Galen Strawson
The University of Texas at Austin, Philosophy, Faculty Member
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Play, Emily Dickinson, Anthropology, Philosophy, English Literature, American Literature, and 27 moreMetaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Kant, Metaphilosophy, Moral Psychology, Subject of Experience, Auden, W. H., Humor, Thing-monism [only one thing], Psychoanalysis, Neutral monism, Monism, Laughter, Ethics, Philosophy of Agency, Self and Identity, Self Consciousness, Maxim Gorky, Reference, Self-Knowledge, Self-Consciousness, The Self, Stuff-monism [only one kind of substance], Embarrassment, Self-Luminosity, Causal Realism, and History of Philosophy edit
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The key claim of MATERIALISM (physicalism)—serious materialism—is that consciousness—real 'qualial' consciousness—is wholly physical; it has nothing to do with doubt about the existence of consciousness. PANPSYCHISM has many variants, but... more
The key claim of MATERIALISM (physicalism)—serious materialism—is that consciousness—real 'qualial' consciousness—is wholly physical; it has nothing to do with doubt about the existence of consciousness. PANPSYCHISM has many variants, but it is originally and fundamentally a materialist position, and its central (materialist) claim is that consciousness in some form is and must be part of the fundamental nature—the fundamental ‘stuff’ being—of physical reality. In its strong form, it holds that consciousness is all there is to the stuff of being (it has nothing to do with Berkeleian idealism).This paper defends a version of panpsychism and discusses some of the reasons why people find it so hard to accept.
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This paper argues that a Cartesian mind is constituted of consciousness.
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Our ordinary notion of free will contains strong compatibilist elements as well as incompatibilist elements Strawson, G. (2012) 'Hier stehe Ich: a comment on free will'... more
Our ordinary notion of free will contains strong compatibilist elements as well as incompatibilist elements
Strawson, G. (2012) 'Hier stehe Ich: a comment on free will' https://www.academia.edu/96913482/Hier_stehe_Ich_a_comment_on_free_will
Strawson, G. (2012) 'Hier stehe Ich: a comment on free will' https://www.academia.edu/96913482/Hier_stehe_Ich_a_comment_on_free_will
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There is, of course, The Given: what is given in experience. The ‘Myth Of The Given’ (‘the Myth’) is just a wrong answer to the question ‘What is given?’ This paper offers a brief sketch of three possible right answers. (1) It examines an... more
There is, of course, The Given: what is given in experience. The ‘Myth Of The Given’ (‘the Myth’) is just a wrong answer to the question ‘What is given?’ This paper offers a brief sketch of three possible right answers. (1) It examines an early account by Charles Augustus Strong of why The Myth is a myth. (2) It maintains that a natural and naturalistic version of empiricism is compatible with the fact that the Myth is a myth. (3) It gives proper place to enactivist (physiological, motor) considerations. (4) It is (in spite of (3)) broadly in line with the Sellarsian view as refined by John McDowell. (5) It meets an important constraint: acknowledging the reality of something that seems at first to lend support to The Myth—i.e. the fact that we can engage in ‘non-inferential self-attribution of … sensations’ (McDowell in ‘Having the World in View’, In Having the World in View Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1998/2009: p. 20) without in any way succumbing to the Myth.
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Ten claims. [1] There is no persisting and unitary self. [2] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between objects on the one hand and their properties on the other. [3] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between the... more
Ten claims. [1] There is no persisting and unitary self. [2] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between objects on the one hand and their properties on the other. [3] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between the base/categorical properties of things and the dispositional/power properties of things. [4] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between objects or substances on the one hand and processes and events on the other. [5] Reality isn’t truly divisible into causes and effects. [6] Objects aren’t governed by laws of nature ontologically distinct from them. [7] There is no free will. [8] Determinism is true. [9] Reality is one. [10] The fundamental stuff of reality is suffused with—if it does not consist of—mentality in some form. I’ll argue that Nietzsche’s mature position certainly includes [1]-[7], and also [8], properly understood, and probably or very probably [9] and [10]. I take it that [1] and [7] are clearly true, in the sense in which Nietzsche intends them, and I’ll argue that [2]-[6] are also true, and that [8]-[10] are also probably or very probably true. I take the claim that [1]-[10] are either certainly true or probably true to be powerful support for the view that Nietzsche held them.
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Abstract: [1] Materialism in the philosophy of mind—materialismPM is the view that everything mental is material (or equivalently physical). Consciousness—pain, emotional feeling, sensory experience, and so on—certainly exists. So... more
Abstract: [1] Materialism in the philosophy of mind—materialismPM
is the view that everything mental is material (or equivalently physical). Consciousness—pain, emotional feeling, sensory experience, and so on—certainly exists. So materialismPM is the view that consciousness is wholly material. It has, historically, nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. Its heart is precisely the claim that consciousness—consciousness!—is wholly material. [2] ‘Physicalism’, the view introduced by members of the Vienna Circle in the late 1920s, also has nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. [3] Recently the words ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’ have come to be treated as synonymous, and as names for a position in the philosophy of mind that does involve denial of the existence of consciousness. They’ve been used to name a position that (i) directly rejects the heart of materialism (materialismPM) and (ii) is certainly false. This is a pity, because they’re good terms for a view that is very likely true.
is the view that everything mental is material (or equivalently physical). Consciousness—pain, emotional feeling, sensory experience, and so on—certainly exists. So materialismPM is the view that consciousness is wholly material. It has, historically, nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. Its heart is precisely the claim that consciousness—consciousness!—is wholly material. [2] ‘Physicalism’, the view introduced by members of the Vienna Circle in the late 1920s, also has nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. [3] Recently the words ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’ have come to be treated as synonymous, and as names for a position in the philosophy of mind that does involve denial of the existence of consciousness. They’ve been used to name a position that (i) directly rejects the heart of materialism (materialismPM) and (ii) is certainly false. This is a pity, because they’re good terms for a view that is very likely true.
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[1] Stoff ist Kraft (≈ being is energy). [2] Wesen ist Werden (≈ being is becoming). [3] Sein ist Sosein (≈ being is qualit(ativit)y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein (≈ being is mind). [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles, and... more
[1] Stoff ist Kraft (≈ being is energy). [2] Wesen ist Werden (≈ being is becoming). [3] Sein ist Sosein (≈ being is qualit(ativit)y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein (≈ being is mind). [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles, and there are also good reasons for favouring [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals about the fundamental nature of concrete reality. More strongly: unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favour panpsychism over all other substantive theories. This is not simply because panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view—given that the existence of conscious experience is certain, and that panpsychism doesn’t posit the existence of any kind of stuff other than conscious experience. A question arises as to why metaphysicians have posited the existence of something for which there is no evidence: non-experiential concrete reality—especially since physics is completely silent on the question of the intrinsic non-structural nature of reality.
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Consciousness Isn’t a Mystery. It’s Matter.
New York Times May 16, 2016
New York Times May 16, 2016
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It's a myth that there was a dramatic resurgence of interest in the topic of consciousness in philosophy, in the mid-1990s, after long neglect. I consider some of the history of the philosophical discussion of the 'matter-consciousness'... more
It's a myth that there was a dramatic resurgence of interest in the topic of consciousness in philosophy, in the mid-1990s, after long neglect. I consider some of the history of the philosophical discussion of the 'matter-consciousness' problem.
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There occurred in the twentieth century the most remarkable episode in the history of human thought. A number of thinkers denied the existence of something we know with certainty to exist: consciousness, conscious experience. Others held... more
There occurred in the twentieth century the most remarkable episode in the history of human thought. A number of thinkers denied the existence of something we know with certainty to exist: consciousness, conscious experience. Others held back from the Denial, as I call it, but claimed that it might be true—a claim no less remarkable than the Denial. I want to document some aspects of this episode, with particular reference to the rise of philosophical behaviourism, and the transformation of materialism from a consciousness affirming-view into a consciousness-denying view.
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(1) A materialist holds that every concrete phenomenon is wholly physical or material. (2) A realistic materialist is a full-fledged realist about consciousness. So (3) a realistic materialist must hold that consciousness is a wholly... more
(1) A materialist holds that every concrete phenomenon is wholly physical or material.
(2) A realistic materialist is a full-fledged realist about consciousness. So
(3) a realistic materialist must hold that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon, and that at least some arrangements of matter are conscious or constitute consciousness.
What follows? I assume in a standard way that
(4) all matter is made of the same stuff (leptons and quarks, or strings, or…)
and I take it to follow that
(5) all matter can be arranged in a consciousness-constituting way.
I then argue that
(6) for certain things A, you cannot get A from non-A
and that
(7) consciousness is one of those things.
Coupled with (1)-(5), (6) and (7) entail that no matter can be wholly non-conscious in its ‘intrinsic’ or ‘ultimate’ nature. If so, any realistic—any truly serious—materialist must be a panpsychist.
key words materialism, physicalism, consciousness, mind-body problem, panpsychism, Eddington, emergence, matter, monism, microexperientiality, panexperientialism
(2) A realistic materialist is a full-fledged realist about consciousness. So
(3) a realistic materialist must hold that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon, and that at least some arrangements of matter are conscious or constitute consciousness.
What follows? I assume in a standard way that
(4) all matter is made of the same stuff (leptons and quarks, or strings, or…)
and I take it to follow that
(5) all matter can be arranged in a consciousness-constituting way.
I then argue that
(6) for certain things A, you cannot get A from non-A
and that
(7) consciousness is one of those things.
Coupled with (1)-(5), (6) and (7) entail that no matter can be wholly non-conscious in its ‘intrinsic’ or ‘ultimate’ nature. If so, any realistic—any truly serious—materialist must be a panpsychist.
key words materialism, physicalism, consciousness, mind-body problem, panpsychism, Eddington, emergence, matter, monism, microexperientiality, panexperientialism
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[1] What does the word ‘physical’ mean in its most general theoretical philosophical use? It’s used in many different ways, and it’s hard to imagine that philosophers could reach agreement on a best use. [2] Should we tie the meaning of... more
[1] What does the word ‘physical’ mean in its most general theoretical philosophical use? It’s used in many different ways, and it’s hard to imagine that philosophers could reach agreement on a best use. [2] Should we tie the meaning of ‘physical’ closely to physics? To do so (in a non-circular way) is to run the risk of ruling out the possibility that there might be two different universes that were ‘formally’ or structurally identical or homomorphic although substantially different—made of different stuff. [3] Perhaps that is not in the end a real possibility. Even so, it seems that we shouldn’t define ‘physical’ in a way that rules it out a priori. [4] If so, it may be that the word ‘physical’ is best used to denote a certain fundamental structure-transcendent stuff-nature—call it P—that allows the possibility that a universe with stuff nature Q structurally identical to a physical universe isn’t physical. [5] Can we suppose ourselves to know something about the ultimate intrinsic nature of P, if physicalism is true? I argue that we can. [6] Can we draw any further metaphysical conclusions from this knowledge? I argue that we can. We can show that panpsychism in some form constitutes the most plausible theory of the ultimate nature of P.
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(1) Materialists hold that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is a wholly physical phenomenon. (2) Consciousness ('what-it's-likeness', etc.) is the most certainly existing real, concrete phenomenon there is. It follows... more
(1) Materialists hold that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is a wholly physical phenomenon. (2) Consciousness ('what-it's-likeness', etc.) is the most certainly existing real, concrete phenomenon there is. It follows that (3) all serious materialists must grant that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley, Eddington, Russell and others observe) to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that consciousness is wholly physical.
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revision of reply to Dennett on NYR Daily blog on April 3, 2018
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brief version of 'Real materialism' (2003) given at Tucson III, 1998.
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in The Return of Consciousness, ed. K. Almqvist and A. Haag (Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation), pp. 89–103. It is a myth that there was a radical resurgence of discussion of the issue of conciousness in philosophy... more
in The Return of Consciousness, ed. K. Almqvist and A. Haag (Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation), pp. 89–103.
It is a myth that there was a radical resurgence of discussion of the issue of conciousness in philosophy in the 1990s. False views of the course of the history of philosophy don't require the passage of time. Repeats and extends discussion in G. Strawson 'The consciousness myth'
It is a myth that there was a radical resurgence of discussion of the issue of conciousness in philosophy in the 1990s. False views of the course of the history of philosophy don't require the passage of time. Repeats and extends discussion in G. Strawson 'The consciousness myth'
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According to the ‘conceivability argument’ [1] it’s conceivable that a conscious human being H may have a perfect physical duplicate H* who isn’t conscious, [2] whatever is conceivable is possible, therefore [3] H* may possibly exist.... more
According to the ‘conceivability argument’ [1] it’s conceivable that a conscious human being H may have a perfect physical duplicate H* who isn’t conscious, [2] whatever is conceivable is possible, therefore [3] H* may possibly exist. This paper argues that the conceivability argument can’t help in discussion of the ‘mind–body problem’ even if [2] is allowed to be true. This is not because [1] is false, but because we don’t and can’t know enough about the nature of the physical to know whether or not [1] is true. This follows from ‘the silence of physics’—the fact that physics neither does nor can tell us about the intrinsic non-structural nature of the physical, and the consequences of this fact for any adequate account of the meaning of the word ‘physical’.
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The debate about Mary and the Black and White Room is a merry-go-round. It rotates round a mistake shared on both sides. The mistake is to adopt the position I call physics-alism—to think that physics can give an exhaustive... more
The debate about Mary and the Black and White Room is a merry-go-round. It rotates round a mistake shared on both sides. The mistake is to adopt the position I call physics-alism—to think that physics can give an exhaustive characterization of the nature of the physical. It’s this that makes it seem to some philosophers that Mary raises a difficult and perhaps insoluble problem for physicalism.
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(1) Many current formulations of naturalism are profoundly anti-naturalistic. This is because they still favour some sort of reductive approach to experience (= consciousness, conscious experience). The bedrock of any remotely realistic... more
(1) Many current formulations of naturalism are profoundly anti-naturalistic. This is because they still favour some sort of reductive approach to experience (= consciousness, conscious experience). The bedrock of any remotely realistic naturalism, hence any serious or real naturalism, is outright non-reductive realism about experience. This is because the existence of experience is a certainly known natural fact (it’s the most certainly known general natural fact). (2) By ‘realism about experience’ I mean real realism about experience. What is real realism about experience? Real realists about experience take experience to be essentially what they took it to be before they did any philosophy, e.g. when they were 6 years old. (3) Physicalism is the view that concrete reality is entirely physical in nature. I take physicalism to be part of naturalism. So I take it that experience is entirely physical. (4) Physicalist naturalism rules out anything incompatible with the truths of physics, obviously enough. But there’s a crucial respect in which physics only gives structural information about the nature of concrete reality, and has nothing to say about the intrinsic nature of the concrete reality in so far as its intrinsic nature is more than its structure. (5) It follows that physicalist naturalism can’t rule out panpsychism or panexperientialism, which is the simplest theory of the nature of reality. (6) There is no evidence for the existence of any non-experiential reality. So truly hard-nosed physicalism has no reason to posit its existence, although it must admit the existence of the certainly known natural fact of experience.
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Many current formulations of naturalism are profoundly anti-naturalistic. This is because they still favour some sort of reductive approach to experience (= consciousness, conscious experience). The bedrock of any remotely realistic... more
Many current formulations of naturalism are profoundly anti-naturalistic. This is because they still favour some sort of reductive approach to experience (= consciousness, conscious experience). The bedrock of any remotely realistic naturalism, hence any serious or real naturalism, is outright non-reductive realism about experience. This is because the existence of experience is a certainly known natural fact (it’s the most certainly known general natural fact). (2) By ‘realism about experience’ I mean real realism about experience. What is real realism about experience? Real realists about experience take experience to be essentially what they took it to be before they did any philosophy, e.g. when they were 6 years old. (3) Physicalism is the view that concrete reality is entirely physical in nature. I take physicalism to be part of naturalism. So I take it that experience is entirely physical. (4) Physicalist naturalism rules out anything incompatible with the truths of physics, obviously enough. But there’s a crucial respect in which physics only gives structural information about the nature of concrete reality, and has nothing to say about the intrinsic nature of the concrete reality in so far as its intrinsic nature is more than its structure. (5) It follows that physicalist naturalism can’t rule out panpsychism or panexperientialism, which is the simplest theory of the nature of reality. (6) There is no evidence for the existence of any non-experiential reality. So truly hard-nosed physicalism has no reason to posit its existence, although it must admit the existence of the certainly known natural fact of experience.
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Panpsychism is a plausible theory of the fundamental nature of reality. It’s fully compatible with everything in physics, and with physicalism. It’s an error to think that being physical excludes being mental or experiential. Anyone who... more
Panpsychism is a plausible theory of the fundamental nature of reality. It’s fully compatible with everything in physics, and with physicalism. It’s an error to think that being physical excludes being mental or experiential. Anyone who endorses the following three views—[i] materialism or physicalism is true, [ii], consciousness is real, [iii] there is no ‘radical emergence’—should at least endorse ‘micropsychism’ or psychism, the view that [iv] mind or consciousness is a fundamental feature of concrete reality, already present in the most basic forms of concrete reality. And given [v] the apparent interconvertibility (fungibility) of all fundamental forms of physical stuff, panpsychism appears to be the most plausible form of psychism.
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Rougly speaking, panpsychism is the view, that everything is mind or have consciousness. Although the view has a long and venerable tradition, and becomes more and more popular in the contemporary debate, it still has many opponents. The... more
Rougly speaking, panpsychism is the view, that everything is mind or have consciousness. Although the view has a long and venerable tradition, and becomes more and more popular in the contemporary debate, it still has many opponents. The aim of this article is to prove that panpsychism is the best metaphysical account of the nature of the ultimate stuff of reality. At the same time, it is a kind of physicalism, according to which experience (experientiality) is the fundamental stuff of all concrete objects. Galen Strawson, „Physicalist Panpsychism”, in: The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness . Second Edition , ed. Susan Schneider i Max Velmans (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), 374–390. Information about Translator: Jacek Jarocki, MA—PhD student, Department of the History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin; address for correspondence: Al. Raclawickie 14, PL 20–950 Lublin; e‑mail: jacekjarocki@kul.pl
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My future life or experience doesn’t belong to me in such a way that it’s something that can be taken away from me. It can’t be thought of as a possession in that way. To think that it’s something that can be taken away from me is like... more
My future life or experience doesn’t belong to me in such a way that it’s something that can be taken away from me. It can’t be thought of as a possession in that way. To think that it’s something that can be taken away from me is like thinking that life could be deprived of life, or that something is taken away from an existing piece of string by the fact that it isn’t longer than it is.
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"I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empirical thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience which I call the psychological Narrativity thesis: 'each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” … this... more
"I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empirical thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience which I call the psychological Narrativity thesis: 'each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” … this narrative is us, our identities' (Oliver Sacks). The second is a normative, ethical claim which I call the ethical Narrativity thesis: we ought to live our lives narratively, or as a story; a 'basic condition of making sense of ourselves is that we grasp our lives in a narrative' and have an understanding of our lives 'as an unfolding story' (Charles Taylor); a person 'creates his identity (only) by forming an autobiographical narrative—a story of his life', and must be in possession of a full and 'explicit narrative (of his life) to develop fully as a person' (Marya Schechtman).
keywords: narrative, Narrativity, Diachronic personality, Episodic personality, non-narrative, anti-narrative, person, memory, story-telling, I*
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keywords: narrative, Narrativity, Diachronic personality, Episodic personality, non-narrative, anti-narrative, person, memory, story-telling, I*
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Some say [1] we all experience or conceive of their own lives as a narrative or story of some sort. Many more say [2] we ought to do this. I think both these claims are false (cp Strawson 2004). Many go on to claim something more... more
Some say [1] we all experience or conceive of their own lives as a narrative or story of some sort. Many more say [2] we ought to do this. I think both these claims are false (cp Strawson 2004). Many go on to claim something more specific: we not only experience our own lives as a narrative of some sort; [3] we ‘constitute our identity’ as a person or self in this way (the ‘narrative self-constitution thesis’). Others again claim that [4] we ought to constitute our identity in this way. Again I reject both these claims. People are very different; there are different good ways to be and to live. I consider Emerson, Nietzsche, Proust and Woolf—among others. Suppose Socrates is right (it may be doubted) that the unexamined life is not a life for a human being: suppose he’s right that self-examination is always a good thing. Even so, the narrative approach is not the only way to do it, nor the best way. I advise against it. [nb the word 'exetasis' is misspelt throughout as 'hexetasis' in original version]
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Some live their lives in a ‘Narrative’ and ‘Diachronic’ fashion. They intuitively feel they’re the same self or person across long periods of time. Others live in a decidedly ‘non-Narrative’ and ‘Episodic’ way with no strong sense that... more
Some live their lives in a ‘Narrative’ and ‘Diachronic’ fashion. They intuitively feel they’re the same self or person across long periods of time. Others live in a decidedly ‘non-Narrative’ and ‘Episodic’ way with no strong sense that they’re the same same self or person across time. Some think you have to live Narratively and Diachronically to live a morally or ethically good life. I argue that Episodic, non-Narrative people can lead equally moral, ethical, responsible, conscience-governed, lives, and are equally capable of remorse, love, friendship, loyalty, and so on. I raise and respond to a doubt about gratitude.
key words narrative, non-narrative, Narrativity, Diachronic personality, Episodic personality, remorse, contrition, guilt, conscience, love, friendship, loyalty, resentment, gratitude
key words narrative, non-narrative, Narrativity, Diachronic personality, Episodic personality, remorse, contrition, guilt, conscience, love, friendship, loyalty, resentment, gratitude
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"Some live their lives in a ‘Narrative’ and ‘Diachronic’ fashion. They intuitively feel they’re the same self or person across long periods of time. Others live in a decidedly ‘non-Narrative’ and ‘Episodic’ way with no strong sense that... more
"Some live their lives in a ‘Narrative’ and ‘Diachronic’ fashion. They intuitively feel they’re the same self or person across long periods of time. Others live in a decidedly ‘non-Narrative’ and ‘Episodic’ way with no strong sense that they’re the same same self or person across time. Some think you have to live Narratively and Diachronically to live a morally or ethically good life. I argue that Episodic, non-Narrative people can lead equally moral, ethical, responsible, conscience-governed, lives, and are equally capable of remorse, love, friendship, loyalty, and so on. I raise and respond to a doubt about gratitude.
key words narrative, non-narrative, Narrativity, Diachronic personality, Episodic personality, remorse, contrition, guilt, conscience, love, friendship, loyalty, resentment, gratitude"
key words narrative, non-narrative, Narrativity, Diachronic personality, Episodic personality, remorse, contrition, guilt, conscience, love, friendship, loyalty, resentment, gratitude"
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The psychological narrativity thesis (PNT) states that all ordinary adult human beings experience or conceive of their life, their existence, in a ‘narrative’ way, as having the form of a story, or perhaps a collection of stories, and—in... more
The psychological narrativity thesis (PNT) states that all ordinary adult human beings experience or conceive of their life, their existence, in a ‘narrative’ way, as having the form of a story, or perhaps a collection of stories, and—in some manner—live in and experience themselves through this conception. This paper argues that PNT is either [a] trivially true or [b] false. It lists eight claims about ordinary human life that may be thought to justify the claim that PNT is true, and argues that if any (or all) of them is (are) held to show that PNT is true, then PNT is trivially true, and to that extent uninteresting, because all eight claims are elementary truisms about human life. If PNT is to be an interesting thesis it must amount to more than this. But if it amounts to more than this then it’s false.
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In your article “The unstoried life”, you criticize the idea that having a ‘storied life’ is necessary for a good life. Some authors would probably admit that having a storied life is perhaps not necessary in order to simply exist as an... more
In your article “The unstoried life”, you criticize the idea that having a ‘storied life’ is necessary for a good life. Some authors would probably admit that having a storied life is perhaps not necessary in order to simply exist as an individual, singular being, but they would probably not accept that what you (in Selves) call a ‘whole human being’ is possible without such (self-)narration.
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Many hold that it is impossible in principle for finite creatures like ourselves to know anything of the nature of non-mental concrete reality as it is in itself, even if we can be said to know the nature of the qualitative character of... more
Many hold that it is impossible in principle for finite creatures like ourselves to know anything of the nature of non-mental concrete reality as it is in itself, even if we can be said to know the nature of the qualitative character of our own experiences (as it is in itself) just in having them. I argue that there is no insuperable obstacle to knowledge of the nature of non-mental concrete reality as it is in itself, even if we have very little as a matter of fact.
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An attempt to take back ‘direct realism’ as a name for a plausible view from those who have recently tried to co-opt it to name a suite of implausible views. (1) Direct realism is true, when properly understood. Descartes and Arnauld... more
An attempt to take back ‘direct realism’ as a name for a plausible view from those who have recently tried to co-opt it to name a suite of implausible views. (1) Direct realism is true, when properly understood. Descartes and Arnauld are good guides, although their writings are open to different interpretations. (2) The issue of the truth or falsity of direct realism must be kept strictly separate from the issue of scepticism regarding an external world; any version of direct realism that permits the refutation of scepticism about the external world—about its existence, or our knowledge of its nature—is ipso facto refuted. (3) No defensible version of direct realism denies the existence of existents that can be correctly called ‘mental representations’. (4) Direct realism neither requires nor entails ‘disjunctivism’; ‘disjunctivism’ neither requires nor entails direct realism. (5) Direct realism doesn’t require the truth of ‘transparentism’, and is incompatible with it on one natural understanding of the word ‘transparent’. (6) There is some truth in the doctrine of transparentism, but we need to distinguish the Moore version from the Reid-James version. (7) A defensible version of transparentism must acknowledge (i) the sense in which we are fully aware of our sensations in conscious perceptual experience, and necessarily so, (ii) the fact that we are in everyday life often aware of our experiences considered specifically as such, even as we are in direct perceptual contact with objects.
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Intentionality is an essentially mental, essentially occurrent, and essentially experiential (conscious) phenomenon. Any attempt to characterize intentionality that detaches it from conscious experience faces two insuperable problems.... more
Intentionality is an essentially mental, essentially occurrent, and essentially experiential (conscious) phenomenon. Any attempt to characterize intentionality that detaches it from conscious experience faces two insuperable problems. First, it is obliged to concede that almost everything (if not everything) has intentionality—all the way down to subatomic particles. Second, it has the consequence that everything that has intentionality has far too much of it—perhaps an infinite amount. The key to a satisfactory and truly naturalistic theory of intentionality is (1) a realistic conception of naturalism and (2) a properly developed understanding of the phenomenon of ‘cognitive experience’.
key words consciousness, experience, phenomenology, intentionality, naturalism, materialism, aboutness, dispositions, ‘stopping problem’, ‘cognitive phenomenology’, cognitive experience, meaning-experience, ‘intentional realism’, ‘taking’
key words consciousness, experience, phenomenology, intentionality, naturalism, materialism, aboutness, dispositions, ‘stopping problem’, ‘cognitive phenomenology’, cognitive experience, meaning-experience, ‘intentional realism’, ‘taking’
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Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn’t just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and... more
Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn’t just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and through. This is obviously true of ordinary human perceptual experience, and cognitive phenomenology is also concerned with something more exclusively cognitive, which we may call propositional meaning-experience, e.g. occurrent experience of linguistic representations as meaning something, as this occurs in thinking or reading or hearing others speak.
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This extract argues that there is indeed such a thing as experience of the content of thought and speech. This is obvious, but many philosophers have denied it — and continue to do so. There is more to experience — 'phenomenology' —... more
This extract argues that there is indeed such a thing as experience of the content of thought and speech. This is obvious, but many philosophers have denied it — and continue to do so. There is more to experience — 'phenomenology' — consciousness — than sensory experience or 'qualia'.
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This provides a detailed example of cognitive phenomenology
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A full-on defence of panpsychism — a newly popular but difficult theory of consciousness-and its place in the material world
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review of Dialogues by Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet
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Life's Dominion is subtitled 'An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia', and the promise of rational argument is welcome and richly fulfilled. Fights about abortion are bitter and worldwide, as Ronald Dworkin observes, and nowhere more... more
Life's Dominion is subtitled 'An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia', and the promise of rational argument is welcome and richly fulfilled. Fights about abortion are bitter and worldwide, as Ronald Dworkin observes, and nowhere more bitter than in the United States. 'Opposing armies march down streets or pack themselves into protests at abortion clinics, courthouses, and the White House, screaming at and spitting on and loathing one another. Abortion is tearing America apart. It is also distorting its politics, and confounding its constitutional law.'
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review of the Oxford Book of Friendship
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Review of books about Thomas Reid and Common Sense Philosophy
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In praise of Eeyore
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It may be that the phrase 'Sleepless in Seattle' first caught Nora Ephron's eye in this review.
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"Like so many other accounts of abnormality, the principal theoretical interest of Dr Sacks's cases lies in what they reveal about normality—about the extraordinary complexities that subserve the apparent simplicities of our most ordinary... more
"Like so many other accounts of abnormality, the principal theoretical interest of Dr Sacks's cases lies in what they reveal about normality—about the extraordinary complexities that subserve the apparent simplicities of our most ordinary experience"
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Oliver Sacks A Leg To Stand On "a gushing, gaudy, colossally cosy piece of work, bosomy and overweight"
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review of Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence by William Ian Miller
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review of Slow Learner by Thomas Pynchon, Times Literary Supplement, Jan 11, 1985
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review of Timothy Leary Flashbacks 1983
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review of Norman Mailer The Gospel According to The Son
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review of What Sort of People Should There Be? Genetic Engineering, Brain Control and their Impact on our Future World (1984) by Jonathan Glover
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review of Austerlitz by W. G. Sebald
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published in The Guardian January 2003
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review of David Lodge, Consciousness and the Novel
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Camus and Albert Camus
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There is no more interesting and inventive British philosopher writing today than Colin McGinn, who is currently teaching at Rutgers University. Recently he has begun to acquire a reputation for intellectual raffishness, and some... more
There is no more interesting and inventive British philosopher writing today than Colin McGinn, who is currently teaching at Rutgers University. Recently he has begun to acquire a reputation for intellectual raffishness, and some philosophers, having learned a great ...
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1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in... more
1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong ...
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This book has been printed digitally and produced in a standard specification in order to ensure its continuing availability OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the... more
This book has been printed digitally and produced in a standard specification in order to ensure its continuing availability OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the ...
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Introduction
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The Evident Connexion presents a new reading of Hume's 'bundle theory' of the self or mind, and his later rejection of it. Galen Strawson argues that the bundle theory does not claim that there are no subjects of experience, as many have... more
The Evident Connexion presents a new reading of Hume's 'bundle theory' of the self or mind, and his later rejection of it. Galen Strawson argues that the bundle theory does not claim that there are no subjects of experience, as many have supposed, or that the mind is just a series of experiences. Hume holds that the 'essence of the mind [is] unknown'. His claim is simply that we have no empirically respectable reason to believe in the existence of a persisting subject, or a mind that is more than a series of experiences (each with its own subject).
Why does Hume later reject the bundle theory? Many think he became dissatisfied with his account of how we come to believe in a persisting self, but Strawson suggests that the problem is more serious. The keystone of Hume's philosophy is that our experiences are governed by a 'uniting principle' or 'bond of union'. But a philosophy that takes a bundle of ontologically distinct experiences to be the only legitimate conception of the mind cannot make explanatory use of those notions in the way Hume does. As Hume says in the Appendix to the Treatise of Human Nature: having 'loosen'd all our particular perceptions' in the bundle theory, he is unable to 'explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together'.
Why does Hume later reject the bundle theory? Many think he became dissatisfied with his account of how we come to believe in a persisting self, but Strawson suggests that the problem is more serious. The keystone of Hume's philosophy is that our experiences are governed by a 'uniting principle' or 'bond of union'. But a philosophy that takes a bundle of ontologically distinct experiences to be the only legitimate conception of the mind cannot make explanatory use of those notions in the way Hume does. As Hume says in the Appendix to the Treatise of Human Nature: having 'loosen'd all our particular perceptions' in the bundle theory, he is unable to 'explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together'.
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John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves--yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In his new book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong,... more
John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves--yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In his new book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point.
Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" only in the ordinary way, as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. In these terms, your personal identity is roughly a matter of those of your past actions that you are still responsible for because you are still "conscious" of them in Locke's special sense of that word.
Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" only in the ordinary way, as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. In these terms, your personal identity is roughly a matter of those of your past actions that you are still responsible for because you are still "conscious" of them in Locke's special sense of that word.
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This is by ALOIS RIEHL. It is Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Volume Three of his book THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS. It expounds 'critical monism'. It's not that easy, but I think... more
This is by ALOIS RIEHL. It is Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Volume Three of his book THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS. It expounds 'critical monism'. It's not that easy, but I think everyone who is interested in the 'mind-body problem would benefit greatly read at least §§1-10.
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I think perhaps this is the best thing on the 'mind-body' problem I have read for 20 years
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chapter 14 of Evolutionary Naturalism (1922) by Roy Wood Sellars
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Poster V Seminario de Historia y Filosofia de la Ciencia
https://estudiosciencia.wordpress.com/eventos-y-actividades/v-seminario-de-historia-y-filosofia-de-la-ciencia/
https://estudiosciencia.wordpress.com/eventos-y-actividades/v-seminario-de-historia-y-filosofia-de-la-ciencia/
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Caliban 1967 by Tim Gluckman and Patrick MacCartney
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Panpsychism is a plausible theory of the fundamental nature of reality. It’s fully compatible with everything in physics, and with physicalism. It’s an error to think that being physical excludes being mental or experiential. Anyone who... more
Panpsychism is a plausible theory of the fundamental nature of reality. It’s fully compatible with everything in physics, and with physicalism. It’s an error to think that being physical excludes being mental or experiential. Anyone who endorses the following three views—[i] materialism or physicalism is true, [ii], consciousness is real, [iii] there is no ‘radical emergence’—should at least endorse ‘micropsychism’ or psychism, the view that [iv] mind or consciousness is a fundamental feature of concrete reality, already present in the most basic forms of concrete reality. And given [v] the apparent interconvertibility (fungibility) of all fundamental forms of physical stuff, panpsychism appears to be the most plausible form of psychism.