

Major Cities Chiefs Association Intelligence Commanders Group





REPORT ON THE 2020 PROTESTS AND CIVIL UNREST

October 2020

*The **Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA)** is a professional organization of police executives representing the largest cities in the United States and Canada. The MCCA provides a unique forum for urban chiefs, sheriffs and other law enforcement executives to share ideas, experiences and strategies. MCCA provides a collaborative forum for the advancement of public safety through innovation, research, policy development, government engagement, community outreach, and leadership development. MCCA membership is comprised of Chiefs and Sheriffs of the sixty-nine largest law enforcement agencies in the United States and nine largest in Canada. They serve 79.9 million people (65.7 US and 14.2 Canada) with a workforce of 251,082 (222,973 US and 28,110 Canada) officers and non-sworn personnel.*

*The **MCCA Intelligence Commanders Group (ICG)** functions as a subset of the MCCA that focuses on law enforcement intelligence and national security matters. The ICG is comprised of intelligence commanders from each MCCA agency that represents their organization's intelligence and/or national security mission. The group serves as a mechanism for advising the Chiefs and Sheriffs on security matters, exchanging intelligence between MCCA members, and developing programs for combatting crime and terrorism globally.*

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INTRODUCTION

Background

On May 26th, 2020, protests erupted in Minneapolis, Minnesota as a result of the in-custody death of George Floyd. Video footage of the catalytic event quickly went viral, garnering widespread media attention and calls for condemnation of the involved officers. An unprecedented wave of protests and civil unrest began flowing across the U.S. and Canada in the days and months that followed. In total, there were 8,700 protests that took place in most major cities between May 25th and July 31st, 2020. While the vast majority of these protests were peaceful, a large portion did include non-violent acts of civil disobedience such as the takeover of a roadway or disruption of commerce. Additionally, there were 574 protests that involved acts of violence, some of which were severe. This violence was limited to only 7% of all protests and in most cases, the acts were perpetrated by individuals or small groups that infiltrated the larger protests. Nonetheless, the sheer volume of protests, combined with the level of civil disobedience and existence of some ultra-violent events, created an extraordinarily challenging environment for law enforcement agencies. This report examines the 2020 protests and civil unrest that occurred, and it presents a comprehensive perspective into the law enforcement challenges and lessons learned in 68 of the largest cities in the U.S. and Canada.

Scope

The scope of this report is limited to the experience and perspectives of law enforcement agencies from the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA). While not comprehensive of all law enforcement, the MCCA represents 78 of the largest police agencies in the U.S. and Canada. These agencies service 79.9 million people and comprise a workforce of 251,082 police officers and non-commissioned personnel. MCCA members also represent the majority of cities that experienced protests and civil unrest in 2020.

This report is also primarily based on a law enforcement account of the protests that occurred within each jurisdiction. The data collected and presented does not include information from open sources or the general public. The data is also limited to the protests and civil unrest that occurred in MCCA member cities between May 25th and July 31st of 2020.

For the purpose of this report, “protest” is used as an umbrella term that includes demonstrations or public assemblies that involve 1) lawful and peaceful, 2) unlawful but non-violent (i.e. civil disobedience), and 3) violent protest-related activities. The first category of lawful and peaceful is exclusive to protests that did not involve any acts of civil disobedience or violence. However, the latter two categories are not mutually exclusive and instead involve some overlap. For example, while civil disobedience is based on unlawful but non-violent acts, there were some events where a portion of the protest involved some level of civil disobedience and another portion that involved some level of violence. Additionally, there were

some protests that involved a sudden or constant transition between these two types of activity.

Methodology

This report was developed by the MCCA Intelligence Commanders Group (ICG), which functions as a subset of the MCCA Homeland Security Committee. The ICG is comprised of intelligence commanders from each MCCA agency and this network of representatives established the following three datasets that were used for this report:

- **Surveys:** The first and most significant set of data was developed by surveying MCCA member agencies. The five-page survey included qualitative and quantitative questions about the protest-related events, violence, and the law enforcement response that occurred in each jurisdiction. A total of 68 of 78 MCCA agencies responded to this survey.
- **Facilitated Discussion:** The second dataset used for this report is based on ICG meetings in Washington, D.C. and Dallas, Texas, where MCCA agencies participated in an after-action review of the 2020 protests and civil unrest. There were 44 MCCA agencies represented in the meetings, which also included a virtual component for those that could not travel to the host cities. This after-action review was based on a facilitated conversation where the representatives provided a briefing on the protests and civil unrest they experienced in their city. The review also included a question and answer period, as well as polling to help identify protest-related trends across jurisdictions.
- **After Action Reports:** The final dataset used for this report is based on a small number of after-action reports that individual law enforcement agencies produced regarding the 2020 protest and civil unrest. Most MCCA agencies had not yet produced or published an after-action report during the research phase of this project and therefore, the number of after-action reports that were available was limited. However, these reports did provide some additional context and helped confirm what was identified via the surveys and facilitated discussion.

OVERVIEW OF PROTESTS IN THE U.S. AND CANADA

There were approximately 8,700 protests that took place in 68 major cities and counties between May 25th and July 31st, 2020.¹ The largest numbers of protests in a single jurisdiction were reported in Los Angeles County and New York City, each with over a thousand events. El Paso and Honolulu reported the smallest number of protests, each with only eight during this time. The largest crowd size for a single protest was in Houston, where one event was estimated to involve 60,000 protesters. Several other cities, including Los Angeles, New York, Seattle, Chicago, Boston, Tulsa, Wichita, and Edmonton also experienced protests with extraordinarily large crowds, ranging from 15,000 to 50,000 in a single event. The largest crowd size for the remaining cities ranged from 100 to 12,000, with most cities experiencing at least one event that involved 3,000 or more protesters.




Figure 1 - General Statistics on All Protests

¹ While the group of 68 participating agencies represents a large portion of U.S. and Canadian law enforcement, it is not comprehensive and as such, the figure of 8,700 is likely less than the actual total number of protests that took place in the two countries.

While the majority of protests were lawful and peaceful, 94% of major city law enforcement agencies (64 out of 68) experienced at least one protest that involved unlawful but non-violent acts of civil disobedience (e.g. illegal takeover of a public roadway). Also, 79% of agencies (54 out of 68) experienced at least one protest that involved some level of violence.² The following section offers a more in-depth analysis of each type of protest: events that were entirely peaceful and lawful, events that were peaceful but unlawful (i.e. civil disobedience), and events that involved some level of violence. It is important to note the latter two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, some agencies may have had a protest event that included both a peaceful but unlawful component, as well as a violent component. As such, the data presented in this report includes some overlap between the number of protests that were categorized as having some level of civil disobedience, violence or both.




Figure 2 - Percentages of Agencies that Experienced Protests, Civil Disobedience, and Violence

Peaceful and Lawful Protests

Of the 8,700 reported protests, approximately 4,434 (51%) were both peaceful **and** lawful.³ This latter condition of lawfulness is important as it differentiates between these events and the peaceful but illegal protests that involved non-violent acts of civil disobedience. Although any form of peace is much better than violence, there is still a negative effect and challenge that accompanies a law enforcement agency’s response to protesters that illegally block traffic or passively disrupt commerce. Fortunately, these types of peaceful but unlawful protests were limited to less than half of all events and entirely absent in at least three major cities.⁴

² The term “some of level of violence” was broadly defined to include any protest event that involved physical violence against law enforcement and/or the general public to include acts or rioting, looting, arson, and civil unrest.

³ The remaining 4,266 protests were comprised of civil disobedience and/or violent events. Although civil disobedience was defined as unlawful but non-violent, there were some agencies that reported protests that included both a component of civil disobedience and violence simultaneously, or a constant transition between the two types of activities.

⁴ Baltimore County, Prince George’s County, and Ottawa reported that all their protests were peaceful **and** lawful.

Peaceful but Unlawful Protests (Civil Disobedience)

The level of civil disobedience that began in late May and continued for many months was significant and unprecedented for most major city law enforcement agencies. These non-violent but illegal acts often involved the takeover of a freeway or roadway, blocking traffic, and refusing to cooperate with lawful orders. In some cities, protesters also disrupted outdoor dining and entertainment areas by trespassing onto private property, harassing patrons, and challenging the flow of commerce. Although most of these non-violent acts of civil disobedience did not result in injury, many still posed a danger to innocent bystanders, as well as to the individuals engaged in the civil disobedience. For example, in many cities, protesters entered major highways on foot and began blocking both directions of travel. Innocent motorists were often trapped by the protest crowd and in some cases, this resulted in confrontations and violence.

In total, approximately 42% of all protests (3,692 out of 8,700) involved some level of unlawful but non-violent acts of civil disobedience. The highest number of protests involving civil disobedience in a single city was 500 and the average was 55.




Figure 3 - General Statistics on Protests that Involved Some Level of Civil Disobedience

Although the average percentage of protests within a single city that resulted in civil disobedience was 45%, the amount of civil disobedience varied significantly between cities. On one hand, there were three agencies that did not report any instances of civil disobedience and 12 who indicated no more than 10% of the protests in their jurisdiction involved civil disobedience. On the other hand, there were nine major city law enforcement agencies who encountered civil disobedience in every protest they responded to.⁵




Figure 4 - Percentage of Protests that Involved Some Level of Civil Disobedience by Location and In Total⁶

Arlington, TX	30.8%	Edmonton, AB, CA	10.0%	Nashville, TN	29.8%	Portland, OR	100.0%
Atlanta, GA	87.0%	El Paso, TX	12.5%	Miami-Dade, FL	73.9%	Prince George's Co., MD	0.0%
Aurora, CO	91.7%	Fairfax Co., VA	38.5%	Milwaukee, WI	88.8%	Raleigh, NC	93.7%
Baltimore Co., MD	0.0%	Fort Worth, TX	23.1%	Minneapolis, MN	50.0%	Sacramento, CA	100.0%
Baltimore City, MD	10.5%	Fresno, CA	3.6%	Montgomery Co., MD	17.4%	Salt Lake City, UT	91.7%
Boston, MA	13.5%	Honolulu, HI	25.0%	Nassau Co., NY	76.9%	San Antonio, TX	6.1%
Buffalo, NY	7.5%	Houston, TX	8.8%	New Orleans, LA	2.1%	San Diego, CA	100.0%
Calgary, AB, CA	10.0%	Indianapolis, IN	88.9%	New York, NY	20.5%	San Jose, CA	16.7%
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC	8.5%	Jacksonville, FL	25.0%	Newark, NJ	9.5%	Seattle, WA	60.0%
Chicago, IL	76.3%	Kansas City, MO	59.0%	Oakland, CA	20.0%	St Louis, MO	88.9%
Cincinnati, OH	6.7%	Las Vegas, NV	9.3%	Oklahoma City, OK	33.3%	Suffolk Co., NY	3.7%
Columbus, OH	100.0%	Long Beach, CA	82.0%	Omaha, NE	67.6%	Tampa, FL	81.7%
Dallas, TX	70.7%	Los Angeles Co., CA	6.5%	Orlando, FL	16.7%	Tucson, AZ	100.0%
Washington, DC	N/A	Los Angeles City, CA	27.4%	Ottawa, ON, CA	0.0%	Tulsa, OK	28.6%
DeKalb Co., GA	46.2%	Louisville, KY	75.0%	Peel, ON, CA	16.7%	Vancouver, BC, CA	10.3%
Denver, CO	100.0%	Memphis, TN	100.0%	Phoenix, AZ	93.0%	Virginia Beach, VA	18.2%
Detroit, MI	100.0%	Mesa, AZ	25.0%	Pittsburgh, PA	45.3%	Wichita, KS	69.8%

Table 1 - Percentage of Total Protests that Involved Some Level of Civil Disobedience by City

⁵ 67 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

⁶ This graph is designed to highlight the portion of unlawful but non-violent protests compared to the total number of 8,700 protests. The remaining "all other protests" reflected in this graph includes lawful and peaceful protests, as well as the protests that involved some level of violence.

Violent Protests

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the 8,700 protests were either peaceful or involved non-violent acts of civil disobedience, there were groups and individuals that sought to exploit the protest environment in many cities and engage in violence. An estimated 7% of the protests (574 of the 8,700 protests) involved violence.

The malicious actors who took part in this violence were motivated by a wide variety of factors. Some were driven by extremist anti-government or anti-law enforcement ideologies on both sides of the political spectrum. Others simply used the protests as cover to engage in criminal behavior. As seen below, one city alone experienced 100 protests in which acts of violence occurred. This consistent violence transpired in a span of just 68 days. Each agency also experienced, on average, nine protests where some level of violence occurred. On average, 10% of all the protests occurring in each city resulted in some level of violence.




Figure 5 - General Statistics on Protests that Involved Some Level of Violence

Similar to the acts of non-violent civil disobedience that occurred throughout the different cities, the severity and recurrence of violence varied dramatically between cities. For example, 3 major city law enforcement agencies reported over 60% of their protests involved some level of violence and there were 16 other agencies that experienced violence in at least 10% of the protests that took place in their cities. However, there were also 13 agencies that did not report any instances of violence during protests.⁷




Figure 6 - Percentage of Protests that Involved Some Level of Violence by Location and in Total⁸

Arlington, TX	7.7%	Edmonton, AB, CA	0.0%	Nashville, TN	2.1%	Portland, OR	62.5%
Atlanta, GA	3.5%	El Paso, TX	12.5%	Miami-Dade, FL	26.1%	Prince George's Co., MD	0.0%
Aurora, CO	8.3%	Fairfax Co., VA	0.0%	Milwaukee, WI	25.4%	Raleigh, NC	6.3%
Baltimore Co., MD	0.0%	Fort Worth, TX	2.6%	Minneapolis, MN	20.0%	Sacramento, CA	6.1%
Baltimore City, MD	10.5%	Fresno, CA	0.0%	Montgomery Co., MD	0.0%	Salt Lake City, UT	3.3%
Boston, MA	2.7%	Honolulu, HI	0.0%	Nassau Co., NY	0.0%	San Antonio, TX	2.4%
Buffalo, NY	5.0%	Houston, TX	3.8%	New Orleans, LA	2.1%	San Diego, CA	4.7%
Calgary, AB, CA	0.0%	Indianapolis, IN	6.2%	New York, NY	4.9%	San Jose, CA	8.3%
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC	7.6%	Jacksonville, FL	7.5%	Newark, NJ	0.0%	Seattle, WA	16.0%
Chicago, IL	3.8%	Kansas City, MO	10.3%	Oakland, CA	20.0%	St Louis, MO	11.1%
Cincinnati, OH	6.7%	Las Vegas, NV	2.3%	Oklahoma City, OK	3.3%	Suffolk Co., NY	0.0%
Columbus, OH	63.8%	Long Beach, CA	1.1%	Omaha, NE	16.2%	Tampa, FL	8.7%
Dallas, TX	5.4%	Los Angeles Co., CA	0.9%	Orlando, FL	16.7%	Tucson, AZ	11.8%
Washington, DC	N/A	Los Angeles City, CA	7.7%	Ottawa, ON, CA	0.0%	Tulsa, OK	21.4%
DeKalb Co., GA	15.4%	Louisville, KY	12.5%	Peel, ON, CA	5.6%	Vancouver, BC, CA	0.0%
Denver, CO	68.0%	Memphis, TN	5.7%	Phoenix, AZ	7.0%	Virginia Beach, VA	4.5%
Detroit, MI	9.4%	Mesa, AZ	18.8%	Pittsburgh, PA	3.5%	Wichita, KS	7.0%

Table 2 - Percentage of Total Protests that Involved Some Level of Violence by City

⁷ 67 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

⁸ This graph is designed to highlight the portion of protests that involved some level of violence compared to the total number of 8,700 protests. The remaining "all other protests" reflected in this graph includes unlawful but peaceful protests, as well as the protests that were both lawful and peaceful.

AN IN-DEPTH LOOK INTO PROTEST-RELATED VIOLENCE

In cities where violence did occur, assaults on police officers, looting, and arson were the most common criminal activities. Approximately, 72% of major city law enforcement agencies had officers harmed during the protests.⁹ This included nearly every agency that experienced at least one violent protest. In total, over the course of the civil unrest from May to July, more than 2,000 officers sustained injuries in the line of duty. One agency reported 50 officers being injured in a single week of protests. Another agency reported that 462 of their officers were injured during the protests in their jurisdiction.




Figure 7 - Percentage of Agencies that Experienced Looting, Arson, and Rioting

Looting was also a common occurrence (2,385 instances), with 62% of major city law enforcement agencies indicating that at least one incident of looting occurred in their cities.¹⁰ This activity was primarily clustered during the first few days of protests. Of note, several agencies reported that in some instances, the looting appeared to be coordinated and organized. For example, some cities encountered “looting caravans” that moved throughout different neighborhoods. One agency reported 115 commercial burglaries occurred in just one day. Two other agencies reported \$927,000 worth of damage as a result of looting in each of their jurisdictions, and another agency reported a single looting event at a shopping mall that resulted in over \$70 million in damage.

⁹ 67 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

¹⁰ 66 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

More than half of major city law enforcement agencies (56%) experienced arson incidents.¹¹ The individuals who committed these crimes targeted a variety of structures including government buildings, places of worship, and seemingly random stores and businesses. Law enforcement buildings and property were also popular targets. One agency reported dumpsters, trash cans, trees, furniture, and vehicles being set on fire. A UPS truck was reported as being looted and set on fire in another jurisdiction. In many cities, city hall, as well as other iconic public buildings and federal courthouses were targets of arson. Several agencies also had police precincts set on fire and hundreds of police cars were significantly damaged throughout the various protests across the U.S. One agency alone reported 300 police cars damaged to include 19 that were fully engulfed in flames.




Figure 8 - Total Number of Acts of Looting, Arson, and Attacks on Police

¹¹ Arson incidents that did not involve police vehicles were counted separately from those that involved the burning of a police vehicle. 66 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

Types of Weapons Used

There were a variety of weapons used by protesters during acts of civil disobedience or violence. The most common weapons were improvised or weapons of opportunity such as rocks, bricks, pieces of landscape, and bottles (including frozen water bottles and glass bottles). More than three quarters of major city law enforcement agencies (78%) that experienced violent protests reported having officers attacked with these types of weapons. Another common violent tactic used by protesters involved throwing “molotov cocktails” at officers.¹² One agency reported these incendiary devices being thrown at officers who were standing at their skirmish lines. In another instance, the devices were thrown behind officers, trapping them between the ensuing fire and a barrier built by protesters. This tactic was extremely dangerous and presented a high risk of death or injury to officers.




Figure 9 - Percentage of Agencies that Experienced Various Weapons Used by Protesters

¹² “Molotov cocktails” are homemade incendiary devices typically made of a bottle filled with flammable liquid with a means of ignition attached.

Other items used as weapons or projectiles against officers included fire extinguishers, hammers, wood, cinderblocks, rocks, frozen fruit, and suspected bodily fluids. Multiple agencies also reported being attacked by protesters who threw these types of dangerous objects down onto officers from elevated positions such as apartment or business windows, landings, and rooftops. Another common tactic was to use peaceful protesters as human shields while violent individuals attacked officers and attempted to incite violence by throwing objects from deep within the crowds. Law enforcement officers were also attacked with weapons and tactics that had rarely been seen before, such as the use of lasers to target the eyes of officers, which 41% of agencies reported.

Approximately 63% of major city law enforcement agencies reported fireworks being launched or thrown at officers. Other protesters showed up with more traditional weapons, indicating that these individuals likely came prepared for, or looking to engage in, violence. These weapons included items like bats and poles, which 59% of agencies reported, and shields, which 53% of agencies reported.

A slight majority of agencies (51%) were also confronted with firearms, most of which were legally carried based on open carry laws. In these instances, protesters often carried semi-automatic assault rifles such as AR-15s, shotguns, and handguns. Firearms carried by protesters often required an elevated and more complex response from law enforcement agencies. It became necessary for these agencies to deploy specialized squadrons and position additional police officers armed with rifles and other deadly force options in order to proportionately protect against any firearm threat or attack.

Tragically, this concern became a reality in numerous major cities. Five agencies reported police officers being shot or critically injured during protests. One agency reported four of their officers being shot and a retired police captain killed by protesters using firearms. Another agency reported protesters discharging their firearms from vehicle caravans and two agencies reported protesters being shot and killed by other protesters.

Paid and Out-of-State Protesters

A common trend observed by major city law enforcement agencies was the large number of visitors from out-of-state who participated in the protests. Nearly all agencies (90%) experienced protest events with persons that came to the event from another state. Additionally, many agencies reported that violence seemed to spike on days where out-of-state protesters were present.¹³ The days that levels of violence were lower were days when local protesters remained, and fewer numbers of out-of-state participants were observed.

While less common, over a quarter of major city law enforcement agencies (29%) reported situations with participants that were paid to partake in the protest.




Figure 10 - Percentage of Agencies that had Out-of-State and Paid Protesters Participate in Protests

Nationwide Coordination

The weekend of May 29th to the following Monday, June 1st was by far the most violent for many major city law enforcement agencies. These events had thousands of people in attendance including groups with suspected violent extremist ideologies. “Prepared and coordinated resistance” was reported by some agencies and similar tactics such as the use of arson, looting, barricades, caravans, and specific types of weapons were seen in major cities nationwide. Protesters seemed to coordinate their movements and actions on these days as if the violence and tactics were pre-planned. For example, across the U.S., major city law enforcement agencies reported peaceful protests beginning in the early to late afternoons and violence beginning once it became dark.

¹³ Reported during the ICG After-Action Review in Washington, D.C. and/or Dallas, Texas.

Violent Extremist Ideologies

Another trend seen in many cities involved individuals with suspected violent extremist ideologies infiltrating various protest groups to commit acts of violence, looting, and rioting. More than three quarters of agencies (78%) discovered persons that seemed to self-identify with violent far-left ideologies, and more than half (51%) discovered persons that seemed to self-identify with violent far-right ideologies.




Figure 11 - Percentage of Agencies that had Far Left or Right Violent Extremists Involved in Protests

PROTEST-RELATED ARRESTS

From May 25th until July 31st, major city law enforcement agencies arrested 16,241 individuals during protest-related events. Nearly 17% (2,735) of these arrests were for felony offenses.¹⁴ The average number of felony arrests per agency was 41 with the highest number of felony arrests for a single agency being 639. The fact that only 7% of the protests were violent but almost a fifth of the individuals arrested were for felony offenses is significant. This level of felony arrests demonstrates that law enforcement agencies largely focused on individuals who engaged in serious criminal activity and/or represented a threat to public safety.




Figure 12 - General Statistics for All Protest-Related Arrests

¹⁴ 67 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

More than half (53%) of all agencies reported that their District Attorney’s Office elected not to prosecute protest-related cases. More than half of these agencies (19 out of 36) indicated their local District Attorney dismissed “a lot” of cases. One agency reported that a local District Attorney dismissed more than 600 cases and would only pursue cases that had multiple charges. In some instances, prosecutors refused to charge those arrested for felony crimes committed during the protests despite the availability of video evidence and suspect confessions. Large sums of money were also collected through public fundraising and other means to post bail for some protesters, who in turn attended the next protest and re-committed the same crimes.

This lack of accountability and failure to prosecute may have removed an important deterrent for preventing criminal activity. This point is underscored by the fact that approximately 52% of major city law enforcement agencies reported having to re-arrest suspects at least once at different protest-related events.




Figure 13 - Level of Protest-Related Cases Dismissed by District Attorneys and Number of Re-Arrests

POLICE USE OF FORCE

Use of Force Analysis – Nationally

Analysis of the level of force used by major city law enforcement agencies indicates the response to the protests that occurred between May 25th and July 31st, 2020 was measured and proportionate. Major city law enforcement agencies deployed CS gas, pepper balls, and high volume pepper spray during 1.8%, 1.8%, and 3.5% of protest-related events, respectively. The use of kinetic projectiles was even more limited. The use of less lethal shotguns only occurred in 1.2% of all protests and 40mm launchers (for foam rounds or similar projectiles) only occurred in 2.1% of all protests.¹⁵




Figure 14 - General Statistics on Police Use of Force, Compared to the Proportion of All Protests

¹⁵ 64 of 68 agencies provided data for the measurement regarding the use of high volume pepper spray. 65 of 68 agencies provided data for the measurements regarding the use of CS gas, pepper balls, less lethal shotguns, and 40MM launchers.

Use of CS Gas – By Agency

CS gas was used proportionately by agencies in comparison to the violence experienced in their jurisdictions.¹⁶ In fact, CS gas was used less frequently than the percentage of protests that contained acts of violence per city. This means that most of the time, agencies deployed this tool less often than they could have to quell violence. Overall, agencies refrained from the disproportionate or overuse of this tool, despite being confronted with acts of violence and large-scale coordinated acts of civil disobedience.

USE OF CS GAS - COMPARED TO PERCENTAGE OF VIOLENT EVENTS					
Agency	% of Violent Events	% of Force Option Used	Agency	% of Violent Events	% of Force Option Used
Arlington PD	7.7%	0.0%	Metro Nashville PD	2.1%	2.1%
Atlanta PD	3.5%	0.9%	Miami-Dade PD	26.1%	4.3%
Aurora PD	8.3%	0.0%	Milwaukee PD	25.4%	0.8%
Baltimore Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%	Minneapolis PD	20.0%	20.0%
Baltimore City PD	10.5%	0.0%	Montgomery Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Boston PD	2.7%	1.4%	Nassau Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Buffalo PD	5.0%	5.0%	New Orleans PD	2.1%	2.1%
Calgary PD	0.0%	0.0%	New York PD	4.9%	N/A
Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD	7.6%	4.2%	Newark PD	0.0%	0.0%
Chicago PD	3.8%	0.0%	Oakland PD	20.0%	8.0%
Cincinnati PD	6.7%	5.0%	Oklahoma City PD	3.3%	3.3%
Columbus PD	63.8%	N/A	Omaha PD	16.2%	5.4%
Dallas PD	5.4%	1.6%	Orlando PD	16.7%	13.3%
Washington Metro PD	N/A	N/A	Ottawa PD	0.0%	0.0%
DeKalb Co. PD	15.4%	7.7%	Peel Regional PD	5.6%	0.0%
Denver PD	68.0%	24.0%	Phoenix PD	7.0%	4.2%
Detroit PD	9.4%	6.3%	Pittsburgh PD	3.5%	1.2%
Edmonton PS	0.0%	0.0%	Portland PB	62.5%	39.1%
El Paso PD	12.5%	12.5%	Prince George's Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Fairfax Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%	Raleigh PD	6.3%	3.2%
Fort Worth PD	2.6%	2.6%	Sacramento PD	6.1%	1.8%
Fresno PD	0.0%	0.0%	Salt Lake City PD	3.3%	0.0%
Honolulu PD	0.0%	0.0%	San Antonio PD	2.4%	2.4%
Houston PD	3.8%	0.0%	San Diego PD	4.7%	0.9%
Indianapolis Metro PD	6.2%	4.9%	San Jose PD	8.3%	2.5%
Jacksonville SO	7.5%	5.0%	Seattle PD	N/A	N/A
Kansas City PD	10.3%	10.3%	St Louis Metro PD	11.1%	1.1%
Las Vegas Metro PD	2.3%	1.9%	Suffolk Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Long Beach PD	1.1%	0.0%	Tampa PD	8.7%	0.0%
Los Angeles Co. SO	0.9%	0.9%	Tucson PD	11.8%	5.9%
Los Angeles City PD	7.7%	0.0%	Tulsa PD	21.4%	21.4%
Louisville Metro PD	12.5%	2.5%	Vancouver PD	0.0%	0.0%
Memphis PD	5.7%	1.9%	Virginia Beach PD	4.5%	4.5%
Mesa PD	18.8%	0.0%	Wichita PD	7.0%	4.7%

Force Option Used **More** than the Percentage of **Violent Events**
 Force Option Used **Equal** to the Percentage of **Violent Events**
 Force Option Used **Zero or Less** than the Percentage of **Violent Events**

Table 3 - Percentage of CS Gas Used in Comparison to the Percentage of Violent Events by Agency

¹⁶ 64 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

Use of Less Lethal Shotguns – By Agency

Less lethal shotguns were only used by 25 agencies (39%) during protests.¹⁷ Every agency reported proportional use of this tool in relation to violence. Most agencies reported using it even less than the number of times the tool may have been permitted. There is also a correlation between the severity of violence that occurred in specific cities and the prevalence of the less lethal shotgun used by police during protests.

USE OF LESS LETHAL SHOTGUNS - COMPARED TO PERCENTAGE OF VIOLENT EVENTS					
Agency	% of Violent Events	% of Force Option Used	Agency	% of Violent Events	% of Force Option Used
Arlington PD	7.7%	0.0%	Metro Nashville PD	2.1%	0.0%
Atlanta PD	3.5%	0.2%	Miami-Dade PD	26.1%	0.0%
Aurora PD	8.3%	2.8%	Milwaukee PD	25.4%	0.0%
Baltimore Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%	Minneapolis PD	20.0%	20.0%
Baltimore City PD	10.5%	0.0%	Montgomery Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Boston PD	2.7%	0.0%	Nassau Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Buffalo PD	5.0%	5.0%	New Orleans PD	2.1%	0.0%
Calgary PD	0.0%	0.0%	New York PD	4.9%	N/A
Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD	7.6%	0.0%	Newark PD	0.0%	0.0%
Chicago PD	3.8%	0.0%	Oakland PD	20.0%	0.0%
Cincinnati PD	6.7%	5.0%	Oklahoma City PD	3.3%	3.3%
Columbus PD	63.8%	N/A	Omaha PD	16.2%	0.0%
Dallas PD	5.4%	0.0%	Orlando PD	16.7%	0.0%
Washington Metro PD	N/A	N/A	Ottawa PD	0.0%	0.0%
DeKalb Co. PD	15.4%	0.0%	Peel Regional PD	5.6%	0.0%
Denver PD	68.0%	24.0%	Phoenix PD	7.0%	7.0%
Detroit PD	9.4%	3.1%	Pittsburgh PD	3.5%	3.5%
Edmonton PS	0.0%	0.0%	Portland PB	62.5%	0.0%
El Paso PD	12.5%	12.5%	Prince George's Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Fairfax Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%	Raleigh PD	6.3%	3.2%
Fort Worth PD	2.6%	2.6%	Sacramento PD	6.1%	3.5%
Fresno PD	0.0%	0.0%	Salt Lake City PD	3.3%	3.3%
Honolulu PD	0.0%	0.0%	San Antonio PD	2.4%	0.0%
Houston PD	3.8%	0.0%	San Diego PD	4.7%	0.0%
Indianapolis Metro PD	6.2%	0.0%	San Jose PD	8.3%	3.3%
Jacksonville SO	7.5%	5.0%	Seattle PD	N/A	N/A
Kansas City PD	10.3%	7.7%	St Louis Metro PD	11.1%	1.1%
Las Vegas Metro PD	2.3%	0.5%	Suffolk Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Long Beach PD	1.1%	0.0%	Tampa PD	8.7%	7.7%
Los Angeles Co. SO	0.9%	0.0%	Tucson PD	11.8%	0.0%
Los Angeles City PD	7.7%	6.0%	Tulsa PD	21.4%	21.4%
Louisville Metro PD	12.5%	0.0%	Vancouver PD	0.0%	0.0%
Memphis PD	5.7%	0.0%	Virginia Beach PD	4.5%	0.0%
Mesa PD	18.8%	6.3%	Wichita PD	7.0%	4.7%




 Force Option Used **More** than the Percentage of **Violent Protests**
 Force Option Used **Equal** to the Percentage of **Violent Protests**
 Force Option Used **Zero or Less** than the Percentage of **Violent Protests**

Table 4 - Percentage of Less Lethal Shotguns Used in Comparison to the Percentage of Violent Events by Agency

¹⁷ 64 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

Use of 40MM Launchers – By Agency

40MM Launchers were also used proportionately, if not fewer times than when it may have been permitted.¹⁸ These statistics were like that of the less lethal shotguns. There was a correlation between their use and cities that experienced high levels of violence during protests.

USE OF 40MM LAUNCHERS - COMPARED TO PERCENTAGE OF VIOLENT EVENTS					
Agency	% of Violent Events	% of Force Option Used	Agency	% of Violent Events	% of Force Option Used
Arlington PD	7.7%	0.0%	Metro Nashville PD	2.1%	2.1%
Atlanta PD	3.5%	1.0%	Miami-Dade PD	26.1%	4.3%
Aurora PD	8.3%	5.6%	Milwaukee PD	25.4%	0.0%
Baltimore Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%	Minneapolis PD	20.0%	20.0%
Baltimore City PD	10.5%	5.3%	Montgomery Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Boston PD	2.7%	1.4%	Nassau Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Buffalo PD	5.0%	5.0%	New Orleans PD	2.1%	2.1%
Calgary PD	0.0%	0.0%	New York PD	4.9%	N/A
Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD	7.6%	1.7%	Newark PD	0.0%	0.0%
Chicago PD	3.8%	0.0%	Oakland PD	20.0%	0.0%
Cincinnati PD	6.7%	6.7%	Oklahoma City PD	3.3%	3.3%
Columbus PD	63.8%	N/A	Omaha PD	16.2%	4.1%
Dallas PD	5.4%	2.2%	Orlando PD	16.7%	0.0%
Washington Metro PD	N/A	N/A	Ottawa PD	0.0%	0.0%
DeKalb Co. PD	15.4%	0.0%	Peel Regional PD	5.6%	0.0%
Denver PD	68.0%	16.0%	Phoenix PD	7.0%	7.0%
Detroit PD	9.4%	3.1%	Pittsburgh PD	3.5%	3.5%
Edmonton PS	0.0%	0.0%	Portland PB	62.5%	39.1%
El Paso PD	12.5%	0.0%	Prince George's Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Fairfax Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%	Raleigh PD	6.3%	3.2%
Fort Worth PD	2.6%	2.6%	Sacramento PD	6.1%	3.5%
Fresno PD	0.0%	0.0%	Salt Lake City PD	3.3%	3.3%
Honolulu PD	0.0%	0.0%	San Antonio PD	2.4%	0.0%
Houston PD	3.8%	3.8%	San Diego PD	4.7%	0.9%
Indianapolis Metro PD	6.2%	0.0%	San Jose PD	8.3%	3.3%
Jacksonville SO	7.5%	5.0%	Seattle PD	N/A	N/A
Kansas City PD	10.3%	0.0%	St Louis Metro PD	11.1%	1.1%
Las Vegas Metro PD	2.3%	1.9%	Suffolk Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Long Beach PD	1.1%	1.1%	Tampa PD	8.7%	3.8%
Los Angeles Co. SO	0.9%	0.9%	Tucson PD	11.8%	11.8%
Los Angeles City PD	7.7%	6.0%	Tulsa PD	21.4%	21.4%
Louisville Metro PD	12.5%	2.5%	Vancouver PD	0.0%	0.0%
Memphis PD	5.7%	0.0%	Virginia Beach PD	4.5%	4.5%
Mesa PD	18.8%	0.0%	Wichita PD	7.0%	4.7%

Force Option Used **More** than the Percentage of **Violent Protests**
 Force Option Used **Equal** to the Percentage of **Violent Protests**
 Force Option Used **Zero or Less** than the Percentage of **Violent Protests**

Table 5 - Percentage of 40MM Launchers Used in Comparison to the Percentage of Violent Events by Agency

¹⁸ 64 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

Use of Pepper Balls – By Agency

The agencies that used pepper balls did so proportionately and the vast majority used the tool fewer times than when it may have been permitted.¹⁹ This tool is also commonly used to address acts of civil disobedience, which may or may not involve violence. This tool was limited to acts of violence or civil disobedience that created a public safety exemption for using the tool (i.e. the takeover of an active freeway where persons were placed in immediate harm).

USE OF PEPPER BALLS - COMPARED TO PERCENTAGE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (C/D)					
Agency	% of C/D Events	% of Force Option Used	Agency	% of C/D Events	% of Force Option Used
Arlington PD	30.8%	0.0%	Metro Nashville PD	29.8%	0.0%
Atlanta PD	87.0%	0.2%	Miami-Dade PD	73.9%	0.0%
Aurora PD	91.7%	0.0%	Milwaukee PD	88.8%	0.0%
Baltimore Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%	Minneapolis PD	50.0%	0.0%
Baltimore City PD	10.5%	5.3%	Montgomery Co. PD	17.4%	0.0%
Boston PD	13.5%	0.0%	Nassau Co. PD	76.9%	0.0%
Buffalo PD	7.5%	7.5%	New Orleans PD	2.1%	0.0%
Calgary PD	10.0%	0.0%	New York PD	20.5%	N/A
Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD	8.5%	4.2%	Newark PD	9.5%	0.0%
Chicago PD	76.3%	0.0%	Oakland PD	20.0%	0.0%
Cincinnati PD	6.7%	6.7%	Oklahoma City PD	33.3%	0.0%
Columbus PD	100.0%	N/A	Omaha PD	67.6%	16.2%
Dallas PD	70.7%	2.2%	Orlando PD	16.7%	0.0%
Washington Metro PD	N/A	N/A	Ottawa PD	0.0%	0.0%
DeKalb Co. PD	46.2%	7.7%	Peel Regional PD	16.7%	0.0%
Denver PD	100.0%	20.0%	Phoenix PD	93.0%	8.5%
Detroit PD	100.0%	0.0%	Pittsburgh PD	45.3%	0.0%
Edmonton PS	10.0%	0.0%	Portland PB	100.0%	0.0%
El Paso PD	12.5%	0.0%	Prince George's Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Fairfax Co. PD	38.5%	0.0%	Raleigh PD	93.7%	3.2%
Fort Worth PD	23.1%	0.0%	Sacramento PD	100.0%	3.5%
Fresno PD	3.6%	0.0%	Salt Lake City PD	91.7%	0.8%
Honolulu PD	25.0%	0.0%	San Antonio PD	6.1%	2.4%
Houston PD	8.8%	2.5%	San Diego PD	100.0%	1.9%
Indianapolis Metro PD	88.9%	7.4%	San Jose PD	16.7%	3.3%
Jacksonville SO	25.0%	5.0%	Seattle PD	N/A	N/A
Kansas City PD	59.0%	0.0%	St Louis Metro PD	88.9%	1.1%
Las Vegas Metro PD	9.3%	2.3%	Suffolk Co. PD	3.7%	0.0%
Long Beach PD	82.0%	0.0%	Tampa PD	81.7%	8.7%
Los Angeles Co. SO	6.5%	0.9%	Tucson PD	100.0%	11.8%
Los Angeles City PD	27.4%	0.0%	Tulsa PD	28.6%	28.6%
Louisville Metro PD	75.0%	12.5%	Vancouver PD	10.3%	0.0%
Memphis PD	100.0%	0.0%	Virginia Beach PD	18.2%	0.0%
Mesa PD	25.0%	6.3%	Wichita PD	69.8%	4.7%

Force Option Used **More** than the Percentage of **Civil Disobedience** Protests
 Force Option Used **Equal** to the Percentage of **Civil Disobedience** Protests
 Force Option Used **Less** than the Percentage of **Civil Disobedience** Protests

Table 6 - Percentage of Pepper Balls Used in Comparison to the Percentage of Civil Disobedience Events by Agency

¹⁹ 64 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

Use of High-Volume Pepper Spray – By Agency

The use of high-volume pepper spray was the most common tool that agencies utilized to quell civil disobedience and violence during protests. All agencies that used this tool did so proportionately and 98% of agencies used this tool fewer times than when it may have been necessary.²⁰ This tool is also commonly used to address acts of civil disobedience, which may or may not involve violence.

USE OF HIGH VOLUME PEPPER SPRAY - COMPARED TO PERCENTAGE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (C/D)					
Agency	% of C/D Events	% of Force Option Used	Agency	% of C/D Events	% of Force Option Used
Arlington PD	30.8%	0.0%	Metro Nashville PD	29.8%	2.1%
Atlanta PD	87.0%	0.9%	Miami-Dade PD	73.9%	0.0%
Aurora PD	91.7%	2.8%	Milwaukee PD	88.8%	0.8%
Baltimore Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%	Minneapolis PD	50.0%	20.0%
Baltimore City PD	10.5%	0.0%	Montgomery Co. PD	17.4%	0.0%
Boston PD	13.5%	1.4%	Nassau Co. PD	76.9%	0.0%
Buffalo PD	7.5%	2.5%	New Orleans PD	2.1%	0.0%
Calgary PD	10.0%	0.0%	New York PD	20.5%	N/A
Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD	8.5%	5.1%	Newark PD	9.5%	0.0%
Chicago PD	76.3%	2.3%	Oakland PD	20.0%	0.0%
Cincinnati PD	6.7%	6.7%	Oklahoma City PD	33.3%	3.3%
Columbus PD	100.0%	N/A	Omaha PD	67.6%	5.4%
Dallas PD	70.7%	2.2%	Orlando PD	16.7%	6.7%
Washington Metro PD	N/A	N/A	Ottawa PD	0.0%	0.0%
DeKalb Co. PD	46.2%	15.4%	Peel Regional PD	16.7%	0.0%
Denver PD	100.0%	20.0%	Phoenix PD	93.0%	8.5%
Detroit PD	100.0%	6.3%	Pittsburgh PD	45.3%	3.5%
Edmonton PS	10.0%	0.0%	Portland PB	100.0%	39.1%
El Paso PD	12.5%	0.0%	Prince George's Co. PD	0.0%	0.0%
Fairfax Co. PD	38.5%	0.0%	Raleigh PD	93.7%	3.2%
Fort Worth PD	23.1%	0.0%	Sacramento PD	100.0%	3.5%
Fresno PD	3.6%	0.0%	Salt Lake City PD	91.7%	0.0%
Honolulu PD	25.0%	0.0%	San Antonio PD	6.1%	2.4%
Houston PD	8.8%	3.8%	San Diego PD	100.0%	0.0%
Indianapolis Metro PD	88.9%	4.9%	San Jose PD	16.7%	N/A
Jacksonville SO	25.0%	5.0%	Seattle PD	N/A	N/A
Kansas City PD	59.0%	7.7%	St Louis Metro PD	88.9%	0.0%
Las Vegas Metro PD	9.3%	3.7%	Suffolk Co. PD	3.7%	0.0%
Long Beach PD	82.0%	0.0%	Tampa PD	81.7%	7.7%
Los Angeles Co. SO	6.5%	0.2%	Tucson PD	100.0%	11.8%
Los Angeles City PD	27.4%	0.0%	Tulsa PD	28.6%	0.0%
Louisville Metro PD	75.0%	2.5%	Vancouver PD	10.3%	0.0%
Memphis PD	100.0%	0.0%	Virginia Beach PD	18.2%	4.5%
Mesa PD	25.0%	12.5%	Wichita PD	69.8%	0.0%

Force Option Used **More** than the Percentage of **Civil Disobedience** Protests
 Force Option Used **Equal** to the Percentage of **Civil Disobedience** Protests
 Force Option Used **Zero or Less** than the Percentage of **Civil Disobedience** Protests

Table 7 - Percentage of High-Volume Pepper Spray Used in Comparison to the Percentage of Civil Disobedience Events

²⁰ 63 of 68 agencies provided data for this measurement.

PROTESTER TACTICS AND CHALLENGES

Major city law enforcement agencies observed protesters utilizing a wide variety of tactics over the course of the 8,700 protests. There also appeared to be a significant level of coordination in what tactics were used by protesters and how this information was shared between cities. For example, some agencies reported seeing protesters utilize tactics that first appeared in other jurisdictions, indicating there was some level of communication and information sharing between protesters in different cities. For example, one major city law enforcement agency indicated protesters in their jurisdiction were using social media to circulate a flyer with protest tactics and best practices that were adopted from protesters in Hong Kong. These tactics included using umbrellas to block identities and conceal criminal activity, using laser pointers to blind officers and helicopters, throwing projectiles, ramming vehicles, creating barricaded autonomous zones, and de-arresting police prisoners. Many of these tactics, to include the unique use of umbrellas, were then reportedly seen at protests in multiple U.S. cities.

The following were some of the most prevalent tactics reported by major city law enforcement agencies:

High Trending Protester Tactics

- **Staging Ahead of Protests:** Many agencies have seen protesters use homeless camps or suburban neighborhoods to stage in advance of an incident.
- **Out-of-Town Protesters:** Many agencies experienced a correlation between the level of violence and presence of protesters from out of town. In some cases, the violence stopped entirely once out-of-town protesters left the area.
- **“Snack Vans” Concealing Weapons:** Many agencies observed vehicles delivering or storing weapons for protesters that were disguised as vehicles delivering water or snacks.
- **Recording Police Radio Broadcasts:** Many agencies experienced protesters using their cell phone to record radio transmissions from officers’ lapel mics. The assumption is this tactic was used to listen to what was being broadcasted between police personnel.
- **Bicycle Scouts:** Many agencies experienced people on bicycles serving as scouts for protesters that were on foot. The bicyclists would ride in advance of the group and provide information on police activity.
- **Doxing Police Officers:** Many agencies experienced the targeting of their officers and their families, where persons associating with anti-police protests would use the internet to harass and cause personal harm.
- **Barricades in Autonomous Zones:** Many agencies experienced barricades being used against law enforcement. In one city, the barricades police deployed to contain a self-proclaimed autonomous zone were used by protesters to strengthen their position against law enforcement.
- **De-Arresting Tactics:** Many agencies experienced protesters using aggressive tactics to free arrestees from police custody.

- **False Claims:** Many agencies experienced an uptick of false allegations against officers, to include false use-of-force and internal affairs complaints.
- **Weapon Caches:** Many agencies observed weapon caches near protest events. In one city, the use of two handprints—believed to align with the "hands up, don't shoot" saying—were used to mark areas where weapons were stored for protesters.
- **Shooting at Officers:** Many agencies experienced gunshots being fired at police officers during a protest event and/or in the context of a protest-related incident.
- **Precinct Takeovers:** Many agencies experienced the targeting of police precincts and substations.

Low Trending Tactics

- **Targeting of Pawn Shops:** A few agencies noticed a trend in looting that focused on pawn shops. The assumption is that this is based on the presence of firearms that could be stolen.
- **Controlling the High Ground:** A few agencies experienced challenges in controlling the high ground during an incident as some protest groups would place lookouts on top of parking structures and buildings.
- **Tools for Scaling Fences:** A few agencies reported the use of wooden pallets, bicycles, and grappling hooks by protesters to climb fences. The pallets would be stacked vertically, and the bicycles would be chained to the fence at staggering heights to create a makeshift ladder.
- **Protest Bait:** A few agencies experienced false or inaccurate 911 calls that were designed to bait officers into a confrontation and potential protest-like encounter.
- **Looting Convoys:** At least one agency experienced vehicle convoys of up to 100 cars being used to loot businesses at multiple locations.
- **Bicycle Protests:** At least one agency experienced large-scale protests with people on bicycles, to include up to 3,000 riders.

Challenges with Community Support

In the context of the protests that occurred between May and July, approximately 21 major city law enforcement agencies (31%) indicated that public trust was “low” or “very low” compared to 13 (19%) who believed it was “high” or “very high.” This lack of trust likely played a role in exacerbating tensions, which complicated the police response to protests. It also may have contributed to the false narrative that law enforcement agencies were seeking to prevent protesters from exercising their First Amendment rights.

Approximately 43% of major city law enforcement agencies viewed relations between themselves and their communities as normal. Police-community relations was reported low by 21% of agencies and reported as very low by none. Police-community relations was reported as high for 29% of agencies and very high for 6%.




Figure 15 - Level of Public Trust and Police Community Relations

Challenges with Elected Officials and Federal Partners

Approximately 46% of agencies reported experiencing a low or very low level of support from elected officials. In comparison, only 22% of agencies reported experiencing a high or very high level of support and 31% reported feeling a normal level of support.

More than three quarters (77%) felt that effective communication with their federal partners was either “high” or “very high.” This strong local-federal partnership enabled information sharing, assisted with coordinating operations, and helped identify agitators and other individuals who sought to exploit the protests to engage in criminal activity.




Figure 16 - Level of Support from Elected Officials and Effectiveness of Communication with Federal Partners

Challenges with Officer Morale

Amongst major city law enforcement agencies, the protests and civil unrest negatively impacted officer morale. More than half of the agencies (55%) rated officer morale as either “very low” or “low”. Comparatively, only 6 agencies (7%) reported that officer morale was “high” or “very high.”




Figure 17 - Level of Officer Morale

Challenges with Planning for Protests

Most agencies reported that protest organizers refused to cooperate with police in order to facilitate a peaceful protest and pre-plan marching routes. This was possibly due to the anti-police nature of the protests and that the protests were being used to call for police reform. Three quarters of agencies (51 out of 68 agencies) reported that this lack of cooperation was one of the biggest challenges they faced during the pre-planning and handling of protest-related incidents. More specifically, approximately 60% of agencies (41 out of 68 agencies), reported this was the most significant challenge with respect to managing protest-related incidents.




Figure 18 - Ranking of the Most Significant Challenges in Handling Protest-Related Incidents

Many agencies also experienced a lack of resources and personnel to effectively manage the size and violence of protests across the U.S. and Canada. A lack of training regarding the handling and management of protests and crowd control was the lowest rated concern for agencies. It is of note that agencies that reported a lack of training mentioned that the unprecedented nature of the protests—with respect to both the levels of violence and crowd size—created a training discrepancy. Many agencies had mostly newer officers, many of whom had never experienced such large-scale protests in their careers. The nature of the protests, including the presence of multiple extremists and violent tactics, also challenged the standard training and policies that many agencies had previously implemented.

Challenges with communication was the lowest ranked challenge. This challenge was commonly limited to specific situations where some agencies had a sudden compromise of incident command or communication systems.

Challenges with Overtime Costs

All 68 agencies incurred overtime costs as a result of their response to protest-related incidents. The vast majority of these agencies (81%) measured their related overtime costs as “a great deal,” while most others (18%) measured their overtime costs as “some”. Only one agency (1%) indicated they incurred “little” overtime cost.




Figure 19 - Percentage of Agencies that Incurred Overtime Costs

LOOKING AHEAD

The vast majority of agencies are still experiencing protests (85%) and nearly three quarters of all agencies (74%) are anticipating a rise in protest-related violence before, during, or soon after the U.S. election in November 2020. Regardless of whether these events continue or this projection proves accurate, there is value in advancing law enforcement's ability to address protest-related incidents in the near future.




Figure 20 - Percentages of Agencies Still Experiencing Protests and Expecting More Protest-Related Violence

Possible Areas of Improvement

Community outreach was ranked as the number one priority that would help improve police response to future protests. Most major city law enforcement agencies reported attempting to work with protest organizers to support peaceful protests and create safe pre-planned marching routes. As mentioned previously in this report, many organizers and protest groups were unwilling to work with police due to the nature of the protests being anti-police. This shows the need for neutral actors, such as community leaders or others, to act as liaisons between police and protest groups to facilitate some sort of communication.




Figure 21 - Ranked Priorities for Improving Police Response to Protest-Related Incidents

Agencies ranked an increase in funding as the second most important area for improvement. There is no doubt that any sort of responsible reforms and improved training will require additional funding. The third most important area for improvement was specific to increasing the accuracy of media reporting, especially when it comes to law enforcement matters. Several agencies reported that media outlets would fail to report on the violent acts that occurred and instead focused more on police use-of-force and the false narrative that agencies were disproportionate in their response. The last two categories that were identified involved improving policies and tactics and adding more transparency and body worn cameras to police agencies.

The Use of Curfews and Weapons Ordinances

Curfews were used by many agencies to prevent civil disobedience and violence to include rioting, looting, and arson. These orders not only proved useful in the dispersal of large groups before they became unruly, but they also enabled law enforcement to separate peaceful and law-abiding protesters from those seeking to commit crimes. In these cases, peaceful protesters generally complied with the orders and dispersed themselves, while individuals with the intent to break the law or become violent often remained. This separation allowed law enforcement agencies to focus on the problem persons as they attempted to de-escalate the protest-related incident as a whole.

City and county ordinances that prohibit weapons during a protest were also used by most major city law enforcement agencies. Some agencies used existing ordinances to take objects away from protesters that were being used as weapons, while others worked with their elected officials to enact new orders as the violence unfolded. An example of the latter was seen in Las Vegas, where the city council enacted an emergency order to limit the use of backpacks and similar bags during a protest.²¹ This new ordinance proved effective in preventing some persons from bringing weapons to the event, as was done in the days prior. Ultimately, these types of ordinances allowed law enforcement agencies to preemptively confiscate some weapons and prohibited items before they could be used to damage property or cause injury.



Figure 22 - Examples of Weapons and Prohibited Items Brought to Protests in 2020

²¹ Under this emergency ordinance (Las Vegas City Bill No. E-2020-1), the following items were banned from protests: purses of a certain size, coolers, briefcases, backpacks, fanny packs, cinch bags, luggage, computer bags, camera bags, or other large bags.

CONCLUSION

2020 has been an unprecedented and challenging year for law enforcement agencies across the U.S. and Canada. During the period between May 25th, 2020 and July 31st, 2020, 8,700 protests occurred across 68 major cities. Approximately, 3,692 of these protests involved illegal but non-violent acts of civil disobedience and 574 involved acts of violence. Some cities experienced a level of sustained and relentless violence and civil unrest during this time while other cities reported experiencing peaceful and lawful assemblies with minimal criminal or violent activities. It has not yet been determined why certain cities experienced larger crowds or higher levels of violence when others did not.

Specific trends and similarities in relation to protester tactics, timeframes, and coordination were identified across most cities. Many out-of-state protesters were also identified by most major city law enforcement agencies and some also encountered paid protesters. The weekend of May 29th to June 1st was the most violent weekend that most agencies experienced, and nationwide coordination was recognized between protest groups in major cities.

Approximately, 16,241 individuals were arrested for criminal acts committed during the protests. More than half of the 68 agencies reported their District Attorney's Office elected not to prosecute protest-related cases and most cases nationwide continue to be dismissed by prosecutors. Police Use of Force was proportionate to the level of violence and civil disobedience experienced by every agency and law enforcement as a whole demonstrated tremendous restraint in their response to the 2020 protests.

With the upcoming U.S. Election in November 2020, many agencies are bracing themselves for another wave of protests to occur. Agencies have reported implementing new and improved tactics and training to prepare for future protests and civil unrest. Each agencies' top priority is to facilitate the public's desire to express their constitutional right to peacefully assemble, while also creating a safe environment for peaceful protests to occur. Ultimately, the lessons learned in the past months will aid in strengthening and developing the future of policing.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The development of this report would not have been possible if not for the many partners and participants that contributed throughout the process. In particular, a special thank you to the MCCA Executive Board, Homeland Security Committee, and Intelligence Commanders Group.

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APPENDIX A – AGENCIES THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE SURVEY

Arlington PD	TX	Houston PD	TX	Orlando PD	FL
Atlanta PD	GA	Indianapolis Metro PD	IN	Ottawa PD	ON, CA
Aurora PD	CO	Jacksonville SO	FL	Peel Regional PD	ON, CA
Baltimore Co. PD	MD	Kansas City PD	MO	Phoenix PD	AZ
Baltimore City PD	MD	Las Vegas Metro PD	NV	Pittsburgh PD	PA
Boston PD	MA	Long Beach PD	CA	Portland PB	OR
Buffalo PD	NY	Los Angeles Co. SO	CA	Prince George's Co. PD	MD
Calgary PD	AB, CA	Los Angeles City PD	CA	Raleigh PD	NC
Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD	NC	Louisville Metro PD	KY	Sacramento PD	CA
Chicago PD	IL	Memphis PD	TN	Salt Lake City PD	UT
Cincinnati PD	OH	Mesa PD	AZ	San Antonio PD	TX
Columbus PD	OH	Metro Nashville PD	TN	San Diego PD	CA
Dallas PD	TX	Miami-Dade PD	FL	San Jose PD	CA
Washington Metro PD	DC	Milwaukee PD	WI	Seattle PD	WA
DeKalb Co. PD	GA	Minneapolis PD	MN	St Louis Metro PD	MO
Denver PD	CO	Montgomery Co. PD	MD	Suffolk Co. PD	NY
Detroit PD	MI	Nassau Co. PD	NY	Tampa PD	FL
Edmonton PS	AB, CA	New Orleans PD	LA	Tucson PD	AZ
El Paso PD	TX	New York PD	NY	Tulsa PD	OK
Fairfax Co. PD	VA	Newark PD	NJ	Vancouver PD	BC, CA
Fort Worth PD	TX	Oakland PD	CA	Virginia Beach PD	VA
Fresno PD	CA	Oklahoma City PD	OK	Wichita PD	KS
Honolulu PD	HI	Omaha PD	NE		

APPENDIX B – AGENCIES THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE AFTER ACTION REVIEW

Arlington PD	TX	Las Vegas Metro PD	NV	Phoenix PD	AZ
Auston PD	TX	Long Beach PD	CA	Pittsburgh PD	PA
Baltimore Co. PD	MD	Los Angeles Co. SO	CA	Prince George's Co. PD	MD
Buffalo PD	NY	Los Angeles City PD	CA	Salt Lake City PD	UT
Calgary PD	AB, CA	Louisville Metro PD	KY	San Antonio PD	TX
Cincinnati PD	OH	Memphis PD	TN	San Diego PD	CA
Columbus PD	OH	Mesa PD	AZ	San Jose PD	CA
Washington Metro PD	DC	Metro Nashville PD	TN	San Francisco PD	CA
DeKalb Co. PD	GA	Miami-Dade PD	FL	Seattle PD	WA
Edmonton PS	AB, CA	Milwaukee PD	WI	St Louis Metro PD	MO
El Paso PD	TX	Montgomery Co. PD	MD	Suffolk Co. PD	NY
Houston PD	TX	Nassau Co. PD	NY	Tampa PD	FL
Indianapolis Metro PD	IN	New York PD	NY	Tucson PD	AZ
Jacksonville SO	FL	Oklahoma City PD	OK	Vancouver PD	BC, CA
Kansas City PD	MO	Omaha PD	NE		