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Causes and Strategies of Terrorist Activities and Crimes by Separatist Forces in the Balochistan Region of Pakistan

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Abstract

The separatist forces operating in Pakistan's Balochistan region stem from a fusion of domestic separatism and terrorism. Balochistan province has fostered a socio-political climate conducive to "separatist ideologies," influenced by both internal and external factors. This has led to sustained violent terrorist activities targeting China's global interests. These activities severely impact Pakistan's economic growth, impede the Belt and Road Initiative's progress, disrupt the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and pose a direct threat to China's overseas interests. To confront these challenges, China must adopt a unified, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable global security approach, fostering a community with a shared future for humanity. This necessitates establishing mutual symbiosis for safeguarding overseas interests, crafting a distinctive protection system for overseas interests, enhancing engagement with Pakistani civil society, domestic media, and think tanks, mitigating damages through tribal networks, establishing a three-pronged counter-terrorism security risk prevention and control system involving the Chinese government, enterprises, and citizens, and deepening intelligence and law enforcement collaboration with nations like Pakistan.

Keywords: Balochistan separatist forces, terrorist activities, causation, strategies

1. Introduction

As the second-largest nation in South Asia, Pakistan has long grappled with the menace of terrorism, orchestrated by diverse extremist factions ^[1]. In recent years, these acts have posed substantial threats to the safety of Chinese diplomatic missions, businesses, citizens, and other overseas interests involved in the Belt and Road Initiative. As per the 2023 Global Terrorism Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace in Australia, Pakistan ranked sixth globally in terms of the gravity of terrorist threats in 2022. The fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks surged from 292 in 2021 to 643 in 2022, constituting 10 percent of global terrorism-related deaths ^[2].

At the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, it is imperative to fortify the construction of overseas security capabilities. China's overseas interests denote the national interests of China projected globally by the government, enterprises, social organizations, and citizens. These interests transcend China's sovereign jurisdiction and are primarily manifested through international contracts ^[3]. In recent years, separatist forces in Pakistan's Balochistan region, notably the "Balochistan Liberation Army," have perpetrated numerous terrorist acts against China's overseas interests, posing a grave threat to our national security, particularly the security of our overseas interests. This paper will outline and analyze the characteristics of terrorist activities by Balochistan separatist forces, delve into the motivations behind their criminal deeds, and propose countermeasures.

2. Overview and Characteristics of Balochistan Separatist Forces

The issue of Balochistan separatism chiefly concerns the aspiration of the Baloch people in Pakistan's Balochistan province to establish an independent state, leading to multiple armed uprisings against Pakistan's central government ^[4]. It emerges from a blend of domestic separatism and terrorism. This form of ethnic separatism serves as a political ideology that underpins the growth of terrorism ^[5]. The early Baloch nationalist movement laid the groundwork for separatism, while terrorism emerged as an extreme manifestation and outlet for this separatist sentiment. Notable Baloch separatist armed factions encompass the "Balochistan Liberation Front" (BLF), "Balochistan Liberation Army" (BRA), "Baloch Republican Guards" (BRG), "Baloch Liberation Tigers"

(BLT), "Balochistan Youth Tigers" (BYT), among others. Historical political legacies and the recourse to violence in addressing grievances have propelled the internationalization of the Balochistan issue in present-day Pakistan, forming the basis of its linkage with terrorism.

2.1 Overview of Balochistan Separatist Forces

15,

2005

Province

construction

site

China's Beixin Road &

The "BLA" is comprised of three major tribes in Balochistan province: "Marri," "Bugti," and "Mengal." Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which aimed to disrupt logistical supply lines supporting Afghan guerrilla forces in Pakistan, the Soviets established multiple organizations engaged in destructive activities within Pakistan, including the "BLA" [6]. Its ideological framework amalgamates early Marxism, Western liberalism, anarchism, radical sectarianism, and tribalism. The faction seeks the separation of Balochistan province from Pakistan, striving for national self-determination and the establishment of an independent state termed "Greater Balochistan." The Pakistani government forcibly proscribed the organization, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, its operations temporarily halted due to lack of funding. However, post-"9/11," the United States, in its pursuit of intelligence on the Taliban, provided funding for its revival. Backed by countries such as India and Afghanistan, the group gained prominence by orchestrating attacks against the Pakistani government and military. The "BLA" stands as one of the most active and widespread terrorist organizations within Pakistan's borders. In recent times, it has consistently claimed responsibility for a substantial number of terrorist incidents in Pakistan. Shifting its focus from domestic government and military targets to foreign institutions and businesses, particularly Chinese consulates, affiliated organizations, and enterprises (see Table 1).

Separa	ilist i bi ces.			
Date	Location	Method of Attack	Consequences	Remarks
May	Gwadar Port,	A roadside bomb	Three Chinese engineers	
3,	Balochistan	exploded targeting a car	from CCCC First Harbor	http://news.sina.com.cn
2004	Province	carrying 12 Chinese	Consultants Co., Ltd.	/c/2006-02-16/0154821
		engineers passing through	were killed, and nine	5324s.shtml
		western Gwadar.	others were injured.	
Nove	Gwadar Port,	A rocket attack was	Several vehicles were	
mber	Balochistan	launched at the	destroyed, but there were	https://news.sina.com.c

Table 1: Overview	of Attacks on	Chinese	Targets	by the	"Balochistan	Liberation Army'	' (BLA)
Separatist Forces.							

of

no injuries to Chinese

engineers or staff.

n/o/2005-11-17/065874

64988s.shtml

Febr		Bridge Construction Group Co., Ltd. near Gwadar.		
uary 15, 2006	Hub, approximatel y 700 km southeast of Quetta, Balochistan Province	Masked gunmen in Pakistan attacked a vehicle transporting Chinese engineers.	Three Chinese engineers and one Pakistani driver were killed in the attack.	http://www.sina.com.c n
2016	Saindak Metals Ltd, Pakistan	Armed militants set fire to five oil tankers belonging to a company in Balochistan.	CollaborationwithMetrologicalConstructionCompanyof China in operating amine in the Mastung areaof Balochistan	https://www.guancha.c n/Third-World/2016_0 4_11_356596.shtml
Augu st 11, 2018	Dalbandin area, Balochistan Province	While en route to Dalbandin airport, a convoy carrying Chinese company employees was attacked; a suicide bomber detonated explosives near the convoy.	Three Chinese and three local security personnel injured; Attack orchestrated by Aslam, the son of "BLA" leader, after joining Majeed Brigade	https://baike.baidu.com /item/8%C2%B711%E 5%B7%B4%E5%9F% BA%E6%96%AF%E5 %9D%A6%E8%BD% A6%E9%98%9F%E9 %81%87%E8%A2%A D%E4%BA%8B%E4 %BB%B6/22808575?f r=aladdin
Nove mber 23, 2018	Chinese Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan	The BLA Majeed Brigade attacked a consulate; three armed militants were shot.	Four casualties (police and civilians) occurred with no Chinese casualties.	https://baike.baidu.com /item/11%C2%B723% E4%B8%AD%E5%9B %BD%E9%A9%BB% E5%8D%A1%E6%8B %89%E5%A5%87%E 9%A2%86%E4%BA% 8B%E9%A6%86%E9 %81%87%E8%A2%A D%E4%BA%8B%E4 %BB%B6/23167674?f

				r=aladdin
May	Pearl	An attack by four armed	Multiple hotel security	https://baijiahao.baidu.
11,	Continental	"BLA" militants targeted	personnel were killed,	com/s?id=1633402691
2019	Hotel,	a hotel housing Chinese	and several others were	701694354𝔴=spide
	Gwadar,	and other foreign	injured. All attackers	r&for=pc
	Balochistan	investors.	were killed, and there	
	Province		were no Chinese	
			casualties.	
June	Pakistan	Four militants affiliated	Five security personnel,	https://baijiahao.baidu.
29,	Stock	with the "BLA" attacked a	including one policeman,	com/s?id=1670840002
2020	Exchange	building.	were killed, and several	058410572𝔴=spide
	Building,		others were injured.	r&for=pc
	Karachi			
Augu	Eastern Bay	A child associated with	One Chinese person was	https://baijiahao.baidu.
st 20,	Expressway,	the "BLA" conducted a	lightly injured, and two	com/s?id=1708733824
2021	Gwadar,	suicide attack against a	children were killed	614558224𝔴=spide
	Balochistan	convoy carrying Chinese	(including the attacker),	r&for=pc
	Province	personnel.	while three others were	
			injured.	
April	Karachi,	A female suicide bomber	Four fatalities occurred,	https://mp.weixin.qq.co
26,	Pakistan	targeted a small van at the	including three Chinese	m/s/ELg_BVUNojimm
2022		Confucius Institute at	citizens and one	XJXlGTgwg
		Karachi University.	Pakistani driver.	
May	Hoshab,	Pakistani	There were no casualties.	https://baijiahao.baidu.
16,	Balochistan	counter-terrorism forces		com/s?id=1733119746
2022	Province	arrested a female		127759760𝔴=spide
		attempting a suicide		r&for=pc
		bombing against a		
		Chinese convoy along the		
		China-Pakistan Economic		
		Corridor.		
Dece	Gwadar Port	A significant fire erupted	A severe terrorist attack	https://kan.china.com/a
mber		in the port, affecting a	took place at the	rticle/2209680.html
14,		storage facility with 10 oil	China-aided Gwadar Port	
2022		tanks and causing damage	in Pakistan.	
		to 13 oil tankers,		

		including commercial ships and a Pakistani naval vessel.		
May	Karachi Port	Two gunmen attempted to	No suicide vest was	
11,		breach a Chinese-owned	found on the deceased,	http://stock.hexun.com/
2023		shipyard; one gunman	who was discovered with	2023-05-12/208581439
(even		was killed in an exchange	an automatic rifle and	.html
ing)		of fire with local police,	ammunition. The	
		while the other escaped.	attacked company is a	
			Hong Kong-based marine	
			engineering firm. There	
			were no casualties or	
			property damage.	
Augu	Near Gwadar	The "Balochistan	An improvised explosive	https://baijiahao.baidu.
st 13,	Police	Liberation Army"	device exploded during	com/s?id=1774105428
2023	Station,	attacked a Chinese airport	the attack, causing	196072923𝔴=spide
	Balochistan	pickup convoy comprising	gunshot damage to the	r&for=pc
	Province	23 Chinese personnel,	van.	
		three SUVs, and one		
		bulletproof van.		

In 2022, statistics from the Institute for Economics and Peace indicated that the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Pakistan emerged as the fastest-growing terrorist organization. The BLA conducted 30 terrorist attacks, resulting in 233 fatalities and 113 injuries, ranking it fifth globally in terms of casualties caused by terrorist organizations.

Terrorism is purposeful and strategic, not random or irrational. It signifies intentional acts with well-defined objectives^[7]. The BLA stands as a typical ethnic terrorist separatist group, differentiating itself from religious extremist organizations like the Pakistani Taliban.

2.2 Analysis from Table 1 delineates the characteristics of their activities:

Targets encompass both soft targets such as Chinese vehicles, construction sites, oil tankers, shipyards, hotels, and hard targets like consulates and stock exchange buildings. Engineering vehicles were specifically targeted (7 incidents, constituting 50 percent). Recent years have seen predominant use of methods like explosions, shootings, and arson, with suicide bombings, especially against soft targets, emerging as a major tactic (5 incidents, accounting for 36%) - a method less frequently used by Balochistan separatist forces in the past ^[8].

Perpetrators, including women and children, were involved in three incidents (21 percent). The targeted domains signify terrorism's swift expansion from physical spaces to psychological and online realms (approximately 10 incidents, constituting 71 percent). Incomplete statistics indicate over 30 deaths, including Chinese citizens, since 2004 due to criminal consequences. The current criminal scenario underscores frequent collaboration and alliance-building among Balochistan separatist forces. In June 2019, the Balochistan Liberation Army, Balochistan Liberation Front, and Balochistan Republican Army formed a new alliance termed the Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), citing entities like Pakistan's Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) and China as primary exploiters of Balochistan's natural resources ^[9]. In July 2020, BRAS announced a tactical alliance with the "Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army", sharing common goals of liberating Balochistan and Sindhudesh regions while opposing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ^[10].

3. Causes behind Balochistan Separatist Force Attacks on Chinese Targets

"The work of motivation theorists begins with a fundamental premise: every action has a reason. Their objective is to uncover these reasons. "^[11]

3.1Balochistan's middle class, supported by external forces like India, opposes the federal government, particularly represented by Punjab, and China's Belt and Road Initiative.

They aim to strain China-Pakistan relations by attacking Chinese targets, seeking global attention and pressuring the Pakistani government to meet their economic and political demands amid longstanding China-Pakistan ties and substantial trade.

3.2 Balochistan separatist forces view Chinese projects in Pakistan as interfering with their interests.

Strategically targeting Chinese investments-particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) traversing Balochistan, a key conflict area. The CPEC offers significant employment and economic benefits to Balochistan, potentially reducing separatist support.

3.3 Thirdly, armed Balochistan groups oppose the CPEC's development

Driven by the relative deprivation theory suggesting frustration and relative deprivation catalyze ethnic separatism^[12]. These groups perceive the federal government's exploitation of Balochistan's natural resources through "economic development." Balochistan's rich resources

contribute substantially to Pakistan, yet the BLA sees Chinese involvement as resource exploitation, encroaching on Balochistan's political, economic, and societal interests.

3.4 Donald Horowitz highlights that separatist movements "rely to a great extent on the international political balance – extending beyond the movement's country, engaging in international maneuvers" ^[13]. Supported by countries like the United States and India, the BLA aims to disrupt China-Pakistan cooperation.

Following changes in Afghanistan's government, the BLA intensified attacks, disrupting cooperation and positioning itself for the United States. The CPEC project has attracted attention and concern from both the United States and India. India, in particular, is a significant financial supporter of the BLA. The United States and India support the BLA with the intention of undermining this project. The U.S. support for the BLA is a response to China, while India's support aims to counter Pakistan and, to some extent, China. In November 2020, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented extensive evidence at a press conference, demonstrating that India used its consulate in Afghanistan to fund, train, and shelter organizations such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the BLA. India formed a dedicated group and allocated 80 billion rupees to sabotage the CPEC project ^[14]. Since the April 2022 suicide bombing, there have been suggestions in Pakistani media that India may be the primary hidden supporter of the BLA, as undermining Sino-Pak relations aligns with its strategic interests.

Indeed, China's ability to weaken the motivations of local separatist forces is extremely limited, as it involves Pakistan's internal issues. The key issue is that there is a social foundation for "separatist ideology" in Balochistan province, and similar violent terrorist activities are likely to continue.

The terrorist activities of Baloch separatist forces significantly undermine Pakistan's economic prosperity, hinder the steady progress of the Belt and Road Initiative in the region, and have a severe impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. As shown in Table 1, from 2004 to 2023, more than 20 people, including Chinese construction personnel, vehicles, and ships, have been killed in terrorist attacks, with over 10 related incidents. Terrorist attacks by separatist forces in Balochistan obstruct the secure operation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, disrupt corridor economic and trade development, affect policy stability, and intensify geopolitics competition along the corridor. These crimes pose a serious threat to China's overseas interests security. Currently, Balochistan province is the most severely affected region by terrorism against China's overseas interests. Unlike organizations like the

Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and its associated religious extremist groups, which are hostile to China, the BLA's attacks on Chinese targets are part of an indirect strategic approach aimed at pressuring the central government to make concessions. The indirect nature of the BLA's strategy in attacking Chinese targets, along with its relationships with local tribes, provides a potential means for it to evade risks to China's overseas interests security. ^[15]

4. Strategies for Dealing with the Terrorist Activities of Balochistan Separatist Forces

China's approach to safeguarding its overseas interests rejects traditional expansion or power politics and seeks a path that aligns with contemporary trends, gains global acceptance, and carries distinctive Chinese characteristics. ^[16] In addressing the terrorist activities of the Balochistan separatist forces, China should employ the following strategies^①:

4.1 From a macro perspective, adhere to a shared, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable global security outlook.[®] Strengthen collaboration in the security domain, maintain global strategic stability, join forces to tackle global challenges, and promote the development of a community with a shared future for humanity.

Strategically coordinate the security of overseas interests, actively shape the overseas security situation, integrate the interests of all parties, achieve mutually beneficial coexistence for the security of overseas interests, and develop a protection system with distinctive Chinese features. As a rising emerging power, China consistently pursues the goal of building a community with a shared future for mankind, guided by an overarching national security outlook. It actively incorporates the essence of Chinese traditional culture and explores a new model that leads international security and peace-building.

4.2 Increase exchanges with Pakistani civil society, domestic media, and think tanks, leveraging tribal influences to mitigate damage^[17].

Terrorism is, and always will be, planned, purposeful, and premeditated. Counter-terrorism research strives to unravel the motives behind these activities ^[18]. To address the Balochistan issue effectively, resolving underlying social issues becomes pivotal. While potential

[®]In theory, terrorists are unrestrained; what's limited are the weapons and ideas they can obtain. Given sufficient motivation, terrorists will employ any means necessary. However, China's involvement in Pakistan primarily revolves around prevention, with the actual counter-terrorism efforts largely managed by Pakistan.

misconceptions about China among the Balochistan people may exist, inherent animosity does not ^[19]. The Chinese government can steer domestic non-governmental organizations and civil groups towards engaging in people-to-people exchanges and Track II diplomacy with Pakistan. This includes elucidating the historical context, characteristics, and interrelations among diverse factions and tribes within the Balochistan province. Facilitating assistance to local ethnic groups in addressing livelihood challenges aims to eradicate fertile grounds for terrorism.

Moreover, fostering communication with Pakistani domestic media and think tanks remains crucial. In countering distortions by Western media and terrorist organizations concerning Xinjiang-related matters, leveraging local languages like Pashto, Sindhi, and Balochi through Pakistani media and think tanks can unveil genuine development in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Efforts should aim to counter adverse public opinion. Additionally, integrating the CPEC project's development into Pakistan's nation-building narrative can serve to promote Pakistani patriotism, fostering unity among provinces and ethnicities rooted in patriotism rather than solely religious inclinations^[20].

Chinese enterprises operating in the region should fortify ties with tribal communities, leveraging tribal influence to sway Balochistan separatist forces. Strengthening interactions with local tribes during peacetime not only aids effective crisis management but also serves as an early warning system before crises emerge.

4.3 Establishing a three-in-one counter-terrorism security risk prevention system involving the Chinese government, enterprises, and citizens remains pivotal.

In the Belt and Road Initiative's development, where the government leads and enterprises play a central role ^[21], China should proactively recalibrate the conventional security mindset of the CPEC project. Under government guidance, formulating a risk control model involving market dynamics with enterprises at the core and citizen inclusion becomes paramount for security risk prevention strategies ^[22].

Faced with complex international security threats, unilateral efforts are insufficient, and reliance solely on military might is ineffective. Cooperative, collective, and shared security are imperative for resolution.

4.4 In alignment, China actively collaborates on counter-terrorism with Pakistan and other South Asian nations.

4.4.1 In intelligence cooperation, bolstering both domestic and international counter-terrorism intelligence efforts, and enhancing predictive capabilities, early warning systems, and preventive measures are essential.

Strengthening China's counter-terrorism intelligence channels, refining cooperation mechanisms within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, diversifying data sources, and establishing intelligence collection points or stations in countries like Pakistan become critical. Establishing mechanisms for sharing early warning intelligence on potential terrorist threats involving Chinese personnel in Pakistan is imperative.

Additionally, building a proficient intelligence workforce in China for analysis, assessment, investigation, and resolution in Pakistan becomes crucial. Deploying law enforcement liaison officers, immigration inspection officers, military intelligence representatives, and airport security liaison officers to Chinese institutions in Pakistan becomes essential.

Lastly, enhancing the collection and sharing of counter-terrorism intelligence between China and Pakistan, implementing data governance, and fostering systematic and standardized development of counter-terrorism data remain critical. While utilizing the "big data" intelligence platform effectively, equal focus on traditional intelligence collection methods like human intelligence gathering and open-source intelligence analysis is pivotal to preempt potential terrorist incidents targeting China.

4.4.2 Turning to the cooperation in law enforcement:

There's a pressing need to enhance international collaboration in law enforcement between China and Pakistan. Utilizing multilateral frameworks like the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, as well as the China-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Consultation and Cooperation Mechanism, a robust counter-terrorism framework should be established. Priority should be given to negotiating and finalizing the China-Pakistan Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, strengthening cooperation on repatriation, extradition, and transfer of foreign "jihadists," and creating a robust legal framework for international cooperation in counter-terrorism.

Moreover, coordinated assistance for Pakistan's law enforcement and security operations is crucial to effectively combatting terrorist organizations like the "BLA" and the "Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement." China's counter-terrorism^[23] law, specifically Article 71

pertaining to "cross-border counter-terrorism," is viewed as a unique form of international cooperation in counter-terrorism. Thus, there needs to be coordination at the national level to provide aid to pivotal countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, merging law enforcement support with efforts against these three factions^{⁽¹⁾}. If necessary, direct aid to Pakistan in counter-terrorism endeavors should be explored, alongside advocating for the establishment of an international security presence in Pakistan to further bolster overseas counter-terrorism actions.

Lastly, it's imperative to reinforce the institutional capabilities of China, Pakistan, and other SCO member nations in counter-terrorism, refine various practical cooperation mechanisms, strengthen the China-Pakistan border cooperation mechanism, and prevent and counter the infiltration and influence of groups like the "BLA," the "Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement," and similar entities. Special attention should be given to leveraging the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and counter-terrorism cooperation mechanisms within BRICS countries, with a focus on effective collaboration between India and Pakistan within these frameworks. China should fully utilize the coordinating role of the "Shanghai Cooperation Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure" and enhance coordination of counter-terrorism strategies and cooperation. Additionally, the BRICS platform can be utilized for discussions and cooperation with India on counter-terrorism matters^[24].

5. Conclusion

Terrorism is an incredibly intricate and ever-evolving social phenomenon. ^[25]In response to external support for Balochistan separatist forces, Pakistan has in recent years amplified collaboration with the Islamic world, intensified counter-terrorism partnerships with the United States, engaged in constructive engagement with India, exerted pressure on European nations, and carried out domestic counter-terrorism operations. While these endeavors have been substantial in addressing external backing for Balochistan separatist forces, they haven't fundamentally resolved these external issues. Rooted in political and historical factors, geopolitical maneuvering, and trends in international terrorism, Balochistan separatist forces

⁽¹⁾ Article 71 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China outlines strict authorization: for the public security and national security departments to send personnel abroad for counter-terrorism tasks, agreements must be reached with the respective countries involved and approved by the State Council. In the case of the People's Liberation Army and Chinese Armed Police Force, approval from the Central Military Commission suffices. For example, after the terrorist attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan, in July 2021, the Ministry of Public Security dispatched experts to assist in the investigation following an agreement with Pakistan and approval from the State Council.

have evolved into a global issue since their inception. As international terrorist entities infiltrate and strengthen connections, they become a frontier and tool for international counter-terrorism efforts and political agendas. The geopolitical reality serves as a basis for Western political interference.

Humanity constitutes a global community with a shared destiny. China can only prosper when the world is doing well. ^[26]As China succeeds, the world stands to benefit even more. Despite the fluid shifts in the global landscape, China will steadfastly stand by Pakistan, fostering steadfast cooperation to harmonize both development and security. This entails engaging in more advanced, extensive, and profound collaboration, elevating the China-Pakistan all-weather strategic cooperative partnership to unprecedented levels and making substantial contributions to the peace and prosperity of both nations and the wider region.

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