulative?", and "is it imposing an elite standpoint or excluding other voices?"

Deep frames are deployed – deliberately or inadvertently – by government, businesses and civil society organisations. Political strategists and marketers are particularly skilled in the deliberate use of deep frames, and often deploy these without transparency about how they are being used, or their likely wider effect:

it is not considered to be in the interests of a communicator to be clear about why particular deep frames are being activated and strengthened.

Civil society organisations should lead the way in openly discussing the values that a campaign or communication seeks to activate, presenting for public scrutiny both the evidence that these values will help to achieve the aims of that campaign, and the ways that the frames they deploy will help to strengthen these values. This would help to build public understanding of, and critical reflection on, the frames that people encounter in other communications. Indeed, having achieved transparency in their own use of frames, civil society organisations should begin to demand similar standards from other organisations – both government and private sector.

4.1.2 Practical implications

Civil society organisations should invest in developing the expertise to identify the deep frames that their existing communications and campaigns serve to activate and strengthen. Some of the techniques of frame analysis are outlined in Appendix 3.

The activation of particular frames should then be justified through open reflection on the aims of the communication or campaign; even if – at least initially – it is decided, for issue-specific tactical reasons, to persist in activating frames that are likely to be unhelpful (see Section 4.6). Such reflection could be presented as a dedicated section in a report, or a page on a website, or a section in an annual accountability report. But this text should make clear:

- the overall aims of the campaign;

- the frames and values that the campaign seeks to promote; and

- the rationale for promoting these frames, presenting the evidence that these deep frames, and the values they promote, will help to achieve the campaign targets.

Provision should be made for public debate about these frames and the rationale for their use – for example, through online discussion threads.

Civil society organisations should invest in developing the expertise to identify the deep frames that their existing communications and campaigns serve to activate and strengthen

Having pioneered such approaches on their own communications and campaign material, civil society organisations should urge the government to conduct frame analysis of public communications and new policy initiatives. Such analysis would examine the values that communications and policies are likely to elicit from the public, and the probable wider social and environmental impacts of activating these values. This analysis should be publicly available on the internet, and should provide important input to public consultations on new policy initiatives. Of course, such analysis will be contested – but instances of disagreement will point to areas where additional research is needed, and will serve to increase public understanding of some of the dilemmas that a full appreciation of the importance of values and frames present.

Civil society organisations should also call for the mandatory use of frame analysis by marketing agencies in launching new marketing campaigns. Such analysis, again made available on the internet, would support public debate about the values that such marketing campaigns promote, and the wider impacts of these. Again, this analysis will be contested – but marketing agencies and their clients should welcome indications of the need for additional research while they work to ensure that their campaigns are not inadvertently generating social and environmentally damaging side-effects.

4.2 Principle 2: Ensure that communications and campaigns embody the values that they seek to promote

4.2.1 Theory

Even if a campaign is unsuccessful, it will have cognitive impacts – because people will see the campaign materials and unconsciously respond to the values that these enshrine. These cognitive impacts may be unrelated to the specific issue or policy request that the campaign is highlighting. Thus, *the way in which the campaign is conducted* is likely to have unforeseen secondary impacts – and these may either help or hinder the emergence of more systemic social or environmental concerns. This has profound implications for civil society campaigning. Working with an understanding of cognitive policy can help to ensure that the public *experience* of a communication or campaign simultaneously serves to convey and reinforce the values necessary for systemic engagement with social and environmental challenges, irrespective of whether or not the campaign itself is formally 'successful' in terms of the material changes it is seeking to create.

4.2.2 Practical implications

Campaign communications should be designed such that these have a widespread positive impact in strengthening helpful deep frames, *even if the campaign itself is unsuccessful* in terms of delivering the desired 'material' change. For example, they should consider focusing on the common-interest imperatives for change (rather than appealing to self-interest as a motivation for people to support the campaign); they should respond with empathy to any interest groups that may be disadvantaged as a result of the campaign (rather than, for example, dismissing the needs of employees in industries that may be seen as environmentally or socially damaging); they should demonstrate public support for the campaign objectives (rather than appealing to the passive acquiescence of a supporter base, techniques of participative enquiry should be used to evidence active support).

4.3 Principle 3: Be prepared to work for systemic change

4.3.1 Theory

There is an irony at the heart of a great deal of campaigning on bigger-than-self problems: as our awareness of the scale of many of these problems – and the difficulty of addressing them – grows, we tend to rely ever more heavily upon a set of issue-specific tactics which may at times undermine progress towards the systemic and durable solutions that are needed. As has been discussed, education, media and political discourse all contribute to strengthening particular deep frames – which may be helpful or unhelpful in addressing bigger-than-self problems. Working at this level is an involved but necessary process: cutting corners doesn't help.

Helpful frames can be strengthened, and unhelpful frames challenged. Strengthening particular frames involves an ongoing learning process where people 'unlearn' old habits and take on new ones, and this requires sustained effort – maintained at all times through communications and campaigns that are transparent in their aims.

Dennis Chong and James Druckman write that a frame must be accessible. That is, for a frame to be activated, it must be present in the long-term memory of individuals: it must be a frame that is shared in the culture and context. This does not necessarily mean 'conscious' – most frames are retained and used unconsciously. Frames can be made more accessible (and also raised to consciousness) through repeated exposure: "One way in which accessibility increases is through regular or

recent exposure to a communications frame" (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 110). Another leading cognitive linguist has claimed that there is a "continuous scale of entrenchment in cognitive organisation. Every use of a structure has a positive impact on its degree of entrenchment, whereas extended periods of disuse have a negative impact" (Langacker 1987: 59).

Helpful frames can be strengthened, and unhelpful frames challenged

This means, for example, that exposure to particular language cues and other aspects of people's lived experience will tend to activate a particular deep frame (say the common-interest frame) and the values that this frame conveys; but *repeated* experience of these cues will also strengthen this deep frame, and (in this example) the community feeling goals or universalism values that it conveys. It will also help to suppress the dominance of the self-interest frame. Such cues will arise in many ways – for example, through educational experience, through exposure to the media, through exposure to political debate, or through experience of social institutions and public policies. Conversely, if the common-interest frame is not activated, it will become progressively weaker, and the values that are conveyed by this frame will become less prominent.

In the same way, communications and campaigns should seek to avoid activating unhelpful frames. This may require care – particular communications and policy initiatives may simultaneously convey both helpful and unhelpful frames. The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change provides an example of such dissonant communication: see Case Study 2.

4.3.2. Practical implications

Consistency

Particular aspects of people's lived experience will tend to activate particular deep frames, and the values that these frames convey; but when repeated, this experience will also strengthen the corresponding deep frame

Civil society campaigns should operate to repeatedly activate helpful frames – both through use of linguistic cues, but also through creating experiences in which these frames are activated. Conversely, campaigns should, where possible, *avoid* activating unhelpful frames, or simultaneously activating elements of both helpful and opposing unhelpful frames.

Monitoring and evaluation

Working for systemic change will have implications for the way in which civil society organisations monitor and evaluate the success of their campaigns – particularly in those instances where there are possible trade-offs between pursuing issue-specific targets and working towards the creation of systemic change. Approaches to monitoring and evaluating impacts must begin to incorporate an appreciation of the importance of more systemic impacts, which are inevitably more difficult to measure.

Funding revenues

This will also have implications for funding streams. Funding organisations must come to recognise the importance of sustained commitment to supporting programmes that are designed to help strengthen helpful deep frames.

4.4 Principle 4: Build new coalitions

4.4.1 Theory

The opportunities for several civil society organisations to campaign jointly on an issue that is of common importance in promoting helpful deep frames point to the possibility of launching initiatives that transcend particular sectoral concerns.

For example, environmental organisations will benefit from building new coalitions with other organisations that, although perhaps focused on a very diverse set of *issues*, nonetheless share common interests in engaging with the ways in which certain *values* currently come to predominate. Ultimately, this points to the need for an additional mode of operation for many civil society organisations. Thus, in addition to asking "how can we marshal the widest range of interest groups to support the *environmental* cause?", environmental organisations might come to ask "how can we best build on our natural support base, and our natural areas of political influence, to begin to support campaigns that promote helpful values, and to tackle institutions and policies that promote problematic values?" And in embracing this agenda, they might also come to ask "how, in the course of launching new campaigns designed to engage helpful deep frames, can we achieve greater influence through coalition with a wide range of organisations drawn from other sectors?"

Clearly, this mode of campaigning should not entirely replace current approaches, but it could importantly augment issue-specific campaigning.

4.4.2 Practical implications

Practically, this entails identifying factors that promote unhelpful values, or key barriers to the promotion of helpful values, and designing joint campaigns to address these. An example is explored in Case Study 3.

In addition to such joint campaigns, collaborative work between civil society organisations might also begin to explore ways in which systems thinking can be applied to deepen an understanding of the inter-dependencies between different sectors, and how strategies can be adjusted in the light of emerging knowledge. The ActionTown Roadmap project provides one example of a network of strategists from civil society organisations that are beginning to address these questions.[19]

Case Study 3
Advertising and bigger-than-self problems

This case study presents a possible campaign for a change that could have generic benefits in promoting concern about a range of bigger-than-self problems – for example, environmental challenges, development challenges and inequalities – at a 'cognitive' level.

There is not space to develop this case in full here, but there is clear evidence that high levels of exposure to commercial marketing – the average adult sees some 3,000 advertisements a day according to some estimates – has an impact on a person's values. Greater exposure to commercial marketing is correlated with higher levels of materialism, and lower levels of concern about a range of bigger-than-self problems, and there is also good evidence that exposure to commercial advertising actually causes increased levels of materialism (as opposed merely to being correlated with them) (see Section 2.5).

Much advertising directly promotes the self-interest frame, which we know to be unhelpful, and serves to strengthen the goals of financial success, popularity and image, and the values of power and achievement.

There is therefore common interest across a range of civil society organisations working to tackle bigger-than-self problems to campaign for reductions in people's exposure to commercial advertising – particularly, further reductions in children's

exposure. Such campaigns might be best presented in terms of the impacts of commercial marketing upon people's freedom to 'think for themselves' (particularly in the light of mounting evidence that the most persuasive effects of advertising are unconscious); rather than in terms (for example) of advertising having the effect of increasing the material consumption of unhealthy or unsustainable products. Important as this latter effect is, a crucial benefit of a campaign focused on advertising would be to raise public awareness of the indirect impacts that advertising has on levels of happiness, community feeling, parent-child conflict, etc.

It is possible to envisage a great many other campaigns, each designed to engage at the level of values. These might range, for example, from initiatives to address income inequality, to campaigns that encourage the uptake of wellbeing indicators (rather than economic indicators) as primary measurements of national progress, to projects to encourage the conversion of streets into 'home zones', with attendant increases in community cohesion.

4.5 Principle 5: Understand the full impact of policy

4.5.1 Theory

This section explores ideas about cognitive policy (developed by George Lakoff and colleagues) and policy feedback (a phenomenon described by political scientists). These concepts were introduced briefly in Section 3.2. Both point to the importance of policy in helping to activate and strengthen deep frames.

Cognitive policy

Policy proposals that may seem similar in terms of their *material* aims can differ widely in terms of their *cognitive* impacts. This difference may be implicit, drawing on (and supporting) a set of deep frames without conscious discussion. As Brewer and Lakoff suggest: "Concentrating on material criteria alone can be counterproductive if a policy is either unpopular, or if it instils in the public's mind long-term values that contradict the aims of the policy." (Brewer and Lakoff, 2008a: 3).[20] Thus, George Lakoff asks of policy:

"What are a policy's empathetic consequences – how does it affect all that we are connected to? How does it affect the natural world? Does it sustain life, or does it harm life? How am I personally connected to its consequences, as a human being? What, if anything, makes it beautiful, healthful, enjoyable, fulfilling? What causal system does it fit into? How will it affect future generations? Is it fair and does it make us more free? Will it lift spirits, and will we find awe in it?" (2009: 122).

This implies that the cognitive effects of policy in one area – perhaps far removed from, for example, environmental policy – could have implications for embedding deep frames of importance for public acceptance of (and demand for) environmental policy.

Policy feedback

Policy is an important tool for strengthening particular values in public discourse, such that future policies will seem natural, and will attract public support (Brewer and Lakoff, 2008a and 2008b). As such, ideas about cognitive policy are closely aligned to the adage "new policies create new politics" (attributed to EE Schattschneider) and the concept of 'policy feedback'. As Soss and Schram (2007) write:

"Most models of democracy assume that policy actions can generate electoral reward or punishment. [...] The feedback concept, however, suggests a deeper interplay. In this view, policies do more than satisfy or dissatisfy; they change basic features of the political landscape. Policies can set political agendas and shape identities and interests. They can influence beliefs about what is possible, desirable, and normal. They can alter conceptions of citizenship and status" (Soss and Schram, 2007: 113).

The ways in which policy may affect mass public opinion are far from straightforward, and are probably dependent upon both a policy's *visibility* (the degree to which a policy is known and talked about in public debate) and its *proximity* (the extent to which the policy has a concrete and immediate effect on people's lives) (Soss and Schram, 2007). A more visible and proximal policy is likely to have greater effect in shaping public opinion.

There is good evidence for the effect of public policy on cultural values. Of course, it is often difficult to establish whether pursuit of certain policies has led to shifts in cultural values, or whether changes in cultural values created the political space necessary for institutional reform.

It seems that the different systems of social protection in East and West Germany were translated into deep differences in the West and East Germans' worldviews prior to reunification

However, German unification presents a natural laboratory to examine the causality of policy feedback processes. Following reunification, West German policies were 'imposed' on East Germany, not as a result of a shift in public attitudes, but rather as a result of a seismic political event. Public attitudes towards government responsibilities in the former West Germany (for example, whether government should provide healthcare for the sick, provide a decent standard of living for the old, or reduce income differences between the rich and poor) were found to be stable over the period 1990-2006. However, attitudes in the former East Germany changed markedly following the external 'imposition' of West German institutions on East Germany. Attitudes in East Germany then shifted to become aligned to those in West Germany. It seems that the different systems of social protection in East and West Germany were translated into deep differences in the West and East Germans' worldviews prior to reunification (Svallfors, 2010). Stefan Svallfors concludes his study on the effect of policy feedback on German attitudes to state intervention:

"New institutions create new normative expectations that lead to new attitudes towards public policies. New generations are particularly susceptible to new institutional conditions, as they have no previous formative experiences that need to be reconsidered" (2010: 131).

Anne Larason Schneider and Helen Ingram have detailed the many ways in which public policy shapes people's understanding of their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Of particular relevance here, in the light of discussion about the participative democracy frame, is the way in which the process of policy development itself is open to 'capture' by political elites and experts. There are a great many approaches to bringing citizens into the process of policy making (for example, focus groups, citizen juries, community advisory boards, consensus conferences, and inclusive management) (Schneider and Ingram, 2007). These have the effect of *both* improving specific policy strategies where these techniques are deployed, *and* building an understanding of citizenship that includes active involvement in policy process – therefore helping to safeguard against the capture of policy process and its cognitive influence by elites. Planning policy is one policy area which could be of importance in influencing the prevalence of the common-interest frame (see Case Study 4). It seems likely that the extent to which planning policy serves to promote the common-interest frame will be importantly dependent upon the extent to which the planning process itself is experienced to be open and deliberative (that is, the extent to which it reflects the participative democracy frame).

Case Study 4
Policy feedback in UK land use planning policy

This box explores some of the possible ways in which UK land use planning policy may have helped to strengthen the common-interest frame among UK citizens, with implications extending beyond public attitudes towards planning issues. Although untested empirically, it is informative to explore this as a potential example of policy feedback.

Town and country planning in the UK grew from 19th century building bylaws arising from concerns about public health and the environmental impact of uncontrolled development. These evolved, particularly after the Second World War, to bring almost all significant development under public control by making it subject to planning permission. Under the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, "[d]evelopment rights in land and the associated development values were nationalised. All the [land]owners were thus placed in the position of owning only the existing (1947) use rights and values in their land." (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006:23.)

Post-war legislation such as this represented an acknowledgement of the need for government intervention in certain areas in the public interest, in a way that might be considered unthinkable in many other political contexts (for example, the United States). It has led Philip Allmendinger, director of the European and Regional Research Centre, and an expert on planning theory, to comment that "to become a planner or planning academic is to enter into a world where the common good is raised by the individual" (Allmendinger, 2001: 102). To the extent that the planning system reflects these principles, it should contribute to further embedding the common-interest frame.

It seems likely that UK planning laws will have had a cognitive impact on UK citizens: For example, people's personal experience of planning controls is likely to have increased public expectation that commercial development or new infrastructure projects should be properly subject to rigorous planning procedures – much as people accept that their own application for a house extension will come under scrutiny. This, in turn, may have served to strengthen public expectation that individual choice, or business interests, should at times be subjugated to the wider public interest.

It does not seem that there is research which directly addresses this issue, and there is a general dearth of research on public attitudes towards planning laws. Nonetheless, it is informative to compare aspects of the land use planning system in the UK with the debate over land use in North America. For example, in February 2005, 'Greenbelt' legislation was passed to define and protect 720,000ha of environmentally sensitive land and farmland from urban development and sprawl in Ontario, Canada. The legislation encountered vocal opposition from landowners concerned about losing their ability to use the land they owned as they wished. In the UK, public acceptance of green belt policy is such that few now challenge its key principles.

Moreover, it seems likely that UK planning policy will tend to reduce resistance to development where this is transparently demonstrated to be in the public interest.

Certainly within campaign groups like CPRE, there is a perception that fair and transparent processes will increase willingness to accept outcomes which, while perhaps having negative local impacts, nonetheless are demonstrated to be in the wider public interest. It seems inevitable that this public support will be closely linked to perceptions of government commitment towards citizen involvement in planning decisions. If public consultation exercises are seen as *post hoc* window-dressing exercises, public confidence in the system will obviously be eroded. That is, where planning policy operates to instantiate and promote the participative de-mocracy frame, one can anticipate that public acceptance of the common-interest basis for the planning system will be promoted.

Of course, this is not to suggest that the current UK planning system is flawless: it is at times opaque, vulnerable to capture by vested interests, and slow to respond to the changes in land use that responses to sustainability challenges are likely to require. But there is no fundamental political critique in the UK of the principle that a public body should have extensive powers in deciding issues of land use.

4.5.2 Practical implications

Incorporate an understanding of policy feedback into campaign design

Campaigners should recognise that campaigns for new policies or regulations, if successful, will lead to new government interventions which will themselves have important cognitive implications. Irrespective of whether or not these policies are helpful in immediately alleviating a set of social or environmental problems, they are likely to either support or undermine work aimed at strengthening the values outlined above. Attention must be paid to such impacts – whether these are positive or negative. Here approaches must be developed, and utilised, for assessing the cognitive impact of new policy.

Campaign for inspiring policy

Civil society organisations should also campaign for policy that is inspiring, and communicate this inspiring nature through appeal to intrinsic values. Campaigns should promote the public belief that government policy can become something of which citizens should be proud. Campaign managers should give consideration to advocating against policy initiatives that assume citizens will behave in self-interested ways, even if the material impacts of such policies are potentially positive: such policies are likely to help elicit, and therefore embed, those values that they presuppose.

Look across the gamut of public policy

Campaigners should recognise that prominent pieces of policy far removed from a particular issue may have profound impacts for citizens' attitudes towards that issue. This will be the case particularly with policies that have a high profile, and of which people often have personal experience. For example, people's lived experience of the National Health Service (NHS) may be very important in strengthening deep frames that will underpin expressions of public concern about climate change or global poverty (Crompton *et al.*, 2010). Similarly, people's lived experience of public control of land use (that is, planning policy) may be important in strengthening a common sense of the need to protect our shared environment.

Design policy proposals such that material and cognitive effects are mutually supportive

Safeguard against the erosion of public support for helpful policies. Good policies can be revoked – for example, following a change of government. This is more likely to happen if public support for these policies is eroded. Therefore, it is important to ensure that, in shaping a policy to address a material outcome, the cognitive effects of that policy *also serve simultaneously* to further strengthen the deep frames that are important to maintain public support for that policy. Again, this can be seen with the example of the NHS. Citizens are reminded of the core values of public health policy every time they see money taken from their salaries or wages (even if also they have private health insurance and would never themselves use the NHS). This simple act represents an undertaking that care will be taken of an individual if he or she becomes ill. This knowledge is embedded in the institutional make-up of the policy, and it provides a clear moral foundation for continued support of the NHS.

Build on synergies between policies at the level of the frames that support these

Look for ways to capitalise on the cognitive impacts of particular policies, where these enjoy widespread public support, to build support for other policies which further embed the same values. So, pursuing the example of the NHS one stage further, future empirical work could focus on establishing whether people's experience of the NHS helps to embed a set of core values in the UK. If this is the case, cooperative and empathetic attitudes towards health provision could be used as source domain for a metaphor that maps cooperative care for citizens on to the target domain of concern for the welfare of – for example – citizens of the world (and hence global poverty and health issues), the natural world, or other species. This will help to further strengthen a 'public healthcare' frame, while also helping to promote universalism values. Of course, the source domain of 'environmental care' (although almost certainly not as strong culturally at present) might also be used to help further strengthen a 'public healthcare' frame.

4.6 Principle 6: Manage trade-offs where these are unavoidable

4.6.1 Theory

Often, those values that are most productively activated in pursuit of a specific set of issue-specific campaign objectives will be the *same* values that will come to motivate more systemic change. Where this is the case, issue-specific and systemic campaign objectives will converge. As intrinsic values are made more salient, and people are increasingly motivated to act as a result of them, such synergies will emerge with increasing frequency.

At times it will be necessary to accept practical trade-offs in pursuing change

Sometimes, inevitably, those values that might be most productively deployed in the course of pursuing issue-specific objectives will also serve to undermine progress on more systemic objectives. At some level, such tension seems inevitable: some of those values that have presided over the exacerbation of today's problems are held to be widely important, yet it will be necessary to appeal to alternative values in pursuing the development of systemic and proportional responses to these problems. At times, therefore, it will be necessary to accept practical trade-offs in pursuing change.

Campaigns and communications could be designed with one of two potentially competing priorities in mind:

- **'Win the specific battle at all costs'.** Campaigns and communications are designed in a way that focuses narrowly on a set of issue-specific campaign objectives, and deploys whatever approaches will maximise the chances of successful delivery on specific campaign objectives – even if the values that are activated (and therefore further strengthened) are likely to operate counterproductively at a more systemic level, or;

- **'Focus on the war, accepting that some battles will be lost'.** Campaigns and communications are designed in a way that accepts that the war will only be won through a thoroughgoing and consistent deployment of particular values, even if consistency in appeal to these values sometimes detracts from the effectiveness with which issue-specific campaign objectives are met.

In practice, these two priorities represent ends of a spectrum, reflecting the possible trade-offs between the pursuit of, on the one hand, more issue-specific objectives, and, on the other, more systemic objectives.

This points to a key dilemma that should be put at the heart of debate about communication and campaigns strategies: how to manage these trade-offs, where they arise. At present it seems that, where these tensions do arise, issue-specific expediency all-too-often wins out over systemic concern, leading to opportunistic and at times counter-productive campaigning strategies that are conducted without full awareness of the collateral damage these may cause. It is therefore necessary to introduce a conscious awareness of, and reflection upon, these trade-offs in designing campaigns and communications.

4.6.2 Practical implications

A number of factors could be taken into account in deciding what trade-offs should be accepted in the case of any particular campaign. These factors will include:

- *What does the 'war' look like?*

- *What is everyone else doing, and what might they be persuaded to do?*

- *What are the material benefits of 'winning the battle', and how likely is victory?*

- *What are the likely implications in further strengthening unhelpful frames, and how influential will the campaign be in terms of engaging public deep frames?*

- *What are the cognitive impacts of the desired change?*

Each of these factors is explored further in the remainder of this section. There is no doubt that more work will be needed to turn an awareness of these factors into a set of practical tools to help in the design and execution of campaigns and communications.

What does the 'war' look like?

How big is the overall 'war' or universe of problems seen as being? Compromising more systemic progress in pursuit of issue-specific policy success will be more attractive the more narrowly the 'war' is construed. Two very different examples of the dilemmas to which this can lead are discussed in Case Studies 5 and 6.

Case Study 5
Trade-offs in the gay rights movement

This case study explores the strategies deployed by the gay rights movement in the course of campaigning for same-sex marriage – and in particular, the position that gay rights organisations have taken on whether sexual orientation is biologically determined. Accepting that sexual orientation is biologically determined may increase public support for same-sex marriage, but risks incurring other costs – in particular, reinforcing the perception that human rights issues only properly apply to biologically predetermined factors (and not, for example, political beliefs).

There are instances where tensions have emerged within the gay rights movement over the extent to which the tactical advantages of particular campaign strategies should be embraced, even where these may lead to more systemic problems. One such example is the debate over whether sexual orientation is biologically predetermined or chosen.

Some in the gay rights movement choose to stress the imperative to extend the legal rights of heterosexuals to include a hitherto excluded *minority* (of lesbian, gay and bisexual people) who currently encounter discrimination. Others view the issue of gay rights as an instance of the wider imperative to extend *everyone's* right to express his or her sexual identity, however this may be orientated. This debate cuts to the heart of gay identities, and raises important existential questions: are sexual identities malleable, as many gay people would themselves attest, or is sexual identity essentially 'fixed' (in which case, reinforcing perceptions of discrimination against a minority group becomes an important basis for arguing for equal rights)?

Often, the gay movement has deployed the idea of fixed sexual identity – providing a basis for arguing that the gay minority should be accorded the same rights as those enjoyed by the straight majority. There may be good reasons for this. Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2008) find that if the cause of homosexuality is perceived as controllable – for example, through learning or through personal choice – straight people tend to be more prejudiced towards gay people and less supportive of gay rights policies. If, on the other hand, homosexuality is attributed to biological factors, support for gay civil rights, civil unions, and same-sex marriage are stronger.

Some academics suggest that many in the gay rights movement have promoted the idea of fixed identity for tactical reasons, rather than because gay activists themselves hold the view that sexual identity is fixed – clearly many do not (Jeffrey Weeks, *personal communication*). This position has led to disagreements within the gay rights movement. Peter Tatchell writes about theories that sexuality is genetically determined:

"It's almost as if those pushing these theories believe we don't deserve human rights unless we can prove that we are born gay and that our homosexuality is beyond our control. […] Surely we merit human rights because we are human beings? The cause of our homosexuality is irrelevant to our quest for justice. We are entitled to dignity and respect, regardless of whether we are born queer or made queer, and irrespective of whether our homosexuality is something beyond our control or something freely chosen" (Tatchell, 2008:2).

In critiquing the gay rights movement's willingness to accept arguments for biological predetermination towards a gay orientation, Peter Tatchell is clearly arguing from the perspective of someone who sees the gay rights movement as being properly situated within the wider arena of human rights. The argument from 'predetermination', effective as it may be within the scope of concerns about gay rights, does appear to risk creating (or otherwise reinforcing) a view that human rights issues only properly apply to biologically predetermined factors (e.g. race, arguably gender, genetically-based disability, and – here – sexual orientation) and not to 'chosen' factors (such as religious or political conviction).

If the 'war' here is taken to be the struggle to achieve legal provision for same-sex marriage, then tactical acceptance that homosexuality may be genetically determined seems sensible, as it is likely to strengthen the argument that laws against same-sex marriage represent discrimination against a minority group.

But as the 'war' is construed more widely, it becomes more difficult to argue the case for accepting the trade-off that this position seems to imply: if the 'war' is taken to be the struggle for widespread public acceptance that people's sexual orientations lie on a spectrum, and that social institutions should operate to support people in the expression of these orientations, whatever these may be, then the Civil Partnerships Act may represent a retreat (because it can be seen as serving to further embed discrimination between gay and heterosexual people).

Debate about the nature of the 'war' leads to an understanding of the importance of the 'graininess' of the issue. Civil society campaigns tend to fragment issues, such that they reflect – and therefore reinforce – the distinctions (rather than the synergies) between different issue groups. There are a number of pressures which lead to this fragmentation – not least the issue-specific focuses of funding bodies, competition for supporters, and the need for differentiation in a crowded 'marketplace'. And yet 'fine-grained' campaigns tend to militate against the emergence of responses to bigger-than-self problems at a more systemic level. Reducing issue fragmentation will have the effect of increasing the attractiveness of accepting more issue-specific trade-offs in pursuit of systemic change.

What is everyone else doing, and what might they be persuaded to do?

Accepting further erosion of the possibility of issue-specific success in pursuit of systemic change may not make sense if nobody else is doing this, or if nobody else is going to be persuaded to follow suit. Systemic change will probably only follow from concerted effort across a large number of organisations and individuals. Potentially compromising one's issue-specific campaign objectives in the interests of contributing to pressure for more systemic change is a difficult decision to take. It is helped by recognising that, in making such a decision, a communication or campaign is likely to help create space and pressure for other organisations to follow suit. So both what others are doing, and what others are willing to do, will be important factors to consider in deciding on the level of acceptable trade-off, and the degree to which new leadership is shown.

What are the material *(as opposed to cognitive) benefits of 'winning the battle', and how likely is victory?*

If the *material* benefits of winning the campaign are high (for example, securing a new and important piece of legislation), then campaign strategists may sensibly argue that they should be more opportunistic in designing the campaign for issue-specific success, with less concern about the overall usefulness of the campaign in simultaneously promoting helpful values. Thus, greater potential trade-offs might be accepted in launching a campaign to encourage people to insulate their loft-space (a highly significant behaviour, in terms of individual energy-efficiency savings), than in a campaign to encourage people to switch their television off standby when they have finished watching it for the day. But in terms of the values that such campaigns help to strengthen, this is a dangerous strategy to pursue, and campaigners should make such trade-offs with extreme caution.

How influential will the campaign be in terms of engaging cultural values?

Some campaigns are more likely to have an impact in helping to bring particular cultural values to the fore than others – perhaps because they attract more media coverage, for example. It seems especially important to examine the values that a communication or campaign will help to activate and strengthen in the case of work that is likely to generate particular public debate and engagement.

It is often argued that, because a problem – climate change, for example – is of urgent concern, there 'is not enough time' for systemic responses

There is one factor which does *not* have any straightforward bearing on the level at which trade-offs are accepted in campaign design: *urgency of the problem*. It is often argued that, because a problem – climate change, for example – is of urgent concern, there 'is not enough time' for systemic responses. This is a suspect argument: it seems *at least* as likely that appeal to 'easy wins' on climate change will actually serve to help defer ambitious action until it becomes "too late" for this to be taken effectively.

Case Study 6
The Jubilee 2000 debt campaign

The Jubilee 2000 campaign serves to underscore the importance of how a campaign is framed. This example illustrates the possible costs of failing to deploy frames that could have come to underpin widespread support for systemic approaches to tackling debt.

The campaign split over whether debt should be framed as 'unpayable' or as 'illegitimate'. Framed as 'unpayable', the campaign tended to reinforce the elite governance frame: Northern governments had lent money to the South, and it was their right to cancel this debt. Framed as 'illegitimate', the debt was seen as having been accrued through deals between government elites; it was neither in the interests of the poor that the debt was taken on, nor was it accrued with their consent. This approach rejected the elite governance frame, and argued, in applying a participative democracy frame, that the debt was illegitimate.

Over 21 million people from 155 countries had signed the Jubilee 2000 petition by the time it was submitted to the UN Millennium Summit in 2000. This was a very impressive campaigning feat, especially on an issue like debt, which is more global and abstract than issues such as children's rights or species extinction.

By 2000, rich countries had promised to write off US$110bn of debt, 20 countries were promised some debt relief, and the campaign disbanded – as it had promised to do. But the campaign itself acknowledged that the success was only partial, both because the "debt relief so far agreed will only provide an average 30 per cent cut in repayments for the countries concerned" (Jubliee 2000 Coalition, 2000:3), and because this debt relief came with strings attached: governments were obliged to sign up to specific policy pledges in order to be granted debt cancellation.

Several Southern movements had for some time requested that the Jubilee 2000 campaign move beyond its argument that debts were 'unpayable'. They wanted to challenge the legitimacy of the system that leads to debt creation in the first place. They argued that Northern governments must acknowledge their partial blame for promoting loans for strategic or commercial gain, via institutions that they controlled. If debt cancellation announcements ignored this issue it could jeopardise public perception of debt relief in the South. It would also fail to capitalise on the opportunity that the campaign offered to insist that future debts must be contracted in the interest of Southern people, and with their consent.

However Jubilee 2000 wanted "disciplined support for our principled position on the cancellation of the unpayable debts of the poorest countries". This approach aimed to unify diverse groups and make it easier to approach the G8, IMF and other powerful bodies. This refusal to challenge the system that led to the debt created tension within the campaign. Ultimately, some Southern groups split away and ran their campaign under the banner of Jubilee South. Jubilee South mobilised under the slogan 'don't owe, won't pay' and aimed to reframe debt as illegitimate, but few Northern campaigners chose to follow this approach.

Of course, we cannot know what would have happened if more Northern campaigners had adopted the position of Jubilee South. But Jubilee 2000's own self-assessment recorded: "[O]ne of the most profound lessons from the Jubilee 2000 campaign is this: the unpayable debt will not be cancelled in full until we have changed the process whereby debt cancellation is agreed. Future campaigns, therefore, will have to tackle the deep structural injustices of international financial relationships" (Jubilee 2000 Coalition, 2000:7).

It is informative to look at what happened where Northern campaigners campaigned on the basis of these structural injustices. For example, Norwegian campaigners responded to the call of Jubilee South, and ran a 'dictator debt' public campaign, which drew attention to loans that had been provided to rulers known to be illegitimate, for purposes other than development. They also highlighted how their government had used export credits to bail out Norway's shipping industry, selling ships to be used in conditions for which they were not at all suited and often soon broke down. The approach adopted by these campaigners was vindicated. After years of public campaigning and advocacy the Norwegian government agreed to cancel the remaining shipping debts of five countries. It did this unilaterally and unconditionally, accepting "co-responsibility" for what it admitted had been "a development policy failure" (Eurodad, 2006: 2).

The Jubilee 2000 campaign had many successes. But it accepted, and therefore risked reinforcing, prevailing assumptions in order to build political traction for its specific campaign objectives. It side-stepped the larger challenge of framing its work as part of an effort to change the official discourse on debt, and to transform economic structures and power relations. It left the South-North debt movement divided, compromising efforts to monitor debt cancellation and to prevent the subsequent bad lending that is leaving some countries as indebted as they were 15 years ago.

(Contributed by Alex Wilks)

4.7 Principle 7: Tailor the message to the audience

4.7.1 Theory

Audience segmentation can help to establish knowledge of a specific audience – but there are important limitations to how segmentation approaches should be deployed

As discussed in Section 1.4, it is important to tailor communications to particular audiences. Audience segmentation techniques can help here in establishing knowledge of a specific audience, such that approaches to encouraging public debate can be tailored to resonate with their needs and interests. But this must not lead to opportunism in appealing to whatever values are considered to be most important for a particular audience segment, irrespective of whether these values are helpful or not.

The evidence from social psychology is that *all* audience segments will have *all* the values in the values circumplexes. Audience segmentation however, can contribute to establishing what language and which metaphors are likely to be particularly effective in activating or strengthening helpful frames. That is, the language and metaphors needed to activate community feeling values may be very different for different audience segments – varying, for example, with cultural background or occupation.

4.7.2 Practical implications

Audience segmentation models, such as those in which several government departments and large non-governmental organisations have already heavily invested, are helpful. But rather than deploying these to tailor messages to an individual's dominant values, as these are revealed by survey work, they should be used to help tailor communications to resonate with dominant aspects of a person's identity in the course of working to strengthen *helpful* frames and values.

4.8 Principle 8: Make it fun and dare to dream

4.8.1 Theory

The changes this report advocates for campaign and communication strategies do not imply the adoption of a serious, moralising approach, urging self-denial. After all, the evidence clearly suggests that aside from the social and environmental benefits of promoting intrinsic values, people who hold these values to be more important also report greater wellbeing.

Yet one key challenge – which this report does not address – is to develop approaches to promoting helpful deep frames in ways that are compelling and enthusing. There are a great many communications agencies who have developed expertise in such communication approaches: Futerra's recent publication *Sizzle: The New Climate Message* provides an example (Futerra, 2009). The report opens by suggesting that:

"The most common message on climate change is that we're all going to hell. That's what climate change looks like when you get right down to it: rising seas, scorched earth, failing food supplies, billions of starving refugees tormented by wild weather" (p.2).

The report continues:

A compelling vision of an attractive future is needed – but this must be rooted in helpful deep frames

"But contrary to every expectation, hell doesn't actually sizzle. Hell doesn't sell. Although these Armageddon climate scenarios might be accurate and eye-catching, they haven't changed attitudes or behaviours nearly enough. Threats of climate hell haven't seemed to hold us back from running headlong towards it.

"But there is one message that almost every audience responds to. A narrative that changes hearts, minds and even behaviours. An approach needed now more than ever before. And it's the opposite of climate hell. We must build a visual and compelling vision of low carbon heaven" (p.2).

Futerra is right on this. But the challenge is to root that compelling vision in a set of helpful deep frames – rather than the 'green consumerism' frames to which many communications agencies often resort. This is the challenge to which gifted communication specialists must respond.

In his book *Dream: Re-imagining Progressive Politics in an Age of Fantasy*, Stephen Duncombe draws an important distinction between dreaming and pursuing the 'unconditional impossible demand' (the insistence that no compromise can be tolerated in the pursuit of universal justice, for example): "political dreams, if they are ethical [that is, if they are honest in what they communicate] are always recognisable as dreams. They may promise magical transformation, but they also frankly acknowledge that they are magical. The problem with the 'unconditional impossible demand' is not that it is a dream, but that it is a fantasy masquerading as a possible reality" (Duncombe, 2007:168-169).

Duncombe shows how, as neither reality nor fantasy, dreams can be created and used by creative campaigns to show people alternative futures. Dreams, he suggests "are meant to inspire and to guide, to be a lodestone to orient a political compass." (Duncombe, 2007: 169).[21] As an example, he highlights The Reverend Billy's dream to 'stop shopping'. The performance artist Bill Talen, dressed as a preacher in a shopping mall, urges his congregation (mystified shoppers) that "We can start trying to remember what we imagined. We can begin to recall what desire was when it was not supervised" (cited in Duncombe, 2007: 164.) It doesn't matter that we are unlikely ever to (voluntarily) stop shopping, or that Reverend Billy is, at some level hypocritical (he shops himself, and he sells merchandise on his website). The power of his approach is that he communicates a *dream*; he does not proffer an imminent reality.

4.8.2 Practical implications

Civil society campaigners need to work with creative people who have the ability to convey ideas in compelling and exciting ways, and who understand how to communicate dreams. But steps must be taken to ensure that the enthusiasm and creativity that these people exercise doesn't deflect attention from the other principles outlined in this section.

Summary, Section 4

Here are eight principles for civil society organisations to consider adopting in the course of responding to an understanding of values and the frames that help to strengthen these:

Principle 1: Be transparent and participatory, and demand the same standard from others. Starting with civil society organisations themselves, all organisations should openly scrutinise the values that their activities promote, draw public attention to these, and outline the justification for working to strengthen these values.

Principle 2: Ensure that communications and campaigns embody the values that they seek to promote. The public *experience* of a communication or campaign should serve to convey and reinforce the deep frames necessary for systemic engagement with social and environmental challenges, irrespective of whether or not the campaign itself is formally 'successful' in terms of the material changes it is seeking to create.

Principle 3: Be prepared to work for systemic change. Strengthening particular frames involves an ongoing learning process. This requires sustained effort – maintained at all times through communications and campaigns that are consistent and transparent in their aims.

Principle 4: Build new coalitions. An understanding of the importance of values and frames points to the possibility of coalitions of civil society organisations, possibly with very divergent policy interests, coming together to campaign jointly on specific drivers of unhelpful deep frames that serve to frustrate each of their separate (and possibly disparate) campaign aims.

Principle 5: Understand the full impact of policy. People's *experience* of living with particular *policies* can have a profound impact on their values, and their appetite for new policies. Civil society organisations should advocate policies that serve to promote helpful deep frames – even when these policies are developed in areas far removed from the issues on which a particular civil society organisation focuses.

Principle 6: Manage trade-offs where these are unavoidable. Often, those deep frames that are most productively deployed in pursuit of a specific set of issue-specific campaign objectives will be the *same* frames which will come to motivate more systemic change. But sometimes the most effective tactics in motivating a specific change will be in tension with a strategy aimed at achieving more systemic change. There are several factors that should be considered in deciding on the best campaign approaches when such tensions arise.

Principle 7: Tailor the message to the audience. Audience segmentation is important in order to communicate with different audiences, to help strengthen helpful deep frames and associated values. But this is a very different use of segmentation techniques from that made by strategies that advocate tailoring communications in order to appeal to *whatever* dominant values an audience segment may express.

Principle 8: Make it fun and dare to dream. Compelling communication approaches and inspiring new visions are needed – and campaigners must draw on the expertise of people with a gift for such communication. But the drive for creativity must not be allowed to distract from the importance of appealing to helpful values!

APPENDIX 1

THE ORGANISATION OF LIFE-GOALS AND VALUES

This report discusses two related concepts: life-goals and values. As will be seen, these are conceptually related – both embody some concept of the 'ideal'. For this reason, they are, on the whole, referred to in the main text of this report generically as 'values'. This Appendix elaborates on the distinctions between them, and the empirical work that underpins an understanding of them.

A1.1 Life-goals

Goals – the aims for which people strive in life – have been found empirically to be distributed on two axes, according to whether these are 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic', and whether they are focused on 'self-transcendence' or the 'physical self'.

Unlike intrinsic goals, the pursuit of extrinsic goals does not lead directly to the satisfaction of innate psychological needs – rather, the satisfaction they confer is contingent upon the responses of others

Intrinsic goals include personal growth, emotional intimacy or community involvement – they are goals that are inherently rewarding to pursue because they are pretty good at satisfying people's psychological needs. *Extrinsic goals* include acquisition of material goods, financial success, physical attractiveness, image and social recognition. Unlike the intrinsic goals, their pursuit does not lead directly to the satisfaction of innate psychological needs (such as belonging) – rather, the satisfaction they confer is contingent upon the responses of others. For example, the desire for physical attractiveness arises from an interest in how a person feels that they are perceived by others.

Self-transcendence goals include matching society's desires (conformity), benefiting society and future generations, and seeking out universal meanings and understandings (e.g. spirituality). These goals contrast with *physical self goals*, which are concerned primarily with maintaining and enhancing one's own physical pleasure and survival – pursuit of bodily pleasures (e.g. hedonism), physical survival (e.g. safety and health) and the material means to both of these (e.g financial success).

Note that, in practice, a goal is not 'purely' associated with one or other of the poles of these two axes (although spirituality, hedonism and popularity come close). For example, community feeling is highly intrinsic and highly self-transcendent (so it appears at approximately 2 o'clock on the circumplex in Figure 1).

The statistical analysis of survey data (using multi-dimensional scaling analyses) demonstrates that intrinsic and extrinsic clusters of goals are strongly consistent within themselves and strongly opposed to each other. Similarly, self-transcendent and physical-self clusters of goals are in opposition to one another (Grouzet *et al.*, 2005). It is important to stress that this is an empirical finding – the result of statistical analysis on survey data.

The important result of these empirical studies is that goals of financial success, image and popularity are found to cluster together. That is, if one of these extrinsic/physical self goals is prioritised, people also tend to prioritise others within the cluster. Intrinsic/self-transcendence goals, which concern pursuing self-acceptance (trying to grow as a person), affiliation (having good interpersonal relationships) and community feeling (trying to make the broader world a better place) are found on the opposite side of the circle. They also cluster together, and activation of one tends to lead to the activation of related goals.

Table A1.1: Opposing life-goals and the corresponding elements used to define them.

Life-goal of particular importance for motivation to engage with 'bigger-than-self' problems	Corresponding indicator goals presented to subjects in surveys	Opposing life-goal(s)	Corresponding indicator goals presented to subjects in surveys
Affiliation. To have satisfying relationships with family and friends	People will show affection to me, and I will to them. I will feel that there are people who really love me. Someone in my life will accept me as I am, no matter what. I will express my love for special people. I will have a committed, intimate relationship.	**Conformity.** To fit in with other people.	I will be polite and obedient I will live up to the expectations of my society. My desires and tastes will be similar to those of other people. I will "fit in" with others.
		Image. To look attractive in terms of body and clothing.	My image will be one others find appealing. I will achieve the "look" I've been after. People will often comment about how attractive I look. I will successfully hide the signs of aging. I will keep up with fashions in clothing and hair.
		Popularity. To be famous, well-known and admired.	I will be admired by many people. My name will be known by many different people. Most everyone who knows me will like me.
Self-acceptance. To feel competent and autonomous.	I will be efficient. I will choose what I do, instead of being pushed along by life. I will feel free. I will deal effectively with problems in my life. I will feel good about my abilities. I will overcome the challenges that life presents me. I will have insight into why I do the things I do.	As above	As above
Community feeling. To improve the world through activism or generativity. Related to this intrinsic goal is the importance of a sense of *agency* in working to create change.	I will assist people who need it, asking nothing in return. The things I do will make other people's lives better. I will help the world become a better place.	**Financial success.** To be wealthy and materially successful.	I will have many expensive possessions. I will be financially successful. I will have enough money to buy everything I want. I will have a job that pays well.

Table A1.1: Legend

Specific goals used in the survey are taken from Grouzet *et al.* (2005), and from the corresponding version of the 'Aspiration Index', available at: *http://faculty.knox.edu/tkasser/aspirations.html.* Subjects were presented with 57 different "goals that you may have for the future" and were asked to rate "how important each goal is to you" on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).

Goals on opposite sides of the circle are found to oppose one another: it is psychologically difficult for individuals to pursue community feeling and financial success simultaneously, for example.

There are several life-goals that are of particular importance in our discussion about people's concern about bigger-than-self problems, and their motivation to engage in behaviour consistent with this concern (see Section 2.3). These are shown in Table A1.1, along with the goal indicators that are used in surveys to establish the relative importance that respondents attach to each of these goals.

A1.2 Values

Values have been defined as psychological representations of what we believe to be important in life

Values have been defined as psychological representations of what we believe to be important in life (Rokeach, 1973) and as "desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity" (Schwartz, 1994a: 21). Values are typically defined as being about one's own view of the ideal – what one believes to be best or most desirable. Shalom Schwartz writes that:

"We can summarise the main features of the conception of basic values implicit in the writings of many theorists and researchers as follows:

• *Values are beliefs. But they are beliefs tied inextricably to emotion, not objective, cold ideas.*

• *Values are a motivational construct. They refer to the desirable goals people strive to attain.*

• *Values transcend specific actions and situations. They are abstract goals. The abstract nature of values distinguishes them from concepts like norms and attitudes, which usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.*

• *Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events. That is, values serve as standards or criteria.*

• *Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. People's values form an ordered system of value priorities that characterise them as individuals. This hierarchical feature of values also distinguishes them from norms and attitudes"* (Schwartz, 2006:1).

Social psychologists have worked to identify values that recur across cultures, and a number of different approaches have been taken to assessing values. Shalom Schwartz and colleagues have identified, through empirical studies, a series of priorities held by people across different countries, listing 10 basic values which they suggest include all the core values recognised by a diversity of cultures Schwartz, 1992 and 1994b.[22] These are grouped according to four higher order value types, comprising a two-dimensional structure. Thus one dimension comprises openness to change values in opposition to conservation values. This reflects the extent to which people are motivated "to follow their own intellectual and emotional interests in unpredictable

Table A1.2: Opposing values and the corresponding elements used to define them.

Value	Corresponding indicator value presented to subjects in surveys	Opposing value	Corresponding indicator value presented to subjects in surveys
Benevolence. Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the 'in-group').	Loyal (faithful to my friends, group). Honest (genuine, sincere). Helpful (working for the welfare of others). Responsible (dependable, reliable). Forgiving (willing to pardon others).	**Achievement.** Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.	Ambitious (hard-working, aspiring). Influential (having an impact on people and events). Capable (competent, effective, efficient). Successful (achieving goals).
Universalism. Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.	Equality (equal opportunity for all). A world at peace (free of war and conflict). Unity with nature (fitting into nature). Wisdom (a mature understanding of life). A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts). Social justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak). Broadminded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs). Protecting the environment (preserving nature).	**Power.** Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.	Social power (control over others, dominance). Wealth (material possessions, money). Authority (the right to lead or command). Preserving my public image (protecting my 'face'). Observing social norms (to maintain face).

Table A1.2: Legend

Values as measured using the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS). Respondents rate the importance of each value item "as a guiding principle in my life" on a 9-point scale running from +7 to –1. Some points on this scale were labeled, as follows: 7 (of supreme importance), 6 (very important), 3 (important), 0 (not important), -1 (opposed to my values) (see Schwartz, 2006: 11). Elements are taken from Schwartz (2009).

and uncertain directions versus to preserve the status quo and the certainty it provides in relationships with close others, institutions and traditions" (Schwartz, 1992: 43). Note, that the term 'conservation', as used here, should not be confused with its use to refer to environmental protection.[23]

The second basic dimension comprises self-enhancement values in opposition to self-transcendence values. This "arrays values in terms of the extent to which they motivate people to enhance their own personal interests (even at the expense of others) versus the extent to which they motivate people to transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and distant, and of nature" (Schwartz, 1992:43-44).

This basic opposition between the two elements in each of these higher order value types has strong cross-cultural empirical support: it is very rare to find values representing one higher order type in the region representing the opposing type. Schwartz (1992), for example, reports the frequency of this as being less than 1%.

Although people may vary widely in the values to which they accord particular importance, the structure of values has been found to be very similar across cultures

Although people may vary widely in the values to which they accord particular importance, the structure of values has been found to be very similar across cultures – even across very diverse cultural, linguistic, geographic, religious and racial groups (Schwartz, 1992). As is the case with life-goals, values are found to be distributed in two dimensions, and can therefore be mapped on a 'circumplex', locating opposing values on opposite sides of a circle, and compatible values adjacent to one another (see Figure 2).

For example, concern with enhancement of others and transcendence of selfish interests (important motivations for addressing bigger-than-self problems) unite benevolence and universalism values, whereas the desire for social superiority and esteem unite the power and achievement values (Schwartz, 1992).

There are several values that are of particular importance in our discussion about people's concern about bigger-than-self problems, and their motivation to engage in behaviour consistent with this concern. They are shown in Table A1.2, along with the indicator values used in surveys.

APPENDIX 2
VALUES AND BIGGER-THAN-SELF PROBLEMS

This appendix provides an amplification of the evidence presented in Section 2.3, demonstrating the importance of values in determining concern about bigger-than-self problems, and the motivation to engage in behaviour to help address these problems.

A2.1 Peacefulness

Studies have examined the relationship between values, at a societal level, and the peacefulness of a society (that is, whether a country is involved in conflicts, whether it provides internal stability to its citizens, and how militarised the society is overall). So, for example, the cultural value 'hierarchy' (which is closely aligned to the personal value 'power' – see Section 2.2) is strongly correlated with lack of peace. It seems that:

"how a society deals with internal and external conflict […] is related to prevailing value orientations within that society. Three values, in particular, are consistently related to global peace – namely, harmony, [negative] hierarchy and intellectual autonomy – relations that are empirically robust and stable. Societies valuing harmony with nature are less likely to experience strong internal and external conflict as are those in which intellectual autonomy values – indicating greater tolerance of diverse opinions – are strongly endorsed" (Fischer and Hanke, 2009: 241).

Note that the values harmony, hierarchy and intellectual autonomy are used by Schwartz in studies of cultural as opposed to personal values. These values are closely related to the personal values universalism, power and self-direction, discussed in Section 2 and Appendix 1. The association between concern for global peace and harmony and intellectual autonomy are both positive, the association with hierarchy is negative.

Corroborating this study, through work on personal (as opposed to cultural) values, Christopher Cohrs and colleagues found that militaristic attitudes were consistently associated with the prioritisation of security, conformity, achievement and – especially – power values. Benevolence and, particularly, universalism were found to be correlated with lower levels of militaristic attitudes (Cohrs *et al.*, 2005). The authors of this study suggest that militaristic attitudes may arise in response to two different concerns: a desire for power and superiority, and a concern for security and social conformity.

A2.2 Attitudes to human rights

Individuals who attach greater importance to universalism values, and lower importance to power values, express greater concern about human rights

Other studies find that individuals who attach greater importance to universalism values, and lower importance to power values, express greater concern about human rights (that is, they report being more concerned about human rights, and are more likely to engage in behaviour in line with this concern) (Cohrs *et al.*, 2007; Spini and Doise, 1998). In assessing attitudes towards human rights, Christopher Cohrs and colleagues asked participants to score the extent to which they agreed with statements like: "The work of human rights organisations such as Amnesty International is worth being supported without qualification" (sic); or, "There are times when people should be kept from expressing their opinion". They were also asked whether they had participated in behaviour in line with a concern about human rights – such as donating money to human rights organisations, or writing letters to an editor or parliamentarian. The authors found that "personal values emerged as important predictors of human rights orientations" (Cohrs *et al.*, 2007: 458-460).

A2.3 Attitudes to people who are 'different'

There is an extensive literature on the relationship between individuals' values and their attitudes towards other groups. There isn't scope to review this here, and a few examples of this research base will have to suffice.

Prejudice is positively related to the importance of power and security values

A study of Australian student prejudice towards Australian Aborigines found that prejudice is positively related to the importance of power and security values (see Section 2.1) (Feather and McKee, 2008). These results are corroborated by a great many similar results, including, for example, studies looking at the readiness of Israeli Jewish teachers to have contact with Israeli Arabs (Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995). Here security, tradition and conformity values correlated negatively with readiness for social contact with members of the other group, and self-direction and universalism values correlated positively with this willingness.[24] Other work has shown that materialism predicts racism: a relationship that is found to be mediated importantly by selfishness (Roets *et al.*, 2006). Finally, racism has also been found to be associated with extrinsic (as opposed to intrinsic) goals (Duriez *et al.*, 2007). This is to be expected in the light of the stimulation that extrinsic goals provide for interpersonal competition. The authors of this study conclude:

The pursuit of E/I goals [that is, extrinsic rather than intrinsic goals] seems to develop together with the belief that our society is a dog-eat-dog world in which adopting a dominant stance toward others is the only way to survive. E/I goals and social dominance mutually reinforce one another over time, and both factors hinder people from adopting a tolerant view on different races and ethnicities (Duriez *et al.*, 2007: 778.)

Individuals who value power, and who attach little importance to universalism and benevolence are found to score more highly on scales assessing sexism

As might be expected in the light of work on other forms of prejudice, attitudes that individuals have towards people of the opposite sex are also related to values. Individuals who value power, and who attach little importance to universalism and benevolence are found to score more highly on scales assessing sexism (Feather, 2004).

Results such as these are also consistent with studies on support for immigration. Eldad Davidov and colleagues (2008) tested attitudes towards immigration in 19 countries. They found that self-transcendent values (universalism and benevolence) are associated with greater support for immigration, whereas conservation values (conformity, security and tradition) are associated with lower support.

Other work has examined how an individual's value structure influences his or her attitudes towards people who are simply 'different' (Sawyerr, *et al.*, 2005). Here, attitudes toward people who are 'different' were assessed through agreement (or disagreement) with statements like: "persons with disabilities can teach me things I could not learn elsewhere"; "I attend events where I might get to know people from different racial backgrounds"; or, "getting to know someone of another race is generally an uncomfortable experience for me". In this study, as in the others, a strong positive relationship was found between, on the one hand, openness to change and self-transcendence values (stimulation, self-direction, universalism and benevolence values) (see Figure 2), and, on the other, more positive attitudes towards difference. People who scored high on openness to change and self-transcendence values "ascribed greater importance to seeking a diversity of interactions with others than those who scored low" (Sawyerr *et al.*, 2005: 514).

A2.4 Attitudes to global poverty

Although there is a great deal of work on the relationship between values and helpfulness towards others, much of this work focuses on helpfulness towards members of a person's in-group (benevolence values).[25] However, concern about global poverty requires the expression of concern about the welfare of members of the out-group (universalism values). It seems that there are few studies which directly assess an individual's attitudes towards global poverty, although a person's attitudes towards people who are different (see Section A.2.3) is likely to be very closely related to this.

Commitment to buy fair trade products is consistent with attaching importance to universalism values, which in turn underpin concern for the out-group, and about many other bigger-than-self problems

It seems that support for fair trade produce – the purchase of which supports producers in developing countries – is related to attitudes towards a person's in-group. As might be predicted, work on fair trade purchasing behaviour has found benevolence and universalism values to be important, although there is a distinction to be drawn between these two values. Universalism values are ranked as the most important values by *loyal* fair trade consumers (that is, consumers who always purchased fair trade goods when offered the choice) (Doran, 2009).[26] However, *intermittent* consumers of fair trade (those who bought fair trade products only occasionally) ranked benevolence above universalism. The author suggests that:

"Intermittent consumers subordinate the needs of everybody in favour of those in their in-group, whereas loyal consumers subordinate the in-group to prioritise the needs of all people" (Doran, 2009: 559).

It seems that commitment to buy fair trade products is consistent with attaching importance to universalism values, which in turn underpin concern for the out-group, and about many other bigger-than-self problems.

A2.5 Attitudes to the environment

Values for power and achievement were associated with viewing humans as consumers of, rather than part of, nature

Quantitative empirical studies document that people who strongly endorse self-enhancing values and extrinsic goals also express more negative attitudes towards non-human nature. For example, Wesley Schultz and colleagues (2005) studied almost 1,000 university students from six nations and found that values for power and achievement were associated with viewing humans as consumers of, rather than part of, nature. Schultz and colleagues also reported that stronger values placed on power and achievement are associated with less concern about how environmental damage affects other humans, children, future generations and non-human life. Where these self-enhancing values promote concern about ecological damage, this concern is limited to an egotistic consideration of how such damage might affect one *personally.* Conversely, a positive correlation has been found between self-transcendent values (universalism and benevolence) and pro-environmental attitudes and behaviour (Schultz *et al.*, 2005).[27]

Other work (Saunders and Munro, 2000; Good, 2007) corroborates these results: caring more about materialistic values is associated with significantly less positive attitudes towards the environment, and with lower levels of biophilia (the desire to affiliate with life). Values have been found to influence behaviour as well as attitudes. Studies in the US and the UK show that adolescents who more strongly endorse materialistic goals in life report themselves as being less likely to turn off lights in unused rooms, to recycle, to reuse paper and to engage in other positive environmental behaviours (Gatersleben *et al.*, 2008; Kasser, 2005).[28]

Similar findings have been reported for American adults, among whom extrinsic life-goals and more materialistic values are found to be negatively correlated with the frequency of engagement in pro-environmental behaviours such as riding a

bicycle, reusing paper, buying second-hand, and recycling (Brown and Kasser, 2005; Richins and Dawson, 1992). Brown and Kasser (2005) also examined how the ecological footprints of 400 North American adults were associated with their goals in life. A relatively high focus on extrinsic life-goals was related to a higher ecological footprint arising from lifestyle choices regarding transportation, housing and diet.

Game theory research further supports these results. Kennon Sheldon and Holly McGregor (2000) assessed college students' value orientation before asking them to play a forest-management game in which they simulated directorship of a timber company. Each subject (or timber company) then made a series of bids against three other companies to harvest wood from a state forest. Sheldon and McGregor found that in comparison to other groups, those composed of four individuals who all scored relatively highly in extrinsic goals exploited the forest resources more intensively, and were significantly less likely to have any trees remaining at the 25th year of bidding. The authors generalise from these results to reflect on other instances of the 'tragedy of the commons'. They conclude that: "the more intrinsically oriented people there are within a group, the more everybody in that group prospers" (2000: 405).

Data at the national level also demonstrates negative associations between environmental behaviour and cultural values for mastery and hierarchy (roughly equivalent to the personal values of achievement and power). Kasser (*in press*) correlated archival data about the values of large samples of undergraduates and teachers in 20 wealthy nations with the amount of CO_2 each nation emitted in 2003. Even after controlling for gross domestic product (GDP), per capita CO_2 emissions were higher in countries where citizens placed a greater priority on values associated with wealth, achievement and status.

These results are further corroborated by work on the relationship between people's values and their preferences for climate-change related policy. Anthony Leiserowitz, for example, has conducted studies on the importance of people's cultural biases in determining their attitudes towards climate change policy.[29] He found that:

"Policy preferences [that is, support for policies designed to mitigate climate change] were most strongly influenced by value commitments. Support for national and international climate policies was strongly associated with pro-egalitarian values, while opposition was associated with anti-egalitarian, pro-individualist and pro-hierarchist values. Interestingly, these value commitments were stronger predictors than either political party identification or ideology" (Leiserowitz, 2006: 63).

Finally, studies have shown that *levels of motivation* to engage in particular behaviours are also higher when these behaviours are adopted in line with the goal of community feeling. Typical of such studies is one conducted by Maarten Vansteenkiste and colleagues (2004a). In this experiment, students were asked to read a text about recycling. Subjects were randomly assigned to have this reading task presented as relevant either to the extrinsic goal of saving money or to the intrinsic goal of benefiting the community. Results showed that those who had the goal presented in intrinsic terms not only learned the material in the text more deeply, but were also more likely to voluntarily visit the library and a recycling plant to learn more about recycling. Frequency of engagement in pro-environmental behaviour, it seems, is higher when the level of self-determination (or the appeal to more intrinsic goals) is higher.

In constructing the values circumplex (Figure 2), Shalom Schwartz and colleagues found that the three value items related to nature ('unity with nature', 'protecting the environment', and 'a world of beauty') are closely associated with value items

that refer primarily to the welfare of other humans outside the 'in-group' ('world at peace', 'equality', and 'social justice'). It seems that concern for nature is closely linked to the concern for the welfare of all humankind, and that activating and encouraging universalism values will have the benefit of promoting concern about both global environmental problems and global poverty. Shalom Schwartz writes that universalism "is presumed to arise with the realisation that failure to protect the natural environment or to understand people who are different, and to treat them justly, will lead to strife and to destruction of the resources on which life depends" (Schwartz, 1992: 39).

A2.6 Civic involvement for social change

Civic involvement is found to be associated with universalism values, and negatively associated with conformity and – particularly – security values

People's motivation to engage with political process, and to demand change, is shaped importantly by their values. Engagement with electoral process has been found to be associated particularly with self-direction and universalism values, while engagement with community activities has been found to be positively influenced by conformity and tradition. Power and achievement, on the other hand, were found to be negatively related with both forms of political engagement (Augemberg, 2008).

Shalom Schwartz (2006) reports on the association between values and civic involvement (measured as the number of political acts participants in the study had undertaken in the last year – behaviours such as contacting a politician, or joining a demonstration). Civic involvement is found to be associated with universalism, and negatively associated with conformity and – particularly – security (presumably because civic involvement is oriented toward change, and can be risky). (There is also a positive association between civic involvement and stimulation – or 'excitement, novelty and challenge in life' – something that Schwartz attributed to the possibility that some people become politically involved because they find it exciting.

APPENDIX 3
TOOLS FOR ANALYSING FRAMES

The tools that are outlined here are used to help identify existing helpful deep frames – which may occur relatively infrequently in public discourse – *prior to then developing strategies to help strengthen* these. It is not suggested that, having used these tools to identify existing helpful frames, these frames can then be activated and strengthened simply through use of the particular words or metaphors that define them.

A3.1 Participant response analysis

Focus groups and questionnaires can be used to create the data for subsequent analysis. This data should be drawn from key social segments, because the process of activating helpful frames will need to be tailored to different social groups.[30] Transcripts of verbal feedback from direct participant analysis is then analysed through the use of text analysis tools.

A3.2 Text analysis

Everyone analyses text and talk unconsciously, and to a certain extent critically: otherwise we would not 'make sense' of language and interact meaningfully with it. But linguists and discourse analysts bring all this to the surface and make it available for dialogue and critique. One approach to text analysis combines both large-scale analysis (which can be automated) with close-text analysis (requiring analysis by a linguist). This requires the engagement of a small team of researchers.

A3.2.1 Large-scale analysis

Corpus linguistics has been used as a large-scale analysis tool in a number of studies – for example, racist attitudes in print news. The method involves choosing an appropriate 'corpus' of text – for example, reflecting a particular time-period and genre (transcribed conversation from focus groups, news text, speeches, government reports, etc.). Computer software is then used to statistically analyse patterns of words and to compare these sub-corpora (for example, detecting differences between different focus groups, or present and past governments).

A3.2.2 Close-text analysis

To get at *meaning*, thus *frames*, requires the judgement of an experienced linguist-analyst who has knowledge of the cultural, social and political context. Critical discourse analysis presents one set of tools for approaching this close-text analysis.

The analyst works with selected texts (for example, feedback from a particular focus group, a political speech, or government document). Using quantitative indications from the large-scale analysis, analysts identify particular *meaning clusters* (that is, words and phrases with interrelated meanings that appear in some texts and not others), including those dependent on frames and deep frames. These are used to point to underlying conceptual metaphors and their relation to frames. There are various conceptual frames (words and phrasings) that serve as cues to underlying conceptual metaphors (ranging, for example, from explicit analogy to fleeting verbal hints). These cues may not be immediately obvious – this is where experience is needed on the part of the analyst. For example, these cues may include:

Presuppositions – things that the speaker takes for granted, or points with which he or she tacitly assumes that an audience agrees.

Modal expressions – for example, expressions that imply obligation, prohibition or permission; little words like 'may', 'might', 'must' or 'should', or more substantial words like 'obligation' or 'duty'. Such words presuppose (but do not explicitly specify) some shared frame of values, morality, or legal requirement.

The relative frequency of such cues can be tracked and their significance analysed in relation to deep frames and values.

A3.3 Taking account of other aspects of lived experience

The techniques of textual analysis outlined above need then to be combined with an understanding of other aspects of a person's lived experience – their experience of particular social institutions and government policies, for example – in order to understand how aspects of this experience can help to embed particular deep frames. This will be a necessarily more intuitive process, but one that can nonetheless draw on input from both social psychologists and political scientists with expertise in policy feedback.

REFERENCES

Allmendinger, P (2001) *Planning Theory*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave.

Anderson, K and Bows, A (2009) Reframing climate change: what does the latest science and emissions tell us about mitigation, adaptation and equity? Tyndall Centre Presentation, November, 2009. Available at: *www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/Images/ESRC-JRF-%20 Nov%2009%20-%20KA_tcm6-34993.pdf*

Andersen, SM, Moskowitz, GB, Blair, IV and Nosek, BA (2007). Automatic thought, in Higgins, ET and Kruglanski, AW (eds.), *Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles* (pp. 138-175). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Andor, J (1985). On the psychological relevance of frames, *Quaderni di Semantica*, 6: 212-21.

Augemberg, K (2008) 'Values and politics: value priorities as predictors of psychological and instrumental political engagement' (1 January 2008). *ETD Collection for Fordham University.* Paper AAI3301430. Available at: *http://fordham.bepress.com/dissertations/AAI3301430* (accessed 20 April, 2010).

Banerjee, R and Dittmar, H (2008) Individual differences in children's materialism: the role of peer relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31, 17-31

Barbas, TA, Paraskevopoulos, S, Stamou, AG (2009) The effect of nature documentaries on students' environmental sensitivity: a case study. *Learning, Media and Technology*, 34, 61-69.

Bardi, A and Schwartz, SH (2003) Values and behaviour: strength and structure of relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29, 1207-1220.

Barsalou, LW and Hale, CR (1993), Components of conceptual representation: from feature lists to recursive frames, in Van Mechelen, I, Hampton, J, Michalski, R and Theuns, P (eds.), *Categories and Concepts: Theoretical Views and Inductive Data Analysis* (pp. 97-144). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Blakeslee, S (2006) Cells that read minds, *New York Times*, 10 January.

Brewer, J and Lakoff, G (2008a) Why voters aren't motivated by a laundry list of positions on issues. Available at: *http://www.cognitivepolicyworks.com/what-we-do/cognitive-policy/why-voters-arent-motivated-by-a-laundry-list-of-positions-on-issues/* (accessed on 2 August, 2010).

Brewer, J and Lakoff, G (2008b) Comparing climate proposals: a case study in cognitive policy. Available at: *http://www.cognitivepolicyworks.com/what-we-do/cognitive-policy/comparing-climate-proposals-a-case-study-in-cognitive-policy/* (accessed on 2 August, 2010).

Brown, KW and Kasser, T (2005) Are psychological and ecological well-being compatible? The role of values, mindfulness and lifestyle. *Social Indicators Research*, 74, 349-368.

Buijzen, M and Valkenburg, PM (2003) The effects of television advertising on materialism, parent-child conflict, and unhappiness: a review of research. *Applied Developmental Psychology*, 24, 437-456.

Burgoyne, CB and Lea, SEG (2006). Money is material. Science, 314, 1091-1092.

Chilton, P (1996) *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House*, New York: Peter Lang.

Chilton, P (2004) *Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice*, London: Routledge.

Chilton, P and Ilyin, MV (1993) Metaphor in political discourse: the case of the 'Common European House', *Discourse and Society*, 4, 7-31.

Chilton, P and Lakoff, G (1995) Foreign policy by metaphor, in Schäffner, C and Wenden, A (eds.), *Language and Peace* (pp. 37-60), Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Chong, D and Druckman, JN (2007) Framing theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 103-126.

Cienki, A (2007), Frames, idealised cognitive models, and domains, in Geeraerts, D and H. Cuyckens. *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics* (pp. 170-187), Oxford: OUP.

Clemins, EK and Schimmelbusch, H (2007) The Environmental Prisoners' Dilemma, 20 May 2007. Available at: *http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~clemons/blogs/ prisonersblog.pdf* (accessed on 2 August, 2010).

Cohrs, JC, Maes, J, Moschner, B and Kielmann, S (2007) Determinants of human rights attitudes and behaviour: a comparison and integration of psychological perspectives. *Political Psychology*, 28, 441-470.

Cohrs, JC, Moschner, B, Maes, J and Kielmann, S (2005) Personal values and attitudes toward war. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 11, 293-312.

CPRE (2003) *A Pox on the Countryside?* London, UK: CPRE.

CPRE (2007) *Developing an Intrusion Map of England*, London, UK: CPRE.

Crompton, T (2008) *Weathercocks and Signposts: the environment movement at a crossroads*. Godalming, UK: WWF-UK.

Crompton, T and Kasser, T (2009). *Meeting environmental challenges: the role of human identity.* Godalming, UK: WWF-UK.

Crompton, T, Brewer, J and Kasser, T (2010) Values, framing and the challenge of climate change, in *From hot air to happy endings: how to inspire public support for a low carbon society* (pp.46-51), London, UK: Green Alliance.

Cullingworth, B and Nadin, V (2006) *Town and Country Planning in the UK* (14th edition), Oxford, UK: Routledge

Curtice, J (2010) Thermostat or weathervane? Public reactions to spending and redistribution under New Labour, in Park, A, Curtice, J, Thomson, K, Phillips, M, Clery, E and Butt, S (eds.) *British Social Attitudes 2009-2010: the 26th report* (Chapter 2), London, UK: Sage.

Davidov, E, Meuleman, B, Billiet, J and Schmidt, P (2008) Values and support for immigration: a cross-country comparison. *European Sociological Review*, 24, 583-599.

Dawkins, R (2001) Sustainability doesn't come naturally: a Darwinian perspective on values. Inaugural Lecture of the Values Platform for Sustainability, The Environment Foundation, delivered in 14 November 2001. Available at: *http://www. environmentfoundation.net/reports/richard-dawkins.htm* (accessed 2 August, 2010).

de Waal, FBM (2006) *Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

DECC (2009) *UK's National Strategy for Climate and Energy: Transition to a Low Carbon Society.* London, Department for Energy and Climate Change.

Defra (2008) *A framework for pro-environmental behaviours.* Available at: *www.defra.gov.uk* (accessed 18 April, 2008).

Degenhardt, L (2002) Why do people act in sustainable ways? Results of an empirical survey of lifestyle pioneers, in Schmuck, P and Schultz, PW (eds.), *Psychology of sustainable development* (pp. 123-147). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

DESA (2010) *Millennium Development Goals Report 2010.* New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Donnelly, J (2000) *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Doran, CJ (2009) The role of personal values in fair trade consumption. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 84, 549-563.

Douglas, M and Wildavsky, A (1982) *Risk and Culture: An Essay on Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers*, Berkley: California University Press.

Dryzek, JS (2005) *The Politics of the Earth* (2nd edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Duncombe, S (2007) *Dream: Re-imagining Progressive Politics in an Age of Fantasy.* New York: The New Press.

Dupré, J (2001) *Human Nature and the Limits of Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Duriez, B, Vansteenkiste, M, Soenens, B and De Witte, H (2007) The social costs of extrinsic relative to intrinsic goal pursuits: their relation with social dominance and racial and ethnic prejudice. *Journal of Personality*, 75, 757-782.

Eurodad (2006) Norway makes ground-breaking decision to cancel illegitimate debt. Available at: *http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/articles.aspx?id=302* (accessed 2 August, 2010).

Evans, V (2009) *How Words Mean: Lexical Concepts, Cognitive Models, and Meaning Construction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Feather, NT (1992) Values, valences, expectations, and actions. *Journal of Social Issues*, 48, 109-124.

Feather, NT (2004) Value correlates of ambivalent attitudes toward gender relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30, 3-12.

Feather, NT and McKee, IR (2008) Values and prejudice: predictors of attitudes towards Australian Aborigines. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 60, 80-90.

Fillmore, C (1982) Frame semantics, in Linguistics Society of Korea (ed.), Linguistics in the *Morning Calm*, Seoul: Hanshin.

Fillmore, C (1985) Frames and the semantics of understanding, in *Quaderni di Semantica*, 6, 222-254.

Fischer, R and Hanke, K (2009) Are societal values linked to global peace and conflict? *Peace and Conflict*, 15, 227-248.

Flouri, E (1999) An integrated model of consumer materialism: can economic socialisation and maternal values predict materialistic attitudes in adolescents? *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 28, 707-724.

Foresight Land Use Futures Project (2010) *Final Project Report*, London: The Government Office for Science.

Frohlich, N (1974) Self interest or altruism, what difference? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 18, 55-73.

Futerra (2009) Sizzle: The New Climate Message. Available at: *www.futerra.co.uk* (accessed on 20 April 2010).

Gatersleben, B, Meadows, J, Abrahamse, W and Jackson, T (2008) Materialistic and environmental values of young people, *unpublished manuscript*, University of Surrey, UK

Goatly, A (2007) *Washing the Brain: Metaphor and Hidden Ideology*, Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Goldberg, ME, Gorn, GJ, Peracchio, LA and Bamossy, G (2003) Understanding materialism among youth, *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, 13, 278-288.

Good, J (2007) Shop 'til we drop? Television, materialism and attitudes about the natural environment. *Mass Communication and Society*, 10, 365-383.

Greenberg, BS, and Brand, JE (1993) Television news and advertising in schools: the 'Channel One' controversy. *Journal of Communication*, 43, 143-151.

Grouzet, FME, Kasser, T, Ahuvia, A, Fernandez-Dols, JM, Kim, Y, Lau, S, Ryan, RM, Saunders, S, Schmuck, P and Sheldon, KM (2005) The structure of goal contents across fifteen cultures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89, 800-816.

Haider-Markel, DP and Joslyn, MR (2008) Beliefs about the origins of homosexuality and support for gay rights: an empirical test of attribution theory. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 72, 291-310.

HM Treasury (2006) Publication of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 30 October. Available at: *http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_stern_06. htm* (accessed on 2 August, 2010).

Holbert, RL, Kwak, N, Shah, DV (2003) Environmental concern, patterns of television viewing, and pro-environmental behaviors: integrating models of media consumption and effects. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 47, 177-196.

Hopkins, R (2008) *The Transition Handbook: From Oil Dependency to Local Resilience*. Totnes, UK: Green Books.

Hulme, M (2009) *Why We disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

IPSOS-MORI (2008). Public attitudes to climate change, 2008: concerned but still unconvinced, (London, UK: IPSOS-MORI, 2008), Available at: *www.ipsos-mori. com/Assets/Docs/Publications/sri-environment-public-attitudes-to-climate-change-2008-concerned-but-still-unconvinced.pdf* (accessed 20 November 2009).

Jubilee 2000 Coalition (2000) *The World Will Never Be the Same Again*. Available at: *www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/download.php?id=284* (accessed 2 August, 2010).

Kahan, DM (2010) Fixing the communications failure. *Nature*, 463, 296-297.

Kasser, T (2005) Frugality, generosity, and materialism in children and adolescents, in Moore, KA and Lippman, LH (eds.), *What do children need to flourish?: Conceptualising and measuring indicators of positive development* (pp. 357-373). New York: Springer Science.

Kasser, T (in press) Cultural values and the wellbeing of future generations: a cross-national study. *Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology.*

Kasser, T, Cohn, S, Kanner, AD, and Ryan, RM (2007) Some costs of American corporate capitalism: a psychological exploration of value and goal conflicts. *Psychological Inquiry*, 18, 1-22.

Kasser, T, Ryan, RM, Couchman, CE and Sheldon, KM (2004) Materialistic values: their causes and consequences, in Kasser, T and Kanner, AD (eds.), *Psychology and Consumer Culture: The struggle for a good life in a materialistic world* (pp. 11-28). Washington DC: American Psychological Association.

Kövecses, Z (2005) *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lakoff, G (2002) *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, G (2004) *Don't Think of an Elephant! Know your Values and Frame the Debate*, White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing.

Lakoff, G (2006) *Thinking Points: Communicating our American Values and Vision*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Lakoff, G (2009) *The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist's Guide to your Brain and its Politics*, London: Penguin.

Lakoff, G and Johnson, M (1980) *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Langacker, R (1987) *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar* (vol. 1), Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Lieserowitz, A (2006) Climate change risk perception and policy preferences: the role of affect, imagery and values. *Climatic Change*, 77, 45-72.

Maio, GR, Pakizeh, A, Cheung, WY and Rees, KJ (2009) Changing, priming, and acting on values: effects via motivational relations in a circular model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 97 (4), 699-715.

Minsky, M (1974) A framework for representing knowledge, in Winston, PH (ed.), *The Psychology of Computer Vision* (pp. 211-277). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Murphy, G (2005) Influencing the size of your market. London, UK: Institute of Practitioners in Advertising.

O'Guinn, TC and Shrum, LJ (1997) The role of television in the construction of consumer reality. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 23, 278-294.

Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2004) Planning Policy Statement 7. Available at: *http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/planningandbuilding/pps7* (accessed on 2 August, 2010).

Olson, JM and Zanna, MP (1993) Attitudes and attitude change. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 44, 117-154.

O'Neill, B (2010) Now the elite wants to colonise our brains, *Spiked On-line*, 6 April. Available at: *www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/8499/* (accessed on 14 June, 2010).

Poppenk, J, Walia, G, Joanisse, M, McIntosh, AR and Köhler, S (2008) Why is the meaning of sentences better remembered than their form? An fMRI study on the role of novelty-encoding processes. *Hippocampus*, 18, 909-18.

Premack, D and Premack, AJ (1994) Moral belief: form versus content, in Hirschfeld, LA and Gelman, SA (eds.), *Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture* (pp.149-168). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Richins, ML and Dawson, S (1992) A consumer values orientation for materialism and its measurement: scale development and validation. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 19, 303-316.

Rizzolatti, G and Sinigaglia, C (2008) *Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions* (trans. Anderson, F), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Roccas, S and Sagiv, L (2010) Personal values and behaviour: taking the cultural context into account. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 4, 30-41.

Roets, A, Van Hiel, C and Cornelis, I (2006) Does materialism predict racism? Materialism as a distinctive social attitude and a predictor of prejudice. *European Journal of Personality*, 20, 155-168.

Rokeach, M (1973) *The Nature of Human Values.* New York: The Free Press.

Rose, C and Dade, P (2007) Using values modes. Available at: *http://www.campaignstrategy.org/articles/usingvaluemodes.pdf* (accessed on 2 August, 2010)

Sagiv, L and Schwartz, SH (1995) Value priorities and readiness for out-group social contact. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69, 437-448.

Santa Ana, O (2002) *Brown Tied Rising: Metaphors of Latinos in Contemporary American Public Discourse*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

Saunders, S and Munro, D (2000) The construction and validation of a consumer orientation questionnaire (SCOI) designed to measure Fromm's (1955) 'marketing character' in Australia. *Social Behavior and Personality*, 28, 219-240.

Sawyerr, OO, Strauss, J and Yan, J (2005) Individual value structure and diversity attitudes: the moderating effects of age, gender, race, and religiosity. *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 20, 498-521.

Schön, DA (1979/1993) Generative metaphor: a perspective on problem-setting in social policy, in Ortony, A (ed.), *Metaphor* (pp.254-83). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schneider, AL and Ingram, H (2007) Public Policy and democratic citizenship: what kinds of citizenship does policy promote? in Fischer, F; Miller, GJ and Sidney (eds.), *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics and Methods* (pp.329-348). New York: CRC Press.

Schultz, PW, Gouveia, VV, Cameron, LD, Tankha, G, Schmuck, P and Frank, M (2005) Values and their relationship to environmental concern and conservation behaviour. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 36(4), 457-475.

Schwartz, SH (1992) Universals in the content and structure of values: theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries, in Zanna, M (ed.) *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 25 (pp. 1-65). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

Schwartz, SH (1994a). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? *Journal of Social Issues*, 50, 19-45.

Schwartz, SH (1994b). Beyond individualism/collectivism: new dimensions of values, in Kim, U, Triandis, HC, Kagitcibasi, C, Choi, SC and Yoon, G (eds.) *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory Application and Methods* (pp. 85-119). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Schwartz, SH (1996) Value priorities and behavior: Applying of theory of integrated value systems, in Seligman, C, Olson, JM and Zanna, MP (eds.) *The Psychology of Values: The Ontario Symposium*, Vol. 8 (pp. 1-24). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Schwartz, SH (2006) Basic human values: an overview. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Available at: *http://segr-did2.fmag.unict.it/Allegati/convegno%207-8-10-05/Schwartzpaper.pdf* (accessed 2 August, 2010).

Schwartz, SH (2007). Cultural and individual value correlates of capitalism: a comparative analysis. *Psychological Inquiry*, 18, 52-57.

Schwartz, SH (2009) Draft Users Manual: Proper Use of the Schwarz Value Survey, version 14 January 2009, compiled by Littrell, RF. Auckland, New Zealand: Centre for Cross Cultural Comparisons. Available at: *www.crossculturalcentre.homestead.com* (accessed 2 August, 2010).

Sheldon, KM and Krieger, LS (2004) Does legal education have undermining effects on law students? Evaluating changes, motivation, values and well-being. *Behavioral Sciences & the Law*, 22(2), 261-286.

Sheldon, KM and McGregor, H (2000) Extrinsic value orientation and the tragedy of the commons. *Journal of Personality*, 68, 383-411.

Sheldon, KM, Ryan, RM, Deci, EL, Kasser, T (2004) The independent effects of goal contents and motives on well-being: it's both what you pursue and why you pursue it. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30, 475-486.

Sheldon, KM, Sheldon, MS and Osbaldiston, R (2000) Prosocial values and group assortation in a N-person prisoner's dilemma. *Human Nature*, 11, 387-404.

Sherman, DK and Cohen, GL (2006) The psychology of self-defence: self-affirmation theory, in Zanna, MP (ed.) *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* Vol. 38 (pp. 183-242), CA: Elsevier.

Sherman, SJ, Mackie, DM and Driscoll, DM (1990) Priming and the differential use of dimensions in evaluation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 16, 405-418.

Shrum, LJ, Burroughs, JE and Rindfleisch, A (2005) Television's cultivation of material values. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 32, 473-479.

Shrum, LJ, Wyer, RS and O'Guinn, TC (1998) The effects of television consumption on social perceptions: the use of priming procedures to investigate psychological processes. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 24, 447-458.

Soss, J and Schram, SF (2007) A public transformed? Welfare reform as policy feedback. *American Political Science Review*, 101, 111-127.

Spini, D and Doise, W (1998) Organising principles of involvement in human rights and their social anchoring in value priorities. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 28, 603-622.

Stern, N (2007) *The Economics of Climate change: The Stern Review*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Svallfors, S (2010) Policy feedback, generational replacement, and attitudes to state intervention: Eastern and Western Germany, 1990-2006, *European Political Science Review*, 2, 119-135.

Tatchell, P (2008) Homosexuality: it isn't natural. *Spiked On-line*, 24 June. Available at: *http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/5375/* (accessed on 2 August, 2010).

Thøgersen, J and Crompton, T (2009) Simple and Painless? The Limitations of Spillover in Environmental Campaigning. *Journal of Consumer Policy*, 32, 141-163.

Tomasello, M (2009) *Why We Cooperate*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

van Dijk, TA (1993) *Elite Discourse and Racism*. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.

Vansteenkiste, M, Lens, W, Deci, EL (2006) Intrinsic versus extrinsic goal contents in self-determination theory: another look at the quality of academic motivation. *Educational Psychologist*, 41, 19-31.

Vansteenkiste, M, Simons, J, Lens, W, Sheldon, KM, and Deci, EL (2004a). Motivating learning, performance, and persistence: the synergistic role of intrinsic goals and autonomy-support. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 87, 246-260.

Vansteenkiste, M, Simons, J, Lens, W, Soenens, B., Matos, L, Lacante, M (2004b). Less is sometimes more: goal content matters. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 96, 755-764.

Vohs, KD, Mead, NL and Goode, MR (2006). The psychological consequences of money, *Science*, 314, 1154-1156.

Westen, D, Weinberger, J and Bradley, R (2007) Motivation, decision making, and consciousness: From psychodynamics to subliminal priming and emotional constraint satisfaction, in Moscovitch, M and Zelazo, PD (eds.), *Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness* (pp. 671-700) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ENDNOTES

1 For example, an individual may well personally benefit from successful efforts to mitigate climate change. But the reduction in international greenhouse gas emissions arising from the steps she takes to reduce her *own* greenhouse gas emissions will have infinitesimal effect in reducing the *overall* impacts of global warming, and will not therefore be of net benefit to her as an individual. 'Prisoner's dilemma' problems of this nature are a type of bigger-than-self problems, because individuals who lead attempts to address these problems are likely to invest effort and resources going far beyond those that would be expected on the basis of a rational assessment of their self-interest.

2 For example, a recent UK public opinion survey found that only 13% of respondents thought that it was reasonable to expect people to 'make significant and radical changes to their lifestyle in terms of the products they buy, how much they pay for things and how much they drive and fly' in order to tackle climate change. See IPSOS-MORI (2008).

3 The extent of opposition between these materialistic life-goals and the pro-social life-goals is attested by circular stochastic modelling leading to the graphical representation of values in Figure 1, which reveals that life-goals for financial success and community feeling are 192 degrees in opposition (with 180 degrees representing perfect conflict).

4 The goal of 'generativity' refers to the desire to generate something creative or socially productive.

5 This is not, of course, to deny – or detract attention from – the importance of political leadership. There is doubtless also a crucial role for bold political leaders to make the case for change, and to enact policies in line with this even where they encounter electoral resistance. But there are limits to what even more courageous and charismatic leaders can achieve, and these limits are in part imposed by cultural values.

6 'Conservation values' here is a potentially misleading phrase, but it is retained in order to maintain consistency with its use in the academic literature. It is used to refer to security, conformity and tradition values, and is therefore aligned to the desire to maintain the *status quo*.

7 Although not of central importance to this report, intrinsic goals are also associated with greater wellbeing.

8 'In-group' refers to a group that shares social identity – for example, based on gender, race, nationality, profession, religion or political leanings, as well as smaller groups such as fans of particular football teams or types of music.

9 'Priming' refers to making a value more 'salient', or 'activating' a value – for example, by asking someone to perform a task that leads them to reflect on that value. Sherman *et al.* (1990: 405) write that priming is "a procedure that increases the accessibility of some category or construct in memory".

10 Of course, people often do pursue behaviour to address bigger-than-self problems in part through the appeal of extrinsic motivations. For example, poverty campaigners themselves often admit in their more candid moments that they are motivated *both* intrinsically (for example, because of their sense of wanting to 'make the world a better place'), *and* extrinsically (for example, because they enjoy occasional moments of publicity). But the evidence is that the greater the emphasis placed on the intrinsic as opposed to the extrinsic motivations, the more persistent, engrossed (and happier) these campaigners will be. It is important here to distinguish between the 'what' and the 'why' of the goals that a person pursues: That is, 'what' are the goals that a person pursues – money, image, community, etc. – and 'why' does a person pursue them? As regards the 'why', a person may pursue particular goals for several different reasons: these include 'intrinsic' reasons (pursuing them is fun and challenging); 'identified' reasons (having considered the goal, a person considers this to be a fundamental part of who they are or what they care about);

'introjected' reasons (not to pursue them leaves a person feeling bad about herself) or 'external' reasons (in pursuit of praise, money, or to avoid criticism) (see, for example, Vansteenkiste *et al.*, 2004b; Vansteenkiste *et al.*, 2006; Sheldon *et al.*, 2004). Most of the time there is a positive correlation between pursuing goals for more intrinsic and identified *reasons*, and pursuing more goals that are themselves more intrinsic in *content*. For example, a person is more likely to systematically attempt to reduce his personal carbon footprint in pursuit of the challenge, and because he feels that it is inherently important, than because he would feel bad if he didn't or because he wants the praise of his friends. Behaviour adopted in pursuit of intrinsic and identified reasons is found to be associated with greater persistence, more 'deep-' (as opposed to rote-) learning and higher wellbeing. But the reasons a person adopts a particular behaviour are rarely unalloyed. One might also ask: what might poverty campaigners, who admit some extrinsic motivation for their work, have chosen to do for a career if those extrinsic motivations had been more important to them? Might they have rather pursued a career where fame and fortune could be more forthcoming? And when, on occasion, these campaigners are carried away by the prestige of moments in the public eye (that is, when more extrinsic values are activated) do they then find that their intrinsic concerns (for example, the conviction that it is right to fight global poverty irrespective of the personal costs) are diminished – at least temporarily? The evidence suggests that this is likely to be the case.

11 Note that this is not to imply that all television viewing serves to increase the prevalence of extrinsic values. For example, there is also evidence that nature documentaries can increase support for environmental concerns (see, for example, Barbas *et al.*, 2009; Holbert *et al.*, 2003).

12 For example, Chilton (1996) shows how the image schema of 'container' structured thinking and discourse about conflict in the Cold War era; Santa Ana (2002) shows the role of other image schemas in xenophobic discourse in the United States.

13 On the propagandistic use of conceptual metaphor, see Goatly (2007).

14 There is clear evidence that 'rational actor' concepts are transferred from the individual level to the national level. Classical *rational choice theory* models individual decision and strategy formation on the basis of an individual's assessment of the balance of cost and benefit to herself. There are criticisms of the theory: the most general one being that individuals do not always act in accordance with the model of rationality with which rational choice theory works. If we call the cost-benefit model of rationality a frame (a highly conscious and mathematised one) we can see that it serves as the input to the source domain in realist international relations theory. Such realism operates with the conceptual metaphor: 'nation states are rational actors' (in the sense of rational choice theory). Clearly, nation states are not human individuals. But the contents of the frame are carried over from the source domain to the target domain (the foreign policy choices and actions of a nation state). This is a good example of a metaphor that leads to actions, often actions with serious consequences. The texts of the classic realist theorists are replete with wordings that are driven by this underlying conceptual metaphor (See Chilton, 1996 and Chilton and Lakoff, 1995).

15 Note that 'realism' has a precise meaning in the context of international relations. It refers to the belief that while, *within states*, there is the possibility of using political authority and rule to tame selfish aspects of human nature (which are taken to be both inevitable and dominant), in *international* relations, these selfish aspects of human nature will be necessarily given free rein (Donnelly, 2000: 9-11).

16 Of course, rational choice theory can accommodate social responsibility. But according to this frame, a person's sense of morality or desire to behave in a way that benefits others is viewed as just another utility (e.g. 'the rewards I can anticipate as reciprocation for being nice').

17 On the use of the 'house' frame and the racist use of the 'health/disease' frame, see Chilton (1996) and Chilton (2004).

18 Of course, they may also live in an apartment or flat, etc., and these variations point to just one of the areas where care would need to be taken in developing this frame further.

19 http://action-town.eu/

20 George Lakoff suggests that some American policy-makers have responded to this understanding even to the extent of deliberately adopting policies that they *knew would fail* because, in failing, they served the bigger project of promoting particular deep frames.

21 Stephen Duncombe's case for a new, creative, approach to campaigning, based on 'ethical spectacle', is important, though he does not properly understand the importance of values in building public commitment to change – suggesting, for example, that involvement in politics, if it is to be attractive, should appeal to the desire to exercise power: something that is likely to strengthen unhelpful values.

22 Note that Schwartz has developed two models. One maps 'personal values', and is based on individuals' responses to survey questions. For this model, the number of data points is equivalent to the number of individuals surveyed. The other model maps 'cultural values', taking the mean of respondents' responses to survey questions within a cultural domain (for example, a nation), and mapping these. This necessarily leads to a smaller data-set for statistical analysis. Although there isn't complete equivalence between these two approaches, both use the same survey items. So, for example, the same survey items that are used to establish the personal value power are used to establish the cultural value hierarchy, and the same survey items used to establish the personal value achievement are used to establish the cultural value mastery.

23 See endnote 6

24 Of course, such results should not be taken to imply that values are the sole determinants of prejudice. As Norman Feather and Ian McKee write: "Prejudice has deep roots in social learning, family and group dynamics, self-interest, social identification, and in structural variables in society. But prejudice is also linked to the value systems that people develop in the course of their lives as they adjust to universal issues of satisfying biological needs, relating to others, maintaining some stability and security in their social roles and group memberships, and developing a meaningful and integrated sense of self." (Feather and McKee, 2008: 88).

25 Recall from Section 2.1 that while both universalism and benevolence values are focused on helping others, the focus of universalism values is on all people and nature whereas the focus of benevolence values is on people who are members of the in-group.

26 Interestingly, demographic considerations (the age, gender, race, educational attainment or marital status of consumers) did not have a significant bearing on willingness to buy fair trade products.

27 Note that in these studies, the explicitly environmental components of Schwartz's universalism values were left out of the study.

28 Saunders and Munro (2000) used a scale measuring consumer orientation; Good (2007) used a materialism measure developed by Richins and Dawson (1992). Gatersleben *et al.* (2008) and Kasser (2005) both used survey items that focused on aspects of materialism – not the whole goals circumplex. Materialism as a construct is closely related to the expression of more extrinsic goals and more self-enhancing values.

29 This work on cultural biases, or worldviews, draws on cultural theory (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). The questionnaire items used by Leiserowitz to establish pro-egalitarian values are closely related to the questionnaire items used to establish universalism values.

30 Note that, unlike social marketing approaches, such frame analysis would then be used to tailor communications for specific social segments in order to help activate and strengthen *helpful* deep frames. A marketing approach, on the other hand, might proceed on the basis that these deep frames are essentially 'fixed', and would then seek to appeal to particular audience segments through appeal to their dominate deep frames – *even where this serves simultaneously to activate unhelpful frames.*

Working Group Members

Tim Baster
Executive Director
Climate Outreach Information
Network (COIN)
Old Music Hall
106-108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JE
Tel: 01865 403 334
Email: tim@COINet.org.uk
www.COINet.org.uk

Neil Sinden
Director of Policy and Campaigns
Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE)
128 Southwark Street, London SE1 0SW
Tel: 020 7981 2800
Email: info@cpre.org.uk
www.cpre.org.uk

Adeela Warley
Head of Communications
Friends of the Earth (FOE)
26-28 Underwood Street, London N1 7JQ
Tel: 020 7490 1555
Email: adeela.warley@foe.co.uk
www.foe.co.uk

Martin Kirk
Head of UK Campaigns
Oxfam GB
Oxfam House
John Smith Drive, Oxford OX4 2JY
Tel: 01865 473 219
Email: mkirk@oxfam.org.uk
www.oxfam.org.uk

David Norman
Director of Campaigns
WWF-UK
Panda House
Weyside Park, Godalming, Surrey GU7 1XR
Tel: 01483 412336
Email: info@wwf.org.uk
www.wwf.org.uk

Debate relating to this report can be found at the Common Cause Working Group website, **cc-wg.org**, where we encourage you to contribute your own views.