Right Wing Populism

In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 81 percent of American evangelicals voted for right-wing populist Donald Trump. Since his election, evangelical support has not dropped below 65 percent. These numbers argue for an affinity between Trump and evangelical belief. While this may be the case, this paper argues that those beliefs are not the religious beliefs associated with evangelical activism (opposition to abortion and gay marriage for instance). After sketching a rubric that allows us to justify calling a movement populist, the article explores the historico-cultural materiel from which American right-populism draws its worldview and policies: most importantly, a robust, democratic localism and wariness of  central authority. Under economic or "way of life'" duress, these may become the ground for the binarized "us-them" politics associated with right populist movements. Finally, the article traces a parallel wariness of central government, which has special traction among evangelicals for theological and religio-historical reasons. Evangelical support for the small-government-ism of the Republican party and right populism is thus not a Faustian bargain, where evangelicals are indifferent to economic and political positions but support them in return for Republican support on religious matters. Rather, evangelicals are drawn to their own traditional beliefs in a self-reliant, Tocquevillian republic unmolested by an over-reaching government and other potentially disruptive intruders. This, in addition to more narrowly religious issues (abortion, gay marriage) helps explain evangelical support for the Republican party and Trump. The article closes with a look at the vocal minority of evangelicals who oppose him.

Right-wing populism in its relationship with the refugee movement was the topic of the roundtable organized by the UTE in the context of the Conflict Zones network programme. The attempt was to focus on the reactions registered all around Europe in response to the recent massive migration of the refugees. This direction was forced to encounter a moral and civil urgency: the whole debate had to be contextualized in the light of the horrible attacks that had taken place in Paris just the night before.

The tone of the conversation was set on a highly (though solid) theoretical level, rather than on a practical line of work. I tried to further investigate some aspects interviewing Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Westminster, London.

In 1997 lanceerde Fareed Zakaria het concept ‘illiberale democratie’ in Foreign Affairs. Hij maakte hierin onderscheid tussen liberalisme enerzijds en democratie anderzijds. Volgens Zakaria was dit onderscheid nodig omdat de termen democratie en liberale democratie vaak door elkaar heen worden gebruikt, terwijl liberale democratie een systeem is dat niet alleen wordt gekenmerkt door vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen, maar ook door een rechtsstaat, scheiding der machten en de bescherming van basisrechten als vrijheid van meningsuiting, vereniging, religie en bezit.
De theorie is nauwelijks toegepast op Israël, terwijl zich daar het afgelopen decennium wel degelijk een illiberalisering heeft voltrokken. Die lacune wordt in dit onderzoek opgevuld. Centraal in dit onderzoek staat de vraag wat de implicaties zijn van de illiberalisering van de democratie in Israël tussen 2009 en 2018, onderverdeeld in respectievelijk de rechtsstaat, het maatschappelijk middenveld en rechten van minderheden. Naast geschreven bronnen is daarbij gebruik gemaakt van semigestructureerde interviews. Gesprekken met experts zijn bepalend geweest voor de opbouw van het onderzoek en hebben bijgedragen aan de diepgang van de analyse, wat gezien de gevoeligheid van het onderwerp en het feit dat het over een zeer recente periode gaat belangrijk is geweest. Ook dwongen de gesprekken om tussentijds te reflecteren op de methodologie.
Gebaseerd op de theorie en de historische ontwikkeling die Israël heeft doorgemaakt, kunnen de ontwikkelingen op de deelgebieden rechtsstaat, maatschappelijk middenveld en rechten van minderheden op waarde worden geschat. Het leidt tot de conclusie dat illiberalisering in een kwetsbare democratie als Israël vergaande implicaties heeft. Nog een kabinetsperiode illiberaal beleid kan ertoe leiden dat de democratie in Israël verwordt tot nauwelijks meer dan een lege huls.

The article examines how academic teaching in geography can stimulate critical perspectives in times of an omnipresent political shift to the right and how it can intervene in processes of polarization of urban societies in emancipatory ways. For this purpose, experiences from two research-led seminars in Chemnitz and Berlin are reflected in dialogue. The article also discusses potentials of different approaches using participatory and transformative methodologies in geographical research and teaching, such as action research and urban transition labs.

This article views ‘populism’ as an ideology, the key features of which are identified and briefly discussed. Having assessed the extent to which such features match the profile of the Swiss Lega dei Ticinesi, the author concludes that this party should be seen as a paradigmatic embodiment of populism due to: a) the party’s uneasiness with representative democracy; b) the crucial role played by the concept of the ‘people’ in its propaganda; c) the power of the leader within the organisation; and d) the party’s chameleon-like tendency to borrow keywords and ideas from both sides of the political divide.

Keine Partei ist in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gegenwärtig so umstritten wie die AfD, deren bekanntestes Gesicht der Hamburger Ökonom Bernd Lucke ist.

Aber was verbirgt sich hinter Programm und Personen der AfD? Ist diese Partei tatsächlich „rechtspopulistisch“ und vertritt das Spektrum rechter Bürgerbewegungen wie PEGIDA, wie ihre KritikerInnen meinen? Oder füllt die AfD nur eine Lücke, die CDU/CSU und FDP am (wert-)konservativen Rand der „bürgerlichen Mitte“ hinterlassen haben? Warum entstand eine Partei wie die AfD erst im Schatten der Eurokrise und nicht schon früher?

Dieses Buch untersucht Personal, Struktur, Programm und Politik der AfD. Ihre Kernforderungen werden untersucht und ihre bisherige inhaltliche Entwicklung nachgezeichnet. Es wird erörtert, warum viele Forderungen und Losungen der AfD auf breite Zustimmung in der Bevölkerung treffen – nicht nur bei „rechten“ WählerInnen, sondern weit darüber hinaus. Diskutiert wird, welche Erfolgschancen diese Partei hat, und welche Auswirkungen die AfD auf das Parteiensystem Deutschlands haben könnte.

Schließlich bietet das Buch erste Anregungen, wie eine politische Auseinandersetzung mit der AfD geführt und wie sie nicht betrieben werden sollte.

Özet
İnternetin günlük hayatta kullanımının yaygınlaşmasıyla birlikte sosyal medya, egemen olmayan grupların
kendi sözlerini söyleyebilecekleri demokratik bir mecra hâline dönüşme potansiyeli gösterirken, sağ grupların
nefret söylemini yaymak için sıkça kullandıkları bir alan hâlini de almaktadır. Nefret söylemi, bu makale kapsamında,
bir gruba ya da grup üyelerine yönelik hoşgörüsüzlüğü ve tahammülsüzlüğü kışkırtan düşmanca tavır
ve ifadelerin tümü olarak tanımlanmıştır. Sosyal medya kullanıcıları her gün etnik köken, dinsel inanç, cinsiyet
kimliği ya da cinsel yönelim, politik görüş ve aidiyet gibi özellikleri nedeniyle ırkçı, yabancı/göçmen düşmanı,
homofobik, transfobik, antisemit ve benzeri her türlü ayrımcı söylem ve sözel saldırıya maruz kalmaktadırlar.
Tüm dünyada aşırı sağ, alternatif sağ, popülist sağ gibi isimlerle adlandırılan ama içeriği bilinen eski usul ırkçı,
faşizan sağdan tamamen farklı olmayan hareketlerin yükseliyor oluşu, sosyal medyayı bu söylemin üretilmesi
ve dağıtılması için verimli bir alan hâline getirmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’de sağ popülizmin temel
unsurları üzerinden sosyal medyada üretilen nefret söylemini gündelik örnekler üzerinden tartışmaktır.
Abstract
In conjunction with the widespread use of the Internet in everyday life, social media, which had a potential for
being a democratic channel for the non-dominant groups, has become commonplace for the right-wing groups
to spread hate speech. In this article, hate speech is defined as the hostile attitudes and expressions that provoke
prejudice and intolerance towards a group or group of people. Social media users are exposed to racist, xenophobic,
homophobic, transphobic, anti-Semitic, as well as anti-immigrant discourses, discriminatory speeches,
and verbal attacks every day because of their ethnicities, religious beliefs, gender identities, sexual orientations
or political opinions. The rise of the right-wing movements -one may call them extreme right, alternative right
or populist right, which are not inherently different from the old school racist and fascistic right ideology- makes
the social media a convenient space for the production and distribution of this discourse. The purpose of this
study is to discuss the examples of the hate speech in social media based upon the common notions of the right
populism in Turkey.

Parlando di populismo in Italia, dal dicembre 2013 ci si sofferma spesso sulla figura di Matteo Salvini, leader della Lega Nord (poi semplicemente Lega, vista la nuova vocazione "nazionale") e, nel 2018-2019, mini-stro dell'interno. È una figura senz'altro centrale, gli abbiamo dedicato non poche analisi, ma spesso si sor-vola o si relega sullo sfondo la figura di Giorgia Meloni, leader di Fratelli d'Italia. Questa analisi "salvinicentrica" da parte del grosso dei mass media è legata al fatto che la Lega di Matteo Salvini, dal 3% ereditato dall'ultima gestione bossiano-maroniana, è balzata sopra il 30%, il che lo rende un fenomeno di interesse politologico; nel nostro caso ci si è soffermati sul Carroccio-ma le nostre riflessioni partono già dai primi anni ottanta, quando esistevano soltanto le leghe regionaliste nell'Italia settentrionale, da cui nascerà prima la lista unica regionalista Alleanza Nord (1989), poi la Lega Nord (1991)-per i legami intellettuali di lungo corso con diversi settori politico-militanti radicalismo di destra (la redazione del mensi-le milanese Orion di Maurizio Murelli o la destra intellettuale di stampo etno-identitario) e della nouvelle droite legata al filosofo Alain de Benoist. Fratelli d'Italia, invece, sembrava rimanere sullo sfondo, in secondo piano, come una sorta di 'scopiazzatu-ra' ora del leghismo salviniano-ma incapace di attrarre i consensi di soggetti neofascisti come CasaPound Italia-ora del Front national francese, dove una donna come Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, occupa lo spa-zio centrale da noi occupato dal Carroccio. Ma ora questo partito nazional-conservatore italiano, erede in parte di Alleanza nazionale, del vecchio Msi-Destra nazionale ma capace di attrarre parte di quella "destra sociale" che non si era riconosciuto sta gradualmente ascendendo nei consensi, passando dal 4% di inizio le-gislatura a circa il 10,6% nel dicembre 2019. Avremo anche noi, come si chiedono alcuni giornali, una premier donna di destra? E' il caso di analizzare l'ascesa di Fratelli d'Italia, le similitudini e le differenze con la Lega, i suoi legami con il populismo occidentale liberista e le ambiguità, come nel partito di Salvini, in poli-tica estera. Fratelli d'Italia: dal "centrodestra nazionale" al "conservatorismo social-sovranista" Nato nel dicembre 2012 da una scissione di destra del Popolo delle libertà, il partito unico del centrodestra che univa Forza Italia di Silvio Berlusconi, Alleanza nazionale di Gianfranco Fini e altri soggetti minori, Fra-telli d'Italia (originalmente seguito dall'etichetta Centrodestra nazionale) viene guidato dal triumvirato Cro-setto-La Russa-Meloni. Nasce in parziale opposizione al totale appiattimento della componente maggioritaria (sostanzialmente post-forzista, anche se non mancano componenti riconducibili ad An, come Maurizio Ga-sparri, ex colonnello di Fini e leader con Ignazio La Russa della corrente filoberlusconiana "Destra protago-nista", che seguiranno il leader del Pdl Berlusconi) alle posizioni defazioniste e pro-austerità del governo Monti. La scissione, vista l'assenza di dialettica interna al partito unico del centrodestra e l'annullamento delle primarie, è preceduta il 16 dicembre 2012 dal varo della la convention Primarie delle Idee, che porta i "ribelli" ad animare il nuovo partito di destra, che nel giro di un anno e mezzo adotta come 'nuovo' simbolo, dopo quello di un 'nodo tricolore' che aveva effettivamente poco appeal, al vecchi stemma missino e di An: la fiamma tricolore, che comparirà nel 2014, dopo che La Russa e Alemanno propongono che la Fondazione Alleanza nazionale conceda l'utilizzo del logo di An a Fd'I. Adesso, dopo il congresso di Trieste, ogni riferi-mento ad An scompare. Resta solo la fiamma, ma senza la base trapezoidale con scritto «Msi». 1 1 La riproduzione nel logo di Fratelli d'Italia della "fiamma tricolore"-presente nello stemma del piccolo Movimento sociale Fiamma tricolore, il partito fondato nel 1995 da Pino Rauti e da quanti si erano opposti, nel Msi, alla svolta di Fiuggi, ma soprattutto nel Front national prima e nel Rassemblament national oggi-è senz'altro scelto per attrarre, ol-tre a l'area moderata nazional-conservatrice, i vecchi militanti di An delusi del Pdl, nonché frange della "destra sociale" extraparlamentare ex missina. Quando il 26 dicembre 1946 nacque il Msi, fu scelto dai fondatori di utilizzare la fiamma tricolore come logo del "partito dei reduci" perché rappresentava il risorgere dello spirito fascista dalla bara della Rsi, rappresentata dal trapezio rosso sottostante. Inoltre la sigla "Msi" sarebbe l'acronimo di "Mussolini" o, secondo le voci di alcuni vecchi militanti, le iniziali di Mussolini Sempre Immortale. Verrà accantonata non solo con la nascita del Pdl, ma per la prima volta nel 1999, quando alle elezioni europee Alleanza Nazionale si presenta con il Patto Segni, una coa-lizione liberaldemocratica facente riferimento al leader referendario Mario Segni, un'alleanza che si presentò con un unico simbolo, un tondo con i nomi dei due partiti più il simbolo di un elefantino, esplicito richiamo al Partito repubbli-cano statunitense, sul cui modello Fini e Segni avevano infatti intenzione di promuovere la nascita di un grande partito liberale di centrodestra. Sarà un flop (la lista otterrà il 10,3%, con appena 3milioni di voti) e fu archiviata, portando al ritorno di An.

Over the last decade, the main area of sustained populist growth has been Western Europe, with populist movements reaching new heights in countries such as France, Italy, Austria and Holland. Twenty-First Century Populism analyses this phenomenon by looking at the conditions facilitating the emergence and success of populism in specific national contexts and then examining why populism has flourished or floundered in those countries. The book also discusses the degree to which populism has affected mainstream politics in Western Europe and examines the inter-relationship between populism, political parties, the media and democracy. Containing chapters by a series of country experts and renowned political scientists from across the continent, this volume is the first to offer an in-depth account of the reasons behind the populist wave in twenty-first century Europe.

http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/TwentyFirst-Century-Populism/?K=9780230013490

Ein Sportstück (1998) is by no means the first of Elfriede Jelinek’s works to have dealt with the theme of sport.  It is merely the publication in which sport receives its most central treatment. This article interprets Jelinek’s deployment of sport and its intersection with sociological, philosophical, and dramaturgical theories of sport.  Jelinek’s writing can be seen to engage with sport in a series of interconnections with the media, religion, gender, and with the social and political dimensions of the practice and spectacle of sport.  In Elfriede Jelinek, sport is not the civilizing force of Eliasian social enquiry,  but the embodiment of war in peacetime and, ultimately, a symptom of proto-fascist enthusiasm for the strong, healthy body and condemnation of the weak and the sick. This latter perspective gains an Austrian dimension in Jelinek’s critique of the current political situation in Austria and the growth in popularity of the right-wing, populist party, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), with its fit, telegenic former leader, Jörg Haider.

Vladimir Putin's Russia meets the classical definition of fascist state, says Maria Snegovaya, except for one factor-the Kremlin can't yet unite the public around a clearly articulated nationalist ideology. This missing piece constrains the aggressiveness of the state. Without it, the Russian people will not accept fighting foreign wars indefinitely.

Studies point to the positive role Twitter can play in social justice campaigns. Using Critical Discourse Analysis, this paper looks in detail at one such case: a racist call-out in Canada, which trended on Twitter in many countries leading to its coverage in mainstream media outlets. It had the characteristics, labelled at the time by critics, of ‘cancel culture’, where there were calls for sackings and boycotts. This analysis demonstrates that there should be caution in regard to how social media platforms such as Twitter are able to lead in such matters of social justice. The paper shows how its affordances can work against coherent and careful discussion, fostering fast, simplified, contradictory commentary, where individual tweets load a range of different concerns onto a specific instance. In this particular case, this results in an individualization of racism, which therefore becomes decontextualized and depoliticized. While those tweeting revel in and enjoy their shared moral position, actual endemic structural racism in society remains invisible, and they misrepresent, arguably, the key question that this racist outburst raises.

One of the earliest academic studies of the phenomenon of "eco-fascism", or as I termed it, "Right-Wing Ecology." The book is now out of print, but as I've gotten a number of requests for it, I'm putting out the first two chapters of the book here.

Vortrag online: https://youtu.be/s3EA_uww0iQ
Die Proteste von "Querdenken" und anderen gegen die Corona-Schutzmaßnahmen haben nicht nur zu einer massiven Verbreitung von im Kern häufig antisemitischen Verschwörungslegenden geführt, sondern waren und sind auch häufig durch einen deutlichen Geschichtsrevisionismus geprägt, indem die NS-Verbrechen durch ahistorische Gleichsetzungen instrumentalisiert und zugleich verharmlost werden. Prof. Dr. Jens-Christian Wagner, Direktor der Stiftung Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora, geht in seinem Vortrag den damit verbundenen Geschichtsbildern auf den Grund.

The paper argues that the political effect of the Covid 19 pandemic of 2020 needs to be viewed in the light of the fragility of democracy and its vulnerability to illiberal populist alternatives.  The pandemic is further exacerbating the delegitimation of political and cultural elites and institutions.  At the same time, the fear and resentment it breeds fuels popular confusion, discontent and the consequent openness to non-democratic alternatives.

[An abbreviated version appeared on MarketWatch.Com: The Wall Street Journal Digital Network Sept 11, 2020]

The electoral growth of several ‘anti-political establishment parties’
in Europe since the end of the Cold War, was accompanied by the
growth of the use of the catch-all category of populism to
describe them. Despite the countless analyses related to
populism, less attention – with some relevant exceptions – has
been given to the impact of populism on party organizations. Still,
populist parties do organize. While it is common to compare the
organization of political parties belonging to the same party
family, the attention on the impact of populism in shaping parties
with different ideological backgrounds is scarce. This paper
focuses on this literature gap, analyzing four parties, which the
literature labels as ‘populist’. The conclusion reached in this paper
is that populism can be an ideological feature incorporated by
different parties; however, its impact on the organization differs
substantially from one party to another.

The Hindu rightwing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India has successfully enacted the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in 2019. The BJP-led government is creating a National Register of Citizens (NRC) which will divide the population into citizens and illegal immigrants. According to the CAA, non-Muslim illegal immigrants from the neighbouring Muslim majority countries will be allowed to apply for citizenship, while Muslims will become stateless. In a series of complicated administrative and legal manoeuvres, this act will lead to loss of citizenship of millions of Muslim citizens and render them stateless. Detention camps are already functional to imprison stateless former citizens.

It is the same government which passed the law against triple talaq, in
defence of the rights of Muslim women citizens. The popularization of public opinion against love jihad, the law against triple talaq, the beef lynchings in recent years, are the result of radical Hindu right populism in India. CAA is the culmination of that process, with the aim of complete isolation and statelessness of Muslim citizens of India. The use of gender and religion towards increasing right-wing populism has reshaped the primary criteria for citizenship. The move has led to
extensive non-violent protests from more than 250 million people across the country. In this article, I will discuss how the BJP is using CAA, tense gender relations and religious stereotypes to promote Hindu right populism in India. In doing so, this article will unmask the connections between gender, religion and radical Hindu right politics.

What are the sources of illiberal tendencies in central and eastern Europe? Was the “death of liberalism” (The long read, 24 October) caused by the unfulfilled promises of transformation and the forced “modernisation by imitation and integration by assimilation” imposed by the west?

Ivan Krastev and Steven Holmes claim that the rise of rightwing populism in countries such as Poland and Hungary is best explained by post-transformational fatigue and anger, transformed into resistance against a “catching-up with the west” narrative.

While it is true that the tensions between what was promised in 1989 and what was delivered two decades later led to the victories of rightwing populists, the connection between the two is not straightforward, nor is disillusionment with democracy higher in the post-communist context than in other EU countries.

Krastev and Holmes uncritically follow the populists in collapsing the difference between liberal democracy and neoliberalism. We can safely assume that what most Poles hoped for in 1989 was a system akin to the Swedish welfare state in the 1970s, combining individual freedoms with economic opportunities. But what they got was closer to the American model, characterised by inequalityies and the dominance of capital over work.

Secondly, Krastev and Holmes ignore the role of transnational ultraconservative networks in promulgating the vision of the west as in need of mirroring the east. This idea has long been present in the minds of western far-right activists, who see the west as corrupted by the sexual revolution and liberalism.

Ultraconservatives created outposts in countries such as Russia and Poland hoping for more political opportunities in post-transitional contexts. Rightwing populism rises globally, thus we should view the illiberal tendencies in eastern Europe not as peculiarity, but a transnational trend.

Świdnik, a town in south-east Poland, has become the country’s first ‘LGBT-free zone’. In March 2019, the county council declared its aim to protect children and families from ‘homosexual propaganda’ and moral degeneration. In a non-binding resolution, local politicians pledged to refrain from any action that would encourage ‘tolerance of LGBT people’. That included withdrawing financial help for organisations that aim to promote non-discrimination and equality.Other local governments soon followed suit, with the support of Poland’s ruling right-wing, populist Law and Justice party and Catholic priests. On 1 August 2019, the archbishop of Kraków, Marek Jędraszewski, claimed that contemporary Poland was ‘no longer affected by the red plague [of communism]’ but that a new, ‘rainbow’ plague wanted to control people’s souls, hearts, and minds. His declaration was applauded by politicians from Law and Justice and by ultra-conservative organisations.

In recent years, opposition to feminism and gender have gone mainstream because of growing cooperation between ultra-conservative actors and right-wing populist parties. Right-wing politicians readily adopt ultra-conservative language and scapegoat ‘genderists’ or ‘promoters of LGBT ideology’ to strengthen fear and create a moral division between ordinary people and corrupt elites. So, while Poland’s LGBT-free zones may seem extreme, they form part of a broader trend of exploiting questions of gender in political struggles.

Populisms

Populists aim to rise to the position of courageous heralds of the people who struggle, overall, against the political elite to protect them from endemic and systemic corruption and spoliation in the political world. We strive to contribute with the theoretical and empirical comprehension of the underlying characteristics of the facade of the alleged popular power exercised by populist leaders and, therefore, we set out to not only examine and compile the most varied conceptual definitions, but also to present a theoretical definition in which we recognize a myriad of variable properties of populisms which are strategies commonly used in specific political contexts with the goal of broadening the political force of the movement. The next step was to apply the definition of populisms in the political and normative actions undertaken by Bolsonaro and we found that the attempt of legitimizing a populist governance is characterized, as well, by the use of political and religious moralism, by the rampant drive for misinformation and fake news, by polarization and by the militarization of politics. During the pandemic, that is still lasts, many said that populism would fade facing the need for government officials to be confronted with the urgency of rationally making harm reduction decisions. We do not know if populism will fade or become stronger, what we do know, however, is to identify movements that break with essential paradigms of democracy and, therefore, to prevent democratic disintegration from decaying.







Populistas buscam se alçar à posição de corajosos arautos do povo que lutam, sobretudo, contra a elite política para protegê-lo da corrupção e espoliação endêmicas e sistêmicas do mundo político. Empenhamo-nos em contribuir com a compreensão teórica e empírica das características subjacentes à fachada do pretenso poder popular exercido por líderes populistas e, por isso, nos propusemos a não apenas examinar e compilar as mais variadas definições conceituais, como apresentamos uma definição teórica na qual reconhecemos uma miríade de propriedades variáveis de populismos que são estratégias comumente utilizadas em contextos políticos específicos com o intuito de ampliar a força política do movimento. O passo seguinte foi aplicar a definição de populismos nas ações políticas e normativas empreendidas por Bolsonaro e constatamos que a tentativa de legitimar uma governança populista se caracteriza, também, pelo uso do moralismo político e religioso, do impulsionamento desenfreado de desinformações e fake news, da polarização e da militarização da política. Durante a pandemia, que ainda perdura, muitos disseram,  que o populismo iria se esmorecer diante da necessidade de os governantes serem confrontados com a urgência da tomada racional de decisões de redução de danos. Não sabemos se os populismos vão esmorecer ou se fortalecer, o que sabemos, porém, é identificar os movimentos que rompem com paradigmas essenciais da democracia e, por conseguinte, evitar que a desintegração democrática se decante.

Fomina, Joanna. “Of “Patriots” and Citizens: Asymmetric Populist Polarization in Poland.” In: Democracies Divided The Global Challenge of Political Polarization, eds.Carothers, Thomas and Andrew O'Donohue, Brookings Institution Press, 2019, pp. 126-150.

This study uses Critical Discourse Analysis to analyse the presentation of Muslims in right wing political discourse, specifically speeches made by UK politician, Nigel Farage, and American Republican candidate, Donald Trump. In light of recent terrorist attacks, it is becoming extremely difficult to ignore the existence of discriminatory language against Muslims. The rise of right-wing political parties has meant that prejudiced and discriminatory language is more salient and the need to identify and analyse such discourse has gained significance. Through the discussion of various approaches associated with Critical Discourse Analysis, with a particular focus on Wodak’s work on exclusionary rhetoric and Van Dijk’s work on ideology, a framework was developed to analyse the way Muslims are presented in two right-wing populist speeches. The framework chosen incorporated both Van Dijk’s “Ideological Square” (1998) and Wodak’s discursive strategies (2010). The analysis largely focuses on the speakers’ positive presentation of “Us”, referring to those in the West and the negative presentation of “Them”, referring to Muslims and immigrants. This dissertation has
identified that the British rhetoric analysed is more implicit than the American rhetoric, however both speakers rely on the use of implicit language and connotations to present Muslims as the “Other”, presenting them as both terrorists and immigrants, and using the terms interchangeably. 

Keywords: Muslims, ideological square, exclusionary rhetoric, political discourse, critical discourse analysis

This book charts the new phase of global struggles around gender equality and sexual democracy: the ultraconservative mobilization against "gender ideology" and feminist efforts to counteract it. It argues that anti-gender campaigns, which emerged around 2010 in Europe, are not a simple continuation of the anti-feminist backlash dating back to the 1970s, but part of a new political configuration. Opposition to "gender" has become a key element of the rise of right-wing populism, which successfully harnesses the anxiety, shame and anger caused by neoliberalism and threatens to destroy liberal democracy.　

Anti-Gender Politics in the Populist Moment offers a novel conceptualization of the relationship between the ultraconservative anti-gender movement and right-wing populist parties, examining the opportunistic synergy between these actors. The authors map the anti-gender campaigns as a global movement, putting the Polish case in a comparative perspective. They show that the anti-gender rhetoric is best understood as a reactionary critique of neoliberalism as a socio-cultural formation. The book also studies the recent wave of feminist mass mobilizations, viewing the transnational revolt of women as a left populist movement.　

This is an important study for those doing research in politics, cultural studies, gender and sexuality studies and sociology. It will also be useful for activists and policy makers.　　

Ethnopopulism is an elite strategy for winning votes and concentrating power – a common playbook for the erosion of liberal democracy that is empowered and justified by a companion playbook of ethnopopulist and majoritarian appeals. Ethnopopulism is flexible with the truth, and flexible in identifying friends and enemies of “the people”. Ethnopopulist parties manipulate opposition to neo-liberal economic policies and racialize the immigrant threat. Democratic backsliding has unexpectedly taken hold in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, and the very factors that seemed to augur well for liberal democracy may have contained the seeds of its degradation at the hands of ethnopopulist leaders.

Depuis quelques années, le vote d'extrême droite progresse dans de nombreux pays européens. Si dans certains d'entre eux, il s'agit d'une manifestation récente, dans d'autres pays, l'extrême droite a connu un enracinement certain. Ainsi, en Belgique, en France ou en Autriche, les partis d'extrême droite font désormais partie de l'échiquier politique. Ces formations influencent profondément les débats politiques et pèsent sur les orientations gouvernementales. Cela est particulièrement vrai sur des thèmes tels que l'identité nationale, la sécurité intérieure, les politiques sociales, l'intégration des étrangers et les flux migratoires. Le présent ouvrage aborde l'extrême droite en France et en Belgique de manière comparative, ce qui constitue sa principale originalité. En effet, cinq sujets identiques guident les analyses réalisées respectivement sur le Front national en France, le Vlaams Blok en Flandre et le Front national dans la partie francophone de la Belgique. La première question a trait aux étapes de la formation de ces partis, à leur identité politique, à leur organisation et leur personnel politique et, enfin, à leur enracinement progressif. Le deuxième sujet, qui est très souvent oublié mais qui nous renseigne sur leur filiation idéologique, porte sur leur programme économique et social. Le troisième thème concerne l'électorat des partis d'extrême droite et vise à donner une analyse nuancée, capable de restituer l'hétérogénéité des groupes qui votent pour les partis d'extrême droite. Le quatrième champ analyse des effets de la progression des partis d'extrême droite sur les autres formations politiques. Enfin, la cinquième problématique évoque la situation de deux villes sous l'emprise des partis d'extrême droite, Toulon à l'heure du Front National et Anvers à portée de main du Vlaams Blok. Ces deux monographies nous montrent aussi ce que signifie ou peut signifier l'administration de la collectivité par des partis d'extrême droite.

L’élection présidentielle du 22 avril 2007 et le scrutin législatif qui l’a suivie ont été une terrible désillusion pour Jean-Marie Le Pen et le Front national (FN). Après avoir dominé l’agenda politique et médiatique durant les années quatre-vingt-dix et créé une secousse inédite dans le système politique lors des élections présidentielles de 2002, le FN était ramené à une expression électorale et un poids politique extrêmement modestes. Ce résultat, en phase avec le mouvement de déclin observé dans les années 2000, est confirmé au scrutin municipal de 2008 où l’extrême droite française est évanescente. D’aucuns évoquent alors la fin sans gloire de Jean-Marie Le Pen et de son parti.

A la veille des élections présidentielles et législatives de 2012, la présentation et le regard sont pourtant tout autres. En janvier 2011, Marine Le Pen a « hérité » de la présidence du parti ; trente-neuf ans après l’accession de son père à cette même présidence. Le Front national a opéré une percée aux élections cantonales du printemps 2011 et les enquêtes d’opinion créditent Marine Le Pen de scores oscillant entre 15 et 20% des intentions de vote pour le premier tour de la présidentielle.

Après le pain noir, le pain blanc ? Les choses sont indubitablement plus nuancées. Dans un environnement européen où l’extrême droite a (re)trouvé des couleurs dans certains Etats, une nouvelle analyse approfondie du phénomène frontiste s’imposait, tant il est vrai que le déclin politico-électoral de la deuxième moitié des années 2000 avait asséché les recherches consacrées au Front national.

L’ouvrage, qui rassemble des contributions de spécialistes réputés de l’extrême droite française, retrace et analyse tour à tour l’histoire du Front national, les rapports du FN à l’extrême droite européenne, le modèle organisationnel et militant du parti, ses axes idéologiques et programmatiques, de même que son implantation électorale et la question des alliances politico-électorales. Enfin, trois zones de force du Front national, dissemblables dans leur profil, sont très finement observées : le Nord-Pas-de-Calais, l’Alsace et Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur.

This dissertation intends to explore possible reasons for the observed discrepancy between the popularity and electoral success of right-wing populist parties in France, from 1980 to 2017, and the relative failure of similar parties in Germany during the same period. To this end, the effects and persistence of populist parties in both countries will be compared, and it will be argued here that the main determining factor in the success of populist movements will be due to each nation’s historical context, the nature of each nation’s dominant historical discourse, and the manner in which national identity is constructed. In the extant literature, the rise of populism is generally attributed to either economic or sociological factors. By utilising Mill’s method of difference, this dissertation aims to show that neither of these previous explanations are useful for understanding the varying popularity of right-wing populism in two countries where the underlying economic and sociological conditions are essentially similar. In this dissertation, the method of process-tracing will be applied to these historical factors, in order to understand how the trauma of Nazism in Germany has come to stigmatize populist discourse, and how such stigmatization is absent in contemporary France. In contrast, the positive image that the French hold regarding the country’s colonial legacy, as well as the white-washing of the actions of the fascist Vichy Regime, have allowed right-wing populist movements to gain a far stronger presence in French politics, especially when compared to the situation in neighbouring Germany. In addition to this, an in-case comparison between the states of former East and West Germany, will be conducted in order to strengthen our understanding of the importance of common historical narratives for the rise of populism.

In recent years right-wing populism has risen significantly across the west. In 2017, Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front, came very close to winning the French presidential election. She eventually lost out to Emanuel Macron, a man dedicated to maintaining the neoliberal consensus but smart enough to voice the usual progressive liberal platitudes during his election campaign. If this was a victory for liberalism over an increasingly virulent and regressive nationalism, it rang rather hallow. The huge strides made by the National Front under Le Pen, quite clearly, do not augur well for the continuation of liberal values in Europe. However, it seems quite important to ask why a representative of the dominant yet ailing politico-economic order was presented to the electorate as the alternative to the ethnocentric nationalism currently pulling France to the right. Is it feasible that Macron's unmitigated neoliberalism can assuage the anger and anxiety that underpin the new French nationalism? Does the invidious choice between Le Pen and Macron not tell us something about the parlous state of liberal democracy and the chains that have been placed upon our collective political imagination? Might the continued dominance of neoliberal capitalism – which has throughout the west concentrated wealth in the hands of an oligarchic elite and permeated economic insecurity throughout the rest of the population – have in some way influenced the development of this new right-wing populism? Could the current crisis in fact be an outcome of neoliberalism's continued political dominance? And perhaps more to the point, shouldn't we be asking searching questions about why the political right has been the principal beneficiary of post-crash economic insecurity, stagnating wages, declining lifestyles, austerity and the gradual breakup of the west's welfare states? Why has there not been a resurgence of interest in traditional left-wing politics rooted in political economy and committed to advancing the interests of the multi-ethnic working class? Why have we not seen a new generation of strident leftist politicians, keen to control the brutal excesses of market society, bursting onto the stage? There is no doubt that the new right has prospered in the vacuum created by the traditional left's decline. Focusing on 'Brexit Britain', the task we have set ourselves here is to identify why the historical relationship between the working class and left-wing politics has become fragile, strained and at risk of coming to an end altogether.

When alienated people take action to resolve their grievances with the regime in power, sometimes they turn to the political Right for ideas and leadership. In his early work, Marx focused on how the rise of capitalism produced several forms of alienation (Marx 1964: 120-34). A more recent translation used the term “self-estrangement” to describe the same phenomena (Marx 1994: 71). Theories of alienation have long been used to analyze right-wing movements, and the work of the Frankfurt school concerning authoritarianism and fascism is well known (Jay [1973] 1996; Arato and Gebhardt 1998).

Since the mid-1980s there has been a renewed scholarly interest in fascism and neo-fascism. This chapter will examine three contemporary research currents that offer useful tools for those studying how contemporary right-wing populist and neo-fascist movements mobilize alienated constituencies:

>>>the apocalyptic style as a rhetorical organizing strategy, which, in a dualistic version, includes the related dynamics of demonization, scapegoating, and conspiracism;

>>>how right-wing populism merges with a dualistic apocalyptic style to create a producerist frame that generates conspiracist narratives;

>>>the relationship between right-wing populism and fascism;

The central argument of this study is that fascism is a distinctive revolutionary form of right–wing populist millenarianism with a tendency to scapegoat demonized enemies, often using dualistic and apocalyptic frames, and conspiracist narratives. The chapter will also discuss how globalization on behalf of transnational corporations has created alienated populations, some of whom have turned to right-wing ideologies and mass movements in response. Finally, there is an overview of the discussion as to whether or not certain forms of militant Islamic Fundamentalism are versions of clerical or theocratic neo-fascism. The notes section includes an expanded set of references to facilitate further study.

Depuis un quart de siècle, plusieurs partis d’extrême droite ou de la droite populiste ont opéré une percée dans leur système politique national : le Front national en France, le FPÖ en Autriche, le parti du progrès en Norvège et au Danemark, le parti populaire danois, le parti national slovaque, le Mouvement social italien-Alliance nationale, la Ligue du nord, les Republikaner, le NPD et la DVU en Allemagne, la Liste Pim Fortuyn et le parti de la Liberté aux Pays-Bas, Ataka en Bulgarie, le parti populaire de la Grande Roumanie, le Vlaams Belang et le Front national en Belgique, l’Union démocratique du Centre en Suisse, LAOS en Grèce… Au surplus, un fait politique nouveau s’est imposé ces dernières années : outre la progression électorale et politique observée par nombre de ces partis, plusieurs formations d’extrême droite ont accédé aux responsabilités gouvernementales ou ont soutenu des gouvernements de l’extérieur. Par-delà les riches travaux consacrés aux développements des partis d’extrême droite, il s’imposait donc d’analyser les conditions et les conséquences de cette nouvelle donne. Tel est l’angle d’approche de cet ouvrage, qui réunit des contributions des meilleurs spécialistes de la question. La réflexion porte sur la vie et les choix internes de ces partis. Souhaitent-ils accéder au pouvoir ? Cette question suscite-t-elle des débats difficiles ? Observe-t-on un processus de modération quand ces formations rentrent au gouvernement ? Les militants endossent-ils ce choix ? Le parti est-il sanctionné ou conforté aux élections suivantes ?... Mais elle se fixe aussi sur les dimensions extérieures à ces formations. Les thèmes portés par les partis d’extrême droite percolent-ils chez les partis démocratiques ? L’apport de l’extrême droite est-il marquant sur certains thèmes qui lui sont chers ? Embrasser l’extrême droite est-ce mieux l’étouffer ? ... A partir d’études de cas et d’approches comparées, l’ouvrage fournit des réponses inédites à ces questions contemporaines.

In Eastern Europe the successful populist parties are mostly right-wing nationalist (for instance the Hungarian Fidesz and the Polish Law and Justice) or exceptionally left-wing populist (for instance Slovak Direction – Social Democracy in Slovakia) with a huge nationalist sentiment. It seems to be that in this region populism and nationalism have been closely related or merged. Moreover, following the traditional literature on populism (Ghita Ionescu, Ernest Gellner), we can easily say that our contemporary “populist Zeitgeist” can be seen as some kind of (post)modern nationalism. In this paper, I am dealing with the problem, how can we define and analyse populism in Eastern Europe. It is hard to say that populism and nationalism have nothing to do with each other, but I am convinced that populism cannot be identified with nationalism. That is why, I introduce the term of historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism.
According to post-Marxist, critical and discursive literature (Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe) it is obviously that populism is not just a right-wing phenomenon and there is a thing which can be called transnational left-wing populism (Benjamin Moffitt, Panos Panayotu). This version of populism is not an unknow phenomenon in this part of Europe, because the Communist regimes before 1989 a transnational populist agenda has been created (Antal, 2017b), but the Left-wing populism is seriously underrepresented in contemporary Eastern Europe.
I am investigating here the political theoretical (Antal, 2017a) and historical background of nationalist populism of our time in Eastern Europe analysing examples from the following countries of this region: Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania. My main thought is that the politics in this region has always been populist in that sense there is a constant need to contrast “the people” (as a large powerless group) and “the elite” (a small powerful group). This “never ending” political tradition of Eastern European populism turned up in the history once in nationalist and other times in transnational perspectives. However, the contemporary Right-wing nationalist populism means a relatively new phenomenon, but it has deeply historical ground in the interwar Right-wing nationalism.
According to my other hypothesis, the governing Right-wing populist parties (especially the Fidesz in Hungary) use the nationalist discourse to create permanent political enemies inside and outside of the nation (Brubaker argues that this kind of nationalism appears as civilizationsim). These parties belong to the political elite and use populist discourse to cover up their corrupt politics which does not serve the interest of the people. In my view there is a new chapter in historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism in Eastern Europe, this is the emergence of populist entrepreneurs using nationalism to maintain their governing power based on populism, which raises several dangers.

Based on a constructivist approach, this book offers a comparative analysis into the causes of nationalist populist politics in each of the five Nordic independent nation states. Behind the social liberal façade of the economically successful, welfare-orientated Nordic states, right-wing populism has found support in the region. Such parties emerged first in Denmark and Norway in the 1970s, before becoming prominent in Sweden and Finland after the turn of the millennium and in Iceland in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, when populist parties surged throughout the Nordics. The author traces these Nationalist trails of thoughts back to the National Socialistic movements of the 1920s and 1930s (the respective Nordic version Nazi parties) and before, to the birth of the Nordic nation states in the nineteenth century following the failure of integration. Since then, as the book argues, separate nationalisms have grown strong in each of the countries. This study will appeal to students and scholars as well as wider audiences interested in European Politics, Nordic Politics, Nationalism, and Populism.

Populist right-wing politics is moving centre-stage, with some parties reaching the very top of the electoral ladder: but do we know why, and why now?

In this book Ruth Wodak traces the trajectories of such parties from the margins of the political landscape to its centre, to understand and explain how they are transforming from fringe voices to persuasive political actors who set the agenda and frame media debates. Laying bare the normalization of nationalistic, xenophobic, racist and antisemitic rhetoric, she builds a new framework for this ‘politics of fear’ that is entrenching new social divides of nation, gender and body.

The result reveals the micro-politics of right-wing populism: how discourses, genres, images and texts are performed and manipulated in both formal and also everyday contexts with profound consequences. This book is a must-read for scholars and students of linguistics, media and politics wishing to understand these dynamics that are re-shaping our political space.

Final draft of the following publication:
Schleusener, Simon (2020): 'You're Fired!' Retrotopian Desire and Right-Wing Class Politics. In: Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (Eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag (pp. 185-206).
DOI: 10.14361/9783839449806-011
Online ISBN: 978-3-8394-4980-6
© 2020 transcript Verlag.