The Jewish People Policy Institute
המכון למדיניות העם היהודי



Annual Assessment
The Situation and Dynamics of the Jewish People
5782 | 2022

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1 Foreword

The Jewish People Policy Institute's *Annual Assessment of the Situation and Dynamics of the Jewish People* undertakes, each year, to determine whether the past year's developments have affected Israel and the Jewish world positively or negatively. The *Assessment* summary submitted to the Government of Israel is a vital resource for the country's decision makers – a condensed, policy-oriented overview of trends and recommendations in five different dimensions of Jewish well-being: geopolitics, community bonds, resources, identity and identification, and demography.

A year ago, the Jewish people had to contend with its own specific challenges while participating in a worldwide effort to address the sudden and severe crisis precipitated by the coronavirus pandemic. This year, although that crisis still hovers in the background, the spotlight has shifted to another dramatic development – a war raging in Europe that threatens global stability and the current world order. Not coincidentally, this year's Demography Index focuses on the Jews of Ukraine and Russia. There is a triple irony of history. There are 10,000 Holocaust survivors in Ukraine among the more than 100,000 Jews. They survived in their youth by hiding or fleeing from the Nazis, many to Russia. Now in their older age they must hide and flee again, this time more than 70 years later, and now from Russian aggression. And they are seeking refuge in Germany, which had been the epicenter of the Holocaust and to Poland, where the Nazis carried out their greatest genocide.

The war has forced the Jewish world to engage with a number of issues, some of them urgent. The State of Israel, the Jewish

Agency, and Diaspora Jewish communities have mobilized to provide Humanitarian aid and to absorb immigrants and refugees. Organizations like the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Jewish Claims Conference have organized remarkable ambulance convoys to get homebound survivors to safety. Israel has provided mobile hospitals and medical assistance to Ukrainians, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. However, Israel has also had to tread a fine line between its desire to help a beleaguered Ukraine and its need to maintain stable relations with Russia, whose military presence in Syria – especially its extensive air defenses – gives Russia leverage against Israel. Indeed, Russia could dramatically raise the costs to Israel of carrying out air operations to blunt the Iranian effort in and through Syria to transfer advanced weapons, including precision guidance for missiles, to Hezbollah. Presently, Russia generally permits Israel freedom of action in Syria but could change that posture and Israel must manage that reality. The discussion of Russia, Syria, and Iran highlights Israel's need to balance its interests and its moral responsibilities. In this year's assessment, the broader balance of issues pertaining to the Jewish people's interests and moral mission are interlaced with the discussion of trends and recommendations appearing in this report.

These new challenges have not, of course, eliminated old ones. Antisemitism in countries around the world, on both the left and the right, continues to erode Jewish security; young people say they are "lowering their profile" in order to avoid confrontation with radical antisemitic and anti-Israel elements. Jews in vulnerable areas in France are being relocated to safer residences by the French Jewish community, CRIF. American college campuses remain hotbeds of anti-Israel, anti-Zionist activity, putting Jewish students on the defensive and in need of positive answers to combat misinformation about Israel.

Israel's security concerns about the Iranian nuclear threat have not disappeared; as of this writing, it remains unclear whether there will be a revival of the Iran nuclear deal, the JCPOA, and if so, how much time will it buy? Israel and the United States share the objective of preventing Iran from ever acquiring or developing a nuclear weapon but have different views on what it will take to ensure that. While the current Israeli government is seeking to work closely with the Biden administration on Iran, it has also made clear it will not be bound by the JCPOA if it is revived. Iran, as well as the Palestinian issue in an era when little progress is possible on it, pose difficulties for navigating Israeli policy in Washington. The Israeli government has indicated an interest in helping the economic circumstances and living standards of both Israeli Arabs and Palestinians, but efforts have been halting and not up to the challenge.

There is also some good news in the report. Israel's economic situation is stable, and the resources available to the Jewish people are substantial. We recommend that some of those resources be allocated to strengthening Jewish education in the Diaspora. Another positive development of the past year is that Israel has continued to improve and strengthen its relations with several of its Arab neighbors.

The Abraham Accords, signed in September 2020, have been highly successful in a short period of time. After more than 40 years of peace, trade between Israel and Egypt in 2021 was only $300 million, with little Israeli tourism to Egypt. By contrast, in a short period of time, trade between Israel and the UAE in 2021, the first full year of the Accords, was over $1 billion, and is expected to reach over $2 billion in 2022. And even with Covid restrictions, 250,000 Israelis have visited the UAE, which has opened two new synagogues and hosted an Israeli pavilion at its world expo. There is room for much greater trade and investment, to the mutual benefit of both countries.

Moreover, the government coalition that formed with the participation of Jews and Arabs, though it has not solved the complex problems in the relations between these groups, has nevertheless highlighted the potential for cooperation that could produce a better future for Israel's Jewish and Arab communities alike.

This year, in the framework of its policy recommendations, JPPI emphasizes the challenge of absorbing the diverse wave of immigration arriving from Ukraine and Russia, with its cultural and social implications; decision makers are again called upon to carefully examine means of addressing the Haredi sector's rapid growth and its social, economic, and cultural ramifications; the problem of global antisemitism demands significant attention on the part of the Israeli government, which must plan its response in a systematic way at the highest echelons; and, of special importance, Israel must use its resources and creative powers to narrow the gaps between different groups and sectors, and to achieve maximal cohesion, both internally and among the Jewish people as a whole.

The challenges are great, and the lack of governmental stability still casts its pall, making it hard to cope with the challenges and to formulate long-term plans for their resolution. But it is clear that, given current circumstances, Israel cannot wait until the political situation changes, or until the electorate makes an unequivocal decision. Israel must act, and if the governmental baton once again passes, we hope that those who come after will take action in their turn.

Stuart E. Eizenstat and Dennis Ross

2 Main Recommendations to the Government of Israel

Dialogue with Jews who support the Democratic Party must be deepened in order to harness their support and assistance in advancing Israel's positions on the Iran nuclear issue (details on page 18)

Diaspora communities (with the assistance of Israel) should prioritize significant Jewish education projects – financially, socially, and institutionally (details on page 22)

Philanthropy in Israel, by both individuals and institutions, should be encouraged, emphasizing the Jewish value of giving as is customary in Diaspora communities worldwide (details on page 23)

A comprehensive social and political response must be formulated to an expected increase in the number of Israelis who belong to the Jewish majority population but are not recognized as Jews (details on page 30)

Continued rapid growth of the ultra-Orthodox community requires intra- and extra-sectoral attention to the socioeconomic ramifications of this trend (details on page 31)

TRENDS

3 Integrated Net Assessment: JPPI's Five Dimensions of Jewish Well-Being

Key Drivers Affecting the Jewish People in 2021-2022



This year, the Jewish people contended with, and were affected by developments in several main areas:[1]

Geopolitical developments: the war in Ukraine is intensifying trends that undermine the current "world order," with implications for the international standing of the United States and the future of Europe. Efforts by the U.S. and its allies to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran continue (the agreement's contours are not to Israel's liking). There has been a significant improvement in Israel's relations with a number of its Arab neighbors, but those states have also had some degree of rapprochement with Iran. A wave of Palestinian terrorism has erupted as well.

Political developments: Israel's political system has not yet stabilized. At the beginning of November the citizens of Israel will go to the voting booth for the fifth time in less than four years. The American political system is preparing for mid-term elections and the possibility of a divided government, against the background of an expected dramatic Supreme Court ruling on abortion rights, with sociocultural repercussions. In France, the radical right has gained ground.

Societal developments: As in the rest of the world, the influence of social media is also evident in Israel, which erodes trust in governmental institutions, polarizes the public discourse and leads to mutual delegitimization and negation (of the government and the political camps). Wide polarization is also evident in those discursive spaces pertaining to Israel and Israel-Diaspora relations. The involvement of Israeli Arabs in terrorist attacks in Israel, as well as the emphasis on fighting violence in the Arab sector, continues to indicate fragility in relations between Jews and non-Jews. Renewed unrest in the political arena has caused tensions to resurge between right and left and between secular Israelis and religious/ultra-Orthodox Israelis.

Antisemitism: Reports persist of an upsurge in antisemitic incidents around the world. Young Jews report "lowering their Jewish profile" out of fear of compromising their social status. There is controversy within the Jewish community, especially among its younger generation, about what "anti-Zionism" means in the context of antisemitism.

Demographic developments: In the wake of the Ukraine conflict, the pace and rate of immigration from Ukraine and Russia have increased. The immigration rates from most countries are slowly returning to their pre-pandemic levels. The rate of Jewish population increase in the Diaspora is slowing.

The Covid-19 pandemic: There has been significant recovery of trips by individuals and Jewish groups to Israel.

1. In addition to the analysis provided by JPPI experts, we were aided this year in our discussion of the developments and our setting of the gauges by the responses obtained from detailed ranking questionnaires that were sent to all members of JPPI's Executive Board and International Board of Governors, as well as to several dozen Jewish leaders, scholars, and intellectuals around the world.

Jewish identity: The crisis in Ukraine reveals a gap between Israel and the Diaspora on issues of morality and Jewish survival. In Israel there was (at least at the beginning of the crisis) a "tribal" orientation, both in terms of maintaining ties with Russia (due to Israel's national interests), and in terms of refugee absorption (a preference for those eligible for immigration under the Law of Return). In the United States, the American Jewish tradition of resettling refugees and assisting oppressed communities has been renewed. In these communities the distinction between Jew and non-Jew has blurred, and there has been an emphasis on the ethical-universal element of the Jewish obligation to assist persecuted groups.

4 Geopolitics



Geopolitical uncertainty has intensified in the last year, with implications for Israel and the Jewish people. The challenges facing Israel are becoming more demanding against the background of great power rivalry, which intensified in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. At the time this report was completed, a struggle was still underway to decide the fate of the negotiations aimed at signing a renewed nuclear agreement between the major powers and Iran. Whether such an agreement is reached – to Israel's dismay – or not, Israel will be forced to face the Iranian threat in an intricate geopolitical arena that complicates its maneuverability. If negotiations fail to result in an agreement, Iran will likely accelerate its efforts to equip itself with nuclear weapons. At the same time, Israel will intensify its countermeasures and a worsening of the conflict can be expected.

In Israel's relations with the Arab world, several encouraging developments stood out: ties with Egypt were strengthened; the Negev Summit was held with the participation of four Arab foreign ministers, high-level visits were made, and the Abraham Accords were maintained (along with a thaw in Israel's relations with Turkey). At the same time, the deterrence achieved by Operation

Guardian of the Walls seems to be eroding. While Abu Mazen has weakened and his exit from the world stage is imminent, Hamas is positioning itself as the defender of Jerusalem and is trying to inflame Judea and Samaria and to draw Arab Israelis into hostile action against Israel, so far with limited success.

This past year the threats to Israel remained the same, with no turning point on the horizon that would offer hope of a solution to the country's fundamental strategic problems. The situation could potentially devolve into violent confrontation on all fronts. Israel's relations with the United States are marked by issues that could emerge as hotbeds of controversy (Iran, the Palestinians, Ukraine, relations with Russia and China). The Israeli government's diplomatic maneuvering ability is limited politically. The constant danger to the coalition's stability is not conducive to strengthening Israel's strategic resilience. However, because the past year's developments are both negative and positive in effect, we are leaving the needle of the geopolitics gauge where it was last year, in the "troubled" range.

Trends and Recommendations

Dialogue with Jews who support the Democratic Party must be deepened in order to harness their support and assistance in advancing Israel's positions on the Iran nuclear issue.

Explanation: About two-thirds of U.S. Jews support the Democratic Party, and a similar share have expressed and continue to express support for the policies of Presidents Obama and Biden on the Iran nuclear issue.[1] This public's loyalty to the president is clear (63% support among Jews, much higher than among the general American public), meaning that Israel could benefit from efforts vis-à-vis the administration and Congress to advance policy elements where, in their view, Israeli and American interests overlap. Should a nuclear agreement be signed with Iran, Israel would fear Iran's continued covert progress, camouflaged by the agreement, toward the manufacture of a nuclear weapon, as well as its continued regional subversion – all while utilizing the resources it would be able to amass once the sanctions were removed. At the same time, Israel could face American pressure not to act against Iran, so as not to endanger the agreement. In such a situation, Israel should try to mobilize Israel-supporting Jewish Democrats to promote measures that would ensure strict enforcement of the agreement while bolstering Israel's military capabilities. Should an agreement not be signed, one could try to enlist these Jews for political efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and curb its regional subversion. A serious dialogue with the Jewish Democratic public is also needed to rekindle American Jewry's interest in the challenges facing Israel.

1. See: Jewish Electoral Institute, National Survey, April 2022.

Measures that would ignite Palestinian unrest should be avoided as much as possible, and efforts should be made toward constructive dialogue with the Palestinian Authority.

Explanation: In early August Israel launched Operation Breaking Dawn targeting the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza strip. Terrorist attacks throughout Israel and violence on the Temple Mount attest to uncertainty in the Palestinian arena. Overall, Hamas is maintaining the ceasefire on the Gaza border, while building power under the ceasefire's auspices. The erosion of Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen's status, and the battle over who will succeed him, add to the instability. At the same time, the Biden administration, due to a low probability of success and political disagreements, has made clear that it is not going to push for the resumption of permanent-status negotiations, which could have sparked a major crisis with the outgoing Israeli government. Accordingly, Israel should avoid creating unnecessary crises, with an emphasis on measures that the Biden administration could perceive as attempts to thwart the possibility of a future political solution.

Expanding and deepening cooperation in the framework of the Abraham Accords is a government task for which world Jewry should also be mobilized.

Explanation: The Abraham Accords have changed the face of the Middle East. They have tightened the "alliance of moderates" – nations seeking regional stability; they have opened up opportunities for economic, technological, scientific, and cultural collaboration; and above all, they have strengthened Israel's public legitimacy in the Arab world.

The Accords are also important for the Jewish People, not just in terms of strengthening Israel, but also in terms of fostering an open, friendly, and vigorous Jewish-Muslim dialogue. Alongside the measures taken by the Israeli government to further reinforce the Accords and their significance – as well as the constant striving to expand the circle of signatories, especially in conjunction with Saudi Arabia – it would be appropriate for Jewish communities around the world to take steps aimed at strengthening the Accords. These steps could include political lobbying in various countries (particularly the United States), to communicate the importance of the Accords and generate support for them, and also in direct dialogue with the countries that have joined the circle of signatories.

5 Material Resources



Israel and the Jewish people are affected by global economic developments, which reflect the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war crisis. These developments include increased inflation, rising interest rates, and a shortage of various goods, both for use in technology (due to supply chain difficulties) and for civilian consumption (there are concerns about food and fuel shortages in the coming winter). Israel needs to invest in high-cost infrastructures for increased immigrant absorption and to drive down housing prices; it must also devise plans for reducing income disparities without harming the productive sectors, especially high-tech. Tax increases could provide Israel a certain budgetary margin to allow such investments. Jewish communities around the world need to cope with the pandemic's consequences on communal structures and resources, as well as with the ongoing trend of decreasing population numbers (in the non-Orthodox world). We are moving the needle of the resources gauge in a slightly negative direction, mainly because of pessimistic economic forecasts for the coming year.

Trends and Recommendations

The Israeli government and Israeli social change organizations must formulate strategy and take urgent measures to reduce education and wage gaps

Explanation: Two economies are emerging in Israel, the high-tech economy and the economy of everything else. The high-tech engine is decoupling from the train. While Israel's minimum wage has risen 30% over the past decade and the country's average wage has increased by 34%, the average high-tech wage has climbed by over 50%. The average high-tech wage is about five times that of the minimum wage.[2] These economic gaps are giving rise to social disparities. Israeli high-tech is a "relatively homogeneous and closed circle" based on the work of "non-Haredi Jewish men," according to a report by the Israel Innovation Authority.[3] High-tech is "widening gaps, mainly due to the products of the education system and of Israeli higher education," according to a report by the Knesset Research and Information Center.[4] This situation is problematic in two respects: First, it leads to social unrest among those who have been "left behind." Second, it could potentially cause an "exodus" of tech entrepreneurship from Israel, due to the excessive workload borne by a small number of people expected to financially support the larger group. The situation demands integrated action by the government aimed at the rapid and resolute advancement of Israel's peripheral groups (geographic and social) so that they can take part in the country's "high-tech economy." At the same time, aid and social-change organizations should receive support from donors in the high-tech sector, in order to mitigate societal tensions and reduce disparities. Such measures cannot be effectively realized without a significantly improved education system, and without demonstrating systemwide determination to achieve these objectives in the face of political, ideological, bureaucratic, and budgetary obstacles.

Diaspora communities (with the assistance of Israel) should prioritize significant Jewish education projects – economically, socially, and institutionally

Explanation: Cumulative data from recent years indicate that: 1) Among young Diaspora Jews (except the Orthodox), the sense of connection to Jewish culture, the Jewish faith, the Jewish community, and the Jewish people is weakening. Commonly held claims that Jews are shifting from a "traditional" to a "cultural" identity model (i.e., "museums not synagogues") are not backed up by robust scholarly research and should be treated

2. Data source: Central Bureau of Statistics.
3. High-Tech During the Coronavirus Pandemic: Report of the Israel Innovation Authority, 2020-2021. [Hebrew]
4. High-Tech as a Growth Engine in the Periphery, Knesset Research and Information Center, November 2021. [Hebrew]

with caution. 2) There is a significant positive correlation between Jewish education and Jewish action/attaching importance to Jewish life, both in this generation and in those to come. The Jewish communities, which invest their resources in many different and important objectives, should draw the appropriate conclusions from the data and focus philanthropic and administrative efforts on extending non-Orthodox Jewish education to all those interested, ensuring that it will be geographically available, economically accessible, educationally excellent, and ideologically pluralistic. Investment in Jewish day schools and preschools, in weekly courses and enrichment activities, in summer camps – this appears to be the most worthwhile and urgent option for those who want to perpetuate the existence of active Jewish life in the Diaspora.

Philanthropy in Israel, by both individuals and institutions, should be encouraged, emphasizing the Jewish value of giving as customary in Diaspora communities worldwide

Explanation: The great success of Israeli high-tech has created an economic class of wealthy Israelis whose numbers have increased significantly. These are primarily young people who have no multigenerational family tradition of giving. Data on individual and corporate philanthropy in Israel point to low donation levels compared to other Western countries, and especially with Jews abroad, who are leaders in the philanthropic sphere.[5] Although Israeli philanthropy is trending upward to a degree, it is still far from the desired destination. The flourishing of high-tech constitutes an opportunity for Israeli capitalists to step up their contribution to the development of Israeli society. The strengthening of philanthropy as a value should be supported by governmental moves (tax incentives) and social measures (education, raising expectations, respect, and recognition), and will serve three important objectives. First: increased philanthropy will make it possible to reinforce efforts in the educational, cultural, and welfare spheres. Second: it will promote mutual responsibility on the part of different groups in Israeli society. Third: it will embody a unifying Jewish value for Israel and the Diaspora.

5. See: Philanthropy in Israel: an Updated Picture, Taub Center, 2017; Philanthropy is the lifeblood of the British 2021 July, eJP, Zaki Cooper, Jewish Community; Israeli Philanthropy, 2012-2015, Central Bureau of Statistics [Hebrew]; "Jewish Philanthropy During COVID-19 Focuses on Need, Not Affinity," Hanna Shaul Bar Nissim, Inside Philanthropy, February 2021.

6 Identity and Identification



A number of reports this year have noted the persistence and growing severity of antisemitic phenomena in many countries;[6] some of the reports have gone so far as to declare the effort to counter antisemitism a "failure." Attitudes toward Israel are also affected by rising antisemitism, as well as by political polarization, especially in the United States; as a result, young Jews are lowering their Jewish-Zionist profile in an attempt maintain their social status among their non-Jewish friends.[7] At the same time, the share of Diaspora Jews who observe Jewish traditions (Passover Seders, kosher homes, and the like) continues to fall. Based on the relevant data, we have moved the needle of the identity gauge in a slightly negative direction this year.

6. 'See: Antisemitism Worldwide Report 2021, Tel Aviv University, April 2022.

7. See: AJC Survey of American Jewish Millennials, March 2022.

Trends and Recommendations

The Israel government should formulate a strategy with clear and (where possible) measurable objectives for battling antisemitism

Explanation: JPPI reports have been warning for several years of the possibility that the trend of resurgent antisemitism is on the rise and rooted in deep societal currents of varying sources. The return of antisemitism, as unfortunate and distressing as it is, could become a long-term fixture of global discourse, while the ability of Jewish communities and Israel to influence it is limited. Under these circumstances, Israel, as the world's strongest Jewish organizing force, cannot confine itself to attempts to "fight antisemitism." Israelis must understand what it will mean to live in an era when antisemitism is a persistent factor in Jewish life, and prepare for that era accordingly, while formulating plans for appropriate explanatory, diplomatic, and security activity. Last year we recommended that the government "entrust the response to antisemitism to a single integrative body with powers and implementation capabilities." We reaffirm this recommendation, and with greater urgency, in light of data whose meaning is unmistakable.

Action must be taken to promote the unifying presence of Jewish holidays in Israel's public and private spheres

Explanation: Of all the components of Jewish identity in Israel, the most widely accepted, and the least controversial, are the holidays and festivals.[8] Israeli Jews who disagree too strongly on basic components of identity for their differences to be bridged, still feel that the celebration of holidays and festivals gives expression to their Judaism. This finding should motivate institutions and organizations for joint efforts to make Jewish festivals more enjoyably present in Israel's public and private spheres. When setting such processes in motion, attention should be paid to the kinds of feelings that Jewish-inflected language and terminology elicit in Israelis. In last year's Annual Assessment (2021), JPPI recommended that "the new government […] encourage measures that foster the development of a non-religious Jewish identity." This recommendation is further supported by recent research that has identified a much greater willingness of Jews to study "Jewish texts" than to "learn Torah," despite the fact that, in at least some instances, the practical meanings of these terms are identical. The conclusion to be drawn from this and other examples is that those who plan holiday activities should use the language of Jewish culture rather than of Jewish religion. This is especially the case when the activities are intended for a secular and traditional non-religious public with reservations, sometimes significant ones, about anything couched in religious language (which has unfavorable associations with the political arena).

8. Based on a Jewish People Policy Institute report published this year: "Who Are Jews": the Views of Israeli Jews, Shmuel Rosner, Professor Camil Fuchs, Noah Slepkov. [Hebrew]

7 Community Bonds



The easing of the Covid-19 pandemic has led to a resumption of travel by Jews, to mutual visits, and to the relaunch of Taglit-Birthright and MASA program activity. The war in Ukraine and the absorption of Jewish refugees, along with aliyah from other countries, including those where antisemitism is on the rise, are reinforcing Israel's status as a refuge for the Jewish people. The crisis in Ukraine has also fostered cooperation between Israel and Jewish organizations in the Diaspora, on the commonly accepted basis of humanitarian aid to Jews and refugees. In Israel, a large majority of Jews feel attached to all Jews (about 70%), and most see a shared future for all Jews (64%). At the same time, Israelis continue to have reservations about American Jewry's attempts to exert influence on Israeli policy, especially in the foreign and defense fields; there are expectation gaps in this regard between the Jewish people's two largest communities (most young American Jews feel that they have a right to try to influence Israel).

Other data attest to an erosion of attachment to Israel among the younger generation of Diaspora Jews, and to an expanding critical discourse on the meaning of Zionism, and

even Zionism's legitimacy. However, due to the resumption of in-person encounters and the dramatic impact of Jewish refugee absorption in Israel (2022 is witnessing a two-decade high in immigration), we have moved the needle of the community bonds gauge in a positive direction toward "maintaining."

Trends and Recommendations

The political context (in terms of ideology and right-left differences) should be neutralized wherever possible in managing Israel-Diaspora relations

Explanation: The government and political pendulum is constantly moving, but Israel-Diaspora relations need stability, regardless of the pendulum's oscillations. Such stability is hard to find, due to a growing tendency among Jews to perceive the issue of attachment to other Jews as yet another standard area of disagreement between right and left. Thus, Jews in Western countries (with an emphasis on the U.S.), but also, and to no lesser degree, Jews in Israel (per JPPI's Pluralism Index), position themselves on the attachment-to-other-Jews scale based on political self-identification (those who feel "close" to the Diaspora – rightists; those who are "distant" – leftists). This phenomenon has deep roots, some of them touching on essential issues that are not easy to address. However, educational, and explanatory efforts should be made to close this gap as much as possible. Such efforts should be based on a model of inter-community discourse on issues of culture, history, tradition, sustainability, and high-tech, and strive to reduce preoccupation with controversial matters that make it hard to maintain relationships that are constructive and helpful for all Jews (it must be understood and accepted that, even once this reduction has been achieved, Jews will continue to be deeply divided on important fundamental questions).

Global Jewish cooperation to provide assistance to the Jews of Ukraine and Russia should be expanded

Explanation: The crisis precipitated by the war is creating an opportunity for world Jewry to unite around an undisputed goal, and to participate in a joint effort to assist Jews in distress. This effort should be pursued both via formal channels (the Israeli government and the major organizations of world Jewry), and through the encouragement of informal channels (partnership of volunteers, nonprofits, and foundations, but not via the government or the large organizations). Most of the work should focus on the physical rescue of Jews needing such rescue, on promoting aliya to Israel, and on the absorption of olim in Israel and their integration in the fabric of Israeli life. There should be investment not only in the economic aspects of absorption, but also in the socio-educational aspects, to help the olim (immigrants under the Law of Return, not all of whom are halachically Jewish) to integrate in Israel's majority Jewish culture.

8 Jewish Demography



Demography

2020 2021

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the demographics of the Jewish people (and of the entire world) is evident on several levels, including a decrease in birthrates and an increase in mortality rates. These trends could have a long-term impact on the size of Diaspora Jewish communities in particular, as these communities had higher average ages and lower birthrates to begin with. At the same time, immigration to Israel has rebounded, after coming to a halt during the Covid-19 years, a trend intensified by the war in Ukraine, which has added several tens of thousands of olim to the regular total. The share of the ultra-Orthodox in the Jewish population on the rise, but the challenges emerging due to this trend, and their impact on relations between different Jewish communities, have not yet received adequate attention. For this reason, the needle of the demography gauge has been moved in a slightly negative direction.

Trends and Recommendations

An effort should be made to retain the immigrants from Ukraine in Israel, along with family members who have been left behind, and to also encourage immigration from Russia

Explanation: The war in Ukraine caused a major refugee crisis, which Israel is involved in addressing; a minority of the refugees are not Jewish, while most are eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return and are being absorbed as olim.[10] These refugees came to Israel out of immediate necessity, without planning such a move in advance; if and when the war in Ukraine ends (and depending on its outcomes), they will consider whether to return to their homes or choose Israel as their long-term home. Additionally, a significant number of the refugees-immigrants have left family members behind (males of conscription age in particular); they, too, will have to decide when the war ends whether to return the émigré family to the home they left, or to join their relatives in Israel. Under these circumstances, the absorption and rapid integration of these olim is of special and urgent importance; it is imperative that they feel "at home" in Israel even before they reach a crossroads where they will have to decide which direction to take. At the same time, Israel should, with appropriate caution, encourage immigration from Russia, where the economic, political, and social situation is also deteriorating due to the war.

10. Per the Ministry of Aliyah and Immigration, 42,675 olim immigrated to Israel between Independence Day 2021 and Independence Day 2022. The countries from which the most immigrants came this year are Russia (33%) and Ukraine (27%).

A comprehensive social and political response should be formulated to an anticipated increase in the number of Israelis who belong to the Jewish majority population but are not recognized as Jews

Explanation: There is a gap between the Orthodox establishment's demand for conversion according to its conception, and the attitude of most Israeli Jews, for whom conversion is either: 1) entirely unnecessary (because self-definition is enough); 2) essential but not necessarily via an Orthodox rabbi; 3) essential and should be accomplished via an Orthodox beit din (religious court) that adopts lenient halachic tests. This gap has implications on several levels. First, there is an impact on the public's relations with the conversion establishment, which is perceived as imposing the system of the minority on the majority. Second, the gap affects willingness of Israelis to convert. The measures currently underway to change the conversion system may be important in and of themselves (as a means of weakening the conversion monopoly), but it is doubtful whether they will bring about a major jump in the number of conversions. Under these circumstances, several developments should be taken into account. The first is the major and continued increase in the share of Jews

who do not marry officially (because they cannot do so through the Rabbinate, which is the sole permitted avenue for marriage). The second is growing pressure, perhaps to the point of decisiveness, to institute civil marriage so that couples whom the Rabbinate does not recognize as Jews can marry. The third development is an anticipated rise in the number of families who see themselves as "Jewish" but whom certain sectors will regard as "non-Jewish" or "mixed," which will heighten already-existing tensions stemming from claims of inclusion and exclusion based on the controversial question: "Who is a Jew?" Under these circumstances, halachic pluralism in the conversion sphere may not be the optimal solution to all of the problems, but it is the most realistic option available for implementation.

Continued rapid growth of the ultra-Orthodox community requires both intra- and extra-sectoral attention to the socioeconomic ramifications of this trend

Explanation: It has long been known that the share of the ultra-Orthodox within the Jewish population is rapidly increasing. This year, several reports and forecasts addressed the issue, noting that a decade and a half from now, one out of every four Jews around the world will be Haredi.[11] This trend poses a challenge to the ultra-Orthodox communities, which will have to reconsider their policy as communities with an ethos founded on a minority consciousness (which will soon be irrelevant). It also poses a challenge to non-Haredi Jewish communities, which need to consider how they ought to respond to this trend. From an economic perspective it is clear that this challenge must be addressed as soon as possible (Israel won't be able to flourish if the economic contribution of a significant community within it is relatively small). From a socioeconomic perspective, the challenge is no less meaningful. Data gathered this year indicate the degree to which non-Haredi Israelis feel alienated from the Haredi community.[12] The ultra-Orthodox community's growing dominance could exacerbate societal tensions, and/or bring about gradual change in the character and composition of Israeli society, manifesting in a regression in education and employment levels. Under these circumstances, it is worth remembering that public policy has great power to influence the ultra-Orthodox public, and that the government has a duty to use that power wisely, but also continuously and determinedly, with attention to the sector's unique characteristics, but also to the general needs of the State of Israel.

11. See: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Haredi Jews Around the World: Population Trends and Estimates, L. Daniel Staetsky, May 2022.

12. See: Shared Spaces, Challenging Spaces: What the Findings of JPPI's 2022 Pluralism Index Survey Reveal, Shmuel Rosner, Camil Fuchs, Noah Slepkov.

9 Selected Indicators of World Jewry

Country/ Region	Core Jewish population		GDP per capita, PPP, US $	Index of Human Development – World Rank	Recent out-marriage rate (%)	Aliya
	1970	2021	2020	2020		2020
World	12,633,000	16,472,000	-	-	-	19,676
Israel	2,582,000	6,870,000	39,489.3	19	2	-
North America	5,686,000	7,694,000	-	-	-	2,532
United States	5,400,000	7,300,000	63,206.5	17	61	2,296
Canada	286,000	394,000	46,572.1	16	25	236
Europe (non-FSU)	1,331,000	1,092,000	-	-	-	3,431
France	530,000	446,000	46,991.2	26	>30	2,407
UK	390,000	292,000	46,482.9	13	26	459
Germany	30,000	118,000	54,844.5	6	45-55	80
Hungary	70,000	47,000	33,075.9	40	>50	27
Netherlands	30,000	30,000	59,266.9	8	>50	46
Other	281,000	159,000	-	-	-	412
Latin America	514,000	376,000	-	-	-	1,588
Argentina	282,000	175,000	20,770.7	46	25-35	551
Brazil	90,000	92,000	14,835.4	84	25-35	512
Mexico	35,000	40,000	18,444.1	74	<5	174
Other countries	107,000	69,000	-	-	-	351
FSU	2,151,000	227,000	-	-		11,011
Russian Federation	808,000	150,000	29,812.2	52	>70	6,644
Ukraine	777,000	43,000	13,054.8	74	>75	2,937
Rest FSU	566,000	34,000	-	-	-	1,430
Asia (rest)	104,000	33,000	-	-	-	223
Oceania	70,000	126,000	-	-	-	83
Australia	65,000	119,000	53,316.9	8	33	82
Other countries	5,000	7,000	-	-	-	1
Africa	195,000	54,000	-	-	-	348
South Africa	118,000	52,000	13,360.6	114	19	269
Other countries	77,000	2,000	-	-	-	79

IN-DEPTH ANALYSES

10 The Geopolitical Picture 2022
Israel in the Shadow of Great Power Competition

Geopolitical uncertainty has deepened in the last year, with implications for Israel and the Jewish people. The challenges facing Israel are becoming more demanding against the background of great power rivalry, which intensified in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. At the time this report was completed, a struggle was still underway to decide the fate of the negotiations aimed at signing a renewed nuclear agreement between the major powers and Iran. Whether such an agreement is reached – to Israel's dismay – or not, Israel will be forced to face the Iranian threat in an intricate geopolitical arena that complicates its maneuverability. If negotiations fail to result in an agreement, Iran will likely accelerate its efforts to equip itself with nuclear weapons. At the same time, Israel will intensify its countermeasures and a worsening of the conflict can be expected.

This reality impacts the challenges faced by Israel, which has been mired in an ongoing political crisis that makes it difficult to establish a stable government. The Naftali Bennet (Yamina)-Yair Lapid (Yesh Atid) government collapsed a year into its term, and Israeli citizens are being called to the polling booths for the fifth time in three and a half years.

The political instability, and the government's inability to plan and implement medium- and long-term plans, harms Israel's capacity to function optimally in the geopolitical arena. Moreover, because the outgoing government was based on a tiny parliamentary majority and supported by an ideologically polarized coalition, its ability to make foreign policy decisions was limited from the outset. In the past year, the government faced daunting domestic tasks, chief among them recovery from the ravages of the Covid-19 pandemic. At the same time, however, the geopolitical arena has posed equally vexing external challenges: chronic instability of the Middle East, Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and regional hegemony, the Hezbollah threat, the danger of terrorism and the fragility of the Palestinian situation, recently exemplified by "Operation Breaking Dawn" against the Islamic Jihad. Added to these are the question marks concerning U.S. policy in areas that affect Israel's resilience and the strength of the strategic triangular relationship: Jerusalem-Washington-American Jewry.

The past year also reflected Israel's strength as a regional power with a robust economy

Alongside these challenges, the past year also reflected Israel's strength as a regional power with a robust economy, whose neighbors are seeking to cooperate with it in an unprecedented way.

The International Arena and Great Power Competition

The world is rife with challenges that feed off one another: the war in Ukraine, the effects of the pandemic, the Iranian nuclear program, the Chinese threat to Taiwan, signs of a looming worldwide depression, inflation, using energy as a weapon, uncertainties in the global food market, problems of climate and drought. The poorer countries are the first to pay the price of these crises, which deepen poverty and threaten to intensify the spread of famine and malnourishment. The great power competition raises fears of a return to the atmosphere of the Cold War, and even to violent confrontation driven by the fighting in Ukraine and tensions that have recently worsened over the Taiwan situation. It also reasserts the importance of the Middle East in the calculus of the superpowers.

The Ukraine crisis – The United States and Europe are working to thwart the moves of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, though cautiously for fear of being drawn into direct combat. They have pledged $36 billion in military aid to Ukraine and are presenting a united economic front against Moscow, including comprehensive sanctions. The shock that gripped Europe in the face of the invasion, and the implied Russian threat of using nuclear weapons, breathed new life into NATO and stimulated its willingness to defend Western values. The requests of Finland and Sweden to join the alliance

reflect this reawakening. However, the ability to mount a united global front against Russia is limited. China is not interested in a Russian diminution that would bolster the standing of its American competitor and is helping Moscow by integrating it into an alternative financial system.

The Ukraine situation and other crises have in recent months revealed that the world is polarized in a number of dimensions, which makes it difficult to maintain effective alliances that cover the full range of challenges. For example, the "Quad" strategic security dialogue (the U.S., India, Australia, and Japan), which was designed impede Chinese efforts to take control of the South China Sea, is not united in relation to Moscow. India, like many other countries the U.S. is trying to mobilize for this campaign, is not a partner in the sanctions regime against Russia, from which it imports 20% of its oil supply.

The United States – The Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a change of emphasis in American foreign policy discourse. At the beginning of his term, President Joe Biden defined the great power competition as a struggle between democracy and autocracy and promised that American diplomacy would promote the values of freedom and human rights. The need to address aggressive Russian and Chinese behavior forced the U.S. to change its approach and to cooperate with regimes that are far from democratic. Policy inspired by the liberal-democratic ethos with its "soft power" emphasis in international relations has given way to realpolitik. The most striking expression of this was President Biden's "pilgrimage" to Saudi Arabia – his handshake with Mohammad bin Salman, the country's de facto ruler responsible for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Biden had branded bin Salman a "pariah" during his election campaign.

The main motif of the new American policy is that of a "rules-based international order." Countries not seeking to undermine this order are eligible for membership in the Western camp. Regarding the Middle East, President Biden explained: "As the world grows more competitive and the challenges we face more complex, it is only becoming clearer to me how closely interwoven America's interests are with the successes of the Middle East."[1] The American view is that a boost in Mideast oil production will reduce Russia's capacity for extortion, and moderate rising energy prices. Accordingly, Biden promised that the U.S. "will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran." The president announced a new American policy approach to the Middle East, detailing its logic and principles in five clusters. The main points are as follows:

Biden promised: the U.S. will not leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran

1. The U.S. will support and stand behind countries that respect the rules-based international order.
2. The U.S. will not allow freedom of navigation of Mideast sea lanes to be jeopardized, or one country to dominate another in the region.
3. The U.S. will work to reduce tensions and resolve conflicts. It is committed to ensuring that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.
4. The U.S. will foster political, economic, and security connections with countries in the region, while respecting their sovereignty.
5. The U.S. will promote human rights and the values enshrined in the U.N. Charter.

The countries of the Middle East are not enthusiastic about taking sides in the great power rivalry. Biden's announcement of a change in foreign policy left them under a double question mark.

The first concerns the ability of the American president to fulfill his promises. A July 2022 opinion poll found that nearly 60% of American citizens are dissatisfied with Biden's performance. There are increasing calls for the aging leader not to seek a second term in the 2024 election cycle (Biden will soon celebrate his 80th birthday).

The second question mark concerns the credibility of the announced policy change. Until recently, the U.S. was portrayed as preferring to limit its focus to domestic challenges and its rivalry with China while reducing its involvement in other arenas. It was seen as downplaying the importance of the Middle East, leaving a geopolitical vacuum that draws in its rivals. By contrast, Russia and China seem determined to become more involved in shaping the world order and expanding their regional influence. While Russia's invasion of Ukraine exemplifies Moscow's strategic appetite, the abrupt American withdrawal from Afghanistan points to strategic laxity. (This, despite the successful targeted killings of terrorist leaders by the U.S., as in the air strike on Ayman al-Zawahiri). As a result, doubts have arisen about whether the U.S. will come to Taiwan's aid if China does not content itself with military exercises and attacks the neighboring island.[2]

Russia – Russia has been stung by the sanctions imposed on it, and its economy will contract by 6% this year. In the long term, the damage will be much heavier, due to the withdrawal of about a thousand international companies, the loss of markets, brain drain, and more. In the near term, however, Russia appears to have enough resources to manage, even escalate, the war in Ukraine. President Putin has responded to the sanctions with economic warfare and using energy as a weapon. For example, when the approval of Turkey's President Erdoğan was needed in order for Sweden and Finland to join NATO, the Russian energy

giant Gazprom announced the cessation of gas flows to Turkey due to a sudden need for maintenance work on the pipeline.

The coming winter will be a test of Europe's endurance, which, after experiencing extreme heat waves and a severe drought during the summer, will have to deal with the consequences of the steep increase in gas prices. The price of gas on the continent is now ten times higher than the average over the last decade.

In the Middle East arena, where the U.S. is pushing for the creation of a regional alliance against the Iranian threat, Putin is strengthening his country's ties with Teheran. During his visit there this past July, he advanced a deal in which Russia would invest 40 billion dollars in the development of Iran's oil and gas fields. At the same time, Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, helped launch an Iranian satellite with espionage capabilities into space. In the U.S. it was revealed that Russia is considering the purchase of Iranian-made attack drones.

China – To date, 146 countries have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, reflecting global recognition of China's economic power and the desire to do business with it. In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), China is the world's second-largest economy and is expected to overtake the United States in 2028. China is imposing its will on Hong Kong, defying its South China Sea neighbors to the south and east, threatening Taiwan, violating human rights, and abusing its Muslim minority. China is also steadily working to penetrate further into the Middle East, which constitutes an energy source, a developing market for its products, and a transit station to European markets. The Belt and Road Initiative has over 20 Arab member states. Over the last decade, Beijing has signed strategic agreements with most of them, through which it has obtained huge contracts for infrastructure construction and energy supply. In 2021, trade between China and the Arab world amounted to 330 billion dollars, a third higher than the previous year. The U.S.-China tensions energizes Beijing to bolster its ties with Iran and to extricate Iran from the isolation and sanctions imposed on it. One proof of this is the strategic agreement signed in March 2021, in which China pledged to invest 400 billion dollars over 25 years in Iranian infrastructure, in exchange for oil at a discounted price (it's no surprise that Iran was one of the countries that denounced Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan).

The great powers and Israel – Tension between the superpowers requires Israel to navigate carefully in order to protect its interests, but along with the challenges it also brings advantages and opportunities. If the U.S. does curb its withdrawal from the region, as President Biden promised, it will be an achievement for Israel. Without an American presence, the region attracts Russia and China, whose considerations are not informed by pro-Israel sentiment.

The war in Ukraine poses a strategic dilemma: to what extent should Israel stand behind the U.S. flag, participate in the struggle against Russia and China, and endanger security and economic interests that require cultivating ties with U.S. rivals? This question is also joined by a moral dilemma: Should Israeli foreign policy give greater weight to ethical considerations, even if this comes at a security or economic cost? After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Israel was wary of making sweeping gestures in support of Ukraine. The mediation attempts of Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in Ukraine-Russia talks helped Israel walk a fine line – safeguarding the welfare of Russian and Ukrainian Jews while maintaining coordination with the Russian forces in Syria to ensure continued freedom of action for the Israeli Air Force against Iranian targets.

The war in Ukraine raises a dilemma: to what extent should Israel stand under the American flag?

Russia does not hesitate to convey discouraging messages when dissatisfied with Israeli actions or the statements of its leaders. This was the case when Foreign Minister Yair Lapid called the killing of civilians in the town of Bucha last April a "war crime." When Israel struck the Damascus airport in June, the Israeli ambassador was summoned for reprimand and Moscow pushed for a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel. A similar interpretation could also be applied to the crisis between Russia and the Jewish Agency. The Russian authorities declared Jewish Agency activity illegal (because it collects data on Russian citizens), and Prime Minister Lapid announced in response that a Jewish Agency shutdown would be "a serious matter with ramifications for relations" (the phone conversation held as these lines were being written between President Herzog and President Putin, described as positive, appears to be a milestone on the way to resolving the crisis).

As expected, the great powers rivalry also has implications for Israel's relations with China, its third-biggest trade partner in the world. The U.S. is pressing to moderate Chinese involvement in infrastructure construction in Israel and for restrictions on the transfer of advanced Israeli technologies into Chinese hands. As the conflict between U.S.-China worsens, Israel's identification with the U.S. may provoke Chinese hostility toward it. At the same time, Jerusalem will have to be more attentive to Washington's demands on various issues, such as the involvement of a Chinese company in the management of the Port of Haifa (the U.S. has warned that its Sixth Fleet ships would not enter the port for fear of espionage and cyberwarfare).

The Iranian Threat

The fate of the negotiations for the signing of a renewed nuclear agreement with Iran is close to being decided. Meanwhile, the punishing sanctions imposed on Iran, the problematic economic situation there (severe water shortages, power outages, demonstrations), and various countermeasures attributed to Israel have not halted the progress of the Iranian nuclear project or thwarted its regional subversion. Iran continues building its attack architecture against Israel, supplying advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, and working via proxy militias to suppress the remaining American regional presence. Iran boasts of having established armies under its control throughout the region: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq and Syria, and sympathetic Palestinian organizations (especially the Islamic Jihad). There is no dispute among assessment bodies in Israel and abroad that Teheran is closer to a nuclear bomb than ever before. Defense Minister Benny Gantz estimates that Iran has already enriched 50 kg of uranium to 60% (one nuclear bomb requires 25 kg enriched to 90%). Brigadier General Amit Sa'ar, head of the IDF's Military Intelligence Research Division, explained in April that in addition to enriched uranium, Iran still needs to develop a detonating mechanism and a ballistic missile capable of carrying the bomb: "The Iranians, in our estimation, are two years away from the final stage," he said.

The Israeli-American dialogue on the nuclear issue was conducted over the past year without the public confrontations that erupted during the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration. However, this does not mean that Washington will accede to Israel's demands if and when a new nuclear deal with Iran is signed. Israel objects to a deal that, upon its expiration, would allow Iran to progress toward nuclear bomb production – a deal lacking effective supervision that would not halt the development of ballistic missiles or quell Iran's regional subversion. Israel would prefer a return to the "maximum pressure" policy, to more stringent sanctions and Iran's increased isolation – while also formulating a military containment plan. To Israel's dismay, the United States, which does not wish to be drawn into a military confrontation with Iran, is delaying the effort to obtain the amendments demanded by Israel until after the agreement is signed. It is worth noting that within Israel's senior ranks there are also some who support renewing the agreement. They do not feel that this will be enough to remove the Iranian nuclear threat, but they hope to buy precious time to prepare for what will come.

Israel objects to a deal that would enable Iran to progress toward nuclear bomb production

Teheran clings to former President Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA to explain why

it is not bound by the deal's restrictions. Iran is developing and operating advanced centrifuges, enriching uranium to 60% (the JCPOA allowed a level of 3.67%) and is even producing metallic uranium (a crucial material in the core production process of nuclear weapons). The Iranians have deactivated the surveillance cameras installed by the UN at Iran's nuclear sites "until the signing of a new agreement," and have refused to provide the explanation demanded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the "open cases" in which remains of enriched uranium have been found at some sites. During negotiations, Iran demanded that the Revolutionary Guards be removed from the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations, but under pressure from Israel, President Biden committed to opposing such a move "even if it means giving up on a renewal of the nuclear agreement."

The rhetoric surrounding the nuclear crisis is also escalating. Kamal Kharrazi, president of Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, boasted in July that Iran has the technical ability to manufacture a nuclear bomb should it so desire, and Prime Minister Lapid – in what the media took to be a response – said at the inauguration ceremony for the new head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission in August that Israel's other capabilities "keep us alive."

Both scenarios – signing a nuclear deal or not – leave the Iran issue open. If an agreement is signed, it is expected to be flawed. It will enable Iran to surreptitiously move forward in producing nuclear weapons, will not impede its subversive activity and, once the sanctions are lifted, will make tens of billions of dollars available to it for increased aggression.

The head of the Mossad, David Barnea, labeled the apparent agreement a "fraud." According to him, Iran will not fulfill its part and the West will not withdraw from the agreement as a result.

At the same time, Israel could face American pressure not to act against Iran, so as not to jeopardize the agreement's sustainability. On the other hand, should it turn out that an agreement is not achievable, Iran may accelerate its efforts to equip itself with a nuclear arsenal, and a stepping up of Israel's countermeasures can be expected. In a June 2022 interview with the British weekly *The Economist*, then-Prime Minister Bennett stated that Israel is "implementing the Octopus Doctrine. We no longer play with the tentacles, [we are] going for the head." Chief of General Staff Aviv Kochavi clarified in July that the IDF's preparations against Iran's nuclear program are its main focus.

The worsening of the military conflict between Israel and Iran (which over the past year included an escalation of the cyber war) could lead to tensions between Jerusalem and Washington due to American reservations about being dragged into a military confrontation with Iran. Israel thus faces a wrenching dilemma: how to repel the

Iranian nuclear threat without sliding into a crisis with its sole ally. In the "Jerusalem Declaration" signed during President Biden's visit to Israel in July, the president pledged "never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon," and stated that the U.S. "is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome." In an interview, Biden clarified that he would use force "as a last resort." The question that remains open is the degree of credibility of this statement, as the point in time at which the use of force "as a last resort" would indeed be required is subject to more than one interpretation.

The Middle East – Threats and Opportunities

The Middle East's chronic instability places Israel in constant danger of sliding into violent confrontation with Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. The level of volatility was in evidence during Operation Breaking Dawn in early August when Israel struck Palestinian Islamic Jihad bases and eliminated senior officials from its ranks. Approximately one thousand rockets were fired at Israel during the operation (about 300 were intercepted by Iron Dome batteries, with a success rate of 97%). Other evidence of the region's instability could be found in the IDF's 2021 annual report, which noted a rise in its offensive activity in the "War Between the Wars" – over a thousand strikes in various arenas.

The region is rife with conflict and with social and political trends that undermine its stability. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic added to the region's deeply rooted afflictions: wars, terrorism, waves of refugees, humanitarian crises, faltering economies, corruption, unemployment, and failed governmental systems. In a region-wide poll conducted by the BBC in the first half of 2022, most respondents agreed that "the economy is weak under a democracy." Indeed, even the citizens of Tunisia, the last of the countries on which the democratic mark of the Arab Spring held, gave its president dictatorial powers in a July 2022 referendum.

The global economic crisis and uncertainties in the global food market are raising the region's poverty rates and threatening its stability. According to the World Bank, a one percent increase in food prices moves another 10 million people into extreme poverty. This terrible arithmetic applies to the population of the Middle East, as a region where the amount of basic goods consumed exceeds the quantity it produces (around 70 million suffer from malnutrition).

From Israel's perspective, this complex data field is rife with threats, but also opportunities. The Iranian threat pushes the Arab world to cooperate with Israel. Palestinian weakness and world fatigue from dealing with their affairs have made rapprochement with Israel easier for Arab rulers. Since the signing of the Abraham

Accords in August 2020, ties have been developed with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco. Half a million Israelis have visited the Gulf as of this writing. Saudi Arabia, which has conditioned normalization with Israel on the resolution of the Palestinian problem, has opened its skies to Israeli flights. The Negev Summit of March 2022, which saw U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the foreign ministers of Egypt, Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain gather in Israel, reflected the new regional spirit. Senior Israeli officials have made frequent visits to Arab capitals.[3]

Hezbollah dispatched four drones headed for the Karish gas field

The U.S. is working to deepen regional cooperation in preparing for aerial defense against Iranian missiles and drones. Defense Minister Benny Gantz revealed that these efforts have already "thwarted Iranian attempts to challenge Israel and other countries in the Middle East." Iran, for its part, is working to deter the Gulf states and openly threatening them with harm should they strengthen their ties with Israel. Israeli defense exports to Gulf state signatories to the Abraham Accords grew by 30% in 2021 over the previous year. Israel's gas fields have strengthened its position in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea and constitute a basis for cooperation with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and even Turkey. At a June meeting of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in Cairo, Israel's Minister of Energy, Karine Elharrar, signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding with Egypt and the European Union for the supply of Israeli gas to Europe via Egypt.

Here are a number of developments over the past year in the Middle East that have an impact on Israel's resilience:

Syria – President Bashar al-Assad controls about two-thirds of his country's original territory. Most of the Arab states have reconciled themselves to his continued rule and have renewed ties with his regime at various levels. Syrian territory is being used by Iran to build a military infrastructure against Israel. Iran trains local militias subject to its authority and transfers advanced weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel is waging a continuous struggle against this activity, but the intensifying great power rivalry, which has sharpened tensions between Moscow and Jerusalem, could make it difficult for the Israeli air force operate in Syrian airspace.

Lebanon – The country is in a particularly deep economic crisis. Lebanese currency has lost 90% of its value; 80% of the country's citizens have sunk into poverty, its infrastructure has collapsed and there are shortages of food, medication, fuel, and other essential goods. The government has not been able to meet World Bank conditions for the 3-billion-dollar loan it has requested. Lebanon desperately needs revenue and for this reason returned in early 2022, under U.S.

auspices, to negotiations with Israel over the maritime border between the two countries, so that it can start developing the gas fields along its coast.

Although Hezbollah and its allies lost their majority in Lebanon's May 2022 parliamentary elections, the organization's influence has not eroded significantly. Hezbollah continues to build its military capabilities and, with Iranian assistance, is focusing on its precision guided missile project. It appears that the organization has no interest in another war with Israel, but given Lebanon's state of collapse, an unplanned slide into confrontation could occur. In such a situation, Israel would face a well-trained army with 140,000 rockets and missiles, some of which have a high degree of accuracy, at its disposal. Hezbollah signaled its intentions and capabilities in July when it launched four drones (which were intercepted) at the Karish gas field's drilling platform. The Lebanese government denounced the action, but Hezbollah Secretary General Nasrallah was undeterred, threatening that all of Israel's gas fields lie within the organization's reach. The IDF is preparing for a deterioration and also for the deployment of ground forces deep in Lebanese territory. In an ongoing war exercise, a scenario was played out in which 1,500 rockets and missiles are fired into Israel per day.

Jordan – The Bennett-Lapid government worked to strengthen relations with Jordan, whose economy is in a state of ongoing crisis. Over the past year several meetings were held between Israeli leaders and King Abdullah II, but the violent incidents triggered by Hamas on the Temple Mount during Ramadan reignited tensions between the countries. The Jordanian prime minister praised "those throwing their stones at all of those Zionists who desecrate Al Aqsa Mosque with the protection of the Israeli occupation government." The events showed that Israel-Jordan relations are still sensitive to the Palestinian issue (over half of Jordan's population is of Palestinian origin). In order to ease the tensions, Prime Minister Lapid met with the king at his palace in July, after which the Israeli government decided to advance plans for the "Jordan Gateway" joint industrial park that is expected to employ about 10,000 Jordanian workers.

Israel-Jordan relations are still sensitive to the Palestinian issue

Saudi Arabia – Mohammad bin Salman (known as MBS), Saudi Arabia's de facto leader, scored a significant achievement when President Biden visited Riyadh, demonstrating renewed American recognition of the country's importance in an era of great power competition. It turned out that the U.S. cannot leave the kingdom, which possesses 16% of the world's oil reserves, subject to Russian and Chinese influence. However, Saudi Arabia is

in no hurry to align itself with the U.S. and is skeptical about Washington's willingness to come to its defense when put to the test. Riyadh has no intention of weakening its ties with China, which purchases a quarter of all Saudi oil output, nor will it weaken ties with Moscow. The crown prince explained that acceding to Biden's request for increased oil production would necessitate coordination with the OPEC+ group, of which Russia is a member. After the American president's visit, MBS spoke by phone with Putin to show that coordination with Russia had not eroded. Indeed, the slight oil production increase decided on by OPEC+ was far from Biden's expectations. MBS has ambitious plans to develop the kingdom, and he wants to ensure the security of its oil facilities. He has chosen to maneuver between the great powers, and is even engaged in dialogue with Teheran, which could rupture the regional front against Iranian aggression that Israel wishes to maintain. U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia to publicly acknowledge its secret ties with Israel was rejected, apart from permission to all civilian flights (including, though without specifying, Israeli air carriers) to fly in Saudi airspace. The Saudi foreign minister clarified his country's demands of Israel: implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative and a commitment to establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Egypt – The Egyptian economy continues to grow (6% over the past year). However, it suffers from a shortage of foreign currency reserves, which has recently raised fears that Egypt may have difficulty repaying debts.

It was negatively affected by the Ukraine war and the rise in oil and grain prices. The agreement reached in July to allow the export of grain from the Black Sea ports eased the situation. (Ukraine and Russia are Egypt's main source of wheat and also a source of tourism.) The failure to resolve the dispute over the Renaissance Dam, whose construction is being completed by Ethiopia and which has already begun filling with water, raises Egyptian fears about reduced Nile flow into its territory. President Sisi warned in June that "no one will touch Egypt's water." Ethiopia may be surprised by his tough resolve. Sisi spares no means to suppress the regime's opposition. Human rights organizations claim that 60,000 political prisoners are being held in Egyptian prisons.

The Egyptian president sees Israel as an effective partner, allowing security cooperation with it and helping maintain calm in Gaza. Following Egypt's assistance in achieving a ceasefire in the last round of Israel's battle against Islamic Jihad in early August, tensions rose between Cairo and Jerusalem as a result of its claim that Israel is not meeting the terms of the deal.

Iraq – Its position as a possible buffer against Iran and its possession of the fifth

largest oil reserve in the world testify to the geopolitical importance of Iraq, but the country is in severe internal crisis. Since the October 2021 elections, the various factions have been unable to reach an agreement on the appointment of a president and a prime minister. The political power struggles, which increasingly deteriorate into violence, allow pro-Iranian elements a leg up in strengthening their influence despite not having succeeded in the elections.

Turkey – Erdoğan's aggressive policies in the international arena have not relieved challenges looming at home: an economic crisis with 80% inflation, and the presence of 3.6 million refugees from Syria who strain the country's resources. Concern over the expected results of the elections on the horizon (June 2023) drives Erdoğan to deviate from his usual conflict-seeking approach in the international arena. (Although he threatened Greece recently: "we may surprise you one night.")

He, most of the time, has taken a conciliatory tone toward Israel this year and has his eye on integrating his country into the regional gas export system.

A breakthrough in relations between the two countries was marked by President Herzog's visit to Ankara in March – the highest-level visit since 2008. Later, in a telephone conversation Erdoğan and Prime Minister Lapid agreed upon the mutual return of ambassadors.

Trade between Israel and Turkey, which remained steady despite the political tensions and amounted this past year to seven billion dollars, may grow further thanks to the diplomatic thaw. The strengthening of ties was also evident when security personnel from both countries cooperated this past June to thwart an attempt by Iranian intelligence agents to abduct and harm Israelis visiting Istanbul.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The deepening great power rivalry contributes to pushing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict off the global agenda. In the absence of a path to political solution, Israel risks falling into the reality of a binational state that would threaten its Jewish character. Events of the past year, however, highlight the lack of ripeness for progress toward a permanent resolution of the conflict.

The situation in the West Bank and Gaza is unstable. Corruption, lack of governance, the ongoing failures at reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, the eroded status of 87-year-old Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen, and the evolving internal confrontation over his succession – all contribute to this state of affairs. The Palestinian Authority is having trouble imposing its authority, and incidents of violence and lawlessness are increasing, including attacks against Israel involving Palestinian security personnel. (The

diplomatic paralysis motivates organizations such as Amnesty International to deem Israel an apartheid state.)

President Biden's visit to Ramallah did not herald a breakthrough, although he reiterated his country's commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 lines with agreed-upon land swaps. Biden made it clear that conditions were not ripe for promoting a permanent settlement and, contrary to Palestinian expectations, did not reverse Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and to move the U.S. embassy there. The president left the PLO mission in Washington closed and, under Israeli pressure, did not order the reopening of the American Consulate in Jerusalem that had managed relations with the Palestinian Authority. Against the background of Palestinian frustration with the U.S. position with respect to its plight, the PA announced sweeping support for China in the wake of Speaker of the House Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. Furthermore, there have been threats that the September session of the UN General Assembly will be used to advance a "dramatic" measure, such as nullifying the mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel and demanding full recognition of the State of Palestine.

Washington Inst. poll: a reminder of the risk of a binational reality

A reminder of the risk of slipping into a binational reality appears in the findings of a poll commissioned by the Washington Institute, indicating a "moderation" trend among East Jerusalem's Palestinian residents. Sixty-three percent of the respondents agreed with the statement: "It would be better for us if we were part of Israel, rather than in Palestinian Authority or Hamas ruled lands." Likewise, there are signs of initial organizational activity in East Jerusalem to promote participation in the municipal elections slated for October 2023. Senior Fatah officials have harshly condemned these developments, but the decision, which could have dramatic implications for the Jewish character of Israel's capital city, is in Palestinian hands.

Operation Breaking Dawn against Islamic Jihad, outbreaks of violence on the Temple Mount, and a number of terror attacks over the past year attest to a potential flareup in the Palestinian arena. During the first half of 2022, 61 planned terror attacks and another 36 combat incidents in response to IDF activity were documented. Hamas, with the encouragement of Egypt, is mostly observing the ceasefire on the Gaza border, and chose not to join in the Operation Breaking Dawn hostilities. However, the organization continues to build its military capabilities, and its leaders openly encourage violent actions and terrorism in the West Bank, while focusing on the Temple Mount.

The Gaza Strip, one of the most densely populated areas in the world, suffers from a lack of infrastructure, water and electricity shortages, unemployment (50%), and severe poverty. The current global food market uncertainties and rising energy prices could worsen the economic situation and cause the security situation to deteriorate. Granting permission for laborers to enter Israeli territory, and the intention to increase their number to 30,000 per day, has provided some relief and an incentive to keep the peace. (It will soon become clear how Operation Breaking Dawn has affected this initiative.)

The Triangular Relationship: Jerusalem-Washington-American Jewry

The continued resilience of the "triangle," a decisive force multiplier for the strength of Israel and the Jewish people, is an ongoing challenge for the Israeli government. It requires maintaining both bipartisan American sympathy for Israel, and American Jewry's attachment to Israel (American Jewry accounts for a third of the Jewish people). Security threats to Israel require strict maintenance of irreplicable U.S. support. American Jewry holds power and influence and therefore comprises an important element of the strategic triangle.

Maintaining the triangular relationship's robustness is not a simple task given current trends that threaten to weaken it. Due to differences in perception and values, Israel faces difficulty in holding the sympathy of young American Jews. The situation has been exacerbated in the light of the ideological polarization underway in the United States, which has made the subject of Israel "party-dependent" and strains the preservation bipartisan support.

In Congress, harsh voices against Israel are more common than ever before, and the president is under pressure from the Democratic Party's progressive wing to condition support for Israel on significant policy change regarding the Palestinian issue. Before Biden's trip to the Middle East, 80 Congressional Democrats called for him to act against measures that endanger the two-state solution. The fear in Israel is that this critical trend buzzing in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party – which is still a minority, albeit a loud and assertive one – will seep into the mainstream.

Biden promised: the U.S. will not leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran

Although the Bennett-Lapid government indeed stated its intention of addressing some of the issues that have clouded relations between Israel and American Jewry, declarations of goodwill cannot bridge the opinion gap on fundamental issues, chief among them the Palestinian question. Seventy percent of U.S. Jews are

Democrats, and most have also expressed support for the policies of Presidents Obama and Biden on the Iranian nuclear issue. Their loyalty to President Biden is clear (63% support, much higher than among the general public). Therefore, their willingness to promote policies on which – in the view of the American Jewish leadership – Israeli and American interests overlap is critically important. In-depth dialogue with Jewish Democrats, which has been neglected for years, is essential to rekindling the interest American Jewry in the challenges facing Israel.

Endnotes

1. July 16, 2022, at the Gulf Cooperation Council.
2. China held large-scale military exercises in the wake of a visit to Taiwan by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, August 2022.
3. Prime Minister Bennett met with the King of Bahrain in Manama (February, 15, 2022) and with the UAE president in Abu Dhabi (June 9, 2022); IDF Chief of General Staff Kochavi visited Morocco (July 18, 2022), and according to the Wall Street Journal met in March 2022 at Sharm el-Sheikh with his military counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt to coordinate action in the face of the Iranian threat.

11 The Jewish People in 2022: Challenges of Governance, Culture, and Polarization

In the past year no significant deepening of any of the acute challenges facing the Jewish people was observed. All the same, no progress was registered toward overcoming these challenges. Developments in the geopolitical, economic, and social arenas, however, did affect the Jewish people and overshadowed internal developments and change trends. The war in Ukraine posed the challenge of absorbing refugees, including Jewish immigrants, in Israel. Political instability has necessitated yet another round of Israeli elections, the fifth in four years, while political polarization in the United States continues to intensify as midterm elections approach. Antisemitic phenomena around the world, and on social media, continued in accordance with trends observed in recent years. Studies of Jewish communities in a number of different countries have identified continued erosion processes in Jewish institutional membership, a phenomenon connected with a general trend toward secularization and detachment from any recognizably "religious" identity. Economic crisis, as well as a lack of consensus regarding means and methods, makes it difficult to expand investments in strengthening Jewish identity, while a sociopolitical crisis sharpens disputes among Jews that take control of the agenda.

In this chapter we will examine the political arena in Israel, as well as long-term trends regarding ties to tradition and religion, challenges arising from the current wave of

immigration from Russia and Ukraine, and from the strengthening of Israel's Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) sector. The main discussion of antisemitism appears in the context of the Antisemitism Index on page 93; the main discussion of the situation of the communities in Russia and Ukraine appears in the Demography Index on page 69; and the main discussion of trends in Israel-Diaspora relations appears in Israel-Diaspora Index, which can be found on page 87.

Polarization and Governance in Israel

In Israel, the home of the world's largest Jewish community, political upheaval continues for the fourth year, which makes it difficult to form a stable coalition, to draft and implement long-term plans, and to adequately address burning issues. The outgoing Israeli government, and the Knesset majority on which it rested, registered several specific achievements, above all the significant and precedent-setting inclusion of an Arab party in the ruling coalition.[1] This development signaled the possibility, even if not the certainty, of a long-term trend toward deepening the integration of Israeli Arabs in shaping Israeli policies out of a sense of partnership and shared responsibility for the destiny of the country. However, the fact that the accomplishment was short-lived, which collapsed largely due to the opposition (or elements within the opposition) that rejected this Jewish-Arab partnership and were unable to reconcile themselves to it, indicates the opposite possibility: that, based on this experience, the time is not yet ripe for deepening the Jewish-Arab civic partnership, and Israelis – Jews and Arabs – are not ready for the change of consciousness required to bring such partnership to fruition.

In early November, the citizens of Israel will go to the polls for the fifth time in less than four years, in what is actually an ongoing crisis the essence of which is the difficulty in reaching a consensus on the nature and composition of the governing coalition. The difficulty is less a matter of significant disagreement on policy regarding the major issues, than of resolving gaps of identification with personalities, symbols, communities, and tribes in Israeli society. On the main issues, such as the economy, healthcare, the Iranian challenge, relations with Arab countries, and more, the differences between the positions held by the various political parties are usually not very large. The political fault lines are most evident in the context of personal matters, issues of minor impact on the country's resilience, primarily of symbolic importance (such as the religion-and-state controversy over bringing chametz (leavened products) into hospitals during Passover), and in the context of communal identity of different groups ("Haredim," "Arabs," and the like).

These fault lines indicate an ongoing and sometimes bitter dispute over the Israeli social vision, which is often simplistically (and harmfully) depicted as a conflict between those who want "a more Jewish state" and those who want "a more democratic state." This promotional framing, which public leaders exploit to foment political polarization, obscures the fact that majority of Israeli Jews want a state that is both Jewish and democratic. It sharpens suspicions among Israelis that one political camp is not committed to democracy and another camp is not committed to the state's Jewishness. It is of course true that narrow communal identification and the vision gap may also affect policy on various important issues. This is the case with regard to the challenge posed by the growth of Israel's ultra-Orthodox community and its economic and social implications for Israel. It is also the case regarding the challenge of integrating the Arab sector, and its ramifications for Israel's identity as a Jewish state. It furthermore applies to the integration of radical groups from both ends of the spectrum within Israel's decision-making system.

The cumulative result is that Israel suffers from an ongoing crisis in the government's ability to function – a situation marked by difficulty establishing the functional continuity of the legislative and executive branches. In the absence of any political disagreement of principle, it is important that we understand the source of the crisis, for which three interrelated and complementary explanations may be proposed. The first, point-specific explanation relates to the political figures who lead the various Israeli factions and the crisis of trust between them, which makes cooperation difficult even under conditions of political consensus. The second explanation relates to the structure of Israeli society and the tribal preferences within it. According to JPPI data, the secular sector prefers Arabs as political partners, while more traditionalist and religious Israelis prefer partnership with the Haredim.[2] These two distinct groups, the Arabs and the Haredim, together constitute about a third of the population; both hold the power to enable a government to form, and the power to prevent one from forming. Part of the difficulty in establishing a stable coalition stems from the reluctance of one camp to partner with the Arabs, and the reluctance of the other camp to partner with the ultra-Orthodox (and also the divergent positions of the elected Arab and Haredi officials themselves).

Israel suffers from an ongoing political crisis of instability

A third explanation relates to a fundamental disagreement over the appropriate guiding vision for Israel's future. Several visions exist in a state of tension, competition and, at times, contradiction, as reflected in the personal and group identifications

noted above. In an era characterized by polarized and vitriolic social discourse, in Israel as elsewhere, and by a weakening of the moderating mamlachti ("statehoodist") influence, it is difficult for groups with competing visions to work together even on issues where there is mutual agreement.

At the time of writing, it is too early to determine what the consequences of this phenomenon will be for Israel's political system in the coming year. It may be that one of the "blocs" will achieve a sufficiently large majority to assemble a coalition without having to compromise with disapproving parties. It is possible that such a majority on one side of the political map would force a "rethink" on the other side; it is also possible that the present state of affairs will continue (there is no particular reason to believe the campaign promise of "no sixth round," as such promises were also made during the "third," "fourth," and "fifth" rounds of elections). What is clear is that until a stable government is finally established in Israel, one that will implement a systematic work plan of some kind, it will be impossible to progress toward resolving many of Israel's domestic and external challenges, some of which have broader implications for the Jewish people. This state of affairs is undesirable for Israel, as some of the challenges are accumulating additional layers of complexity, and the longer it takes for Israel to address them, the harder it will be to do so effectively.

There is little reason to believe the promise of no 6th election round

Religious and Political Identity

In recent years, researchers and opinion influencers have claimed that political identity is emerging as an alternative to religious identity for citizens of many Western countries.[3] There are various explanations for this phenomenon, many of which see technological changes as the main key. "Social media and news consumption habits […] have cordoned Americans off into ideological echo chambers that are all-consuming […]. The sense of connection some find online may be replacing social networks once formed by houses of worship."[4] This phenomenon has many different implications for Jews, including their ability to maintain cohesion, ease tension, and reduce polarization. This is because a reciprocal dynamic distances these groups from each other – groups that diverge on religion cannot reach a consensus in the political sphere either, while those that differ in the political arena also experience tension on the religious level.

This relatively new reality naturally sparks debates about cause and effect, whether Jews (and non-Jews) change their political positions due to their religious outlook, or whether they forge a religious outlook in

accordance with their political positions. For some time, it was commonly held that religion is the factor that drives political attitudes. In recent years, however, a number of studies have advanced a different hypothesis: that membership in human groups with a particular political ideology also largely dictates the religious affiliation of their members. Findings from the U.S. and Israel support this idea.[5]

In the U.S., as in Israel, there is an evident connection between political ideology and religious practice. Politically conservative Jews, on average, observe many more Jewish practices than do politically liberal Jews. For example, three times the number of conservative Jews say that religion is very important to them compared to liberal Jews (per Pew data: 41% versus 12%). Accordingly, there is an easily discerned "gradient" in almost all surveys of Jewish beliefs, behaviors, and commitments, for both American and Israeli Jews. The proportion of conservative American Jews who belong to synagogues is nearly double that of liberal Jews (45% versus 25%). A much higher share of conservatives say they observe Shabbat "in a way that is meaningful" to them (53% versus 33%). In Israel, only a minority of those who identify as "completely secular" come from the "right" or the "center-right" (less than a fifth). By contrast, the share of traditional and religious Israelis who hold right-wing political views is much higher.[6] Accordingly, there are gaps in Jewish traditional practice (and not lonely those pertaining to "mitzvah observance") are also evident in the political sphere. On the right, more than half of Israeli Jews "study Jewish texts," compared less than a third of political centrists and less than a fifth of those on the left. On the right and the center-right, nearly all Jews feel "very Jewish" (on the right, over 90% rated their Jewish feeling at 8 or higher on a scale of 1 to 10). By contrast, the share of political centrists who feel "very Jewish" drops sharply (to about 70%), while for those on the center-left and left the percentages drop even further (between 40 and 50%).

None of this is news, but the possible consequences are relatively new: Due to deep political polarization in the U.S. and, on some issues, in Israel, there is a feedback loop between the two phenomena. When political positions are polarized, it becomes necessary to "align" commitment to tradition with them, and when commitment to tradition increases, it becomes necessary to "align" political views accordingly. The cumulative result is a rapid erosion in the share of those able to hold political views typical of one group while maintaining an attachment to tradition characteristic of another group. And on the practical level: 50% of American Jews identify as liberal, 16% as conservative.[7] There are indications that liberal U.S. Jews (and leftist Israelis) who wish to maintain a strong attachment to traditional Jewish practice along with their place in their political identification group

will find the task more complicated than it once was.

In this context it is worth noting that, for somewhat similar reasons, a substantial proportion of Jews in Western Europe have gradually moved from the liberal camp to the conservative camp (in France this occurred in the 1980s; in the UK the process has been slower). Departure from the liberal camp is linked to Muslim immigration, to the left's connection to the immigrant community, and to the rise of antisemitism on the left. According to various findings, both in Western and Eastern Europe, some Jews have become more religious and more community-oriented (or it may be that those who did not make such a transition gradually disconnected from the community and their Jewish identity). Were a parallel process to take place in America,this would translate into more Jews joining the conservative camp and, perhaps, a rise in religious commitment.[8]

The Declining Power of Religion

Long-term processes affecting the Jewish people do not renew themselves from year to year, but new data allow us to identify trends as they develop, and to track the pace of their progression. One such important trend is secularization in the Western world. Indications of this trend can be seen in the two largest Jewish population centers in North America (relative to the general population). In late 2021 it emerged that the share of Americans of no religion, which had been climbing for several years, had reached nearly a third of all citizens, and that the share who say that religion is not important in their lives had reached another third (per data from Pew;[9] Gallup data also point to a rise in the share of those who do not identify with a religion, though that share is lower).[10]

Canadian data show that 85% of Canadians born before 1959 are affiliated with a religion, while for those born in the 1980s and '90s the share plummets to 32%.[11] A quarter of Canadians take part in religious activity of some kind once a month or more (a 10% decline within a decade). The United and Anglican Churches and Jewish religious institutions report the lowest participation rates of all religious factions (24% for Jews). Although the Canadian Jewish community is indeed growing, and on its way to becoming (or already is) the world's third-largest Jewish community after Israel and the United States, it is shrinking in terms of its share of the total population. Today, Jews constitute less than one percent of Canadian population.

The percentage share of Jews in the United States is too low to obtain a precise breakdown of this trend among the Jews. However, specific studies of the Jewish community indicate that it is more than possible that what is happening to other significant American subgroups (especially Protestants) is also happening to the Jews.

Only a third of those belonging to these groups attend prayer services once a month or more. About a fifth say they have no religion – a share lower than that of Jews who self-identify as having no religion.

Jews in general are characterized as much less religious than Americans of other faiths. For example, only a fifth of Jews (according to Pew surveys) consider religion to be "very important" to them, versus 57% of Christians. The share of Jews who never, or almost never, go to synagogue is more than half (52%), compared with a third of Christian adults (32%).[12] And it is worth noting the steep decline in religious engagement in the United States: In 2000, when Americans were asked whether they had entered a house of worship in the past seven days, 44% answered in the affirmative. In 2021, the share dropped to 29%. Along with the decline in attendance at houses of worship, membership in religious institutions has fallen. In the 1930s, more than seven out of ten Americans were members of a church; today the share is less than half, with lower percentages for Jews.

The continued decline of organized religion in Jewish life is a familiar phenomenon, having appeared in the past in conjunction with other developments, such as a general dwindling of the role of religion in the lives of Americans. Like the percentage of mixed marriages, it entails a reassessment of the ability of religious institutions to serve as anchors of Jewish life in North America.

Is there another option for sustaining vibrant Jewish life, one that does not depend on participation in religious activity? In recent years attempts have been made to identify such a possibility, based on the assumption that what Jews are no longer interested in is "institutional religion," and that engagement with Jewish practice and the expression of Jewish identity are gradually moving into other arenas. To date, these efforts have not been persuasive. Take, for instance, the data on "Jewish giving" (to Jewish causes). In the Pew Research Center's 2013 survey of American Jews, 56% of respondents said they give to Jewish causes. In its 2020 survey, the share had dropped to 48%. Comparison of the two surveys is problematic for methodological reasons, but Jack Wertheimer, who conducted such a comparison, found indications of decline in nearly all parameters in a way that is hard to attribute to research methods alone.[13]

Forty-two percent of adult American Jews see their Jewishness as a very important part of their lives, down from 46% in 2013. In 2013, 30% said that they felt strongly attached to Israel, while seven years later the figure had dropped by 5%. Friendship with other Jews has become less common: a quarter of Jews said that they have almost no close Jewish friends, a rise of 4%. Wertheimer points out that "Jewish secular, cultural, or what used to be called 'peoplehood' engagement is also weaker." An examination of different community studies shows that

such engagement characterizes just a small percentage of Jews. For example, in a study of the Baltimore Jewish community (2020) 55% of non-Orthodox Jews said that they never read Jewish content online (31%) or do so rarely (24%).[14] Fifty-eight percent said that they do not consume "books, films, television or music" focused on Jewish themes. In other words: Jewish "religious" activity is, in some cases, engaged in as a form of Jewish "cultural/secular" activity, and not as a substitute for it.

General trend: erosion in Jewish communities around the world

Here is another example in the same context: Among the non-Orthodox in Baltimore, just 8% are affiliated with an institutional Jewish organization, and 6% with a non-institutional organization. The corresponding figures for the Orthodox, whose religious engagement is strong, are 21% and 22%, respectively. The share of non-Orthodox Jews who participated in "an event, program, or class" at a Jewish institution once a month or more was 9%; among the Orthodox the share was 31%. Perhaps more importantly, the share for non-synagogue-members was 6%, but 24% for synagogue members. In other words, a significant relationship was again found between religious engagement and cultural attachment/activity (thus, attachment to Israel as well).

Convergence and Aliyah

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 was an event of global significance with only marginal effect on the Jewish people. However, both countries involved in the war, the invader and the invaded, have Jewish communities – one a victim of wartime aggression like the rest of Ukraine's citizenry, and the other a victim of sanctions and economic deterioration like the rest of the Russian population. In both of these communities – small remnants of the large Jewish communities that dispersed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the great waves of immigration in Israel and the West – there has been renewed interest in emigrating to other countries, including Israel. And for some of them, aid is required to alleviate hardships arising directly from the war, whether in the form of food and supplies for individuals, or assistance to community institutions. This situation is part of a general trend of erosion in Jewish communities in most countries around the world, with particularly rapid attrition in environments unfavorable to Jews, and a convergence of those who do wish to remain actively Jewish in a much smaller number of large communities (mainly in Israel and the United States, but in other places as well)[15] – or in Orthodox-Haredi communities that maintain a distinctive and insular way of life even where things are more complicated in terms of attitudes toward Jews.[16]

Relief work for the Ukrainian and Russian Jewish communities has provided an opportunity for the Jewish people to act on behalf of a common goal with no significant ideological discord. Although political, social, and legal debate has erupted in Israel regarding the state's duty to absorb non-Jewish immigrants as well, there has been no serious disagreement about the absorption of those eligible for immigration under the Law of Return, and state institutions and the Jewish Agency have mobilized for the absorption of larger-than-usual numbers of refugees and olim. Sixty percent of all those who immigrated to Israel over the past year have come from Russia or Ukraine. In the first three months of 2022 some 10,000 olim arrived from these two countries, and it is estimated that by years' end the number of immigrants will be more than double that of previous years.

It should be emphasized that various forecasts of significant Jewish immigration numbering in the tens of thousands, or even the hundreds of thousands, have not materialized, or even come close. As with similar predictions regarding aliyah from France a few years ago, when antisemitic incidents rocked the community, Jews have proven this time as well that they are in no hurry to leave their places of residence – and if they are, Israel is not necessarily their destination. On the other hand, since the beginning of the 21st century, around a fifth of French Jews have left the country, with 60,000 coming to Israel. Although French Jewry numbers half a million, only a third had a meaningful connection to the Jewish community to begin with. That is, the core community numbered fewer than 200,000, making the departure of a quarter of its members significant indeed. However, this does not constitute a dramatic demographic increase for Israel: the number of Jews who arrived from France in 2019-2020 was less than 5,000 in total.[17]

One way or another, the Jews of Ukraine and Russia could have left before the war, but they preferred to remain in those countries. Many of them, even in wartime, have preferred to stay in their current homes rather than emigrate (detailed information on Ukrainian and Russian Jews can be found in the Demography Index, page 69). This year's immigration numbers amount to a few tens of thousands. These are larger numbers than usual, but not large enough to significantly affect Israel's demographic balance (as of this writing, it is too early to assess how the closing of the Jewish organization offices in Russia, including the Jewish Agency office, will affect further immigration).

In the past year, 60% of all Israeli immigrants came from Russia or Ukraine

The war is still going on, and its outcomes are unknown. Accordingly, it is hard to say, at this point, what percentage of those who are

now leaving Ukraine and Russia will wish to return there once the fighting has subsided and the geopolitical arena has calmed down. It can be assumed that the longer the crisis continues, and the more successfully the olim are absorbed, the greater the chance that some or even most of them will remain in Israel. Conditions in Israel will also affect any such future decisions. Data from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics show that a fifth of immigrants from the FSU reported that their main reason for immigrating to Israel was the desire to ensure their children's future, while another fifth immigrated because their parents or spouses decided to do so. Only 14% of these olim said that they had made aliyah because of a "desire to live as Jews in the land of the Jews." In other words: the likelihood of aliyah will increase should the economic situation in Ukraine and Russia remain poor in the long term. And in this sense, it may be that aliyah from Russia, a country caught in the grip of sanctions, is the more likely scenario, while immigration to Israel from Ukraine, should the war end, is slightly less likely (it must be said, with caution, that Russia's long-term occupation of parts of Ukraine is not certain to promote economic prosperity in other parts of the country).

Israel's outgoing government explored changing the conversion system

Regarding Jewish immigration from Russia and Ukraine, it should be noted that most of the immigrants are eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return, but not necessarily recognized as Jews by the state and the Chief Rabbinate, which employ the Orthodox-halachic definition. This situation embodies potential for increased tension surrounding the question of "Who is a Jew" in Israel, especially given this year's Jewish People Policy Institute research finding that, in the consciousness of most Israeli Jews, Jews are those born to a Jewish mother.[18] When the Central Bureau of Statistics, a decade ago, attempted to determine how FSU immigrants self-define, four out of ten were found to consider themselves "Jews," a far lower share than in the general Israeli population. A similar number self-defined as "Israeli," while another fifth (21%) defined their identity according to their country of origin. In Ukraine 200,000 people are eligible for Israeli citizenship per the Law of Return. Fewer than 50,000 Jews there are manifestly Jewish (what is referred to as the "core" Jewish population). In Russia, 600,000 individuals are eligible for Israeli citizenship per the Law of Return, and the core Jewish population there is numbers slightly more than 150,000.

This year, the outgoing Israeli government examined the possibility – which did not come to fruition – of changing Israel's conversion system, so as to increase conversion rates among immigrants. Today, there are half

a million immigrants living in Israel under the Law of Return who are not recognized as Jews, and the number is increasing. The proposed solution still focused on procedures in accordance with Orthodox methods, but research data do not justify assuming that such measures as changing the format and expanding the range of conversion options (the law proposed by former Religious Affairs Minister Matan Kahana would have transferred conversion authority to city rabbis) or easing the conversion process (if certain rabbis agreed to less demanding procedures) would result in a significantly higher number of converts. Most of those who belong to the "irreligious" group marry/establish family units among themselves, or with secular Israelis who see no need for conversion, or who are content with "some kind" of conversion process, even if it is not recognized by the Rabbinate. Under these circumstances, two likely scenarios for the coming years should be considered. One is that the aliyah from Ukraine and Russia will enlarge the share of Jews in Israel who do not marry through official channels (because they cannot be married via the Rabbinate, Israel's sole official channel for Jews). The other is that the large number of "irreligious" immigrants will increase pressure for instituting civil marriage, so that couples whom the Rabbinate does not recognize as Jews will be able to marry in Israel.

The Challenge of Haredi Integration

A widely publicized report released in mid-2022 noted that one out of seven Jews around the world today is Haredi (ultra-Orthodox), and predicted that in 2040 a quarter of the world's Jews will belong to communities identified as Haredi.[19] This report caused a stir, though its findings were not very surprising; rather, they confirmed and provided framing for trends that have long been known. In Jewish communities such as those of the UK and Belgium, the share of Haredim has already reached the numbers forecast for other communities (25% and 35%, respectively). According to the report, the UK community will be 40% Haredi in 2040. In Israel, where the Haredi sector is much larger in numerical terms, the sector is growing at a rate of nearly 4.5% per year (24% over the five years that ended in 2021), thanks to a high fertility rate of 6.6 children per Haredi woman (compared to 2.1 among secular women, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics). According to various forecasts, within a few decades a third of Israeli citizens will be ultra-Orthodox.[20] Even if the Haredi birthrate were to decline somewhat in the coming years, the sector's young age composition ensures continued rapid growth for at least the next two to three decades.

In the ultra-Orthodox sector, the rate of male participation in the work force relatively low,

meaning that, for many young people, the task of supporting the household falls on a small number of breadwinners, and on the state's welfare system. This burdens the Israeli economy with yet another needy population whose contribution to economic growth is small relative to its size. At the same time, the Haredi sector is characterized by a unique way of life that sometimes causes tension in its relations with other groups. Tensions arise with regard to behavioral requirements in the public sphere (such as gender separation); the issue of burden-sharing (e.g., military service); legislation and regulations (e.g., leavened products in hospitals during Passover); relations with progressive Jews (e.g., the struggle over Kotel space), and much more. This state of affairs is not new, but the past year has been marked by developments in several dimensions.

The first development: The lack of Haredi representation in Israel's outgoing government, and fact that a number of attempts at reform were made that put the government in conflict with the Haredim. This was the case with the decision to reform Israel's kashrut supervision system. Another example was the attempt to undermine the Haredi leadership's supervision of cellular phone use via the "kosher" phone system. Other disputes had to do with taxation and budgeting decisions (the tax on disposables, the attempt to change criteria for subsidized childcare, and more). These moves led the representatives of the ultra-Orthodox public to fight against the government, with the aim of toppling it, and, it seems, to a determination to be a part of the next government, conditions permitting.

Because the Israeli political system has had trouble producing a stable parliamentary majority without the participation of the ultra-Orthodox, the present state of affairs indicates a reasonable possibility that the next coalition, no matter who is charged with its formation, will be attentive to the Haredi parties' requirements for joining it. These requirements will likely have both budgetary and cultural components. What this means is that the next government will have trouble formulating policy on ways to address the economic-social challenge posed by the Haredi sector, unless it manages to do so with the consent and cooperation of the ultra-Orthodox leadership itself.

The second development: During the first quarter of 2022, the leader of Israel's Lithuanian Orthodox community, Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky, passed away. For many, his death marked the end of an era in which Israel's Haredi public had a relatively clear and easily identifiable leadership. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef's preeminence was evident in the Sephardi-Haredi sector until his death in 2013; since then, it has been hard to identify a leader whose positions are decisive. The Ashkenazi Haredi community has been in crisis since the passing of Rabbi Elazar Menachem Shach in 2001, though

several leaders did succeed him (Rabbi Shteinman, and then Rabbi Kanievsky) who could be identified as leaders of most of the Lithuanian public. Again, some feel that this sector currently has no clearly defined leadership that speaks with a single voice and can impose its authority on the entire Haredi sector (or at least the Lithuanian-Ashkenazi sector).

The long-term significance of this development is hard to predict. It might result in greater power for the askanim (the Haredi political hacks or power brokers) as opposed to the rabbinical ranks. It might also lead to division into political camps and power struggles within the ultra-Orthodox society. This divisiveness could, in turn, weaken the sector's collective sway, though it might also give rise to extremism, with each subgroup feeling obligated to prove that it is more "authentic" than the others. It could complicate dialogue between the government and the ultra-Orthodox citizenry in the absence of mediators able to "close deals" that would be binding on the entire Haredi public.

The third development: Just before the government fell, a program was launched to enable Haredi primary schools to remain outside the large Haredi educational networks and to teach core subjects such as mathematics, English, and science, in exchange for a budget increase to 100% of the basic state school budget. This program, which has sparked debate about its ramifications and its ability to initiate change in Haredi society, was approved by the rabbinical leader of the Belz Hassidim, and applies to the Belz educational institutions. A few other Hassidic sects, as well various Haredi political leaders, have opposed the reform.

Core studies are currently taught only to girls in the Haredi education system, which creates a significant barrier to the integration of ultra-Orthodox men in the labor market and in high-demand occupations. The new program is an attempt to move toward a goal of more core studies for boys, albeit in an agreed and limited format. Rather than a state-imposed curriculum, the program offers budgetary "carrots" in the form of increased funding for educational institutions. The program has several major and obvious limitations: It applies solely to primary education, although high-level study of core subjects takes place at the post-primary level. It is being implemented solely in Belz institutions; it is unclear whether other institutions will want to join the program, and how many. The program was developed at a time when the Haredim were part of the governing coalition; when the Haredi parties return to the government, budgetary increases will become possible even without the core studies requirement, which could render the program redundant in the eyes of various Haredi subgroups.

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INDICES

12 A Look at Russian and Ukrainian Jewry: Demography and Society

The war in Ukraine has caused many Jews to leave the country. It has negatively impacted the Russian economy, increasing the emigration rate of Russian Jews as well. Therefore, this year we focus on these communities and provide a general overview of their situation.

Russia: Demographic Trends

The Jewish population of the Russian Federation is in decline. There are two main reasons for this. First, among the Jewish population, there are more deaths than births each year, leading to natural population decline. Jews have the lowest birth rate of any ethnic group in Russia, with the total fertility rate estimated to be 1.4 children per woman, well below replacement level. Consequently, the population is old and aging, with a median age of 60.[1]

Additionally, Russian Jews currently have high emigration rates, with even higher rates of Jews emigrating from Russia in the early post-Soviet period. Together, these forces have had a dramatic impact on the Russian Jewish community, which has declined by almost three-quarters since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Jewish population is highly urbanized and concentrated in a small number of cities, with half of Russian Jews living in either Moscow or Saint Petersburg.[2]

Population Size

The most recent Russian census, conducted in 2010, found that there were approximately 157,763 Jews living in Russia (although demographers consider this to be a significant undercount of the Jewish population). World Jewish Population Reports indicate a decline in Russia's core Jewish population from around 570,000 in 1989, to 310,000 in 1999, 210,000 in 2009, and falling further to an estimated 155,000 in January 2020.[3]

Estimated Jewish Population of Russia



Tolts 2020

Source: Data from the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA), based on the World Religions Database, corroborate the population estimates provided by Tolts. They show the decline of the Jewish community both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the Russian population. Jews constituted 0.2% of the Russian population in 2000, a proportion that fell by almost three-quarters by 2015.[4]

Jews, as a Percentage of Russian Population



Source: ARDA

The core Jewish population includes those who self-define as Jewish. In the absence of local survey data that would indicate the propensity of Russians of Jewish heritage to identify as such, and any shifts in patterns of self-identification, the most recent data come from the 2010 Russian census. The census recorded a Jewish population size of 157,763, a sharp decline from the 233,600 reported in the 2002 census. Tolts suggests that this decline is largely attributable to structural changes of the census, as in 2010 the ethnicity question was optional, following the removal of ethnicity from official documents.[5] Thus, part of the apparent decline in the Jewish population of Russia is attributed to an unwillingness to answer the ethnicity question; he estimates that a further 41,000 Jews did not declare their ethnicity in the 2010 census.

However, the large proportion of Jews who did not tick the survey's Jewish ethnicity box might indicate a decline in the tendency to identify as Jewish. Historically, in the former Soviet Union (FSU), Judaism was a nationality and appeared on official documentation such as passports. Those who had two Jewish parents had no choice but to register as Jewish; for those of mixed parentage, there was a demonstrable preference for choosing a non-Jewish nationality. In fact, according to data from the Russian micro census of 1994, only 6.2% of children under 16 with a Jewish father and Russian mother and 4.1% of minors with a Russian father and Jewish mother were recorded as Jewish, either because the non-Jewish identity took precedence over their Jewish one or in an attempt to shield themselves, or more commonly their children, from antisemitic discrimination.[6]

A 1997 survey suggests that Jewish identity is more prevalent among those under 30, demonstrating that the tendency to identify as Jewish may grow as well as decline.[7] Just as other religious identities have enjoyed a revival in the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe, it may be that Jewish identity is becoming increasingly popular among more recent cohorts, whose religious identity was likely shaped by perestroika and the fall of Communism. However, it is currently impossible to accurately determine the size of the population that identifies as Jewish as it is not clear whether Jews who do not identify themselves as such in the census do not have a Jewish identity or simply do not wish to declare it.

Another possible method of counting Jews relies on parentage. In the Soviet Union, rates of Jewish endogamy (marriage within the Jewish community) were historically much lower than in the rest of the Jewish world and Russia had the lowest rates in the Soviet Union. However, in recent years as the pool of potential Jewish partners has declined more rapidly in other post-Soviet republics, Russia no longer has the lowest endogamy rates. In 1978, 59% of Jewish men and 43% of women married non-Jews, with the proportions rising to 73% for men and 63% for women in

1989.[8] Out of all the children with at least one Jewish parent in Russia in 1958, only an estimated 43-53% had a non-Jewish parent,[9] whereas in 1993, between 81% and 86% were estimated to have a non-Jewish parent. Only a small minority of children born to a Jewish parent in the post-Soviet era have two Jewish parents. As a result, the number of Russians with a Jewish parent is much greater than the number included in the core Jewish population estimate and has been estimated to be around 320,000.

Parentage, specifically matrilineal descent, is crucial to the halachic definition of a Jew and in Israeli law. In Russia, marriages between a Jewish man and a non-Jewish woman were historically much more common than marriages between a Jewish woman and a non-Jewish man for demographic and sociological reasons. Therefore, the number of children born to a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother is significantly larger than the population of children who have a Jewish mother and non-Jewish father. The trend appears to be accelerating in the post-Soviet era as the potential pool of Jewish spouses declines.[10] Therefore, it seems reasonable to estimate that fewer than half of those in the youngest cohort (born in the last 20 years) in Russia who have a Jewish parent are halachically Jewish. In fact, it is likely much lower, as there are very few children with two Jewish parents and many more children with a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother than with a Jewish mother and non-Jewish father, but also because some of those Jewish mothers may have a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother and therefore are not halachically Jewish themselves.

An even broader definition, based on Israel's Law of Return, grants citizenship rights to children and grandchildren of Jews, and is further extended to include their spouses and children. According to this definition, the number of Jews in Russia increases dramatically to somewhere in the region of 600,000. Given the trends outlined above, principally the increasing intermarriage rate, the disparity between the Jewish population defined narrowly and the more expansive definition under the Law of Return is likely to continue to increase.[11]

Membership in communal organizations is not an effective measure of Jewish population size. Mikhail Chlenov, chairman of the Va'ad of Russia, estimates that less than 5% of Jews are religious, thus, synagogue lists are of little use in estimating the total Jewish population.[12] Even organizations with a broad reach give little indication of the total number of Jews in Russia as they tend to list their activities across the FSU. Furthermore, the consequence of the proliferation of communal organizations active in Russia is that each one is only in contact with a small sector of the population.[13]

Migration

Migration is the primary reason for the decrease in Russia's Jewish population. In the period following the fall of the Soviet Union, huge waves of migration significantly diminished the Jewish population. As a result, Russia's Jewish population has declined by 71% since 1989. Over 390,000 of those eligible for Israeli citizenship have migrated to Israel since 1989, and large numbers migrated to the United States and Germany. Migration rates were at their highest during the period between 1989 and 2001, when 81,100 Russian Jews moved to the United States and a further 45,000 to Germany. Israel was by far the most popular destination during this period, with 291,200 Russian Jews opting to move to Israel.[14] Population erosion due to emigration from Russia has been moderated by migration into Russia from other parts of the FSU and by the return migration of some who had moved to Israel.[15]

Return Migration

The vast majority of Russian immigrants to Israel chose to remain there, but a minority of around 9 to 13% left Israel; about half returned to their country of origin, and the rest moved to another country, primarily in North America or Western Europe[16] – still others did not settle permanently in either Israel or Russia, opting to maintain a transnational lifestyle.[17] Migration decisions regarding aliyah and whether to remain in Israel are influenced by a range of factors, [18] such as social ties, identity, and economic factors. Although overall economic indicators for Israel are more promising than in Russia, many young Russian immigrants cited the existence of a glass ceiling or the sense that immigrants have to work harder in order to achieve the same professional success as native Israelis as reasons for returning to Russia.[19]

Antisemitism

Jews in Russia suffered from decades of state-sponsored discrimination and restrictions on religious expression. During perestroika and after the fall of Communism, social and political antisemitism declined sharply, with the Kremlin taking unprecedented steps to condemn it and to recognize Jewish suffering during the Holocaust.[20] Although periods of political and economic instability often bring about an increase in antisemitism, this was not the case in Russia in the 1990s.[21] President Putin's record on antisemitism is mixed as he has strong personal ties with Jews, has made public appearances with representatives of the Jewish community, and has cracked down on extremists. However, there is concern that the policy of identifying Russia with the Russian Orthodox Church may pave the way for future antisemitism.[22]

Putin's record on antisemitism is mixed

Current survey data suggest that attitudes toward Jews in Russia are similar to those found in other Eastern European countries.[23] Physical attacks motivated by antisemitism are rare, with none recorded in 2017 or 2018, while vandalism, particularly of Jewish cemeteries, and verbal attacks are much more common.[24] Russian Jews are not particularly concerned by contemporary antisemitism, with only 16% considering it a very serious issue and 39% rating it a serious issue in Russia today.

The issue of Holocaust commemoration is highly sensitive. The importance of the Second World War, or the Great Patriotic War as it is known in Russia, is increasingly the focus of a national narrative that serves a contemporary political agenda. The historical tendency not to differentiate by religion or ethnicity among the millions of victims of Nazi aggression during World War Two is still in evidence and severely impacts the possibility of memorializing Jewish suffering during the Holocaust.

Ukrainian Jews: Demography and Society

The Jewish population of Ukraine is also shrinking, for reasons similar to those mentioned above in the Russian context. Deaths outnumber births and Ukrainian Jews have a high emigration rate. These two trends have had a dramatic impact on the Ukrainian Jewish community, which has dwindled by 91% since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

It is difficult to estimate the size of Ukraine's Jewish population. The country's last census was conducted in 2001. The census planned for 2010 was postponed until 2020, and postponed again. Moreover, no large-scale surveys of the Jewish community have been conducted in Ukraine. The lack of a reliable body of data poses a challenge to those seeking to determine the exact number of Ukrainian Jews. However, attempts can be made to arrive at an approximate number.

Population Size

According to Ukraine's most recent census, which was conducted in December 2001, there were 104,300 Jews living in the country. However, the Jewish population of Ukraine is known to have rapidly dwindled since that time. The demographer Sergio DellaPergola estimates that the core Jewish population of Ukraine dropped from 100,000 at the start of 2002 to 45,000 in January 2020.[25] DellaPergola's estimate is supported by data from ARDA, drawn from the Database of World Religions.[26] The data point to a major erosion of the Jewish population, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total Ukrainian population. In 2000,Jews constituted 0.26% of the Ukrainian population. By 2015, that share had dropped to half its previous level.

Some of this erosion of the Ukrainian Jewish community is the result of natural negative population growth, due to the fact that the number of deaths in the community

is significantly higher than the number of births. Fertility rates are low and the community is aging: the number of elderly significantly exceeds the number of children.[27] Per the 2001 census, only 5% of Ukrainian Jews were under age 14, while 70% were over age 45; half were over age 65.[28] The median age of Jews in Russia and Ukraine is now estimated to be around 57-60.[29]

Estimated Jewish Population of Ukraine



Source: DellaPergola, American Jewish Yearbook, 2000-2020

Jews, as a Percentage of Ukraine Population



Source: ARDA

The core Jewish population of Ukraine includes those who self-define as Jews. In the absence of a census or recent survey data, it is almost impossible to accurately estimate the number of people who currently identify as Jews. In the Soviet Union, Jews were considered a nationality, and were registered as Jews in official documents. Those with two Jewish parents were forced to declare themselves as Jews; those of mixed background clearly preferred to choose a non-Jewish nationality. According to the Russian microcensus of 1994, only 6.2% of all children under the age of 16 whose fathers were Jewish and whose mothers were Russian, and only 4.1% of all minors whose fathers were Russian and whose mothers were Jewish, were registered as Jews.[30]

Ukraine's last census was conducted over two decades ago

The common approach in modern surveys of Jewish identity is to rely on self-definition, and to allow personal autonomy in decisions pertaining to this classification. Of course, self-definition implies a measure of flexibility, and the identity in question may change in character over time. In any case, without focused recent data on Jews, the sole means of estimating Ukraine's core Jewish population is to use other accessible data, to perform a population analysis, to calculate birth and death numbers, emigration and return rates, the number of those joining and leaving the community, arrivals and departures, those starting to self-define as Jews and those ceasing to do so. While data on natural population increase and migration can be found, changes in self-definition cannot be estimated. In Ukraine the problem is particularly acute, as the latest census was conducted over two decades ago.

In the complete absence of data on self-reported religious identity, contact with Jewish communal organizations may serve as an indirect measure of Jewish identification. This approach harks back to attempts to estimate Jewish community size based on affiliation with a religious stream. This approach should be used cautiously as it poses an overestimation risk, due to exaggerated estimates provided by the relevant organizations, or double counting. The Joint Distribution Committee ("the Joint") is one of the Jewish organizations currently active in Ukraine. It coordinates the actions of a large number of charitable organizations and "is serving an estimated 40,000 Jewish elderly and 2,500 poor Jewish children and their families." This figure is very close to the previously-mentioned estimate of Ukraine's core Jewish population, but it does not include people aged 18-60. This raises the possibility that a significant subgroup is not being identified as Jewish in the population census, though it is in contact (whether directly, or through family members) with Jewish community organizations.

Another potential means of estimating

Jewish population size is based on Jewish parentage information. In the Soviet Union, Jewish endogamy (marriage within the ethnic group) rates were much lower than in the rest of the Jewish world. Of all marriages in Ukraine in 1994 where at least one partner was Jewish, 74% of Jewish men married non-Jewish women, while 66% of Jewish women married non-Jewish men. The endogamy rates declined even further as the pool of potential Jewish spouses shrank, due to emigration and population aging.[31] As a result, the number of Ukrainians with one Jewish parent is much larger than the number appearing in the core Jewish population estimate – 90,000. Given the rising rate of marriage between Jews and non-Jews in Ukraine, the gap between the Jewish core population size and the size of the population with at least one Jewish parent is undoubtedly much larger than in countries with high endogamy rates.

Parentage – it should be noted that the Halacha stipulates maternal parentage – this is also crucially important for establishing Jewishness in the context of Israeli law. For demographic and sociological reasons, marriages between Jewish men and non-Jewish women in Ukraine are much more common than marriages between Jewish women and non-Jewish men. For this reason, the number of children born to Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers is substantially higher than the number of children with Jewish mothers and non-Jewish fathers. The share of children born to two Jewish parents, as a percentage of all those born to Jewish mothers, declined from 83% in 1958 to 31% in 1992. Although we have no corresponding data on Jewish fathers, it is clear that the share of children born to non-Jewish fathers who also have Jewish mothers (i.e., those considered to be halachically Jewish) will be smaller than the share of [those born to] Jewish fathers, perhaps by 50%. Therefore, we may estimate that less than half of the young people in Ukraine who have a Jewish parent (those born during the past 20 years) are halachically Jewish. It is, in fact, reasonable to assume that the share is close to a third, given that there are very few children who have two Jewish parents, and many more children with Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers than children with Jewish mothers and non-Jewish fathers (some of the Jewish mothers are themselves the daughters of Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers, meaning that they are not considered Jewish according to Halacha).

The Law of Return applies to the children and grandchildren of Jews

A definition of Jewishness in terms of immigration eligibility according to Israel's Law of Return relates to the children and grandchildren of Jews. This definition has been expanded to include the spouses and children of those eligible. If we look at the

size of the Jewish community based on this definition, the number of those belonging to the community surges dramatically to approximately 200,000. Given the trends mentioned above, and in particular the growing rate of marriage between Jews and non-Jews, we may assume that the gap between the more restrictively-defined Jewish population and the population as defined by the Law of Return's more expansive criteria will continue to grow.

Jewish Emigration

The main factor behind the erosion of the Ukrainian Jewish population is emigration, especially during the period following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Ukraine's Jewish population has fallen by 91% since 1989. Over 350,000 of those eligible for Israeli citizenship have emigrated to Israel; furthermore, many Jews have emigrated to the United States and Germany. Emigration rates peaked during the period 1989-2001, when 128,500 Ukrainian Jews left for the United States, and 92,700 for Germany. In those same years, 299,700 Ukrainian Jews emigrated to Israel.[32]

Some Jews left the conflict area and emigrated to Russia

Emigration was at its height during the period immediately after the Soviet Union's dissolution; by the final years of the first decade of the 21st century it had stabilized at a much lower level. Surveys show that those who emigrated from Ukraine to Israel during this period were motivated primarily by concern about financial instability and its impact on the next generation. The immigrants tended to come from the professionally trained and academically educated strata of the middle class.[33] Later there was a resurgence of emigration to Israel, sparked by the 2014 Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Crimea and Donbas. Except for a temporary halt due to the coronavirus pandemic, emigration rates have since remained high, a result of the ongoing military confrontation. Because many Ukrainian Jews once lived or currently live in Russian-speaking areas in the eastern part of the country, they suffered greater harm from the conflict relative to their population share.[34] Some Jews decided to leave the conflict area and emigrate to Russia. Others went to other countries, including Israel.

Most Ukrainian Jewish migration was from Ukraine to other countries, Israel among them. But there is evidence that

Immigration to Israel from Ukraine



Source: Tolts 2019

Ukraine's Israeli population is growing due to emigration from Israel, a large proportion of which consists of Ukrainians who decided not to settle in Israel permanently.[36]

According to the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, out of 1,020,000 Jews and family members of Jews who had immigrated to Israel from the FSU as of July 2013, a tenth did not remain in Israel permanently, but rather migrated again.[37] It is estimated that half of these returned to their countries of origin, while the others continued to a third destination, such as the United States, Canada, or (less commonly) one of the European Union countries. Many chose to live in more than one country; a few tens of thousands appear to divide their time between Israel and one of the FSU states.

The main reason for this repeat migration, that is, the return to Ukraine of those who had emigrated from Ukraine to Israel, was the difficulty of adapting to Israeli life. Many gave consideration to the professional opportunities available in Israel and the Ukraine, and on that basis determined their stance regarding migration. During the first decade of the 21st century, Israel's climate was also mentioned as a reason for repeat migration. Many, however, regarded the return to Ukraine as temporary, and intended to resettle in Israel at a later point.

It is hard to accurately estimate the number of Israelis living in Ukraine, as the border authorities record those leaving and entering Israel, but not the countries where they actually live. Jewish representatives in Ukraine have provided widely varying estimates, ranging from 9,000 to 20,000.

The Israeli ambassador's 2013 assertion that at any given time there are 45,000 Israelis in Ukraine may be the correct way to describe the situation. The large volume of trips by Israelis to Ukraine for pilgrimage, tourism, family, or business purposes makes it hard to get a more accurate picture of this mobile population.[38]

Tourism and Pilgrimage

Tourists, pilgrims, and those employed in the heritage tourism industry constitute a major component of Jewish presence in Ukraine. Israelis and Jews from all over the world visit Ukrainian sites of Jewish interest. These sites include cities where important Jewish communities historically resided, sites where Jewish tragedies occurred, or places where rabbinical figures lived or were buried and which are now pilgrimage destinations. Ukraine is home to many sites of spiritual meaning to Christians, Muslims, and Jews, and these have become significant pilgrimage sites since the dismantling of the Soviet Union.

The best-known pilgrimage site is R. Nachman's grave in Uman

The best-known pilgrimage site is the burial place of Rabbi Nachman, founder of the Breslov Hassidic movement, in the city of Uman. This site's popularity has grown rapidly; the hundreds who visited the site annually in the 1980s have turned into tens of thousands (the estimate for 2016 was 30,000).[39] Although Rabbi Nachman's grave is most commonly visited at Rosh Hashanah, i.e., in the fall, visitors come throughout the year. Some return each year to visit the gravesite, and form social relationships with each other. In addition to those who attach spiritual importance to the pilgrimage, there are others who are drawn to the site by the economic opportunities and volunteering options generated by the pilgrimage activity.

Although the pilgrimage activity benefits the local population economically, it also gives rise to tensions. Some Ukrainians are offended by the transformation of part of their home city into a Jewish holy site, where customs alien to the local population hold sway; they have held protests against the influx of visitors. In certain cases, Israeli governmental representatives have exerted pressure on the local authorities, hoping to ensure that the pilgrimage activity is not adversely affected by local opposition.[40]

Antisemitism

Ukrainian antisemitism levels are similar to those of the other East European nations. Anti-Defamation League data indicate no meaningful difference between the views of Ukrainians and those of citizens of other

countries in the region. Pew Research Center data show that 15% of Ukrainians would not want a Jewish neighbor, and that 32% would not want a Jewish family member. Similar views have been found in other FSU countries, such as Belarus and Latvia. What is unique about Ukraine is that those who identify as Catholics, or who are unaffiliated with any religion, tend to have more negative attitudes toward Jews than those who identify as Orthodox Christians.

The level of antisemitic activity in Ukraine is a matter of disagreement. According to the Congress of Ethnic Communities in Ukraine, antisemitic incidents are very rare, and antisemitism manifests primarily in damage to sites or property (vandalism). Memorial monuments, cemeteries, and synagogues have been vandalized; there was an arson attempt on a synagogue in Kherson in 2020. The past five years have seen a decline in vandalism.[41]

On the other hand, data collected by Jewish organizations relate to a broader definition of what constitutes an antisemitic incident, which includes verbal attacks. Accordingly, these data indicate a much higher number of incidents than Ukraine's official statistics suggest. Basically, the data place Ukraine among those countries with the highest number of antisemitic incidents, along with the UK, France, and Germany. However, physical attacks on Jews are rare, and government agencies are making an effort to monitor antisemitic crime.

After the Berlin Wall fell, Ukraine was the first of the former Communist bloc nations to establish diplomatic ties with Israel; the first president of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, visited Israel in 1993. He promised to safeguard the rights of ethnic minorities in Ukraine, and to fight antisemitism.[42] Today, most of the country's antisemitic political parties are on the political fringe, and their voters have displayed willingness to elect leaders who openly acknowledge their Jewishness. There was actually a period in 2019 when both the prime minister and the president of Ukraine were Jews. However, the antisemitic Svoboda party has been part of the coalition, and its representatives have held ministerial posts. Antisemitism is present in Ukrainian political discourse, especially regarding the coronavirus and the prominence of Jewish politicians.

In 2009 Ukraine approved the Terezin Declaration on the restitution of stolen assets from the World War II era, but has not enacted any laws that would further the restitution of private Jewish property confiscated during the war. There is evidence that the Ukrainian authorities have been slower to act with regard to historic Jewish property than with regard to the assets of other religious groups. Of the 2,500 Jewish community buildings that were confiscated, the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine (VAAD) and the Eurasian Jewish Committee on Restitution estimate that only 40 synagogues have been returned to

Jewish community control.[43] Furthermore, these organizations estimate that between 10,000 and 15,000 plots of land have yet to be returned to Jewish hands.[44]

Judaism is present in the Ukrainian public realm. Among other things, rabbis are invited to official events; traditional ceremonies such as Hanukkah candle-lighting are held publicly; and ceremonies are performed to commemorate events of the Holocaust.[45] The legacy of the Holocaust is a sensitive topic in Ukraine, as it is throughout Eastern Europe. During the Soviet period, the Jewish identity of the victims was largely downplayed, while in the post-Communist era the focus of interest shifted to crimes perpetrated under the Soviet regime. Collaboration with the Nazis and war crimes were denied or repressed, and anti-Jewish conspiracy theories became widespread. Holocaust remembrance and memorial sites such as Babi Yar spark bitter debate over the degree to which Ukraine should focus attention on the suffering of the Jews.[46]

Community Life

The dissolution of the Soviet Union made it possible for the Jewish community organizations in Ukraine to expand their activity, which focuses mainly on education, charity, and social work. As of 2015, there were approximately 600 Jewish communities and organizations in Ukraine, including 63 schools (the vast majority of them supplementary schools) and 28 periodicals. All of these entities belong to one of 15 "umbrella" groups that handle the affairs of the communities.[47] Political tensions and power struggles subsist between these groups on issues such as the Chief Rabbi position. At times there have been no fewer than four men claiming the title of Chief Rabbi of Ukraine.[48]

The largest of the community umbrella organizations is the Association of Chabad Hasidism of Jewish Religious Organizations of Ukraine, which sponsors 125 organizations, 29 schools, and 17 periodicals.[49] Ukraine is home to 200 Chabad families dispersed across 35 cities; these families are part of the extensive network of Chabad emissaries who are sent to Jewish communities the world over. Chabad in Ukraine runs orphanages and educational institutions; according to the movement, it maintains the largest Jewish center in the world – the 46,000 square meter Menorah Center in Dnipro.

Although religious observance levels in Ukraine's Jewish communities are generally low, attitudes toward Judaism as a religion have changed over the years, reflecting developments similar to those that have arisen in the general Ukrainian population. Those who grew up during the pre-Communist era tend to have positive views of Judaism as a faith, while the religious aspects of Judaism have largely negative associations for Jews who came to maturity under the Soviet regime. By contrast, the younger generation is once again adopting a positive outlook on Judaism as a religious tradition. Attitudes

toward Judaism are shaped by tradition-based experiences in the home; those who have two Jewish parents therefore tend to have a stronger emotional connection to the tradition.[50]

Because most Jews in Ukraine are not married to Jews, non-Orthodox organizations might have been expected to play a more dominant role in the community. However, it is actually the Orthodox organizations that are setting the tone in Ukraine[51]: the country is home to 200 Orthodox communities, versus 51 non-Orthodox communities and 26 independent communities.[52] One reason for this is the decision by the World Union for Progressive Judaism not to invest in FSU Jewish communities based on the assumption that these communities would soon disappear. At the same time, Chabad's deeply-rooted ideal of emissary work has spurred the movement to send rabbis and families to Ukraine, even where living conditions are harsh.

Beyond the recognized Jewish community, Ukraine is home to over 60 communities of Messianic Jews, or Jewish Christians, or Jews for Jesus. The Orthodox community sees these groups as a threat, although some figures and organizations unaffiliated with Orthodox Judaism are more comfortable with their presence.[53]

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13 Israel-Diaspora Index: Attrition in the Younger Generation

Relations between the State of Israel and Diaspora Jewry improved somewhat this year. Israel's change of government, and the new government's greater attention to concerns of the American Jewish community (at least at the declarative level), have raised hopes for practical relations-improving measures as well, certainly within establishment Judaism.

At the same time, the Ukraine crisis has roused the Jewish world and engendered an array of collaborations between the Israeli government, the Jewish Agency, and major Jewish organizations worldwide on behalf of Ukrainian and Russian Jewry.

Aside from this uptick of cooperation, the fundamental trends and deeper currents of Israel-Diaspora relations have not changed. The Diaspora Connection Index published for the past five years by the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, which includes a rating for Israeli attitudes toward the Diaspora, shows no shift. Data have also been collected on the trend of younger non-Orthodox American Jews distancing from their Jewish identity and the State of Israel. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to this trend.

Young Jews in the U.S. and Israel

Attitudes toward Israel within the American Jewish community are affected, though not solely, by what is happening in Israel. From this perspective, Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria is significant, as are developments in the fraught arena of religion and state relations. Beyond that, Israel's definition as a Jewish state has become a stumbling block for Jews on the margins of the American Jewish community. The political radicalization of some young progressive Jews in North American, along with various processes underway within the Jewish community, already affect, and may come to affect more profoundly, support for Israel.

Israel is a central identity component for most older American Jews. Whether they support Israeli policy or are angered by it, they remain committed to the Zionist project and organize their Jewish identity around it. However, identification and support for Israel among younger Jews is eroding, along with their Jewish identity.

In the last couple of years, two major surveys have been conducted that (among other things) mapped the attitudes of young American Jews toward Israel. The Pew Research Center released its survey in mid-2021, and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) released theirs in April 2022. Both revealed worrisome trends in regard to attitudes vis-a-vis Israel.

The Pew survey (May 2021), the most in-depth and comprehensive survey of U.S. Jews, found that young adults between the ages of 18 and 29 relate differently to Israel compared to older age cohorts.[1] To the extent the surveys can be compared, a decline in affinity for Israel is apparent – even in comparison with Pew's previous survey of American Jewry (from 2013).[2] For example, only 54% of young Jews feel they have something in common with Israeli Jews (versus 66% of Jews in the oldest age range); just 48% feel an emotional attachment to Israel (versus 67% in the oldest age range, and 61% of young Jews who felt this way in the 2013 Pew survey); 27% think that a connection to Israel is not essential to their Jewish identity (compared to 8% of Jews in the oldest age range); and only 27% oppose the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement targeting Israel. Furthermore, according to the 2021 Pew survey, some 40% of young Jews self-identify as "Jews of no religion" (they respond "I have no religion" to the question about their religious affiliation, and "yes" to the question about whether they consider themselves Jewish in some way apart from religion). Among this young cohort of Jews, just 27% feel that caring about Israel is a meaningful component of their Jewish identity (compared to 45% in the 2013 Pew survey); 67% of them say they have nothing in common with Jews in Israel. Only 15% of these Jews have visited Israel. This is a group that comprises a large share of young American Jews.



Pew Survey, May 2021

The AJC survey was administered to young Jewish adults (millennials – ages 25-40) in the U.S. and in Israel. It examined the attitudes of American Jews in this age group toward Israel, and the attitudes of the same cohort in Israel toward the American Jewish community.[3]

The survey of attitudes of American Jewish millennials toward Israel found that 25% exhibit a sense of alienation, and a willingness to "pay" with reduced support for Israel in exchange for legitimacy among their broader peer group, most of which appears to be critical of Israel. Thus, 41% of American millennial Jews do not consider ties with Israel to be important; 26% feel that it is appropriate to distance themselves from Israel in order to gain legitimacy among their friends; 27% say that the anti-Israel climate on college campuses has caused them to rethink their commitment to Israel; 22% feel that ties between American Jewry and Israel are not particularly important; 25% do not feel a sense of responsibility toward Jews in Israel.

American Jewish Millennials, Ages 25-40 – Attitudes Toward Israel

The mirror image of the survey of American millennial Jews, the survey AJC administered to Jews of the same age cohort in Israel, examined the degree of connection and attachment felt by Jews in Israel toward the American Jewish community. The overall picture that emerges from the survey of Israelis is more positive. For example, on the

(identical) question about the importance of ties between the communities, only 6% of Israelis answered that maintaining ties is not important to them (versus 41% of the American respondents!). A caring attitude toward the American Jewish community is also evident with regard to rising antisemitism in the United States. Sixty percent of the Israeli respondents said that they pay considerable attention to this issue. However, the Israelis also expressed less buy in to the notion of mutual guarantee than the Americans. To the question about responsibility toward the other community, only 42% of the Israelis answered that they feel responsible to help fellow Jews in the United States, compared to 58% of the American respondents who do feel such responsibility toward Israel.

Reasons for the trend

What are the reasons for the younger generation's eroding attachment to Israel (beyond the erosion of their Jewish identity)? It appears that the challenges facing the entire American Jewish community are having an even stronger effect on the community's younger generation:

The political challenge: The U.S. political landscape has changed. The center, once the core component, is eroding, and the margins are strengthening. On the far right, voices of White supremacy, which view anything non-white or non-Christian as abhorrent, are no longer regarded as illegitimate. On the left, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, which regards the "privileged" as oppressors, and cancel culture are transforming all substantive discussion into an identity discourse in which the downtrodden good (African Americans, Palestinians) face off against the White bad guys – including Jews and Israel.

This reality erodes the American Jewish community's sense of identification with Israel. A large majority of U.S. Jews (71%) vote Democrat. The radicalization of American politics, which comes at the expense of the center, has left the liberal Jewish public scrambling for legitimacy and political sympathy that can no longer be taken for granted. The dilemma facing these Jews is a tough one. Some are progressives who will never move to the American right. On the other hand, joining the far-left means lowering their Jewish profile, renouncing support for Israel, and "confessing" to the injustices for which they are responsible by virtue of being rich and powerful. The result is that the small American Jewish minority, which once enjoyed significant influence, is now navigating a more complex reality in which politics, both left and right, threatens its sociopolitical status. In this reality, young American Jews in the process of consolidating their identity find it easier and often more "correct," given the climate on academic campuses, to identify with the political extremes.

The identity challenge: For generations, the "streams" of American Judaism – the Reform, the Conservative and, to a lesser degree, the Orthodox – have led the American Jewish community. Among older Jews the situation has not changed substantially, but among younger non-Orthodox Jews most are non-denominational, that is, they do not "identify" with any stream. The meaning of this non-identification is two-fold. Some young Jews – the proportion is unclear but not large – are developing a new kind of Jewish identity. The majority, however, appear to be on a path of eroding Jewish identity.

The causes are varied and subject to dispute. Some believe that an excess of Jewish pluralism facilitated this development. Others think it is a natural process for a minority living in an open majority society. But it is clear that the current trend is also influenced by political processes. Young men and women studying on elite American campuses face a cruel choice: belonging to the "correct" side of the political and social map while diminishing their Jewish identity, or preserving and giving clear expression to their identity, which exposes them to condemnation for the sake of a Jewish-particularist identity they do not always understand and to which they do not always relate. In this context, Israel is, for them, the most difficult and dangerous of symbols. Jewish identity itself may still have legitimacy among the American left, but Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish nation-state is dwindling, and attitudes toward the state are increasingly critical and harsh. For a quarter of young American Jews, an inward identification with Israel – and certainly an outward identification it – is a step too far.

The physical antisemitism challenge: Decades after the Holocaust, as its memory fades, antisemitism is once again rearing its head in the United States. The number of antisemitic incidents has increased in the past two years, as has Jewish anxiety: 90% of Jews feel that antisemitism is a problem in the United States (for more information see the Antisemitism Index, page 94).

The strain of antisemitism that manifests as hatred of Israel and the denial of its right to exist automatically identifies Jews with Israel and places them in the line of fire. Jews are not always welcome in the folds of radical American left. Expressions of antisemitism such as tearing down mezuzahs and desecrating holy spaces and objects are becoming commonplace in leftist strongholds. This reality further incentivizes young Jews to loosen their ties to Judaism.

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14 Integrated Antisemitism Index

- A number of reports this year have noted the persistence and growing severity of antisemitic phenomena in many countries.[1] Two significant events influenced the general manifestation of antisemitism in the last two years: the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, peaking during "Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021)," and the continuing Covid-19 pandemic.
- The fight against antisemitism has attained increasing awareness and support. It is the focus of more conferences and seminars than ever before, and legislative initiatives against antisemitism have multiplied. Despite the proliferation of initiatives, some reports have declared the effort to eradicate antisemitism a "failure."[2]
- Attitudes toward Israel are affected by rising antisemitism, as well as by political polarization, especially in the United States. As a result, young Jews are lowering their Jewish-Zionist profiles in an attempt to maintain their social status among their non-Jewish friends.[3]
- American college campuses remain hotbeds of anti-Israel, anti-Zionist activity, putting Jewish students on the defensive. At the same time, there is controversy in the Jewish community, especially among the younger generation, over the meaning of "anti-Zionism" in the context of antisemitism.
- Social media continues to constitute a pivotal platform for the dissemination of antisemitic discourse, ideology, and tropes, and for antisemites to interact with one another. The actions taken by the social media networks against this phenomenon to date have not reduced it significantly. Only a coordinated international effort can press the platforms to set norms to diminish the hate speech they host.

SEVERITY OF ANTISEMITISM IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
(BASED ON PERCEIVED DISCOMFORT AMONG JEWS)



Notable Developments in North America

White supremacists – 2021 saw a major increase in far-right extremist activity, with a near-doubling of exposed white supremacist propaganda efforts,[4] and a significant broadening of reach and influence.[5]

Normalization of the antisemitic discourse – Antisemitic discourse is becoming normalized and is penetrating mainstream national politics on university campuses and on the street.[6] There has been a clear rise in anti-Israel or anti-Zionist expressions from progressive groups that have significantly crossed into antisemitic territory.[7] High-profile positions taken by American Palestinian and Muslim leaders, organizations, and initiatives have also contributed to an environment that legitimizes anti-Zionist and anti-Israel rhetoric, and sometimes antisemitism itself.

Jewish privilege in progressive discourse – Identity politics in the progressive discourse places Jews into the "oppressors" camp (white skin color, social privilege, and power). On this basis, Jewish support for Israel is sometimes equated with complicity with racist policies. Interpretations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through prisms of American racial dynamics enhance the resonance of charges of Israeli apartheid, which the release of an April 2021 Human Rights Watch report bolstering the apartheid claim has helped amplify.[8] Significantly in this context, the percentage of scholars who described the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

as "a one-state reality akin to apartheid" increased from 59% in February 2021 to 65% by September.[9]

Jewish communal disunity – While much of the Jewish establishment urged the incoming Biden administration to make adoption of the IHRA definition of antisemitism a national priority, key progressive Jewish groups lobbied the administration against its adoption.[10] Jewish anti-Zionists play increasingly prominent roles in left-wing policy and discourse arenas.

Behavioral changes – According to the American Jewish Committee: "Many American Jews have changed their behavior, limiting their activities and concealing their Jewishness due to concerns about antisemitism. Four out of ten American Jews say they have avoided posting content online that would reveal their Jewishness or their views on Jewish issues, and 22% refrained from publicly displaying Jewish items. Younger Jews were significantly more likely to have changed their behavior due to concerns about antisemitism, with more than half (52%) of those between the ages of 18 and 29 saying they had taken steps to conceal their Jewishnesss.[11] The situation is more extreme in Europe: 20% of French Jews have experienced physical assault; 37% say they feel insecure "often" or "from time to time"; and 45% of Jewish parents in France ask their children not to disclose their religion."[12]

Notable Developments in Europe

In France, political Islam intersects with progressive fringes. A primary source of antisemitism emanates from the extreme left fringe and often conceals itself behind the mask of human rights and egalitarianism. The growing recognition of the cardinal role of Islamist antisemitism in the resurgence of Judeophobia is challenged by "woke" ideology and the intersectionality movement, which jumped from academic theory into left-wing political activism. This ideology incorporates a post-modern corpus of theories, a fusion of the Frankfurt school's neo-Marxist ideas and the "French theory" that garnered considerable academic truck in the United States beginning in the 1980s. The common fight against imperialism, colonialism, capitalism, and widespread class stratification has thus manifested itself in a convergence of struggles between the radical left and radical Islam, and has in some cases translated into virulent antisemitism. The Jewish state is frequently described by activists in these movements as the last bastion of colonialism, an evil entity that should be dismantled. This is often accompanied by age-old antisemitic tropes, creating a hostile environment for Jews.[13]

At the same time, in some left-wing circles, Muslims are perceived as the new proletariat that should be protected because of their supposed systemic victim status. By contrast,

Jews are seen as the embodiment of a systemically dominant group, a privileged capitalist bourgeoisie. In the neo-Marxist paradigm, racism is considered systemic and institutional, and seen as a function of class struggle. Within this conceptual framework, antisemitism may not be considered "racism" since dominant class groups cannot be victimized or subjected to discrimination.[14]

In Britain, Jewish communities perceive a lack of support in combating antisemitic phenomena, particularly within progressive left circles. British Jews grapple with a frequently imposed framing of Jews in progressive discourse. This framing is an obstacle to fighting antisemitism and contributes significantly to failures to recognize and stand against antisemitism among the broader left. Overall, 18% of British Jews reported feeling somewhat or very unwelcome in the UK.[15]

Jews in Germany feel they are held accountable for Israeli policy

In Germany, it turns out that a quarter to a third of the general population openly or implicitly agree with antisemitic clichés. For example, 30% of all participants and 59% of the far-right AfD party's supporters agreed with the statement: "What Jews are doing with the Palestinians today is nothing other than what the National Socialists did with Jews." Moreover, 40% of Jewish respondents reported having been disadvantaged, marginalized, or threatened in one way or another over the past year. Jews living in Germany often feel they are held accountable for Israeli policy vis-a-vis the Palestinians and that the conceptualization of Israel as the "collective Jew" has become the identificational basis for regarding and judging all Jews.[16]

Snapshot of Selected Figures for Policy Makers

The three dimensions of JPPI's Antisemitism Index look at: 1) antisemitic attitudes; 2) antisemitic incidents; and 3) Jewish confidence in their home country. There was no significant change in the first dimension this year but the number of incidents (the second dimension) and the level of anxiety among Jews (the third dimension) spiked. This decline in confidence reflects the seriousness of the anti-Jewish incidents that occurred during the year.

ANTISEMITISM IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

Data Point	General Trend	US	France	UK	Germany
Hold antisemitic views (%)	–	11[a] (14)	36[b] (35)	43[c] (43)	33[d] (29)
Antisemitic Behavior					
Violent assaults (incidents)	↑	28[a] (+133%)	60[d] (+36%)	176[c] (+76%)	63[d] (+11%)
Total incidents (extreme violence, assaults, damage, desecration, threats)	↑	2,717[a] [2,026]	589[d] [339]	2,255[c] [1,684]	2,738[d] [1,957]
Change from 2020	↑	+34%	+74%	+34%	+40%
Rate of incidents per 1,000 Jews	↑	0.45	1.32	7.7	23.2
Antisemitism as Perceived by Jews (%)					
Antisemitism is a very serious or fairly serious problem	↑	90[a] (76)	95[b] (86)	92[c] (80)	90[d] (80)
Over the past 12 months, have been, themselves, the target of an antisemitic remark in person	↑	24[a]	68[b] (53)	24[c]	24[d]
Avoid displaying visible signs of their Judaism in public	↑	22[a]	61[b] (41)	46[c] (40)	40[d]
Considered emigrating because they do not feel safe in their countries	↑	N/A	46[b] (44)	33[c] (29)	44[e] (25)
Avoid places in their neighborhood because they do not feel safe there as Jews	↑	17[a] (8)	66[b] (45)	68[c] (37)	65[d] (33)

Notes: Numbers without parentheses are for the year 2021/2022. Numbers in square brackets are from 2020, while those in parentheses are the most recent prior figures available. 'N/A' = not available.

a. Antisemitic Attitudes in the US, ADL, 2021
b. An Analysis of Antisemitism in France, AJC-Fondapol, March 2022
c. Antisemitism Barometer 2021, Campaign Against Antisemitism, UK
d. Antisemitism Worldwide Report 2021, Tel Aviv University, April 2022.
e. Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism (second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU), EU Agency for Fundamental Rights' (FRA), December 2018

Significant International Intervention Efforts

- A first-ever EU strategy on combating antisemitism and ensuring the future of Jews in Europe was presented by the European Commission in October 2021. Further, the German government decided to invest 35 million Euros in research and educational projects focused on understanding the causes of antisemitism and how to effectively combat it. Yet, European Union member states are at the same time pressing ahead with legislation to prohibit kosher slaughter, with the backing of the European Court of Justice. Jewish communities have expressed concern that this trend – extended to male circumcision and other rituals – may render Jewish religious life on the continent impossible.
- The American administration appointed its Liaison to the American Jewish Community (Chanan Weissman), its Special Adviser on Holocaust Issues (JPPI's co-chair Stuart E. Eizenstat), and its Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, with the rank of ambassador (Prof. Deborah Lipstadt). Although all three positions existed prior to the Biden presidency, these appointments came in the wake of a campaign five major Jewish groups led in reaction to the May 2021 surge in antisemitism.
- Against the backdrop of "Operation Guardian of the Walls," the number of antisemitic incidents reached new heights around the world. A positive exception was France, where the government adopted a preemptive policy to prevent attacks on Jews during the May 2021 conflict.
- The working definition of antisemitism established by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and the examples it comprises, continue to prove a vital tool in identifying and combating antisemitism. To date, 839 countries, organizations and institutions have adopted the definition. A quarter of them did so in the past year. Morocco ratified the IHRA Charter, and the content of school textbooks was changed in Qatar, Morocco, and Egypt accordingly. In several countries (Morocco, Bahrain), Jewish sites have been restored, and Jewish communities are being established in the Gulf states.
- 38 countries boycotted this year's United Nations World Conference Against Racism in Durban, on the grounds that it had become a platform for the "new antisemitism" and anti-Zionism.

Conclusions and Directions for Action

Antisemitism on both the left and the right, continues to erode Jewish security. JPPI reports have been warning for several years of the possibility that the trend of resurgent antisemitism is on the rise and rooted in deep societal currents of varying sources. The return of antisemitism could become a long-term fixture of global discourse, while the ability of Jewish communities and Israel to influence it is limited. Under these circumstances, Israel, as the world's strongest Jewish organizing force, cannot confine itself to attempts to "fight antisemitism." Israelis must understand what it will mean to live in an era when antisemitism is a persistent factor in Jewish life, and prepare for that era accordingly, while formulating plans for appropriate explanatory, diplomatic, and security activity. The strategy to be built should be coordinated with other international bodies and formulated with clear and measurable objectives for battling antisemitism.

Last year we recommended that the government "entrust the response to antisemitism to a single integrative body with powers and implementation capabilities." We reaffirm this recommendation, and with greater urgency, in light of data whose meaning is unmistakable.

Endnotes

1. *Antisemitism Worldwide Report 2021*, Tel Aviv University, April 2022. The report refers to the different national reports. Criminologists argue that the real numbers of incidents are five to ten times higher than reported. Figures regarding France illustrate the fact that most French Jews do not report the incidents.
2. Ibid.
3. *Survey on American Jewish Millennials*, AJC, March 2022.
4. "White Supremacist Propaganda Spikes in 2020," The Anti-Defamation League.
5. Yonat Shimron, "Some Jews see antisemitism and white nationalism becoming less fringe since the 2017 Unite the Right rally," *The Washington Post*, November 26, 2021.
6. *Antisemitism – Annual Report 2021*, The Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, Jerusalem, January 2021.
7. Jonathan Greenblatt, "Antisemitism on the left is subtler than on the right. But it's getting worse." *The Washington Post*, October 27, 2021.
8. Patrick Kingsley, "Rights Group Hits Israel With Explosive Charge: Apartheid," *The New York Times*, April 27, 2021.
9. "New Survey Finds Mideast Scholars View Israel/Palestine as 'Akin to Apartheid'," University of Maryland, September 2021.
10. Arno Rosenfeld, "Charged Antisemitism Definition Gets Initial Biden Endorsement," *The Forward*, March 2, 2021.
11. *The State of Antisemitism in America 2021*, AJC, October 2021.
12. *An Analysis of Antisemitism in France*, AJC-Fondapol, March 2022.
13. Ibid
14. Ibid
15. *Antisemitic Attitudes in the US*, ADL, 2021.
16. Study by the Forsa polling institute on behalf of the Central Council of Jews in Germany; "AfD-Anhänger stimmen antisemitischen Aussagen besonders oft zu," Jüdische Allgemeine, November 16, 2021.

15 Israeli Society Index: Polarization and Morality

For the past few years, Israel has been subjected to one round of elections after another, which negatively affects both the ability of each successive government to carry out long-term policies and the public discourse. Simply put, election campaigns are times when the country's leadership has an interest in sharpening ideological differences – real or imagined. It encourages polarization between societal groups and characterizes the Israeli reality as an "us" against "them" binary to serve political interests. This picture should be taken into account when examining new data collected this year on the state of identity and society in Israel, some of which will be presented in this chapter.

The past year elapsed without dramatic crises apart from the upheaval in the political system. Key issues of public concern included the cost of living, especially rising housing prices, and Jewish-Arab relations, against the background of the Ra'am party's membership in the governing coalition, which gave rise to political disputes and crises. Like the rest of the world, Israel monitored with concern various destabilizing global developments, first and foremost the war in Ukraine. The war obliged the Israeli government and the Israeli public to face the issue of how to balance Israeli interests with the needs and interests of the Jewish people, both in terms of opening Israel's gates to refugees, and in the context of Israel's

political position vis-a-vis Russia and Ukraine during the war.

Israel did not make much progress this year toward resolving the main challenges facing the country, including the confrontation with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the economic-social challenge posed by the growing ultra-Orthodox community, complex problems of infrastructure and construction, and more. No progress at all was made in solving the fundamental problem underlying the difficulty of forming a stable government, namely, the split into two main camps unwilling to sit together in a coalition due to differences in ideology, style, and language, as well as interpersonal issues.

In this chapter, we will discuss several insights that emerged this year, based primarily on JPPI research, with regard to three issues:

1. Political polarization
2. Jewish-Arab relations
3. Moral considerations in foreign and defense policy

Political Polarization

One finding of JPPI's Pluralism Index provides an instructive illustration of the difficulty of forming a stable governing coalition in Israel.[1] It is this difficulty that led to the formation of the current Bennett-Lapid government, whose very composition presaged its swift demise. The pressures created by the joint participation of fervent ideological opponents in a single coalition ultimately swayed the coalition members, both those at the "right" pole of the coalition political spectrum, and those at its "left" pole – mainly Arab members of the Knesset.

The particular finding in question relates to the two major minority groups represented in the Knesset, and how each of them is unacceptable to large swaths of the Jewish electorate. The graph below illustrates that some Jews want no part of a coalition in which Israel's growing ultra-Orthodox minority is represented, while other Jewish sectors want no part of a coalition in which the large Arab minority is represented. Given this reality, and the fact that the main political parties of the Jewish majority are unwilling to sit together in a coalition, the sole possible coalition is one with a conspicuously divisive composition – right-wing parties with ultra-Orthodox parties, or center-left parties with support from the Arab parties (or some of them). Such a composition invites tremendous internal pressure to institute policies that aggravate social discord, due to the great dependence on parties that represent minority groups. It also forestalls any possibility for a broad coalition that would have a chance of surviving the political pressures for an extended period of time.

In principle, who would you want to see included in the coalition?

(Asked of Jews)



Arab-Jewish Relations

The past year marked a possible turning point with respect to Arab Israeli involvement in the political arena, following the Ra'am party's joining the governing coalition. The possibility was overshadowed by strong opposition on the part of the right-wing parties, which cast doubt on the legitimacy of a government relying on the votes of Ra'am representatives, some of whom have a history of statements and actions that are unacceptable to most Israelis (including expressions of support for terrorists), as well as on the part of the main Arab party, the Joint List, which viewed Ra'am's coalition participation as acquiescence to an agenda that sidelines the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Given these objections to the Bennett-Lapid government (on the part of the opposition), and the support given it by those who saw it as a "rescue government" after four election cycles with no clear victor, it is not hard to understand why Jewish and Arab positions have become more polarized, and why the camps have found it increasingly hard to understand each other. Thus, the share of Jews who think that only "very few" Arabs are "politically extreme" has risen sharply, as Israel's center-left has demonstrated an increased willingness

to tolerate positions common within the Arab sector, and to entertain the possibility that the confrontational discourse prevalent in the political arena does not accurately reflect that sector's sentiments. At the same time, among Arabs observing the opposition's efforts to delegitimize the government, there has been a steep rise in the tendency to paint large swaths of the Jewish public in shades of "political extremism."

How many Israeli Arabs are extremists?

(Asked of Jews)



How many Israeli Jews are extremists?

(Non-Jewish respondents)



Another illustration of the overall trend can be seen in the data pertaining to violence in the Arab sector. The level of violence in Israeli Arab society is high, and an effort was made this year by the government and the police to deal with this challenge with greater resolve than in the past. In the pluralism survey we sought to examine the causes (according to the respondents) of the ongoing violence in the Arab community, which manifests in high murder rates, theft, extortion by protection rackets, and more. Survey respondents were asked to rank four options. Two options attributed most of the responsibility for this situation to state entities (the government and the police) that have failed to address the Arab sector's needs, both in general (neglect) and in concrete terms (fighting violence). The other two possible reasons presented to respondents – Jews and Arabs – focused on internal characteristics of Arab society, placing the responsibility on "the public" or, more generally, on Arab "culture."

The responses starkly represent the divergent or even contradictory perspectives of Jews and Arabs on the social reality of Israel's Arab community, as well as the range of views held by the Jews themselves, based on their ideological-political affiliations. While a majority (albeit

a small one – 51%) of Jews saw key internal factors of Arab society as the main drivers of the violence, a very substantial majority of Arabs (nearly 80%) placed the responsibility on the state. While a high percentage of Arab respondents laid the blame on the government and the police, Jewish respondents were divided, with their answers distributed along a political scale. A very large majority (82%) of left-leaning Jews said that state neglect was the primary factor behind the Arab sector violence. By contrast, a significant majority (61%) of right-leaning Jews said that the violence is "a cultural issue of the Arab sector." A breakdown of internal versus institutional factors shows the left focused almost entirely on failures of the state establishment (92%), while the right (77%) placed the blame primarily on the Arab sector and its culture (centrist voters are divided fifty-fifty).

Factors underlying violence in the Arab sector: Top-ranked reason by political orientation (among Jews)



Moral Considerations in Foreign Relations

The war in Ukraine has created an array of policy dilemmas for Israel, which require it to navigate issues pertaining to its relations with other countries, the security interests it needs to safeguard, its image as a country, immigration and absorption issues, and more.[2] These dilemmas have provided an opportunity to address the larger questions of balancing "moral" and "realpolitik" considerations in Israel's conduct, and to examine the Israeli public's attitudes toward the appropriate balance in these matters. Ahead of a JPPI conference on this topic in early June 2022, a public opinion survey was conducted to determine what Israeli Jews think about a number of questions pertaining to morality and policy, both in its general principled aspect and in terms of specific dilemmas presented to them in the survey. This study produced a number of findings:

A large majority of Israeli Jews feel that Israel is a moral country and that the IDF is a moral army; a large majority believe that in foreign and defense policy, interests and moral considerations must be balanced. However, the more prevalent preference is for a balance that prioritizes interests over morality. There is a clear connection between political views (right-leaning) and the assessment that Israel is a moral nation; there is also a significant relationship between political views (left-leaning) and a preference for moral policy. Most feel that the main lesson of the Holocaust is the need for determination in protecting Jewish lives. Those whose preference derives from Israel being a "Jewish state" tend to prefer interests over morality.

Of all of these findings, we will now focus on the last. This finding shows that Jewish consciousness in the context of Israel's identity is connected with a tendency among Israeli Jews to prioritize interests over "moral considerations." In essence, it indicates that, for Israeli Jews, the most important consideration (and in their view, the prime "moral" consideration) is protecting the security and lives of Jews. The same finding can also be inferred from the practical interpretation given by Israeli Jews to the notion of "lessons of the Holocaust." More respondents chose as a key lesson of the Holocaust "the need for determination in protecting Jewish lives" (51%) than chose the option of "special sensitivity to violence against innocents" (32%).

Are your views regarding foreign and defense policy, morality and interests related to the fact that Israel is a Jewish state?



Endnotes

1. All of the findings of the Jewish People Policy Institute's 2022 Pluralism Index, as well as other data from the survey, can be found on the JPPI website https://jppi.org.il/en/article/pluralism2022/#.YwHqMuxByCc.
2. The data in this subsection are taken from: Should Moral Considerations Be Brought to Bear in Foreign and Security Policy? Attitudes of Israeli Jews. The relevant JPPI survey findings and an analysis of them can be found at: https://jppi.org.il/en/article/morals-interests-survey/#.YvnHCCkzaUl

CULTURAL CURRENCY

16 The Spirit of the Jewish People

Religion, Philosophy, Sociology, History

Changing Haredi Leadership

On Shushan Purim, (March 18, 2022), Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky, the leader of the "Lithuanian" wing of Haredi Judaism passed away at the age of 94. R. Kanievsky represented the culmination of a long-term trend of establishing charismatic leadership at the head of this community. R. Kanievsky held no institutional or official leadership position, except for his occasional participation, in his last years, in the Torah Sages Council of the Degel HaTorah party (the political representative of the Lithuanian ultra-Orthodox public). In a similar vein, most of those who sought an audience with him after he became the sole leader of Lithuanian Jewry in 2017, despite his immense erudition, were not pursuing Talmudic or halachic answers, but rather his "blessing" and/or guidance in their personal lives.

The development of this charismatic orientation is somewhat surprising given that the central ideal of "Lithuanian" Haredi life is the rational study of Talmud and Halacha (Jewish law). Nevertheless, we should recall that the origins of modern Lithuanian Haredi society trace back to the leadership of R. Eliyahu (1720-1797), the Gaon of Vilna, who also had no official position and achieved leadership due to the charisma associated with his extraordinary learning. Over the years though, while charisma maintained a certain degree of importance, especially since the founding of Agudath Israel in 1911, most of the leaders also held official leadership positions either as heads of yeshivot or as communal rabbis or rabbinic judges. R. Chaim Kanievsky, in contrast, remained a Kollel student almost his entire life, though he could have benefited from his family connections in obtaining an important official position – he was the son

of the Steipler Rabbi (R. Yaakov Kanievsky), one of the most important Talmudists since the Second World War.

Together with this charismatic leadership, R. Kanievsky's family maintained an efficient "court" or staff, which channeled his leadership into actual political influence. It appears that this staff continues to function and R. Kanievsky's children, and even his grandchildren, remain influential. It is possible that this influence continues because no obvious figure has emerged to replace R. Kanievsky's leadership.

The most plausible candidate is the 97-year-old R. Gershon Edelstein, who heads the Ponevezh Yeshiva in Bnei Brak and has much less of a charismatic orientation.

It is possible that as the culmination of Lithuanian charismatic leadership, R. Chaim Kanievsky, was also its last great representative. Haredi charismatic leadership seems to be inextricably linked to politics. The concept *of Daat Torah* (special Torah insight) was developed by Agudat Yisrael in Poland in the interwar period to give its leaders the capacity and authority to rule on mundane matters of politics, economics etc. Unlike formal halachic rulings, Daat Torah does not require that one write a formal legal opinion (*responsum*) marshalling evidence and arguments. Naturally, this concept very much augmented the charismatic aspect of Haredi rabbinic authority.

Charismatic leadership facilitates a strong sense of communal belonging and collective identity. According to historian Gershon Bacon, Daat Torah was established as a defensive measure to help close ranks and increase Haredi political mobilization. The contemporary emphasis on Daat Torah and charismatic leadership started in the 1950s with the leadership of the Chazon Ish, R. Abraham Isaiah Karelitz (1878-1953), R. Chaim Kanievsky's uncle. However, the impact of this leadership remained primarily confined to the small and emerging Haredi community. This charismatic leadership took on greater national importance when Agudat Yisrael became an important member of the ruling right-wing coalition in 1977. R. Eliezer Min-Shach, who was the most important leader of that time, began to receive national media coverage and politicians began to make regular pilgrimages to him.

However, the political self-conception of the Haredim may be changing. Rather than viewing themselves as an embattled enclave of religious purity, they may be starting to see themselves as an integral part of Israel's ethno-religious right-wing. The move of some Haredi voters to support the right-wing religious nationalist "Religious Zionist" party is evidence of this shift. This move was so pronounced in the last elections that a full Haredi Knesset seat switched over to the Religious Zionists.

The need for charismatic leadership seems to be connected to the self-image of the

Haredim as an enclave. As an embattled enclave, they need the high boundaries and full mobilization capability charismatic leadership provides. However, if they see themselves as part of a more general right-wing political force, that is, as part of the dominant political bloc in Israel, the Haredim might feel much less threatened and the need for charismatic leadership dissipates.

Different Patterns of Returning to Judaism

Uri Zohar was the most famous Israeli "returnee" to ultra-Orthodox Judaism. A very important and central film director, actor, and stand-up comedian, his adoption of a Haredi Orthodox Jewish way of life in the late 1970s caused a sensation. Despite his absolute commitment to the Haredi way of life, he continued to maintain contact with figures from his former world – entertainment and culture – especially maintaining his close friendship with his former collaborator, Arik Einstein. The pair even became family members as two of Zohar's sons married two of Einstein's daughters.

Zohar (and Einstein) represented the post-heroic phase of Israeli culture – the period of the 1960s and '70s, when after the heroic creation of the state, the Zionist dream settled down into the routine forms of everyday life in the Israeli heartland of greater Tel Aviv. While early Israeli drama and films centered around the heroic struggles and self-sacrifice involved in the creation of the state, Israeli literature, drama, and films in the late 1960s began to examine the more quotidian aspects of daily life. Uri Zohar had a major hand in this as he introduced French New Wave cinema to Israel. Under this influence he made such Israeli classics such as Peeping Toms (1972) and Big Eyes (1974), which dealt with the themes of infidelity and casual sex.

In this context, Zohar's "return to Judaism" should be construed as a challenge: Can the routinization of the Zionist dream really provide meaning and fulfillment? Can meaning and fulfillment really be had by focusing upon the small pains and pleasures of love and autumn days, or of exploring the moral dilemmas of marriage and infidelity? Zohar's films, especially those made in the 1970s, seem to indicate an underlying sense of existential emptiness.

It is within this context that one can interpret the ongoing friendship between Zohar and Einstein as presenting, in a nutshell, the two main Israeli cultural options of those years – either life in the routinized Zionist utopia of Tel Aviv or life in Bnei Brak, the Haredi "negative" of secular Israeliness. In other words, both the extremely religious Zohar and the very epitome of secular Israeliness, Arik Einstein, shared the same conceptual map. The fact that each chose different paths along that map is less important.

Each of these options was conceived of as total. The "truth" that Zohar found in ultra-

Orthodoxy was of the same order as Stalin's socialist "truth," that he was taught as a teenage member of the Hashomer HaTzair (the left- wing Labor-Zionist secular youth movement). The total and unquestioning commitment to a "the truth" (of whatever sort) is characteristic of Zohar's (and Einstein's) generation. However, it appears to be less characteristic of the contemporary generation. Shuli Rand, a much younger performer and film director, also returned to ultra-Orthodox Judaism, becoming a Breslover Hasid. His "return" is more nuanced, as he has made films critical of the Haredi establishment. A step that would have been unthinkable for Zohar.

The "return" of Zohar and Rand reflects a shift in Israeli culture

This distinction between the totalistic "return" to Judaism of Zohar and the more nuanced "return" of Rand reflects a central shift in Israeli culture – from the collectivism that characterized Israeli society in the first half of the 20th century and the early decades of the state, to the more individualist culture that started to characterize Israel at the end of the 20th century and has continued into the current century. "Return" today does not signify joining a sweeping mass community with a clear and unequivocal truth. Rather, it is a choice that stems from the individual's search to crystalize meaning and identity. Thus, even though those who return to Judaism enter a framework of Orthodox observance of the commandments, they continue to explore the appropriateness of the new framework for each of them personally. This enables them to identify with certain parts of the return to Judaism package and have reservations about other parts.

The Lead Tablet from Mt. Eival

One of the ongoing controversies of Jewish and Eretz Yisrael studies has been the relationship of contemporary archeology to the Bible. Archeology, of course, has been one of the more fraught disciplines in Israel. The archeology of ancient Israel, both of the Biblical and the Second Temple periods, has provided both a sense of identity and legitimacy to the Israeli nation-state. It had been commonplace that literary works such as the Bible and the writings of Josephus Flavius provided a guide to locating archeological finds and interpretating them. At the same time, archeological finds enabled one to understand the Bible and canonical Jewish texts better and confirmed the veracity of biblical accounts.

Yet, some archeologists have argued that many finds (or lack of them) did not in fact confirm biblical accounts but rather contradicted them. Archeological research showed that many central biblical accounts were "mythical" and did not really represent

factual history. Some archeologists, too, have been uneasy with the connection between archeology and Israeli nation-building, arguing that archeology as a scientific discipline should not serve political or identity ulterior motives.

The latest fascinating stage in this ongoing controversy has been the spectacular find on Mount Eival in Samaria of a (2 cm by 2 cm) lead "curse" tablet. The Book of Deuteronomy (chapters 11 and 27) commands that once the Israelites crossed the Jordan and entered the Land of Israel, they were to carry out a ceremony blessing those who keep God's commandments and cursing those who do not. The ceremony was to be conducted in the valley between Mt. Gerizim and Mt. Eival. Half of the Israelites were to face Mt. Gerizim and utter the blessing and half were to face Mt. Eival and utter the curse. According to the Bible (Joshua 8), this ceremony was carried out by Joshua and the Israelites after they crossed the Jordan and after their victory over the city of the Ai. The Book of Joshua states that along with the ceremony Joshua built an altar on Mt. Eival and offered sacrifices.

Archeological interest in Mt. Eival started in the 1980s when a young Israeli archeologist, Adam Zertal, uncovered a large rectangular structure he claimed fit the descriptions of an alter in the Bible and the Mishna. Zertal dated the alter to the late Bronze Period and argued that it was in fact the altar Joshua built. Zertal's claims were met with skepticism by other archeologists because there is not much archeological evidence for the biblical conquest narrative. Nevertheless, excavation continued on the Mt. Eival site by American (with Christian and Evangelical affiliations) and Israeli teams. Early in 2022, using new technologies to sift the earth around the "altar" site, the teams found a folded lead tablet with an inscription inside. The tablet has been dated to the late Bronze Age (thought to be the time of Israelite penetration into the Land of Israel) and contains a Hebrew inscription. Using sophisticated scanning techniques researchers contend that the inscription is a curse. In other words, a tablet containing a curse has been found on the mountain that the Bible describes as the mountain of the curse!

Archeological interest in Mt. Eival started in the 1980s

The Christian institutes that sponsored the excavations held a press conference before these findings and their analysis had been submitted in a formal scientific article subject to peer review. They claimed, of course, that the find reconfirms the veracity of the biblical account. Israeli Bible scholars have stated that the inscription is formulaic (it starts and ends with the words "cursed be") and conforms to biblical usage. Other scholars have argued that the Christian affiliation of many of those involved in the

excavation and analysis casts some suspicion on the findings, especially as they have not yet undergone proper scientific evaluation and peer review.

If the findings are validated, then they do not exactly conform to the biblical text but are, rather, in the "spirit" of the biblical account. That would seem to indicate a midway position regarding the issue of the relationship of archeology to the Bible – not an exact reproduction – but something that increases the plausibility of the biblical account.

The Roots of Jewish Consciousness

Since Steven M. Cohen and Arnold M. Eisen published *The Jew Within* in 2000, researchers have been aware that moderately affiliated American Jews tend to construct Jewish meaning in personal and private terms. Accordingly, a growing body of literature addresses "Jewish spirituality," and offers insights into the "self-development" and "self-transformation" that enables one to become a more "authentic" and "fulfilled" human being and the practices associated with doing so. Many of the recently arisen "alternative minyanim" have a spiritualistic orientation, and this trend has extended itself, to some degree, to the Israeli Jewish Renewal movement.

Erich Neumann's The *Roots of Jewish Consciousness* promises to make a significant contribution to this trend. Though Neumann wrote this book in the 1940s and '50s, it was first published in English in 2019. In February 2022, the Hebrew translation appeared. Neumann (1905-1960) was a prominent psychoanalytic theoretician and a leading student of Carl Jung. Although brought up in an assimilated German-Jewish family, he was influenced by Martin Buber's presentation of Hasidism. Based upon his reading of Hasidic stories and teachings, he identified key aspects of Jungian Depth Psychology in Jewish religious teachings, especially among Hasidism.

Hasidism, with its focus upon the soul and its powers, is well positioned to be articulated in the terms of Depth Psychology. Neumann identified in Hasidic teaching the integration of the Jungian "shadow-self" into the overall personality and the integration of the feminine and masculine aspects of personality (*anima* and *animus*).

Neumann worked on the *Roots of Jewish Consciousness* during the same years he wrote his most important works, *The Origins and History of Consciousness* (1949) and *The Great Mother* (1955). However, he didn't publish the *Roots of Jewish Consciousness*, possibly because he did not have access to the original Jewish and Hasidic sources. Neumann thought that this connection between Hasidism and Jungian Depth Psychology would bring about a renewal of Judaism among assimilated Jews. He was not wrong. The "introversion" of Judaism today (two generations after his death) is connected

to a revival of interest in Judaism among some non-Orthodox and loosely affiliated Jews. The publication of both volumes of The *Roots of Jewish Consciousness* will likely quicken interest among those searching for "the Jew within."

17 "Who Is a Jew?" in Israeli Literature and Thought

Literature, Television, Film, Theater, Art

The question of **who is a Jew** is not only one of identification (who am I) but also one of identity (what am I). Alongside it, another identity question exists for nearly half the world's Jews: **Who is an Israeli?** Both questions are fodder for debate, especially around their interrelatedness, and their answers divide Israel's Jewish society (and to a lesser extent also echo disputes with Israel's non-Jewish public). It can be said that these are foundational questions that underlie the disparate visions fueling the local culture war. We chose to place them, and the way they are expressed in contemporary literature and thought, at the center of the *Annual Assessment's* culture chapter.

The decision to address this issue was sparked by a recent event: A pillar of Israeli culture, the writer A.B. Yehoshua, passed away in June of this year. Yehoshua's core argument regarding this issue was that "Israeli identity is the complete Jewish identity.[1]

"Among Israeli writers, Yehoshua stands out for the time he devoted to the heart of the matter of local Israeli identity and its implications for global Jewish identity. With his death, a major voice in the Israeli conversation on this issue has been lost – though Yehoshua himself had long understood that his was a minority voice, not the voice of Israel's emerging majority.

In shaping his thinking about the relationship between the Jewish tradition of the past and the Israeli reality of the present, Yehoshua turned to a towering figure, Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, whose words he quoted: "There is no Jew in the Golah (the Exile), not even a Jew like you, who lives entirely on the basis of Judaism and through Judaism, is able to live as a whole Jew, nor is there a community in the Golah that is able to live a complete Jewish life, only in the State of Israel can there be a complete Jewish life. Only here will a Jewish culture worthy of the name develop." Yehoshua noted that, when he "said

similar things in the United States, [his] words triggered a vehement response." Yehoshua was unsurprised by the passionate debate that ensued in North America but found the Israeli reaction astonishing and troubling. "Something has gone fundamentally wrong lately in people's understanding of the major change in Jewish identity wrought by the founding of the State of Israel," he wrote. He laid the blame on "religious Jews in their various types and sects."

Yehoshua's basic claim was that Israel's founding had fundamentally altered the status of the Jewish people, and that this change should lead to an ideological loosening – the abandonment of aspects of Judaism that had developed for purposes of exilic survival. In an interview near the end of his life, he explained that "what remains of 'Jew' is a partial thing. It's the person living outside of Israel whose national identity is exceedingly partial. Most of the things in his life are under the control of non-Jews. He is in a gentile country, in a gentile landscape, and he lives in a religious or semi-religious enclave. I want to reorder the priorities: homeland first of all. Territory first of all. The Land, first of all. I want to move identity to the national level only. It's no coincidence that Jews are dissatisfied with this partialness, and assimilate into gentile existence."[2]

Yehoshua: I want to reorder the priorities, homeland first of all

Like many of their predecessors, Yehoshua's final two books (the last of which appeared just before his death) featured non-Israeli Jews. Yehoshua said more than once that his main interest in writing was not the story, but the conceptual message it carries ("a technical matter meant to convey an idea," in the words of Benny Ziffer[3]). Even at the beginning of his career, he explained that he was "compelled always to seek the intellectual, symbolic side. To try to see reality as representing a general idea […] That's actually the genre that's most deeply mine."[4]

The Only Daughter (2021) explores the difficulty experienced by Diaspora Jews in maintaining their culture in a Christian space. The novella unfolds over a few weeks in the life of Rachele Luzzato, an Italian Jewish girl living with her wealthy family in a city near Venice. She is the granddaughter of a Catholic grandfather and of a Jewish grandfather who survived the Second World War under the assumed identity of a village priest. Rachele studies Jewish liturgy and Hebrew in preparation for her approaching bat mitzvah, but at the same time she is offered the starring role of "Mary, Mother of God" in her school's nativity play – a performance her father forbids her to participate in.

Literary scholar Dan Miron has suggested that this is a novella centered around the issue of confused, mixed identity – a topic at the core of Yehoshua's approach, which sees the Zionist option as the means of resolving Diaspora Jewry's divided identity. According

to Miron, *The Only Daughter* is, at heart, an in-depth exploration of the religious option as opposed to other alternatives, partial or "complete." In his view, this is what prompts Rachele to taste the various possibilities on her plate. She is a Jewish girl, the daughter of a mother who converted to Judaism, and is overwhelmed by her Christian surroundings (Yehoshua's last book, *The Third Temple*, also features a woman convert, a Parisian Jew, and there are many other correspondences between the two works). In her identity there is a clash between the tribal Aleinu prayer that puts her in confrontation with the religion of her Christian ancestors ("Who has not made us like the nations of the lands"), with Psalm 13, which is suggested to her as a personal substitute – an intimate prayer ("my heart will rejoice in Your salvation") that contains no defiance of others.

Yehoshua's views on the question of Jewish identity in the Israeli era were challenged by Diaspora Jews, who saw them as negating the possibility of a meaningful Jewishness outside of Israel, and by Israeli Jews, who saw them as an attempt to rid Jewish identity of the elements it had accumulated over the long years of exile – in particular, the religious-halachic element. If Jewish identity is expressed solely on the national level, as Yehoshua preached in his writings and interviews, then all those whose Jewishness and national existence are separate, or whose Jewishness is based primarily on the Jewish faith, are flawed Jews. Yehoshua lumped together those groups which, as he saw it, emphasize the religious aspect of Judaism and in so doing undermine the Zionist revolution: Diaspora Jews, religious Jews, post-Zionist Jews, and Arabs. To these groups he proposed an alternative of Israeliness, but over the years came to feel that there was no market for the goods he was offering. Israel, as he understood it, is becoming more Jewish and less Israeli.

Is this indeed the case? And if so, what is the cause? It is interesting to juxtapose the final novel of Yehoshua, who belonged to the previous literary generation, with the third novel of Assaf Inbari, a writer of the younger generation (Inbari is in his fifties), which came out this year and tells the story of three leaders of the Zionist left from the pre-state and early-statehood periods: Meir Ya'ari, Moshe Sneh, and Yitzhak Tabenkin. The book's protagonists are idealistic but at times petty; active Zionists on the practical level, but also eager to settle scores. They represent a new, kibbutz-oriented, socialist or communist Israel, but they also clearly bear the marks of Eastern European Judaism, the Judaism of the Hassidic shtetl. They are the Israeli generation that broke away but did not disconnect from their Jewish roots. The behavior of these leftist "rebbes" is more than a little reminiscent of

Israel, as he understood it, is becoming more Jewish and less Israeli

the behavior of actual Hassidic rebbes, with their "courts," the crumbs thrown to their followers, the Hassidim thirsty for mythical interpretations of everyday events.[5]

Inbari himself is one of the most incisive interpreters of the statehood generation – Yehoshua's generation. In an essay he wrote about a decade ago, he quoted Yehoshua in a critical context: "If I had to come up with a one-sentence encapsulation of the statehood-generation's identity, I'd say it's the meaning of Israeliness as a complete Jewishness […] Israeliness as identity […] is the complete Jewishness." Inbari posits that this outlook reflects the "sense of mastery," the "self-satisfaction" of the "provincial" statehood generation.[6] His criticism extends beyond Yehoshua to Ben-Gurion himself. In Inbari's eyes, the post-Zionists are right to say that "Ben-Gurion indeed failed at the task of building the nation." But in his view, Ben-Gurion "failed not because he tried to build a nation, but because he tried to build an artificial nation. There is no 'Israeli' nation. There is a Jewish nation. The Jewish nation is what required a melting pot, but Ben-Gurion, who did not understand this, purported to create a substitute. In his hatred of exilic Judaism, he failed to perceive that there is a difference between a non-exilic melting pot and a non-Jewish melting pot, and this was the mistake of his life. He should have realized that the purpose of Zionism, beyond its basic Herzlian purpose, is to create a non-exilic Jewish identity here. He should have perceived that the Jewish state is a state of the Jews, not a state of the 'Hebrews'."

Inbari's position is that "the Jewish melting pot requires, in general, a secular process of acclimation to Judaism and a parallel, religious process of halachic renewal." A similar, widely-publicized, view has been championed by another Israeli intellectual of the same generation, Dr. Micah Goodman. In his book *Philosophic Roots of the Secular-Religious Divide* (Hebrew title: Hazarah bli teshuva)[7], as well as in follow-up articles, Goodman rejects what he calls "the temptation to reduce a complex phenomenon to a single principle." Judaism, wrote Goodman this year, "is a historical anomaly that cannot be reduced to a single definition or basic element."[8] While Yehoshua felt that the end of the imposed exile meant the end of the Judaism formed in the Golah, and its replacement with Israeliness, Goodman proposed acceptance of a reality of diverse Jewish options. "Is Judaism a religion, a nationality, or a culture? An answer to this question will not help us answer the question 'Who is a Jew?', but it will be very helpful in answering the question 'Who is a good Jew?' That is because a good Jew, i.e., a Jew who aspires to Jewish excellence, actualizes the phenomenon of Judaism in the best possible way. Thus, if Judaism is a religion, then a good Jew is a Jew who believes in the God of Israel and seeks to obey and be close to Him; if Judaism is a nationality, then a good Jew is a patriot who is devoted to the Jewish people and feels solidarity with all Jews; if Judaism is

a culture, and if the culture emerging in Israel today is indeed a new "floor" in the edifice of Judaism, then a good Jew is a creative Israeli who takes part in the building of a rich and vibrant Israeli-Jewish culture."

The building of such a culture is an "ideological-conceptual project" that is already underway, Michael Mankin writes.[9] Mankin finds much that is positive in this project, but also a fundamental flaw (in his view). "Liberal Israeli Judaism's attempt to advance a statist-national Judaism comes at a heavy price in democratic terms: this is a Judaism that is concerned with shaping the story of the state, and not just of communities within it. That is, it does not advance an intra-Jewish project but rather a project that encompasses the entire state and citizenry while still conducting itself as though it were an intra-Jewish project. Israel's Palestinian-Arab community is thus entirely excluded from this essential discussion regarding the nature of the state." This view is somewhat reminiscent of Yehoshua's, and of similar opinions expressed decades ago by other Israeli intellectuals who wanted to separate the Jewish religion from the Israeli nation. Among these intellectuals was Joseph Agassi, who explained that only such an undertaking "would make a true relationship possible with Jews who are not Israeli and with Israelis who are not Jews."[10]

There is, of course, no single answer to the question of whether the challenge posed by the state's Jewishness to relations with Israel's non-Jewish minority and with non-Israeli Jews represents a fundamental flaw, or one that can be overcome. But data on the views of Israeli Jews and non-Jews, including data gathered by the Jewish People Policy Institute, indicate that Israel's Jewish public does have trouble clearly distinguishing between the issue of shared identity among Jews and the issue of civic partnership among all Israelis. Thus, many Jews in Israel respond in the affirmative to the question of whether in order to be a "real Israeli one has to be Jewish."[11]

The impression that emerges from the data amassed by all of the recent studies on these topics, is that a majority of Israeli Jews do not want to convert Jewish identity into Israeli identity – not in the manner of Agassi and not in the manner of Yehoshua. This is not the place to address the differences between the two (and there are differences). However, a degree of caution is warranted with regard to these data, which are influenced considerably by question phraseology and answer options. A JPPI study conducted this year found that Israelis often tend toward responses that resonate with Yehoshua's view. For example, four out of ten Israeli Jews agree that serving in the IDF is a signpost of having joined the Jewish people. A two-thirds majority of secular Jews feel this way (64%), while among the more traditional groups agreement is lower (traditional-not very religious – 36%; traditional-religious – 18%, and so on).

This is a view that indicates the possible Israelization of Jewishness.

However, one should not infer from such a view that there is significant willingness among Israeli Jews to obscure or abolish the state's Jewishness. Based on data from JPPI's 2021 Pluralism Survey, most Israeli Jews feel that Israel merits the "Jewish state" designation.[12] When the follow-up question is examined, of how Jewish the state should be, 40% said Israel should remain "about as Jewish as it is today" – while the majority either want Israel to be "more Jewish" (37%) or "less Jewish" (23%). In any case, only a tiny minority (1%) would prefer that Israel cease to be a Jewish state. And this latter figure is, of course, very important because it allows us to identify a general shared desire (for a Jewish state), despite strong disagreement over how Jewish the state should be and over the nature of that "Jewishness."

Endnotes

1. "Who Is Israeli?" *Haaretz*, 2013.
2. *Israel Hayom*, 2021, https://www.israelhayom.co.il/magazine/hashavua/article/6619684
3. *Haaretz*, 2022, https://www.haaretz.co.il/gallery/literature/2022-06-14/ty-article-magazine/.premium/00000181-61cb-da8f-a5e3-f7db8e240000
4. "Writing Prose," a talk with Menachem Perry and Nissim Calderon, included in Yehoshua's essay collection *The Wall and the Mountain* (1989).
5. See: Anita Shapira, "Who Wins, History or Literature?" Shmuel Rosner, *The Hedgehog and the Fox*, 2022. https://kipshu.com/shapira-three-books/
6. "The Generation of Collapse," Assaf Inbari, http://inbari.co.il/krisa1.htm
7. *Philosophic Roots of the Secular-Religious Divide*, Micah Goodman, 2019, Dvir.
8. "To Belong and to Believe," Micah Goodman, *Makor Rishon*, May 2022.
9. "Two Approaches to Israeli Judaism," Michael Mankin, *Hazman Hazeh*, Van Leer Institute, https://hazmanhazeh.org.il/israeli-judaism/
10. *Between Faith and Nationality: Toward an Israeli National Identity*, Joseph Agassi, revised edition, 2019.
11. This is a phenomenon that is not unique to Israel: see "Who Is a Jew? Try 'Who Is a Hindu' and You'll Find a Few Similarities," Shmuel Rosner, *HaMadad*, July 2021. https://themadad.com/%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%94%D7%95-%D7%99%D7%94%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99-%D7%A0%D7%A1%D7%95-%D7%B4%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%94%D7%95-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%93%D7%99%D7%B4-%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%92%D7%9C%D7%95-%D7%9B%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%A7/#.YwQ0amgzaUk
12. The statement presented to non-Jewish survey respondents was: "A democratic state should be a 'state of all its citizens', that is, a state that does not emphasize the national or religious character of any specific group." The share of non-Jews who agreed with this statement was very high, 91%, with no significant differences between population groups, ages, religiosity levels, or religions. Of course, the question of how the respondents understand the concept of "a state of all its citizens" is open to speculation. This concept, which has been common in Israeli public discourse since the 1990s, has taken on a variety of meanings.