


August 2022

POLITICAL SCIENCE

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
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THIS OBSCURE
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TRANSPARENCY

*Politics and Aesthetics of a
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PETER ANDREAS




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GAMES**

THE POLITICS OF POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE


THIRD EDITION

ARIANE CHEBEL D'APOLLONIA



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GEORGE
KENNAN


**FOR
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
RESISTING ACCOUNTABILITY
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
HOW NATIONAL STORIES
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ARAM HUR

ENTITLED
NATIONHOOD
&
THE SPECTER
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THE CAUCASUS


**GEORGIAN
AND
SOVIET**



CLAIRE P. KAISER

THE END OF VICTORY

Prevailing in the Thernonuclear Age



EDWARD KAPLAN

EXTRACTED DATA
FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES



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The Article

DON'T LET PUTIN DESTROY FLUID RUSSIA


by Vera Michlin-Shapir

In my book *Fluid Russia*, I argue that analysis of Russian national identity largely overlooks the extent to which globalization shaped Russian society and politics. Throughout the book I demonstrate the profound impact of globalization on legislation, discourse, and ordinary people's practices in Russia. Such analysis helps explain the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia as a reaction to the disruptions produced by global trends. It also gives hope that Russian society, which is more of a part of the global world than it seems, can still be open for dialogue.

In the book's conclusion, however, I warned that "external changes in the global context, such as an international conflict" might drive "Putin's project to solidify Russian national identification... beyond its shallow nature and result in a deeper transformation in Russia." This scenario is materializing right now. The West must make sure that it does not help Putin to isolate the Russian society, a process which would have long-lasting effects.

Fluid Russia argues that when the Soviet Union collapsed, borders opened, censorship lifted, and Marxist-Leninist ideology was cast aside, individuals were ever freer to travel, to live where they wanted, to express what was on their minds, and to form their own understanding of Russianness. But this transformation also revealed globalization's disruptions, where greater freedom and more flexibility are often experienced as an insecure existence. In these precarious conditions, a desire to reaffirm a stronger identity comes from the need for a sense of security. Putin's rise to power and his project to reaffirm a stronger Russian identity should be construed as a campaign to address a deficit of security that was lost in the post-Soviet quest to integrate into the global world.

In these precarious conditions, a desire to reaffirm a stronger identity comes from the need for a sense of security.



Accounting for the impact of globalization allows to tell a more complex story about Putin's Russia. Putin never tried to reverse history and recreate the Soviet Union. Instead, he positioned himself as one of the most vocal and active challengers to globalization and to the he-

gemony of Western liberal values. He argued that Russia was in a struggle with the neoliberal Western-dominated world and framed this confrontation in existential terms. In this context, Ukraine's drifting westward closer to NATO and to the European Union was seen as both a geopolitical-strategic and an ideological challenge.

Yet, for many years Putin and his allies continued to enjoy the fruits of globalization and have never fully isolated Russians from the global world. They tried to perfect a new type of global oppression, corruption and disruption, which derided globalization while at the same time using its perks. Putin's bet was that what he called "Western double standards" and hypocrisy would allow him to ride two horses at once. As a result, the Russian society was in a hybrid state, where elements of global openness were mixed with more exclusivist and closed political agenda that the Kremlin promoted. The popularity of Western social media platforms such as Instagram and YouTube are examples of the profound headways that global trends made in Russian society.


While Western sanctions send an important message to the Kremlin, they carry the risk of playing into Putin's hands.

Putin works hard to fight these trends, and the West must make sure that the introduction of sanctions would not help him accomplish his mission. While Western sanctions send an important message to the Kremlin, they carry the risk of playing into Putin's hands. By isolating Russia from the global economy, sanctions also cut it from global trends and may help Putin to isolate Russians from international flows of information. This will make it ever easier for the Kremlin to shape public opinion.

The Kremlin recently closed the last independent Russian media outlets and blocked access to websites. In his recent address, Putin called the Russian people to segregate "patriots" from "traitors," calling for the persecution of anyone who holds Western values or enjoys its lifestyles. Popular online bloggers, like Veronika Belotserkovskaya whose well-crafted cookbooks I discuss in *Fluid Russia*, are being prosecuted and may face up to 15 years in prison. These steps aim to isolate Russians as much as possible from the outer world, so that the only narrative available for them would be Putin's twisted story about a "limited military operation" in to "demilitarize" and to "denatzify" Ukraine. Within this narrative, Western sanctions could be viewed by ordinary Russians as a disproportional, vengeful and indiscriminate collective punishment, and reinforce Putin's claims that the West is inherently anti-Russian.

In order not to let Putin win, the West must acknowledge the holistic character of the struggle that Putin engages in. We must stand with Ukrainians, who heroically defend their freedoms. We must also find channels to communicate with ordinary Russians, and not let Putin complete a deeper transformation of the Russian society that might outlive his presidency.

THE
EXCERPT



GEORGE
KENNAN

FOR
OUR
TIME

LEE CONGDON

Introduction

ON THE EDGE OF THE ABYSS

Ours is a time of mounting crises, international and national. Since the tenure of Henry Kissinger, a practitioner of Realpolitik, those charged with the conduct of America's foreign policy have set aside consideration of the national interest in favor of crusades to remake the world in America's image, by force if necessary. The result has been protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and insistent calls for military confrontations with Syria and Iran. Having persuaded themselves that America is "the indispensable nation," as former secretary of state Madeleine Albright said, diplomatic officials have refused to adopt balance-of-power policies when dealing with other great powers—those in possession of nuclear weapons. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States stood as the lone superpower—but not for long. Despite some ongoing problems, Russia recovered from seventy-four years of communist misrule and China emerged as a credible rival for world leadership. Rather than view these new realities as incentives to conduct genuine diplomacy (the adjustment of competing interests), successive administrations have chosen to act internationally with an air of superiority.

It is past time to consider anew the warnings and counsels of the late George Kennan, twentieth-century America's most distinguished

Introduction

diplomat. Kennan served as ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and as a senior official in Switzerland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states. He was for a time the deputy commandant for foreign affairs at the National War College and the director of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State. He played a key role in the development of the Marshall Plan that fueled postwar Europe's recovery and he formulated the containment policy that governed US actions and reactions during the Cold War. From 1933, when he first went to Moscow, to 1953, when he retired from the Foreign Service, he was involved in virtually every one of the nation's major foreign policy decisions.

In the course of that involvement, Kennan drafted countless papers, two of which achieved historic status: the "Long Telegram" transmitted to the State Department from Moscow in 1946 and "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947. Always he sought not only to offer his judgments but to polish his prose, because he was a writer as well as a diplomat. After leaving the Foreign Service, he joined Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study, where he embarked on a career as a historian with a literary bent.

For the remainder of his long life (he died at age 101), Kennan was a permanent member of the institute and the author of highly regarded histories, primarily concerning US-Soviet relations and the diplomatic origins of the Great War. He was not, however, interested in the past for its own sake but for the lessons that it imparted to the present. That explains why he continued to lecture and write on contemporary foreign policy, often regarding relations with the Soviet Union but just as often regarding matters of more general concern. Congress regularly invited him to testify, but although its members treated him with respect they

On the Edge of the Abyss

were reluctant to adopt his policy recommendations. Despite the fact that, unlike so many of his generation, he never entertained the least sympathy for the Bolshevik Revolution and during World War II was even considered to be too anticommunist, he had come to be regarded as a Cold War dove, soft on communism.

Nothing could have been further from the truth. The destruction of lives and material culture resulting from the war against Germany and Japan, combined with the development of nuclear weapons, convinced Kennan that the principal responsibility of diplomats must be to prevent an apocalyptic war. He made every effort to convince US and Western foreign policy establishments that the choice before them was not between war and submission, and that it was possible to conduct meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union without glossing over conflicting interests. A patient policy of containment—political, not military—would preserve the peace. Kennan always believed that the Soviet Union would eventually collapse under its own weight, and in the end he proved to be right.

The threat of nuclear war was not Kennan's only preoccupation. He argued against a foreign policy that aimed to democratize the world. A realist in foreign policy, he maintained that the United States should act in the world only in defense of the national interest, narrowly defined. Those, he insisted, who agitated for a morally driven policy failed to recognize that government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral enthusiasms of members of that society. What was needed, therefore, was a policy distinguished above all by its restraint. That was particularly important when dealing with nuclear powers such as Russia and China, which had legitimate interests of their own. He saw no reason why the United States should

Introduction

take it on itself to offer unsolicited political instruction to the governments of those historic lands.

Other than the great powers, Kennan believed that there were only a few world areas of strategic importance to the United States—principally Europe and Japan. He never thought his country had important security interests in the lands of the Near East, and he therefore advocated a complete withdrawal from that troubled part of the world. In opposition to almost every member of the foreign policy establishment, he identified himself as an isolationist, the prevailing posture in America until early in the twentieth century.

The primary business of the United States, in Kennan's judgment, should be to put its own house in order. He judged America's national crises to be even more threatening than those it faced internationally. Among the former he counted the vulnerabilities of mass democracy, the dangers of uncontrolled immigration, the despoilment of nature, the growing number of addictions, the unmistakable signs of decadence, and, above all, the spiritual emptiness. Where Judeo-Christian moral law was once universally honored, even if more in the breach than in the observance, it had come under sustained attack. The country had lost its moral compass along with any agreed upon principles of government.

Although Kennan was well aware that his views concerning international and national life went against the American grain, he never tired of efforts to alert his countrymen to the fateful road on which they were traveling. In this account, I have tied him closely to his writings, because texts do not exhaust their own meanings. A web of personal and historical events always give them wider and deeper significance. It matters that Kennan was born before World War I and judged America to have been a better country then than it became after World War II. It matters, too, that he

On the Edge of the Abyss

was a committed, if unorthodox, Christian who viewed the world through tragic lenses. The lessons for our time that I discuss here bear the indelible marks of a remarkable life and a turbulent era in the history of the United States and of the world.









Following a brief biographical chapter, chapter 2 traces the history of American foreign policy from the realism and restraint of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton to the moralizing interventionism of Woodrow Wilson and his successors. It places Kennan squarely in the realist camp and identifies the principles that informed his teachings and guided his conduct during long years in the Foreign Service. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss Kennan's application of his principles to relations with Russia, Eastern Europe, and the countries of the Far and Near East. Chapter 5 offers an account of the foreign policy establishment's rejection of almost all of Kennan's advice from the Vietnam War on and of that rejection's often disastrous results. Chapter 6 turns to Kennan's critique of an American society he believed to be headed for the abyss, and chapter 7 presents his hopes for its revivification. Chapter 8 explains Kennan's call for a return to representative government and concludes with a plea to his countrymen not to succumb to despair.

1

A Brief Biography

In his memoirs, George Frost Kennan confessed that he was not the cool, detached diplomat many took him to be, that his public self was a persona, a role he assumed in an effort to shield a shy, introverted nature and to meet the demands of his profession. Born in Milwaukee on February 16, 1904, Kennan never knew his mother, Florence James Kennan, who died of peritonitis shortly after giving him birth. His tax-lawyer father, Kossuth Kent Kennan, descended from a Scottish family (the surname being originally McKennan) that arrived in the United States from Northern Ireland early in the eighteenth century; he was named after Lajos Kossuth, the liberal leader of Hungary's abortive 1848–49 revolution and war of independence against Austria.

Kennan took great pride in his family. “The family as I knew it,” he told a close friend, the Hungarian American historian John Lukacs, “still bore strongly the markings of an eighteenth-century experience and discipline.” He was equally proud of the fact that his family's tradition of farming bred into it a love of the rural life, a strong work ethic, and a spirit of independence. Another George Kennan, a cousin of Kennan's grandfather, lent a modicum of fame to the family as a result of his investigation of the tsarist government's Siberian exile system.



The Article

“NOT LIBERAL, NOT A PARTY?” THE LIBERAL PARTY OF NEW YORK

by *Daniel Soyer*


New York voters know that the state has a multiparty system. If they are old enough, they might remember the Liberal Party, which played an important role in state politics between 1944 and 2002.

And if they remember the Liberal Party, they probably recall its last years as a cynical patronage machine with few actual members, no internal life, and no principles to speak of. By the end, critics joked that just as the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire, so the Liberal Party was neither liberal nor a party. Rather, it was a law firm with a ballot line.

But it wasn't always that way. The Liberal Party arose out of New York's labor movement, especially in the garment industry, and commanded considerable support in New York City's Jewish community. It could mobilize tens of thousands for election campaigns or rallies. Mainstays of the city's peculiar social-democracy-in-one-city, the Liberals prided themselves in being a “year-round” party that didn't go into hibernation between elections. Rather, they worked constantly to extend New Deal-style social welfare programs and defend civil rights. There was no doubt in its first several decades that the Liberal Party was both liberal and a party.

By the end, the Liberal Party was neither liberal nor a party.

From the beginning, though, the Liberal Party sought to strike a balance between idealism and pragmatism. Like New York's other small parties, it mainly exerted influence by offering or threatening to withhold support from the Democrats or Republicans. As one party activist put it, the Liberals could not guarantee a Democrat that he would win in a statewide election if they supported him. But they could guarantee that he would lose if they didn't. Conversely, in New York City, a Republican could only win a citywide election by outflanking the Democrat from the left with Liberal help. This strategy was successful, and the Liberal Party helped to elect presidents, governors, senators, and mayors. In return, winning candidates promised to support the party's liberal priorities.



The Liberal Party wheeled and dealt with the most well-oiled of political machines.

But the balance between pragmatism and idealism was precarious. Winning candidates also promised to appoint Liberals to government jobs. Alex Rose, the party vice chair and de facto leader, defended the Liberals' patronage practices by arguing that a political party existed to put its people in positions of influence. Moreover, the Liberals had good, qualified people. What was wrong, Rose asked, with seeing that they had jobs in government? Still, this strategy meant that the Liberal Party wheeled and dealt with the most well-oiled of political machines. Some began to question whether there was much difference between the Liberal Party and its infamous rival, Tammany Hall.

The Liberal Party wheeled and dealt with the most well-oiled of political machines.

By the end of the 1960s, the Liberal Party began to lose its social base, as the garment industry shrank, the unions disaffiliated, and the demographic make-up of New York City changed. At the same time, the party's New Deal-style liberalism began to seem old fashioned and out of step. By the 1980s, the party put much less emphasis on its program, and more emphasis on finding jobs for its people, fewer of whom seemed obviously idealistic or even qualified. By the turn of the millennium the party was a shadow of its former self. And in 2002, it lost its ballot line and went out of business.

By the turn of the millennium, the party was a shadow of its former self.

The recent democratic socialist insurgency led by Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and others within the Democratic Party shows that the issues of principle vs. pragmatism raised by the Liberal Party are not dead. The party's history provides a cautionary tale for movements of all stripes that seek to influence American politics from the margins of the mainstream.



1869

The Cornell University Press Podcast

A CONVERSATION BETWEEN
PETER KATZENSTEIN &
ROGER HAYDON
HOSTED BY JONATHAN HALL

THE TRANSCRIPT

JONATHAN

Welcome to this special ISA 2022 edition of r869, The Cornell University Press Podcast. I'm Jonathan Hall. This episode we celebrate our renowned and pathbreaking series, Cornell Studies in Political Economy, which after nearly four decades will be coming to a close upon the publication of the forthcoming book, *Mediterranean Capitalism Revisited* edited by Luigi Burroni, Emmanuele Pavoni, and Marino Regini. Our guests today are the instrumental players behind the series, series editor Peter Katzenstein, and acquisitions editor Roger Haydon. Professor Peter Katzenstein is the Walter S. Carpenter, Jr Professor of International Studies at Cornell University. His research and teaching lie at the intersection of the fields of international relations and comparative politics. Katzenstein's work addresses issues of political economy and security and culture and world politics. His current research interests focus on power, the politics of regions and civilizations, America's role in the world and German politics. Roger Haydon recently retired as executive editor of Cornell University Press, where he sponsored books in comparative politics, international relations, Asian and Slavic studies, security affairs, political economy, and humanitarian and human rights studies. He always looked for the unconventional and the unexpected, and sought out authors who were consumed by new ways of thinking. In this episode, Peter and Roger give us the behind the scenes history of the Cornell Studies and Political Economy series, their insights into how scholarship in the field has evolved, and their seasoned advice for emerging scholars today.

PETER

How did it all start? It started with Walter Lippincott, becoming the director of the press, the press had been a pretty sleepy outfit, I had no contact with it. But I knew that it was important for Cornell faculty, mostly in the humanities...not so much in the social sciences. Walter came, I don't know from where - full of beans, young, energetic and said, in order to wake up the press, we will do here what I've done at that other press, which is have a certain number of books published in different series, and what you'd like to do this, and I was, in year seven, I came in 1973. And I said, sure. And reflecting on why he asked me it was, I become full professor that year, which was young. I become editor of IO, at the same year, and therefore I will be on top of the field of manuscripts. And that was very smart, because one of the earliest volumes was in fact, the regime's volume, there was a second volume out, which became I think, the all time winner, I mean, in terms of sales. So it was a textbook for 20 years, right? So Walter, Walter, calculated smartly. And, and I was hungry. I mean, that was really how it started. I don't know why you picked me. The third reason is probably political economy as a field, what was in a takeoff stage. That's really something which happened from the early mid 70s on and a lot, there was a lot of interest in political economics, which had basically not existed. I mean, Hirshman, who were two or three people did political economy. But it was really rediscovered as a subject in the mid 1970s. I was part of that generation. So there was a reason why he said, this would be a good thing to do. Right. So Walter

always had impeccable taste, I think, you know choosing me was a sign of impeccable taste. But he had a very good nose, very good nose as a publisher, right. And he was very practical. He said, Well, who would be on top of the field? Well, the guy who was the editor of the journal, the leading journal for this stuff. So. So that's how it all started? Why did I want to do it? So in Germany, when you're an assistant professor, your job is for the next five to seven years, to review all the books of your elders, and to be incredibly critical. This is counterintuitive, because you still need to get tenure. But that's how it is. You're supposed to be a Young Turk, who tears down the work of others, then you win, become a full professor. You hand that over to the next generation, they tear you down - I wrote one book review in the late 70s. Actually, two. One was a review essay and I said, that's something I can live with. But the book review I hate it. I hate the process of writing it and I hated it and was the only one which I wrote I think you know Because I said, why spend your time tearing things down? When, at the, at the back end, when at the front end, you could make it better. And so Walter's invitation to become an editor is satisfied that need. Okay. So okay, here I can work with books and make them better. That seemed to me a more, yeah, a more palatable way of improving scholarship. So I think that is how it started. But that had nothing to do with Roger.

ROGER

No for me, let me jump in for a little bit, okay. For me, I had moved to Ithaca in 1978, and spent a couple of years with short term contract writing jobs and freelance editing jobs of various kinds. Peter in, I think, in 1979, had done a monograph on Switzerland, which was to be published in the Western Societies Papers, which was, it was actually a fairly substantial piece of work. And he wanted an editor to work through it before it saw the light of day. And I got that job and worked through it and found out lots of things about Switzerland I'd never known before, from a very low baseline, I should add mistakes. Well, there were a few of those, but it was the Swiss stuff that I was interested in. And I've since learned more because my sister is married to a Swiss national and lives near Fribourg. So I worked through that. And then I went back to writing scripts for Teach Yourself Better English books for the education department for a while. And then in 1980, Peter brought the journal, it was Bob Kohane, who was editing it previously. Right? Right, he brought he brought it to Cornell and needed a managing editor. And despite the fact that he'd already seen my dubious talents down on paper, decided to hire me as the managing editor for the journal. And I did that for five years. And during that time, I continued I could I did some freelance work for the press did more and more of it as the years went by. And then in 85, with one year's notice, Peter decided to hand on the journal to to Steve Krasner. And Stanford's a very nice place. But editing, as you may have noticed, doesn't pay particularly well. And we were already Margaret and I were already pretty much committed to living in Ithaca. So I applied for a job as a manuscript editor at the press. And you could see the twinkle in Walter's eye, because he thought, I here I have Katzenstein as the editor of the

journal, and a rising star, a well known scholar already, and if I can take him, and then I can also offer the preview, the former managing editor of I O, as the person who will handle the manuscript through the press, I have a better package to sell as far as potential authors are concerned. So much to the dismay of the managing editor at the time, a marvelous woman named Marilyn Sayle, who didn't think very much of the quality of journal editing. He, I think, forced her to hire me as a as a manuscript editor. And I started to work not only on political economy manuscripts, but also on whatever else needed to be prepared for the typesetter. This was a time where manuscript evidence has actually edited manuscripts, which was a long time ago. And then, pretty soon after I had joined the press, which would have been in late 1985. Walter applied for and got the directorship of Princeton University Press, but he was going to stay at Cornell for I can't remember maybe three months, maybe more than that. And he decided at that point that he would stand back from the acquisitions part of his job, in part because Cornell and Princeton were competing over a couple of manuscripts at that time. And I was asked to take over the acquisitions part of the political economy series, at a time when there were actually two competitive works in play between Cornell and other presses. One was Jeanne Laux and Maureen Molot's book about the political economy of contemporary Canada, which was actually we were up against a Canadian and publisher, I can't remember which one it was. But Toronto, it was University of Toronto press. Okay. But I do remember that the Jeanne, later on showed me the comments that she'd received from the academic editor at the University of Toronto press, which stopped in mid sentence, which was the point at which he had heard that, that they had decided to sign with Cornell. And the other was Dick Samuels. Dick Samuels was at MIT, he'd already published one book on on contemporary Japan with Princeton. And the second book was called *The Business of the Japanese State*. It's a really attractive project. And I asked him what he wanted. And he told me, and I said, Yes. And I managed to get him to sign the contract with the press. It's the beginning of a long and very satisfying relationship that involved altogether five, or maybe six books over a period of 30 years. So there I was the first two books that I approached as an acquisitions editor, success on both of them both in in live competition, so I thought, this is dead easy. Walk up, why is there so much fuss about this job, piece of cake. And I soon find out found out why there was so much fuss about this stuff. I mean, it wasn't exactly confectionery. But it was a good beginning. And it was good enough that as the press restaffed, with, with water having departed and other people taking over the various series that he'd started, I continue to work with Peter as acquisitions editor on just on the political economy series for about five years. And then I left the manuscript editing part behind and became a full-time acquisitions editor.

PETER

It's interesting, there's a backstory, which I didn't know about the inside of the press. Here's the inside story, which big story which Roger doesn't know. Cornell had, at the time in which I was looking for an associate

editor for I O. had just gone through modern human resource management revolution, which meant hiring union busting officials out of Detroit, they had made, you know, a bankrupt industry lean and mean, and canals. That's what we want. They couldn't really do this with existing contracts, but they sure could do it with new hires. Okay. And Roger, I couldn't get Roger on board. I said, No, he's going to come with a decent package. And that was an enormous amount of fighting. And it delayed the appointment for about half a year. But no, I'm a persistent dog. And I had the team behind me if I wanted to, but I didn't use it. Right. So eventually, that package came together. And then Roger, no, of course, there was a competitive editing, I interview two other people, no, but the work you've done on the series manuscript convinced me that is a really good editor. Plus, he's fun. Plus, he knows it's well organized. If you have an associate editor who's incompetent as an editor, you did. Okay. And so this was an enormously important appointment for me, I spent a lot of time making it work. And then I had clear sailing. I mean, Roger, just think about the annual report. This is a pain in the back. And Roger did all of it, you know, and all the careful editing other manuscripts. And of course, he built up a reputation. I mean, that time we got what, 150 manuscripts or 200- 250 a year. You know, he built up a reputation right there with about 500 authors by the time he stepped into the Cornell University Press job. And it was clear to me that, you know, that needed a little massaging. So I told Roger, you should leave early in 1985, so that you're not unemployed again, right? I mean, he wasn't a very marginal position when he came in the late 70s. It was very difficult. So that's interesting. Yeah.

ROGER Well, thank you, thank you for the effort. I didn't know

PETER It was pure self interest. It was pure self interest, but it was the enlarged self. Right. I knew that my interest in your interest in this were really parallel and had to work while they were thereafter because you clearly invested so much time and effort that I would have really had to do badly in order to lose the job.

JONATHAN That's fascinating history. Thank you for sharing that and time in history is what you're mentioning with the series 148 books published 131 Different authors and editors 25 Plus Awards, the amount sold 373,000 books. How did you see the trajectory of the series go? I mean, how did the, how did the field change from the 80s? To the present?

PETER How did the series change? Well one way is it moved like the scholarship, from Europe to Asia. We became a preeminent publisher of Japanese political economy as Japan was supposed to own the world, they would hire some American soldiers, but basically the software and the soft power all in Tokyo. That was sort of the image of the 1980s until the mid late 1990s. And then it branched out from there to other parts of Asia. And then of course, in the last 10-15 years. China, right. So there was in terms

of a way from a Eurocentric worldview, to more of an Asian one, but we did not, I mean, Roger was very, very clear said there are certain kinds of reasons we will not do Latin America, for example, he says, that's really much better done by Pittsburgh, you know, and Africa. So we were concentrating our regional focus. And the other one was analytical, you know, this started off as a new field, which I would call broadly institutional state became a big issue and how to theorize the state, state and economy, you know, institutions to argument or Marxist argument, right. That was the first 20-25 years. Then came rational choice and rationalism. And I got off the train and I was much more interested in economics, sociology. So the things which we tended to favor in the last 20 years were more sociological in their orientation. Those were the two broad themes, basically, Roger, you think that's right?

ROGER

Yeah, I think that's right. Of course, for every exclusion. There are exceptions. And so for Latin America, we did Kat Sikkink's, first book, for example. And on Africa that we didn't do very much within the series, we did do Mort Jerven's book *Poor Numbers*, which did very well and quite influential, and also got him on on a do not talk to lists for various various African bigwigs and people at the United Nations as well for a while. But, yeah, that sounds right, we probably did a little bit less on Europe. As the years went by, and the China stuff, at least at the beginning of the 2000s, we tended to leave alone, in part because there was this enormous rush of academic publishers trying to find stuff to publish about China. And so Routledge and Cambridge and two or three other presses had had books specifically devoted to China and Chinese politics. And it seems seem not a great idea to be focusing one's attention very strongly on China at a time when there was over publishing of that particular country, however important that country might be. We did start to do more work on China over the last decade, decade plus in particular Yuen Yuen Ang's book, which is a tremendous piece of work and was very successful. But But that I think, is something that actually that you brought in Peter, right, that you have the first contact with us.

PETER

Yeah, I mean, I think the first principle is the book had to be really good. Yeah, but it really fit or not was, was not so important. So we would publish outside of these mega trends, right. And I think the astonishing number of awards is a reflection of that overarching attitude, and Rodan I never disagreed on what's a good book? I mean, that's really astonishing. Over 35 to 40 years, you'd expect you know, there will be no one or two memorable fights. We never fought. Our intellectual tastes were very much aligned. Right?

ROGER

Yeah. I don't remember any big fights. I was less keen on edited volumes. There was did a few too many of those, but, but they were ways of planting flags in new areas, both geographical and thematic. But yeah, it sounds banal, but my job always to find the best books that I could and then make them better. And that's something I think we agreed about

even though I didn't know anything about politics. I had no sort of academic background in the discipline at all. Five years that I oh really did provide me with something of an education as far as that's concerned.

PETER

The issue of edited volumes as into This thing this really did become I mean, Roger and I think other presses to sit there too many of them. And as we work with a junior cohort in the 1980s, these people became senior. When you become senior, you don't write your own books and you know, you tend to enforce. So they would come back with edit the volumes. And we would gently say, well, not now. Okay, try somebody else. And that became often actually the true for the trade presses like Routledge. And Rena. So and that explains, in part, I think, well, the total number of volumes in the last 10 years published under the imprint of the series, declined somewhat. We were we went for things which were harder to find really outstanding books. And Yuen Yuen Ang's book on China is a field defining book. It's it's a dissertation. But it's cited every place. She's winning prizes, every place. Her follow on work is superb. It became clear defining it was probably the most successful book we've done in the last 10 years, you know, so?

ROGER

Yeah, yeah, that's that sounds right.

JONATHAN

With decades of wisdom that you have, with the series and the your work together, do you have any advice for emerging scholars?

PETER

Well, I do actually, and I won't hold back. I gave a big fancy lecture last year. And the thing, and it was the lecture was followed by a give and take, because my very good friend and the best man at my wedding, David Laitin got the same price the following year. So they bunch them together. And then we had a back and forth. And so there was the last question posed by the by the host of the skitter Foundation? And I said, Yes, I do. Because I've observed that young authors in the last 1015 years I interesting drawn to the craft model of scholarship, they collaborate with large numbers of authors 3456, not not just one. Everybody specializes on something, data analysis, you know, qualitative research, the programming, you know, the typesetting, whatever, right. And thereby they crank out six to 12 articles a year. It shifts the it shifts how you spend your time, and thereby the requirements for getting tenure have shifted towards publishing more. Now, has this person been productive? has only written two articles last year, that's not productive. Right? Nevermind, maybe there were two single-authored articles - it takes a year to write a good single authored article and get it published at least a year. It's an enormous amount of work, getting through these elite journals, right. But what it avoids this mass production system is fear. Everybody specializes in something small, and they are no longer afraid. And I don't think you produce good scholarship without being afraid that you feel like the whole damn thing could collapse on you. And I still live with it fear whenever I do a book, I'm right in the middle of it right now, is this

going to work? I have no clue. And if you don't have that, I don't think you will really be creative. So you become an industrious tailor, there was a wonderful title of a book, Professor Russet: Industrial Tailor to a Naked Emperor. Here, the emperor is not naked, but he's not well dressed. But industriousness does not go for me with scholarship, a certain amount for this, you know, and there's a certain amount of blogging now and public discourse which used to exist. But if the core of your scholarship is not driven by saying, the idea which I have might not pan out, you're missing, you're missing an incredibly important aspect of generating knowledge. In the natural sciences, they are driven by that fear. It's very expensive to create the experiments, and they really don't know whether it's going to work to talk to physicists or biologists. They're full of that existential fear here and the social science becomes more like this humanities, you know, I can spin the story, and I get a publication out and the fear recedes. And I think that's a loss. And, of course, they don't want to write books. They don't want to read books, and they want to write books. Writing a book is a very brilliant to Nicodemus, it takes too much time. That's it, yeah. takes five to 10 years. You know, therefore, you write two or three at the same time, every four or five years, maybe you succeed and something comes up. That's no longer how they read, write and research. It's not the time perspective they have. So I think this scholarship, you know, I think books will eventually be left for dinosaurs to feed on. So I see in the social sciences, and economics now you, you co published three papers with your dissertation supervisor, and you get a PhD. Whenever you have to publish a single article by themselves, they never know what it's like to be afraid. And that's, that's a model in political science touring now, not the only model, but it is ongoing. And that worries me a great deal about for the next generation that they're missing something essential. By having an incentive matrix, which they cannot resist, I totally feel for them, which is misaligned with what scholarship ought to be in part about not wholly but in part. Anyway, that reaction, which I gave, I got probably 30 responses by email. I didn't understand your lecture whatever, the lecture was unimportant. There was really as Wow, that talked to me. These were all older, older authors, all people above 50. So I don't think it's just my reaction.

ROGER

Nice. Yeah. What he said. That, that sounds right. It's certainly true that political science, I think has, has looked on economics ever more fully as a model to be followed over the last 30 years or so. And, and given the success of economics in studying subject matter, that seems to me to be undesirable in itself, even though they do come up with some very nice theories and some very attractive methods. There's that same existential fear, of course, for acquisitions as with the added free songs that that acquisitions editors actually don't have tenure. And so the the testing out is not a matter of a large number of people collaborating rather, it's one person who has sponsored this or that book, and look, here are the sales numbers, and what are we going to do about this. So although they are very different kinds of fears, they do articulate together in a fairly, fairly

obvious way. And I was always very fortunate to that. That with Peter, and also with a couple of other series episodes with David Laitin, on the Wilder House series with Bob Art, and Bob Jervis, on the security affairs series, and much more recently, with Eric Helleiner and Jon Kirschner on the money series, I worked with individuals whose tastes I trusted. They knew what they were doing, even if I didn't know what they were doing. And if they told me that a particular work was really top right, then I would do whatever I could in order to get the damn thing published. Usually, with success, there'll be one or two failures, but I don't think there were many as far as the political economy series was concerned. I mean, with regard to actually getting the thing into production and getting an actual book out of it. I'm, I'm glad I'm retired, because I do very much recognize the pattern that Peter's describing, as far as, as far as more recent scholarship is concerned, in quite a few different areas. And, and I suspect that that being an acquisitions editor really is no fun. It's certainly not as much fun as I had when I was first starting out. Of course, that may just be sort of Golden Age nostalgia. But nevertheless, it's um, it's a new sociology as far as academic production is concerned, and one that I don't find particularly attractive.

PETER Although, and on the theme of fun, I mean, I think, you know, academia is a professional, where you can have fun. And Roger and I had fun. And that's why it lasted so long. And, you know, this this little, which, you know, administration drives me crazy. I can't do I mean, I'm a reasonable administrator, but it's not something I like to do. Right. This was fun. Playing with ideas, how could they be better, you know, and I didn't have to worry about the bottom line. That was Rogers problem, you know, so. So I enjoyed this. Totally. I enjoyed working with Roger getting to know him. We had fun. It was a wonderful experience. really enriching. Thank you, Roger.

ROGER It was for me as well. And I'm, I'm always grateful that you put up with me for so long, but thank you for that.

JONATHAN Thank you both for sharing your time, your stories, the history behind the series, your experiences, and also the insights and wisdom that you can share to future scholars. So I want to congratulate both of you on a very successful series, the Cornell Studies and Political Economy. Thank you so much.

PETER Thank you, Jonathan.

ROGER Appreciate the invitation and thanks for hosting this.

JONATHAN That was Peter Katzenstein, Cornell professor and series editor of Cornell Studies in Political Economy, and Roger Haydon, former executive editor of Cornell University Press, and acquisitions editor for the series.

THREE QUESTIONS WITH JERRY PROUT

author of *Chasing Automation*

1. What is your favorite anecdote from researching your book?

In 1949, during intense labor-management negotiations between Ford and the United Auto Workers (UAW), the new UAW President, Walter Reuther, still attempting to consolidate his power among a contentious rank and file membership, received a telegram from an obscure Professor at MIT. Norbert Wiener, who had developed what became known as “cybernetics,” and thus was instrumental in the new transition to automated assembly lines, reached out to Reuther to warn him of the devastating impacts the discovery might

and Economic Progress. However, I was unsuccessful with either the National Archives or in my visit to the [Lyndon Baines Johnson] Library. I reached out to a couple of members of the Commission and Steve Mangum, the son of the Commission’s Secretary scoured his family members attics in search of any lost papers relating to the Commission. In the process, however, I was able to find and interview Robert Lynn who prepared one of the appendices and provide me with some insight into the Commission’s workings.

The emphasis on social and cultural history greatly enriched our understanding of the American experience.

have on employment. Rather than dismiss the telegram entirely or even ask his staff to bring it to his attention after the negotiation completed, Reuther responded immediately. He wired Wiener and asked that they meet as soon as the negotiation was over. After Reuther successfully concluded the negotiation that resulted in the so-called “Treaty of Detroit,” he met with Wiener to outline a plan for warning the public about an automated future.

2. What do you wish you had known when you started writing your book that you know now?

Originally, I was hopeful to uncover minutes or staff notes from the meetings of the National Commission on Technology, Automation

3. How do you wish you could change your field?

I suspended my formal study of history after receiving a master’s in history from Duke in 1972. When I returned to graduate study in 2006, the field had dramatically and wonderfully changed. The emphasis on social and cultural history greatly enriched our understanding of the American experience. It was no longer the province of heroic white men, though indeed there were many of those. We delighted to find that inspiration could be found in the struggles of slaves, first generation immigrants, women, LGBTQ’s, the unemployed, et al. And we learned from these narratives the darker sides of our history that needed to be told.

THE
EXCERPT



**THE
PERFORMATIVE
STATE**

PUBLIC SCRUTINY AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA

IZA DING

STATECRAFT AS STAGECRAFT

The best fortress there is, is not to be hated by the people.

—Niccolò Machiavelli

On an unrecorded date in 77 BC, a first-time prosecutor named Gaius Julius Caesar brought charges of corruption against Gnaeus Cornelius Dolabella, eminent Roman consul under Sulla, former proconsul of Macedonia, and governor of Thracians.¹ The use of public office for personal enrichment was commonplace among Roman magistrates like Dolabella, but Caesar, twenty-three years of age and “of little achievement and from a poorly connected family,” decided to pursue him in what seemed certain to be a futile chase.² Facing up against two of Rome’s ablest and most seasoned orators, Quintus Hortensius and Caius Aurelius Cotta, the young Caesar perorated against corruption in front of a crowd of spectators. His elocution was lyrical, his moralism impeccable, his comportment immaculate, his stance steadfast.

The trial ended with Dolabella’s exoneration—an outcome Caesar himself must have anticipated and “may have wished for.”³ For it was not justice that Caesar was after. The dictator-to-be had an astute understanding of his audience, both in the Senate and on the Roman street. By targeting a prominent politician, Caesar drew the limelight to himself, and with limelight came the opportunity for power—what the ambitious young civil servant truly sought.⁴

There are many kinds of power—some secured by fear, others born out of love. Sixteen hundred years after the Dolabella trial, a political cognoscente from Florence advised a prince that when you cannot have both, it is better to be feared than loved.⁵ But before Caesar could be feared, he set out on a journey to amass the public’s love.⁶

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Not many details of the Dolabella trial survive, but few of its chroniclers failed to mention that Caesar's theatrical performance commanded the crowd's attention and assent, despite its failure at obtaining a conviction.⁷ Although his prosecution failed—and was doomed to fail—Caesar's performance smoothed his path to political power.

Upon his speech's popular success, Caesar published it for circulation. In the years to come he repeated similar spectacles—in court, in the senate, at funerals—whose outcomes were “less important for his own career than his personal performance.”⁸ It wasn't just any performance that won Caesar his fame. It was by consciously casting himself as “a politician working for the best interests of the people” that Caesar became “a friend of the people.”⁹ The theatrical quality of Caesar's political performances inspired Cicero to compare great orators to great actors.¹⁰

From Politicians to Bureaucrats

Political leaders like Julius Caesar who master the art of theatrical performance in pursuit of mass support can be found throughout history and in every corner of the world. Some, like Martin Luther King Jr., have put their charisma to noble purposes; others have taken history down dark paths.

Max Weber famously called this kind of power “charismatic authority.”¹¹ Passion and wonder are its main elements, discipline and routine are its main enemies. It promises its followers spiritual salvation even when it cannot provide material progress. It turns its willing audience into believers of the unbelievable. It reduces statecraft into stagecraft, giving birth to what Weber once critiqued, in his well-known lecture on “Politics as a Vocation,” as the “mere ‘power politician,’” who is “constantly in danger of becoming an actor . . . and of being concerned merely with the ‘impression’ he makes.”¹²

The same is not typically said of bureaucrats, another object of Weber's fascination. Bureaucrats have long been considered a very different kind of beast than politicians—even the opposite kind of beast. If charisma enchants, bureaucracy disenchants. If charisma improvises, bureaucracy plans. If charisma knows no discipline and follows no rules, bureaucracy knows only discipline and rules. If charisma offers marvel and transcendence, bureaucracy erects a “permanent structure” that is “oriented toward the satisfaction of calculable needs with ordinary, everyday means.”¹³ If charismatic authority feeds off the emotions of its followers, bureaucratic authority rests on “the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules.”¹⁴

This is why a “Weberian bureaucracy,” in present-day social science language, refers to an organization—be it an economic enterprise or administrative

agency—with distinctly “rational” features.¹⁵ Its most distinct markers include an official mission, hierarchy of authority, division of labor, esteem for technical expertise, and impersonal execution of rules. Unlike elected politicians, whose success rests on popularity, modern bureaucrats’ success is ostensibly measured by their ability to execute the responsibilities associated with their position. It therefore stands to reason that politicians frequently rely on the method of theatrical performance, while bureaucrats’ performance is geared toward the substantive.¹⁶

A critical assumption underlies these differences between what “performance” means for a pure politician and a pure bureaucrat: their main audience is different. For a politician it is the public, whereas for a bureaucratic “agent” it is their “principals.” Politicians derive their positions “from below,” and care for no prize more than the prize of popular support; bureaucrats derive their positions “from above,” and care for no audience more than the audience of their superior.¹⁷ According to this view, politicians need a stage like a fish needs water, whereas bureaucrats are but “a small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechanism,” “an appendage of the machine,” tucked away in a “shell as hard as steel” from the spotlight of public acclaim and acrimony.¹⁸

But what if this assumption does not always hold true? What happens when the bureaucratic apparatus of officialdom is captured in the light of public scrutiny? A theoretical possibility therefore presents itself: perhaps bureaucrats are not always the antithesis of performative politicians; perhaps their route of march is not so essentially fixed.

“Airpocalypse”

The theoretical prospect above came to empirical life when I began conducting fieldwork on China’s environmental governance in 2013. China presents itself as a land of bureaucrats: its leaders do not submit themselves to the popularity test of competitive elections, making its political system formally authoritarian. It can be said that bureaucracy and authoritarianism are natural bedfellows, given their shared hallmark of hierarchy.¹⁹ Bureaucracies typically operate in authoritarian fashion, with neither their top leaders popularly elected nor their decisions made by majority rule. This is why the terms *bureaucratic* and *authoritarian* are often used interchangeably as monikers for the Chinese state—in both its modern and imperial guises.²⁰

For all its bureaucratic and authoritarian features, China paradoxically also presents an array of ideas and practices that stand opposed to bureaucracy and authoritarianism. A polity devoid of Schumpeterian democracy (as defined by

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competitive elections for peak political office) can nevertheless exhibit considerable responsiveness to the public. This has been expressed inside China through Rousseauian theories of participatory democracy, Marxist theories of substantive democracy, Maoist notions of antibureaucratism, and the concept of deliberative democracy.²¹ Attempts to realize these ideals fall short of democracy in practice.²² But the idea that the Chinese system selectively tolerates and even invites public participation is undeniable.²³

Public pressure was especially pronounced and influential on the issue of environmental pollution in 2013, around the time I began fieldwork for this study. It was a year when pollution in China reigned in the headlines, making it a problem the party-state could not easily ignore.

Although environmental concerns have always existed in China, and environmental governance has never been absent, multiple events have pushed pollution to the foreground of public attention in recent decades.²⁴ At the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, some foreign athletes reported respiratory complaints.²⁵ That same year, the American Embassy in Beijing installed a rooftop air quality monitor and tweeted out hourly updates of Particulate Matter 2.5 ($PM_{2.5}$) levels.²⁶ (Twitter was not yet blocked in China.) Beijing's longstanding mysterious fog was henceforth recognized by the wider public as "smog" (*wumai*), which could now be discerned and measured with concrete numbers.²⁷ News reporting ramped up in subsequent years, culminating in another critical event: headlines in January 2013 announcing the arrival of an "airpocalypse" in Beijing after pollution blasted through the upper limits of air quality meters.²⁸

Less than two months later, a story about "rivers of blood" stunned the citizenry. Images of dead pigs floating down the Huangpu River, which runs through Shanghai and supplies the city's tap water, dominated the news cycle.²⁹ It was soon discovered that farmers in upstream provinces had been dumping diseaseridden hog carcasses into the river. That March, authorities fished out more than ten thousand dead pigs from the Huangpu.

In the following years, news agencies inside and outside China churned out headline after headline about "cancer villages," "toxic running tracks," and "poisonous rice," with no end in sight.³⁰

Pollution exacts palpable damage on public health. A widely cited 2010 Global Burden of Disease study found that air pollution was contributing to about a million premature deaths in China each year.³¹ A 2017 University of Chicago study found that air pollution had reduced the life expectancy of Chinese citizens by an average of 3.5 years.³²

The public outcry over pollution was loud and clear. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the number of environmental complaints nationwide

increased by 53 percent, and the number of environmental protests increased by 29 percent annually.³³ In my own 2015 national urban survey (covered in chapter 4), 79 percent of respondents reported that they would choose pollution control over economic development if the two desiderata were to come into conflict, and about two-thirds of the respondents expressed a willingness to join environmental protests. When *Under the Dome*, a documentary about air pollution, was released online in 2015, it was played more than a billion times in a single day, unleashing a perfect storm of Internet clamor. Pundits called it China's "Silent Spring" moment.³⁴

China's Environmental State

This gathering outcry dragged an introverted bureaucracy and its street-level bureaucrats into the spotlight. Facing an environmentally conscious and contentious public willing to challenge the "mandate of heaven," how does the state cope? Can the state redeem itself on one of the hardest public policy problems it has ever faced? To answer these questions, I traveled to the belly of China's environmental state and participated in the organizational life of a municipal environmental protection bureau (EPB).

The Chinese EPB is one of the many agencies that form the organs and limbs of China's bureaucratic state. This agency consists of a national-level ministry—called the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) when this study started, and renamed the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) in 2018—and subordinate EPBs (renamed the Ecology and Environment Bureau in 2018) at the provincial, municipal, and county levels. Authority emanates downward from the national ministry to the provincial agencies, and from the provincial agencies to municipal and county bureaus. The MEP/MEE's main organizational mission is to establish rules and practices for environmental protection and to implement environmental policies, laws, and regulations.³⁵

My main research site was Lakeville, a city in the Yangtze River Delta.³⁶ Given the city's relative wealth compared to the national average, and overall reputation for good governance, I expected to find best practices in the form of strict enforcement of environmental regulations there. But as I will detail in chapter 3, my initial expectations quickly fell apart once I entered the field. Day in and day out, my participant observation at the Lakeville EPB revealed that best practices were hard to come by. Despite its very Weberian appearance—and to some extent, substance—the EPB was incapable of performing its primary mandate, that is, to enforce environmental regulations on the city's thousands of polluting enterprises.

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This realization was at first puzzling. After all, China is not only known for its environmental pollution but also for the bold strides it has taken in pollution control in recent years. From the “blunt-force” closure of factories to massive investment in renewable energy, to the ambitious rollout of a national cap and trade system, to the dramatic blanket ban on coal furnaces in northern regions (a policy that was quickly reversed), China’s state-led environmentalism has been as pronounced as its pollution problems.³⁷ Some have even critiqued China’s recent environmental advances as “coercive environmentalism.”³⁸

Paradoxically, authority over environmental policies is beyond the reach of street-level bureaucrats. Working under every potential “policy entrepreneur,” who tirelessly advocates for improving environmental regulations, is a throng of “policy proletarians,” whose energy is devoted toward operating rather than changing the system.³⁹ Behind every dramatic enforcement campaign and substantive policy change lies the less visible reality of everyday governance. Since economic growth still relies on many polluting industries and energy-intensive consumption, environmental concerns usually take a back seat to accommodate more pressing economic needs. Street-level bureaucrats responsible for everyday governance thus find themselves in a situation where they are accountable for something largely outside their control.

If street-level bureaucrats have little control over either making environmental policies or fixing environmental damage, we should naturally expect to see inaction. But bureaucrats at the Lakeville EPB were not dragging their feet, sitting back, or muddling through, as beleaguered bureaucrats are commonly expected to while away their hours on the clock.⁴⁰ The dearth of substantive governance manifested not as *inactivity* but, surprisingly, as *hyperactivity*.

Moreover, their actions deviated from the archetype of modern bureaucrats and started to resemble those of elected politicians, even in a political regime that is by definition bereft of them. After all, as Weber himself emphasized, ideal types are starting points rather than stopping points.⁴¹ They are methodological anchorages from which our analysis departs, with the very purpose of observing how “actual action[s]” deviate from them.⁴² And indeed, the theoretical distinctions between the two pure types of officialdom were coming undone before my eyes, at the street level.

Performative Governance

Pushed to the front of public attention but armed with little authority, bureaucratic behavior takes on an underappreciated dimension—a *performative* dimension. Instead of being inert, environmental bureaucrats were constantly on the

THREE QUESTIONS WITH PATRICIA STRACH & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN authors of *The Politics of Trash*

1. What inspired you to write this book?

Researchers and media sources alike point to politics at the federal or state level, positioning politics as something that takes place far removed from residents' day-to-day lives. However, politics is right in front of people daily. We wanted to shed light on everyday politics to understand what resources governments rely on to accomplish their objectives.

2. How will your book make a difference?

Our book has broader implications for our field









undemocratic resources were part and parcel of how many policies were created and implemented, giving us pause to equate political development with modernization. Corruption, gender hierarchy, and racial inequality are all enlisted in the early days of municipal garbage collection and were “baked” into institutional development.

“We bring a local focus to American political development, which has often been dominated by national institutions.”

of study. First, we bring a local focus to American political development, which has often been dominated by national institutions. Local governments are the most common form of government with a distinct set of responsibilities that affect individuals' lives directly, from water treatment to street paving to sanitation. Second, our research shows how government power is involved in seemingly local, mundane public services—like trash collection-- rendering it nearly invisible. Compliance seems like personal behavior rather than a controversial political project, as it was at its creation. Third, we find that governments rely not only formal resources—public officials and administrative capacities of existing institutions—but also informal resources such as corruption as well as gender and racial hierarchies. These

3. What will attract your colleagues in the field to your book?


The importance of local government in American political development and the endurance of inequality in spite of political development.



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
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
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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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



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

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
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THE
EXCERPT



Introduction

Jonathan Kirshner and Peter J. Katzenstein

Everything comes to an end.

—Carmella Soprano, *The Sopranos*

In 1945, the United States, in concert with Britain and other affiliated states, set the foundations for an international economic order and mechanisms of global governance. Present in the minds of the creators of that new order were the ruins of the old. The 1930s had exposed the failures of capitalism left to its own devices, and the international economy descended into closure and chaos, contributing to the cataclysm that was World War II. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt observed in his 1945 State of the Union Address, although the war was approaching its successful completion, victory would leave still much left to accomplish. “In our disillusionment after the last war we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not see and think exactly as we did,” he lectured. “We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfill our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world. We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow the same tragic road again.”¹ After a dismal thirty years—war, depression, and war—the architects of a new order, with these memories fresh and haunting, sought to build something different, resilient, and durable. From the vantage point of those moments of creation in the late 1940s, the American-led order, despite its visible and often profound blemishes, was successful to an extent that would have been far beyond the most wildly optimistic hopes of its founders. And now, it looks to us, this all might be over.

Distinctive of the American order was a tight coupling of political and economic liberalism. After 1945 many states supported economic liberalism. But

INTRODUCTION

they were unwilling to sign up for political liberalism. American hegemony and widespread support for the United States' "empire by invitation" in western Europe made the coupling of political with economic liberalism the defining trait of the Atlantic world.² A generation later, in the 1980s, Japan as America's looming rival subscribed to the main tenets of political liberalism. As was the case in Sweden, this one-party-dominant system shared many more traits with political liberalism than with any of the other models in the Second or Third World.³ By 2020, as the importance of the Atlantic world recedes and a multiregional, global system emerges, the end of the American order points to a return to the looser coupling of economic and political liberalism that characterized the years immediately following World War II.

Embedded and Neoliberal American Orders

We define the American order as the international system largely orchestrated by the United States from 1945 to 2020. Forged by the United States in the global ruins of World War II, the American order was improvised at its origins and far from coherent, and it retained domestic and international elements that were antithetical to liberalism, often profoundly so. We nevertheless describe that order as a liberal one, if necessarily bearing the untidy and idiosyncratic markings inherent to both economic and political liberalism. Stretching across three-quarters of a century, the American order unfolded in two different phases, each marked by different political contexts and distinct material and ideational underpinnings, interrupted by an interregnum lasting from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s.

The first American order flourished for a quarter of century after 1945. Even as the United States exercised far-sighted global leadership, and, especially from the late 1940s through the early 1960s, cheerfully bore a disproportionate share of the burdens of international leadership, long-standing and enduring instincts of isolationism and unilateralism remained part of the American disposition. Recall, for example, the failure of the US Senate to agree to the originally envisioned International Trade Organization, or the considerable strength of the isolationist wing of the Republican Party in 1952—it was only with the Party's nomination of Dwight Eisenhower that America's bipartisan, internationalist consensus was fully formed to support the first American order.

The first order gave way to an untidy interregnum lasting about fifteen years from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s). The first order unraveled during the stagflation of the 1970s, marked by rampant inflation, increasing unemployment, low economic growth, two oil shocks, and the American abdication of

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the Bretton Woods international monetary regime. At the time many observers saw in all this the end of US hegemony, because it was attendant with the apparent rise of Soviet military power and foreign policy assertiveness and the spectacular growth of the Japanese economy.⁴ Others emphasized continuity in the extraordinary attributes of the American colossus, though admitting that it was limping through a difficult decade. As Susan Strange observed, “To decide one August morning that dollars can no longer be converted into gold was a progression from exorbitant privilege to super-exorbitant privilege.”⁵ President Richard Nixon suddenly slammed shut the “gold window,” but the world still ran on dollars.⁶ The United States had simply shrugged off the modest constraints that had accompanied its position as the issuer of the world’s currency while transferring state control over currency values to market forces. Nevertheless, from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s the American order was adrift. It was also the period when the postwar practice of “Keynesianism” was largely discredited. It mattered little that this widespread delegitimation, as Raymond Aron observed at the time, tended to overlook the fact that “the ideas derived by postwar governments from [Keynes’s] *The General Theory* were only vaguely attributable to the author of that book.”⁷ A shift back toward pre-Keynesian economic orthodoxy was a crucial development in these hinge years, buttressing a more conservative politics and economics.

The second American order emerged in the early 1990s in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Japanese miracle, and the resurgence of the US economy. This order was characterized by its embrace of unrestrained market fundamentalism and the aggressive promotion of globalization—especially in finance. The consensus for that disposition was not as strong as during the 1950s, the initial decade of the first order. In the 1990s the right posed repeated challenges, as the end of the Cold War left uncertain as to what the purpose of American power could and should be in its aftermath. (The first post-Cold War US presidential election, in 1992, witnessed the rise of the nativist, insurgent candidacies of Patrick Buchanan and Ross Perot.) And by the end of the 1990s the Left was increasingly opposed to some of the policies that helped support the American order, as international competition placed new pressures on traditional, labor-intensive sectors of the US economy. But the center held as the Democratic Party, loser of five of the previous six presidential elections, lurched rightward and propelled the second American order. In the twenty-first century, the hollowing out of American society through the trauma of two long, unsuccessful wars, a global financial crisis and its grueling aftermath, and the ever-widening gaps between the wealthy and the rest, led to a resurgence of the populist backlash that had bubbled to the surface decades before. It is possible to protest that the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016 was a fluke.

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But his nomination, steamrolling through the establishment of the Republican Party while articulating positions that trampled on its core principles was clear evidence of a sea change in American politics heralding the end of the second American order. So was the fact that a fringe candidate, an obscure Socialist from Vermont, nearly wrested the Democratic nomination from the formidable, party-backed candidate. Similarly, despite Trump's loss in the 2020 presidential election, there is little evidence to suggest that anything short of a tectonic shift has taken place in the American domestic political disposition, and one that will shape the nation's prospects for international leadership and engagement.

This book's primary focus is on different forms of economic liberalism. Classical economic liberalism refers to the nineteenth-century notion of unrestrained market forces. We associate the period from roughly 1947 to the early 1970s with the practice of "embedded liberalism." This is a reference to a seminal article by John Ruggie.⁸ The institutions of the postwar economic order were designed to encourage a thriving and growing international economy, but with buffers that were intended to permit various domestic social practices and purposes. The "liberalism" of Ruggie's embedded liberalism was thus classically defined—the play of free market forces—which, however, were not totally unrestrained but were embedded (or reembedded, if Karl Polanyi is to be believed) in varieties of local social purposes.⁹ In this volume the phrase "embedded liberalism" refers to both domestic and international arrangements from 1947 to the early 1970s.¹⁰ In this first era the influence of John Maynard Keynes was at its peak. Keynes helped design the postwar international institutions that aspired to steer a middle course between the unfettered play of free market forces that led to disaster in the late 1920s and the often authoritarian and state-centric experiments of the 1930s.

"Neoliberalism" refers to a turn toward the market understood in classical economic, "liberal" terms. With roots extending back to the 1930s and foreshadowed by some policies of the Carter Administration in the 1970s, it emerged full blown in the 1980s and is most notably associated with the reigns of Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. But it endured well into the 2000s. In different states and markets it arrived at different moments and took different forms. It affected both domestic and international politics. The erosion of the embedded liberal order was accelerated, as Ruggie anticipated, not by real economic changes but by the unraveling of the normative consensus that supported it. The neoliberal turn was facilitated by the deregulation of global finance, just as Keynes feared (and would have predicted). Thus, in terms of economics, the first American order reflected the principles and practices of embedded liberalism; the second order reflected those of neoliberalism.

These different American orders, spanning seventy-five years, were, in broad brush, liberal.¹¹ Liberalism, of course, is a contested and perhaps inherently

contestable political concept that lends itself to a wide range of views. This volume does not impose a uniform definition or interpretation on its authors. According to most familiar conceptions of the term, political liberalism includes dispositional tolerance, wariness of concentrations of public and private power, freedom of expression, and the primacy of law over leaders. Of course, the behavior of the United States commonly fell far short of these aspirations. It is certainly the case that in practice, the United States engaged in ghastly illiberal conduct: its wars in Vietnam and Iraq, intimate political relationships with unsavory and even neofascist regimes, and the endurance of profoundly illiberal, racist policies at home, to name a but few. Liberalism, like all politics, cannot escape from dirtying its hands.

Nevertheless, we choose to characterize the American order against plausible counterfactual worlds—what came before, what might otherwise have been, and what might emerge in the future—as opposed to judging it against an idealized vision of the what liberalism aspires to be. By that more modest metric, the American postwar order was indeed a liberal order. And as that order ends, it cedes the stage to a more diverse international system increasingly populated by varieties of authoritarian nationalisms. In this new global order, what will be the balance between political and economic forms of liberalism and other alternatives? And on which side of the scale will America put its considerable weight?

Preview

Jonathan Kirshner details in chapter 1 Keynes's search for a distinct "middle way" between *laissez-faire* and collectivism. Keynes himself was neither a traditional liberal nor a man of the left. He wrote that in a class war he would fight on the side of the educated bourgeoisie. Sharing many Hayekian philosophical positions, he was a reluctant planner.¹² The "new order" he helped build differed dramatically from the nightmarish one the Nazis attempted to fashion in the 1930s and 1940s. In an uncoordinated fashion, Keynes's ideas helped restart the engine of capitalist growth in war-torn Europe after 1945 and helped build an eventually thriving international economy. "The purpose of embedded liberalism," writes Kirshner, "was to permit the practice of the middle way."¹³ Of central importance were the taming of finance and national control of destabilizing movements of speculative capital. In addition, Keynesianism was helped along by the horrific memories of the 1930s and 1940s, America's economic exceptionalism in the 1950s and 1960s, and the restraining influence of the Cold War on the predatory instincts of the money-making classes. The weakening of these conditions over time, the sour experience of the stagflation of the 1970s, and the fantasy of an economy

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characterized by risk, not uncertainty (nourished by the ascendance of clever but hollow rational expectations theory) initiated the era of uncontrolled capital movement and financialization that collapsed in and was resuscitated after 2008. What comes after the total rupture of 2020 nobody knows. Even if Keynes, Keynesianism, and the middle way will not reappear in anything like the form we encountered them before, the radical uncertainty that he recognized as constitutive of much of economic life continues to be with us. Kirshner's chapter introduces two of the key themes that many of the chapters touch on. Was embedded liberalism sustainable? And did its erosion contribute to the political backlashes that Keynes's middle way had been designed to resist?

The creation of what Mark Blyth calls in chapter 2 the first American order looks preordained only in hindsight. It was, in fact, a jerry-built, accidental arrangement that could have easily failed in its first decade. American interests dictated final outcomes on issues such as a global currency and provisions for liquidity in times of need. If there was a driver in all of this it was not the far-sighted policies of a benevolent hegemon but security policy and anticommunism in an intensifying Cold War. Improvisation¹⁴ and an "anti-anarchy struggle" defined the early years of the Cold War.¹⁵ Not so in domestic politics. By 1948 the American version of embedded liberalism had been installed and was supported by an array of political forces enjoying a win-win game.


With Kirshner and Abdelal, Blyth situates the second American order as a reaction to the perceived failure of the first as manifested by the calamitous 1970s. The partial decommodification of labor under a full-employment regime created a backlash by social forces favoring greater reliance on market forces. Keynesian ideas gave way to monetarist dogma. The social purpose of the second order shifted from promoting full employment to disciplining labor, creating price stability, and restoring returns on capital investment and the capital/labor share of the gross domestic product that had slipped since the 1960s. Eventually, the success of these policies favoring capital brought about the financial crisis and the Great Recession. Since 2008 reforms have remained modest and partial, falling well short of creating a new social purpose. Instead, a massive influx of public liquidity stabilized the second order without addressing any of its underlying dysfunctions. Trumpist populism and the explosion of the Black Lives Matter movement during the COVID-19 epidemic in the spring and summer of 2020 set the stage for the emergence of something new, the contours of which remain indistinct. Blyth argues that "nationalism with loose money" may come to replace "globalism with tight money" as one feature of a new pluralist and neonationalist order serving a variety of social purposes. That order, Blyth claims, will remain American because of the



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
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
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


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
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
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
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