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CONTENT

PARTY SYSTEM OF UKRAINE BEFORE AND AFTER MAIDAN: CHANGES, TRENDS, PUBLIC DEMAND
(*Analytical report by the Razumkov Centre*) 2

CHAPTER 1. PARTY SYSTEM OF UKRAINE IN 2010-2015: STAGES AND SPECIAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 3

CHAPTER 2. PARTY SYSTEM AFTER MAIDAN: IMPLICATIONS AND FACTORS 18

CHAPTER 3. DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES: CONTENT OF PUBLIC DEMAND 34

CHAPTER 4. RECOMMENDATIONS 47

Annex 1. Main theses of the Ukrainian political parties' election programmes that have a parliamentary faction 52

Annex 2. Main theses of the Ukrainian political parties' election programmes that have gained over 1% of people's votes 60

POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE: CURRENT STATE, DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT
(*Opinions of political party leaders*) 68

Arseniy YATSENYUK, Maksym SAVRASOV, Oleh BEREZYUK, Yuriy PAVLENKO, Oleh LYASHKO

POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE: EXPERT OPINIONS
(*Interviews*) 74

Oleksiy ANTYPOVYCH, Nataliia BOHASHEVA, Halyna ZELENKO, Vadym KARASIOV, Antonina KOLODIY, Iryna KRESINA and Olena STOIKO, Yuriy OSTAPETS, Mykola PRYMUSH, Maksym ROZUMNYI, Taras STETSKIV, Volodymyr FESENKO, Yuriy SHVEDA, Vasyl YABLONSKYI

CURRENT STATE AND PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY SYSTEM IN UKRAINE: EXPERT ASSESSMENTS 93

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM OF UKRAINE AT PRESENT: PUBLIC OPINION 106

PARTY SYSTEM OF UKRAINE AT PRESENT: CHALLENGES, PROBLEMS, PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS
(*Presentations of international Roundtable participants*) 145

Opening remarks 145

Nico LANGE, Anthony KAMINSKI

Session 1. Development of Ukraine's party system against the background of modern European trends 148

Yuriy SHVEDA, Volodymyr FESENKO, Maksym ROZUMNYI, Viktor TARAN, Halyna ZELENKO, Olena STOIKO, Oleksiy ANTYPOVYCH, Taras STETSKIV, Dmytro SIMANSKYI, Yuriy SHTEPA

Session 2. Current state and development trends of political parties in Ukraine 155

Antonina KOLODIY, Anatoliy LUTSENKO, Mariia KARMAZINA, Nataliia BOHASHEVA, Yuriy KLIUCHKOVSKYI, Petro STETSYUK, Volodymyr FESENKO

ARTICLES

IN SEARCH OF THE "CORE ELECTORATE": HOW SHOULD PARTIES REACT TO AN INDIVIDUALISTIC SOCIETY?
Nico LANGE 164

PARTY SYSTEMS OF EU MEMBER STATES
Dr. Oskar NIEDERMAYER 167

PARTY SYSTEM OF UKRAINE BEFORE AND AFTER MAIDAN: CHANGES, TRENDS, PUBLIC DEMAND

Mass protests of citizens against the criminal, authoritarian regime of V. Yanukovych, known as the Revolution of Dignity, with its epicentre the Maidan was to be a turning point in the modern history of Ukraine, These events differed significantly in scale and consequences – from the final enforcement by Ukraine of its geopolitical choice, beginning of practical implementation of the course of European integration through reforms in all areas of public life to Russian military aggression, thousands of casualties and the loss of a part of the national economy and sovereign territory.

The events of 2013-2014 had a significant impact on the political system in Ukraine. After the fall of V. Yanukovych's regime and the former president's fleeing to Russia, the 2004 Constitution of Ukraine was reenacted. All supreme state institutions underwent renewal. The new President and the Verkhovna Rada were legitimised by special elections and a new Cabinet of Ministers was formed. The process began of reforming the constitutional principles of government organisation in relation to its various branches and levels.

Ukraine's party system, which is an important element of the political system in general, also underwent significant changes. The political parties that belonged to the pro-presidential coalition before Maidan (Party of Regions and Communist Party of Ukraine) were removed from power and actually descended from the political arena. A significant reformatting of the political forces representing the new government took place. This part of the political spectrum is represented both by the "old" ("Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda") and the "new" parties that entered the political arena and were formed during Maidan or after it ("Samopomich", Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, "Right Sector", "People's Front", Petro Poroshenko Bloc). The post-election period was marked by a heightened struggle not only between the new leading forces and the opposition, but also by competition and conflict between the political forces that in the period from November 2013 to February 2014 had acted as a "unified front".

The drastic changes in the party and political spectrum engendered confusion of the public electoral preferences, especially in the part that did not find any equivalent to their established sympathies among the new parties. There are still some free "political niches", which can be claimed by new party structures. The data of public opinion surveys demonstrate that those political forces, which were enthusiastically received by society during the early parliamentary elections in October 2014, subsequently started losing their voter support.

All this indicates that the party system of Ukraine is undergoing a transformation process, a process that apparently will continue at least until the next scheduled parliamentary elections. However, the development of Ukraine as a democratic European state requires an effective and representative political system, which is impossible without effective, institutionalised political parties.

The analytical report comprises four chapters.

The first chapter refers to special features of the evolution of Ukraine's party system in 2010-2015, the processes in political parties, institutional, socio-political and socio-economic context in which the parties perform their activities, the impact of this context on the party system and its nature;

The second chapter considers the changes in parties and party system that occurred during and after Maidan, the main factors behind these changes, the current state of Ukraine's party system, its structure and essential properties;

The third chapter summarises the vision and expectations of citizens from the "desired" political party identifies, the content of public demand for principles of establishment of such a party, its ideological and policy guidelines;

The fourth chapter provides guidelines for political parties and authorities, aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the parties of their functions, strengthening their relations with the public, formation of a party system that adequately reflects the entire spectrum of public interests.

1. PARTY SYSTEM OF UKRAINE IN 2010-2015: STAGES AND SPECIAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION

Previous study by Razumkov Centre, which covers the period of 1990-2010, determines four stages in the evolution of Ukraine's party system, upon completion of which the party system acquired a pattern that significantly differs from the one it had in the beginning. They are as follows: 1990-1995 (formation of a multiparty system); 1996-1999 (stage of formation of a polarised pluralism system); 2000-2004 (stage of transition to a system of moderate pluralism); 2005 – February 2010 (stage of stabilisation of a moderate pluralism system).[1]

The presidential election of 2010 marked the beginning of the fifth stage of evolution of the party system, which culminated in the fall of V. Yanukovych's regime. The victory of the Revolution of Dignity, restoration of democracy in Ukraine and Russia's armed aggression marked the beginning of a new sixth stage of evolution of the party system, which is currently ongoing.

This chapter analyses evolution of the party system, its factors and results over the last two stages – from 2010 until now. To this end, it employs the methodology tested in the precedent study by the Razumkov Centre and further refined by the centre experts,[2] based on the comments and suggestions made in relation to the first study.[3]

1.1. PARTY SYSTEM in 2012-2013

The starting point of this stage is the second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections and the victory of V. Yanukovych.

Internal processes of political parties. The process of the establishment of new political parties continued: over 25 of them were registered during 2010-2011. According to the information of the Ministry of Justice, as of November 2012, 200 political parties were registered in Ukraine, but most of them, as previously, existed only on paper.

Among the newly established parties that exhibited activity, almost all parties were of a "leaderist" type (including Tihipko's "Strong Ukraine", Yatsenyuk's "Front for Change", Klychko's "UDAR" and Grytsenko's "Civic Position"). "Samopomich" (led by Sadovyi) and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko were established somewhat later. During this stage, some parties were also established through public initiatives (Democratic Alliance).

Parties' involvement in electoral processes. Two electoral campaigns fall within the period from March 2010 to 2013: elections to local government in 2010 and the parliamentary election of 2012.

Election to local government agencies in 2010. The new Law of Ukraine "On Election of Members of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Local Councils and Village, Settlements, City Mayors," the proportional system of elections to a number of local councils replaced by mixed ones, electoral blocs have been removed from the list of participants in the electoral process. This was done to ensure the dominance of the ruling political forces in local government. The elections were conducted in the context of large-scale use of the administrative resource in favour of the Party of Regions, pressure on the opposition and delimiting participation of its representatives in the elections, including with involvement of judicial authorities.[4]

The election results demonstrated that the government was able to achieve the goal set. In particular, in the elections to councils at various levels by party lists, a total of 39.39% of the Party of Regions nominees were elected,[5] and together with its "poetic satellites" ("Strong Ukraine", CPU, "People's Party") this figure amounts to more than 55%. For comparison, the leading opposition force "Batkivshchyna" had 16.34% elected candidates, other opposition parties (All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", "Our Ukraine") – 4.47% and 3.26% respectively.

The elections testified to a very prominent support for new parties – "Front for Change" and "Strong Ukraine", which had, respectively, 8.03% and 5.37% of the deputies elected by party lists.

Some "old" extra-parliamentary political parties (Progressive Socialist Party, Union Party, SPU, People's Movement of Ukraine, SDPU (united), and others), as well as new political projects ("United Centre", "UDAR",

The abbreviations used in this journal: **CPU** – Communist Party of Ukraine; **FIG** – Financial-industrial group; **PPB** – Petro Poroshenko Bloc; **PSPU** – Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine; **SDPU** – Social Democratic Party of Ukraine.

[1] See: Ukraine's party system, special features of formation, operating problems, evolution trends. Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2010, No. 5, pp. 3-12.

[2] See: Yakymenko Yu. The methodology of analysis of the dynamics of party systems: basic approaches and special aspects of their application in Ukraine. – Journal of Political Science; Yuriy Yakymenko The evolution of the party system in Ukraine: peculiarities of analysis and basic steps. – Political Science Bulletin, No. 52, pp. 229-237.

[3] In particular, in addition to the typology of G. Sartori, other elements including typologies, and O. Niedermayer and A. Siaroff were used.

[4] See: Local elections – 2010. Pulse of the country (ed. A. Kohut , K. Sidash). – Laboratory of Legislative Initiatives, 228 p., Statement of OPORA public network on holding local elections on 31 October 2010. – OPORA website, 5 November 2010., *http://oporaua.org/news/ 867-2010-11-04*.

[5] Official website of the Central Election Commission. – *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vm2010/wp001*.

"Civic Position", "Conscience of Ukraine", etc.) also played an active part in the election.

The Party of Regions took first places in the elections by party lists to 17 regional councils and the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, including in those central and some western regions, and has the largest number of nominees (including in majoritarian districts) elected to 19 regional councils and the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In some regional councils (Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, Donetsk) the proportion of the deputies of the Party of Regions ranged from 76% to 93%.

In the elections to local councils, especially in the central and western regions, the success of the Party of Regions was mostly due to the mobilisation of the ranks of candidates as representatives of local authorities, heads of enterprises and institutions of different ownership and public employees (doctors, teachers, cultural workers). On the other hand, a prerequisite for the success of the "party of power" became the dispersion of opposition forces, which were unable to consolidate.

In general, the Party of Regions, together with the Communist Party and "Strong Ukraine" were the dominant parties in the East and South and had significant representation in the Centre and West. "Batkivshchyna" and "Front for Change" were relatively more represented in the western and central regions, "Svoboda" and the "United Centre" party – in the West.

Parliamentary elections 2012. In December 2011, the new Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" came into force, its main innovations being the return to the mixed electoral system, raising the threshold to 5% and a ban on participation in the election from electoral blocs. According to expert estimates, these and other innovations sought to secure more favourable conditions for pro-government political forces and candidates to win in the election.[6]

21 political parties took part in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada, held on 28 October 2012 by party lists. In fact, their number was higher as, due to the prohibition to form electoral blocs, representatives of some parties ran on the lists of other forces as non-partisan candidates (including "Front for Change", People's Movement of Ukraine, Reform and Order Party, "Civic Position", "For Ukraine!", People's Self-Defence which stood in elections by lists of the "Batkivshchyna", while representatives of "People's Party" stood on the list of the Party of Regions). In total, 87 parties featured in the electoral process.

The elections were held in the context of extensive use of the administrative resource and their results were affected by fraud, especially in single-candidate constituencies.

Five parties overcame the vote threshold – the Party of Regions (30% votes), "Batkivshchyna" (25.54%), "UDAR" political party (13.96%), CPU (13.18%) and "Svoboda" (10.44%).

The election campaign in 2012 has somewhat changed the alignment of forces in Ukraine's party system. The Party of Regions and the "Batkivshchyna" retained their positions as "poles" of the party system. The CPU increased its electoral outcome primarily at the expense of disillusioned supporters of the Party of Regions.

A number of political parties established in the early or mid 1990s either completely lost or substantially weakened their positions. The Socialist Party of Ukraine, Peasant Party of Ukraine, Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (unified), Ukrainian Republican Party, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian People's Party have in fact descended from the political arena. People's Movement of Ukraine, Reform and Order Party and "People's Party" significantly receded from their positions, having almost lost their subjectivity. The same is true for some parties formed following the Orange Revolution, especially "Our Ukraine" Party.

According to the election results, the territorial division of supporters of the leading political forces has been largely preserved. As in the previous parliamentary elections, it is rooted in the differences of cultural affiliation of the residents of different regions of Ukraine. In particular, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party gained leading positions in the East and South of Ukraine, while the "Batkivshchyna" – in the central and western regions and the "Svoboda" – in the West.

Despite some expectations, in the election campaign of 2012 there was no political force that could qualify for the uniform support of voters in all regions of Ukraine and would become a nationwide party. Such events were associated with "new" political players, including the political parties "Strong Ukraine", "Front for Change" and "UDAR".

However, the bipolar nature of the campaign has not left room for any "third forces", requiring that the parties determine themselves in "government-opposition" terms. Accordingly, the "Strong Ukraine" decided to merge with the Party of Regions; the "Front for Change" became part of the United Opposition "Batkivshchyna", while "UDAR" acceded to the opposition union already in Parliament.

Processes in the party environment. The legal environment has undergone significant changes that define the place and role of parties in the political system. The Resolution of the Constitutional Court as of 30 September 2010,[7] adopted under pressure applied by V. Yanukovych, reenacted the 1996 Constitution. This Resolution significantly reduced the role of parties in the development and implementation of state policy, including by depriving the parliamentary coalition of the right to form the Cabinet of Ministers and to regulate its activities through the coalition agreement.[8]

Significant changes were implemented in electoral legislation regarding both to local and parliamentary elections. Based on the results of both companies, the changes improved the results of elections for ruling parties and candidates.

Separate amendments were made to the law "On political parties", particularly aimed at ensuring gender equality, and the possibility of "suspension" of membership by a party member. Amendments to the legislation on civic associations indirectly affected the legal basis of the parties.[9]

Conditions for activity of the opposition. Legal conditions for activity of the opposition and opportunities for equal competition of political parties significantly deteriorated. Under the pretext of reenactment of the 1996

[6] Parliament and the parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2012: political situation, social attitudes and expectations. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2010, No. 7-8, pp. 19-27.

[7] The Resolution of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the constitutional proposal of 252 people's deputies of Ukraine regarding conformity to the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" as of 8 December 2004. No. 2222-IV (the case of compliance with the Procedure of amendment of the Constitution of Ukraine) – Official website of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, *http://www.ccu.gov.ua/uk/doccatalog/list?currDir=122407*.

[8] For more detail: Parliament and the parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2012: political situation, social attitudes and expectations, …, pp. 3-7.

[9] For more detail see answers to the questions of Bohasheva Centre in the text entitled "*Political parties in Ukraine: expert opinion*", available in this magazine.

Constitution, the parliamentary opposition was stripped of legislative guarantees of its rights and authority in the Verkhovna Rada – the provisions and sections regarding the parliamentary coalition and the opposition were removed from the text of the Law on the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada.[10]

During this stage the political regime developed towards the intensification of autocratic tendencies. The grounds for this were created by the aforementioned decision of the Constitutional Court on the reenactment of the 1996 Constitution.

In 2010-2011, criminal procedures were instituted against the opposition leaders – Yulia Tymoshenko (Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc) and Yuriy Lutsenko of the People's Self-Defence party, and both were imprisoned at that time. As a result of lengthy negotiations with the authorised representatives of the EU, Yuriy Lutsenko was released under the amnesty law, but the authorities have persistently avoided the issue of the release of Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of "Batkivshchyna", the largest opposition party at that time.

The situation with civil rights and freedoms in the country significantly deteriorated.[11] In particular, the information space was eventually monopolised (primarily television) by representatives of the president's entourage and pressure on journalism (including violance) intensified. The opposition was restricted in access to the state and most popular TV channels.

The citizens' rights to peaceful assembly were continually repressed, involving to this end the courts, law enforcement agencies, as well as half-criminal structures, organised and patronised by the authorities. The government resorted to using judicial and law enforcement agencies to exert pressure on opposition political parties, civic organisations, protest movements, some politicians and public figures.

During the elections of 2012 there was a purposeful shaping of a framework beneficial for the ruling forces and candidates, large-scale application of administrative resources, vote buying, direct fraud, including with the involvement of courts and law enforcement agencies.[12]

Autocratic trends gained further momentum in 2013. All the efforts of the authorities were directed at its maximum centralisation, gaining full control over the judicial branch, local authorities and concentration of power in the President's hands.

In particular, in October 2013 the Verkhovna Rada provisionally approved the President's draft amendments to the Constitution, which strengthened the dependency of the judiciary on the President.[13] The adopted Law "On All-Ukrainian Referendum" should contribute to the implementation of these and other constitutional innovations by the authorities.[14] The legislation was amended (October 2013) in a way which could hamper the participation in the next presidential election of 2015 of the best rated opposition candidate at that time Vitaliy Klychko.[15] Funding for security forces (except the army) was significantly increased and representatives of Donetsk Region were assigned to executive positions on a large scale.[16]

The final step in this process was the adoption by the M. Azarov Government of the decision to suspend the process of European integration[17] the forceful and brutal crackdown of peaceful protests on Maidan Nezalezhnotsi square in Kyiv, which marked the beginning of the mass public confrontation (known as the Revolution of Dignity) against the V. Yanukovych regime.

Main social divisions and problematic dimensions. In 2010-2011, a certain reduction of the division of socio-cultural relevance could be observed.

For voters from eastern and southern regions, factors of "appeasement" were the election of V. Yanukovych as head of state and the revenge gained for the defeat in the elections of 2004, the change in the policy of V. Yushchenko in the humanitarian field that was unacceptable for them, refusal of entry to NATO and re-orientation to non-bloc status and a hope for rapid improvement in relations with Russia. For residents of western and central regions, such factors became a temporary "freezing" of the issue of Russian language as a second official language, and compensation of the Russian vector foreign policy by declarations of authorities on the priority of the course of European integration, including the negotiation process around the Association Agreement with the EU.

At the same time, the relevance of social-economic division grew to some extent. Residents of all regions experienced the consequences of unpopular actions of the new government in the socio-economic area: reduction of welfare, significant increase of utility tariffs and rising prices. The unpopular pension reform, the failure of direct electoral promises, shifting "the burden of reform" to the majority of the population, along with the continuing enrichment of "oligarchs", the total corruption of power structures, pretentious wealth and consumption by the authorities – all this led to a sharp decline in the popularity of the Party of Regions and other member parties of the parliamentary majority.

> Throughout 2011, the percentage of citizens who intended to vote for the Party of Regions in the upcoming parliamentary elections decreased from 20.5% in February to 13.5% in December, for the Strong Ukraine party, respectively, from 5.6% to 3.6%. In this case, ratings were falling in all regions, including in eastern and southern Ukraine where people were motivated to vote for the ruling party according to their socio-cultural affiliation.
>
> At the same time, in the respective period, the levels of support for fundamental opposition forces increased: "Batkivshchyna" – from 12.5% to 15.8%, "Front for Change" – from 7.5% to 9.6%. The CPU rating grew from 3.2% to 5.3%.[18]

The left-wing forces started regaining their positions,[19] left-centrist parties (Socialists and Social Democrats) intensified their activities in the attempt to regain their positions.[20]

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10 The Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" as of 8 October 2010.

11 Parliament and the parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2012: political situation, social attitudes and expectations,…, pp. 32-43.

12 Ukraine 2013: between the elections and in the face of choice (analytical assessment). – Razumkov Centre, 2013, pp. 3-4.

13 More details: Judicial reform in Ukraine: current results, prospects and risks of a constitutional stage. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2010, No. 2-3, pp. 2-61.

14 The Law of Ukraine "On All-Ukrainian referendum" as of 6 November 2012.

15 See: Parliament endorsed a bill that could prevent Klichko from running for President. – Online resource ZN.ua, 24 October 2013, *http://dt.ua/POLITICS/rada-pidtrimala-zakonoproekt-yakiy-mozhe-pereshkoditi-klichku-balotuvatisya-u-prezidenti-130622_.html*.

16 See: 2014 Ukraine: new prospects and new threats (analytical assessment). – Razumkov Centre, 2014, pp. 3-4, 8.

17 Resolution of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers "On the Issue of the Association Agreement between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their member states on the other hand" No. 905 as of 21 November 2013. – Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, *http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/905-2013-%D1%80*.

18 See more details on the sociological research of the Razumkov Centre on the website *http://www.razumkov.org.ua*.

19 Despite their joining the ruling majority in the Parliament of the 5th and 6th convocations, the Communists still were perceived by some voters as representatives of the poor social groups, "affected" by the actions of the authorities.

20 Throughout 2011, negotiations were held to unify the two centre-left parties around the "centres of gravity", which were the Socialist Party and the "Justice" party. At the same time, the once pro-government SDPU (unified) took part in the negotiations.

The parties were trying to lead or use to their advantage the protest against the authorities of different social groups – entrepreneurs, "Afghan war veterans", "Chornobyl victims" (their number increased significantly throughout 2010-2011), convert public initiatives to a partisan format or even to "initiate" them on their own.

All this led to the eventual formation in public opinion of the image of ruling parties as proponents of the interests of large oligarchic capital. Most people linked the ability to protect their own interests mostly with opposition parties.

Evidence of this is a generalised image of politics of the ruling and opposition political parties, which emerged in public opinion in 2010-2011.[21]

In socio-economic policy, the community imparted pro-government political forces with state support for major national businesses, strengthening the rights of employers compared to those of employees, raising taxes for all citizens, increasing utility prices and tariffs and increasing the retirement age.

Opposition forces were rather associated with the protection of citizens with low income, the rights of employees, promotion of small and medium businesses, deterrence of growth of prices and tariffs by increasing the taxation on the big businesses of the "oligarchs".

In view of the upcoming elections, the authorities faced the formation of an undesirable prospect of combination of the social discontent factor with sympathy for the opposition parties which could lead to social and economic divisions in the electoral opposition coming to the forefront of attention. Under such circumstances the campaign would be held according to the pattern "power of the rich" against the "opposition of the poor", under which the opposition would have received a guaranteed majority in the future parliament.

To prevent the implementation of this scenario, the authorities resorted to preventive measures of various kinds, ranging from the aforementioned repression against the opposition and amendments to the electoral legislation, to targeted measures aimed at strengthening the segmentation of the electorate, reducing socio-economic factors in the structure of motivation of voters, especially in the East and South, (which led to a decline in support for the Party of Regions), and a sharp increase in the role of socio-cultural factors.

COMPONENTS OF ELECTORAL STRATEGY OF PARTY OF REGIONS GIVEN DECREASING RELEVANCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMICAL DIVISION AND GROWING RELEVANCE OF SOCIO-CULTURAL DIVISION

The EURO-2012 campaign that was aimed to reduce social tension, strengthen a sense of unity in society, divert attention from social and economic problems, and demonstrate the capability of power.

"Social initiaitves" of President V. Yanukovych amounted to a new series of social promises (increased pensions, return of lost savings, affordable housing, etc.).

Address allocation of budget funds to core regions and the single-mandate constituencies with a view to secure victory of a government candidate.

The media campaign to discredit the opposition by placing responsibility for the current situation in the country on its shoulders (the issues of "predecessors", "ruin", gas prices, etc.).

The campaign for adoption of the Law "On Principles of State Language Policy", which envisaged the possibility of granting the Russian language regional language status, which was done by a number of local councils at various levels. The adoption of the Law has caused considerable public outcry and protests among the Ukrainian-speaking community. At the same time these actions were favourably received by residents of eastern and southern regions, and the Russian-speaking population of other regions.[22]

The introduction by the authorities into the public domain of the antithesis "fascists – antifascists", where the opposition (national-democratic, pro-European forces) were identified as "fascists" and the ruling, pro-Russian forces as "anti-fascists". [23]

In this way, the Party of Regions could build up their own rating and significantly restrict the capability of opposition parties to be promoted in the East and South of Ukraine and convert the electoral campaign into a convenient format, characterised by the coincidence of lines of distinction between the parties on the basis of socio-cultural division and their relationship to power. As in previous campaigns, this was the result of deliberate use by the authorities as the basis of the electoral strategy.

Among the problematic dimensions of the party system during the first stage, the dimension of support for the regime came to the forefront. In the early stage it tended to impose on the socio-economic dimension. During the electoral campaign the cultural-ethnic and foreign policy dimensions came to the forefront.

The influence of the Financial and Industrial Group on the party system remained significant, although its character somewhat changed. The pressure of the government on opposition forces made them a considerably less attractive object for political investment and led to the withdrawal of most of the groups from supporting the opposition (primarily Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc). Conversely, the competition for the opportunity to be represented among the Party of Regions' deputies increased. However, some financial and industrial groups were trying to get their candidates elected on the lists both of the ruling and opposition parties.

The external pressure during the period was high, primarily associated with the prospect of signing the Ukraine-EU agreement on political association and economic integration. European institutions regarded the political processes in Ukraine as a very important test

[21] See: Opposition in Ukraine: state, context of activities, relations with the authorities. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2011, No. 7-8, pp. 13-19.

[22] The effectiveness of this move may be attested by the data of a sociological study peformed by the Razumkov Centre in October 2012. 21.9% of respondents noted an improvement in their attitude to Yanukovych and the Party of Regions as a result of the adoption and signing of the language law. That said, such voters were 42.5% in the South of Ukraine and 37.5% in the East.

[23] See: "In Kiev an anti-fascist march entitled "To Europe – without Nazis" was held under the auspices of the Party of Regions . – Website of the Party of Regions, *http://partyofregions.ua/ua/news/event/5197a8fec4ca42047c00038b*.

of democracy and observance of European values by the authorities. The parties represented at the European Parliament, partners of the national parties, continually provided public assessments of political processes in Ukraine. In particular the main topic of the statements of the European People's Party (a political partner of "Batkivshchyna") were the issues of democracy in Ukraine and the release of imprisoned opposition leaders. The position of European parties affected the EU foreign policy on Ukraine, and was one of the elements of information confrontation between the government and the opposition. The US position was one of solidarity with Europe.

After a brief period of improved relations in 2010, the Russian leadership took a rather cautious stance on the situation in Ukraine, avoiding direct support of authorities or certain political parties (despite the partnership of the "United Russia" party with the Party of Regions). However, as the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU approached, the impact of Russia grew into a large-scale political and economic pressure with elements of a "trade war" and political blackmail using their own agents of influence in Ukraine.[24]

The processes inside the party system. The party system had two poles – Party of Regions' and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, although as a result of Tymoshenko's defeat in the presidential electoral campaign of 2010 and her imprisonment the weight of Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc decreased. The "Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defence Bloc" ceased to exist as a separate entity of the party system.

In the early stage (given the maximum effort) the "new" parties (Tihipko's "Strong Ukraine", Yatsenyuk's "Front for Change", Klychko's "UDAR") that gained ground in local elections could qualify for the role of independent poles. However, later this expectation failed to materialise.

In 2011, the position of "Svoboda" strengthened slightly and the Communist Party began to gradually recover its electoral support.

According to the results of the 2012 election, six parties could be included in the party system of Ukraine: Party of Regions, "Batkivshchyna", "Front for Change", "UDAR", CPU and "Svoboda". Medium and small parties remained in the system.

Throughout 2010-2012, the party system retained features of a moderate pluralism system with a tendency towards polarisation due to increased ideological distance between the extreme parties (after the elections, these were the Communist Party and the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda").[25]

However, the maximum concentration of power in the hands of virtually one political force – the Party of Regions (the members of which held all the most senior posts in the country) and strengthening of authoritarian manifestations in the activity of the authorities **attested to the presence of a clear and definitive trend of evolution of the party system towards a system with a hegemon party.**

[24] See: Ukraine's European Integration: internal factors and external influences. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2013, No. 4-5, pp. 2-54.

[25] According to J. Sartori's typology. In the typology of O. Niedermayer, the system had formal features of a pluralist party without a modal party.

[26] Website of the State Registration Service of Ukraine, "Political parties" *section http://www.drsu.gov.ua/show/202.*

1.2. PARTY SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION in 2014-2015

This stage covers the period from the beginning of 2014 – activation and radicalisation of Maidan – to the present. The active reformatting of the party environment (establishment of new parties, splits and unions, descent of old parties from the political arena and exit of new structures) started directly in the course of the Revolution of Dignity. Its next steps were the presidential and parliamentary campaigns in 2014 and preparations for the local elections of 2015.

Internal processes of political parties. In the early stage, the party system as a whole maintained the pattern that shaped after the elections of 2012.

New political parties were being established during this stage mainly "from above" (with some exceptions), as "leadership" projects, with the active participation of business groups. The majority of newly established parties exist only on paper.

As of 7 September 2015, 290 political parties were registered in Ukraine (in fact – 288), while in 2014, 39 of them were registered, and 54 from the beginning of 2015,[26] which is an absolute record in the history of independent Ukraine.

Parties in protest actions. Leading political parties actively participated in the socio-political events at the end of 2013 – early 2014, taking diametrically opposed stances in relation to Maidan. Ultimately, it determined their current position in the party system.

Thus, the opposition parliamentary parties, according to their political positions, from the outset were actively involved in the protests, though initially some community activists and party leaders put forward the requirement of "non-partisan" actions. However, after the brutal beating of participants of peaceful action on Maidan on the night of 29 to 30 November 2013, the parliamentary opposition ("Batkivshchyna", "UDAR" and "Svoboda") took over the main role in the organisation and coordination of the protest movement.

Some other political parties established before Maidan played a prominent role in the protest actions, in particular, the "Civic Position" party (A. Grytsenko), the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (O. Lyashko), the Democratic Alliance party (V. Hatsko) and the Party Association "Samopomich" (A. Sadovyi).

During the protests, the new political parties were crystallised based on the members of public organisations and movements (formal and informal) and of other political parties. The most telling example of this is the Right Sector party.

The parties that belonged to the ruling coalition in the Verkhovna Rada – the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, officially unreservedly supported the activities of then-President V. Yanukovych and the Government. The Party of Regions became the vanguard of the fight against Maidan and everything relating to it.

The culmination of the activities of the parliamentary factions of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party during the developments of Maidan was the adoption on 16 January 2014 of the "dictatorship law." The entry into force of these laws provoked a new wave of violent confrontation between the government and protesters, which saw the first casualties. Thus, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, actually acted as the catalyst of confrontation.

The victory of the protest actions that had engulfed most of the country, Yanukovych's escape and the change of government that took place in late February 2014, marked the end of the Party of Regions' rule.

The events of the Maidan, the victory of the Revolution of Dignity, the beginning of Russian aggression in the Crimea and the conflict in the East of Ukraine caused significant changes in public support of political parties.

DYNAMICS OF PARTIES DURING THE PROTEST ACTION

As of July 2013, the Party of Regions enjoyed almost the highest support, compared to other parties – 20%, practically the same number of people supported All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna", – 19.3%, 14.8% of voters were willing to vote for Klychko's "UDAR", 5.7% and 5.6% respectively for "Svoboda" and the Communist Party. Of the other parties represented in the rankings, more than 1% of voters voted for the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (1.2%).

In December 2013, after the protests, there was an increase in the rating of the Party of Regions up to 26.2% – its voters welcomed the government's decision on the refusal to embark on European integration. During the same period, the rating of "Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda" and "UDAR" had decreased.

At the end of January – beginning of February 2014, the rating of the Party of Regions declined to 20%, that of "Batkivshchyna" increased from 15% to 18%, that of "Svoboda" remained unchanged, and the rating of "UDAR" fell from almost 19% to 14% Surveys showed a rapid increase in the rating of "Solidarity".[27] As of mid-October 2013, the rating of the party amounted to 1.8%, while in early February 2014 it was already 6.6%.

This dynamic correlates with the growth of P. Poroshenko's presidential rating – from 3.8% at the beginning of October 2013 to 12% in early February 2014.

In March 2014, there were significant changes in the level of support for political parties.[28] The Party of Regions plummeted to 9%. The ratings of parties that participated in Maidan slightly decreased. The rating of "Solidarity" was 13%. According to this survey, Petro Poroshenko's rating was already 21% – almost equal to that of Vitaliy Klychko (12%) and Yulia Tymoshenko (11%).

In April 2014, the leader among political parties was "Solidarity," for which almost 22% of respondents were prepared to vote. Petro Poroshenko's rating continued to grow and reached 28%.[29]

After the split, the Party of Regions rating fell to 3%. One of the reasons for that could be the emergence on the list of parties of the "Strong Ukraine" led by Tihipko, who was not supported by the "regionals" as the sole presidential candidate of the Party of Regions. 5.5% of voters were willing to support Tihipko's project.

The level of support of "UDAR" fell to 8%, the support of other parties, compared to March, did not change significantly.

The last survey before the presidential election recorded the following results: "Solidarity" – 22%; "Batkivshchyna" – 10%; "UDAR" – 7%; Communist Party – 5%; Radical party – 5%; "Strong Ukraine" – 4%; "Svoboda" – 3%; Party of Regions– 3%.[30]

On 21-22 February 2014, by the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 7th convocation, the provisions of the 2004 Constitution were reenacted, providing for the parliamentary-presidential model of government[31]. Due to the change of government Parliament underwent political reformatting and the "European choice" coalition was established.[32] O. Turchynov, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada and acting President, was one of the leaders of "Batkivshchyna".

The new Cabinet was formed out of the representatives of the parties, coalition members and activists of Maidan.[33] Representatives of the "UDAR" party refused to enter the government, given the position of their party leader V. Klychko as a future presidential candidate. The government was headed by A. Yatsenyuk (representing of "Batkivshchyna" at that time).

Large-scale changes were implemented in the law enforcement and security agencies and local state administrations. In order to stabilise the situation in the eastern regions the authorities resorted to a non-standard approach: representatives of major domestic businesses I. Kolomoyskyi and S. Taruta were appointed Heads of Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk regional state administrations respectively.

The Verkhovna Rada adopted a decision to hold early elections of the President of Ukraine, local elections in Kyiv and some other cities and regions on 25 May 2014.[34]

Involvement of the parties in electoral processes. Throughout 2014, two national electoral campaigns were held: early elections of the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Presidential elections on 25 May 2014. Before the elections an alignment of forces emerged, which is uncharacteristic for Ukraine. *First*, the society had built up a considerable potential distrust in the leaders of parliamentary parties that were present at the Maidan. Conversely, some politicians, above all, Petro Poroshenko, managed to significantly increase the level of support during the protests. In view of this, previous favorite of the race, leader of "UDAR" Vitaliy Klychko refused to run for president in favour of Petro Poroshenko.

Second, forces opposing the new authorities could not put forward a joint candidate. 5 persons were nominated from the Party of Regions, and the party itself split over the support for M. Dobkin, instead of the best rated candidate. Against a background plummeting support of the Party of Regions due to its identification with the regime of V. Yanukovych, its candidates could not hope for success.

The CEC registered 23 presidential candidates, most of whom were leaders of the political parties (in particular, "Civic Position", Party of Regions, Ukrainian People's Party, People's Movement of Ukraine, Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, Communist Party, "Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda," Right Sector) and representatives

[27] The Party entitled "Solidarity", despite its predominantly formal existence, was mentioned in the surveys given the activities of Petro Poroshenko as a potential presidential candidate, with whom this structure is associated.

[28] The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 5-10 March 2014 2008 respondents aged over 18 were polled in all regions of Ukraine. The theoretical sample error is 2.3%.

[29] The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 25-29 April 2014. 2012 respondents aged over 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea. The theoretical sample error is 2.3%.

[30] The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 14-18 May 2014 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea. 2011 respondents aged over 18 years were polled. The theoretical sample error is 2.3%.

[31] See. in particular: the Law of Ukraine "On reenactment of certain provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine" adopted on 21 February 2014; Parliament Resolution "On the text of the Constitution of Ukraine in the wording of 28 June 1996, as amended and supplemented by the Law of Ukraine No. 2222-IV as of 8 December 2004, No. 2952-VI as of 1 February 2011, No. 586-VII as of 19 September 2013, No. 750 as of 22 February 2014.

[32] The coalition consisted of 250 deputies – members of the factions UDAR, "Fatherland", "Svoboda" and the newly established parliamentary groups "Economic Development" and "European Sovereign Ukraine".

[33] In particular, "Head of Maidan" Yevhen Nyschuk was appointed Minister of Culture, one of the leaders of Automaidan Dmytro Bulatov was appointed Minister of Youth and Sport, and the well-known public figure, journalist Tetyana Chornovol was appointed government commissioner on corruption prevention.

[34] See in particular Parliament Resolution No. 757 "On withdrawal of the President of Ukraine from constitutional powers and appointment of early presidential elections in Ukraine" as of 22 February 2014 and No. 791"On the appointment of early elections of Kyiv Mayor and Kyiv City Council", 25 May 2014" as of 25 February 2014.

of the Maidan. 21 candidates reached the election day, three of whom (including the Communist Party leader P. Symonenko) stepped down.

The main backdrop of the campaign was constituted by the toppling of the V. Yanukovych regime, the rapid Russian military operation to annex the Crimea in February and March 2014, the armed uprising and complete destabilisation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (with fai led attempts to destabilise situation in Kharkiv and Odessa regions), and on the other hand – increase of public demand for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, stabilisation of the situation and the unification of society, substantial power upgrade and a systemic fight against corruption.

The campaign developed within a limited timeframe and was much less expensive than most of the previous presidential campaigns. For the first time since 1994 it did not involve either the use of administrative resources or a significant number of violations and fraud that could affect the final result.

For the first time after 1991, the elections were held in one round, and their winner P. Poroshenko (self-nominated) received almost 55% of the votes.

The runner-ups were leaders of the "pro-European" parties – Yu. Tymoshenko's "Batkivshchyna" (12.81%), O. Lyashko's Radical Party (8.32%) and A. Grytsenko's "Civic Position" (5.48%). The maximum reached by representatives of the former government was 5.23%, obtained by S. Tihipko. The Party of Regions nominee M. Dobkin obtained 3.03% of the votes, the CPU leader P. Symonenko 1.5% of the votes.

Nominees of "Svoboda" O. Tyahnybok and Right Sector's D. Yarosh together gained less than 2% of the vote.

The election results were largely due to the desire of the society to achieve quick stabilisation of power. It was widely believed by the society that Russia would impede by all means the election of a legitimate Ukrainian President, and until he was elected, the probability of an armed invasion remained high. The call to society to determine the winner already in the first round to save time and resources had also played its part.

Presidential elections in 2014 represented a new balance of political forces in the country, in particular:

- focus on European integration has become the "mainstream" in the party and political environment: all candidates who held the highest positions in the election represented the pro-European part of the political spectrum;
- the former "party of power" – the Party of Regions, as well as the Communist Party had lost their support (none of the candidates associated with the previous regime won);[35]
- society did not support political forces that positioned themselves as right-wing ("Svoboda", Right Sector);
- "UDAR" party lost its claim to leadership. This was due to the refusal of its leader V. Klychko to take part in the presidential elections, which could not be compensated for by his victory in the elections for Kyiv Mayor.

Parliamentary elections of 26 October 2014. Parliamentary elections were held under the electoral law of 2011, envisaging the majority-proportional system with a ratio of 50/50 and an electoral threshold of 5%. The elections were not conducted in Crimea and the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, controlled by terrorists.[36] In the single-mandate constituencies, the elections were held in 198 of 225, and about 30.5 million voters were put on the lists.[37]

RESULTS OF EARLY UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS in 2014

PETRO POROSHENKO
54.7%

YULIA TYMOSHENKO
12.8%

OLEH LYASHKO
8.3%

ANATOLIY GRYTSENKO
5.5%

SERHIY TIHIPKO
5.2%

MYKHAILO DOBKIN
3.0%

PETRO SYMONENKO
1.5%

OLEH TYAHNYBOK

DMYTRO YAROSH

<2%

An important feature of the elections was the double reformatting of the party-political field: for the first time – after the victory of Maidan and the fall of Yanukovych; for the second time – based on the results of early presidential elections. According to the results of these processes, the five parties that had factions in the Verkhovna Rada of the 7th convocation (Party of Regions, "Batkivshchyna", "UDAR", "Svoboda" and Communist Party of Ukraine), only two parties – the CPU and "Svoboda", remained unchanged by the start of the new electoral campaign.

The total number of parties that had formed lists for the elections by party tickets was 29 (in previous elections – 21).[38] Among the major contenders for the entry to Parliament majority were parties that supported the Maidan or were created by politicians who took an

[35] S. Tihipko, M. Dobkin, P. Symonenko, Yu. Boyko.

[36] Citizens who left these regions for other regions of Ukraine were able to vote at the place of actual residence in elections according to party lists.

[37] The official website of the Central Election Commission, the section of "Extraordinary parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2014" – *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp001*.

[38] The official website of the Central Election Commission, the section of "Extraordinary parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2014" – *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp501?PT001F01=910*.

active part therein: Petro Poroshenko Bloc, All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna", All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" political party "Civic Position," "People's Front", "Samopomich", Right Sector.

The former pro-government camp was represented by "Strong Ukraine" and "Opposition Bloc" that emerged as a result of the split of the Party of Regions, and its political satellite – the Communist Party of Ukraine. The obvious favorite at the start of the campaign was Petro Poroshenko Bloc, for which 38% of the voters who intended to participate in elections were willing to vote.[39]

The essential core of the campaign were the following themes: restoring peace/defence of the country; maintaining the economic situation/combating the economic crisis; reforms/implementation of the European choice; renewal of authorities (lustration)/combating corruption. Accordingly, the main trend in the formation of electoral lists was to attract "new personalities" – ATO participants, community activists, volunteers and journalists.

Due to the shortened timeframe, the electoral campaign was conducted mainly in the form of advertising in electronic media. The leading forces also splashed out money on outdoor advertising and printed materials. Somewhat lesser emphasis was placed on direct contact with the voters – mass campaigns, travel to regions, etc. The parties that had pro-power candidates on top of their lists, used it to create information occasions.

Out of the 29 parties that participated in the elections by the party electoral lists, six parties overcame the electoral threshold: five of them represented the new government – Petro Poroshenko Bloc, "People's Front", "Samopomich", Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna", and one of them – the previous government ("Opposition Bloc"). The vast majority of candidates elected in single-mandate constituencies, were nominated by leading political forces or were supported by them.

The major surprise was the results achieved by the "People's Front", Petro Poroshenko Bloc and "Samopomich" parties. "People's Front", having started from fourth position progressed to the leading position with 22% of support. Instead, during the campaign, Petro Poroshenko Bloc had lost almost half of its initial rating and took the second place. "Samopomich" managed to make a powerful leap from inferior positions (below 2%) to take third place (over 10% of the vote).[40]

On 27 November 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 8th convocation set up a coalition of parliamentary factions which included 302 people's deputies from 422 elected members of pro-government factions of political parties and non-faction deputies. The remaining deputies joined the "Opposition Bloc" faction (40 MPs), two parliamentary groups (19) or remained out of factions (42 MPs).

The coalition agreed on and adopted the Coalition Agreement, formed a new Cabinet of Ministers on the basis of fractional representation, and for the first time in Ukraine involved people from other countries[41], who had received Ukrainian citizenship. The Government was again headed by A. Yatsenyuk. On 11 December 2014 the Verkhovna Rada approved the Programme of Action of the Cabinet of Ministers in 2015-2016, thus giving the government one-year immunity.

Processes in the party environment. After the change of government there have been significant changes in the legal environment of political parties. One of the first decisions of the Parliament after the fall of the authoritarian regime was the adoption on 21 February 2014 of the Law "On Reenactment of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine",[42] which restored the role of parties in the political system.

Changes to the electoral law came into force. Throughout 2014-2015, the Law "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" was amended mainly due to the adoption of other related legislative acts. On 14 July 2015, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the new law "On Local Elections".

On 16 September 2014, despite the negative sociopolitical consequences of the previous regime and considerable public demand for purification of power structures, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law "On Purification of Power." On 9 April 2015, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a series of laws known as "decommunisation laws".[43] These laws significantly altered the conditions for the operation of some political parties and their participation in the elections.

The amendments were made with a view of ensuring transparency of the financing of political parties and

[39] Based on the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 14-18 May 2014 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea. 2014 respondents aged over 18 were polled. The theoretical sample error is 2.3%. Detailed results of the sociological study by the Razumkov Centre are available online *http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/socpolls.php*.

[40] The official website of the Central Election Commission, the section of "Extraordinary parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2014" – *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp300?PT001F01=910*.

[41] Thus, the current appointments include: Minister of Finance N. Yaresko, former US citizen, Minister of Economic Development and Trade – A. Abromavychus, former citizen of Lithuania, Minister of Health O. Kvitashvili, former citizen of Georgia. The appointment of several candidates who have another nationality is being considered. Several candidates for the post of the head of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau had a different nationality before their appointment by members of the tender committee and the beginning of the candidate selection.

[42] The Law of Ukraine "On Re-enactment of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine" as of 21 February 2014.

[43] The Laws of Ukraine "On condemnation of Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and ban on propaganda of their symbols," "On perpetuation of victory over Nazism in World War II 1939–1945," "On access to archives of repressive agencies of the Communist totalitarian regime 1917–1991," "On the legal status and honouring the memory of fighters for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century".

electoral campaigns, and implementation of budget funding of political parties.[44] In October 2015, The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law "On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Preventing and Combating Political Corruption" (No.2123a), which introduced state funding of political parties (statutory activities and reimbursement for election campaigning), improved the instruments of financial transparency and accountability of political parties, as well as the liability for violations of the law regarding their funding. As of 23 October 2015, the law had not yet been signed by the President of Ukraine.

Conditions for the activity of the opposition. In the early stage, due to the victory of the Maidan, there was a rotation of parties in terms of "government-opposition". Accordingly, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party became the parliamentary opposition. The stage is characterised by the emergence of specific conditions for the "new" opposition's activity.

On the one hand, the country restored democratic norms and free political competition; the opposition candidates and parties had an opportunity to participate in presidential and parliamentary elections. On the other, the opposition parties felt the consequences of their leadership on different levels and a part of their members during the Maidan, as well as during the period of the onset of the occupation of the Crimea and the deployment of separatist movements in the East and South of Ukraine. Their positions in terms of evaluation and interpretation of Russian aggression, terrorist groups in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, actions of the new Ukrainian authorities related to the resistance to aggression, restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and conflict resolution also produced a certain effect. In addition, none of the opposition parties recognised its responsibility for the victims of the Maidan and other, even more tragic, consequences of their tenure at the time of V. Yanukovych's regime.

The legal consequences for the opposition parties were criminal cases filed against former senior political leaders of the State, a number of deputies and members of local councils and ordinary party members, accused of criminal offences (including involvement in the shooting of protesters on the Maidan, theft of state property and other economic crimes, attempts to violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine, aiding and abetting terrorism, etc). These actions **were individual in nature** and were not directed against the parties as a whole. Currently, none of the defendants on a higher level have been brought to account under law.

An exception is the attempted judicial ban of the Communist Party of Ukraine. On 8 July 2014, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine filed a claim with the District Administrative Court of Kyiv, in which the state agency asked the court to ban the party on the basis of "the commission by the Communist Party, represented by its leaders and members of activities aimed at violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine" and on other grounds

provided by the Constitution.[45] The claim has not been considered because of bureaucratic delays.[46] The Minister of Justice also appealed to SBU with the request to conduct further investigation into the involvement of the CPU leader P. Symonenko in criminal offences related to financing terrorism or supporting terrorist organisations LPR and DPR, recognition of the annexation of Crimea and actions aimed at overthrowing the constitutional order and territorial integrity of Ukraine.[47] This appeal has not yet yielded other consequences apart from P. Symonenko's summoning for questioning.

At the same time the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, according to the Law "On the Condemnation of Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and Ban on Propaganda of Their Symbols", adopted the resolution under which three communist parties – the Communist Party, the Communist Party of Ukraine (renewed) and the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants cannot participate in the electoral process.[48]

The political consequences for opposition parties were the "suspending" of the Party of Regions and its partial reformatting into the "Opposition Bloc", decreased activity of the Communist Party in Kyiv and some regions, a significant reduction in the level of support for these parties in 2014, which, in its turn, affected the results of their participation in the early parliamentary and presidential elections. Opposition deputies, contrary to the established parliamentary tradition, are not part of the Verkhovna Rada leadership and do not chair any of the parliamentary committees. The sections eliminated in 2011, in particular, one that defines the rights of the parliamentary opposition, have not been restored in the Law "On Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine".

Social consequences reflected in a sharp rise in negative attitudes towards the Party of Regions and the Communist Party and their representatives among the residents of different regions, especially in Western and Central areas. This led to radical manifestations such as attacks on the offices of these parties in Kyiv and other cities and "spontaneous lustration" of their individual representatives. In April 2015, one of the active members of the Party of Regions and the organisers of Anti-Maidan O. Kalashnykov and journalist Oles Buzyna, known for

[44] The Law of Ukraine "On principles of state Anti-Corruption Strategy in Ukraine (Anti-Corruption Strategy) for 2014-2017", the Law "On Amendments to Article 87 of the Budget Code of Ukraine."

[45] Ministry of Justice vs. the CPU. Administrative claim. – The historical truth, 9 July 2014, *http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2014/07/9/143697/view_print*.

[46] See: The Ministry of Justice will further accompany the proceedings to ban the Communist Party and requires to bring to justice the judges who sabotage the proceedings to ban the Communist Party. – Ministry of Justice of Ukraine (old version), 30 March 2015, *http://old.minjust.gov.ua/news/46963*.

[47] Petro Symonenko's activities related to terrorist financing and support for the LPR and DPR are to be investigated by the SSU – Ministry of Justice. – Website of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine (old version), 30 March 2015, *http://old.minjust.gov.ua/news/46969*.

[48] The Ministry of Justice banned the Communist Party from taking part in the elections. – UNIAN, 24 July 2015 *http://www.unian.ua*.

his anti-Ukrainian and anti-Maidan position, were killed in Kyiv. The investigation into these cases continues.

As early as during the protests in the Maidan, in Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava and Chernivtsi regional councils decided to ban the activities and symbols of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions in the territory of their regions.[49] Several councils subsequently confirmed thise decision and included in the list the successors of the Party of Regions ("Opposition Bloc", Party of Development).[50] In general, despite the absence of legal implications of such "bans," public sentiment in some regions of the country led to a certain decline in the activity of opposition parties, especially in terms of mass-political and promotional activities because of the probability of all manner of negative consequences.

However, the opposition parties also have the opportunity for full, unimpeded operation of their branches in most regions, which was attested to by their active participation in the local elections of 2015.

Major social divisions and problematic dimensions. In the early stage, the major social division that determined the line of inter-party distinction was the socio-cultural division that at the end of 2014 stepped back in terms of relevance to the socio-economic one.

The most pressing, troubled dimensions of the party system at this time are, above all, the socio-economic dimension and the dimension of support for the regime. The cultural, ethnic and foreign policy dimensions remain relevant, but to a lesser extent.

Impact of FIG on the party system. This stage is characterised by the weakening influence of FIGs on political parties during its first period. This primarily resulted from a weakening of the oligarchic groups associated with the previous regime, and increasing public demand for deoligharchisation, which limited the impact of FIGs on the newly established parties (except the "Opposition Bloc" the faction of which includes leaders of several FIGs). The influence of FIG on political parties and coalition members is more indirect in nature. The factors that constrain it are the attention of the public and the media to sources of financing and the nature of legislative activities of these parties, as well as the external factor.

At the same time, the announcement of deoligarchisation policy by the government, its open conflict with individual FIGs and the coming local elections of 2015 significantly increased the level of attention of various business groups to the party projects.[51]

External influence. During that stage, the external influence was very significant. On the part of Russia it had acquired an extreme character – open military aggression and annexation of a part of the territory of Ukraine. The influence of the West was an important factor in the victory of the Revolution of Dignity, and the actions of Ukraine's Western partners in response to Russian aggression (*forming a broad international coalition in support of Ukraine with the involvement of the EU and the USA, imposing international sanctions against Russia, economic and financial aid to Ukraine*) enabled the state to survive in armed conflict and initiate internal reforms.

The processes inside the party system. At the present stage, the structure of the party system in Ukraine includes 10 political parties, which are represented in Parliament or are able to influence the political process. Medium and small parties continue to coexist within the system.

The system remained bipolar. One pole is represented by the parliament coalition (pro-European) parties, the other (the weight of which has considerably reduced) – by "Opposition Bloc". The level of representation of extreme right-wing political forces in parliament has dropped significantly; "traditional" left-wing parties are not represented at all.

The watershed in the party system lies between the pro-government coalition and the opposition, especially in terms of their attitude towards the conflict in Donbas, the actions of authorities directed against the FIGs who support the opposition, towards lustration processes and decommunisation.

Simultaneously, there is noticeable tension within the ruling coalition, depending on the willingness of the parties to bear joint responsibility for the social consequences of the unpopular socio-economic policy of the government. This tension led to the announcement by the Radical Party leader O. Lyashko of their withdrawal from the coalition.

The CPU may qualify as an anti-system party, although its influence today is insignificant.

On the whole, the party system of Ukraine retains features of a moderate pluralism system. However, an active process of formation of the new party projects, dynamic changes in support of parliamentary parties, potential reformatting of the coalition and the government, local, and potential and early parliamentary elections are the factors of system instability at this stage. Thus, one might conclude that the **process of evolution of the party system at the current stage is an ongoing one, and the system itself has not acquired its final form.**

[49] Ban of the Party of Regions and CPU initiated in Ukraine. The first to implement the ban are Ternopil, Poltava and Ivano-Frankivsk. – website Mukschevo.net, 26 January 2014, *http://www.mukachevo.net/ua/News*.

[50] "Opposition Bloc", Party of Regions and Communist Party banned in Ivano-Frankivsk Region. – BBC Ukraine, 17 April 2015, *http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2015/04/150417_ivano-frankivsk_prohibit_party_dk*.

[51] The most illustrative example is the creation of "UKROP" party by "Privat" Group.

1.3. STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES OF UKRAINE'S PARTY SYSTEM DURING TWO ELECTORAL CYCLES: DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

This section attempts to analyse the changes in the party system of Ukraine in the recent years, based on the assessment of changes in the basic parameters of the party systems, used by Western scholars (including that of volatility, effective number of parties, fragmentation), and assess the ideological spectrum of the national party system.[52]

The structural parameters of the party system. Electoral level

In the period of the electoral cycle of 2007-2012 in Ukraine, the party representation remained relatively stable, because the variability of the percentage of votes cast for the parties in the elections of 2012 as compared to the percentage of votes they received in the elections in 2007 amounted to 23.4%.[53]

The Revolution of Dignity led to qualitative changes in the party system in Ukraine and the destruction of the previous succession of party representation in Parliament. Based on the results of early elections of 26 October 2014, a large number of parties emerged in the Verkhovna Rada that either were not previously represented in Parliament or their representation was negligible.

Volatility of the percentage of the vote cast for the parties in 2014 compared to 2012, rose dramatically, nearly doubling to 55.4%, which is an indicator of the temporary instability of party representation (Table "*Number of mandates, received by parties based on the results of elections of 2007, 2012 and 2014*").[54] As we can see, over two election cycles none of the political forces has nominally remained in Parliament.

The dramatic rise in electoral volatility in 2014 demonstrated the loss of electoral support for the parties supporting the coalition in the Parliament of the 7th convocation (2012-2014) – the Party of Regions (from 183 to 0), the Communist Party of Ukraine (from 32 to 0 seats) and the level of representation of "Svoboda" (from 36 to 6 seats) was also decreased.

However, the Parliament now comprises new political parties that previously either were not represented in Parliament as individual political parties – "People's Front" (A. Yatsenyuk), Petro Poroshenko Bloc, "Samopomich" Union or those which, like the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, were represented among the previous deputies by individual members elected in 2012 in single-mandate constituencies.

Parliamentary format: fragmentation and competitive structure

The number of parties represented in the Parliament increased. While the Verkhovna Rada of the 7th convocation (2012-2014) included deputies from nine parties (five – in the multi-mandate constituency, four – in a one-mandate constituency), in the Verkhovna Rada of the 8th convocation (since 2014) there were elected deputies of 11 parties (six – in the multi-mandate and five – in single-mandate constituencies).

The thesis of growing fragmentation of the party system in the studied period of two electoral cycles confirms the growth of the index of effective amount of parliamentary parties from 3.12 in 2007 and 4.11 in 2012 to 7.68 in 2014.

Number of mandates, received by parties based on the results of elections of 2007, 2012 and 2014

Early parliamentary elections in 2007, proportional, 3% vote threshold		
	Summary mandate, Σ	
	quantity	%
Party of Regions	175	38.88
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc	156	34.66
Electoral Bloc "Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defence"	72	16.0
Communist Party of Ukraine	27	6.0
Lytvyn Bloc	20	4.44
Number of seats in Parliament	**450**	**100**
Parliamentary elections in 2012, mixed, 5% vote threshold		
	Summary mandate, Σ	
	quantity	%
Party of Regions	183	41.12
All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna"	99	22.24
"UDAR"	40	8.98
All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"	36	8.09
Communist Party of Ukraine	32	7.19
"United Centre"	3	0.67
People's Party	3	0.67
Union	1	0.22
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	1	0.22
Number of seats in Parliament	**445**	**98.88**
Early parliamentary elections in 2014, mixed, 5% vote threshold		
	Summary mandate, Σ	
	quantity	%
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	132	31.28
"People's Front"	82	19.43
"Samopomich"	33	7.82
"Opposition Bloc"	29	6.87
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	22	5.21
All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna"	19	4.50
All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"	6	1.42
"Volia"	1	0.23
Right Sector	1	0.23
"Strong Ukraine"	1	0.23
Agrarian Union "Zastup"	1	0.23
Number of seats in Parliament	**422**	**93.7**

[52] This approach requires the inclusion in the study time period of the results of 2007 elections, which will enable the analysis of two consecutive electoral cycles of 2007-2012 and 2012-2014. The report's authors are aware of limitations in the use of appropriate research instruments concerning the domestic political practice. However, its testing and adaptation to the Ukrainian reality seem important in view of the need for comparative studies.

[53] The effective number of parties is an indicator of fragmentation of the party system. See: Laakso M., Taagapera R. Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. – Comparative Political Studies, No. 12, 1979, pp. 3-27.

[54] To calculate electoral volatility, we operate the number of mandates received by parties following the elections and not the percentage of votes received by parties in the elections, due to the fact that the conditions for obtaining votes differ; as we know, different electoral systems were used in the 2007 elections as well as of 2012 and 2014 and, in addition, the threshold was changed from 3% to 5%.

Since this index is over 5, according to the typology of Niedermayer, the Ukrainian party system became highly fragmented based on the election results of 2012.[55]

Similar data are received by calculation according to the Siaroff method.[56] According to his methodology, in terms of structure, the party system of Ukraine in 2007 and 2012 can be described as **a moderate multi-party system with two dominant parties** (Party of Regions and "Batkivshchyna").

Changing the fragmentation of the party system and instability of the electoral support of parties

	2007 Early elections Proportional system	2012 Regular elections Mixed system	2014 Early elections Mixed system
The effective number of parliamentary parties	3.12	4.11	7.68
Electoral volatility	23.4		55.37

The party system that has evolved following the results of elections in 2014 can be described **as an extremely multi-party system with two dominating parties** (Petro Poroshenko Bloc and "People's Front"). None of the victorious parties had either a majority sufficient for the formation of an independent government, or more over two-thirds majority in the Verkhovna Rada necessary to make amendments to the Constitution.

Ideological positioning of Ukrainian parties and ideological polarisation of the party system before and after the Revolution of Dignity (2012 and 2014).

Determining the nature of ideologies of Ukraine's political parties is problematic. It is also difficult to correlate the nature of voting of the parties in Parliament with their ideological platforms, party or election programs, taking into account, *first*, the complexity of justification of direct and unambiguous correlations, *second*, the lack of relevant policy documents, their eclecticism, populist character, amorphousness etc.[57] The situation is complicated by the fact that in practice, in the face of existing coalition, coalition agreements and governments, each separate party votes on certain issues that may be evidence of political compromise or concessions.

In addition, in the consolidated democracies the weight of ideological differences between political forces is often relegated to the background when there is a need to ensure the sustainability of management.[58]

However, it is the ideology that sets the limits for political compromise for each political party, if it has identified itself in terms of ideology and defined its position on the most fundamental issues. The latter, in turn, correlate with differentiation, based on which parties build their identity and develop their electoral proposal.

There are various classifications of parties on ideological grounds. In particular, Claus von Beyme offers the following typology based on ideological affinity:[59]

- Liberal and Radical;
- Conservative;
- Socialists and Social Democrats;
- Christian Democrats;
- Communists;
- Agrarians;
- Regional and ethnic;
- Right extremist;
- Ecological.

Obviously, this classification is more consistent with the developed democratic countries of the West, where there are traditional parties, which can be determined as programme-based parties with a high level of ideological articulation.[60] In determining the ideological positions of the parties in these countries, the historical "ideological families" to which they belong are taken into account, their membership in international associations of the parties and ideological self-determination of the parties, which, in particular, is reflected in their names.[61]

However, these criteria are always effective in post-communist countries with unconsolidated democracy, a low level of democratic political culture, weakly institutionalised parties. Many of them "have no history", i.e have been formed relatively recently and have existed for just two or a maximum of three electoral cycles. Also, not many of them belong to the international party associations.[62] The names of the parties also cannot serve as reliable criterion for the determination of their ideological position.

55 Niedermeier Oskar, Die Analyse von Parteiensystemen, Niedermeier Oskar, Handbuch Parteienforschung. – Springer VS, 2013, pp. 83-117.

56 Siaroff A. Comparative European Party Systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections Since 1945. – Taylor & Francis, 2000; Siaroff A. A Typology of Contemporary Party Systems. – Paper Presented at the 20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan, 9-13 July 2006. – *http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_5213.pdf*.

57 For more detail see annexes to this report.

58 In this context, we can bring a single known example of the creation of a "broad coalition" in Germany following the results of parliamentary elections in 2005-2009 and in 2013. A similar format of the coalition government was present in the Austrian parliament in 2006 when, to ensure stable operation of the government, the right-conservative Austrian People's Party has united in a coalition with (Österreichische Volkspartei) the left Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs).

59 See: Beyme K. Political Parties in Western Democracies. – N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

60 Although in recent years, the party systems of developed democratic countries saw the establishment and growth of the influence of parties which cannot be classified within a certain category in the above classification. More details in the article of Nikolai Lange "In search of "basic electorate": how should the parties react to individuali- sation of society?", included in this magazine.

61 In particular, P. Mair and C. Mudde propose to determine the ideological affiliation of the parties based on the following criteria: the origin of party coalitions internal and external communications, the position of the parties and their policies. See: Mair P., Mudde C. The party family and its study. – Annual Reviews of Political Science, Volume 1, 1998, p. 211.

62 Frequently, the ideological guidance of Ukrainian political parties and members of international associations do not correspond to orientations of their western partners. An example of this is the membership of centre-left "Batkivshchyna" in the right European People's Party (EPP).

The material for evaluation of the ideological positioning of Ukrainian parties at the present stage are their election programs. Although party programmes are more related to the "self-identification plane" of the parties,[63] on the other hand, first, the voters' idea of national political parties is formed primarily during election campaigns and, therefore, on the basis of election programs and, second, some of the political parties, especially the "new" parties, either do not have any programmes or they coincide with the pre-election programmes.

For assessment of ideological positioning we use the methodology that is based on the international research project of electoral programmes of the parties *Manifesto Research Group* (*MRG*) and works by a number of foreign researchers.[64]

The chart titled "*Ideological positioning of major political parties in Ukraine in 2012 (based on the parties' programmes)*" presents the positioning of the main political parties in Ukraine in 2012, carried out according to the above-mentioned methodology.[65]

Based on the analysis of party programs, leading political parties in 2012 could be characterised as:

Party of Regions – weakly positioned right liberal;

"Batkivshchyna" – weakly positioned left conservative;

"UDAR" – strongly positioned right liberal;

CPU – strongly positioned left with conservative tendencies;

"Svoboda" – strongly positioned conservative (nationalist) with leftist tendencies.

However, the election programmes of the parties that won the elections in 2012 had some deviations compared to the party programmes. The dominant trend for pre-election programmes of such political parties as the Party of Regions, "Batkivshchyna" and "Svoboda" was an increasing left swing and sometimes increasing populism.

Based on the analysis, following the results of the elections to the Verkhovna Rada in 2012, Ukraine's party system gained some signs of polarisation. Two of its ideological "extremes", i.e., poles, were political forces with opposing ideologies: the CPU as a left

The ideological positioning of the major political parties in Ukraine in 2012 (based on the parties' programmes)



conservative political force and "UDAR" as the right-liberal party. However, in terms of political practice a political opponent of the Communist Party was All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda".

The period after the Revolution of Dignity and early parliamentary elections in October 2014 are characterised by important features.

Pre-election programmes of political parties generally are characterised by low ideological articulation, that is, statements related to approaches for evaluation and policy in the socio-economic sector (left/right vector) and values (vector of liberalism/conservatism), account for a relatively small amount here.

Based on an assessment of pre-election programmes of political parties that entered the Parliament in 2014, one can state that the vector of liberalism / conservatism is not important for most political forces.

By the left/right vector, Parliament is dominated by parties of the right spectrum – Petro Poroshenko Bloc, "UDAR", "People's Front". "Opposition Bloc" with its paternalistic attitudes and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko can be qualified as leftist, given the rhetoric the parties resort to; however, populist rhetoric waters down the picture of its positioning.

The ideological positioning of political parties in Ukraine, as of 2014 (based on pre-election programmes)



63 Mair P., Mudde C. Op cit…, p. 219.

64 The methodology developed by UCIPR experts allowing to account for the peculiarities of the Ukrainian political parties and applied to analysis of their election programmes on the eve of parliamentary elections in 2012. Its essence is the determining of the ratio of "left" and "right" and "liberal" and "conservative" theses in the programme. More detail: ideological positioning of political parties in Ukraine (UCIPR: S.H. Kononchuk, O.A. Yarosh). – Agency "Ukraine", 2013.

65 Areas and categories of analysis of the ideological positioning of political parties have been adapted to the realities of the political processes in Ukraine. See: Ideological positioning of political parties in Ukraine, pp. 13-14.

"Opposition Bloc" – weakly positioned left-oriented.

Among the key "left" theses, the following are submitted as positive: increase social protection of young families; provide for credit and tax holidays for businesses in the regions affected by hostilities; introduce preferential motgage loans for young families; adopt a new law "On providing the first job to young people who received higher or vocational education" with the view to abolish the practice of exploitation of young specialists through unpaid probation.

"Batkivshchyna" is a weakly positioned left-conservative party, with a dominant share of populist slogans in the electoral programme.

Among the key "left" theses the following are presented as "positive": restore justice; retain agricultural land in state ownership; citizens can sell state shares at a reasonable price; prevent excessive concentration of land in the same hands, which may lead to the actual enslavement of peasants; introduce government grants for young people to obtain higher education and training in Europe.

The theses of the populist brand "pass a law under which every official and their family will be required to prove legal origin of their property. Those who fail to undergo tests will be fired and their property will be seized; qualifying disciplinary committees will be set up with the public participation and charged with control of courts; legally envisage the establishment of an independent public with the right of a blocking vote; cancel the immunity of the president, MPs and judges; implement a mechanism for revoking the position of a people's deputy of Ukraine; ban leaders and people's deputies who have been accused of corruption from holding public office."

Petro Poroshenko Bloc – strongly positioned, right liberal.

Among the following right theses the following are submitted as positive: the real competitive economic model in Ukraine; elimination of the "corruption tax" on the economy; implementation of socially responsible business which pays taxes to the budget instead of bribes to certain officials; prevent monopoly and cartel agreements in big business; offer guarantees of fair competition in small business.

The key thesis of the liberal trend: effective mechanisms of social, legal and political control over the authorities; transparency of media ownership structure, strengthening of the competitive environment in this area; free market economy, which requires business initiative, hard work and constant improvement; meritocratical system where the smartest, most energetic and hard-working achieve the greatest personal success, which serves society as a whole; independent courts that can provide for the protection of rights and freedoms and security of property; encouragement for citizens to start their own business, taking responsibility for themselves; adherence to the rule of law; preventing discord in society and confrontation based on language, ideology or religion; guarantees of respect for the fundamental rights of individuals, limiting government interference in private and public life.

"People's Front" – strong positioned right liberal.

Among the following "right" theses the following are presented as positive: reforms necessary to meet European standards; European standards of governance; significant limitation of corruption, decentralisation and local government development; the government shall become "convenient" for citizens; disclosure of the ownership structure of enterprises for each individual beneficiary; reducing the amount of permits, inspections and supervisory bodies, etc; prevention of abolition or reduction of subsidies for utilities to low-income citizens.

The key theses of the liberal trend include: the rights and freedoms of citizens; self-determination of a person, his/her interests and needs as the basis of the political course of the party; expansion of freedom of entrepreneurial activity, significant reduction of the administrative functions of economy regulation.

Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko is a weakly positioned left-oriented party interspersed with conservative theses and the highest proportion of populist slogans in the electoral programme as compared to other political forces.

Among the key "left" theses the following are presented as "positive": creation of a public welfare society; return of privatised enterprises to the state, if the oligarchs do not pay a petty surcharge for privatisation; lowering payroll taxes, and increasing taxes on raw materials for oligarchs; introduction of a crisis tax for oligarchs to fill the budget and stop inflation; ban on sale of land, elimination of illegal land market, where the wealthy and speculators enrich themselves; introduction of the right to lease land under state control.

The theses of "conservative load": "We are the new Ukrainian politicians – energetic and resolute patriots"; "let the Ukrainian power and truth prevail, let the freedom raise the yellow-blue flag over the whole country."

Among others, the following statements are of a populist nature: "We will make it possible to reclaim Ukraine's nuclear status"; "The following will be politically and criminally punished: Parliament werewolves and saboteurs, separatist officials in the East, corrupt cops and thieves, businessmen who have paid mercenaries for the murder of Ukrainians; oligarchs who directly organised separatists will turn over their property to the state"; "a public anti-corruption body will start operating to respond to citizens' complaints, the composition of this body to include uncompromising veterans of the hostilities in the East"; "We will demand cancellation of 75% of external international loans because the money was borrowed by embezzling bureaucrats; the state will allocate 10 times more money than it does now for medicine."

"Samopomich" – weakly positioned left conservative.

Among the key left theses the following are presented as positive: agricultural land shall be the asset of Ukrainian farmers, so that they could attract investment and develop their economies; granting public access to medical facilities and resort facilities of the State Administration; introduction of targeted help to those who need it; guaranteeing the quality of education through transparent mechanisms for licencing and accreditation of examination.

The key theses of the conservative brand include: "We, Ukrainians, regardless of our ethnic background, are a unified national body, have a living soul and immortal spirit; our mutual support makes our nation truly independent; our unity is impersonated by the Ukrainian state"; "The duty of every Ukrainian is to defend the independence and integrity of the state, and the state's duty is to protect each of us"; "Formation of a modern Ukrainian village as archetypal values and one of the main sources of identity"; "Every Ukrainian seeks to collaborate with others for their well-being and success of their children and the attractiveness of their country."

Overall, at this stage the party system in Ukraine, in terms of its ideological dimension, can be qualified as "moderately pluralistic" ("conscious pluralism"). Based on the analysis of pre-election programmes, such parliamentary parties as "Opposition Bloc", "Batkivshchyna", "Samopomich" and the Radical Party can be roughly attributed to the left section of the ideological spectrum, which is poorly articulated. The pre-election programs of the "People's Front" and Petro Poroshenko Bloc enable their assignment to the right of the ideological spectrum, while ideologically they are articulated more clearly and unambiguously.

Given that all parliamentary parties, with the exception of "Batkivshchyna" can in one way or another be considered as new, only their future political activities will reveal their degree of institutionalisation and the solidity of consolidation of ideological identification.

Currently the ideological extremes are represented by "Samopomich" as a left-oriented conservative party and Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" as a right liberal party. Simultaneously, the two main coalition parties – Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" and the "People's Front", declare similar ideological approaches.

Given the extremely turbulent social and political processes in Ukraine, the dynamic nature of processes in the party system, low institutionalisation of the parties themselves, a significant impact on changing the degree of ideological polarisation can be made by the parties that carry a polarising potential, tend to the extreme position, and are capable of resorting to anti-systemic means of political activity.

CONCLUSIONS

In the period of 2010-2015, Ukraine and its society have undergone dramatic changes that affected the development of the Ukrainian party system. The changes occurred in the functioning of the system as a whole, and of its elements – political parties in the external environment (legislation, political and other environment, direction of external influence, etc.).

In 2010-2013, the party system developed under moderate pluralism.

From the moment of V. Yanukovych's victory in the presidential election in 2010, the political tendency to monopolisation of the political space by the Party of Regions was actively developing. To this end, at first a new law on elections to local government was passed, then the 1996 version of the Constitution was restored in an unconstitutional manner, and the new law on parliamentary elections was adopted.

Significant changes in the functioning of the party system occurred with the start of the elections campaign for the Verkhovna Rada in 2012. The positions of many "old" political parties formed in the 1990s had weakened significantly. Deteriorating conditions for the opposition's activity prompted various forms of consolidation of the parties opposing the regime. In order to create favourable conditions for achieving results in the elections, the "party of power" resorted to measures aimed at realising the socio-cultural division of society.

The period after the parliamentary elections in 2012 marked the growth of system polarisation, establishment of monopoly control of political power over government, including its judiciary, increasing pressure on the opposition parties, civil society, business structures and supporting the opposition. The party system had experienced a significant drift from the system of moderate pluralism towards systems with a "hegemon party".

The growth of authoritarian tendencies in the government, the rejection of the European integration policy and reorientation on integration into the Eurasian space caused protest actions that were significantly radicalised after the authorities' attempt to declare a de facto dictatorship (with the adoption of the notorious law of "16 January").

The large-scale protest movement that had turned into the Revolution of Dignity, led to the fall of V. Yanukovych's regime. The party system acquired a new look due to the reformatting of power, based on the results of the early presidential elections (25 May 2014) and the parliamentary elections (26 October 2014).

An important factor at this stage was the restouration of the Constitution as amended in 2004, which significantly enhanced the role of political parties. In particular, parliamentary factions of political parties again obtained the right to form a coalition and appoint a government. However, the old system of parliamentary elections was preserved, of a mixed type with inherent, significant shortcomings.

The change of power led to a radical renewal of the party system. On the one hand, due to the loss of public support the party that had been ruling until recently, experienced a split and then virtually

disappeared from the political scene, on the other hand, the main components of the system were now the political forces that remained in opposition until V. Yanukovych's regime was toppled.

The general background of the system reformatting was constituted by extreme conditions: the need to restore the functioning of the state mechanism along with the aggression from the Russian Federation, an extremely difficult socio-economic situation. Overall in 2014, there was an extreme growth in the level of influence of external factors – Russian and Western, whose vectors followed a diametrically opposed direction.

The establishment of the new parties proceeded at accelerated rates. Its significant part was formed of politicians and public figures who played an immediate part in the protests on the Maidan. The adoption of laws on decommunisation provided legal grounds for the termination of the activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine and other communist parties.

The parliamentary election campaign in 2014 was a consequence of the joining of mostly new political forces to the party system (except "Batkivshchyna"). The system regained features of moderate pluralism.

In the ideological plane, for the first time in the history of Ukraine both during the presidential and the parliamentary elections the main competition evolved between the parties that declared their adherence to the European way of development.

In general, the party system in Ukraine currently retains the features of a system of moderate pluralism. It includes parties which can be roughly attributed to both parts of the ideological spectrum – left and right. At the same time, the parties of the right wing of the ideological spectrum are more articulated. In terms of the number and ratio of the weight of parliamentary parties, the system at this stage can be characterised as a highly multiparty system.

Despite the radical renewal, the nature of political parties as components of the system remains generally unchanged. The parties are largely created to meet the specific needs of individual groups, their formation largely proceeds from the top down, as do the processes of unification of the parties.

2. PARTY SYSTEM AFTER MAIDAN: IMPLICATIONS AND FACTORS

Modern stage of the party system evolution, despite the relatively short time from its beginning, is characterised by significant changes in the dynamics of political parties and the party system.

Some of these trends are already close to completion, some are ongoing, and some have just been initiated.

2.1. BASIC CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE PARTIES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN THE LAST STAGE

The main results of the post-Maidan period of the evolution of the party system are as follows:

Significant renovation of the composition of the party system. In 2014, the political arena witnessed the emergence of the parties established during the protests and after their conclusion (Right Sector, Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity", "People's Front"), as well as the previously established parties, whose leaders built up their support during Maidan ("Samopomich", Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko). "Batkivshchyna" and "Svoboda" have retained their place, albeit losing their support to a certain extent. "UDAR" suspended its independent activities.

The former party of power – the Party of Regions (the party split and was "frozen") and its political satellite – CPU have lost their support. Some of the Party of Regions members have created a new political project – the party entitled "Opposition Bloc". S. Tihipko's attempt to restore the party "Strong Ukraine", that once merged with the Party of Regions, proved to be a failure.

Overall, among the parties that passed the electoral threshold in parliamentary elections in 2014, there was only one party that overcame it in the 2012 elections ("Batkivshchyna"), and of the 12 parties that got over 1% of vote in 2014 there were only four parties that obtained such result in the 2012 elections ("Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda", Communist Party of Ukraine, Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko).

The results of the 2014 elections showed the predominance of the "new" parties. Among the parties of the pro-European wing that scored more than 5% of votes, the "new" parties ("People's Front", Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity," "Samopomich" and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko) scored a total of more than 62% of the vote, while the "old" ones ("Batkivshchyna" and "Svoboda") – less than 11%.

Change of the balance of power. Unlike the previous period, when the party system included approximately two equal party camps (conventionally speaking, pro-Russian and pro-European camps), after the 2014 elections, a fundamentally different situation has evolved. Public support for pro-European parties (parties that supported Maidan) has significantly increased, while support for the parties of pro-Russian affiliation has declined.

Thus, if the approximate ratio of votes cast for "pro-European" and "pro-Russian" parties in the the multi-mandate constituencies in the 2012 elections normally amounted to 50%:44%, in the 2014 elections it was 68%:9.4%, and taking into account the parties that did not overcome the vote threshold, this ratio amounted to 80%:17%.

"Pro-Russian" parties lost their monopoly in representation of voters in eastern and southern Ukraine. If in 2012 the Party of Regions won the elections by party lists in all eight districts of these regions,[1] in the 2014 elections the "Opposition Bloc" was able to win in five of these areas, with the Petro Poroshenko Bloc ranked first in the other three. Thus, pro-European parties have received more votes than their opponents in five of the eight districts of these regions (except Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions).

The growing trend towards the establishment of leaderist and personalist parties. This tendency, which was observed in the party system from the very beginning of the 2000s, increased substantially throughout 2013-2014. At the same time it was more peculiar for the parties of pro-European affiliation.

Incentives for the development of this trend included the role of politicians (who led or later took the lead of the political parties) during Maidan and permanent public attention thereto, as well as the holding of presidential elections before parliamentary elections. The election of the President of Ukraine envisages competition between individual candidates and competition between leaders, personalities, and only secondary to this – between their party structures.

Manifestations of this trend involved the direct use of surnames as brands of the leading parties (the winners of the 2014 election included two such parties – Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko), and vesting leaders with a key role in electoral politics and strategies.

In particular, Radical Party, All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" and "People's Front" based their campaigns on the personalities of their leaders and frontmen. For example, the key messages in the election campaign of Popular Front were "availability of the best candidate for the office of Prime Minister" and a "strong team", which contributed to significant growth of the party's electoral results on the basis of the campaign outcome.

[1] Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Kherson regions. Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, where in 2012 the Party of Regions also won, were not included.

In what way did the said actions affect your intention to vote for the chosen political force during the electoral campaign?
% of those who voted for any party

Publication of the list and content of the main reforms that this political force is seeking to implement



The party's presentation of the most important bills it will push forward



The activities of politicians who were on top of the party list at their positions in the Government and other authorities



Publication of their candidates for the post of Prime-Minister and the new Government



Publication of their candidates for key positions in the new Government



November 2014

In general, the leaderist character of the parties has both its advantages and disadvantages. The latter are caused primarily by hypertrophied dependency on the personality of the party leader – in the event of growth of his popularity this enables the rapid ramping up of their political potential, but in the event of a decline a loss of such potential just as quickly.

Loss of importance of the policy and ideological component. This tendency exists in the party system of Ukraine for a long time and is due on the one hand, to a high level of homogeneity of the electorate in terms of its socio-economic situation and needs and, on the other hand, to significant socio-cultural differences. This has enabled the parties to offer their voters nearly the same "set" of socio-economic promises, to distinguish "their" voters through the use of "conflict" issues (language, foreign policy, etc.).

A manifestation of this trend was a failure of the two "last ideological parties" in the system – the Communist Party and "Svoboda" to obtain seats in the Parliament in the 2014 elections.

On the level of ideological and policy documents of the parties this trend is revealed in the parties ignoring the need to develop party programmes and to change their (or use as such) pre-election statements and documents. In addition, according to comparative analysis, there was a simplification and, to a higher degree, a unification of the content of the electoral programmes of political parties.[2]

In particular, among the parliamentary and the leading non-parliamentary parties, the full-scale party programmes. were provided by "Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda", CPU and Civic Position party. The party and electoral programmes of the "People's Front" and Petro Poroshenko Bloc are similar in volume and content. Other parties (Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, "Samopomich", "Opposition Bloc", "Strong Ukraine") the party programmes are fully identical with electoral programmes.

In terms of subject matter and content of the programmes, in 2014, the "core" issues for pro-European political forces were: defence of the country; restoration of peace; combatting the economic crisis; implementation of reforms (practical implementation of the European choice); decentralisation; renewal of authorities (lustration and fighting corruption).

Basic differences that distinguished the programmes of the opposition parties, concerned their approaches to conflict resolution (the need for a peaceful approach, disarmament of volunteer battalions as "illegal paramilitary formations"), denial of lustration, maintaining a non-bloc status, special status for the Russian language. Pro-European parties were more focused on securing victory in the conflict, supporting the Army and other military formations, ATO participants, abolition of non-bloc status and accession to NATO. The radical parties resorted to anti-Russian rhetoric.

In the issue of reforming the system of governance (decentralisation), economy, social sector, no significant differences were found between the pro-European parties and, more especially, between them and the opposition (except the CPU).

The estimates of ideological affiliation of the programmes of most parties is complicated, given their combination of approaches inherent in different trends (simultaneously, in the left and right camps).[3] This

[2] See Annexes "Main theses of electoral programmes...", contained in this magazine.

[3] See. subsection 1.3. of this report. See also: Bulletin "Your Choice-2014. The parliamentary elections". No. 5. – Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Studies, Kyiv, 2014, pp. 11-24.

indicates the situational purpose of programme documents of the political parties and, obviously, the same approach to their practical political activity.

Strengthening of the position of populist parties and the spread of populism in general. The socio-economic situation in Ukraine and the nature of the social structure of Ukrainian society create favourable conditions for the spread of populist approaches in politics. Political forces appeal to the "majority" of voters who are not internally differentiated, to "citizens" or the "people" as a whole, contrasting their "elite" offering "rapid change for the better" without considering real opportunities for such changes.[4]

Such approaches were used in varying degrees in the activities of domestic political parties in the past,[5] their increase was observed in the election campaign 2012, where elements of populism were present (in varying degrees) in programmes of all political parties that formed factions in Parliament.[6] Oleh Lyashko, leader of the Radical Party was elected to the Verkhovna Rada of the 7th convocation in a single-mandate constituency, whose campaign as well as the programme of the party, was marked by his undisguised populism.[7]

The victory of Maidan and the change of government have significantly increased the level of public demand for rapid positive change in the country, creating the illusion that "everything is possible now", awakening faith in the implementation of "determined revolutionary action". Combined with the restoration of the prospects of European development for Ukraine, this entailed the rise of excessive public expectations related to the prospects of improving of their socio-economic status, even in the context of armed conflict with Russia and the subsequent negative trends in the economy.

These sentiments were actively used by political parties during the presidential and parliamentary election campaigns of 2014. During the presidential campaign, the populist rhetoric of Oleh Lyashko brought him an unexpected third place with more than 8% of the vote.[8]

During the 2014 election campaign, the programmes of leading political forces offered the public a very similar set of political objectives that could be supported by the majority (restoration of peace/territorial integrity of Ukraine; decentralisation and restoration of authority/lustration, tax reform (reduction of taxes and tax burden), along with increasing expenditure, in particular, on defence and social protection, prohibition of the sale of land, etc). The programmes of certain parties (including the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, "Svoboda") were particularly notable for their radical rhetoric. The TV advertising of political forces was based on simple images, being the main means of communication between parties and voters during the 2014 campaign.

The populist nature of some parties manifested itself in their activity in the Verkhovna Rada. In particular, some of the parties that signed the coalition agreement, approved the programme of the Cabinet of Ministers and delegated their representatives thereto, did not support government bills that had socially unpopular consequences, publicly criticised the government, organised a massive protest campaign in the region against its decisions (e.g., "Batkivshchyna" and Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, "Svoboda" campaigned against raising tariffs).

However, populist approaches were characteristic of the representatives of the two largest factions of the coalition. An extreme manifestation of populism in the Verkhovna Rada was the adoption of the Law "On the restructuring of liabilities on loans in foreign currency" as of 2 July 2015, which, if it were to come into force, would have catastrophic consequences for the financial system.[9] 229 deputies, including representatives of all factions of the coalition, voted for the law.

In the context of approaching local elections, populist approaches persisted in the activities of parliamentary parties and were actively used when creating new "political projects" of a national and regional nature.

At the same time, the practice of development of party systems in other countries shows that the trend to increased populism is not an exclusively Ukrainian phenomenon. This trend is typical for other post-communist countries, including EU Member States.[10]

"Virtualisation" of the activity of political parties. This trend is reflected in the transfer by parties of the emphasis from propagandist campaigns to direct communication with voters in the media and Internet space. For a long time the main items of expenditure of the parties' electoral budget have been expenditures on political advertising, especially on TV. Meanwhile, in the 2012 election campaign, leading political forces, including the opposition, attributed this component to mass political campaigns in the regions (in particular, the campaign "Ukraine against Yanukovych", which was conducted by "Batkivshchyna"), largely due to the existence of barriers to access the leading TV stations controlled by the government.

In 2014, due to active processes of transformation of political parties and the early parliamentary elections, a situation emerged where some entities of the future parliamentary election campaign were established shortly before or even immediately prior to the beginning of the electoral process and at the beginning of the campaign did not have full-scale party structures in the regions – replacing them with their local headquarters. Thus, the parties that were to be future winners of the election were created just before of the beginning of election process: Petro Poroshenko Bloc – 27 August 2014, "People's Front" – 10 September 2014.

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4 Regarding the essential features of populism in political parties see: A. Romaniuk, Populism and development of the party system in Ukraine. – The party system of modern Ukraine: evolution, trends and development prospects. Proceedings of international scientific conference, 24-25 November 2011, pp. 242-258, Yu. Shveda Political parties Encyclopedic Dictionary. – Lviv, 2005, pp. 291-292.

5 See: A. Romanyuk Populism and development..., pp. 250-257.

6 See: Electronic Bulletin "Your Choice 2012", issues 1-5. – UCIPR website, *http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/publications/5631/start/10*.

7 See: Election programme of the Radical of Party Oleg Lyashko "New Way for Ukraine". – Website of the Central Election Commission, *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2012/WP502?pt001f01=900&pf7171=114*.

8 See: Programme of the presidential candidate Oleh Lyashko "Lyashko's Plan: Liberation of Ukraine from the Occupants. Order on Our Native Land" – Website of the Central Election Commission, *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2014/wp001*.

9 See: Poroshenko vetos the law on restructuring foreign currency loans – Kononenko. – Ukrainian Pravda, 2 July 2015., *http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/07/2/7073230*.

10 See: V. Lytvyn Populist parties in the structure of modern party systems in Central Europe: a comparative analysis. – Ukrainian academic journal "Education of the region: political science, psychology, communication", No. 2, 2012, *http://social-science.com.ua/article/788*.

When did you decide for whom you will vote?
% of those who voted for any party



	Age, y.o. (May 2015)					EDUCATION (May 2015)		
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Special secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education
I was a supporter of this party long before the elections	32.2	34.0	35.6	43.8	47.3	44.4	40.3	36.3
As soon as the campaign started, earlier than three months before it	20.4	21.9	19.6	18.5	18.1	17.6	19.9	20.5
Earlier than a month before the elections	14.3	15.8	15.1	14.1	10.9	11.5	14.9	13.7
Last month before the election	16.1	14.9	16.0	15.7	10.3	12.7	12.1	17.0
Last week before voting	10.0	3.7	5.3	5.6	5.7	6.1	5.6	6.1
Last day before the vote	1.3	2.3	3.1	1.2	2.8	3.5	1.7	1.6
I made up my mind at the polling station	3.5	4.7	2.2	0.8	2.3	2.3	2.8	2.7
Difficult to say	2.2	2.8	3.1	0.4	2.6	2.0	2.6	2.0

November 2014

Under these conditions, the emphasis was placed on pre-election activities to ensure media presence. The dominance of media technologies over organisational work was also due to the short duration of the election campaign.

On the prevalence of media activity in the activities of political parties during the campaign, according to sociological research data. Thus, al most 70% of voters received information on political parties from speeches of their representatives in talk shows, almost 58% – from TV advertising and only 10% – from direct meetings with representatives of political parties.[11] It was the information received on the TV, affected the public choice the most. Thus, 60% of citizens made their choice between the

[11] The information was drawn from a study conducted by the Razumkov Centre on 21-26 November 2014 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea and in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. During the study more than 2,000 respondents participated in sample polling, representing the adult population of Ukraine by the main socio-demographic indicators. Theoretical sampling error (excluding design effect) is less than 2.3% with a probability of 0.95.

From what sources did you draw information about the party you voted for in the elections? *
% of those who voted for any party



* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

parties after the election campaign began, while 40% said they were supporters of the parties they voted for long before the election.

Thus, the period of 2014-2015 was marked by a specific situation when citizens elected parties to Parliament which actually did not exist,[12] a kind of proto-parties. These parties obtained representation at the Verkhovna Rada, having no membership base or organisational structure. Most of the voters voted "in advance".

At the same time, there is a positive fact that Petro Poroshenko Bloc, "People's Front", "Samopomich" and other "new" parties have developed their structures in the regions over 2014-2015 and have their own network as of June 2015. An important incentive of this development was the prospect of local elections scheduled for 25 October 2015.

The establishment of parties on the basis of civil society and the incorporation of the most active civil society representatives into the parties

The role of civil society in organising protests and countering aggression against Ukraine affected the process of party building. "Interpenetration" of civil society and political parties occurred in several areas.

At the time of Maidan, some parties emerged based immediately on formal and informal structures of civil society – particularly as it was in case of the Right Sector party. Involvement of the Maidan activists in the authorities during February and March 2014 enabled their further access to leadership positions in the new political forces, created before the elections (including the "People's Front" – V. Siumar, A. Parubiy).

Some political forces were actively incorporating the public initiatives at a local level ("Samopomich") or collaborating with parties which, in turn, were "umbrella organisations" for social movements (cooperation of "Civic Position" with Democratic Alliance party).

The most widespread form was the inclusion of representatives of different categories of civil society (civic activists, NGO leaders, volunteers, volunteer participants of ATO, non-governmental experts) to election lists. Representatives of these categories were put on the list of all pro-European political parties that were elected to the Parliament and occupied senior positions in the Verkhovna Rada based on the the election results (O. Syroyid, Ye. Sobolyev, A. Teteruk and others), parliamentary factions and committees.

This approach was favourably received by the electorate of relevant affiliation and largely entailed the "advance" of these parties in the form of voting for them This, according to opinion polls, 68% of respondents before the elections positively reacted to placing civil

[12] The legal status of such parties constitutes a separate problem, particularly given the presence of a sufficient number of centres in regions that is required by effective law.

Information from what sources influenced your choice the most?*
% of those who voted for any party



	REGIONS					AGE, y.o.					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Special secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education
Speeches of party representatives in TV discussion programs (talk shows)	68.1	50.7	69.7	68.5	53.9	55.9	60.6	58.2	65.6	60.7	52.9	63.7	62.7
Stories about the party in the news	36.8	29.7	40.2	19.7	37.3	26.1	33.0	30.2	32.1	34.9	30.8	32.6	31.1
TV advertisement	24.7	37.3	28.7	28.2	33.1	29.6	34.4	29.6	27.6	33.9	37.6	30.5	27.9
Discussions with other people	25.0	19.9	10.6	18.3	13.5	20.0	14.4	20.4	19.6	21.2	16.7	22.2	18.4
Leaflets and other campaign materials of the parties	12.9	12.3	14.8	6.1	5.0	9.6	11.1	14.2	8.0	11.4	9.5	12.7	9.6
Newspaper publications	8.3	9.1	11.4	9.9	16.2	6.6	8.3	9.3	13.7	10.9	11.2	9.3	10.0
News or political websites	9.5	12.7	3.3	6.1	11.3	21.3	12.0	9.8	6.8	3.4	4.6	6.5	16.2
Meetings with party representatives	6.3	9.5	13.9	3.3	8.5	8.3	5.6	10.7	9.6	6.2	6.3	8.9	8.0
Party newspapers	4.0	8.5	5.7	6.1	7.8	2.6	5.1	7.5	7.2	8.5	7.2	7.1	4.9
Speeches by party representatives on the radio	5.7	7.1	6.5	6.1	6.4	4.8	7.4	2.2	8.8	7.8	9.8	5.0	5.3
Social networks (e.g.*VKontakte*, *Facebook*, *Odnoklassniki* etc.)	6.0	8.1	7.4	2.3	5.6	15.7	8.8	4.4	4.0	1.8	4.6	5.4	8.4
Billboards of the parties and their leaders	0.6	1.9	0.8	1.4	4.3	0.9	2.3	2.7	2.0	1.0	1.4	2.4	1.2
Personal letters and appeals to the leaders of the parties sent by mail	1.4	1.7	2.5	0.5	0.0	1.7	1.9	0.0	1.2	1.3	1.7	1.3	1.0
Other	4.3	1.0	0.8	5.2	5.7	1.3	4.7	1.8	2.8	4.1	3.2	2.6	3.5
Difficult to say	1.7	3.1	0.8	1.9	1.4	3.0	0.9	4.0	0.4	2.3	2.9	1.1	2.7

* Respondents were asked to choose no more than three acceptable answers.

November 2014

activists on the lists over 60% to placing volunteer batalion commanders on the lists along with military servicemen and ATO participants.[13]

Cooperation with civil society, the involvement of its most active representatives in the formation of party structures with the participation of social movements and initiatives is a positive trend, which facilitates implementation of the representation function by the parties. At the same time, implementation of these approaches in political life during 2014-2015 had some negative consequences for the parliamentary political parties, including the introduction to Parliament of radical and populist approaches and a certain decrease of the professional level of deputies.

The impact of changes on the systemic problems of political parties

Previous studies by the Razumkov Centre determined a number of problems and shortcomings peculiar to the domestic political parties. They are as follows:

- lack of sustainable ties with certain social groups (sustainable social basis);
- weakness (absence of) programme and ideological principles;
- regional support (absence of national parties);
- control by FIGs, opacity of financing, political corruption;
- separation from society, lack of accountability to voters of the representatives elected to government agencies;
- a tendency to unite in blocs;
- hypertrophied significance of the personal factor;
- lack of internal party democracy.[14]

In terms of the status and prospects of solving these problems, the changes in the party system during the last phase have had some outcomes.

In particular, despite the tendency to preserve the positioning of most parties as "all-encompassing", there are some signs of linkages between certain categories of citizens selected on social grounds (including demographic, professional, educational level, economic status) and party sympathies. For example, sociological survey data show a more positive attitude to the "new" political parties among citizens with higher education, of a younger age.[15] Also, according to the survey, among the survey respondents, selected on a professional basis, from 26% to 41% of Ukrainians recognise the existence of a party which represents their interests (Diagram "*Is there a party in Ukraine, that you can say...?*").

To enable political parties to define more clearly and adjust the system for working with those social groups that could become their social base. This is also facilitated by revitalisation of the parties' work with civil society on various levels.

Results of parliamentary elections in 2014 and the local election campaign attested the available grounds for the development of certain parties towards the national level, overcoming the traditional "regionalisation" of their support. Such opportunities, given the certain decline of the impact of some socio-cultural differences on the nature of political sympathies of citizens still remain.

The above-mentioned changes in legislation regarding the introduction of budget financing of political parties, strengthening of financial control, and greater public attention to these problems, are positive preconditions for further abatement of the parties' dependence on FIGs, reducing the level of political corruption.

However, the situation with such issues as weakness (absence) of a programme and ideological principles of political parties, hypertrophied nature of the personal factor (creation of "personal" parties is on-going), low accountability to voters, failure to observe principles of internal party democracy (although some of the "new" parties try to build their activity on this basis) has not changed or deteriorated.

Assessing the parties' performance of their main functions[16] and the impact on the process of changes in the party system that occurred in the last stage needs further study, given its limited duration in time.

Is there a party in Ukraine that you can say represents your interests?
% respondents



[13] The survey was conducted by the Razumkov Centre on 19-23 September 2014 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea. 2012 respondents aged over 18 years were polled. The theoretical sample error is 2.3%.
[14] See: Ukraine's party system, special features of formation, operating problems, evolution trends. Report of Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, No. 5, 2010, pp. 22-30.
[15] See material entitled "*Political parties and party system of Ukraine at present: public opinion*", included in this magazine.
[16] See: Ukraine's party system, peculiarities of formation, operation problems, trends of evolution..., p. 22.

Meanwhile, according to the results of the survey by the Razumkov Centre, the experts poorly rated the implementation by existing parties of most of their functions, exclusive of the function of fighting for power.[17]

2.2. PRIMARY FACTORS OF INFLUENCE ON EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM AT THE PRESENT STAGE

The period of 2013-2015 in the history of Ukraine was rich in unprecedented events that significantly affected all and every sector of social life. Consequently, this engendered some distinctive features of the factors that have influenced and continue to influence processes within the party system of Ukraine. The nature and effects of these factors are discussed below.

Changes in legal environment for activities of political parties. After the change of government in 2014 there have been significant changes in the legal environment of political parties.

Re-enactment of the Constitution as amended in 2004. One of the first decisions of Parliament after the fall of the authoritarian regime was the adoption on 21 February 2014 of the law "On Re-enactment of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine".[18] This decision restored the leading role of the parties in the formation of executive and legislative power, determining the content of their political activities. On the basis of the recovered Constitution, the parties participated in the formation of the coalition at the Verkhovna Rada of the 7th and 8th convocations and two coalition governments.

The electoral law. The early parliamentary elections in 2014 were held under the same electoral law the as the 2012 elections. This happened despite the presence of significant public demand for a proportional electoral system with open lists. As a result, two non-partisan parliamentary groups with a mild identity emerged in the political structure of Parliament and there is also a significant number of independent deputies.

14 July 2015 the Parliament adopted a new law "On Local Elections". The law provides for the right to nominate candidates by parties: in single-mandate constituencies upon the election of deputies to village and town councils; candidates for village chairmen, town and city mayors; lists of candidates in multi-mandate constituencies for the election of deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, district, city, city district councils, with assigning candidates to territorial election districts, into which the corresponding multi-mandate constituency is divided.

The election threshold for parties participating in the distribution of seats in multi-mandate constituencies increased from 3% to 5%. A "gender quota" for party lists – "representation of persons of the same sex in the electoral lists of candidates for deputies of local councils in multi-mandate constituencies is being introduced which must be at least 30% of the total number of candidates in the list."

During the discussion in the second reading of the draft bill, the following rules were withdrawn: on participation of electoral blocs in elections and admission to participation in the elections only for those parties that were established not later than 365 days before the election.

Despite public expectations and the availability of appropriate alternative drafts bills, the law does not envisage the presence of preferential voting (so-called open lists), as it does not enable voters to choose between candidates in one of the party lists. However, compared to the previous mixed system of elections to the respective councils, the new system may be seen as definite progress.

Statutory rules (particularly, raising the electoral threshold, prohibition of creating the party blocs, the system of elections in the multi-mandate constituencies) create certain benefits for the more powerful parties.

The law on lustration. On 16 September 2014, with regard to the negative social and political consequences of the previous government and a significant social demand for government cleansing, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law on lustration.[19] Part 3 of Article 1 of the Law envisages the prohibition to hold posts in government and local government (except for elected positions) at different times (5 or 10 years) for several categories of people, including those who held high positions in central and local government under President V. Yanukovych. Given the status of the Party of Regions during this period, we can assume that the enactment of the Law led to the dismissal in state and local authorities of a certain number of members of this party, as well as of other ruling parties.[20]

In its conclusions on the Law (as amended on 21 April 2015), the Venice Commission drew attention to a number of problematic issues, particularly on an overly extensive list of positions in its view that fall under lustration on grounds of their occupation under the V. Yanukovych regime.[21]

However, the poor lustration of the new government, from the public's point of view, keeping officials of V. Yanukovych's time in their positions, led to the spread of the phenomenon of spontaneous, "wastebin lustration", to which some deputies from the Party of Regions have been subjected, including V. Zhuravskyi and V. Hrushevskyi. Representatives of some radical parties (Radical Party of Oleh Lyasho, Right Sector) participated in these actions.

Laws on decommunisation. On 9 April 2015 the Verkhovna Rada adopted a series of laws known as "decommunisation laws".[22] These laws significantly alter the conditions for activity of some political parties.

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[17] See results of expert survey "Current state and prospects of development of party system in Ukraine: expert assessments", contained in this magazine.

[18] The Law of Ukraine "On re-enactment of certain provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine" as of 21 February 2014.

[19] The Law "On Government Cleansing" of 16 September 2014.

[20] It is not possible to receive precise data on this issue given the lack of information on party affiliation of the lustrated persons in official sources. In particular, see the Unified State Register of persons to whom the provisions of the Law "On Government Cleansing" are applicable." – Website "On Government Cleansing in Ukraine", *http://lustration.minjust.gov.ua/register*. According to data published by the chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for the Prevention of Corruption, as of 16 October 2015, more than 700 officials were lustrated in Ukraine and more than 1.000 resigned voluntarily. – Ukrainian Pravda, 16 October 2015.

[21] Adopted Final Opinion on the Law on Government Cleansing (Lustration Law) of Ukraine as would result from the amendments submitted to the Verkhovna Rada on 21 April 2015, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 103rd Plenary Session (Venice, 19-20 June 2015), CDL-AD(2015)012-e, clause 111 part (d)).– Venice Commission website, *http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282015%29012-e*.

[22] The Law "On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols", "On perpetuation of victory over Nazism in World War II 1939–1945", "On access to archives of repressive agencies of the Communist totalitarian regime 1917–1991", "On the legal status and honouring the memory of fighters for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century".

The Law "On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols,"

Article 3, prohibits propaganda of Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and their symbols.

The law establishes that a violation of the ban by political parties and (or) their use in the titles of the relevant symbols constitute grounds for refusal of registration and (or) termination of their registration, in case of non-compliance by the parties with the law their activity is subject to termination in court (under the claim of a central executive body that carries out their registration (legalisation) – the Ministry of Justice).

The Law vests the Ministry of Justice with the authority to make decisions regarding non-compliance of the title and/or symbols of a political party with the requirements of the Law in the manner specified by the Cabinet of Ministers. In the event this solution is adopted, the party and its regional structures are deprived of the right to be play a part in the election process.

In addition, it envisages criminal responsibility of individuals for violations of this law.

The same Law amended the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine", which qualifies as grounds to ban the formation and activities of political parties, the propaganda of communist and/or National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and their symbols and prohibits the use as party symbols of the symbols of communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes.

The Law "On the legal status and honouring the memory of fighters for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century"

The law defines the list of authorities, organisations, institutions and groups, whose members are recognised as fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century. The list included, in particular, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

The law establishes liability for public expression of neglect for fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century and deems unlawful the denial of the legitimacy of the struggle for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century.

The Law "On perpetuation of victory over Nazism in World War II 1939–1945"

The law introduces into official circulation the term "World War II" instead of the "Great Patriotic War" and sets a new holiday – the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation on 8 May, and cancels the use of Soviet symbols (the flag of victory) during celebrations.

These laws have significant consequences for the party system. *First*, there appears an additional ground for the suspension and prohibition of participation in the elections of existing leftist parties based on communist ideology, using the "heritage" of the communist regime in the titles, programme documents and their practical activity.[23] Creation of new parties of relevant affiliation becomes impossible.

The same applies to parties that could use national socialist symbolism (although there are no such parties in Ukraine at this time). Generally it restricts the establishment and activities of "extreme" parties, especially of the leftist kind.

Second, adopted laws complicate to a great extent the propagandist activities of parties who exploit the post-Soviet, "nostalgic" mood of voters.

Third, the possibilities for use by political parties of controversial social issues, particularly the problem of OUN-UPA, are restrained. On the one hand, the purpose of struggle for the right-wing parties disappears (status of a participant of relevant formations) on the other – the fight against such recognition is considered illegal, which may cause problems for the activities of political parties that try to exploit this issue.

Consequently, the discourse of political parties can shift from the "struggle for the past" to "the struggle for the present and future", which will be a positive trend. In addition, the law provides the state authorities with additional grounds to interfere in the work of political parties, using the relevant rules of law to combat political opposition.

Changes to legislation aimed at transparency in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns, the introduction of budget financing of political parties. On 14 October 2014 the Verkhovna Rada has approved the Law "On bases of state anti-corruption policy in Ukraine (Anti-corruption strategy) for 2014-2017".

The main provisions of the Anti-Corruption Strategy on political parties and electoral campaigns

- Unification of campaign finance regulation stipulated by laws of Ukraine "On elections of people's deputies of Ukraine", "On elections of President of Ukraine" and "On elections of deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, local councils and village chairmen, town and city mayors";
- introduction of direct public funding of political parties as budget financing of statutory activity of political parties based on the results of the elections, including the support of political parties that have no parliamentary representation and the reimbursement of expenditures for the electoral campaign of the political parties that passed the electoral threshold in the amount determined by law;
- defining requirements for transparency of the current funding of parties, including through regular reporting, publication of reports of political parties in an accessible form with detailed information on proceeds (including persons who have contributed to the financing of the party), costs (fees) and financial liabilities;
- implementation of a clear regulation of donations and gifts, setting limits on the amount of donations and gifts received by political parties;
- determining the content and form of the annual reports of political parties; ensuring proper accounting of income, expenses, debts and assets, presentation of consolidated reports;
- introducing independent audit of current and election reporting of the parties by certified auditors;
- establishing an effective mechanism for monitoring compliance with the law on financing of political parties and election campaigns, investigating violations and bringing those responsible to justice, creation (definition) for this purpose of a state agency that meets international standards of independence and effectiveness;
- establishing effective and proportionate sanctions for violation of legislation on political finance.

On 8 October 2015 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on preventing and combatting political corruption".

[23] As of 24 March 2015, there were four political parties in Ukraine that included in their title the word "communist" and, in respect of three of them, the Ministry of Justice decided on their non-compliance with the above Law. See: Minister of Justice Petrenko: Three Communist Parties Banned from Participating in the Electoral Process for Violating the Laws of Ukraine. – Interfax-Ukraine, 24 July 2015.

Main provisions of the Law "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on preventing and combatting political corruption"[24]

Amendments to the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine"

A statutory public financing of political parties has been implemented. Statutory activities of political parties not connected with their participation in elections of people's deputies of Ukraine, the presidential election and local elections, and the costs associated with the financing of election campaigns during regular and extraordinary parliamentary elections in Ukraine are reimbursed at the expense of the State Budget Ukraine.

The annual state funding of statute activities of political parties is being set: two hundredths of a minimum wage set as of 1 January of the year preceding the year of allocation, multiplied by the total number of voters who participated in voting in the national multi-mandate constituency at the last ordinary or extraordinary parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

It is determined that the right to public funding of statutory activities shall be held by a party whose electoral list at the last ordinary or extraordinary elections of the deputies of Ukraine in the national constituency received at least 2% of valid votes of voters who participated in voting.

At the same time, prior to the next parliamentary elections, only parties that passed the 5% threshold in the 2014 elections will be funded, while, based on the results of parliamentary elections, the parties that will get more than 2% of the vote.

The decision to fund statutory activities of a political party or refuse to provide such funding shall be taken by the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption on the basis of the last parliamentary elections in Ukraine in a multi-mandate constituency. The National Agency for Prevention of Corruption also decides not to grant state funding for statutory activities of political parties, for suspension or termination of such funding.

90% of the amount of annual state funding of statutory activities of political parties are divided between the parties eligible for funding in proportion to the number of votes cast for their listings. 10% are shared equally between the parties that are eligible for such funding, given their observance of "gender quota".

The limits for contribution to the parties made throughout the year have been set as follows: 400 minimum salaries – for individuals, 800 minimum salaries – for legal entities. It is assumed that if a natural or legal person exercises or can exercise a decisive influence on the activity of one or more legal entities, the contribution of such person or entity and subordinate entities shall be deemed as the contribution of one person and shall be limited to a total size (amount) of the contribution (contributions) set by applicable law.

The funding of parties by legal entities, whose ultimate shareholders (controllers) are persons authorised to perform state functions or local government according to the Law of Ukraine "On prevention of corruption."

It is permitted for an international organisation or a political party registered in EU member states to support the statutory activities of a party.

It is determined that state control of the financial activities of the parties shall be performed by:

• Accounting Chamber – for the targeted use of funds by the political parties allocated from the State Budget of Ukraine to finance their statutory activity;

• National Agency on Corruption Prevention – for compliance with established restrictions on financing political parties, campaigning, legal and intended use of budget funds to finance statutory activities, timely reporting on assets, income, expenses and financial obligations by the parties, reports on the receipt and use of election funds at national and local elections, the completeness of such statements, their compliance with set registration requirements and accuracy of the data included.

It is assumed that the political party which was a player in the electoral process in the presidential elections, elections of the deputies of Ukraine or participated in regular or early local elections and a political party which receives state funding, must undergo an external independent financial audit of the reports on assets, income, expenses and liabilities for the financial year, following the year of elections or the receipt of public financing.

It is determined that a political party must submit on a quarterly basis the party's report on assets, income, expenses and financial obligations for the quarter and publish this report on its official website to the National Agency on Corruption Prevention. The nature and extent of information that should be included in the report, including dates, amount, entities making contributions to their support and data on all payments made from the party's account.

The party's report on assets, income, expenses and financial obligations, as well as analysis of the report shall be published on the official website of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention and is accessible in the public domain for at least five years.

Under the transitional provisions of the Law:

• rules on statutory annual public funding of the political parties, reimbursement of the parties' campaigning and setting limits on contributions in support of the parties made by individuals and legal entities shall enter into force on 1 January 2017;

• state funding of statutory activities of political parties to support the electoral lists for which at least 5% of votes were cast during the 2014 parliamentary elections shall be carried out from Q2 2017.

Changes to the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code of Ukraine

Provision is made for administrative and (or) criminal liability for violation of the procedure of financing the political parties, their pre-election campaigning, campaigning for a nationwide or local referendum, including for violation of the procedure for making or receipt of contributions in support of political parties, breach of the procedure governing provision or receipt of public funding of statutory activities of political parties, campaigning or canvassing for a nationwide or local referendum, violation of the procedure for presentation of the financial report on receipt and use of campaign funds, the party's report on assets, revenues, expenses and financial obligations.

With changes to the Law "On Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine" and "On elections of the President of Ukraine" the relevant laws are brought into line with the amendments to the procedure for funding political parties, implementation of reporting and control of the financial activity of political parties.

[24] While the Law was not signed by the President and was not officially published, the text of Bill No. 2123a and information of people's deputies on the changes made to the text during its discussion and final adoption were used for the analysis.

The Law "On Amendments to Article 87 of the Budget Code of Ukraine" (regarding the financing of political parties) was adopted on 8 October 2015, according to which the State Budget for 2017 and the budgets for the coming years will provide for the funds for "the public financing of political parties in the forms prescribed by law".

In the event of practical implementation of these laws, actual prerequisites can be created for reducing the impact of FIGs on political parties, provision of greater transparency of party finances and stimulation of institutional development of party structures.

Basic social divisions and problematic dimensions. As noted, during this stage, changes took place in the hierarchy of social divisions that define the main lines of inter-party division.

The exacerbation of socio-economic division is caused by a significant drop in the living standards of citizens, in particular, as a result of Russian aggression that entailed the loss of the territory of Ukraine and the damage to its economy and as a result of unpopular actions of the government dictated, among other things, by the terms of obtaining assistance from international financial institutions.[25]

In modern terms the socio-economic divide manifests itself as the dissatisfaction with the majority of social and economic policies of the government and the course of implementation of reforms.[26] In addition, in the public's opinion the government is often identified with oligarchic groups that control the country's economy. The slogan of "deoligarchisation" is used both by the pro-government parties and their opponents, the populist parties.

Withdrawal to the background of socio-cultural division, in turn, was caused by significant changes in the public mood across Ukraine, in particular, the increased level of patriotism in the face of military Russian aggression, a fall in the topical relevance against this background of controversial social issues (in particular, linguistic and religious), increased support for the Western vector of foreign policy with a simultaneous, sharp increase and spread to the Eastern and Southern regions of a negative attitude toward Russia and others.[27]

The influence of this factor is evidenced both in the results of presidential and parliamentary elections (the victory of the pro-European candidate and parties) and apparent change of emphasis in the inter-party debate in Parliament, where the main discussions and conflicts now evolve around socio-economic issues but not cultural or foreign policy ones.

Influence of FIGs on the party system. The developments of Maidan and the armed conflict with Russia significantly affected the relations between political parties and FIGs. *First*, one of the requirements of the Maidan was the removal of the oligarchs from power and, respectively "deoligarchisation" was a requirement for the political parties that claim to represent the interests of Maidan, and their financing by oligarchs became a factor that reduces electoral support. Accordingly, in the 2014 election campaign pro-European parties tried to demonstrate the transparency of their own sources of finance and non-involvement of oligarch funding.[28]

Second, significant changes occurred in the balance of power between major oligarchic groups. The removal from power of V. Yanukovych, international sanctions and criminal proceedings against his entourage, the loss of Crimea and the armed conflict in Donbas, as well as the new government's activities as part of "deoligarchisation" led to the deterioration of the oligarchic groups that supported the Party of Regions and the parties which were "technological projects" of the authorities. Now there is a hidden relationship of "Opposition Bloc" (this group was believed to have an impact on some parties belonging to the coalition) with the oligarchic groups (Liovochkin-Firtash).

After the appointment of Ihor Kolomoyskyy as head of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration, the positions of Privat Group temporarily strengthened. Representatives of the group have created their own political project – the party "Ukrainian Union of Patriots" (UKROP), and the Group is deemed to have impact on other parties as well.[29] After Ihor Kolomoyskyy was released from office, the relations of the Group with the authorities acquired a confrontational nature.[30]

However, the media reported the attempts by some members of FIGs to develop a "common solution" regarding the means of exerting influence on the government, and the initiative to create new parties was launched.[31] The intention to set up a party by representatives of business-groups[32] of the former authorities that remain outside Ukraine was also reported.

[25] Learn more below.

[26] See: Results of the sociological study "Assessment of citizens in Ukraine and the state of reforms." – website of the Razumkov Centre 11 June 2015, *http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/news.php?news_id=635*.

[27] See: Results of sociological survey "The public perception of the state independence of Ukraine", 21 August 2015, Results of sociological study "Public assessment of the situation in Donbass", 28 August 2015. – website of the Razumkov Centre, *http://www.uceps.org/ukr/news.php?news_id=656*.

[28] Although the top of the lists of parliamentary parties included representatives of business structures at various levels. See analysis of electoral lists of the parties on the website of News Agency "Slovo i dilo" *http://www.slovoidilo.ua*.

[29] In particular, "Revival" (Vidrodzhennia) party. See: Vicious Circle. President, Government and Oligarchs. – Ukrainian Pravda, 7 September 2015.

[30] An illustrative example of such a conflict in the party-political arena has become the fierce competition of the UKROP party representative Korban and Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" representative Berezenko in the midterm elections to the Verkhovna Rada in constituency No. 205 (Chernihiv Region).

[31] The oligarchs had a secret meeting at which they discussed what to do with the authorities – a deputy. – Ukrainian Pravda, August 4, 2015.

[32] See: Azarov and Klyuyev are preparing to establish a new political party in Ukraine – Media. – UNIAN, 17 June 2015, *http://www.unian.net/politics/1090574-azarov-i-klyuev-gotovyatsya-k-sozdaniyu-v-ukraine-novoy-politicheskoy-partii-smi.html*.

Currently, parliamentary parties have no "monopoly donors", typically enjoying the support of business groups of various scale. In the parties' activities parliamentary coalition significantly fewer cases of lobbying the specific interests of FIG in the legislative process were observed. This may be a sign of a certain reduction of the impact on party politics on a national level. However, on the eve of local elections interest of business in regional policy projects increased, which is reflected in the growth of their number.

External impact. For the party system of Ukraine the external influence entailed the growing influence of pro-European political parties (which are all member parties of a parliamentary coalition) and, accordingly, a significant weakening of pro-Russian parties. In addition, the Western influence manifested itself in implementing sanctions against a number of Ukrainian politicians – leaders of the Party of Regions, the Russian side – in the provision of asylum and protection from criminal prosecution to some of the above.

As a result of Western influence, contacts between the Ukrainian pro-European political parties and their representatives with European parties significantly intensified. Currently, three Ukrainian parties ("Batkivshchyna", "UDAR" and People's Move-ment of Ukraine) are members (observers) in the EPP, the European Party of Ukraine is an associated member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).[33] Russia continued to support the Communist Party, a member of the "Union of Communist Parties – CPSU", Communist Party of Ukraine leader P. Symonenko is a secretariat member in this association.[34]

The activities of international partners to support reforms in Ukraine evolve with the active involvement of representatives of political parties, both deputies and

experts, which helps develop the capacity of pro-European political parties. The activities of foreign institutes in Ukraine continue, which facilitates institutional development of national political parties (including *NDI*, *IRI* and German political foundations).

Peculiarities of the social – economic and social – political situation The modern period of the party system is characterised by the influence of factors that are derived from a situation in which Ukraine found itself over 2014-2015: armed aggression of Russia, the need to mobilise resources for the defence of the country and to overcome the consequences of combat actions, the need of simultaneous reforms, including Ukraine's socially unpopular but necessary seeking of international financial assistance and the militarisation of various aspects of public life.

Economic crisis, decrease in the public welfare. Ukraine's economy has suffered significant losses as a result of Russian aggression, which negatively affected the socio-economic situation of the majority of citizens.

The main economic and social consequences of the conflict

According to the results of 2014, the slump in production amounted to 10.5% In the first half of 2015 performance indicators (real sector) continued to deteriorate, industrial production declined by 20.5%, agriculture – by 9.3%. The decline in construction reached 28.3%, in retail trade - 24.7%.

The inflation process has rapidly accelerated from the beginning of 2015. During the first half of the year, the consumer price index increased by 40.7% (food prices increased by 37.7%), the consumer price index for industrial products increased by 23.4%. The main components of inflation in 2015 (the same as in the second half of 2014) proved to be the plummeting of UAH (growth rate of hryvnia against the US dollar from 15.8 at the beginning of the year to 22.0 at the end of July) and a sharp rise in prices for utilities (the relevant price index was 221.7%).

The government's activities, aimed at Ukraine's compliance with the terms of international creditors had a negative impact on public sentiment. In particular, the need to sign the Memorandum with the IMF had the following consequences:

- freezing minimum wages, pensions and social benefits;
- reducing public sector wages – doctors, teachers, lecturers, civil servants and social, cultural workers by abolishing the current co-payments and bonuses;
- improving the terms of retirement and length of service necessary for many categories of workers;
- additional personal income tax, including pensions, housing, bank deposits and so on.

The basic social standards remain at the level of 2013 (the subsistence minimum for employable individuals and the minimum wage amount to UAH 1,218; the minimum pension amounts to UAH 949), which does not correspond to the actual subsistence minimum for employable persons. In prices of May 2015, The real amount of subsistence minimum[35] for the working population was UAH 2,466 (including the amount of tax on personal income – UAH 2,629).[36]

The real incomes of citizens of Ukraine decreased by 10% and the poverty rate increased by 30%. Almost all the received resources – both of households and the private sector – are spent on consumption, the level of which in 2015 reached 93% of GDP.

[33] See: website of the European People's Party *http://www.epp.eu/member-parties*; European Party of Ukraine joins the European political body. – TSH-UA, 13 May 2013, *http://tsn.ua*.

[34] See: UCP – CPSU website, *http://skpkpss.ru/rukovodstvo*.

[35] Calculated in accordance with Article 5 of the Law "On Living Wage".

[36] Information about the actual size of the subsistence minimum. – Ministry of Social Affairs, *http://www.mlsp.gov.ua/labour/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=178535&cat_id=141688*.

Sociological studies confirm a trend towards deterioration of living standards among all population segments. Thus, in 2014, 51% of respondents noted the difficult financial situation and, in 2015, their number increased to 75%,[37] 56% of Ukrainians started to save on products, 53% – on clothes.

The issue of unemployment was exacerbated Throughout 2015 there was a further reduction in the total number of people in work.[38] The unemployment rate of the working population, defined by the ILO methodology in Ukraine grew on average from 7.3% (2013) to 10% (2015).[39]

As of June 2015, there were on average 10.2 candidates for every vacancy (job) on offer (the same figure in June 2013 amounted to 5.9).[40] The IDPs from the ATO zone, which focus on finding work in other areas, increase the burden on regional labour markets and increase competition for jobs.

Ukraine faced the issue of internally displaced persons, which amounts to 2% of the country's total population (about 60% of them are of retirement age).[41] According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a total of 5 million people need immediate humanitarian assistance.

As a result of adverse changes the public perception of the government significantly worsened, the level of support for the government institutions and senior government officials declined, there was a significant disillusionment among citizens in the reforms which were expected not to cause a slump in living standards, but to improve them.

The socially unpopular actions of the authorities were actively used by its critics (whether justified or not) not only by opposition forces ("Opposition Bloc", Communist Party), but also by pro-European parties, including coalition members. At the same time, the latter often came forth with populist slogans (e.g., demanding not to raise utility rates, improve social standards without specifying the real sources of finance for these expenditures).

As a result, during 2014-2015, there was a decline in public support for the two main coalition parties – Petro Poroshenko Bloc and especially of "People's Front", whose leader, Prime Minister A. Yatsenyuk obviously became the embodiment of the negative effects of reform in the public perception. The ratings of parties criticising the government (including the "Batkivshchyna" and "Opposition bloc") slightly increased.

Such a social consequence of the conflict as the changing socio-demographic structure of the population due to migration of Ukrainian population in Crimea and eastern Ukraine to other areas is worthy of particular mention. This could result in significant changes in the public support of political forces for which the relevant regions were "core" centres.

Militarisation of social consciousness and political life. The most common manifestation of the impact of conflict were significant changes in the public consciousness. Throughout 2014-2015, the level of public patriotism has significantly increased, foreign policy orientation has changed – support for the western vector of foreign and security (NATO) policy increased and the negative attitude towards Russia and its leadership has also significantly increased. These changes affected the political sympathies of citizens for political parties and, accordingly, the results of their participation in parliamentary elections.

The task of combating the aggressor, the need for conflict resolution in Donbas, return of the Crimea, support for the Ukrainian military has become prioritised in the activities of government institutions in general and the parliamentary parties in particular. At the same time, the theme of war, patriotism, security and defence were also used for populist purposes in the rhetoric of some political parties. This was reflected in the promotion of not sufficiently correct (or deliberately populist) initiatives (draft laws, regulations, appeals) submitted in the context of the struggle against Russian aggression. Inclusion by the parties of members of volunteer movements in the electoral lists and their election to Parliament, on the one hand, had a positive effect, on the other – contributed to the conflict in parliamentary activities and a certain decline of the deputies' professional level.

At the beginning of the conflict, such issues as the correlation of civilian and military approaches to solving it came to the forefront, creating a division of parties depending on their approaches into the "party of peace" and the "party of war". Subsequently, significant casualties among military and civilians and several waves of mobilisation increased "war fatigue" among the public, which was actively used by the opposition.

Such problems as ineffective command and control, which led to significant losses, approaches to conflict resolution, recorded in the Minsk Agreement, the position of the authorities (including presidential authority) regarding the volunteer battalions, created a new line of tension among the parties who are the political heirs of Maidan.

[37] The survey was conducted by the Razumkov Centre in May 2014 and 2015 (theoretical sampling error for each survey is 2.3%). For more detail see the website of the Razumkov Centre.

[38] At the same time, the number of insured persons for whom a single levy for obligatory state social insurance is paid (according to the Pension Fund of Ukraine) in May 2015 amounted to 10.2 million people (compared to the respective month of 2014 it decreased by 2.0 mln people). A significant reduction in numbers of payers is observed in all the regions.

[39] The unemployment rate in Ukraine is lower than in the EU, where it was 11% (particularly in Greece and Spain, respectively, 27% in Croatia and 17% in Cyprus, 16% in Portugal, 14% in Slovakia and 13% in Ireland and Bulgaria.

[40] "Supply and demand of the workforce in 2015 "– State Statistics Service of Ukraine, *http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua*.

[41] Recommendations of the hearings in the Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and International Relations "State of the rights of internally displaced persons and citizens of Ukraine residing in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine and in territory not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities in the area of anti-terrorist operations." – *http://kompravlud.rada.gov.ua/kompravlud/control/uk/publish/article;jsessionid=001666F695D06907C2C7235B92EBCF94?art_id=50223&cat_id=45376*.

The militarization of public opinion has also become a factor that justifies action of an illegal nature (both government and certain political forces) against carriers of opposition views, limiting their rights and freedoms (including the right to peaceful assembly), based on accusations of a lack of patriotism, betraying the national interests and promoting the fight against the aggressor.

The most negative consequences are the establishment of military formations by certain political parties or the involvement in the political struggle of their representative ATO-participants (particularly true for the party Right Sector and All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"). During 2014-2015, forceful methods were transferred to socio-political life at both regional and the national levels[42] and their active use by respective parties during mass actions.[43] The precedents of the participation of the armed representatives of political parties and their military structures in conflicts of a political and economic nature occurred in a number of regions and in Kyiv. In some cases this has led to casualties.[44]

In general, the attempts of certain parties to resolve the political problems at the national level through the use of its own security forces are fraught with their armed confrontation with the government and carry a serious risk of destabilisation in the country (especially in the context of purposeful activities of the intelligence service of the aggressor country). A favourable backdrop for this scenario is created by the public mistrust in the authorities and the protest potential, the return of demobilised military personnel and volunteers from the ATO zone, with a negative attitude towards the authorities and the illegal distribution of weapons among the population.

Overall, the militarisation of social consciousness and political life do not contribute to the normal functioning of the party system, affecting both the content and the nature of the activity of the political parties.

The prospect of elections to local self-government and the expectation of early parliamentary elections

Throughout 2015, an important factor that entailed a number of changes in the party system and stimulated the activity of the processes in the party environment were approaching local elections scheduled for 25 October 2015.

First, If the final amendments to the Constitution regarding decentralisation are finally approved, in 2017, local elections are to be held by the self-government bodies with significantly extended authorities. Hence, victory in the local elections in 2015 secures the parties a foothold for future success in the 2017 elections.

Second, the problems in the functioning of Parliament as a whole and in the parliamentary coalition in particular created a basis for the expectation of early parliamentary elections. Given the public disillusionment with the authorities and falling ratings of the ruling parties, the opposition sees early elections as a chance for political revenge, some coalition parties – as a chance to improve their own positions, extra-parliamentary parties – a chance for representation in the Verkhovna Rada.

Accordingly, the political parties (both parliamentary and some extra-parliamentary) performed extensive political activities at the regional level. First of all, attention was focused on building local organisations and staff, selection of candidates for the forthcoming elections, political positioning, given the specific socio-political and socio-economic situation.

Activities of political parties on the eve of local elections in 2015

As a result of lengthy negotiations in late August 2015, an agreement on unification of "UDAR" and "Opposition Bloc" was reached. Former leader of "UDAR" Vitaliy Klychko was elected Chairman of Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity".[45] Negotiations on the format of joint participation in the elections were conducted between Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" and "People's Front", but they have not led to the unification of parties.[46] Given the unsatisfactory starting position for participation in local elections,"People's Front" has decided to withdraw from participation.[47]

"Batkivshchyna" and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyasho were actively campaigning in regions opposing government policies. The issues of raising utility tariffs, prices, corruption of government officials and others were employed. "Svoboda" resorted to similar tactics, holding the campaign entitled "For social justice!"

An additional factor of tension between Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" and "People's Front" and other parties who are the political heirs of Maidan was he attitude to the draft law on

[42] Most indicative in this context is the initiation by the Right Sector of a referendum for "expression of popular distrust in the President and Government" and issues related to the conflict, renaming of the Military-Political Movement "Right Sector" into the National Liberation Movement "Right Sector" and calls for national revolution. See Right Sector held the "Down with the traitors" council on Maidan – website of the Right Sector, 21 July 2015, *http://pravyysektor.info*.

[43] See How did the protests change a year after Maidan? Report of the Centre for Social and Labour Studies. – CSLS website, *http://cslr.org.ua/yak-zminilisya-protesti-cherez-rik-pislya-maydanu*.

[44] The assassination of the "Right Sector – West" leader, Sashko Bilyi (Olexandr Muzychko) in March 2014, the conflict with casualties between the fighters of the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps Right Sector and security forces in the Carpathian region in July 2015, three soldiers of National Guard killed and at least 131 wounded from the conflict outside the Verkhovna Rada with the use of grenades and explosive devices during protests involving "Svoboda" on 31 August 2015.

[45] See: Klychko: We create a united political force that is aware of its responsibility for effective reform and real change. – "UDAR" website *http://klichko.org/news/?id=24689*.

[46] See: M. Zhartovska, S. Musayeva-Borovyk Vicious Circle President, Governemnt and Oligarchs – Urainian Pravda, 7 September 2015

[47] See: Arseniy Yatsenyuk about non-participation of his party in elections: "I do not care about temporary party ratings. I do care about the rating of the Ukrainan state," – website of the People's Front, 28 August 2015 *http://nfront.org.ua/news/details/arsenii-yatseniuk-pro-neuchast-iogo-partii-u-vyborakh*

amendments to the Constitution as regards decentralisation.[48] A positive vote for the project on 31 August 2015 caused a violent clash in Parliament with fatalities and numerous people wounded.[49] This event is actually placed the coalition on the brink of disintegration, but, only the Radical Party announced its withdrawal.[50] Other parties opposing the amendments to the Constitution (All-Ukrainian Union "Batykivshchyna" and "Samopomich") decided to remain its members, but they demanded the reforming of the coalition Government and redrafting of the coalition agreement.[51]

The Right Sector party has mainly held rallies in support of ATO and selective direct grassroots actions against certain officials. After the developments in Mukachevo, the party announced a nationwide campaign to change government and announced the deployment of agencies to prepare a nationwide referendum.[52] No practical action in this area ever followed. The party also announced its participation in local elections.

Established by "Privat" Group, UKROP party led an active campaign criticising the government. According to its leader Hennadiy Korban, the party declares the objective of "radical reforming of the system of governance and implementation of radical changes in the state".[53] UKROP may become a real competitor to the existing radical political parties.

"Samopomich" has used alternative methods in its campaign – establishment of local organisations and their management on a competitive basis, public discussion of candidates fpr leadership positions, "primaries", local project competitions and others. The principle difference was the party's focus not on the "hot" political issues of the day but rather on the provision of services to the population (opening legal consultations, sports clubs for children, basic courses etc.).

"Opposition Bloc" was the most active. The regional structures were rebuilt and rebranded, the Government was criticised using a wide range of topics: social and economic conditions, war, laws on lustration and decommunisation etc. The "Strong Ukraine" party was active in the South.

The Communist Party of Ukraine mounted continual campaigns of criticism of the government using the social slogan: "Jobs, wages, protection." Another topic for criticism of the government were the laws on decommunisation and the problem of war. Organisations of the CPU, with a view of the potential ban of the parties, became involved in the development of a social organisation titled NGO Left March.[54] On 12 June 2015, there was a meeting of the "Left Opposition" movement, whose participants were the Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party. One of the tasks of the movement was proclaimed the restoration of relations with Russia.[55]

A political project – the "Socialists" party has emerged in the political field, whose leadership included prominent representatives of the centre-left Party of Regions and V. Tsushko and L. Kozhar and the media reported on the possible involvement of A. Klyuyev in its funding.[56] The party is trying to position itself as "European".[57] Ex-leader of the SPU O. Moroz participated in its founding congress.

At the regional level, a significant number of new political projects emerged (in the form of new or "revived" parties), as "personal projects" of individual politicians and those who were technical in nature or represented the interests of business groups and structures of various levels. The active structures created by politicians who are in conflict with the current Government leadership include the "Common People Party" of S. Kaplin and "People's Control" (D. Dobrodomov, O. Musiy). "Our Land" party claimed the role of a representative of the interests of regional local governments. The "Revival" and Republican Platform parties functioned at the level of several regions. In some regions the party spectrum was quite extensive. In particular, Transcarpathia saw the active functioning of the "KMKS" Party of Hungarians of Ukraine, the Democratic Party of Hungarians of Ukraine, the Party "United Centre", in Kyiv there were the Power of Communities party, the Movement for Reform, the New Faces, the New Solidarity Ukraine and others.

According to the monitoring of the public network OPORA, out of 132 of parties allowed to participate in local elections, only six political parties campaigned in more than one third of regions (Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" in 24 regions, "Batkivshchyna" – in 20 regions, "Our Land" in 12 regions, "Opposition Bloc" – in 10 regions, UKROP and "Samopomich" – in nine regions. Six more political forces campaigned in more than two regions. Overall, according to the monitoring data, active election campaigns were launched by 27 parties, but most of the activity was limited to certain regions or administrative centres (cities of regional and district importance).[58]

Today is too early to assess the political prospects of the newly formed party projects. However, in case of success in local elections, some of them will be able to claim a place in the party system in the future as it was once with the parties "UDAR", "Front for Change" or "Strong Ukraine". One of the factors to hamper this is the lack of strong and authoritative nationwide leaders.

Overall, these trends in the activities of political parties may lead to the recovery of the system polarised pluralism, where the ruling parties of right-liberal wing (Petro Poroshenko Bloc, "People's Front") will have several opposition parties ("a party of revenge," "a populist opposition", which will use a mixture of patriotic rhetoric and leftist approaches and it is not improbable that there will be a pro-Russian opposition.

The establishment of such a system is fraught with the atomization of a multi-party system, which featured a "war of all against all" and ad hoc political alliances.

[48] The factions of "Batkivshchyna", Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, most members of the faction "Samopomich" (those who supported the project were subsequently excluded from the faction) and representatives of "Svoboda".

[49] Active participants of clashes were representatives of "Svoboda" and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko.

[50] See: Radical Party withdrew from the coalition. – Website of the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, 1 September 2015. *http://liashko.ua/news/general/1054-radikalna-partiya-vijshla-z-parlamentskoyi-koaliciyi-video*.

[51] See: Self-Reliance demands a review of the coalition agreement. Yatsenyuk is working on proposals. – Website NEWSru.ua, 2 September 2015. *http://www.newsru.ua/ukraine/02sep2015/pereform.html*.

[52] See above.

[53] See: Party Congress of UKROP held in Kyiv led by Korban, Filatov, Palitsa, censor.net, 13 July 2015, *http://censor.net.ua/n343640*

[54] See: Symonenko created the "Left March" organisation . – Korrespondent.net, 28 May 2015, *http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3520710-symonenko-stvoryv-orhanizatsiui-livyi-marsh*.

[55] See: M. Hluhovskyi, O. Loy Left wing. Marriage of convenience. – Glavkom. 15 June 2015, *http://glavcom.ua/articles/30014.html*.

[56] See: Ukrainian left looking for a new niche. – Korrespondent.net, 13 March 2015, *http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3490277-korrespondent-ukrainski-livi-shukauit-novu-nishu*.

[57] See: L. Kozhara Ukrainian socialists and German Partayhenosse. – Obozrevatel, 22 June 2015, *http://obozrevatel.com/blogs/26398-ukrainski-sotsialisti-ta-nimetski-portajgenossen.htm*.

[58] See: Interim report based on the monitoring of OPORA on the local elections on 25 October 2015., *www.oporaua.org*

CONCLUSIONS

In 2014-2015, the party system of Ukraine has undergone significant changes. Its composition has been significantly updated. In 2014, the parties established during the protest actions and after their completion entered the political arena.

The balance of power between parties located on opposite sides of the socio-cultural divide of society changed. Public support for the pro-European parties has significantly increased. Support for the parties of tentatively "pro-Russian affiliation" decreased, with them losing their monopoly for representation of interests of the population of eastern and southern Ukraine.

Overall, a characteristic feature of this period was the situation in which the electorate cast their vote for political parties created just before or immediately at the beginning of the election, did not have adequate organisational structures in the regions or a membership base and, in fact, could not be deemed to be adequate political parties.

During the election campaign, the parties mostly abandoned direct contact with their constituents and communicated in virtual space and the media.

The tendency towards the formation of parties of an openly leaderist nature increased. This trend, along with some positive features also has drawbacks, which significantly affect the functioning of the party system. This is primarily the party dependency on the personality of the leader, which narrows the opportunities for the development of a political power, thus imparting it with the features of temporality.

Another tendency that is characteristic of the leading political parties in this period is the decreasing significance of the ideological component. This is reflected in a formal, simplified approach to designing political and election programmes, an eclectic combination in programme texts of approaches specific to different policy areas (e.g. conservative and liberal, left and right, etc.), ignoring the requirements of the parties for their own programmes in practice.

There was an increase in the level of populism in the activities of political parties. Favourable conditions for this were the complicated socio-economic situation, the complex problems of the country reforming and the high level of expectations of changes in government within the period of Maidan.

An important development feature of the party system in this period was the growing influence of civil society on political parties that acquires the form of the direct creation of new political parties based on its structures and through the involvement of its most active representatives in the electoral lists of the leading political parties and their entry to the institutes of governance. This interpenetration is one of the new characteristic features in the history of the party system in this country.

The special nature of the period after the victory of Maidan engendered specific factors that influenced and continue to influence the processes being implemented in the party system.

Among the institutional factors, first of all, one should note the reenactment of the Constitution as amended in 2004, amendments to the law on local elections, adopting laws on decommunisation and cleansing of power and creating a legal framework for the introduction of budget financing of political parties to improve the transparency of the party finance.

Among the social factors, the strongest effect on the party system was produced by changes in the hierarchy of social divisions and the emergence of new dividing lines between political parties. Thus, the relevance of socio-cultural division decreased to some extent, while the relevance of socio-economic division came to the force. The tension between the parties increased on the grounds of the attitude to the socially unpopular reforms of the Government and the approach to a solution of the conflict with Russia. The changes in the structure and nature of the manifestations of such factor as the impact on the activity of parties by FIGs took place. The increasing level of attention to Ukraine all over the world led to a highly intensive external influence.

Russian aggression was the main cause of the emergence of such specific factors as socio-economic crisis, changing social and demographic structure of the population and militarisation of social consciousness and political life. A drop in the population income along with errors in the reforming and implementation of state policy in multiple sectors has greatly affected public support for the ruling political forces and at the same time has increased public support for the parties that resorted to openly populist rhetoric and actions.

Confronting aggression has resulted in a rise of patriotism in society and changes in foreign policy orientation toward growing support for the Western vector. However, there are such negative phenomena as the merger of certain political forces and armed groups and the transfer to force-based methods for solving political problems.

From the middle of 2015, the most significant factor which directly affected the functioning of the party system in Ukraine were approaching local elections scheduled for 25 October 2015 and expectations related to the possibility of calling early parliamentary elections. This intensified the formation of local party organisations, creating new political projects, exacerbated the debate between the member parties of the parliamentary coalition, became a source of radicalisation of rhetoric and general movement of the party system in the direction of polarisation.

The changes that took place gave reason to hope for positive developments in addressing such issues of the domestic political parties as the lack of an established social base, regional support, control of FIGs and opacity of funding. At the same time, the situation around complicated issues such as weakness of programme-ideological principles, the hypertrophied nature of the personal factor, lack of accountability to voters and lack of internal democracy has remained unchanged.

3. DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES: CONTENT OF PUBLIC DEMAND

Public opinion of political parties is an important factor influencing the formation of party systems, as the credibility of the parties as an institute, the public vision of certain of parties as exponents of their interests, compliance of the spectrum of parties existing in the country, the ideological preferences of voters, adequacy of the political proposals of the parties to address social problems – these are points that affect the electoral support of parties and, consequently, the nature of the party system.

According to the data of sociological surveys on various aspects of public opinion about political parties, ideological preferences of voters and their electoral motivation, the attitude of Ukrainian citizens to political parties is ambivalent. On the one hand, the parties have a consistently low level of confidence, the percentage of citizens who are party members remains consistently low, citizens assess the activities of most parliamentary parties mostly negatively, regardless of their pro-government or opposition status. On the other hand, the majority of citizens reported certain (sustainable or not) electoral sympathies for specific parties and the level of turnout in elections is relatively high. According to the survey, citizens give priority to parties in terms of the representation of their interests in social processes, compared to other subjects.

This gives reason to believe that the people of Ukraine are not satisfied with particular parties, not with the parties in general, and are ready to give credit of trust to the "best" political forces they expect to appear. This is confirmed both by the data of the last election in which the majority of voters voted for entirely new political parties that had no political history, as well as by the results of opinion polls performed as part of the project.[1]

Thus, there is a public demand for certain qualities of political forces that could be supported by citizens. Below, on the basis of public opinion research[2] the main parameters of the requirement are being formulated.

3.1. MODEL FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A "DESIRED PARTY"

Political priorities of parties in the eyes of voters

A half (51%) of respondents indicated as a key principle of the activities of the parties they might support the protection of the national interests of Ukraine (Diagram "*What is the most important political principle…?*").

Protection of the interests of the region's residents where the respondents' live ranks first by a considerable margin (12%), the protection of the interests of the social group to which they belong coming third (10%).

The residents of all regions believe the protection of national interests to be the most important task of the parties, while in the West and in the Centre it forms the majority (70% and 56%, respectively), in the South, East and Donbas it is a relative majority (45%, 41% and 33%, respectively).[3]

In Donbas there are many more people who chose the principle of protecting the interests of the region (27%) and there are many such citizens in the East (13%). In the other Ukrainian regions the percentage of supporters of protecting regional interests ranges from 6% to 9%.

In the East, number of those who chose protection of ideological principles observed by the respondent is also greater than in other regions, at 20%.

Support for the principle of protection of national interests increases proportionally to the level of education.

The lower class representatives support the principle of protecting the interests of the social group they belong to more than middle class representatives.

There are significant differences between the answers of respondents on a linguistic basis. Representatives of the Russian-speaking population supported the principle of the protection of national interests (35% vs. 64%, respectively) much less than those of the Ukrainian-speaking population, but more often they support the protection of interests of their region (21% vs. 7%), the interests of their social group (14% vs. 8%) and ideological principles (13% vs. 4%).

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1 More detail in the material "*Political parties and party system of Ukraine at present: public opinion*", pp. 106-144.

2 Based on data from the survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre (1) from 29 April to 5 May 2015 in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; (2) from 21 to 26 November 2014 in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. During the study more than 2,000 respondents participated in sample polling, representing the adult population of Ukraine in terms of the main socio-demographic indicators. Sample polling was designed as a multi-stage, random quota selection of respondents at the last stage. Theoretical error of of each sample (excluding design effect) does not exceed 2.3% with a probability of 0.95.

3 The following territorial division by regions is used: **West**: Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions; **Centre**: Kyiv city, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions; **South**: Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson regions; **East**: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kharkiv regions; **Donbas**: Donetsk, Luhansk regions.

What is the most important political principle that the political party you would support in the election should observe in the first place?
% of respondents



	REGIONS					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME		
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	Incomplete secondary or general secondary	Specialised secondary	Higher or incomplete higher	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian
Protection of the national interests of Ukraine	69.8	55.6	44.7	40.8	32.5	46.1	49.4	57.1	34.5	64.2	50.8
Protection of the interests of residents of the region where you live	6.2	8.7	7.4	13.0	26.5	16.0	10.2	10.0	20.7	6.6	9.9
Protection of interests of the social group to which you personally belong	5.0	10.9	13.0	9.2	12.6	11.4	9.9	8.2	13.6	8.1	8.1
Protection of ideological principles that you adhere to	4.5	2.9	5.6	20.0	8.2	5.3	8.9	7.7	12.6	4.1	6.7
Protection of the interests of the ethnic group to which you belong	3.8	2.8	1.4	3.0	6.3	3.1	4.2	2.8	4.3	3.2	3.0
Protection of interests of the professional group to which you personally belong	0.7	2.6	0.0	2.2	2.5	1.6	1.8	2.1	1.6	1.1	3.1
None of the above principles	4.8	6.6	15.3	7.6	6.6	10.7	6.0	6.0	6.9	4.9	10.4
Difficult to say	5.2	9.9	12.6	4.3	4.7	5.8	9.6	6.1	5.7	7.8	8.1

May 2015

Main political task of parties

Nearly equal shares of respondents believe that the priorities of political parties are win the presidential elections and forming their own faction in parliament (18% and 19%, respectively) (Diagram "*Which of the following tasks must the political parties implement…?*", p. 36).

According to them, their next priorities are winning the local elections in Ukraine in general (12%) and in particular regions (11%).

Across the regions the hierarchy of tasks slightly changes. For all regions except the South, these two top goals of the parties are winning the post of President and forming a faction in the Verkhovna Rada. Residents of the South often mention the election of the President and victory in the local elections across Ukraine.

Views on the organisational structure of the parties

Among citizens there is no unanimous position on whether the party should have a fixed membership and its own members or that they can be based on other organisational principles. However, a relative majority (29%) support the position on the need for fixed membership (Diagram "*With which statement regarding Ukraine's political parties do you agree more?*", p. 37).

To a greater extent this position is supported in the East (39%) and West (33%) of Ukraine. In Donbas, there is the largest number of those who disagreed with any of the proposed options of party organisation (34%).

Thus, for citizens the issue of the model of party organisation is not essential.

Which of the following tasks must the political parties implement in the first place to be able to effectively protect the interests of their voters?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Obtain seats in the Parliament and form their own faction	25.2	16.6	9.3	21.3	17.1
Achieve the election of their candidate for the post of the President of Ukraine	18.3	18.9	14.8	16.4	21.2
Obtain as many seats as possible in local councils across Ukraine	13.8	8.9	13.9	11.1	16.1
Win in local elections in one or several regions of Ukraine and form a majority in local councils in these regions	12.4	8.6	6.9	14.8	10.4
Gain senior positions in the Cabinet of Ministers	6.2	9.6	1.9	8.1	7.6
Achieve a constant presence of party representatives in popular talk shows on various TV channels	3.3	3.3	4.2	4.0	2.5
Other	3.8	8.2	6.9	3.0	1.3
Difficult to say	16.9	25.9	42.1	21.3	23.7

May 2015

Approach to the issue of leadership in the parties

Among several proposed options of the model leadership in the parties the relative majority of respondents chose the option in which a party headed by a "strong, respected leader who does not change for a long time" (42%) (Diagram "*What approach to the issue of leadership in political parties…?*", p. 38).

A much smaller shares of respondents chose options that the party should be led by "leaders who are elected on a competitive basis" (16%) and "a group of influential leaders who periodically replace each other" (14%).

The leaderist model is supported more than any other in all regions (particularly in the East (50%)). This model is the most popular in all age groups (most – from 60 years and older) and among respondents of all educational groups.

Type of parties with regard to the nature of the programme principles

The respondents do not have a shared position on the desired type of party in terms of the nature of its programme principles (Diagram "*What type of party would you prefer?*", p. 39).

Almost equal shares of respondents support the principles of political party organisation based on a particular political ideology (27%); based on the "great goals" (24%); based on the desire to solve a specific social problem (23%).

The least supported (4%) was a party model aimed at realisation of the visions and ideas of its leader, which testifies to a certain dissonance with the importance of the "leadership factor" for the public.

Across the regions the party that is based on a particular ideology has homogenous support; the party adheres to

With which statement regarding Ukraine's political parties do you agree more?
% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE, y.o.					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Incomplete secondary or general secondary	Specialised secondary	Higher or incomplete higher
Modern parties must have a fixed membership and their own members	33.1	27.9	24.3	38.8	16.5	28.9	29.0	29.6	28.8	28.4	26.7	29.7	29.7
Modern parties need not have fixed membership or active supporters; it is sufficient for them to maintain the paid party apparatus (in the centre and locally) and in the election period – hire propagandists and other necessary staff	14.0	13.4	10.7	13.2	18.0	11.5	16.9	14.5	16.9	11.6	13.1	16.1	12.3
Modern parties need not have fixed membership or active supporters; it is sufficient for them to maintain the paid party apparatus (in the centre and locally) and have active supporters to help parties on a voluntary basis	16.4	11.1	12.1	11.1	11.1	13.8	11.0	13.3	13.6	10.4	7.1	11.3	17.8
Disagree with all of the above statements	14.3	18.3	18.2	14.8	34.2	18.6	18.8	19.2	17.5	21.4	22.7	19.2	16.5
Difficult to say	22.1	29.3	34.6	22.1	20.3	27.2	24.4	23.4	23.3	28.2	30.5	23.7	23.6

May 2015

has relatively more support in the West to achieve the "great goals".

Ideological parties are supported somewhat more by senior voters, the "great goals" parties – by the youngest voters.

With an increasing level of education the support of ideological parties and "great goals" parties increases.

Thus, the reliance of parties on the basis of a political ideology is not a prerequisite for their support by voters.

Sources of party financing

The respondents were asked to choose three main sources from which, in their opinion, the parties should be funded (Diagram "*By whom and from what sources should the activity of political parties be financed in Ukraine?*", p. 40). Most respondents believe that political parties should be financed by their members, from membership fees (61%). In second place (38%) – financing by citizens, who support the parties with their voluntary contributions, in third (30%) – by businesses, from voluntary contributions of businesses. Three identified sources of support are the most popular in all regions.

19% of respondents believe that the parties should be financed by the state from the state budget, and 12% – that they should be financed from local budgets. State or municipal support of the parties is the least popular in the East.

Respondents with vocational or higher education are much more likely to support the funding of parties by business than citizens with a secondary education.

What approach to the issue of leadership in political parties is the best for modern Ukrainian parties?
% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE, y.o.					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Incomplete secondary or general secondary	Specialised secondary	Higher or incomplete higher
A party is headed by a strong, respected leader who does not change over the course of time	42.0	43.3	31.2	49.9	34.6	42.3	41.8	36.9	36.6	47.6	41.0	41.1	42.6
A party is headed by leaders who are elected on a competitive basis by statutory bodies and replace each other in a specified period of time	21.0	10.0	16.7	11.9	26.4	15.1	15.8	19.2	16.9	14.1	13.1	15.8	18.8
A party is headed by a group of influential leaders who periodically replace each other as head parties in accordance with internal agreements	16.2	14.5	5.1	14.8	13.2	16.3	12.9	16.2	14.4	10.3	13.4	12.9	14.9
Other approaches	10.0	11.5	10.7	5.7	5.0	10.0	8.8	7.7	10.0	8.3	9.4	8.8	8.8
Difficult to say	10.7	20.6	36.3	17.8	20.8	16.3	20.6	20.1	22.2	19.7	23.0	21.4	15.0

May 2015

Citizens' answers to the question of supporting or not supporting the implementation of budgetary funding given the greater control and accountability of ther financial activity was as follows.

The introduction of budget financing, even given the simultaneous increase of control and accountability of parties in financial matters is supported only by every fourth (25%) respondent. It is not supported by 47% of respondents.

Regional differences in answers are not a matter of principle.

Budgetary funding is supported by more respondents with higher education and a better financial situation.

3.2. PROGRAMME BASES OF A "DESIRED PARTY"

In order to find out which party programme could be supported by the majority of citizens, as well as the differences between the views of residents of different regions and social groups, respondents were asked to define their position on a five point scale (from 1 to 5) in relation to various positions in different political areas. The alternatives placed on the left can be provisionally classified as left-wing, on the right – to the right wing (Table "*Here the alternative positions on the most fundamental issues…*", pp. 43-45).

In this case, a score of "1" means that the position is maximally close to a statement presented on the left, score "5" – support of positions on the right, and the score of "3" means a citizen cannot give preference to any of the statements.

Analysis of the distribution of responses showed the following peculiarities of public opinion.

The citizens' positions have very limited amplitude – their estimates range from 2 to 4 points, with most estimates within the range of 2.5-3.5 points.

Public positions reveal a clear expectation of a strong social policy of the government. Citizens give

Which type of party would you prefer?
% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE, y.o.					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Incomplete secondary or general secondary	Specialised secondary	Higher or incomplete higher
A party based on a certain political ideology and a programme which is consistent therewith	26.9	25.5	27.9	26.1	28.7	25.3	26.8	20.7	26.8	31.6	23.6	26.9	29.0
A party which poses a “great goal” (for example, Ukraine’s accession to the EU, reforms, etc.)	31.9	26.3	15.3	23.5	16.1	31.7	23.3	21.3	21.0	22.9	18.4	24.0	29.3
A party, which seeks to solve a particular social issue (eg, fighting for the purity of the environment, against corruption, etc.)	21.4	21.3	18.6	28.8	24.6	19.6	22.0	28.4	22.9	22.9	22.5	25.6	20.1
A party, committed to implementation of vision and ideas of its leader	3.8	6.0	4.7	3.8	2.5	1.9	5.6	5.0	5.8	4.0	6.7	3.3	3.7
None of the above	8.8	12.5	18.6	11.3	23.3	15.0	13.1	15.7	16.6	10.2	20.4	12.1	10.7
Difficult to say	7.1	8.4	14.9	6.5	4.7	6.4	9.1	8.9	6.9	8.3	8.4	8.0	7.3

May 2015

preference to protection of rights of employees; increased taxation of “oligarchs” and, thus, control over consumer prices and tariffs.

The priority of protection of citizens with low incomes is more strongly supported than protection of the interests of the “middle class”.

There is uncertainty on the issue of reforming the current system of social benefits and introducing a system of targeted subsidies, or rather keeping the existing system.

In matters of socio-economic development, in particular in the expansion of the public sector, the return to state ownership of the previously privatised enterprises and the creation of a full-fledged market of agricultural land, citizens tend more to support the left and centre-left positions.

Citizens speak more in favour of state support for domestic industrial enterprises (although the priority over the support of foreign investment is not too high). The support which enables citizens to make a living through their own efforts, the support of small and medium-sized business and farmers is more popular across society.

The answers to questions about the relationship between citizens, society and the state and the desired area of development of the party system show that in the society there is no definite standpoint regarding priority of the rights of individuals or community, as well as

By whom and from what sources should the activity of political parties be financed in Ukraine?*
% of respondents



	REGIONS (May 2015)					EDUCATION (May 2015)		
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	Incomplete secondary or general secondary	Specialised secondary	Higher or incomplete higher
Party members, from with their membership fees	57.1	57.0	72.1	62.8	64.4	57.2	60.3	64.8
Citizens who support parties, from their voluntary contributions	36.4	33.3	30.2	44.9	47.3	34.1	34.9	44.7
Business, entrepreneurs, from voluntary contributions of business entities	26.7	32.9	34.6	36.7	18.0	22.9	33.4	32.1
Government, from the state budget	21.2	21.0	19.1	11.3	19.9	17.9	17.3	21.5
Local governments, from local budgets	14.8	13.0	20.5	5.1	6.3	10.2	10.7	14.0
Other sources	8.6	9.6	6.5	10.0	9.5	8.0	10.4	8.3
Difficult to say	13.8	15.0	13.5	18.1	8.8	19.4	15.5	8.5

* Respondents were asked to choose three possible answers.

change of government towards strengthening the parliamentary or presidential model.

The idea on prevention of restrictions on political rights and freedoms for the sake of stability enjoys more support than ensuring stability at all costs. The idea of strengthening the role of parties in political life has somewhat lower support than the idea of reducing the role of the parties, which is obviously conditioned by a significant level of mistrust in them.

Free development of NGOs has slightly higher support than the idea of strengthening state control over them, so one can speak of a certain mistrust of society in the private sector.

Instead, the idea of strengthening public control over law enforcement bodies has somewhat higher support. The idea of granting more rights to the regions and decentralisation enjoys more support as well.

In foreign policy the idea of Ukraine's accession to the EU enjoys more support compared to the Euro-Asian vector of integration. The idea of NATO accession enjoys somewhat more support than the idea of preserving neutral status.

In matters of human development citizens are more inclined to support Ukraine's entry into the European cultural space, maintaining and strengthening the official status of the Ukrainian language.

Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2014-2017, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, provides for introduction of direct government (budget) funding for statutory activities of the parties based on the election results along with increased control over financial transparency and accountability of political parties.

Do you support the introduction of public funding of parties under such conditions?
% of respondents



The idea of equality of all religions is preferred to prioritising a particular one.

The respondents are more often inclined to believe that the Ukrainian nation includes all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their ethnic origin.

Regional aspect

Shared.

The residents of all regions of the country prefer supporting farmers rather than large agricultural companies, prefer the expansion of the public sector of the economy to privatisation, prefer to support domestic manufacturers rather than facilitating the entry of foreign companies.

There is a noticeable public preference in all regions to support salaried employees rather than empowerment of employers, restraining consumer prices and tariffs due to the taxation of big business, while citizens in all regions could speak out for a center-left approach (high taxes – certain free services) or a liberal approach (low taxes, people pay themselves for the services they need) in relation to principles of tax policy issues.

The idea of creating a free market of agricultural land was not supported in any region.

With regard to the principles of the relationship between state and citizen, community and the individual, the basic principles of the state system, public opinion in different regions has almost no significant differences.

Thus, people speak more in favour of giving the regions more powers and decentralisation than the centralisation of power, the position of public control over law enforcement bodies to improve their accountability to government and prevent restrictions of political rights and freedoms has somewhat lesser priority over the position of political stability at any cost. There is no definiteness in matters of prioritising the rights of an individual over the rights of a community, or the growing influence of the Parliament on the Government and the executive, or the growing influence of the President, the increasing role of parties in political life or reduction of their role.

In all regions of the country the citizens favour the equality of all religious confessions in the relations with the state.

It should also be noted that there is no considerable support for the position of Ukraine's accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus in any region.

Differences.

Regional differences remain high regarding the following issues:

1. support for farmers is greatest in the West, but the alternative idea of supporting a major agricultural producer does not find much approval in other regions;

2. support for joining the European cultural space is unanimous in the West. In other regions, this idea prevails over the idea to preserve Ukraine in the post-Soviet cultural space, while in Donbas both positions have approximately equal support;

3. support for granting the Russian language the status of the second official language is more popular in Donbas, while in other regions, particularly in the western and central regions, the majority expresses support for the idea of protecting and strengthening the status of the Ukrainian language;

4. the idea of accession to NATO and the EU enjoys most support in the western regions. In other regions the idea of Ukraine joining the EU has more moderate support. The idea of accession to NATO has moderate support in central regions and is often not supported in the East and South of Ukraine and Donbas.

Age distribution

Citizens of different age groups show similar approaches in the absolute majority of fundamental issues.

Citizens of all ages tend to support the interests of citizens with low incomes rather than support the "middle class", protection of the rights of employees rather than strengthening the rights of employers, extension of the moratorium on free sale of agricultural land over the implementation of full-fledged land market and curbing consumer prices and tariffs rather than restricting state intervention in pricing and tariffs.

Citizens of all ages also express support for the position of the equality of all religious confessions in the relations with the state, for Ukraine's entry into the European cultural space and preservation and strengthening of the official status of the Ukrainian language. In particular, the support of Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO in the foreseeable future increases in inverse proportion to the age of citizens.

To a lesser extent similar tendencies are also characteristic in issues of decentralisation of power (has priority over centralisation), strengthening the public control over the law enforcement, promotion of small and medium business (priority over promotion of the big national businesses), preventing the restriction of political rights and freedoms for the sake of political stability, the question of whether the state should serve all the needs of citizens, or whether the state should enable citizens to earn money themselves for everything necessary in life.

All age groups are uncertain in the issues of strengthening the impact of Parliament or the President on the Government and the executive, the priority of individual rights over the rights of the community, the principles of development of the tax system, strengthening state control or promotion of unrestricted development of NGOs.

Among citizens of all ages there is no obvious priority in support for an increase or a decrease of the role of parties in political life.

Thus, a significant part of society in all age groups is willing to accept similar policy principles.

Distribution by property status

There were no significant differences due to different property status on most issues.

In matters of socio-economic development, citizens with different income levels prioritise support of small and medium businesses over support of the large ("oligarchic") ones, support of farmers over support for large agricultural producers, support for national industrial enterprises over promotion of the entry of foreign companies.

The level of support for the thesis that the state should enable citizens to make their own living over the idea of the state providing for all citizens' needs grows in direct proportion with the level of income. The same applies to support for the reform of social assistance through the introduction of a system of targeted subsidies.

In turn, support the idea of curbing consumer prices and tariffs due to increasing taxation of "oligarchic" business is losing popularity with the growth of income, but remains noticeable in all income categories.

The same can be said of the priority of support for strengthening protection of salaried employees over the idea of strengthening the rights of employers and about the priority of protecting the poorest over protection of the "middle class".

Citizens of all property groups are more prone to support expansion of public sector in the economy rather than privatisation. In matters of tax policy priorities no clear, definite standpoint is observed in any category.

In all groups the support for the idea of extending the moratorium on creation of a free market of agricultural land has priority over the implementation of its free sale.

Citizens with different income levels do not give obvious preference to the idea of strengthening influence of the Verkhovna Rada over the idea of strengthening presidential powers, priortising the increasing role of parties in political life over the restriction thereof. In all income groups there is a certain priority of support for ideas of granting the regions greater autonomy and decentralisation over the idea of further centralisation of power.

Citizens with different income levels are inclined to prefer a strengthening of public control over law enforcement, support the prevention of restriction of political rights and freedoms for the sake of stability, and promotion of free development of NGOs.

In matters of foreign policy there is a fairly noticeable increase in support for Ukraine's accession to the EU, proportional to the growth of income, as well as for joining NATO.

In matters of humanitarian policy there is a noticeable support among different groups for the preservation and strengthening of the official status of the Ukrainian language and equality of all religious denominations in their relations with the state.

Similarly, people with different income levels tend to support the idea that the Ukrainian nation should incorporate all citizens regardless of their origin.

Distribution by level of education

The differences in education level have no fundamental importance for the formation of the position of citizens on a particular issue.

With the increase in education level the support in such matters as accession to the EU and NATO, strengthening the status of the Ukrainian language, the entry into the European cultural space, opportunities for citizens to earn money for everything they need in life slightly increases.

With the drop in education level, a certain tendency towards increased paternalistic expectations can be traced.

Here the alternative positions on the most fundamental issues of Ukrainian society in various fields are presented. Where a position of the party is to be placed on the scale from 1 to 5, which would you support in the elections?*

average score

The state favouring certain religious denominations and churches	1 2 3 4 5 4.02	Equality of all religious faiths and churches in relations with the state (equality before the law)
Granting Russian language the status of the second official language and granting minority languages the status of regional languages	3.77	Maintaining and strengthening the official status of the Ukrainian language
State support for big national business	3.76	Promoting development of small and medium businesses
Ukraine remaining in Russian (post-Soviet) cultural space	3.76	Ukraine's accession to the European cultural space
Ukraine's accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus, joining the Eurasian Economic Union	3.76	Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future
Control of the whole vertical of power (to a local level) from the cente, centralisation of power	3.74	Giving the regions more autonomy, decentralisation of power
Increased accountability of law enforcement authorities	3.68	Strengthening public control over law enforcement
Ensuring political stability at any cost, even through restrictions on political rights and freedoms	3.49	Preventing restrictions of political rights and freedoms for the sake of political stability
Support for large agricultural producers	3.38	Support for farmers
Non-aligned status of Ukraine and its non-accession to military blocs	3.36	Ukraine's accession to NATO in the foreseeable future
Strengthening state control over the activities of non-governmental organisations	3.27	Promoting unrestrained development of NGOs
Ensuring priority of community rights (collective, territorial community, whole nation, etc.) over individual rights	3.19	Ensuring priority of individual rights over the rights of any community (collective, territorial community, whole nation and other).
The state should provide citizens with everything they need in life	3.13	The state should enable citizens to earn money for everything they need in life
Increased impact of the President on the Government and the executive branch, restricting the powers of the Verkhovna Rada	3.06	Increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Government and the executive branch, limiting the President's powers
The tax system under which people pay high taxes but receive certain state social services	3.05	The tax system under which people pay lower taxes, but have to pay for social services themselves
Reducing the role of the parties; party-independent authorities	2.83	Enhancing the role of parties in political life, power partisation
Keeping the current system of benefits for housing and communal services (available to all citizens who belong to a particular category, in the form of discounts for utilities, free travel, etc.).	2.83	Reform of the social benefits system, the introduction of a system of targeted subsidies in cash form
The Ukrainian nation comprises all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their nationality	2.62	The Ukrainian nation is the citizens of Ukraine of an Ukrainian ethnical background
Protecting the interests of citizens with low income	2.53	Protecting the interests of the "middle class" – qualified employees with middle income
The expansion of the public sector, returning previously privatized enterprises into public ownership	2.44	Privatisation of state enterprises, the priority development of the private sector
State support for domestic industrial enterprises	2.42	Promoting the entry of foreign companies into Ukraine
Extension of the moratorium on free sale of agricultural land	2.18	Introduction of free purchase and sale of agricultural land
Curbing consumer prices and utility tariffs by increasing tax for big business and "oligarchs"	2.09	Limited state intervention in pricing and tariffs, where they should be regulated by the market
Protecting the rights of employees before employers	1.98	Enhancing the rights of employers in relations with employees

* On a scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means full support to the position shown on the left and "5"means complete support for the position shown on the right. "3" means it is difficult to give preference to any of the statements.

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	
The state favouring certain religious denominations and churches	4.4	4.1	3.7	3.7	4.0	Equality of all religious faiths and churches in relations with the state (equality before the law)
Granting Russian language the status of the second official language and granting minority languages the status of regional languages	4.6	4.1	3.3	3.4	2.9	Maintaining and strengthening the official status of the Ukrainian language
State support for big national business	4.0	3.7	3.5	3.8	3.8	Promoting development of small and medium businesses
Ukraine remaining in Russian (post-Soviet) cultural space	4.6	4.0	3.3	3.4	3.0	Ukraine's accession to the European cultural space
Ukraine's accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus, joining the Eurasian Economic Union	4.6	4.0	3.1	3.4	3.1	Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future
Control of the whole vertical of power (to a local level) and centralisation of power	3.7	3.7	4.0	3.6	3.9	Giving the regions more autonomy, decentralisation of power
Increased accountability of law enforcement authorities	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.7	Strengthening public control over law enforcement
Ensuring political stability at any cost, even through restrictions on political rights and freedoms	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.1	3.6	Preventing restrictions of political rights and freedoms for the sake of political stability
Support for large agricultural producers	4.0	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.2	Support for farmers
Non-aligned status of Ukraine and its non-accession to military blocs	4.1	3.6	2.7	3.0	2.7	Ukraine's accession to NATO in the foreseeable future

Strengthening state control over the activities of non-governmental organisations	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.3	Promoting unrestrained development of NGOs
Ensuring the priority of community rights (collective, territorial community, whole nation, etc.) over individual rights	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.1	Ensuring the priority of individual rights over the rights of any community (collective, territorial community, whole nation etc.)
The state should provide citizens with everything they need in life	3.5	3.2	3.1	2.7	3.1	The state should enable citizens to earn money for everything they need in life
Increased impact of the President on the Government and the executive branch, restricting the powers of the Verkhovna Rada	3.2	2.9	3.3	3.0	3.1	Increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Government and the executive branch, limiting the President's powers
The tax system under which people pay high taxes but receive certain state social services	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.8	3.1	The tax system under which people pay lower taxes, but have to pay for social services themselves
Reducing the role of the parties; party-independent authorities	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.9	Enhancing the role of parties in political life, power partisation
Keeping the current system of benefits for housing and communal services (available to all citizens who belong to a particular category, in the form of discounts for utilities, free travel, etc.).	3.3	2.9	2.7	2.3	2.9	Reform of the social benefits systema the introduction of a system of targeted subsidies in cash form
The Ukrainian nation comprises all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their nationality	3.0	2.7	2.1	2.9	2.1	The Ukrainian nation is the citizens of Ukraine of an Ukrainian ethnical background
Protecting the interests of citizens with low income	2.6	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.8	Protecting the interests of the "middle class" – qualified employees with middle income
The expansion of the public sector, returning previously privatized enterprises into public ownership	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.5	Privatisation of state enterprises, the priority development of the private sector
State support for domestic industrial enterprises	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.2	Promoting the entry of foreign companies into Ukraine
Extension of the moratorium on free sale of agricultural land	2.6	2.0	2.4	2.2	1.8	Introduction of free purchase and sale of agricultural land
Curbing consumer prices and utility tariffs by increasing tax for big business and "oligarchs"	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.1	Limited state intervention in pricing and tariffs, where they should be regulated by the market
Protecting the rights of employees before employers	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.3	1.9	Enhancing the rights of employers in relations with employees

CONCLUSIONS

In Ukrainian society there is a demand for political parties as the institute that represents public interests in social processes. According to public evaluation, in order to qualify for public support, a political party has to focus its activity on protecting the national interests of Ukraine, to a lesser extent – on protection of the interests of specific regions and social groups. For this purpose the party should set itself the highest political goals to put their candidates up for the presidential and parliamentary elections.

The nature of the party's organisational structure has no fundamental importance in terms of public support. This opens up the possibility of the coexistence of different types of parties – both built on a fixed membership, and "personnel" or "electoral" principles.

Meanwhile, there is a noticeable demand in society for the parties that are led by strong and respected leaders. Turnover of leaders is not popular in society.

The widespread thesis that the traditional ideological parties have no future seems an exaggeration; some citizens would like to see the parties proceeding in their activities from a particular ideology. At the same time parties can invest their efforts in the achievement of "great goals" or in the solution of specific, burning social issues.

In public opinion, the parties should be financed primarily by their members and supporters. Financing of the parties through donations from businesses is permissible, but the origin of the funds or the business itself should not include a corruption component and the party must remain independent from its donors.

Citizens have their position on the most fundamental issues of the development of Ukrainian society. Significant differences caused by area of residence, age, education and income levels create a demand for achieving social consensus on the priorities of future development. The absence of overwhelming public support for one of the alternatives for the majority of issues will facilitate the convergence of positions of political forces which aspire to the role of an exponent of the interests of different social groups.

Society as a whole is extremely vulnerable in issues related to the economic situation. The majority of citizens, regardless of age, property income, education, gender or mother tongue, expect more obvious and efficient social support form the state.

There are regional differences in matters of foreign and humanitarian policy (accession to the EU and NATO, strengthening the position of Ukrainian language and culture). However, no radical rejection either of the policy of strengthening the position of the Ukrainian language and culture, and the west-oriented integration policy of the country was observed among major social groups.

Consequently, differences can be overcome through a balanced state policy. In matters relating to freedom of religion, no significant differences are observed, the whole society demonstrates tolerance and expects a balanced policy in this field.

Society finds the democratic methods of governance, self-reliance (national business) and support for private initiative more acceptable.

In this context, the support of the majority of citizens can be obtained by the party that:

• in the social sector, advocates protection of the rights of employees, protection of citizens with low incomes, increased taxation of "oligarchs," curbing of prices and tariffs; finds a balance between reforming the current system of benefits and the introduction of a targeted system and preserving the existing social security system;

• in terms of socio-economic development, advocates expansion of the state sector of the economy, returning previously privatized enterprises to state ownership; prioritizes support for national capital over support for foreign investments; speaks in support of farmers and against the introduction of a free land market;

• in foreign policy, advocates Ukraine's accession to the EU and also to NATO in the foreseeable future;

• in terms of humanitarian policy, speaks out for maintaining and strengthening the status of the Ukrainian language, joining the European cultural space, equality of all religious denominations in relations with the state;

• in terms of relations between the citizen and the state, political development, defends the principle of political rights and freedoms without trying to justify their restrictions for the sake of political stability; supports strengthening public control over law-enforcement agencies; supports a decentralisation policy and empowerment of regions; finds a balance in the priority of individual or community rights; does not advocate a radical change in the model of the power structure.

However, it is clear that related programme activities are necessary, but are not the only prerequisite to achieve electoral success.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Social and political processes in Ukraine after Maidan events developed in conditions that are extreme in many respects. Society has demonstrated a strong demand for serious, sometimes radical changes in all areas of relations – from mechanisms of public policy and government organisations (including – power decentralisation and reform of local self-government) to a complete reboot of law enforcement and the judiciary, the beginning of a true fight against corruption, deoligarchisation and stimulation of economic growth.

As a result of social processes, the party system stands on the verge of a new stage of development, an important feature of which is the growing influence of society (direct and mediated) in political life. There is a clear demand in society for new politicians, new leaders and new political forces that citizens would like to see in the first place as spokespeople and defenders of their interests.

As evidenced by national sociological research,[1] citizens are ready to accept the existing political parties, however they are putting forward more and more demands and requests, indicating some underrun of the party development from social processes.

Accordingly, the main challenges for most parties, politicians and government at this stage are overcoming the existing mistrust of the public, cooperation with civil society, formation of political parties as effective democratic institutions acting in a certain stable system, representing different social strata in state politics. The experience of establishment of the party system in Ukraine over the years of independence has shown that political parties must play the main role by themselves in the realisation of these objectives. Modern processes in social and political life of Ukraine, in particular due to the implementation of the policy of European integration and considerable actualisation and increasing influence of civil society, have created favourable conditions for this.

Given the above, the main addressee of recommendations made below are the political parties of Ukraine. Recommendations to the authorities are aimed at providing additional external incentives for internal party transformations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

1. Focus on the need for constant work on the formation of a stable electorate based on party representation of the interests of different social groups, achieve compliance of the party system and political parties, as its elements, with the social structure of society.

There is public demand for party cooperation with civil society, so such cooperation has to become an important reserve for the development of political parties and to increase their support in elections at all levels.

2. Make an attitude towards the programme and ideological work responsible. Society expects ideological certainty from parties, the availability of a programme of action in the form of clearly defined goals and objectives, understanding the mechanisms and methods of their implementation and expected results.

The programmes shall not be similar to the programmes of other parties – in this case, the party loses identity and voter motivation falls. Similarly, the election platform (programme) should be based on the provisions of the party programme, but not replicate it in full, and include specific and achievable goals and objectives and ways of achieving them. Outright populism and unrealistic goals should be avoided as they reduce electoral attractiveness and decrease support of the parties in the period between elections.

In the programme work it is very important to consider that society is ready to support the parties that focus on the problems that are common for the entire country while it is not inclined to support the emphasis on the differences between different regions (cultural etc.).

The programme and ideological work should take into consideration the public expectations for the government to improve social protection along with an increased capacity to defend national security interests, as well as foreign policy and humanitarian policy interests.

For the practical implementation of programme and ideological work, establishment of analytical bodies that would work for the needs of the parties on a regular basis (not as a campaign headquarters, which should be set up and operate separately) is expedient.

3. It is important to move away from the rigid binding of a party to a particular leader, which makes the party in fact a hostage to that person's political career, and move the focus to the collegial work of the party leadership. However, one should be aware that in society there is a strong demand not just for mythical "new faces" but for leaders who cannot be accused

[1] More detail in the material "*Political parties and party system of Ukraine at present: public opinion*", pp. 106-145.

of corrupt practices and who have proved themselves in difficult situations. Peaple believe civil society organisations, intellectuals, patriotic and politically active citizens to be the most preferred sources of recruitment of these leaders.

4. Citizens consider the parties as the most important mechanism of representing their interests in social processes. This should encourage the parties to perform systemic work of setting up communication with the society.

The components of the overall communication strategy should be, in particular, regular meetings of the party representatives with voters, keeping society updated on the activity of the parties on different levels, the implementation of their programmes and election platforms. Effective communication must prove in practice the commonality of interests of the parties and different social groups, focusing on their needs in political activities, and it must be implemented by different means. Implementation of this task requires the active deployment of regional party structures and their continuous and effective work at the level of a particular local community.

At the same time, effective mechanisms should be developed to enable citizens to experience in practice the accountability to the community both of the parties and party branches and officials elected from a particular party.

5. The merger of political parties with financial and industrial groups and persons of dubious reputation in the public view is perceived negatively. The growth of negative perception of the parties can be prevented through elaborating personnel policy, providing transparent financial activities, drawing attention to the needs of society as a whole and individual social groups.

It is in the interests of the parties to secure a support and an implementation of the solutions needed to improve the transparency of party finances and establishing mechanisms for funding the statutory activities of political parties from the state budget.

6. Every political party should operate as a recruiting agency and a certain "social lift" that will effectively perform its core functions and expand both the direct talent pool and electoral base. In this context it is important to build a system of party education and staff training.

7. The party documents, and especially the party statutes, should not be the formal papers but the documents that actually regulate the internal activities of every party. Particular attention should be paid to the issues of internal party democracy, procedure of formation and giving the authority and competence of the governing bodies, transparency in the decision-making and accountability of the party leadership before the party members, holding party conventions and conferences.

Effective mechanisms must be developed to involve party members in decision-making (particularly regarding the nomination of candidates). Overall this will not only enhance the party development, but also its positive perception in society.

Usual practice of "suspension of membership" in the party must be terminated. Permanent migration of political leaders between different parties leads to a high level of distrust in the party system as a whole.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO AUTHORITIES

The problem of modernising the party life in Ukraine requires amendments to the current legislation in at least three segments. These are the laws and regulations that concern the regulation of the formation and registration of political parties and on the financial activities of political parties and election laws.

1. Establishment and reorganisation of parties, including procedures, names and improving merger procedures

1.1. More clearly define the status and procedure of the founding event and establish requirements that promote a certain level of representation of citizens as early as at the stage of party establishment.

It is suggested as follows:

The Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" shall:

1. Envisage that the constituent convention of the political parties is a meeting of citizens, which includes at least 50 persons eligible to be members of political parties who are not members of other parties at the date of the constituent assembly, while at least 14 regions of Ukraine must each be represented by at least three participants of the meeting.

2. The "collection of signatures in support of the party" shall be replaced with the requirement of providing 500 applications of citizens to join the party (including members of the constituent convention), including no less than 25 applications by citizens living in each of at least 14 regions of Ukraine.

1.2. Clear requirements shall be established for the names of political parties, unjustified change of parties' names shall be limited and the use of elements both of the existing parties and the parties that have ceased to exist in the names of the parties shall be prevented.

It is suggested as follows:

The Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" shall:

1. Provide that each party has a name that is determined by the constituent convention of the party in compliance with legal requirements and cannot be changed save for the party reorganisation through merger with another party (parties).

2. Determine that in all public relations as well as in internal party life the party acts under its own name.

3. Determine that the party name:

- *cannot reduplicate or be similar[2] to the name of another registered political party, a political party that terminated its activity or a party, which changed its name during the reorganisation, within 10 years after entering the appropriate information into the State Register of Political Parties;*

[2] For the purpose of practical application of this standard, it is proposed to determine structural components of party names, including "individual part" which must be different from the names of other parties and entities.

- *cannot reduplicate or be similar to the name (title) of state authorities, local government administrative territorial units, international organisations etc.*;
- *cannot reduplicate or be similar to private or commercial names of business entities registered in Ukraine or generally known commercial names*;
- *cannot contain the name and/or surname of an individual or abbreviation, consonant with the name or surname of an individual, irrespective of the individual's consent*;
- *cannot contain the names of another state or forms derived from it; the words "state", "public" or "international" in respective forms*.

1.3. Important role in the development of a party system in Ukraine should be played by the process of mergers of politically and ideologically cognate parties. Regulation of the *merger* procedure shall ensure the constitutional and legal succession of the merging party, provide for a simplified procedure for termination of a legal person of the merging party given the simplicity of the relevant property relations. Only in this case it may be possible to change the party's name (adopt the new name of the merged party).

It is suggested as follows:

The Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" should:

1. Establish that the decision on the reorganisation of two or more parties through their merger is to be adopted by the congresses of each of the parties in accordance with their statutes and must be approved by them. Provide the definition of the party, which will be inherited by the merged party.

2. Ensure control over the procedure of convening, holding rallies and making decisions regarding compliance with the requirements of the statutes of parties on the part of the registration authority in the normal manner prescribed by law. Establish that after the positive conclusion of the registration authority, the decision of the congresses cannot be appealed.

3. The following should be performed at the merger congress: finalisation of the united party; adoption of its constituent documents or amendments to the programme and the statute of a party, whose successor is a merged party; formation of the unified leadership of the party; decision regarding the name of the new merged party or keeping the old name of the party, whose successor is the merged party; decision on the symbols of the merged party. The statute of the merged party should envisage the consolidation of the names of the merged parties.

4. Envisage that at least 100 delegates elected by congresses of the merging parties, representing all local organisations of regional level of the parties, should participate in the merger congress.

5. Envisage that the decisions of the parties' congresses, which have decided to merge and the decision of the merging congress becomes binding for all local organisations of the merging parties.

6. Ensure that after the notice on holding the merger congress, the registration authority shall remove from the State Register of Political Parties the information on the merging parties (except the party whose successor is the merging party), as parties that have ceased to exist.

2. Ensuring real "national status" of political parties

2.1. Develop effective legal mechanisms to provide a truly "nationwide status" of political parties, including their capability to operate within the entire state, and the obligation to *ensure* this capability through the establishment of local organisations.

It is suggested as follows:

The Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" should:

1. Establish that within six months after the state registration of a political party, it is required to set up and register at least 18 regional party organisations.

2. Provide regular monitoring of compliance with the national status of the party (requirement of existing 18 regional organisations) by informing the registration authority about conducting regulatory measures (conferences of party organisations, meetings of governing bodies).

3. Establish that the candidates for national elections can be nominated throughout Ukraine by a political party that, according to the registration authority, ensures its national level, and in local elections – a local registered party of a national level.

4. Establish that in the absence of 18 regional organisations of the Party the registration authority warns the party, with a proposal to eliminate violations within six months.

3. The problem of the formalisation of membership/membership account

3.1. The internal account of party members, statutory regulation for joining the party or leaving (exclusion from) the party and the impossibility of judicial review of these actions should be retained.

Retaining the restrictions on the right to party membership for some categories of officials and prohibition of simultaneous membership in more than one party shall be subject to public control.

It is suggested as follows:

The Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" should:

1. Specify the list of officials and persons involved in certain activities, who are banned from being members in political parties. Details of their possible membership in a particular party should be subject to public monitoring, including preventive monitoring in appointment to the relevant office.

2. It shall be determined that senior positions in the party (local party) can be held only by members of the respective party. Therefore the data on the current composition of the governing bodies of the party (local party organisations) should be public. Membership

in the governing body of the party shall be deemed evidence of a person's membership in a relevant party.

The laws "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" and "On Local Elections" shall:

1. Due to the public importance of the information about party affiliation (non-partisan status) of persons nominated as candidates for election, the information about the parties nominating the candidate shall be deemed official attestation by the party of the fact of a candidate's membership in the party or his/her non-partisan status (independence from any party).

3.2. Absence of an exhaustive list of grounds for and consequences of suspension in the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" leads to a number of phenomena (members and even leaders of parties that do not nominate candidates, "suspend" membership and run for elections on behalf of other parties as "non-partisan" candidates, after their election the above persons have renewed their membership in their parties, in senior positions as well). Such actions constitute an abuse of law and are aimed at cheating the voters.

The practice of "suspension (temporary suspension) of party membership" should be abandoned, providing only for a citizen's right to withdraw from the party on their own accord.

3.3. Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine in 2012 and 2014 demonstrated a trend in which the lists of candidates submitted by certain political parties, were almost entirely composed of "non-partisan" candidates. Under these conditions, a political party will have no political influence on behalf of elected deputies in the event of success, therefore, cannot guarantee the performance of its own election programme.

In order to prevent this phenomenon, it is proposed to facilitate the establishment of quotas for members of political parties in the electoral lists of parties, keeping the possibility for a political party to nominate independent candidates.

It is suggested as follows:

The laws "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" and "On Local Elections" should:

Provide that in the list of candidates nominated by a political party (the local organisation of the party), at least 50% of the number of candidates shall be members of the party.

4. Enhancing the programme and ideological functions

Provision should be made for the election programme of the party to be based on its programme as a statutory document and cannot contradict it.

It is suggested as follows:

The Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" shall:

1. Include the requirement that the programme of the party submitted to the registration authority during the party registration or in the amendment shall differ from the programmes of parties that are already registered. The absence of significant differences in the "pan-national programmes of social development" of the two parties should constitute grounds for refusal from registration (with a proposal to address these shortcomings).

The laws "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" and "On Local Elections" should:

1. Establish that the election programme of the party (local party) should be based on the party platform. In case of divergence between the election programme and the party programme, the respective election commission should return the documents submitted for registration of candidates nominated by the party, to address shortcomings.

5. Achieving internal democracy and their normative regulation

5.1. Given the fact that many political parties' statutes contain provisions which do not contribute to the democratic nature of internal party life, the principles of internal democracy should be enshrined in law.

5.2. In particular, it is necessary to ensure the rule of elected collegial bodies of the party, regularity of party congresses, limiting multiple-stage congresses (which entails and unchanged composition of delegates for a long period) and to set the overall balance of powers of the chief executive officer of the party and elected collegial governing bodies of the party.

5.3. Establish the legal requirement for a mandatory statutory body for the internal party control, independent from the governing bodies and senior party officials, whose members are elected by the party congress. Provide that members of this body cannot simultaneously be members of any body of party leadership or a local party organisation.

5.4. The party statute shall provide for the formation of an independent party body, authorised to carry out internal audits of financial and property status of the party, establishing the order of its formation, the procedure and timing of the audit and the procedure of bringing the audit findings to the attention of all local organisations of the party.

6. The transparency of party finances

6.1. Ensure implementation of changes to legislation that envision, inter alia, budgetary funding of statutory activities of political parties, prevent the introduction of delay or cancellation of these amendments on the grounds of difficult economic and financial situation, or for other reasons, in due time.

6.2. Enshrine in law the collection of mandatory contributions as a source of financing of political parties; the amount of which shall be set individually by the party.

What electoral system in your view is the best for Ukraine?
% of respondents



7. Political parties and government

7.1. Define a single central executive body, authorised to register political parties, control compliance with the law by parties in their activities (except for electoral and financing activities) and supervision of their observance of the requirements of their statutes.

7.2. Provide for the public registration authority to maintain a State Register of Political Parties, which shall contain information on:

1) name of the party, and (in the case of a party merger) name and previous names of parties that merged in the course of reorganisation;

2) year of registration, year of reorganisation (merger);

3) constituent documents (programme and statute) of the party in their current wording;

4) the date of the last congress;

5) the composition of the central leading organs of the party, the name of the highest official of the party;

6) location (registered address) of the party;

7) list of registered regional party organisations with notes regarding each year of its registration, date of the last conference of the organisation, members of governing bodies, name of the senior official (head) of the organisation and location (registered address) of the organisation.

7.3. Provide for the party obligation to notify the registration authority on the congresses of the party, conferences of regional organisations of the party, amendments to the party programme or statute and changes in governance bodies, changes of senior officials of the party, of the regional party organisation, creation or termination of the regional party organisations, change of registered address of the party or its regional organisation.

7.4. Provide that the registration authority shall publish on its website all its decisions made regarding the political parties.

7.5. In order to prevent the existence of "phantom parties",[3] which is a breeding ground for the negative phenomenon of "sale-purchase" of political parties, a clear and efficient procedure for voluntary termination of the activity (dissolution) of a political party shall be set.

8. The electoral law for parliamentary/ local elections

8.1. Adopt amendments to the Law "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine", which introduced the proportional electoral system with open regional lists of candidates and the compensatory pan-national level. The electoral districts should primarily correspond to the administrative and territorial units of the regional level (with possible separation of the largest ones into two electoral regions). Establish a nationwide electoral threshold at the level of 4%.

8.2. Adopt amendments to the Law "On Local Elections" in which the election of deputies to local councils (cities of regional significance, Kyiv) implement the proportional electoral system with open lists in one or more (in case of district division) electoral districts.

Allow the nomination of lists of independent candidates ("self-nomination by the list") for such elections.

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[3] Registered parties that are inactive and do not perform any activity and parties that have decided to dissolve (to join another party), but the liquidation process has not been completed for a long time.

MAIN THESES OF THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' ELECTION		
Political party "People's Front" ("Narodnyi Front")	**Party "Petro Poroshenko Bloc"**	**Political party "Samopomich" (Self-Reliance)**
registered on 31 March 2014 leader – Arseniy YATSENYUK Programme "Restoration of Ukraine"	registered on 5 May 2000 leader – Yuriy LUTSENKO Programme "Live in a New Way!"	registered on 29 December 2012 leader – Andriy SADOVYI Programme "Unity Means Strength"
(22.14%)*	**(21.82%)***	**(10.97%)***
INTERNAL		
Decentralisation,		
Decentralisation. Local governments should receive a stable financial basis for execution of extended powers.	Decentralisation of power. Communities at the local level should receive more rights and funds for implementation of powers. The executive power in regions will belong not to "governours" assigned from top authorities, but to executive committees, established by regional councils, elected by the people.	Decentralisation of power.
Purging		
Civil servant screening and renewal of government agencies. Attracting civil society to solving of the most pressing issues.	Anti-corruption purging of court, law-enforcement, tax and customs authorities. Early local elections in case if elective authorities and local self-governing authorities lost trust of the people.	Purging – cleaning state services from people who cause damage to the country through their work.
Anti-corruption		
Renewal of anti-corruption laws and implementation of new anti-corruption practices: • creation of an independent anti-corruption body, • implementation of income and expenditure declarations for civil servants, politicians, judges, employees of the public prosecutor's office, and so on with compulsory verification of these reports, • engaging society to the anti-corruption monitoring process. Implementation of e-government and transfer to administrative services provision using the single-window principle.	Ability of citizens to obtain comprehensive information about the decisions made by state authorities and local self-governing authorities. Open access to information about personnel policy and the activity of each civil servant and senior official, their property and income, as well as the expenditures of civil servants and their families' members.	Creation of an independent body for investigating corruption within senior-level authorities. Transparent state procurement and property sale procedures. Simplifying the rendering of administrative services.
Power distribution,		
Reforming the Ukrainie's political system, aimed at creating reliable safety measures against attempts to usurp state power.	Maintaning and further improvement of the renewed parliamentary-presidential form of government, when the government is formed by parliamentary coalition. Electing the parliament by the open party tickets.	Ensuring a balance between the responsibilities and powers of the President, Parliament and Government for each authority. Adopting the law on the President of Ukraine. Cancelling privileges and setting a fair salary for parliamentarians and ministers. Cancelling parliamentary immunity.

* Programmes are taken from the official website of the CEC, heading "*Early parliamentary elections of people's deputies of Ukraine 2014*", *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp501?PT001F01=910*.

PROGRAMMES THAT HAVE A PARLIAMENTARY FACTION		
Political party "Opposition Bloc"	**Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko**	**All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" (Fatherland)**
registered on 23 April 2010 leader – Yuriy BOYKO Programme "Ukraine: the Right to a Future"	registered on 28 September 2010 leader – Oleh LYASHKO Programme "Lyashko's Plan. Ukraine's Victory"	registered on 16 September 1999 leader – Yuliya TYMOSHENKO Programme "Ukraine Will Win!"
(9.43%)*	**(7.44%)***	**(5.68%)***
AFFAIRS		
local governance		
Decentralisation of power. Citizens should receive the right to independently elect and recall, the heads of regions via direct voting. The transfer of functions, powers and finances to the local communities and to create executive authorities of local councils by eliminating district state administrations	Decentralisation of power. Collected taxes remain predominantly at the local level. Provision to the citizens of the right to conduct referendums to adress the important issues.	Implementation of reforms of local governments, extending their rights and financial independence as per the European Charter of Local Self-Government. Liquidation of the local state administrations, giving the right to regional and district councils to form their own executive committees.
Stop thoughtless dismissal of public servants and pursuit of political opponents under the slogan of purging. The fight against corruption should be fought within the framework of effective legislation.	Purging of authorities from traitors and thieves. Full purging means the inspections of the activity of civil servants on a local level.	Pass a law about purging and create an independent state purging committee. Banning from occupying state appointments the officials and people's deputies who worked for the Yanukovych regime, voted for the dictatorship laws of 16 January 2014, or were suspected of corruption.
policy		
	Elimination of bribery. Creation of a public anti-corruption corpus to respond the complaints from citizens. Installing the procedure of preventing bribery with immediate detention and punishment of bribetakers. Nationalisation of their property. A system for monitoring civil servants' expenses. Dismissal of oligarchs.	Bringing the legislation on judiciary, prosecutor's offices, the State Security Service, police and public service in line with the standards and anti-corruption requirements of the EU. Implementation of the severest possible criminal liability for corruption and bribery. Passing a law whereby each public servant and his/her family should be obliged to prove the legality of the origin of his/her property. To oblige public servants and people's deputies not only to declare their income, but also their expenditure. To place their tax declarations in the public domain online. Creation of an independent Anti-corruption Bureau with the right to provoke bribery and conduct lie-detector tests. To open a network of administrative services "supermarkets". Creation of an e-government system.
election system		
Commencing implementation of the process of constitutional changes. Full-fledged implementation of the rights and freedoms of a person and citizen. Provision of the stable economic, social and political development of Ukraine is the main objective of the Constitutional reforms.	Elections under open party tickets.	Passing the law about elections to the Verkhovna Rada as per a proportional system with open party tickets. Passing the law on parliamentary opposition with a right to appoint the head of the Clearing Office to control budget expenditures. To cancel immunity for the President, parliamentarians and judges. To launch a mechanism for recalling of a people's deputy of Ukraine. Passing the laws about impeaching the President and on transparency of party's funding.

MAIN THESES OF THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' ELECTION		
Political party "People's Front" ("Narodnyi Front")	**Party "Petro Poroshenko Bloc"**	**Political party "Samopomich" (Self-Reliance)**
HUMANITARIAN		
Language		
Extension of use of Ukrainian as the national language.	Free use of the native language, with maintaining and strengthening of a single Ukrainian humanitarian space; specifics of each region will be taken into account in the language-cultural sphere, in education and in the policy of the historical memory.	
Information policy,		
Protection of the national information space. Competitive media market, independent and professional mass media, powerful social media. Formation of a common, all-national identity.	Transparent ownership structure of mass media. Creation of public television.	Creation of a proactive state information policy. Telecommunication infrastructure development.
Science and		
Patriotic education of citizens. Further reforms in the educational sphere as per European principles.		Increasing the salary of teachers. Achieving the real academic and student self-governance. Grant support to young scientists. Creation of the independent National Research Fund to finance fundamental, applied research, innovation projects and startups.
Religion		
THE ENERGY		
Diversification of energy resources and supply chains, their economy and achieving a high level of energy efficiency. Bringing the energy sector into line with the requirements of the Energy Community Treaty.		
INTERNATIONAL		
International policy		
Updating the legislation and implementation of a strategic course for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.	Ukraine's membership in the European Union.	Disclaiming the non-bloc status of Ukraine.
Crimea,		
	Political and diplomatic fight for the return of the temporarily occupied Crimea and maintaining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.	

PROGRAMMES THAT HAVE A PARLIAMENTARY FACTION (continued)

Political party "Opposition Bloc"	Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" (Fatherland)
POLICIES		
Ensuring thorough development of the Ukrainian as the state language. Giving citizens the opportunity to define the status of the Russian and other languages as regional languages in places of compact residence of national ethnic minorities. To enshrine in legislation the right for development of regional languages in the sphere of court procedures, culture, education and the provision of administrative services.		
mass media		
education		
Extending the network of after-school educational facilities.		Establishment of state grants for young people to receive a university education and internships in Europe.
Development and approval of the Humanitarian development conception "Unity in diversity" aimed at providing legal, organisational principles for the spiritual development of every person.		
SPHERE		
Increasing the state energy efficiency and energy independence.		
AFFAIRS		
directions		
Preservation of non-bloc status and neutrality.	Association with the EU.	Ukraine's accession to NATO. Ukraine's membership in the European Union.
Anti-terrorist operation		
Activation of negotiations with Russia via mediation of the EU states, the USA and other countries aimed at creating the stable conditions for peace in the East of Ukraine.		Return to the "Geneva" format of negotiations with Russia. Implementation of Ukraine's own sanctions against Russia, recognition Russia as an aggressor and sponsor of terrorism, and the DPR and LPR – as the terrorist organisations. Launching a programme for the return of Crimea, making Russia compensate losses incurred from the occupation of the Autonomous Republic Crimea and part of Donbas in the international courts.

MAIN THESES OF THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' ELECTION		
Political party "People's Front" ("Narodnyi Front")	**Party "Petro Poroshenko Bloc"**	**Political party "Samopomich" (Self-Reliance)**
ECONOMY		
Taxes		
Tax system reform.	Reduction of tax volumes, decreasing tax rates. Ways to avoid payment of tax via offshore structures should all be blocked. Simplified taxation for small and medium-size businesses.	Decentralisation of taxes. Liberalisation of the tax legislation regarding sponsorship and patronage in education, science, culture and sport.
Ownership		
Disclosure of the enterprise ownership structure.	Inviolability of ownership.	Transformation of agricultural land into the property of Ukrainian farmers so they can attract investment and develop their farms.
Deregulation		
Demonopolisation of the economy. Extension of the freedom of entrepreneurial activity and a significant reduction of functions of the administrative regulation of the economy. A reduction in the volume of permissions, control bodies and inspections. In 20 years to enter the top twenty countries in the Human Development Index. Implementation of the e-government and transfer to the administrative services provision using the single-window principle.	Implementation of the real competitive economic model in Ukraine. The Anti-Monopoly Committee should become a key economic regulator.	Deregulation and the fight against corruption and monopolies. Simplifying the rendering of administrative services. Implementation of a real anti-monopoly policy. Ensuring a reasonable cost of financial resources.
Priority		
Agricultural production. Development of modern manufacturing industry sectors.	Agrarian sector. Development of high technologies.	High technologies, mechanical engineering and extended processing. Creation of technological and industrial parks, export-import agency, development bank and modernisation fund. Export of food products, not only agricultural raw materials.
Social		
Salaries,		
	Social protection for disadvantaged citizens.	
Monetary		
Banning the cancellation or reduction of communal services subsidies for the low-income citizens.		Implementation of the targeted assistance system. Transparent and targeted support for individuals who defended the freedom of Ukrainians and the territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as for their families.

PROGRAMMES THAT HAVE A PARLIAMENTARY FACTION (continued)

Political party "Opposition Bloc"	Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" (Fatherland)
Decrease of the tax burden on small and medium-size business and implementation of a moratorium on inspections. Implementation of credit and tax holidays for enterprises in the regions that have been affected by war.	A simple and clear tax system. Credits for development with a 5% interest rate for 10 years. Smaller taxes on salary, bigger taxes on oligarchs' raw material products. Crisis tax on oligarchs.	Simplification of the payment procedure and a decrease of the quantity of existing taxes and duties – there should be no more than six. Reduction of the unified social tax to 15%.
	Prohibition of land sales. Land lease right under strict state control. Prohibition for foreigners managing our black soil.	State ownership of agricultural land and renewal of free provision of land assets. Citizens can sell shares to the state for a beneficial price. Making over-concentration of land in the hands of one person impossible, since this may lead to the actual enslavement of farmers.
Improving the investment climate.	Simple reporting, minimum of inspections and minimum bureaucracy.	Radical reduction of the number of licences and control bodies. A significant reduction of staff in government authorities. Implementation of a business-ombudsman institute, to prohibit so called "masquerades" and unsubstantiated inspections of small and medium-size business. Opening a network of administrative services "supermarkets".
industries		
Approval of state programmes to support national manufacturers.	Revival of full cycle qualitative manufacturing. Assistance for the Ukrainian national manufacturer, employer and tax payer.	
sphere		
pensions		
Ensuring salaries and pension indexation in line with inflation. Put a stop to the reducing of public sector employees and ensure the fair pay for their work.		Fair salaries and privileges to combatants in anti-terrorist operations.
aid		
Increase the child birth and child care support. Introduction of preferential loans for young families forhousing. Increase of social protection for soldiers and their families, law enforcement officials and family members of those who have been killed or injured during the anti-terrorist operations.	Targeted monetary aid to low-income citizens. Families with two children will be recognised as big families and will receive the corresponding support. Service people injured during the anti-terrorist operations and their families will receive the social protection from the state.	

MAIN THESES OF THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' ELECTION		
Political party "People's Front" ("Narodnyi Front")	**Party "Petro Poroshenko Bloc"**	**Political party "Samopomich" (Self-Reliance)**
		Medical
Provision of access to good-quality medical services. Provision of essential medical services, prosthestics for heroes and provision of accomodation, social guarantees to families of those who were killed during battles for Ukraine.		Grant access to medical facilities and health resort institutions of the Public Affairs Administration. Implementation of a medical insurance system. Provision of fair pay for doctors.
		LAW ENFORCEMENT
		Court
Real judicial reform, which would include a purge of personnel, "cleansing" and significant institutional changes.	Court independence. Establishing public control over the appointment of judges and their activities and creation of a system for their independent functioning.	Renewal of the juridiciary. Removing the President and Parliament from the process of forming the judiciary. Improvement of mechanisms for the selection of judges and disciplinary accountability to strengthen their independence
		Internal affairs
Radical reform of law enforcement bodies and the civil security sphere.	Reform of the law enforcement system of courts, police, State Security Service and the Prosecutor's Office.	Increased liability for crimes or criminal failure of state officials, prosecutors or law enforcement officials to act and a decrease in staff numbers and an increase in salary. Establishment of municipal law enforcement bodies. Renewal of the prosecutor corps. Formation of the prosecutor's office as a public prosecution service.
		NATIONAL SECURITY
		Territorial integrity,
Restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity. Gaining control over the state border. Renewal of Ukraine's National Security Strategy. Passing a new War Doctrine, where Russia will be clearly defined as an aggressor.	The political and diplomatic fight for the return of the temporarily occupied Crimea and safeguarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine.	Forming a new War Doctrine. Manufacture and purchase of modern armaments. Effective management of the defence industrial complex.
		Armed Forces
Reforms in the army and other sectors of security and defence, their equipping with new, modern types of weapons, military equipment and auxiliary components.	Increase of expenditure on modernisation and strengthening of the Armed Forces.	Forming a military reserve by creating a system for military training of civilians.
		Volunteers
		Support of citizens who self-organised to help the army.

PROGRAMMES THAT HAVE A PARLIAMENTARY FACTION (continued)

Political party "Opposition Bloc"	Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" (Fatherland)
support		
Implementation of the medical insurance system, provision of the right to free medical services for the disadvantaged and retired people.	Allocation of 10 times more funds for medicine compared to the present level. A medical and obstetric centre in each village.	
SYSTEM		
Implementation of the judiciary reform. Election of members of the judiciary and extension of juridical self-governance.		Purging of judges involved in violation of human rights, making illegal judgements, political repression and corruption. Organisation of a jury court. Creating equal opportunities to protect the rights via court for all citizens. Election of the local court judges by the people.
agencies		
Reforms of the law enforcement system, ensuring its absolute accountability to and controllability by society.		Penitentiary system reform.
AND DEFENCE		
defence		
Strengthening of Ukraine's capability to defend itself.	Victory in the war.	Maintaining for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. Establishing the Headquarters for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, through which the President will manage the state defence system.
of Ukraine		
Implementation of an army modernisation programme will provide state-guaranteed orders for more than 160 companies in Ukraine's defence industrial complex.		Building a powerful army. Restoration of Ukraine's Armed Forces and ensuring their re-equipment on the basis of the domestic defence industrial complex in line with NATO standards. Purging the army of traitors and replacing the incompetent generals.
Disarmament of all illegal military formations.	Creation of potential guerilla units and preparation of the population to defend major cities.	Elimination of bureaucratic obstacles to volunteer activities.

MAIN THESES OF THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' ELECTION		
Political Party All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (Freedom)	**Communist Party of Ukraine**	**Party of Serhiy Tihipko "Strong Ukraine" ("Sylna Ukrayina")**
registered on 16 October 1995 leader – Oleh TYAHNYBOK Programme "Ukrainian Victory: Programme of Fundamental Transformations"	registered on 5 October 1993 leader - Petro SYMONENKO Election programme "Peace to the Ukrainian Land! Prosperity for Every Family!"	registered on 25 March 2005 leader – Serhiy TIHIPKO
(4,71%)*	**(3,88%)***	**(3,11%)***
INTERNAL		
Decentralisation,		
Dissolution of the local state administrations. Transfer of their powers to the executive committees of local councils.	Implementation of the constitutional changes that give the way to decentralisation. A broad regional independence subject to strong constitutional guarantees of unity and territorial integrity of the country. The most important debatable issues of state and society life should be solved by means of national plebiscites.	Regionalisation of management. Local communities (at the level of towns and districts) should receive the right to manage their property and the most of their budgets collected on their territory, to influence the appointment of heads of local law-enforcement and controlling authorities. Regional councils should receive the right to choose governing bodies. Regulation of local tax rates depending on the region's needs. The President's representative functions in the regions should be limited to control over the observance of Ukrainian laws in the given territory.
Purging		
Lustration – the fundamental cleansing of authorities. Removal from public office the agents of the KGB/FSB, government officials who held executive positions in the Communist Party, Yanukovych's accomplices, separatists and occupants.		
Anti-corruption		
To check the correspondance of the official income of the civil servants and members of their families to their real expenditure and property status.		Adopting a plan for urgent measures to fight corruption, within the framework of which the volume of control authorities, their control functions and numbers of public servants who work in them should be reduced. To implement priority and the most severe measures to stop corruption in senior-level authorities. To abandon the punitive tax system. To check only those with clear evidence of tax avoidance. To implement a system of personal liability for civil servants of the control authorities regarding the reasoning behind and the legality of business checks. Extension of civil society's rights in the fight against corruption.
Power distribution,		
A proportional system for elections to the Parliament as per open election lists. Providing the right for citizens to recall deputies, civil servants and judges of the various levels from office by means of referendum. Cancelling the immunity of President, parliamentarians and judges from liability for criminal acts and economical crimes.		

* Programmes are taken from the official website of the CEC, heading "*Early parliamentary elections of people's deputies of Ukraine 2014*", *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp501?PT001F01=910*.

PROGRAMMES THAT HAVE GAINED OVER 1% OF PEOPLE\S VOTES		
Political Party "Cilic Position" ("Hromadska Pozytsia (Anatoliy Grytsenko)")	**Political Party All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union "ZASTUP"**	**Political Party Right Sector ("Pravyi Sektor")**
registered on 24 March 2005 leader – Anatoliy GRYTSENKO Programme "Security. Justice. Renewal"	registered on 4 May 2011 leader – Vira ULIANCHENKO Programme "For Our Native Land!"	registered on 29 September 1997 leader – Dmytro YAROSH Programme "Victory! Statehood! Liberty!"
(3,10%)*	**(2,65%)***	**(1,80%)***
AFFAIRS		
local governance		
Decentralisation of power. Transfer of the necessary functions and powers, relevant physical and financial resources to the local governing bodies. Elimination of the state administrations; creation of the local council executive committees. Central authorities to be limited in their functions of supervision, control and coordination over implementation of state-level programmes.	Decentralisation of power. Self-governing communities should become the real owners with a high level of powers and budget resources. Delegation of the powers of authorities as close as possible to a citizen level. Development of the local governance.	Extension of the local governance authorities.
Purging the authorities, prosecution of thieves and criminal; anti-corruption programme at the system level.		Purging and staff renewal in the law-enforcement agencies. Lustration and assessment of officials at the public service agencies.
policy		
Provision of public access to information on the use of state and communal funds at all levels, including online access to the information about all transactions on the accounts of the Treasury Department. Adopting the law on transparency of the political parties funding and political advertising. Criminal prosecution for the "unjust enrichment" – purchase by a politician or civil servant of property that could not be explained by legal sources of income, and punishment with property confiscation.	Taking land use out of shadow turnover; counteracting land fraud and corruption in commercial land use.	Setting corruption in the military sphere on a level with especially grave crimes. Implementation of the e-governance on the national and local levels. Severing the punishment for corruption including the life-long bans from the public service.
election system		

MAIN THESES OF THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' ELECTION		
Political Party All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (Freedom)	**Communist Party of Ukraine**	**Party of Serhiy Tihipko "Strong Ukraine" ("Sylna Ukrayina")**
HUMANITARIAN		
Мова		
Strengthening status of the Ukrainian as the single official language of Ukraine. Establishing a compulsory Ukrainian language test for civil servants and candidates to elected posts. To make all civil servants use the Ukrainian language at work and during public speeches. To grant tax privileges for the manufacture and distribution of culture-related products in the Ukrainian language. To regulate use of the Ukrainian language in mass media and film distribution.	Maintaining and developing languages and cultures of all ethnic groups. Russian language should be given the status of a official language.	Regions should receive the right to independently define the principles of language and cultural policy. The goal of the Centre is to support development of Ukrainian language, culture and history.
Information policy,		
Mass media should inform citizens about all their owners. Prohibition of broadcasting TV-series and programs that depict the humiliation of Ukrainians. Provision of equal access to mass media for all election participants. Prohibition of paid political advertisements in mass media three months before and during an election campaign.		
Science and		
	Increasing the financing of culture facilities, libraries and bookshops. Return to state free preschool, secondary, vocational technical and university education.	
Religion		
	Support of traditional religious confessions.	
THE ENERGY		
Ukraine's energy independence, reduction of consumption, increase of production and diversification of supply sources. To import not more than 30 % of energy resources from one supplier country. Creation of the Ukrainian full nuclear power cycle. Alternative energy system development. Implementation of the energy saving technologies.		
INTERNATIONAL		
International policy		
Ukraine's accession to NATO. Determination of European Ukrainian centrism as a state strategic course. Building close political and economical collaboration with countries on the Baltic-Black Sea axis. Introducing the visa regime with the Russian Federation and a visa-free regime with the EU. Require the efficient protection from the states signed the Budapest Memorandum. Signing the bilateral agreement with the USA on the provision of military and technical support.	Reliable screening for pro-NATO intentions. Restoration of good-neighbourly and brotherly relationships with CIS-countries, primarily, Russian, Belarus and Kazakhstan.	
Crimea,		
Shutdown at the diplomatic relationships with Russia until it stops aggression against Ukraine and pays compensation. Bringing Putin and his accomplices to international criminal court for terrorism and military crimes.		Multylateral peace negotiations. Accompaniment of peace process by the special envoy of the UN General Secretary. Strong negotiation position of Ukraine, based on principles of independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

PROGRAMMES THAT HAVE GAINED OVER 1% OF PEOPLE\S VOTES (continued)

Political Party "Cilic Position" ("Hromadska Pozytsia (Anatoliy Grytsenko)")	Political Party All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union "ZASTUP"	Political Party Right Sector ("Pravyi Sektor")
POLICIES		
	The single state language should be Ukrainian.	
mass media		
		Creation of the concept of protecting the Ukrainian information space.
education		
Provision of equal opportunities to receive education, preschool and after-school creative development of children and young people; closure of universities that award diplomas but do not provide profound knowledge or the occupations required on the labour market.	Development of education, science and modern agrarian technologies.	Ensuring free the general secondary education. Development of national education and sporting-patriotic education for young people. Military and raise national military-patriotic education to the appropriate level at secondary educational facilities.
		Invilving the national confessions to the spiritual education of young people.
SPHERE		
Reaching energy independence by 2020, by means of a gas share reduction in the structure of the energy balance; activing geological exploration and augmentation of the production of energy resources; fundamental energy saving.	Promotion of the latest technologies in energy efficiency within the agro-industrial complex.	Diversification of energy supply sources.
AFFAIRS		
directions		
Ukraine's accession to the European Union and NATO. Building allied relationships with the USA and United Kingdom on a bilateral treaty basis. Ratification the Agreement on association with the European Union and providing its unconditional execution.	Europe is the Ukrainian choice, but entering tne united Europe should take place on advantageous conditions.	Cooperation with NATO and other international security structures, aimed at preventing external threats. Central and Eastern Europe on the Baltics – Transcaucasia diagonal (Sweden, Lithuania, Poland, Turkey, Georgia) should become a priority space in implementation of the Ukrainian geopolitical strategy.
Anti-terrorist operation		
		The Ukrainian army should once and for all get the Russian army out of Ukraine. Introduction of a martial law and official recognition of Russian aggression.

MAIN THESES OF THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' ELECTION		
Political Party All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (Freedom)	**Communist Party of Ukraine**	**Party of Serhiy Tihipko "Strong Ukraine" ("Sylna Ukrayina")**
ECONOMY		
Taxes		
Simplification of tax system. Provision of preferential loans for opening a small business. Implementation of a progressive taxation scale as per the principle: "small business – small taxes, big business – big taxes". Implementation of a progressive taxation scale for the income of natural persons.	Exempting small salaries from taxes, implementation of progressive taxation of the income of the rich and extremely rich people and introduction of tax on luxury objects.	Reduction of tax burden for production facilities with high added value. Reduction of numbers of taxes and simplification of their administration. Implementation of a five-year moratorium for tax inspections at small and medium-size business with annual turnover up to UAH 10 mln. Reduction of the unified social tax to the average European level (not more than 20%). Regulation of local tax rates depending on the region's needs.
Ownership		
Banning the privatisation of strategic enterprises and returning already privatised companies to the state ownership. Banning the sale of agricultural land. Giving land for long-term use to Ukrainian citizens with a right of family heritage. Giving back the natural monopolies and ownership energy-generating enterprises to the state. Liquidation of private monopolies and oligopolies, the market share of which is more than 25%. Giving back the to state ownership of enterprises, the owners of which do not commit their social and investment obligations.	Legal nationalisation of strategic industry sectors, returning state control over mineral and natural resources and banning the sale and purchase of agricultural land. State monopoly over the production and sale of alcohol and tobacco products.	
Deregulation		
Simplification of the permit system.		Bringing the number of permits and licences to a reasonably necessary level. Increase of economic freedom and improvement of investment climate.
Priority		
Agriculture, information technologies, aircraft engineering, ship building, mechanical engineering, energy sector, defence industrial complex and space industry.	State support of domestic manufacturers, science and farmers. Development of the middle class, which constitutes at least 60% of the population.	Mechanical engineering, metallurgy, agricultural product processing. Protection and support of domestic industry development. Protection of domestic commodity markets. Launch of the of state programme for preferential loans and support of small and medium-size business.
Social		
Salaries,		
Cancellation of the Azarov-Yanukovych pension reform. Ensuring dependence of the pension age on average pensioner's life span. Cancellation of pension privileges. Installing the accumulation pension system.	Quarterly indexing with account for real salaries, pensions and scholarship inflation. Establishment of salaries for budget sphere employees at the level of the average salary in the industry; cancellation of pension and medical reform; return to the following retirement age: 55 years for women, 60 years for men; tax exemption for small wages.	Review of minimum subsistence level and amount of minimal salary and pension at least 4 times a year. High salaries and social protection of soldiers and officers and introduction of modern weaponry.

PROGRAMMES THAT HAVE GAINED OVER 1% OF PEOPLE\S VOTES (continued)

Political Party "Cilic Position" ("Hromadska Pozytsia (Anatoliy Grytsenko)")	Political Party All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union "ZASTUP"	Political Party Right Sector ("Pravyi Sektor")
Liquidation of the tax police. Effective use of collected taxes.	Support of measures for the tax system reform, which will transform it from a confiscating system to a promoting system. Preservation of special tax regimes for agrarians; reduction of the volume of taxes and duties, simplification of their administration; introduction of tax holidays for start-up farmers; tax stimulation for capital asset renewal.	Simplification of the tax system for small and medium-size business. Implementation of a special tax system for restoration of Ukrainian production. Reduction of the number of taxes to only three – individual income tax (10%), income tax (7%) and investment activity tax (5%).
Opening ownership registers for public access with compulsory notification about real owners during bank account registration, company registration, sale and purchase actions, participation in the government procurement and privatisation.	A moratorium on agricultural land sales should remain in force until provisions of reliable guarantees for agricultural workers and their right to own the land are made. Urgent adopting of the Law "About turnover of agricultural land". Improvement of sales procedure for agricultural land lease rights.	Return to the state ownership of stolen assets and capital belonging to the Ukrainian people.
Performance of the fundamental deregulation in entrepreneurial and investment activities for small and medium-size business. A halving of the number of control bodies and civil servants. Simplification of administrative services provision and full transfer to a single-window system. Implementation of the e-governance.	Deregulation of the land use system. Adoption of targeted government programme "Soil Fertility Protection". Counteracting monopolistic plots at agricultural product markets.	Triple reduction of the public service staff. Simplification of the regulation process and minimisation of administrative procedures. Implementation of the anti-monopoly policy, aimed at limiting the economic influence of oligarchs.
industries		
	Rural development. State support for organic manufacturing. Raising investment for the production of commodities with high added value.	Rural modernisation and priority development of rural infrastructure.
sphere		
pensions		
Ensuring fair pension accrual based on employee tenure and size of salary, with extra payment for special working conditions. Maximum pension should exceed the minimum pension by no more than 10 times.		

MAIN THESES OF THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' ELECTION		
Political Party All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (Freedom)	**Communist Party of Ukraine**	**Party of Serhiy Tihipko "Strong Ukraine" ("Sylna Ukrayina")**
		Monetary
Preferential loans for young people to gain a university education. Provision of the high social guarantees for participants of anti-terrorist operations. They should be granted privileges in education, job placement, business, payment for municipal services and free land share.	Implementation of a system for financial and social support to young teachers and medical personnel, especially those who work in rural areas. Provision of free accomodation to low-income citizens. Expenditure on municipal services should not be more than 10% of family income. Provision of accomodation, fair living standards and social guarantees to military service personnel.	Provision of monthly financial aid to the most socially unprotected young families for child care.
		Medical
Implementation of the compulsory state social medical insurance, which will contain a basic package of medical assistance.	Provision of free medical assistance to citizens. Purchase of medication and its provision at the expense of budget funds, critically needed for life-saving. Government control over prices, quality of food products, commodities and medical services.	
		LAW ENFORCEMENT
		Court
Personal financial accountability of civil servants and judges for illegal judgements. Local judges to be elected by the community, appeal court judges to be elected by congress of local court judges and Supreme Court judges to be elected by congress of Ukrainian judges.		
		Internal affairs
Police reform and reduction of staff.		
		NATIONAL SECURITY
		Territorial integrity,
Introduction the martial law on the territory where military operations are taking place. Ensuring that all the country's military expenditures are covered by taxing the super profit-making oligarchs. A new concept of state's defence capabilities.	Constitutional guarantees of unity and territorial integrity of the country.	Independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Passing a new War Doctrine, where the current status of threats and risks for the country will be depicted.
		Armed Forces
Establishing funding of Ukraine's Armed Forces at the level of 5% GDP. Building up a highly technical, professional army and mass popular reserve of Ukraine's Armed Forces as per the Swiss model. Creation of the territorial defence units. Establishing a system for general military training of civilians. Reorganisation of the defence industrial complex for urgent equipping of the Armed Forces with the modern armaments.	Restoration of national respect for defenders of Motherland. Provision of accomodation, fair living standards and social guarantees to the military service personnel.	A modern, professional army on a contractual basis, which is capable of stopping any type of external threat. Reforming the structure and financing principles of Ukraine's Armed Forces.
		Volunteers
	Urgent liquidation of non-official military units.	

PROGRAMMES THAT HAVE GAINED OVER 1% OF PEOPLE\S VOTES (continued)

Political Party "Cilic Position" ("Hromadska Pozytsia (Anatoliy Grytsenko)")	Political Party All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union "ZASTUP"	Political Party Right Sector ("Pravyi Sektor")
aid		
Social protection for military service personnel and combatants and their family members.	Implementation of an incentive policy for living in rural areas; good quality of municipal services for the rural population; to spend up to 25% of local budgets on the development of a culture and education infrastructure.	Development of a guaranteed social insurance package for military service personnel and family members of those, who were killed in battle.
support		
Annual determination by the Law of the guaranteed package of medical assistance which could be received by each person free of charge. Development of insurance medicine. Strengthening of state control over prices and quality of medication.		Introduction of new standards for the health care system.
SYSTEM		
Strengthening of court system independence based on judicial self-governance, high selection criteria and transparent procedures of judge appointment and strict accountability for making judgments contrary to the Law.		A guarantee of real court independence. Establishment of the institution of a jury court. Introduction of the institution of elected judges.
agencies		
		Introduction of elections for local and district police heads and district police officers.
AND DEFENCE		
defence		
Building a three-level country defence system: a professional contract army; a military reserve of permanent readiness; a complex system of territorial defence.	State sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Defence of own territory by all possible means.	Return of all occupied territories.
of Ukraine		
Provision of the modern armaments to the Armed Forces and the National Guard. Restoration of a modern technological base for the civil protection system, introducing training of people for action in the event of military aggression. Building an effective system for national information and cyber security, based on the latest developments of domestic IT.		Increase of expenditure on the army, its reforming and re-equipping.
		State status for the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE: CURRENT STATE, DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT: OPINIONS OF POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS

Political parties play an important role in formation and operation of government, provide a link between political institutions and civil society, perform a number of important social functions. At present stage, when Ukraine is going through the most difficult phase of its history, the issue of efficiency and accountability of parties becomes more immediate. In this regard, there is considerable public interest in the vision of their objectives, plans and problems of political parties themselves.

In the framework of project "Party System of Ukraine Before and After Maidan: Changes, Trends, Public Demand", the Razumkov Centre has asked the leaders of key Ukrainian political parties[1] to answer questions on the current state, prospects and problems of operation of political forces headed by them. [2]

Below are presented answers of leaders or authorised representatives of political forces, who replied to the request of the Razumkov Centre.[3]

Arseniy YATSENYUK
the Prime Minister of Ukraine,
Leader of "People's Front" Party

DEVELOPMENT, ACTIVE WORK WITH CITIZENS AND SOCIETY ARE AMONG OUR CONSTANT PRIORITIES

– How would you describe your party in terms of its place in the ideological spectrum, organisational structure and electoral base?

"People's Front" party was created at a difficult time for Ukraine, when we faced the problems of the state's survival and the standing up to open military aggression from Russia. But our goal is not only to protect Ukraine, it is to build a strong, democratic, prosperous, modern, just state, which serves people, and defending which is a great honour.

We stand for carrying out in-depth fundamental transformations in all spheres of life, for establishing honesty, accountability and fairness in the relationship between the state and each person. The state must ensure creation of basic conditions for free development of private initiative, so that the entire society feels not threatened by the state, but supported on a daily basis.

This approach drives us to seek a combination of prompt implementation of reforms, a sharp drop of intensity of government's interference in everyday life, and increased social support of people, many of whom now find themselves on the brink of poverty at no fault of theirs. We are at the point, when the future of Ukraine depends on the level of responsibility of the state, government, as well as of business.

So, **"People's Front" is a modern, European, centre-right party, which advocates for strong social state policy**. Actually, this path is taken by many influential parties in European countries.

A party is a living organism that develops together with society and has the goal of serving its interests. From the very beginning, "People's Front" was created as a union of people, who made the Revolution of Dignity happen¸ who headed civic volunteer movements in the most complicated times for our country, defended it at the frontlines, led public opinion, as well as of professional politicians. We have united around such values as Ukraine and statehood, democracy and human rights.

We are developing "People's Front" organisational structure in such a way that it is efficient and is capable of operating under any political circumstances in the country. Our party is meant to serve as a real-life example for many other forces of the work based on principles of democracy within the party, openness to people and activism.

We are not pursuing the numbers of members in our ranks, as it has been trendy to do lately. It is typical for many European countries that parties compete between themselves not for the number of members (which, as we have learnt, does not define anything), but for the support of society. "People's Front" believes that this should also be happening in Ukraine.

Who are our voters? We count on everyone, who cares for Ukraine, who strives to transform Ukraine's

[1] The questions were sent to leaders, whose parties gained over 1% of votes by party lists in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 26 October 2014.
[2] The survey was conducted in June-September 2015.
[3] Answers are published in the order of results the parties gained in the national multi-mandate electoral district in the 2014 Parliamentary election.

development into a true success story and build a powerful modern European state in our land. We appeal to all those who seek justice, the rule of law, the triumph of democracy, who are ready to create and strengthen Ukraine's European future with their own hands, and it does not matter for us, what language is native for a person, or which church he or she goes to, or if they visit a church altogether. "People's Front" will always further the empowerment of Ukraine's nation and civil society, who paid with blood for their right to a better life.

– In your opinion, what are the main directions of development of your political party?

"People's Front" holds promise as a political force that represents all regions of the country, cities and villages, as a party that leads large-scale transformations in the state.

Based on this, I, as the leader of the party, can talk about the following key directions of its development:

• ***Parliament and Government work.*** We plan not only to continue our work in the Verkhovna Rada and the Government, but increase its scale, intensify it, add more content to the work that aims to protect our country, approve and implement reformatory laws and decisions, – together with the President, our colleagues in the coalition and everyone, who really wants to transform Ukraine. The amount of work is incredibly large, but I am convinced that difficulties will only make us stronger and more enduring.

"People's Front" must remain the powerhouse of our country's European direction of development and reforms, and we are working on enhancing the potential of our party in this sphere, on involving the intellectual and creative potential of our people in the development of new ideas, proposals, and draft laws.

• ***Preparation for local elections.***[4] We must do everything in our power to prevent any second chances for those anti-Ukrainian, anti-people forces that used to be named the Party of Regions and have now redecorated themselves as "Opposition Bloc" and several other parties. Thus, our task for the nearest future is to consolidate in the local elections the positions of the coalition that assumed responsibility in all regions of the country, in each city and village.

We are working with our colleagues to develop a shared position in the local elections, to avoid the unnecessary competition in the complicated time, to join forces and capacities. This will allow us to stand together and restore people's trust in the state and the government, will make us stronger individually and as a whole. "People's Front" has come forward with this initiative having certain thoughts and solutions in mind.

• ***Party development, communication with society.*** Our party has to develop both in scope and in depth. On one hand, this will always be the party dedicated to certain values – democracy, human rights, Ukraine. On the other hand, we aim to create an influential political force that will under no circumstances fall under control of oligarchs, businesses or other sources of external influence.

Our task is to lead society and not to forget about the promises we have made as soon as the election is over. That is why development, active work with citizens and society are among our constant priorities. We must realise that people will only have faith in us, when they see that we really know how they live and what is important for them, and also that we work hard for their lives to take a drastic turn for the better. People must know everyone who aspires to represent their interests in councils of any levels.

• ***Party diplomacy.*** We are planning more active work in external directions. Party diplomacy must be active and aimed at strengthening international solidarity and support of our country, so that we have solid and unquestionable European and Euro-Atlantic prospects. Our plans include strengthening partnerships with leading parties of EU member-countries, founded on the same values that our party shares.

– What is your assessment of conditions, in which Ukrainian political parties have to operate? What are the main problems? What is your view on financing political parties from the state budget?

Victory of the Revolution of Dignity has allowed to bring Ukraine back to the path of democratic development. The current version of the Constitution creates all necessary conditions for full-fledged operation of political parties – in particular, it is political parties that create the parliamentary coalition and form the government. Of course, there are areas for improvement both in the legal framework and in political practices.

Not only I, but also many civic activists, journalists and citizens can easily name the main problem of political life in Ukraine: non-transparency and influence of oligarchs on political parties to the extent, when some parties become their property.

The issue of shadow financing of politics in general and political parties as part of this process is not new, and this is exactly the root, from which stems political corruption that causes the loss of trust of society in parties and in government.

It is because of corruption, because parties and some politicians, hungry for money, have forgotten about conscience, that we have almost lost our country, Ukraine suffered huge losses. We have to put a stop to this. **Open, transparent financing of parties**, incl., from the state budget, **with public records, is absolutely necessary for us to finally have parties that** not only compete for power, but also **assume full responsibility for everything that happens in the country**.

All of us together need to change this corrupt construction that prevents our development and only complicates the situation. We should probably start by drastically changing electoral legislation. It should stimulate operation of political parties and not support corruption and produce thoughtless button-pushers. "People's Front" fully supports implementation of a proportional system with open party lists now, already for the local elections.

Parties should not be one-day TV projects or business clubs, their task is to construct policies and implement them in real life, based on national interests and needs of society. Having created a good framework for their operation, we will finally be able to lay the foundation of political tradition and lower the level of populism, which is still present in abundance in our politics.

And of course, normal, open and fair competition between parties is a way to reduce the threat of power usurpation, a way to further improvement and democracy, as well as economic development.

[4] It should be noticed that the answer to the Razumkov Centre's request was provided in June 2015, before the adoption of a political party council decision on its non-participation in the local elections, announced on August 28, 2015 by A.Yatsenyuk. – Ed.

Maksym SAVRASOV,
Head of the Secretariat of
"PETRO POROSHENKO BLOC "SOLIDARITY" Party

WE THINK THAT STRONG COMMUNITIES ARE THE KEY TO UKRAINE'S SUCCESSFUL FUTURE

– How would you describe your party in terms of its place in the ideological spectrum, organisational structure, electoral base?

"Solidarity" party professes the centre-right ideology. Our values and beliefs are based on the idea of solidarity. We stand for minimal government intervention in the economy, free market, de-monopolisation. We think that strong communities, participation of citizens in administration of villages, cities, state, – are the key to Ukraine's successful future. The legacy of past generations' cultural identity, national traditions and family values is an integral component of the development of a new country.

In the core of the party stand politicians, who have assumed responsibility for the country at a difficult time. The electoral base of "Solidarity" party are people, regardless of their social status or age, who desire changes and are ready to act

– In your opinion, what are the main directions of development of your political party?

At this stage it is important to involve as many active citizens into the government as possible. So, party development focuses on attracting in our ranks efficient, responsible managers, volunteers, community activists.

Territorial branches of the party, on the constant basis, including, in the period between elections, implement a whole number of themed projects. These are:

1) **"Anti-Corruption".** Fighting corruption (responding to citizens' appeals involving law enforcement authorities), helping citizens get high-quality services from government and local self-government bodies, information campaign on fighting corruption;

2) **"Support of the fight for Ukraine's Independence"**. Support of ATO soldiers and their families (registration of status, collecting aid for the front, etc.), assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), holding themed patriotic events;

3) **"Public Office of the Party"**. Party branches in all regions have Public offices, where people can receive consultations and assistance regarding their pressing concerns;

4) **"Prompt assistance in processing of utility subsidies"**. Party members provide practical assistance to citizens in processing utility subsidies in party offices and through the work of mobile teams (explanation of new rules, preparation of documents, etc.);

5) **"Toloka" (work party)**. Party members regularly organise events for landscaping and maintenance of socially significant venues; areas around residential buildings, children's playgrounds and sports grounds, school, kindergarten and hospital territories; clean-ups of parks, areas of recreation, lakes and rivers, random dumps.

We have initiated the process of gradual unification into one political party of those political forces that support our principles and have similar ideology. This is the path that will allow to give structure to the political environment, unite hundreds of thousands of activists and ensure stable support of millions of people. At this point, we need to search for things that unite us, not to play in the field of populism, splitting parties up for the benefit of winning different elections.

Concerning the international direction, "Solidarity" party has applied to join the centre-right European People's Party. After a number of consultations in Kyiv and Brussels, accepting our party in the EPP is one the agenda for the nearest months.

– What is your assessment of conditions, in which Ukrainian political parties have to operate? What are the main problems? What is your view on financing political parties from the state budget?

Obviously, after the triumph of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, the experiment on formation of a one-party system has ended. In essence, at this point anyone willing to create a party can do so, or join one and participate in a democratic election. However, we still do not have the clear rules defined by legislation for parties' operation, in particular, their financing. Thus, each election, separate political projects are created, for which election results are the moment of truth that defines the party's very existence. Such parties constantly appear and disappear as business and political projects.

Today the issue of party financing is on the agenda not only in Ukraine, but in the entire Europe. We share the approach of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that the rules for financing of political parties and election campaigns must be based on the fair criteria for distribution of state assistance and strict rules concerning private donations. Also, parties' election campaign expenses are to be under tight control (through transparent reporting).

We are convinced that the state must stimulate citizens to participate in the political life of a country. This is why state budget financing of political parties with observation of the above mentioned requirements could bring significant results.

Our party in the Parliament has already supported the draft law on state financing of parties (by the way, among the authors, the majority are the representatives of "Petro Poroshenko Bloc" party faction). The core of the document has been approved. Of course, it still requires serious work on all comments and proposals made by experts. If the document is approved, state will start financing parties in 2017. Assistance will be allocated to those parties, which gained over 3% of people's votes in the previous election. We are convinced that it would be wise to consider lowering the threshold to 1-2%. It is doubtful that any party would enter the election to get this state financing, as the amounts are not very large. Meaning, it will not cause the growth of number of one-day parties. However, it will allow political forces, which have certain support of society, to carry out minimum operations (especially topical in the period between elections) without accepting funds from big sponsors.

Oleh BEREZYUK,
Chairman of the Deputy Faction
of Political Party "SAMOPOMICH Union"

THE ELECTORAL BASE OF OUR POLITICAL FORCE INCLUDES ALL CITIZENS OF OUR COUNTRY WITHOUT EXCEPTION

– How would you describe your party in terms of its place in the ideological spectrum, organisational structure, electoral base?

The ideological platform of the Ukrainian – in its core – political party "Samopomich" (Self-Help – *ed.*) is based on conservative Christian values: "Be yourself! Cooperate with others! Help those in need! Together we are strong!"

Organisational structure of "Samopomich" is typical for party systems of countries with high level of political culture, but it differs from the models that have formed in our country in the course of history. The difference is that we stand strongly against the quantitative approach in the development of party structure, our priority is the qualitative indicator.

This means that "Samopomich" invites to cooperation those people, who share the values that have united the founders of the party, in particular:

1. Life is seen as a task that a person must perform responsibly, as a sacred duty.

2. A person's identity must be combined with willpower and morality, including the following spiritual components:

• faith in the truth of life;

• faith in the power of the human spirit;

• love of one's neighbour.

3. Joining the common search for truth, which develops a high sense of belonging to one's nation and Motherland.

4. Learning about the past experiences of one's people and accepting universal human values, and, therefore, being open to the world and the future.

5. Influencing events and processes of life, forming oneself through development, education, and active building-up of one's potential in life.

Presence of these fundamental criteria allows to eliminate inefficient people without the appropriate moral qualities, and at the same time, to create a team of like-minded people. Such people unite into initiative groups in different parts of Ukraine and demonstrate their ability to solve socially significant issues on the local level.

This is very important, as the work on building a country one would want to live in, demands vast intellectual and labour resources, as well as strong ideological beliefs.

The electoral base of our political force includes all citizens of our country without exception. Dividing, classifying or separating people into electoral circles based on any geographical, ethnic or social principle ruins the idea of state unity and prevents using the comprehensive approach in resolving general issues.

– In your opinion, what are the main directions of development of your political party?

The main direction of development of our political party is, first of all, the work in our priority areas, namely:

- the Constitution of Ukraine;
- national defence capability;
- decentralisation of power and strengthening of communities;
- overcoming corruption;
- economics;
- science and education;
- broad introduction of IT in Ukraine;
- international cooperation.

This work is to be carried out with high standards by members of the deputy faction in the Verkhovna Rada, local self-government deputies and officials of executive power branch.

– What is your assessment of conditions, in which Ukrainian political parties have to operate? What are the main problems? What is your view on financing political parties from the state budget?

Problems in the Ukrainian political arena, which led to the social and economic situation our country currently finds itself in, became the foundation for the ideological platform of our union in the form of a political party.

Funding of political parties from the state budget is a good practice used in developed countries. This would allow to control expenses and would ensure financial independence of the main actors of the political process, the majority of which are now dependent on financial resources of certain groups of people. However, this requires an efficient legal framework and an increase of sources of Ukraine's state revenues.

Yuriy PAVLENKO,
member of "Opposition Bloc"
political party faction

TRYING TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL MONOPOLY, THE AUTHORITIES BLOCK THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN OUR COUNTRY

– How would you describe your party in terms of its place in the ideological spectrum, organisational structure, electoral base?

"Opposition Bloc" is a party of democratic orientation that advocates principles of social justice and progressive, qualitative changes in economy. In essence, Opposition Bloc is a representative party, the foundation of which are its deputies at the councils of all levels and party representatives in regions.

The party has broad representation in all regions of the country, both at the level of deputy factions and groups in local self-government bodies, and at the level of primary party organisations. "Opposition Bloc" is also supported by the civil society. The party has many influential partners from public organisations.

Our main supporters are people with pro-active attitude, working people. We enjoy especially strong support in industrially developed regions of Ukraine.

Among those, who work in the real economy, among representatives of small and medium business. Our party also has supporters in the scientific and scientific-technical environment, among public officials and employees of state-financed organisations.

People support us, foremost, due to the reasonableness of our ideas and expertise of party representatives in the issues of political and economic development of our country.

"Opposition Bloc" party advocates the reunification of the country, starting an extensive public dialogue in order to achieve civil peace. We believe that only peaceful development policy will provide a way out of the current crisis, will ensure the welfare of Ukrainian society and each family in our country.

We stand for the need of deep and systemic transformations in the economy with the focus on implementing a new industrial policy. At the core of this policy is support of national goods producers, modernisation of domestic industry, development of new innovative and commercially viable sectors.

In creating a strong industrial economy we see the basis for ensuring the high rate of employment, fair social policy, high salaries and decent pensions for the citizens of Ukraine.

"Opposition Bloc" supports the prompt reform of local self-government. Its objective is to create a capable government that efficiently administers community life and area development. At the same time, one of the consequences of the reform should be the increased influence of local self-government on state social and economic and humanitarian policy. The ultimate task of the reform is emergence of capable regions with strong economy with preservation of the unitary administrative-territorial structure of the state.

In its external policy, "Opposition Bloc" supports consistent implementation of the European integration course with national pragmatism policy at the basis. Unlike our political opponents, we are realists. We think that Ukraine, as a young European country, has to build its foreign policy focusing on developing mutually beneficial relations not only with the EU, but also with CIS countries, Middle East, South-East Asia.

Among today's active political forces "Opposition Bloc" occupies the centre-left position. We do not accept either radical nationalism or calls to return to the "bright past".

– In your opinion, what are the main directions of development of your political party?

"Opposition Bloc" actively propagates the idea of reforming and empowering local self-government. This is why we carry out active party operations locally, striving to constantly improve the professionalism of work of our local representative bodies. "Opposition Bloc" aims to ensure success of our party teams in regions in the nearest elections to local councils of all levels.

We also consider that **the current Parliament is dysfunctional, and the ruling coalition does not accomplish the tasks set by the society**. This is why "Opposition Bloc" insists on conducting early parliamentary elections and is actively preparing for them. We are developing a system of information outreach, involve active young citizens in party work.

Under the auspices of the "Opposition Bloc" was created the opposition government that is working on the package of initiatives concerning a wide spectrum of tasks: from new social policy to constitutional amendments.

Another important sphere of activity of the party is the work with NGOs. This includes trade union movement, unions of entrepreneurs, unions that specialise in the issues of local community development.

"Opposition" Bloc has initiated and is implementing a number of programmes aimed at practical assistance for people. This includes legal assistance, help in raising money for resolving pressing problems of local communities. Party activists provide various types of support on a regular basis for IDPs from the area of the military conflict. We participate in programmes of providing humanitarian assistance to people living in territories that have been affected in the course of military actions.

Of utmost importance is the party's work on protecting the rights of children affected in the course of the military conflict. In the framework of project "Children of the Unannounced War", we provide a broad spectrum of services for children and their families: from emergency assistance to wounded children to implementing new regulations for protection of children – victims of the war and children, who are in need of help in the non-combat regions of Ukraine.

"Opposition Bloc" plans to develop a broad educational campaign in order to promote the global experience of conducting reforms, to protect our cultural heritage, to raise the level of legal consciousness of Ukrainian citizens.

– What is your assessment of conditions, in which Ukrainian political parties have to operate? What are the main problems? What is your view on financing political parties from the state budget?

The current government is choosing a false and biased approach towards political parties in Ukraine. In an effort to establish political monopoly, the government blocks the development of the party system in our country. Actions aimed at limiting parties' operation and political repressions against political parties that present competition for the ruling coalition have become a regular practice.

The opposition is under severe pressure, being subjected to informational provocations, and large-scale administrative obstacles in their operation. Among the most painful problems – the use of law enforcement and fiscal authorities to organise political prosecution. Equally problematic are government's attempts to block the development of party network locally, to stall registration of opposition parties' local offices. All of these – to exclude opposition from the election process, prevent them from increasing the number of their supporters.

This is why "Opposition Bloc" believes that **ensuring the right to political operation for all parties working according to the Constitution of Ukraine and within the law is currently the issue of top priority**. In many ways, this will define the further development of democracy in Ukraine.

"Opposition Bloc" supports the idea of financing the work of political parties from the state budget. At the same time, we stress the need to create transparent procedures for controlling this process. We need to save these expenses from the abuse of power.

Besides this, state financing should not exclude the possibility of financial support of parties' work by Ukrainian citizens. They must have the right to support statutory activities of the party that defends their interests, on condition of transparency and financial accountability.

Oleh LYASHKO,
People's Deputy of Ukraine,
Leader of the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko

OUR SOCIETY REQUIRES RADICAL AND RAPID CHANGES

– How would you describe your party in terms of its place in the ideological spectrum, organisational structure, electoral base?

The Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko does not have the goal of occupying a certain ideological niche. The cornerstone of our party's work is the main and single principle – to build in Ukraine a society of equal opportunities and social justice.

For 20 years, our country has been going round in circles. Governments, presidents, deputies come and go, with zero results. The Radical Party believes that our society requires radical and rapid changes.

These changes are only possible, if radical reforms are conducted in all spheres: in economics, in politics, in law enforcement and in court system. In order to lead the country out of crisis we need to attain the following key objectives: eliminate corruption, introduce fair trial procedures, exclude oligarchs from influencing decision-making on the state level, and allow foreign investment into the country.

Radical Party is consistently advocating for patriotic principles, which is especially important in the situation of opposing external aggression. The issues of national security, strengthening defence capacity, social security for veterans – are exceptionally important in such circumstances.

In order to create social relations of a new quality, we require a radical purification of the communist past and lustration of officials associated with the regime of Viktor Yanukovych; the Radical Party has initiated the relevant decisions in the Parliament.

Organisational structure of the Radical Party is based on the grassroots initiative. We do not force anyone to join the ranks of our party. If you want to change your country – come to us. We will meet with you, have a discussion, share thoughts and on we go. A country can be changed on any level, starting from one's own yard to the Constitutional Court. Yes, we register oblast and local offices, but for us the main indicator is the quality of primary organisations, not their number. The places where we work are staffed with a team of experts, professionals in different areas, volunteers. During the Revolution of Dignity, the Radical Party was joined by many activists, participants of Maidan events, and it is they, who together with the earlier core members of the party have ensured great results in the latest presidential and parliamentary elections.

The electoral base of the Radical Party is the entire Ukraine. Everyone who shares our ideas can and does vote for us. Radical Party supporters live in all oblasts of Ukraine, in cities and in villages. Exit poll results have demonstrated that the ideas of the Radical Party are supported by pensioners, middle-aged people, and youth. The main thing that unites them: they are discontented with the slow pace of reforms, cannot accept half-way solutions and want radical changes.

– In your opinion, what are the main directions of development of your political party?

The Radical Party works in three main areas:

- Parliament work
- Local and national projects
- Party development

The Radical Party's objective is to develop and implement local and national initiatives addressing specific issues that concern people today: transport infrastructure, employment, security of native land, social support, energy sector modernisation, decommunisation of society, fight against corruption, openness of government agencies.

The Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko has a powerful deputy faction in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and expects to gain representation in all local councils after the elections in October 2015. It is local deputies from the Radical Party, who will ensure implementation of the above mentioned initiatives.

Development of the Radical Party structure has the grassroots initiative principle in its foundation. During 2015, offices of our party were established almost in all regions and oblast centres. Formation of the team is in its final stages. Now we are planning to create expert groups of the Radical Party involving party members, activists, supporters, volunteers, ATO veterans.

After creating a parliamentary faction, the party has intensified its international cooperation, first of all, with European conservative and reformist parties.

– What is your assessment of conditions, in which Ukrainian political parties have to operate? What are the main problems? What is your view on financing political parties from the state budget?

The main problem of political parties in Ukraine is their distance from people**. The majority of political forces operate to serve the interest of their main stakeholders – oligarchs.** Parties do not reflect the attitudes of society, instead they manipulate people's minds through their slogans and election campaigns, trying to deceive them. The thinking of parties goes along the lines of gaining people's votes, rather than solving their problems.

The idea of financing parties from the state budget is not new. Such practice is common in European countries. The main objective of this financing is to eliminate political corruption. The party receives the money, spends it on its political operations, and fully reports to the voters regarding the expenses. Essentially, the people hire a party and are able to control its operation. We should strive to implement such practices. Can Ukraine afford this now? At this point – no, until the most pressing social issues are resolved. But it is clear that we should be gradually getting used to this practice. Anyway, these are European political principles and values, and we are going to introduce them step by step.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE: INTERVIEWS

In the framework of the Project "Party System in Ukraine *before* and *after* the Maidan: Changes, Development Trends, Public Expectations". For the purpose of a thorough analysis of changes in political parties, party system, institutional and social conditions of their functioning, the Razumkov Centre appealed to leading national political scientists and sociologists who represent leading universities of Ukraine, competent state research institutions, renown research centres and sociological organisations, asking to answer some questions that meet the profile of their research.

The interviews are listed below in alphabetical order.

TO SOME EXTENT ELECTORATE CHOICE IS BASED ON CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY

Oleksiy ANTYPOVYCH,
Director of the Sociological Group "Rating"

– In your opinion, what are the main factors influencing the electoral choice of Ukrainian voters between parties?

The main factor that motivates the electoral choice is the attitude to party leader; only a small share of voters base their choice on the ideological component (CPU and "Svoboda" voters).

An election campaign only partially influences the choice of citizens, namely slogans, promises and bright representatives of a party team. Quite a lot of voters make their choice in terms of choosing "the lesser evil" and proven (known) politicians. Although most Ukrainians declare a desire to see new faces in Ukrainian politics, they still vote for the "old" politicians.[1]

– How firmly established is the sympathy of Ukrainian voters for certain political parties? What determines this firmness?

So far as electoral choice is mainly based on the choice of party leader, the **stability of choice depends on the attitude to specific politicians**, and their ratings always change.

The basic axis for party (politician) choice is the "friend or foe" axis. The "friend" category includes politicians who comply with voters' concepts of foreign policy direction (integration Russia/Europe), attitude to the past (Soviet past), choice between democracy (freedom) and paternalism, and also politicians who hail from the same region where voters live.

Ukrainians do not demonstrate a stable choice. To some extent electorate choice is based on changes in the country. For example, radical sentiments increase against the backdrop of war. However, change of the choice of one party over another (one politician over another) occurs within the electoral niche to which the voter belongs. For example, former supporters of Viktor Yanukovych have not become supporters of any party that belongs to the present majority in the Verkhovna Rada, and supporters of Petro Poroshenko Block or People's Front migrate toward the allied parties in the Verkhovna Rada.

– What features should be inherent in political parties today to receive the support of voters? What ideological niche provides most of the prospects for this?

Since the war in Donbas covers the vast majority of information flows in the country and divides Ukrainians into supporters of a radical ending of the war (winning it at all costs) and those who support a peaceful settlement of the conflict **– radical and moderate are the two most promising electoral niches**.

Slogans and directions in which parties can gain electoral support are:

- *for the radical niche* these are possibly joining NATO, severance of relations with Russia, the war to complete victory, Ukrainisation, the rejection of the Soviet past, reforms in all spheres, fighting corruption, a militaristic mood, priority of European integration, and an increased activity of citizens in public life;
- *for the moderate niche*: reaching stability, peace in Donbas at any cost, restoration of relations with Russia, return to the Soviet past, rejection of European values, non-alignment and multilateralism, assigning more responsibility for the situation in the country to the state authorities. ■

[1] See in particular "Social and political expectations of citizens: April 2014". – Website of Sociological Group "Rating", *http://ratinggroup.com.ua/products/politic/data/entry/14087*.

TODAY IT IS EASIER TO "BUY UP" A PARTY THAN TO CREATE AND REGISTER A NEW ONE

Nataliia BOHASHEVA,
Chief Consultant of Legislation Institute of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

– What main changes have occurred in constitutional and legal regulation of activities of political parties in Ukraine during the period of March 2010-June 2015? What were the consequences for political parties?

Some changes occurred in constitutional and legal regulation of political parties in Ukraine during the mentioned period; whereby it was both direct amendments to the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine", and amendments to other laws.

Amendments to the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine". *Amendments on the rights of party members were made* to the Article 6 of the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" on 22 March 2012 "*to stop or to cease party membership by presentation of a statement to the appropriate statutory bodies of political party at any time. Membership in a political party stops or ceases from the date of the statement submission and does not require additional solutions. On the same day holding of any elective positions in the political party by a citizen of Ukraine also ceases*".

The right to *cessation* of membership from the date of statement submission enhances freedom of association in its negative aspect: secession from the association on a person's own will without a decision by a party agency. On the contrary, such freedom may cause problems in the establishment of the legal fact of a person's secession in an instance where the party denies this.

However, the concept of "*membership* cessation" is not legally defined; the differences between "cessation of membership for some time" and cessation of membership with possible re-entry or "renewal" in the party are not established. **Unclear formulation of "membership cessation", particularly the lack of an exhaustive list of grounds and consequences for such cessation**, and now the means for confirmation of such legal fact **lead to** adverse results, which in substance mean **the misleading of voters**.

Thus, members (or even leaders) of some parties not participating in elections "cease" membership in their parties and run for elections as "non-party persons", avoiding legislative prohibition for political parties to nominate candidates among members of other parties. After being elected such persons often "renew" party membership, as well as their leadership positions, thus giving rise to the phenomenon of representation in Parliament of parties that have not participated in elections. Such actions should be treated as abuse of right.

In order to ensure gender equality, in 2013, amendments were made to the Law regarding the obligatory requirement for specifying information in the party charter on the "*quota, which determines the minimum level of representation of women and men in the electoral list of candidates for people's deputies of Ukraine from the party in nationwide constituency and which shall be at least 30 percent of candidates in the election list*".

Considering the number of candidates in the list (225 under the conditions of a mixed system), this requirement is very formal in nature. Herewith, the body, which should control the compliance of this requirement, is not established; the procedure for verification of this requirement is not determined; and sanctions against parties for failure to comply with this requirement are not stipulated. Therefore, this provision is of a declarative nature.

The provision of Article 24 of the Law came into effect in 2011, under which *non-nomination by a political party of its candidates for elections of the President of Ukraine and elections of people's deputies of Ukraine within ten years* is grounds for revocation of the party registration certificate. Since 2011 this provision began to be applied in practice by the courts for revocation of certificates (in fact, the liquidation) of political parties.[2]

The Law on elections

The electoral legislation substantially influences the functioning of parties. Adoption of the Law "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" as of 2011 returned mixed electoral system. To some extent this reduced the role of political parties as subjects of candidate nomination, restoring the institution of self-nomination. At the same time, the Law retained powers of a party to initiate cancellation of registration of its previously nominated candidate, which should be seen as an instrument for violation of the right to be elected.

The mentioned Law introduced a number of innovations that affect the electoral activity of political parties. Thus, for the first time the institution of electoral blocs of political parties as a subject of candidate nomination was excluded from electoral legislation (thereafter the same amendments were made to the Law "On Elections of President of Ukraine"); unfortunately it stimulated "electoral mimicry" with use of the institute of temporary suspension of membership in the party.

The requirement for advance (the year before the elections) registration of a political party to receive the right to nominate candidates was cancelled; therefore the parties are allowed to participate in elections regardless of the time of their creation, including the parties registered immediately prior to the election process. This innovation greatly simplified the opportunity for creating the so-called "electoral projects" – imitation of political parties focused on one-time participation in certain elections. Largely due to this **the political palette of Parliament was sharply updated almost after each elections** (as in 2012 and 2014).

[2] See in particular: Kyiv District Administrative Court upheld the claim of the Ministry of Justice and cancelled registration of five political parties. – BBC Ukraine, 24 November 2011, *http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news_in_brief/2011/11/111124_ko_parties_ukraine.shtml*.

Legislative regulation of the procedure for nomination of candidates was cancelled; now the law stipulates the establishment of such procedure only by charters of the parties. Under the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" the legalisation body controls the procedure of convocation and holding of a party convention on nomination of candidates; however, the corresponding procedure is not adapted to a fast electoral process. As a result, some parties nominate candidates at conventions with participation of 20 or fewer delegates, which is not formally forbidden by the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine". This **step, aimed at the weakening of legal regulation to nominate candidates is wrong**, especially in terms of ensuring the democratic nature of a nomination process. **European standards in the sphere of political parties emphasize the requirement of maximum publicity, transparency and democracy of this procedure.**

In this context introduction of a mixed electoral system by the Law "On Local Elections" as of 2010, significantly expanded powers of local party organisations to nominate candidates in all local elections, including in those territorial communities where there are no cells or even party members. **Excessively growing role of parties in formation and functioning of the local government cannot be considered a positive development** in view of the legal nature and functions of local government.

Other laws and regulations

The Law "On the Condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Regimes, and Prohibition of Propaganda of Their Symbols" dated 9 April 2015 introduced a prohibition on the creation and functioning of political parties, which programme goals or actions are aimed at "propaganda of communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes" and on symbols "of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes". This resulted in legal impediments to existence of some leftist parties in their current form, including the Communist Party, which may affect the course of court proceedings regarding its prohibition.

The Law "On Public Associations" was adopted in 2012, whereupon the Law "On Associations of Citizens" ceased to be in force, some provisions of which supplemented the legislative regulation of political parties (in particular, establishing the principle of equality of members of the association, the requirements for its name, and the prohibition for political parties to conduct business). As appropriate amendments to the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" have not yet been made, this has resulted in certain gaps in the legislative regulation of parties.

In recent years there have been some changes in determination of the body authorised to carry out the legalisation of political parties and public control of their activities. By Decree[3] of the President of Ukraine respective powers were transferred to the newly created State Registration Service of Ukraine, although the law gave these powers to the Ministry of Justice. By the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine[4] the State Registration Service was liquidated in January 2015 and respective powers were transferred to the Ministry of Justice. At the same time certain regulatory chaos in these issues has led to increased trends of expansion of the requirements of the Law "On State Registration of Legal Entities and Sole Traders" on political parties. This law is focused primarily on business entities, and the number of its provisions does not include the legal specificity of political parties.

– What major problems exist in legislative regulation of the activities of political parties in Ukraine today?

Practice in application of the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" demonstrated the presence of many gaps and conflicts in the regulatory control of parties. However, a sequential approach to regulation of relevant social and political relations, which should be legally determined and correspond to the requirements of a democratic society with limited state influence on political parties in Ukraine on the basis of international legal standards, has not yet been elaborated.

The Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" too generally regulates *the procedure* for creation of political parties. This procedure provides an additional stage, which is carried out after the founding convention: it is necessary to collect signatures of at least 10 thousand citizens of Ukraine not less than in two-thirds of Ukraine's regions in support of creation of the party.

However, the legal substance of this procedure is unclear: because citizens who put their signatures are not obliged thereafter to be involved with the appropriate party. The law does not establish the subject of the collection of signatures, does not regulate the procedure for collecting signatures or ways to establish the authenticity of signatures. **Imperfect procedures for creation of a new party reveal themselves through common practice of "buying up" parties instead of creating them in the established order.** The need for clarification of a regulation is confirmed by the fact that, in practice, today it is easier to "buy up" a party than to create and register a new one.

An important problem is the lack of public funding of political parties that in conditions of practical unavailability of sufficient legal sources of funds becomes the most corrupt element of their activity and the reason for political party dependence on its main sponsors. The phenomenon of "oligarchs" primarily comes herefrom.

Legislative control of the names of political parties is incomplete and quite contradictory. Therefore, there are parties with very similar names ("Revival" party, political party "Revival and Development", political party "National Revival Party", political party "Revival of Ukraine") or with names unclear in their content (political party "5.10", political party "Officer Corps", political party "Pirate Party of Ukraine", political party "Good Samaritan", etc.). Lack of proper regulation of this issue promotes political technological methods of "political mimicry" often used at elections by so-called "technical parties" to the detriment of known and influential political forces.

[3] The Decree of the President "On Approval of the State Registration Service of Ukraine" No. 401 dated 6 April 2011. – *Ed.*

[4] The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers "Issue of optimisation of activities of central executive bodies of justice system" No. 17 dated 21 January 2015. – *Ed.*

Parties have broad freedom in establishing their method of statutory regulation of internal issues. **Ukrainian legislation practically does not establish requirements for internal and organisational activities of political parties.** However, such freedom amid insufficient legal and political culture and oligarchic influence on the parties leads to significant deformations in parties' internal life.

– What changes to the legal regulation of political parties in Ukraine could have a positive impact on their effectiveness in the near future?

To ensure normal functioning and strengthening of its democratic nature, the parties, first of all, have *to restore the state funding of political parties* – both their statutory activities and reimbursement of expenses of parties related to financing of their election campaigns.

This step is necessary to improve the transparency of activities of political parties, to ensure their financial independence and, therefore, political freedom, elimination of the corruption component in the financing of elections and political activities. It is necessary, on a legislative level, to determine the principles, methods and amounts of funding of parties from different sources and list of subjects for control over the financial activities of political parties. However, such control over the activities of a party as a legal entity *shall not restrict the activities of political party as a subject of constitutional and legal relations*. In particular, sanctions for violating the rules of party funding shall have a monetary nature and shall not provide for the prohibition of activities of a party or its individual organisations.

It is highly important to establish legislative requirements for internal democracy in parties. This is because the party that accustoms its members to internal party authoritarian governance cannot fully ensure the functioning of democracy in the state. The extent of relevant regulatory requirements for internal party democracy shall be established according to their real needs in a democratic society and clearly defined limits and procedures for state control over compliance with these requirements.

Only a small part of relations in this sphere allows direct legal regulation; other requirements can be formulated as instructions for the subject and acceptable limits of regulation by the charter of the political party (regarding the procedure for formation and powers of the governing bodies, holding of conventions and conferences, ensuring transparency of decision-making, involvement of party members in solving the basic issues of party activities).

The issue of termination of activities of political parties, particularly by dissolution (reorganisation) needs improvement.

Some parties have resumed their activities after a long period of being in "a state of liquidation" as a result of the adoption of a decision on dissolution. Such parties are often the subject of "purchase and sale" and revive after a change of "owners" of the party brand, which has an adverse effect on the development of the party system in Ukraine. ■

PARTIES DO NOT NEED TO WORK WITH VOTERS AND BUILD AN INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

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– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after the Maidan in terms of their construction, ideology and nature of activity?

The Maidan was a catalyst for the beginning of the transformation of political parties, during which a political **party as an institution has been completely discredited**. This concerns not only the ruling and pro-government parties, but also the parties that were in opposition.

Furthermore, Maidan generated social demand for renewal of political parties and their methods of operation. Return to a parliamentary-presidential republic resulted in the restoration of political competition. Parliamentary parties returned their inherent functions – the right to form a government and the right to adjust its current composition. This increased the role of parties in political life, their status, and as a result, has made parties more expressive and relatively more responsible.

The positive impact of these processes has been levelled by the preservation of a mixed electoral system, on the basis of which early parliamentary elections were held in 2014. Although the **increase in the role of parties in political life has resulted in mass emergence of new parties**. In particular in 2014 the Ministry of Justice registered 39 parties, in 2015 as of 1 May, 26 parties were registered, despite the fact that in the past two years 6-7 political parties were registered each year.[5]

Despite the emergence of new names, mention should be made of the rebranding of political parties. Despite the fact that new parties got into Parliament (except "Fatherland"), its composition was renewed approximately by half[6] (after elections in 2012 – for 52-53%); the main political actors, principles of forming political decisions, schemes and criteria for electoral selection have not changed.

Parties now remain "pseudo institutions" that have been established legally, but failed to become valuable political institutions. Political parties gain voters through the use of media and turn into means of legitimising the power of business groups. The last parliamentary elections proved this fact.

5 Site of the State Registration Service of Ukraine, heading "Political parties", *http://www.drsu.gov.ua/show/202*.– *Ed*.
6 This relates to the results of early parliamentary elections in 2014. – *Ed*.

– What are the main features of political parties in Ukraine today? What are the differences between "new" and "old" parties?

The greatest problem of modern parties is an **unprecedented level of populism**, which is manifested in "old" and "new" parties in different ways. Thus, populism in "old" parties is aimed at criticism of any initiatives and political decisions offered by the ruling parties. Populism of "new" parties lies in simplification of the problems the country is facing.

The results are: the growth of amateurism in politics; slowing down and blocking of the articulation of the interests of social groups, complication of their possible representation and protection (whereas populists simulate them); strengthening of the state of permanent confrontation in the society; permanent delegitimation of the existing political and social order; formation of a binary view of the world ("the people" vs. "enemies"), and vulgarisation of political decisions.

Another feature of "new" political parties in Ukraine is that they, like "old" parties and with few exceptions, have not become social elevators and do not perform one of their basic functions – co-optation of the elite and articulation of interests. **Parties remained political elevators for the financial industrial groups**, albeit under new names and slogans.

The style of the activities of parliamentary parties has slightly changed, in addition to the mentioned institutional changes, due to available and extremely intense social demands against the background of high radicalisation of public sentiments.

If until quite recently parliamentary political parties mainly resorted to imitation of performance of their campaign promises (and in some cases, such as the status of the Russian language, conventional "dissolution" of Ukraine to the East and the West, deliberately aggravated the problem for electoral purposes), **now the level of imitation has significantly decreased, while changing into sharp populism**.

The institutional structure of parties remains virtual. Parties just do not need to work with voters or build an institutional structure. This happens because of the possibility of using the media owned by the same business groups that are the owners of parties, the use of administrative resources (in the form of direct pressure on voters, the removal of competitors through court decisions, nomination of technical candidates) and due to the lack of political responsibility.

In what directions will political parties in Ukraine develop in the near future? What model of political party will dominate in five years in Ukraine (the main features of a "typical party")?

Public demand for a leftist ideology will increase in conditions of falling living standards. Accordingly one should expect a substantial "leftist trend" in the party political spectrum.

Development of political parties and formation of a relatively stable party system will depend on: prospects for adoption of a proportional electoral system with open lists for parliamentary elections, introduction of a differentiated approach to parties and election coalitions; a method for determining the boundaries of voting districts; regulation of the status of parliamentary opposition; resolving the problem of funding political parties.

However, the impact of these factors will become noticeable after at least two electoral cycles, provided that these new "rules of the game" will be preserved. In the near future (1-2 electoral cycles) parties will build their election campaigns on populist slogans, remaining essentially non-ideological – so-called "*catch-all parties*".

Conservation of existing electoral selection procedures will not introduce any significant qualitative changes either in the organisational structure of political parties, or in their activities. Therefore, a "typical" party going into elections under social-democratic slogans will remain a "catch-all" party and an elevator for the business groups that have privatised the power.

At the same time, patriotic parties will appear against this background, and they more likely will be right and centre-right in the conditions in Ukraine. Their success will depend on a reduction of the extent of populism that may occur after the next parliamentary elections.

Upon the introduction of the above-mentioned changes, which usually stimulate processes of party genesis, the party political spectrum of Ukraine will start to acquire the features typical of "young democracies". This means a large number of centrist parties, both left- and right-facing, and a small number of highly radical parties both on the left and right of the party political spectrum.

However, as it was noted, this is a matter of at least several electoral cycles. Furthermore, distrust in parties on the part of society will slow down the processes. Overcoming this alienation will be much more complicated than "restarting" political parties by returning their inherent functions.

Meanwhile, the use of political parties as elevators for business interests and profitable business projects and the practice of "forcing" members into the party in power are observed in the domestic politicum, etc. This has been happening for 15-20 years, and does not give grounds to hope for qualitative changes in the near future. ■

NEW PARTIES ARE HORIZONTAL, NOT VERTICAL, AND ARE OF CIVIL, NOT LEADERSHIP TYPE

Vadym KARASIOV,
Director of the Institute of Global Strategies

– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after the Maidan in terms of their construction, ideology, and nature of activity?

In terms of construction, political parties are now formed more "from below" on the basis of active citizenship of people. Parties actively carry out rebranding, recruitment of new staff on the basis of active cooperation with the new political players and activists, "new heroes" (ATO members, volunteers and others), and non-governmental organisations.

New parties are horizontal, not vertical, and are of a civilian, not leadership type. However, **changes in party construction have only just started**. Therefore we have two trends now. On the one hand, the old parties try to

follow current trends, be more open and engage civil society activists. On the other hand, the young parties declare ambitions to create a qualitatively new organisation "from scratch".

The main ideological focus of political parties is concentrated on patriotic, human rights and integration directions. Parties are trying to help people in defending their rights against arbitrary government, corruption and injustice. European integration is considered by parties as a kind of model of social relationship building within society and legal relations between society and the state.

The nature of political parties' activities is also undergoing changes. Parties are working more and more in the "field", organising and taking an active part in pickets, rallies, flash mobs and protest actions. The type of interaction with supporters is also changing. This is facilitated by the active use of social networking and mobile technologies, crowdsourcing, etc.

However, notwithstanding the positive trends, parties continue to work in conditions of a frozen political regime. Therefore there are still political clubs, electoral machines designed to perform instrumental functions and primarily participation in elections. The peculiarity of such parties is the instability of ratings, and there may be an increase in popularity due to noisy PR-campaigns (scandal, provocation, etc.).

The weakness of the parties today is that they are trying to "pump up their muscles" by means of social activity, but at the same time they **are not ready for state administration**. This work includes a vision of a strategy of state development, use of modern state management, modelling of economic policy and conceptualization of Ukraine's course of integration. In other words, if the "state party" previously dominated ("party of power"), it is now the society parties that dominate. But the best party will be the one that is able to combine the social basis with the state vision.

– What are the main features of political parties in Ukraine today? What are the differences between the "new" and "old" parties?

"Old" parties are parties of administrative resource, leadership type, clannish and oligarchic interests. "New" parties are associations of public power, collective management, social and legal interests. "Old" parties continue to be spokesmen of old regime elites, while "new" parties become spokesmen of active, advanced, progressive layers of society.

At the same time "old" and "new" parties are facing common challenges to which they cannot provide an adequate response. It is difficult for parties to work with a large variety of public interests. Old technologies of mass mobilisation of supporters are not functioning anymore in society, because now it appears like a mosaic of "niche" interests, needs and challenges. The main challenge for parties today is to intertwine common and political interests.

– In what directions will political parties in Ukraine develop in the near future? What model of political party will dominate in five years (the main features of a "typical party")?

The instability of the political regime, parliamentarism, economy, and preservation of old electoral rifts will influence the instability of the party system in Ukraine. The "menu" of parties in elections will constantly change, and the parties themselves will try by "trial and error" to find an optimal trajectory of political behaviour.

The next five years are likely to be a period of party turbulence and a search for a recipe of "sustainability". Therefore, the main feature of future parties is to be "in active search". This would correspond to the "post Maidan" need for a qualitatively new party and correlate with the key challenges of the modern Ukrainian state, passing through a phase of reconsideration of its identity and prospects for future development. ■

THE SO-CALLED NEW PARTIES ARE VIRTUALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE OLD ONES

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– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after the Maidan in terms of their construction, ideology and nature of activity?

The Maidan has made no significant impact on ways of creation of political parties and their typology. The political component of the Maidan was weak and did not respond to the challenges facing the political system of Ukraine.

The leaders of the then opposition were adapting instead of leading, and the public sector was unable to detect new political leaders from its environment and to create mass movement on the basis of which new organised political force could emerge.

So everything happens under the known formula of L. Kravchuk: we have that we had, namely: leadership-based, corporate, created for elections and obviously unstable political organisations. Even the "Samopomich" is not some really new organisation, albeit its people are new and most of them are progressive.

– What are the main features of political parties in Ukraine today? What are the differences between "new" and "old" parties?

The differences relate not so much to the political parties themselves, as to their influence and role in Parliament: majority parties, as it is known, became the forces which we called democratic and pro-European for a long time, which were in opposition to Yanukovych's regime and to whose feet the power "fell" after the Maidan. Their capabilities have increased, but they are unable to use them for the benefit of society, because the nature of these parties has not changed.

As to parliamentary parties and those hardly reaching vote threshold, "new" parties formally include "Petro Poroshenko Block", "People's Front", "Samopomich" (which gained nationwide significance only after the

Maidan) and also the "Opposition bloc". Old parties include All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland", the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" and perhaps the Communist Party, although it obviously will not have a future.

How are they different? *"Petro Poroshenko Block" is a typical centrist party for our country*, the axis of which has shifted to the side of democracy, European choice and protection of national interests in accordance with the situation in the country and the position of its leader. However, it is impossible to say it has some "flashes" of ideological unity.

The PPB programme was written in a hurry and is a set of generally defined guidelines and election slogans. The fact that the party does not distinguish between the concept of a party programme and an election platform is a further proof that this party does not have a programme and ideological model. The Party is situational, pragmatic and leadership-based, as indicated even by its name. Party chairman Yu. Lutsenko has promised to return the party's old name "Solidarity", but this kind of right step will not change anything essentially, as it will not affect either the method of members' co-optation nor reasons for commitment of party supporters.

"People's Front" is just the same with only difference that this party *is more radical both in its programme statements and personal composition of the faction*. However, there are the same opportunistic, corporate, old ties and behaviour stereotypes that run into arrogance and unwillingness to break the system.

The presence of "young blood" in the two largest coalition parties slightly changes their guidelines and political course, but not radically. Young politicians who come from civil society, show adherence to principles in matters of openness and compliance with procedures and demonstrate an ability to balance conservatism and counteract the dominance of hidden lobby interests of the two largest factions in the coalition.

Anti-oligarchic measures by Parliament and the President are related to them, but there is no mention of this in parties' programmes. Therefore, we can assume that these steps are forced, occurring under the pressure of the political situation and civil society. In other words, oligarchic ties and dependence on them remain. It seems that it is even greater in PF, than in the PPB.

"Samopomich" slightly differs in terms of its greater openness, proximity to civil society and its demands and adherence to principles of faction members in matters of voting. However, the party is close to the previous two in that it has, relatively speaking, a "patron" of the party (A. Sadovyi) and, according to the media, an oligarchic origin of at least a part of party funding.

The Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko is a typical example of populist, personalistic and at the same time *patronage* (in the sense of it being maintained by oligarchs) *party*, that received its chance due to the decline of other populist party – All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" and also because of the very favourable time for the "bellicosity" of its leader against the background of insufficient radicalism of other parties that were going for power. Like all populist parties, the Radical Party is maintained on the trust of part of voters in the leader. The personal composition of the party is very variegated, with a small number of "friends" and reliable people, if there are any at all.

All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" is old and not just leadership-based, but a leaderism party of the populist type. Previously the party held and increased its ranking due to the charisma of its leader, which sharply decreased after the release of Tymoshenko from prison. A line of unsuccessful steps of the party leader, her inability to fit into a new social and political situation caused a drop in trust in her among the society and a fall in the party's rating. The example of "Fatherland" proves the hopelessness of leaderism parties in democratic society: when there is no "big enemy" (Party of Regions) and when the charismatic leader loses his/her "charm", the party will inevitably decline.

"Opposition Bloc" – remnants of the former ruling party that is trying to play the role of an opposition, but can only exercise power by authoritarian means for selfish purposes. OB has no other purpose or other abilities. It is the successor of Party of Regions in personnel, financial and ideological aspects. Thereafter, it maintains a pro-Russian orientation, which attracts the electorate though trying to hide it (behind its seemingly peace promoting position). If party leaders are not brought to account for their past offences (political and/or corruption related), OB will have a chance to overcome its current weakness and uncertainty and to consolidate around simple but powerful ideas of survival and economic interest.

The party of S. Tihipko "Strong Ukraine" is a kind of "communicating vessel" with OB. If one loses, the other one gains, while the purposes and supporters of these parties are the same. The latter is more judicious in words, but "barren" in reality.

Two parties (old) that claim to be ideological but theoretically are antipodes: *All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" and the Communist Party*, in my opinion, *have no prospects*. The first gained unexpected success in 2012 as one of the most radical and oppositional parties. In fact, it did not prove its claims and immediately became uninteresting. Its ideology is very outdated, methods of action are on the verge of provocation and are not perceived by the majority of Ukrainians. Good managers among members of this party were not found, and in matters of corruption ties they appeared to be the same as everyone else. Therefore, the party needs any special occasion to increase its influence, but this may not happen. Even the active participation of the leader of "Svoboda" in the revolutionary events of 2014 has not helped the party to maintain its popularity.

CPU should have finally left the scene – after a package of laws aimed at de-communisation of society and possible restoration of proceedings against it.

Another party is *"Civil Position", whose leader put the evil eye on himself by calling himself impassable*. "Impassability", first of all, is related to doubts as to the ability of leader and party to change anything in practice. It was possible to break this vicious circle of distrust

only by becoming involved in some practical political activities, but the party seems to be incapable of it.

Thus, the so-called new parties (hastily organised after the Maidan) are practically indistinguishable from the old ones. Both of them are leadership-based and represent corporate associations with opaque funding. They are associations of people who decided to enter power or seek to remain in power, uniting around some more or less charismatic, but always promising leader with money (or reliable sponsors). Such parties personify the yesterday of our politics. And it is not yet clear how to part with them. The law on state funding of political parties may not have the effect which is expected of it, as the shady schemes of "support" for the parties will not disappear.

In what directions will political parties in Ukraine develop in the near future? What model of political party will dominate in five years in Ukraine (the main features of a "typical party")?

I believe that parties of the old type will decline no earlier than a powerful political movement "from below" for the creation of parties (party) on new principles will appear. This should not necessarily be an ideological party of the old model. I share the view that the time of pure ideologies is behind us. However, we have to unite clearly and objectively (and not in the form of slogans) around a defined and value-determined programme, which shall describe both the vision of promise and specific tasks for the nearest time. Devotion of party members to social interests and their aspiration for changing the society shall primarily stand for this. Such a movement will not appear without some new upheavals, although the upheavals themselves are not a guarantee of its advent.

In order to speak of concrete terms of changes in the party system (five or however many years), it is necessary to predict what will happen in the country. I am not able to do this and see no great certainty from other experts. So I will say this: in case of upheavals everything will depend on their nature. Without them it is possible to predict only slow evolution, as it has always been (through mentality, cultural tradition, institutional "path of dependence"), of parties that we have now towards Europeanisation and some legal reclamation. ■

TO SPEAK OF THE EMERGENCE OF "NEW" POLITICAL PARTIES AFTER THE MAIDAN IS POSSIBLE ONLY FROM A FORMAL POINT OF VIEW

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– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after the Maidan in terms of their construction, ideology, and nature of activity?

If to consider quantitative indicators, more than half of the current 242 political parties were registered after 2004.[7] However, a determinant of these changes was not an increase in public activity, but the creation of institutional preconditions for the development of political parties by holding 2006 and 2007 elections under the proportional system. However, political parties were not ready to fulfil the new tasks assigned to them in connection with the transfer to a parliamentary-presidential republic and they were unable to fulfil their promises to citizens.

Confirmation of this is the fact that after 10 years the political parties and their leaders, who received an extraordinary vote of confidence from voters in 2004-2006, found themselves on the margins of political life or very close to it. Moreover, **they discredited the idea of national revival**, which "shot" in 10% of "Svoboda" only in 2012 and not least due to its opposition activities.

The Revolution of Dignity and armed aggression by the Russian Federation (the annexation of Crimea, separatist armed groups' activities in the territory of Donbas) had a radical impact on the ideology of Ukrainian parties. Their result was the consolidation of the foreign policy vector of more or less significant political parties that now declare a pro-European course and barely make mention of the eastern integration vector (deepening relations with Russia and CIS countries).

[7] According to information given under the "Political parties" heading on the site of the State Registration Service of Ukraine (*http://www.drsu.gov.ua/show/202*) 262 political parties are registered in Ukraine. – *Ed*.

These events determine the reformatting of the ideological spectrum in future: further shift of political parties to the right because of the electoral demand for strengthening national identity and "exposure" of the left flank as a result of actual prohibition of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the absence of an influential pro-Western socialist or social-democratic party.

– What are the main features of political parties in Ukraine today? What are the differences between the "new" and "old" parties?

To speak of the emergence of "new" political parties after the Maidan is possible only from a formal point of view. If we take the top ten political parties as per the results of the 2014 elections, new among them are "People's Front" (registered in 2014, actual successor of "Front for Change" created in 2007), the "Samopomich" association (registered in 2012), Opposition Bloc, Radical Party (2010), Strong Ukraine and Civil Position (2005).

However, if we take their staff composition, it should be noted that after 2004 new faces in Ukrainian politics almost never appeared, and methods of political struggle have not changed. The main problem is that the splash of civil activism and qualitative changes in public consciousness, both at the end of 2004 and 2013, have not gained proper institutional consolidation: legislative consolidation of the new rules of interaction between the state and civil society, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, creation of preventive mechanisms against the usurpation of power, improvement of party legislation, etc.

It is not the time to speak of the emergence of genuinely new parties even after the Revolution of Dignity without radical reforms in many areas of social life. An eloquent fact: a financial statement on income and expenditure and also a report on the property of the party for 2014 which should be published annually in the national media, can be found only on the websites of "People's Front", Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the "Samopomich" association, while Radical Party did not provide this information at all. If the parties themselves do not show an interest in increasing the transparency of their activities, including through publicity of the process of electoral list formation, then there are no qualitative differences between the "new" and "old" parties.

– In what directions will political parties in Ukraine develop in the near future? What model of political party will dominate in five years in Ukraine (the main features of a "typical party")?

A range of factors will affect further development of party system in Ukraine. This primarily refers to the type of electoral system, both on national and local levels. A return to a proportional system will facilitate the structuring of the party system and introduction of open lists will foster a qualitative renewal of the staff composition of existing parties.

Another factor is the solution to the problem of the state funding of political parties. **Provision of state support to political parties that entered Parliament will give grounds to demand greater transparency in their activities**, in particular, in terms of conducting election campaigns, **will facilitate their professionalisation** and reduction of dependence on representatives of business circles.

Consolidation at the legislative level of requirements for observance of democratic principles in the organisation of inner party life would facilitate qualitative changes in the nature of Ukrainian political parties. **Without a return to a proportional electoral system and the introduction of open election lists, changes in the party system of Ukraine in the near future will be rather cosmetic.**

As for the ideological dimension, in connection with strengthening of patriotism, the use of pro-Ukrainian slogans by almost all parties, the emergence and growing popularity of radical right parties are unlikely. Due to the deterioration of social and economic conditions there is danger on the left flank, where ultra-left populist parties can be formed, which will exploit the theme of social justice and the problem of increased inequality in the property status of citizens. ■

THE CURRENT STATE OF UKRAINE'S PARTY SYSTEM AND ITS CONFIGURATION WERE FORMED AS A RESULT OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 2014

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– What processes and events, that occurred in Ukraine during 2013-2014, caused major changes in the party system of Ukraine and how did they affect its functioning?

First of all, they are the Revolution of Dignity, the 2014 presidential election, the return to the parliamentary-presidential form of government and parliamentary elections in 2014.

The current state of Ukraine's party system and its configuration were formed as a result of parliamentary elections in 2014. Revolutionary events in Kyiv changed the positioning of political forces prior to the parliamentary elections. *Firstly*, the Party of Regions compromised itself by rejecting European integration course and did not participate in the elections. The rating of its nearest satellite – CPU – also significantly decreased. Those forces that represented the Party of Regions, now form the Opposition Bloc. *Secondly*, one of the consequences of the Revolution of Dignity was the formation of new party structures ("Petro Poroshenko Bloc", "People's Front", "Right Sector" and "Samopomich").

Based on the regional dimension of election results it can be stated that East-West sociopolitical divide continues to determine the format of a party system in Ukraine. Four

new political parties have entered Parliament. At the end of 2014, 235 political parties were registered in Ukraine,[8] not more than 14 of them may be referred to the party system under the criteria of results of participation in elections.[9]

The ideological dimension of the party system has also changed. **It is about the process of de-ideologisation of party structures and the interpenetration of ideological doctrines.** This process is closely connected with the change of organisational structure of political parties. The process of transition from mass to professional and electoral or cartel parties is now being observed. **The consequence of this process is the ideology's loss of its mobilising function and key role in party building.**

At the same time, one should speak of differentiation between electoral and professional parties in their attitude to ideology. One can distinguish the electoral and professional parties with strong ideological articulation and electoral and professional parties with weak ideological or pragmatic articulation. The latter include: "People's Front", "Petro Poroshenko Bloc", "Opposition Bloc", "UDAR". On the other hand, political parties with strong ideological articulation or "programme-based" parties are characterised by a stable, long-term compliance with the defined ideological line. Such parties in Ukrainian politics are AUU "Svoboda", CPU and PMU.

It should be also noted that all parties which form Ukraine's party system, are of leadership type, which means that they are unstable because of their dependence on the leader's ranking.

– In what periods did the most significant changes occur in the party system in Ukraine?

First of all, it is the first alternative elections to the legislative body of Ukraine, where People's Movement was the main opposition force to the Communist Party. Due to this it gained the opportunity to create a parliamentary opposition – the People's Council (125 persons).

Further development of Ukrainian multi-party system was stipulated by constituent elections, which include presidential election in 1991 and parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994. **Constituent elections in Ukraine fulfilled their functions in conditions of democratic transition, outlining the features of electoral competition, showing its regional character and became the basis for future legitimation of the political regime.**

There are also the parliamentary elections in 1998, conducted under a mixed electoral system for the first time, the proportional component of which made parties the main subjects of the election process. Based on the results of the 1998 parliamentary elections, the format of the party system was formed by 8-12 parties; the very same party system functioned on the principles of the system of polarised pluralism.

However, the most significant changes in the party system occurred in Ukraine in the period from 2004 to 2014. Eight election campaigns took place within this period: four parliamentary (2006, 2007, 2012, 2014), three presidential (2004, 2010, 2014), elections to regional authorities (2010); form of government was changed three times (2004, 2010, 2014); electoral formula was changed two times (in 2006 and 2012); transformational changes took the form of the revolution in 2004 (Orange Revolution) and in 2014 (Revolution of Dignity). As a result of these events the party system format and the main political actors have repeatedly changed.

Institutional changes in society, related to the 2004 presidential elections, ended with a constitutional reform (8 December 2004), which resulted in a change of the form of government to a parliamentary-presidential format as well as introduction of the proportional electoral system for elections to the Verkhovna Rada and local authorities, and **had a positive impact on the development of the national party system**.

Further polarisation of society occurred according to the results of parliamentary elections in 2006-2007. Ukraine remained divided not only geographically, but also electorally: in the South and East voters voted for the Party of Regions, Bloc of Natalia Vitrenko "People's Opposition", the Communist Party of Ukraine, in the Centre and West, for the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, and the pro-presidential bloc "Our Ukraine" won in the three Western regions of Ukraine (Zakarpattia, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions). Such results of voting indicate opposite value orientations in Ukraine.

The result of the parliamentary elections and institutional changes was the reformatting of the party system that failed to reproduce the 1998-2002 system. The party system began to function on the principle of a two-bloc system based on the parliamentary elections results in 2006-2007.

The 2010-2012 electoral cycle includes presidential elections on 17 January 2010, local elections on 31 October 2010 and parliamentary elections on 28 October 2012. The results of the presidential elections in 2010, as well as in 2004, were caused by social and cultural division into East and West.

After winning the elections, Viktor Yanukovych initiated the return to a presidential-parliamentary republic. The corresponding decision was adopted by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on 1 October 2010.[10] The Ukrainian party system acquired the configuration of the system with a dominant party (Party of Regions) based on the results of local elections in 2010 and parliamentary elections in 2012. The party system again returns to a two-bloc format based on the results of events in 2013-2014.

– What factors will have the most influence on the format of the party system in Ukraine in the near future? In five years?

The formation of party systems in transitional societies is influenced by a range of factors. First of all, their development is caused by the general development trends

[8] Site of the State Registration Service of Ukraine, heading "Political parties", *http://www.drsu.gov.ua/show/202*.– *Ed*.

[9] Site of the Central Election Commission heading "Early election of people's deputies of Ukraine 2014", *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp001*. – *Ed*.

[10] This relates to the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the constitutional proposal of 252 people's deputies of Ukraine regarding conformity to the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" dated 8 December 2004. No. 2222-IV (case on compliance of procedure for amending the Constitution of Ukraine) No. 20 dated 30 September 2010. – *Ed*.

of political parties in the modern world (the formation of new types of party structures, such as cartel parties, parties of post material values, etc.) and directly by the logic of democratic transition.

In addition, I would like to draw attention to the effect of the following factors: (*a*) social and political divisions; (*b*) electoral system; (*c*) selection of the form of government; (*d*) regulatory and legal framework of the functioning of political parties; (*e*) influence of financial and industrial groups.

Social and political division into "West-East" was formed in Ukraine historically. It was latent before the parliamentary elections in 2002 and it became relevant during the parliamentary elections in 2002. Since then its effect is becoming more powerful and transcends other problematic social and political dimensions.

The process of evolution of the electoral system of Ukraine is not completed and **all parliamentary elections in the independent Ukraine were conducted under new rules**, that certainly had negative consequences for consolidation of the party system. Therefore, the future development of the party system will largely depend on the system of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Changes of the form of government in 2004, 2010 and 2014 also had a significant impact on the configuration of the party system. These changes primarily contributed to the emergence of new political parties.

The regulatory and legal framework of the functioning of political parties needs improvement. The main directions of its improvement may be the following: (*a*) introduction of state funding of political parties; (*b*) involvement of ethnic minorities in political life at local level; (*c*) effective mechanisms for preventing the abuse of state resources for political purposes, etc.

The main task in reforming the legislative framework for political parties, in my opinion, **is the intro duction of their state funding**, that will make subordination of political parties to oligarchic groupings impossible in future.

Therefore, one can distinguish factors that over the next five years will have a decisive influence on the development of a party system in Ukraine and will stipulate its format. They are social and political divisions, electoral system, regulatory framework of the functioning of political parties, administrative and territorial reform that will considerably strengthen regionalisation of party influence. ■

MODERN POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE HAVE NO "MASTER PLAN OF DEVELOPMENT"

Mykola PRYMUSH,
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– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after the Maidan in terms of their construction, ideology and nature of activity?

After the Revolution of Dignity political parties in Ukraine have walked away from the "regional strategy" and ideological component of their development and focused on fundamentally new opportunities: patriotic rhetoric about the unity of Ukrainian society that lives "in a humiliated state" (the slogan "poorest European nation" and others).

Moreover, this "humiliation" aspect has its specificity – on the national scene, it is presented as a fight against Russian aggression, annexation of the Crimea and the war in Donbas, while in Donbas and South East of Ukraine it orients the electorate and society to a search for and implementation of fundamentally new opportunities.

The organisational work of political parties is undergoing very interesting changes. Thus, every political force after the Revolution of Dignity tries to attract the largest possible share of "non-politicians": military men, journalists and volunteers closely associated with the ATO.

Striking examples are the situation with the arrest in Russia of the famous Ukrainian pilot N. Savchenko, which increased the publicity of the party "Fatherland", or commanders of volunteer battalions from the ATO zone entering Parliament (S. Semenchenko, D. Yarosh).

The purpose of such measures could be the practical implementation of two trends. *Firstly*, it is an attempt to fundamentally update the political development of the country in terms of "patriotic" values, "national security", "freedom of speech", "strong civil society" and "national dignity".

Secondly, Ukrainian political forces have lost the ideological component of their policy documents and are trying to introduce a "universal ideology" into Ukrainian politics. Its essence lies in development and implementation of a comprehensive public policy based on political ideals: "social economy", "free market and market relations" and a "competitive education". **A kind of "mix" of ideologies occurs; the demands of the electorate are fulfilled by resolving urgent problems and engaging the greatest possible number of civil society representatives.**

Thirdly, the idea proposed by national political scientists V. Horbatenko and Y. Shveda on the "atomisation"[11] of political parties and party systems in conditions of system transformation has been confirmed. The number of political parties continues to grow, despite low efficiency of their state development programmes, the rapid disappointment of the electorate and, in general, the lack of actual reasons for increase in their number. Thus, more than 50 political forces with similar ideas, slogans and party programmes emerged after the Revolution of Dignity, whose aim is to accelerate the implementation of Ukraine's European integration course.

Fourthly, political parties after the Revolution of Dignity continue to turn into a kind of marketing, electoral product. The examples are "Petro Poroshenko Bloc" and Yatsenyuk's "People's Front". The essence lies in the fact that "governmental" and "presidential" parties perform their activities as a kind of electoral strategy based on the vision of current problems, but through a prism of social and cultural values: peace and harmony in the country, the welfare of every Ukrainian, national state, national dignity and pride.

Crisis elements of party development remain unchanged, they maintain actuality for a long time and are primarily related to the lack of political will both in leaders and in party functionaries.

Firstly, political parties continue to choose the strategy for their formation around the leader, with his name officially included in the party's name.

Secondly, **demand for solely ideological political forces is lost in the society**; failure of "Svoboda" and CPU in the last parliamentary elections proves this. They are replaced by parties of broader consensus that build their policies around social and cultural categories of "understanding", "solidarity", "peace", "society without corruption", etc.

Thirdly, political parties have not turned away from the influence of oligarchic interests in politics. Moreover, the oligarchs openly support certain political forces, with certain individuals entering their ranks. The fundamental difference is that now oligarchs try to get involved in civil initiatives and openly finance them; this may cause a lot of questions concerning the legality of the financial activities of political parties in the future.

– What are the main features of political parties in Ukraine today? What are the differences between "new" and "old" parties?

Ukrainian political parties at the current stage of their development are increasingly oriented toward "managerial project" or "party for elections" and choose the strategy of their development depending on the acuteness of social problems.

"Old" political forces, which include AUU "Fatherland", fragments of the Party of Regions that call themselves "Oppositional Bloc", significant part of "Petro Poroshenko Bloc" and Yatsenyuk's "People's Front", place economic strategy at the foreground. Its essence is that such political forces are calling for a consensus in the economic interests of all participants of the political process, but direct management shall be carried out only by one party – the winner of the election.

"New" political forces, which include "Samopomich" and "Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko", instead of ideological features, are trying to implement the principle of "universality", which is popular in EU countries (coordination of their own position with a wide range of business interests, civil assets, ordinary citizens, etc.).

"Old" and "new" political forces are united not only by a joint position on Russia's external aggression, but also the widespread use of means of practical psychology, PR-technologies and elements of an information war in their own activities and in communication with the electorate. "Old" political forces based their strategy on the use "Us-They" dichotomy. "New" political forces more and more often use elements of modern sinestetics in their activities – choice of colours, slogans, symbols, logos, verbal and non-verbal communication, whose aim is to awaken the necessary feelings (such as patriotism, loyalty to the state, protection of own family from aggression of a "neighbour" and so on).

An increasing use of informational influence and PR-technologies does not cause an increase in the efficiency of party activities. It still remains ineffective after the events of the Revolution of Dignity. On the contrary, the "new" political forces could aim to improve cooperation between the parties, develop a universal strategy of cooperation between them, while not merging into a single political force (the essence of the parliamentary-presidential republic lies in this).

Therefore, **in terms of political parties theory, neither the "new" nor the "old" political associations represent parties with regard to ideology, specificity of activities, methods of party organisational work**, etc. They are rather social movements that have emerged as public organisations that were active during acute social events ("The Right Sector" – during the Revolution of Dignity as the most radical of its participants, "Samopomich" – as a social, humanitarian and intellectual project which became known thanks to volunteers from the ATO zone).

Also political forces of the "new generation" carry out a fundamentally new kind of communication with the electorate and supporters: they "virtualise" the communication component of their own activities and increasingly communicate with the electorate over social networks. **Their electorate is no longer a certain "mass" of citizens, but a personified, qualitative composition of people who not only follow the activities of the political force, but also play an active, remote role.**

However, with that, the "new" parties, unlike the "old" ones, are not interested in increasing the number of their ranks and instead focus their work on two factors: creating a qualitative and personified electoral base and

[11] See in particular: V. Babkina, V. Horbatenko Politology: manual, Kyiv, 2002; Y. Shveda The theory of political parties and party systems, Lviv, 2004; A. Romaniuk, Y. Shveda Parties and electoral policy, Lviv, 2005, etc.

increasing the number of their own electorate with the use of sinestetics (cause feelings of worry, anxiety, uncertainty and thereby fix in the minds of citizens a political force that understands and feels). Political forces such as "Samopomich" develop precisely according to this pattern.

– In what directions will political parties in Ukraine develop in the near future? What model of political party will dominate in five years in Ukraine (the main features of a "typical party")?

Modern political parties in Ukraine in general have no "master plan of development" as political forces and self-development as a party in the classical sense of this word. The main thing is that party functionaries do not study social needs, so any party rapidly loses its electoral and political authority and influence, and therefore will have to leave the political arena. This especially concerns "the party of power". There are many examples of this – SDPU (u), "Our Ukraine", the Party of Regions. However, the trend towards formation of a "party of power" will continue to maintain its actuality due to the low level of political culture of the population and politicians as well as instant disappointment of citizens in their electoral sympathies.

Ukrainian political parties over the next five years will develop in three directions:

- *firstly*, their activities will continue to be "virtualised" (i.e. on the Internet) showing greater efficiency of communication with voters;
- *secondly*, political parties will completely lose their influence on creation of state strategic development programmes, whereas, on the one hand, they are trying to create a universal ideology, and on the other hand, they do not give sufficient attention to this issue because of the voters' reluctance to get acquainted with the party's policy;
- *thirdly*, political parties will continue to form around their leaders, while remaining their satellites.

This appears to be a model of a typical political party in Ukraine in two years.

However, despite their low authority in society, Ukrainian political parties can maintain dominant positions in the political space if they focus attention on the following aspects:

- they will work closely both with their own electorate and the electorate of their opponents;
- they will develop more real political programmes that not only will be close to the interests and problems of Ukrainian society, but also will have an appropriate financial base for their implementation;
- they will present moral and ethical values like the German political parties, especially in humanitarian and social policy;
- they will turn away from the focus on the leader and focus on developing party staff professionalism;
- will more actively interfere in the formation of government policy and effectively influence the development of strategic development programmes in Ukraine. ■

FORMATION OF A NEW MODEL OF POLITICAL SYSTEM AND A NEW TYPE OF PARTIES DEPENDS ON WHAT WILL REPLACE THE OLIGARCHIC CONSENSUS

Maksym ROZUMNYI,
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– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after Maidan in terms of their structure, ideology and nature of activity?

It is appropriate to consider the changing party system in Ukraine in the post-Maidan period in the context of the evolution of the institutional complex of representative democracy ongoing during Ukrainian independence.

The theory of democratic transition envisaged a decisive role of democratic governance institutions in the transformation of non-liberal societies. The main strategy and tactics for democratisation was to widely establish NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and consistently implement in the post-Soviet political reality of democratic standards and procedures, developed in the West, in the process of its own liberal evolution.

However, the result turned out to be somewhat different from what was expected. It was **a so-called facade democracy, within which a significant part of the real functioning social standards and principles have degraded to frankly feudal forms**, while the institutional framework (facade) of the political system continued to "improve".

Moreover, the client-oriented, corrupt and criminal social structures have not only learned how to use the institutions of representative democracy, but also managed to fit most of the democratic changes in the context of their own corporate strategies. An example of this is the permanent process of "political reform", manipulation of the electoral system and the contradictory collisions of the domestic "constitutional process".

Evolution of the Ukrainian party system "in the period before and after Maidan" illustrates this quite eloquently. Despite the fact that since 1998 (the first parliamentary elections under the proportional system), theoretically, the political parties have been the main subject of political accountability and a mouthpiece of the interests of the people, and the fact that their role in the process of constitutional amendments and changes to the electoral law only grew, the party system has relentlessly degraded all this time.

This is evidenced by the level of distrust in the political parties; the instability of the party system, in which the

leaders are constantly changing, mergers and splits, political "suicide" and "hostile takeovers" take place, the opaque and non-democratic structure of most of the parties, which are founded mainly around the public figure of a leader and/or sources of shady finance.

What are the main features of political parties in Ukraine today? What are the differences between the "new" and "old" parties?

The crisis of 2014-2015 left not so much the parties in the classic sense of the word, but rather "political projects" as main subjects of political competition. By the nature of their emergence and functioning the latter are balancing between the logic of business "start-ups" and the laws of promoting popular stars.

In addition, the "market" of political representation, as an ambience of demand for ideology, leadership and activities has remained basically unchanged. Ukrainian society is constrained by the same beliefs, motivations and emotions that existed over the years of independence. Its dominant features will remain the paternalist paradigm, an unstable and partly conflicting identity, the search for authority, a lack of confidence in the institutions and the expectation of a "strong hand".

It is probably these, somewhat infantile views that brought about the effectiveness and success of the manipulative technologies, which as a result entailed the current critical state of the party system and the system of political representation as such. Too inert and archaic in its demands and expectations, the social ground is being exploited by the political class to gain an administrative mandate over democratic procedures. To that end postmodern media technologies are applied, being supported for persuasiveness by the mechanisms of violence against freedom and consciousness of the representatives of the electorate – bribery, intimidation and involvement in the corporate groups.

The previous period of the political history of Ukraine may be described as oligarchic consensus destroyed at a certain stage of its development by the attempt of monopolisation by Yanukovych's entourage.

The "old" parties serviced this consensus: (*a*) prevented alien elements that were not incorporated in the clan environment from access to leverage political and administrative control; (*b*) served as a balance in addressing conflicts that periodically broke out between interest groups, and served as differentiation tools (quotas) of the areas of interest; (*c*) acted as a catalyst of social tension as a side effect of oligarchic domination.

Maidan and further political changes in Ukraine have formed a new coordinate system in which the oligarchic groups faced the need to agree on new rules of interaction amongst each other and with society.

These new regulations have yet to be determined. On the one hand, there is a great probability of returning to the oligarchic consensus, but with a new list of members. This prospect arises from the very nature of the political elite, which almost never underwent significant changes after Maidan, and therefore will search for mechanisms and instruments of domination which are habitual for it. The political technologies it adopted, the accumulated resource (financial, material, administrative, media-related) leave practically no hope for any political alternative – either as a party or social movement or independent media.

However, the resumption of the oligarchic model is obstructed by several external factors, which are objective in their nature. *First*, it is the low profitability of the socio-economic model built around the oligarchic consensus, which is based on corruption and total monopolisation. In the context of an ongoing war and the crisis of public finance this low profitability is an obstacle to survival of the State.

Second, the obstacle to saving the domestic oligarchic consensus is the integration imperative. Ukraine had exhausted its chances of survival on the roadside of integration processes that ultimately led to a crisis on the eve of the Vilnius Summit. Financial, material and legal openness inevitably reveals low competitiveness of the Ukrainian oligarch groups and breaks their consensus as an insignificant barrier to bigger players on the global market.

Third, Ukrainian society has passed through the experience of radicalisation, and this experience will prompt active societal elements not to adapt to the realities of the oligarchic consensus but rather to try to destroy them. If we combine this radicalisation factor with the external pressure and the low profitability of the oligarchic economy, it becomes clear that nobody will be capable of returning to the old forms of social domination in Ukraine.

Therefore, one should expect that a new model of political system along with a new party type will be formed depending on what will come in place of the oligarchic consensus in Ukraine.

In what directions will Ukrainian political parties develop in the near future? What model of political party will dominate in five years in Ukraine (the main features of a "typical party")?

Most probable is the transition to a relatively competitive model, in which the main oligarchic groups will retain their dominance, but will be forced to reduce the pressure on public finances; grant access of external competitors to the internal market; use the media resource to protect corporate interests with more caution.

The result of such changes, in particular, could be the emergence of new political projects based on the network and other mobilisation technologies, financed from alternative, including external, sources.

The resumption in the short term of the classical ideological spectrum and return to the traditions of "staff-based" party machines is highly unlikely. The transformation period will require flexible organisational and propagandist decisions. Advertisement of the party brands will become increasingly aggressive, party leaders will become more impressive and the party activists' circles with time will become more professional and will acquire signs of corporate privacy.

THE MAIN FEATURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE TODAY IS THAT THEY ARE NOT PARTIES

Taras STETSKIV,
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– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after Maidan in terms of their structure, ideology and nature of activity?

In fact, no significant changes have taken place. Most likely, there has been a regress of the party structure. Prior to Maidan there had been mainly leaderist parties, set up by means of administrative resources and serious financial injections, as well as depending on the victory or defeat of their leaders in the presidential and parliamentary elections.

This applies to Our Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Party of Regions. These parties had dominated over the decade after the Orange Revolution.

After Maidan, we saw a significant shift towards the emergence of temporary electoral projects, specific "party brands". The ratings of these parties were formed exclusively as a result of massive pre-election TV advertising and considerable funds infused by oligarchic clans. The emergence of such "one-off" parties, dependent on a single leader and financed by one or several oligarchs, is a vivid example that Ukraine has not overcome the oligarchic clannish economic and administrative state model.

Political parties in Ukraine began to die from the late 1990s (Popular Movement, Ukrainian People's Party, Ukrainian Republican Party, Reform and Order Party, etc.) due to insufficient work with the population, outdated ideological and political guidance and, of course, because of the lack of finance.

They were eventually replaced by parties, built using administrative resources and the money of oligarchic clans, which have developed in Ukraine (Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), Green Party, People's Democratic Party, Solidarity, etc.). And they, in turn, had been replaced by the "monster parties" which developed after the Orange Revolution (Our Ukraine, Party of Regions, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc).

– What are the main features of political parties in Ukraine today?

The main feature of political parties in Ukraine today is that they are not parties. They are television projects made up for elections. They are brands, usually dependent on one or several oligarchs. They are projects without ideology and even without their own vision of Ukraine's future, moreover, without their own built (on their own or with experts) concepts or plans for implementing certain reforms in the country.

They usually have no real membership base and no existing regional and local offices. It is simply unnecessary, as **the rating is acquired through advertising and in elections**. Almost all of them are leaderist parties, i.e. created behind a single leader, who, in turn, is dependent on one or more "money bags".

As a result, we observe practically no activities by these parties in between elections at a local level. Everything is replaced with their media presence, participation of its leaders or representatives of these "brands" in popular national talk shows ("Freedom of Speech" on ICTV, "Shuster Live", "The right to power" on 1+1 and "Black Mirror" on Inter).

– In what areas will Ukrainian parties develop in the next five years?

I think that in the next five years really effective parties should (and will) emerge more or less similar to the parties existing in EU countries. In other words, the parties who will service the interests of different social strata or occupational clusters.

This does not mean that there will be no leaderist and fake parties or one-time projects. They will exist. However, new (or updated versions of the existing) parties, constructed on a completely different basis, will be established.

They will have ideology (purpose, vision) and their own ideological and political platform. By ideology I mean not the labelling of various -isms on parties (liberalism, conservatism, nationalism, etc.), but the availability of their own ways of solving important social issues that arise and to which parties need to continually respond.

They will be built not as a hierarchical structure, but as horizontal network organisations.

They will be based on multi-leader principles, and the leader will grow with this system. This is fundamentally different from the parties existing today in Ukraine, where an eternal leader is chosen, who usually makes personal and political decisions.

They will operate systematically and regularly, working on the ground, notably for the population, thereby gaining confidence, credibility and, finally, a rating.

In my opinion, these should be the main features of a typical political party in a country willing to join Europe. These features will enable the Ukrainian parties to produce their own competitive intellectual product, i.e. their own option for solving the most important socio-political issues. It is in this way that the real parties will be able to "bury" the currently existing pseudoparties based on predominance of oligarchic clans.

An independent researcher from Lviv, Plahktii once made a wonderful remark: "All Ukrainian parties are based on the principle of an asphalt plant. The task of such a plant is to produce asphalt. The main task of a political party is to deliver intellectual product and disseminate it among the population. Therefore modern parties should be based on the principle of leading IT corporations".[12] ■

[12] Taras Plahktii is a freelance researcher, chair of the public organisation Centre for Development of Ukrainian Culture and Self-organisation. On 22 May 2015, Plahktii took part in the TV-show "Issue of the Day: Ukrainian Political Organisations – What Are They Like?" on the local Region TV channel in Dnipropetrovsk. – Taras Plahktii's website Dynamic networks. Theory and technology, *https://tarasplakhtiy.wordpress.com*. – *Ed*.

THE MAKING OF A NEW PARTY SYSTEM ONLY BEGINS

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– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after the Maidan in terms of their construction, ideology and nature of activity?

After Maidan the political parties in Ukraine have not undergone that many fundamental changes as the national party system has, i.e., a complex of quantitative and qualitative parameters of interaction between Ukrainian political parties.

One can distinguish three stages in the development of a party system in Ukraine:

1. The initial phase (1990-2004) – the period of establishment and development of new political parties in Ukraine. This is a period of ideological confrontation between national democrats and the leftist parties (Communists and Socialists), as well as political confrontation between the half-partisan Parliament and non-partisan Presidents of the country. At the same time, a few not very successful attempts to establish the "parties of power" were made.

2. The bipolar oligarchic stage of development of the Ukrainian party system (2004-2013). The process of oligarchisation of the party system in Ukraine (intensification of the influence of oligarchic groups on the leading political parties) began after the introduction of a mixed election system and the 1998 parliamentary elections. However, the heyday of the oligarchic party system was 2004 – after implementation of the proportional electoral system and the constitutional reform, which envisaged transition to a parliamentary-presidential system.

During the presidential elections of 2004 and after the Orange Revolution, the party system underwent a polarisation. The Party of Regions (in other words the "Party of the East"; the party that relied mostly on the Russian-speaking voters of eastern and southern regions of Ukraine and the post-Soviet nomenclature) became one pole, and the other – was represented by pro-Western (in terms of internal and external political sense) political parties (Yulia Tymoshenko's "Fatherland" and "Our Ukraine" and its political successors).

This stage was also characterized by a certain equilibrum, a relative balance of the electoral potential of the two competing camps. During the presidential and parliamentary elections, the winner was the camp that won in the central regions of Ukraine.

3. A new stage in the development of the party system has began after the Euromaidan, the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the war in the East of Ukraine. The party system has undergone significant changes with radical change in the balance of electoral forces as its main trend.

The Party of Regions formally left the political scene, although it has a successor – the Opposition Bloc. However, the assumed "Party of East" has lost (due to the annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of part of the territory of Donbas) several million potential voters. The balance of electoral support has changed radically in favour of western-minded parties. For the first time since Ukraine's independence none of the left-wing parties has made it into the Verkhovna Rada.

The camp of pro-Western political forces has been substantially renewed. At the extraordinary parliamentary elections in October 2014, out of the formally "old" parties, only "Fatherland" made it into Parliament. Other winners of the parliamentary elections were officially "new", though their leaders were seasoned politicians. Moreover, the main winners of the extraordinary parliamentary elections were the party of the new President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and the party of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Both of them have played a significant role in Ukrainian politics over the last 10 years. "Samopomich" and, to a certain extent, the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko seemed rather new.

At the extraordinary parliamentary elections in October 2014 public demand for new political forces very clearly emerged. Although almost no qualitative changes in the political parties of Ukraine (structure, ideology and nature of activities) have occurred. The oligarchic influence **on the leading political parties has slightly decreased, but largely remains**, especially with regard to their funding. Again **the leaderist and "personalised" parties predominate**. As previously, **the lack of internal party democracy is being felt**.

At the extraordinary parliamentary elections in 2014, new party brands and electoral machine, not parties as organisations, achieved victory. While the ideological parties ("Svoboda" and the Communist Party) lost out. Thus, the renewal process has been launched. So far this mainly concerns the party system. And we do not know yet what it will be like. The making of a new party system is only beginning. After a certain time changes will inevitably affect the institution of political parties. There is also a demand for that. However, changes in the activity of political parties will evolve in a slower and contradictory manner.

– What are the main features of Ukrainian political parties today? What are the differences between the "new" and "old" parties?

To date no qualitatively new parties have appeared in Ukraine's political system. Allow me to note what kind of parties I believe to be the "qualitatively new ones". They are not the parties that have appeared over the past 2-3 years, and not those with relatively new leaders. Qualitatively new parties will be only those political forces that will implement qualitatively new political practices, in particular, new democratic and transparent mechanisms for funding their activities, new means of communication and feedback from ordinary citizens, active development of internal party democracy, and no ties to any particular charismatic leader.

– In what directions will political parties in Ukraine develop in the near future? What model of a political party will dominate in five years in Ukraine (the main features of a "typical party")?

Ukrainian policy is transient, and it is still going through a period of radical change. Therefore, it is hardly appropriate to predict even five years ahead. Besides,

there are no reliable, scientifically-based methods of such predictive modelling. One may try very cautiously to forecast trends for Ukrainian political parties in the coming years, especially if early parliamentary elections will be held again.

The leaderist parties will continue to dominate, but they will try to challenge the new political projects that rely on community activists, youth and the new middle class. Perhaps, among those projects there will be some attempts to create qualitatively new political parties (at least in terms of certain features). The new politicians and public activists, who are now scattered among various political forces, will most probably attempt to merge into one political party.

In the context of post-war and crisis (post-crisis) time, populist parties will play an active political role. One should hardly expect a renaissance of ideological parties. Their time, and in general the age of ideologies of the modern era, are on the way out. They have failed to resonate among common Ukrainians. Perhaps the future belongs to parties and social movements who will be network based (the age of social networking!), set specific political goals and carry out their functions only temporarily.

As for the format of the party system in Ukraine, it can be determined by a specific model of electoral system, as well as by development of the political situation in eastern Ukraine. Most likely, this will be a system with 2-3 leading parties, but 5-7 more will aspire to get into Parliament. Two to five parties will constitute a parliamentary majority. Gradual and relative stabilisation of the party system will be facilitated by the introduction of public funding of political parties that overcome an electoral threshold in parliamentary elections. ■

THE MAIN INTRIGUE IS WHETHER THE POST-MAIDAN PARTIES WILL BE ABLE TO BECOME POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCES AND PROPOSE A NEW AGENDA FOR UKRAINE

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– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after Maidan in terms of their structure, ideology and nature of activity?

After Maidan (the Revolution of Dignity) the political parties in Ukraine changed in ideological, organisational and functional respects.

The most significant are changes that have affected the outlook (ideology) of political parties. The so-called egalitarian values (such as social equality, anti-oligarchy and democracy, combatting corruption, etc.) have become evident in their slogans. However, public demand for similar values, unfortunately, mainly resulted in predominance of populism and populist parties. Modern Ukrainian parties never presented any serious proposals that would change the existing social order.

Regarding changes at the organisational level – they involved a growing role of citizens (ordinary members of parties) in internal party life as was manifested in incorporation of a civil component represented by leaders of civil society organisations (including volunteers).

Russian aggression forced political parties to establish their position on the issue of war and peace. With this in mind, **a new division of Ukrainian political parties into "parties of war" and "parties of peace" emerged**. Numerous military servicemen and leaders of voluntary military units appeared on the party lists for parliamentary elections. A demand has emerged for involvement of independent political experts who are capable of reforming the existing social relations, as well as carriers of new moral values – journalists and "Maidan heroes". A growing publicity of political parties' activity has become a common trend in post-Maidan political life.

– What are the main features of political parties in Ukraine today? What are the differences between the "new" and "old" parties?

The Revolution of Dignity has pointed to the crisis of the existing political parties model in Ukraine and the very fact that **all currently existing parties** (both ruling and opposition) **are not parties in the classical sense of this concept**. They fail to perform a number of socially important functions. First of all, it is insufficient for parties only to ensure communication between the state and civil (political) society.

As a result, the spontaneously organised society, taking a stand against the existing political regime, at the initial stage of the Revolution of Dignity deliberately distanced itself from political parties. However, a compromise between the opposition parties and the protest movement loomed later on. The latter turned out to be not ready for the long-held fight, lacking the required resource. The opposition political parties have proven to be quite flexible and capable of taking on representation and of the protest movement and subordinating it to themselves.

As a result – civil society proved to be unprepared to take a form of an independent political force and its most prominent representatives and slogans have been incorporated into already existing party structures. Actually, there was a compromise between the already existing (old) parties and the protest movement, which acted as a prototype of the new parties.

New political forces (new parties), which emerged as political representatives of Maidan participants, **having no resources required for successful political activity** (primarily financial, material and media-related), have in fact **remained on the margins of political life**. And therefore, the main intrigue is whether the anti-Maidan parties will be able to become powerful political forces and propose a new agenda for Ukraine. The "old" restored

political forces continue to be under the influence of financial-industrial groups, while contemporary Ukrainian politics boils down to a fight for an allocation of resources between them. Political parties remain the only tool in this fight.

– In what directions will Ukrainian political parties develop in the near future? What model of a political party will dominate in five years in Ukraine (the main features of a "typical party")?

The system of party organisation is in need of serious systemic changes. Their essence is the transformation of political parties into full-fledged agents of political life. This, first of all, is subject to changing the models of financing the political parties. Most experts (myself included) agree that **introducing public funding of Ukrainian political parties would be the best model**, which would significantly change their social status.

Therefore, the direction of development of modern political parties in the short term will be determined by resolving the issue of their financial support. If the law on the public funding of political parties is adopted – we will see their brand new type emerge. Most likely, this will be an election party with signs of a cartel party. If the system of funding political parties in Ukraine remains unchanged – quasi-parties will continue to exist (virtual parties or so-called electoral projects), sharing a significant populist component.

The model of party organisation will also depend on the electoral formula that will be accepted in political elections. **The introduction of open election lists with preferences will greatly change the nature of internal and external party relations**, making them more public and sensitive to the needs of voters and strengthening internal party democracy. ■

WITHOUT REDUCING THE ROLE OF OLIGARCHS IN THE COUNTRY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING THE ACTIVITIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN LINE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES

Vasyl YABLONSKYI,
Deputy Director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies

– What changes have political parties undergone in Ukraine after Maidan in terms of their structure, ideology and nature of activity?

Political parties[13] have actually undergone a number of changes over the past six months. Almost all of them remained the leaderist parties of a charismatic type that

are funded by oligarchs or politicians who are capable of maintaining them. One can also speak of a certain virtuality of these parties – most of them institutionally exist only at national and regional levels.

The approach of Ukrainian politicians to exploiting the political parties has not changed. For many of them sustaining continual party "rebranding", which to a certain extent allows to avoid political accountability, is more advantageous. On the one hand, it is a way for politicians to survive in politics while, on the other, it is a means of coaxing a society that demands new faces and new political forces all the time. **A certain compromise between the politicians and society is a kind of "renewal", where preserving the status and influence of the current party leader is almost a prerequisite.**

As an example, one may recall the winners of the last parliamentary race – the People's Front party and Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Both parties have repeatedly changed their names, and it looks like this process is not yet completed.

With certain reservations, the Opposition Bloc can fit into this group. Despite the fact that formally, the Party of Regions still exists, the vast majority of its leaders have joined a new formation. It is not out of the question that the former "party of power" is being preserved with an aim to resume its activity under favourable political circumstances. The very name of the Opposition Bloc reveals its pronounced populist nature. It also means that before elections the party never planned to take part in the coalition and clearly understood its place in the structure of electoral sympathies.

The Fatherland party, a relative longstanding player in Ukrainian politics, became an outsider among current parliamentary parties. This is partly a political price for previous activities of its leadership while remaining in executive, legislative and local government.

– What are the main features of political parties in Ukraine today? What are the differences between the "new" and "old" parties?

Political structures that entered the ruling coalition as a result of the elections took into account the society's need for change, but, the process of party lists formation and determining majority candidates was not always transparent and unconstrained. Presence of "random"

[13] I am referring to the political forces represented in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or which are likely to pass an electoral threshold.

people on party lists and lack of sufficient qualifications by people's deputies represent a vivid example.

A positive exception may be the new parties that were formed on the eve of the Revolution of Dignity and were actively involved in it, and who have no experience of office prior to 2014 ("Samopomich", Democratic Alliance). On the one hand, this is a positive phenomenon in Ukrainian politics, as it destroys the fixed system of party relations and party lobbying. On the other hand, these parties have a low level of predictability in terms of political behavior and not always transparent funding mechanisms that undermine the positive effects of their activities.

The ideological component of political parties deceases. Current Parliament no longer has "purely" ideological parties such as the Communist Party and "Svoboda", whilst other political structures have a very fuzzy ideological identity. This is due to, inter alia, poor social structuring of Ukrainian society and a party tendency to orient not to clearly defined electoral clusters, but to a wider social stratum.

The organisational structure of political parties is also far from perfect. The situation amid which parties contested in the 2014 elections resulted in their leaders having virtually no membership base, structure or grassroots departments. Paradoxical at first sight, but characteristic of Ukraine, a situation has emerged when the parliamentary coalition has been formed mainly of political structures, which are incompetent from an organisational point of view.

Underdevelopment of political parties as democratic institutions in Ukraine has its explanation. The parties in Ukraine have lost their large-scale involvement and became private clubs due to the influence of financial-industrial groups. Without reducing the role of oligarchs in the country it is impossible to bring the activities of political parties in line with democratic principles.

While the sources and ways of financing the political parties, the processes of forming higher party bodies, election of party leaders, formation of electoral lists and determining candidates by constituencies all remain opaque, we cannot talk about the existence of a full-fledged party system in Ukraine.

Like many of the institutions that are effective in democratic societies, but not working at full force in Ukraine, **Ukrainian political parties are rather attributes of a political game, a means of entering into power**. Not all of them are genuine democratic institutions, ensuring the exercise of popular sovereignty and contributing to renewal of political elites.

– In what directions will political parties in Ukraine develop in the near future? What model of political party will dominate in five years in Ukraine (the main features of a "typical party")?

The development of political parties will depend primarily on the chosen electoral system and the nature of changes to the legislation on parties. The parties will also develop through implementation of their basic functions.

Primary among them is the *function of communication and representation of interests*. The parties that will always involve their supporters in making real party decisions will have constant top-to-bottom communication and vice versa, and are likely to receive strong support in elections.

The formation and selection of political elites is a feature that is genuinely implemented by Ukrainian parties. A positive trend has been observed especially after the revolution of 2013-2014. However, all the political parties renew their members, primarily because of the introduction into electoral lists of the leaders of thought and popular personalities. More complicated is the situation involving real professional politicians who could compete with party leadership and certain internal party groups.

Recent history shows that Viktor Yanukovych seems to be the only politician who became President Ukraine as a candidate of a political party. Despite the negative connotations of this example, in modern terms, the party will be forced to nominate politicians of a nationwide scale from their milieu, and not engage them from the outside.

The function of making a policy and political course. Depending on the extent to which a party is ready to implement policies through internal democratic mechanisms, rather than adopting a leadership initiative, they will have a chance to work on achieving goals that are important for the entire society.

Social integration also remains an important function of parties, despite a global trend towards its decrease (the number of voters who identify themselves with parties has been dropping). Political parties will remain mobilisation centres for their supporters or political targets for their opponents. Therefore, **an important direction of their activity is an active work with citizens beyond election campaigns**.

In the medium term, parties of a "charismatic" type will gain popularity in the political system of Ukraine, with greater or lesser influence of oligarchic capital on their activity.

Parties, according to global trends, **will evade clear-cut ideological identity**, while the impact of the existing "clean" ideological parties will continue to decline.

The declared changes in social and public institutions, introducing restrictions on financing of political parties by individuals and legal entities and the introduction of state funding, coherence of state anti-corruption policy are the preconditions under which transformation of Ukrainian parties can occur in order to achive greater efficiency in performance of their functions. ■

CURRENT STATE AND PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY SYSTEM IN UKRAINE: EXPERT ASSESSMENTS

An important component of Razumkov Centre studies of political parties and party system is analysis of public and expert opinions. With this purpose, in the framework of the project, we conducted national survey of public opinion[1] and an expert survey.[2]

The goal of the survey was to determine experts' opinions on current problems that political parties face, differences between the "old" and the "new" parties, degree of execution of their functions by parties, factors that influence Ukrainian party system formation. An important element of the study was bringing to light expert vision of multi-party system development prospects in Ukraine, in particular, future party models and directions of party system evolution.

Experts' answers to questions are summarised in tables and diagrams presented below.

PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM: CURRENT STATE AND PROBLEMS

According to the majority of experts, currently in Ukraine **prevail "leader-centred" parties**, the work of which is focused on implementing visions and ideas of party leaders (according to 62% of experts).

In the second place, with a large margin (29%) was the opinion that in Ukraine prevail parties with a "great goal" (European integration, reforms, etc.). The least expert votes (14%) were given in support of the idea that in Ukraine prevail parties with a certain ideology and a corresponding programme, or parties that aim their work at solving a specific problem (Table "*Parties of what type prevail in Ukraine?*").

Parties of what type prevail in Ukraine?*
% of respondents

Parties, the work of which is aimed at implementing visions and ideas of their leaders	61.5
Parties that set a "great goal" for themselves (for example, Ukraine's accession to the EU, reforms, etc.)	29.2
Parties founded on a certain political ideology that have a corresponding programme	13.5
Parties that aim their work at solving a specific problem in the society (for example, efforts for clean environment, fighting corruption, etc.)	13.5
None of the above	11.5
Hard to say	2.1

* Experts were asked to choose up to two acceptable options

According to three quarters of experts, in Ukrainian parties dominates the approach, when parties are headed by strong, reputable leaders, who do not change for a long period of time (Table "*Which approach to the issue of party leadership prevails…?*").

Which approach to the issue of party leadership prevails in modern Ukrainian parties?
% of respondents

The party is headed by a strong, reputable leader, who has not changed for a long period of time	74.0
The party is headed by a group of reputable leaders, who periodically replace each other as party heads according to internal agreements	13.5
The party is headed by leaders, who are elected on a competitive basis by statutory bodies and are replaced after a certain period of time	4.2
Another approach	3.1
Hard to say	5.2

Most often experts think that modern parties serve the interests of financial and business groups (80%), as well as party leaders (62%). Only 14% of experts think that parties serve voters' interests (Diagram "*Whose interests do political parties in Ukraine serve?*").

Whose interests do political parties in Ukraine serve?*
% of respondents



* Experts were asked to choose all acceptable options

[1] For more information, see "*Political parties and the party system of Ukraine at present: public opinion*" in this publication.

[2] Expert survey "*Current State and Prospects of Development of Party System in Ukraine*" was conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre on 18 May – 19 June 2015. It included 95 experts, among which were representatives of government authorities and local self-government, research institutions, local offices of political parties in all oblasts of Ukraine, NGOs, higher education institutions, independent experts.

Experts think that **the most significant problems of modern political parties are** (in order of descending of significance): political corruption; dependence on financial industrial groups; unaccountability to voters; absence of regular communication with society; lack of inner-party democracy; lack of qualified party personnel.

These are followed by: lack of a stable support base; weakness of organisational structure; primarily regional support; weakness of programmes and ideology, dependence on external influences (Table "*How relevant to the current state of political parties…?*").

How relevant to the current state of political parties in Ukraine are the following problems?*
average score

Political corruption	4.5
Dependence on financial industrial groups (FIG)	4.2
Unaccountability to voters	4.2
Absence of regular communication with society	3.9
Lack of inner-party democracy	3.9
Lack of qualified party employees	3.9
Lack of a stable support base	3.7
Weakness of organisational structure	3.7
Primarily regional support	3.6
Weakness of programmes and ideology	3.6
Dependence on external influences	3.4

* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means minimum relevance, and "5" – maximum.

Experts rated performance of their functions by the majority of existing parties as unsatisfactory. Only performance of the fighting for power function was rated high – 4.6 (on a five-point scale).

Formation of the ruling elite got 3.2 points, development and implementation of the line of policy – 2.8 points, social representation – 2.5 points, social integration – 2.2 points (Diagram "*Assessment of performance…*").

Among experts there is no consensus in assessment of certain qualities attributed to political parties in Ukraine.

Assessment of performance of their functions by political parties in Ukraine*,
average score



* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means minimum value and "5" – maximum.

Thus, experts did not have a single opinion regarding the issue, whether in Ukraine there are parties, which **represent interests of certain social groups and support regular ties with them**, or there are no such parties: votes are equally divided (44% each).

Over a half of experts think that **Ukraine does not have a national party that would be supported in all regions of the country.** However, 38% of respondents do not agree with this statement.

Almost a half of experts (48%) believe that Ukraine has political parties that **build their work on the basis of certain ideology.** Although 40% deny the existence of such parties.

The relative majority of experts (42%) think that in Ukraine there are no parties that are financed from different sources and are not controlled by oligarch groups, even though 34% think that such parties exist.

48% of experts think that in Ukraine there are parties that operate based on principles of inner democracy. Although 37% deny their existence.

The majority of experts think that in Ukraine there are no political parties that **regularly report to voters on implementation of party and election programmes**, but almost a third of experts disagree with this (Diagram "*Are there political parties in Ukraine…?*").

Somewhat clearer is experts' position on possession by political parties of certain qualities necessary for their operation: regarding each of them experts mostly said that "*This quality is present only in some political parties*" (from 43% to 69%).

Are there political parties in Ukraine that would match the following criteria?
% of respondents



Most often, according to experts, none of the political parties have the following qualities: "ability and desire to protect the interests of their voters, the "electoral core" (37%); "ability to develop a clear action plan" (29%); "a determined position regarding state development strategy" (22%).

Among qualities named as "present in the majority or in almost all political parties" were "presence of strong leaders" (34%) and "availability of sufficient funding" (34%) (Table "*To what extent do Ukrainian political parties…?*").

To the direct question, "what do existing Ukrainian political parties lack in the first place", most experts chose answers "a determined position regarding state development strategy" (33%), "ability and desire to protect the interests of their voters" (26%) and "ability to develop a clear action plan" (19%) (Diagram "*What do existing Ukrainian political parties lack…?*").

Lines of division between parties. Over a half of experts think that the strongest conflict is between parties in the parliament that belong to the coalition and those that are in opposition, as well as the conflict between the pro-Western and pro-Russian parties (which is almost the same).

A third of experts note that among the strongest conflicts are those inside the coalition, and over a fourth of experts – those between the parties controlled by oligarchs, who are in conflict between themselves (Table "*The strongest conflict is between which of the existing Ukrainian parties?*").

What do existing Ukrainian political parties lack in the first place?
% of respondents



The strongest conflict is between which of the existing Ukrainian parties?*
% of respondents

Those that belong to the coalition and those that are in opposition	52.1
Those that look in the direction of Western countries and those that look towards Russian	51.0
Between parties inside the coalition	33.3
Between parties that are controlled by oligarchs, who are in conflict between themselves	27.1
Those that are represented in the Verkhovna Rada and those that did not get there	11.5
Those that support Ukrainian language and culture and those that support the idea of giving Russian language the official status	9.4
Those created before Maidan and new parties created during Maidan and after it	7.3
Those that support state-controlled, planned economy and those that support market economy, privatisation	3.1
Between all parties	3.1
There is no conflict between parties	2.1
Hard to say	1.0

* Experts were asked to choose up to three acceptable options.

Much smaller shares of experts noted such grounds for conflicts, as conflicts between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties, support of opposite sides in the language and cultural issues, time of establishing (pre- or post-Maidan), support of state-controlled or market economy.

To what extent do Ukrainian political parties, about the work of which you are knowledgeable, possess each of the following qualities or characteristics?
% of respondents

	This quality is present in almost all political parties	This quality is present in the majority of political parties	This quality is present only in some political parties	This quality is not present in any of the political parties	Hard to say
A determined position regarding state development strategy	3.1	18.8	53.1	21.9	3.1
Ability to develop a clear action plan	3.1	11.5	52.1	29.2	4.1
Ability and desire to protect the interests of their voters, the "electoral core"	4.2	10.4	42.7	36.5	6.2
Availability of sufficient funding	3.1	31.3	55.2	4.2	6.2
Presence of strong leaders	2.1	32.3	56.3	5.2	4.1
Ability to organise work in the field	0.0	11.5	68.8	14.6	5.1
Ability to cooperate with NGOs, associations of citizens	2.1	16.7	59.4	14.6	7.2

Thus, the main sources of conflict are most often the aspects of being in power, geopolitical orientation and being controlled by certain oligarchs.

Differences between parties that belong to the coalition. Only 16% of experts see a noticeable difference between the election programmes of coalition parties. 40% of experts see insignificant differences, 31% think that there are almost no differences.

Regarding the character of their work, the differences between coalition parties are more noticeable – they are considered significant by 40% of respondents, 31% think that the differences are insignificant, 22% – that there is almost no difference (Diagram "*How significant is the difference between political forces…?*").

How significant is the difference between political forces within the coalition in today's Verkhovna Rada…?
% of respondents



Among experts there is no certainty regarding **the state of protection of opposition's rights in Ukraine**: 27% think that their rights are protected, 23% – that they are not protected, while the relative majority (43%) think that they are protected partially (Diagram "*Are the rights of the opposition protected in Ukraine?*").

Are the rights of the opposition protected in Ukraine?
% of respondents



Factors that influence formation of the party system in Ukraine. The biggest impact on party system formation (more than 7 points on the 10-point scale), according to experts, had the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014, presidential election of 2004 and the Orange Revolution, introduction of a fully proportional system of parliamentary elections in 2004, transfer to parliamentary-presidential republic on the basis of Constitutional amendments in 2004, early presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014, political crisis of 2006-2007 and early parliamentary elections in 2007, adoption of the Constitution in 1996.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine and signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU received almost the same number of votes. According to experts, comparable to these events was the influence of such events as adopting the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" in 2001, prohibition of the Communist Party of Ukraine (as part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in 1991, transformation of the People's Movement of Ukraine into a political party in 1993, introduction of a mixed system of parliamentary elections in 1997, victory of V. Yanukovych in the presidential election of 2010, and formation of majority on the basis of the Party of Regions following the 2012 parliamentary elections (6.6-6.9 points).

The return to the Constitution of 1996, establishment of the authoritarian regime of V. Yanukovych was also an important event for party system formation, and experts rated the influence of this event and the influence of the fight for powers between President L. Kuchma and the Verkhovna Rada in 1998-2000, as the same (6.4 points each).

Further in the hierarchy of events that were most influential for formation of the party system, experts named the attempts to create in Ukraine the "governing parties" (their establishment "from the top" – People's Democratic Party (NDP), Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU(o)), Party of Regions), presidential election of 1999, establishing their own political forces by Presidential candidates in 2010, adoption of the Law "On the Unification of Citizens", "the Cassette Scandal", absence of state funding for political parties (5.7-6.2 points) (Table "*Assessment of influence of the following events…*").

By **the efficiency of influence of different aspects on the development of political parties and political party system**, experts gave the first place to positions of major FIG (4 points on the five-point scale). Next is the work of mass media (3.9 points).

A whole number of aspects got similar rating: changes of socio-demographic structure of society due to the annexation of Crimea and military activity in Donbas (3.6); government actions (adoption of regulations regarding the work of political parties); changes of socio-economic structure of society due to the economic decline; government reforms (lustration, decentralisation); uncertainty in the matters of electoral legislation concerning both national and local elections – 3.5 points each.

These are followed by such factors as public opinion on political parties; opinions of civil society institutes; activities of foundations, programmes implemented in Ukraine with support of foreign countries and international organisations; positions of authorities of foreign countries and their unions; absence of state funding and positions of foreign political parties (Table "*Efficiency of influence of the aspects below…*").

So, according to experts, parties are considered political instruments of their sponsors, rather than institutes of political programming of state development and political representation of different social groups.

Assessment of influence of the following events on party system formation in Ukraine in 1990-2015*,
average score

The Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014, the victory of Maidan and the fall of the Yanukovych regime	8.3
Presidential election of 2004, the Orange Revolution	8.0
Introduction of a fully proportional system of parliamentary elections in 2004	7.9
Introduction of amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine in 2004, which laid basis for Government formation by a coalition of deputy factions	7.7
Early presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014	7.5
Adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996	7.3
The political crisis of 2006-2007 and early parliamentary elections in 2007	7.3
Restoration of the 2004 version of the Constitution	7.2
Transformation of the People's Movement of Ukraine into a political party in 1993	6.9
Introduction of a mixed, majority-proportional system of parliamentary elections in 1997	6.9
Prohibition of the Communist Party of Ukraine (as part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in 1991	6.8
Russia's aggression against Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, occupation of separate regions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts	6.8
Presidential election of 2010, the victory of the Party of Regions leader – V.Yanukovych	6.7
Parliamentary elections of 2012, formation of majority on the basis of the Party of Regions	6.7
Adopting the Law "On Political Parties in Ukraine" in 2001	6.6
Signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU	6.6
The fight for powers between President L. Kuchma and the Verkhovna Rada in 1998-2000	6.4
The return to the Constitution of 1996, establishment of the authoritarian regime of V. Yanukovych	6.4
Attempts to create in Ukraine the "governing parties" (People's Democratic Party (NDP), Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU(o)), Party of Regions)	6.2
Presidential election of 1999	6.1
Establishing their own political forces by Presidential candidates in 2010 – S. Tihipko, A. Yatsenyuk, A. Grytsenko	6.1
Adoption of the Law "On the Unification of Citizens" in 1992	6.0
The Cassette Scandal, the Gongadze case, and the "Ukraine without Kuchma" campaigns that followed	5.8
Absence of state funding for political parties	5.7
Attempts of businesses to create parties ("Community" ("Hromada"), the Party of National Economic Development of Ukraine (PNERU), etc.)	5.3

* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means minimum influence, and "10" – maximum.

Efficiency of influence of the aspects below on the development of political parties and political party system in Ukraine*,
average score

Positions of major FIG	4.0
The work of mass media	3.9
Changes of socio-demographic structure of society due to the annexation of Crimea, military activity in Donbas	3.6
Government actions (adoption of laws, other regulations regarding the work of political parties)	3.5
Changes of socio-economic structure of society due to the sharp economic decline, depreciation of hryvnia	3.5
Political-administrative system reforms (lustration, decentralisation, etc.)	3.5
Uncertainty in the matters of electoral legislation concerning both national and local elections	3.5
Public opinion on political parties	3.2
Opinions of Ukrainian civil society institutes (NGOs, trade unions)	3.2
Activities of foundations, programmes, assistance projects implemented in Ukraine with support of foreign countries and international organisations	3.1
Positions of authorities of foreign countries and their unions	3.0
Absence of state funding for political parties	2.9
Positions of political parties of foreign countries	2.3

* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means minimum efficiency, and "5" – maximum.

"OLD" AND "NEW" PARTIES – DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

Answering the question about the differences between parties established before and after Maidan, experts' opinions divided in two: 42% of respondents think that such differences exist, and the same percentage think that there are none (Diagram "*Are there differences between political parties…?*").

Are there differences between political parties created before and after Maidan?
% of respondents



The majority of experts (absolute or relative) think that the following qualities are more characteristic of parties established after Maidan: "new" parties are more connected with people's initiatives, volunteers, civic movements; these parties support reforms and advocate for new ideas and projects.

The majority of experts think that parties created before Maidan have better developed organisational structure in the regions.

At the same time, in their answers to most questions about the presence of different qualities in the "old" and "new" parties, the majority of experts (relative or absolute) chose option "no difference".

In these questions, relatively bigger shares of experts opted for:

in "new" parties:

• protection of national interests;

• lower degree of corruption;

• lower dependence on the influence of oligarchs;

• more inner-party democracy;

in "old" parties:

• protecting interests of certain regions;

• presence of ideological basis and party programmes;

• presence of professionals, specialists.

Experts' assessment of such qualities as focus on "average voters'" interests and presence of prominent leaders was practically the same for old and new parties (Table "*The following characteristics can be attributed…?*").

The following characteristics can be attributed to a greater degree to which of the parties (created before or after Maidan)?
% of respondents

	Created before Maidan	Created after Maidan	No difference	Hard to say
Focus on voters who by their socio-economic status belong to the majority	9.4	9.4	68.8	12.4
Are more free from the influence of oligarchs	9.4	21.9	59.4	9.3
Are based on certain political ideologies and have corresponding party programmes	21.9	13.5	54.2	10.4
Protect national interests of Ukraine	10.4	32.3	49.0	8.3
Have more professionals, specialists	21.9	14.6	47.9	15.6
Have prominent leaders	19.8	22.9	45.8	11.5
Protect interests of certain regions	36.5	8.3	43.8	11.4
Are less corrupt	8.3	35.4	42.7	13.6
Are democratic inside	5.2	32.3	42.7	19.8
Support reforms necessary for the country	7.3	42.7	40.6	9.4
Advance new ideas and projects	5.2	45.8	36.5	12.5
Have a developed organisational network in regions	52.1	6.3	33.3	8.3
Are more connected to initiatives of people, volunteers, civic movements	4.2	68.8	20.8	6.2

The majority of experts (78%) think there is a need for new parties and new leaders (Diagram "*Does Ukraine need new political leaders?*").

Does Ukraine need new political leaders?
% of respondents



The hierarchy of qualities that new leaders should possess is the following (in descending order): non-involvement in corruption; patriotism, nation-building approach; presence of a clear programme and an action plan; independence from FIG; integrity; leadership qualities; education, professionalism; readiness to protect interests of common people; democracy, ability to lead a dialogue with people.

Such options as modesty, ruthlessness, ability to compromise were chosen by a small percentage of experts, while foreign education was chosen by none (Diagram "*What qualities should…?*").

What qualities should new political leaders possess?*
% of respondents



* Experts were asked to choose up to three acceptable options.

New leaders with new qualities can emerge from the following environments (in descending order): civil society, new political forces, ATO participants, volunteers, already existing political parties, intellectuals, small or medium business.

According to experts, in this issue, one should not rely on organisers of mass protests, big businesses, foreign politicians. The least number of experts chose defence and law enforcement agencies as the environment for emergence of new leaders (Diagram "*From what environment can emerge new political leaders?*").

From what environment can emerge new political leaders?*
% of respondents



* Experts were asked to choose all acceptable options.

Largest shares of experts note that a party can be considered new, if it has a clear vision of social transformations and a specific action plan (63%), and also if it is headed by a politician who has not compromised himself through corrupt actions and financial fraud (60%).

These are followed by other qualities parties should possess in order to be considered new (in descending order): headed by a strong, responsible leader; make only realistic promises and avoid populism; allow young, promising people to demonstrate their potential; actively cooperate with NGOs, civic movements; bring forward problems common for residents of different regions, instead of "break-up" topics; have transparent funding.

Other options (in particular, newly registered, headed by a young politician, trying to spread its ideology) had significantly less support from experts (Table "*Which of the following qualities should a party have…?*").

Which of the following qualities should a party have in order to be considered a "new political force"?*
% of respondents

A party has a clear vision of social transformations, a specific action plan to implement once in power, instead of fighting for power just to gain power	62.5
A party has to be led by a politician, who has not compromised himself through corrupt actions, financial fraud	60.4
A party has to be led by a person, who has demonstrated his leadership in complicated situations and can assume responsibility	46.9
A party makes only realistic promises, avoids populism	44.8
A party gives way for young people with future prospects, "new faces"	41.7
A party actively cooperates with NGOs, civic movements and initiatives, provides support for them	28.1
A party brings forward common for residents of different regions socio-economic problems, and avoids emphasising the existing between citizens of different regions differences in beliefs (language, religion, etc.)	28.1
A party has transparent funding, regularly publishes its financial reports	25.0
A party tries to spread its ideology, its approaches in the society, instead of gaining power	17.7
A party has to be led by a politician, who has not previously held senior positions in government	16.7
A party highlights problems that remain unnoticed by the majority of other parties (for example, protecting historical environment of cities, green areas from construction, the rights of bank depositors, the quality of food and water, etc.)	14.6
A party has to be led by a young politician (younger than 40 years old)	13.5
A party's registration must not be earlier than five years ago	12.5
A party uses in its work new information technologies, means of communication – Internet, social networks, etc.	9.4
Other	3.1
Hard to say	2.1

* Experts were asked to choose up to five acceptable options.

Curiously, transparent funding was not among priorities for the expert community, which is to some extent contrary to the wishes of experts to see new political leaders free of corruption, independent of oligarchic influence.

ASSESSMENT OF WORK OF SPECIFIC POLITICAL FORCES

Experts were asked to assess the work of parties, which received not less than 1% of votes in the snap parliamentary elections of 2014.

Experts gave the most positive evaluation of the work of "Samopomich" party (almost 71% of experts evaluated it completely or rather positively).

The work of Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" is rather or completely positively assessed by 62% of experts (rather or completely negatively – 31%) (Diagram "*How would you evaluate the work of the following parties?*").

The work of "Batkivshchyna" party got 47% of experts with positive or rather positive attitude, and 40% – with negative.

Approximately the same were the evaluations of the "Right Sector" and the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda". Prevalence of positive expert evaluations over negative was also noted regarding operation of A. Grytsenko's "Civic Position" party.

The work of "People's Front" party is rather or completely positively assessed by almost 43% of experts, while rather or completely negatively – by 46%.

The leader of the negative expert assessments of its work is the CPU (96%), as well as "Opposition Bloc" party, the work of which is negatively assessed by 89% of experts. The third place by negative expert assessments is taken by S. Tihipko's "Strong Ukraine" (79%), considering the fact that in the time after the elections it was almost impossible to track its public activity on the national level.

Least known to experts was the work of "Zastup" party (39% of experts do not know about it), the balance of attitude to the party is negative (-49%).

How would you evaluate the work of the following parties?
% of respondents



PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM, FUTURE PARTY MODEL

Representative function. The relative majority of experts (38%) believe that parties must represent interests of a certain social group, even if this approach is not popular among other voters. 10% of experts think that representation of interests of a certain group is not necessary, as the main goal of the party is to win elections, 28% of respondents support a combination of these approaches (Diagram "*Which approach to Ukrainian political parties' foundation…?*").

In the future, 32% of experts envision for Ukraine existence of primarily universal parties, 8% – parties representing certain social groups, while 52% – parties of both types.

Ideology. 75% of experts think that parties must have certain ideology, the principles and values of which are used to form party and election programmes. 6% of experts share the opinion that ideology is not mandatory, a party can form its programmes according to political usefulness. 13% think that both approaches are acceptable (Diagram "*Which approach to ideological basis…?*").

Along with this, only 8% of experts think that **parties in Ukraine will develop as ideological**. 37% believe that parties will develop as pragmatic, and their programme documents will be based on the desire to meet the needs and demands of the widest possible range of voters. Exactly half of the experts think that Ukraine will have parties of both types.

How will Ukrainian political parties develop…
% of respondents



Which approach to Ukrainian political parties' foundation do you agree with most?
% of respondents



Which approach to ideological basis for political party operation is more acceptable in Ukrainian conditions?
% of respondents



Membership. Exactly half of respondents believe that parties must have fixed membership and their own members. While 28% of experts think that it is enough for parties to maintain paid apparatus and have active supporters.

The least percentage of experts (7%) think that modern parties do not have to have fixed membership or active supporters, it is enough to maintain a paid apparatus and hire employees in the pre-election period.

Notably, over 10% of experts disagree with all of these options (Table "*With which statement regarding political parties…?*").

With which statement regarding political parties in Ukraine do you agree more?
% of respondents

Modern parties must have fixed membership and own members	50.0
Modern parties do not necessarily need to have fixed membership, it is enough for them to maintain paid party apparatus (in the centre and locally) and have active supporters, who help the party on the volunteer basis	28.1
Modern parties do not necessarily need to have fixed membership or active supporters, it is enough for them to maintain paid party apparatus (in the centre and locally), and hire promoters and other necessary employees for the period of elections	7.3
I do not agree with any of the above mentioned statements	10.4
Hard to say	4.2

Funding. The majority of experts support party funding from membership fees of party members (85%) and from voluntary donations of citizens who support the party (78%). 45% of experts support party funding by businesses, which contradicts the desire to see new political forces free of corruption and independent of oligarchic influence, and makes them vulnerable to the influence of businesses. 41% of experts support party funding from the state budget, 8% – from local budget funds and only 2% – from abroad (Diagram "*Who and from what sources must fund…?*").

Who and from what sources must fund the work of political parties in Ukraine?*
% of respondents



* Experts were asked to choose three acceptable options.

Top-priority tasks of parties. 73% of respondents think that in order to effectively protect their voters, a party has to get into the Verkhovna Rada and form its own faction.

In the second place – the task of winning local elections and getting as many of their deputies as possible to local councils in the entire country (60%). Further, with almost the same result (about a half of answers), are getting key positions in the Government, and election of their candidate to the post of the President, 40% of respondents chose the option of winning local elections in one or several regions of Ukraine (40%) (Diagram "*Which of the following tasks should political parties realise in the first place…?*")

Which of the following tasks should political parties realise in the first place in order to effectively protect the interests of their voters?*
% of respondents



* Experts were asked to choose all acceptable options.

POLITICAL GUIDELINES OF A FUTURE PARTY

Experts were asked to choose among alternative political positions in different spheres the position of an imaginary party that in their opinion would be supported by the majority of voters (on a five-point scale).

According to the answers, a set of programme provisions was formed, which leans towards positions of a centre-left party (Table "*Here are presented alternative positions…*", p.104).

In the socio-economic sphere these are: facilitating the development of small and medium businesses; protecting the rights of salaried employees; containment of consumer prices and tariffs at the expense of increased taxation of big businesses; support of farmers' movement; extension of the moratorium on free sale of farmland; introduction of a targeted subsidies system instead of the current system of benefits; giving people a possibility to earn means for everything necessary for living themselves (i.e., free development of private initiative).

In the political and legal sphere these are: preventing restriction of democracy, rights and freedoms for political stability; granting more independence to the regions; facilitating free development of NGOs; strengthening public control over law enforcement agencies; increasing the influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Government and the executive power.

In the issues of foreign policy and socio-cultural affairs these are: Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO in the foreseeable future; Ukraine's entering European cultural space; strengthening the official status of the Ukrainian language; equality of all religious denominations in their relations with state. Expert also believe that there are more chances of people's support for the determination of the Ukrainian nation as a community of citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality (origin).

At the same time, experts could not give a definitive answer as to which of the following alternative positions will be more supported by the society: protecting the interests of people with low income or support of the middle class; expansion of the state-owned sector of economy or privatisation; the policy of high taxes and state subsidies or low taxes and ability of citizens to pay for the necessary services themselves; state support of national enterprises or support of foreign companies' arrival in Ukraine.

In the political-legal sphere there is an uncertainty in the issues of "priority of individual rights over the rights of the community or vice versa?", as well as in the issue of the reduced role of parties, nonpartisan government, or increased role of parties and party affiliation of government.



ATTITUDE TO THE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM AND ITS DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

Ukraine needs a multi-party system – 95% of respondents agree with this (Diagram "*Does Ukraine need a multi-party system?*"). But in the question of the specific direction of development of the multi-party system experts' opinions differed.

In particular, according to one-third of experts, there must be 2-5 political parties, and almost the same number think that there the number of parties should be 5 to 10.

15% of experts believe that there should be over 20 parties, while 13% think of 10-20 (Diagram "*Approximately, how many parties should be in Ukraine?*").

Along with this, almost three-quarters of experts think that in the future, Ukraine's party system will be comprised of 5-7 parties of different focus, which will form coalitions of different format.

Much smaller percentages of experts (12-14%) supported answer options that Ukraine's party system will evolve in the direction of two powerful centrist parties (left- and right-centre), which will alternate their position in power, or one powerful centrist party and several smaller ones, which can take turns entering into a coalition with the largest party (Diagram "*Which direction of evolution…?*", p.105).

Does Ukraine need a multi-party system?
% of respondents



Approximately, how many parties should be in Ukraine?
% of respondents



Here are presented alternative positions on some of the most fundamental issues of the development of Ukrainian society in various fields. Where on the scale from 1 to 5 must be placed position of the party that could be supported by the majority of Ukrainian voters?*
average score

Ukraine's accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus, joining the Eurasian Economic Union	4.5	Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future
Keeping Ukraine in the Russian (post-Soviet) cultural space	4.4	Ukraine's entering European cultural space
Giving Russian the status of the second official language, national minority languages – the status of regional languages	4.4	Preservation and strengthening of the official status of the Ukrainian language
Providing state support for certain religious denominations and churches	4.3	Equality of all religious denominations and churches in relations with state (equality before the law)
State support of large national business	4.2	Support of development of small and medium business
Increased accountability of law enforcement authorities to the government	4.2	Increased accountability of law enforcement authorities to public
Ukraine's non-aligned status, its non-accession to military blocs	4.2	Ukraine's accession to NATO in the foreseeable future
Managing the whole power vertical (down to local level) from the centre, centralisation of power	4.1	Giving regions more independence, decentralisation of power
Increased government control of the work of NGOs	4.1	Support of free development of NGOs
State should provide citizens with everything necessary for living	4.1	State should ensure a possibility for citizens to earn means for everything necessary for living themselves
Preserving the current system of benefits for utility payments (provided to all citizens belonging to a certain category in the form of reductions of utility bills, free passes in transportation, etc.)	4.0	Reforming the system of social support, introduction of a targeted subsidies system in the monetary form
Support of large agrarian producers	3.9	Support of farmers' movement
Ensuring political stability at any cost, even through limiting political rights and freedoms of population	3.9	Preventing restrictions of political rights and freedoms of citizens for the sake of maintaining political stability
Increased influence of the President on the Government and the executive power branch, limiting powers of the Verkhovna Rada	3.5	Increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Government and the executive power branch, limiting powers of the President
Protecting the interests of citizens with low income	3.3	Protecting the interests of the "middle class" – qualified employees with middle income
Expanding state-controlled sector of economy, returning previously sold enterprises to state ownership	3.3	Privatisation of state enterprises, prioritised development of private sector of economy
Ensuring priority of community rights (team, territorial community, nation as a whole, etc.) over the rights of an individual	3.3	Ensuring priority of an individual's rights over the rights of any community (team, territorial community, nation as a whole, etc.)
Tax system in which people pay high taxes, but receive certain social services from the state	3.2	Tax system in which people pay low taxes, but also pay for social services themselves
Reduced role of parties, nonpartisan government	2.9	Increased role of parties in political life, party affiliation of government
State support of national industrial enterprises	2.9	Support of arrival of foreign companies in Ukraine
Extension of the moratorium on free purchase and sale of farmland	2.5	Introduction of free purchase and sale of farmland
Containment of consumer prices and utility tariffs at the expense of increased taxation of big businesses, "oligarchs"	2.4	Limited state intervention in pricing and tariff formation, which are to be regulated by the market
Ukrainian nation are all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality	2.2	Ukrainian nation are citizens of Ukraine, who are Ukrainian by nationality
Protection of employees' rights from their employers	1.9	Strengthening the rights of employers in relations with employees

* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means full support of the idea presented on the left, and "5" – full support of the idea presented on the right. "3" means it is hard to give preference to any of the statements.

Which direction of evolution of the Ukrainian party system is the most favourable for the development of the country?
% of respondents



Attention is drawn to the uncertainty among experts concerning the issue – who has to **represent citizens' interests in social processes**. Thus, a third of respondents could not give a definite answer to this question, while an almost equal number of experts believed that NGOs, as well as political parties can do this (29 and 25%, respectively). Only 7% of experts believe that mass media are up to the role, and only 3% – trade unions (Diagram "*Who should represent…?*").

Areas of improvement of electoral legislation. Given the importance of the electoral system factor for the development of parties and the party system,

Who should represent citizens' interests in social processes in the first place?
% of respondents



experts were asked to assess possible innovations in the electoral legislation. The majority of experts (80%) supported the introduction of open party-lists (with preferential voting). The majority also supported proposals on the introduction of a differentiated threshold for parties and blocs (57%), as well as a regulation that party members must make up not less than a half of candidates on the electoral list (50%).

The majority of experts (74%) viewed as negative the proposal of cancelling the electoral threshold or its significant increase (60%).

Experts' opinions on allowing electoral blocs to participate in elections split almost in half: 41% supported this idea, 39% – did not (Diagram "*Lately, there have been different initiatives…*").

Lately, there have been different initiatives to improve the Law "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine". What would your reaction be to the proposals below?
% of respondents



POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM OF UKRAINE AT PRESENT: PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion is an important indicator of the state and maturity level of political parties, their appropriateness in relation to their role and place in society's political system. In order to identify people's attitudes to various aspects of operation of Ukrainian political parties in Ukraine, as part of the project "Party System of Ukraine Before and After Maidan: Changes, Trends, Public Demands", sociological service of the Razumkov Centre has conducted a number of national sociological surveys, the results of which are summarised below.[1]

CITIZENS AND PARTIES: DEMANDS, INVOLVEMENT, AWARENESS

The majority of citizens (70%) believe that parties are necessary for normal development of Ukraine as a state. 14% think that parties are unnecessary, 16% had no answer.[2] By region, the largest percentages of citizens, who think parties are necessary, are in the West (78%), least – in the South (60%).[3] The need for parties grows along with the level of education (Diagram "*Are political parties necessary or not…?*").

Are political parties necessary or not for the normal development of Ukraine as a state?
% of respondents



	EDUCATION (May 2015)			GENDER (May 2015)	
	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Female	Male
Necessary	61.1	70.7	77.3	68.9	71.9
Not necessary	17.2	14.8	10.7	14.0	14.1
Hard to say	21.7	14.5	12.0	17.0	14.0

[1] Results of studies conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre: (1) from 29 April to 5 May 2015 in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; (2) from 21 to 26 November 2014 in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. In each survey, there were over 2,000 respondents with the sample representative of adult population of Ukraine by main socio-demographic indicators. Sampling was multistage, random, with quota sampling of respondents in the last stage. Theoretical error of each sample (excluding design effect) does not exceed 2.3% with probability of 0.95.

[2] Presented data is rounded to whole numbers.

[3] The following regional division is used: **West:** Volyn, Zakarpattya, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi oblasts; **Centre:** city of Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts; **South:** Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson oblasts; **East:** Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kharkiv oblasts; **Donbas:** Donetsk, Luhansk oblasts.

Almost half of respondents (49%) think that Ukraine needs a multi-party system, 34% of citizens think that it is unnecessary.[4] The least number of multi-party system supporters are in the Centre (42%) and in the South (44%). The need for multi-party system significantly increases along with the level of respondents' education.

Compared to November 2014, percentage of respondents who think that multi-party system is necessary has gone slightly down (from 56 to 49%), in June 2014, approximately equal shares of respondents though that multi-party system is necessary and unnecessary. However, on the overall, during the last five years, this indicator is on the increase: in May 2010, the need for multi-party system was stated by 34% of respondents[5] (Diagram "*Does Ukraine need a multi-party system?*").

The relative majority of respondents (47%) think that there should be from 2 to 5 parties in Ukraine, 19% of respondents – from 5 to 10, and 11% believe that there should be one party.

Least certain in this issue are respondents from Donbas – 29% of respondents did not have an answer, 24% chose 2-5 parties option, and 20% – 5-10 parties. The share of one-party supporters grows among older citizens. It is also favoured more by respondents with lower level of education.

Compared to December 2009, notably grows percentage of respondents who think that there should be from 5 to 10 parties, and decreases the share of one-party supporters (Diagram "*Approximately, how many parties should there be in Ukraine?*" p.108).

Does Ukraine need a multi-party system?
% of respondents



Regions (May 2015)



AGE, y.o. (May 2015)

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Yes	50.4	50.0	58.1	46.8	43.0
No	32.7	33.1	31.3	34.9	37.2
Hard to say	16.9	16.9	10.6	18.3	19.8

GENDER (May 2015)

	Female	Male
Yes	47.1	51.4
No	33.8	34.6
Hard to say	19.2	14.0

EDUCATION (May 2015)

	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education
Yes	36.7	50.7	57.1
No	42.1	31.8	30.3
Hard to say	21.2	17.5	12.6

[4] The differences in comparison with answers to the previous question are due to people's irritation with the existence of an excessive number of parties, fragmentation, which is identified with the term "multi-system". For more information, see: Political Parties and Party System of Ukraine through the Eyes of People. – National Security and Defence, №5, 2010, p.62.

[5] For some questions, we present dynamics of responses for various years. For more information on the results of sociological studies conducted by the Razumkov Centre, visit *http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/socpolls.php*.

Approximately, how many parties should there be in Ukraine?
% of respondents



EDUCATION (May 2015)

	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education
One	17.8	9.8	7.0
From 2 to	47.5	49.2	45.3
5-10	14.5	18.1	24.8
10-20	1.5	4.6	5.6
More than 20	1.6	1.4	2.7
Hard to say	17.1	16.9	14.6

Regions (May 2015)



Party membership. The majority of citizens (69%) consider themselves "simple voters" in relation to political parties. Only 1% of citizens admit to being members of political parties. Over 13% consider themselves supporters of a certain party (active or simple), 10% – voters with stable party preferences.

The degree of "party-affiliation" is slightly higher in the East and in the South of Ukraine and in Donbas, it grows along with the level of respondents' education. Among citizens, who consider themselves middle class it is higher, than among those, who include themselves in the lower class (Diagram "*In relation to political parties, who are you?*").

In relation to political parties, who are you?
% of respondents



REGIONS

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
A simple voter	75.3	74.4	62.8	62.2	59.0
A voter with stable party preferences	11.2	7.6	11.6	9.5	14.8
A simple (passive) party supporter	5.5	6.0	7.0	11.1	11.7
An active supporter of a certain party	4.5	4.9	7.4	7.6	3.8
A member of a certain party	1.2	1.0	1.9	1.4	0.6
Hard to say	2.4	6.1	9.3	8.4	10.1

	AGE, y.o.					**EDUCATION**			**GENDER**	
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Female	Male
A simple voter	68.3	66.8	68.0	72.3	68.1	72.1	69.0	65.5	69.0	68.2
A voter with stable party preferences	7.6	9.9	10.7	10.0	12.5	7.8	10.7	11.6	9.7	11.0
A simple (passive) party supporter	9.1	8.8	7.1	7.2	6.9	7.1	7.5	8.8	8.6	6.9
An active supporter of a certain party	5.5	5.4	6.5	3.3	6.0	3.8	5.1	7.1	5.5	5.4
A member of a certain party	0.2	1.9	0.9	1.7	1.4	0.4	1.3	1.6	1.0	1.3
Hard to say	9.3	7.2	6.8	5.5	5.0	8.9	6.4	5.4	6.3	7.2

May 2015

To the direct question on their political party membership, 94% of respondents said that they are not members of any parties. 5% of respondents said that they are members of a party. The number of party members is relatively higher among people with higher education and those who include themselves in middle class.

Since May 2010, the share of party members was in the range between 3.9 and 5.3%. Numerically, the highest number of party members since 2001 was in October 2005 and December 2009, when this number was 6.7% and 6.4%, respectively (Diagram *"Are you a member of a political party?"*).

Are you a member of a political party?
% of respondents



Regions (May 2015)



Age, y.o. (May 2015)



Gender (May 2015)



Education (May 2015)



Among respondents there were 37% of those, who would want to make a career as a politician, a government employee (deputies of different level, heads or employees of central or local authorities) or would wish this for their children (Diagram "*Would you personally like or would you like your children to become…?*").[6]

There were differences in people's readiness to implement this goal through different forms of political party involvement. The biggest share of citizens (57%) were ready for paid employment in a party office for this. 47% – were ready to become a member of a party. Only in these two options, percentage of respondents, who were ready for this, exceeded the number of those, who were not.

Only 23% are ready for unpaid employment in a party (63% are not ready), 36% are ready to volunteer in an election campaign (49% – not ready), 26% – ready to support a party financially with membership fees (not ready – 59%), 11% – ready to make a large one-time contribution to a party's election fund (not ready – 76%) (Diagram "*Are you ready for the following?*"). Thus, the overall attitude of people to parties, even to realise their own goals, is largely pragmatic.

Readiness to support a party financially. The majority of respondents (77%) are not ready to provide financial support to a party they voted for in the latest elections to the Verkhovna Rada, 11% of citizens are ready for this (Diagram "*Are you ready to provide personal financial support…?*").

There are relatively more people ready to support a party in the West (16%), least of all – in the East (8%).

Readiness to financially support a party is significantly influenced by people's financial standing: among the two poorest groups of people there were respectively 6% and 9% of such respondents, among citizens who generally have enough for living – 16%, among the well-to-do citizens – 23%. Compared to November 2014, percentage of people ready to support a party financially has remained almost the same.

Among citizens, who are ready to support a party financially, the relative majority (48%) are ready to spend up to 100 UAH per year, 23% – from 100 to 200 UAH, another 22% are ready to spend 200 UAH and more (Diagram "*How much per year you are willing to pay…?*").

How much per year you are willing to pay to support your chosen political party?
% of those, who are ready to provide personal financial support for a party



Would you personally like or would you like your children to become…?
% of respondents



Are you ready for the following?
% those, who gave an affirmative answer to at least one answer option to the question "*Would you personally like…?*"



Awareness of political parties. The relative majority of citizens (45%) believe that they do not have sufficient information about parties. Yet, almost the same percentage of citizens (42%) think that the information they have is enough.

In the West, there are more of those, who have enough information. The worst is the situation with awareness in the East and Centre: half of citizens said they lack information, 35% and 38% respectively – that there is enough. Most often the lack of information is noted by citizens with secondary and specialised secondary education. The lack of information is felt more by bilingual and Russian-speaking citizens compared to Ukrainian-speaking ones (Diagram "*Do you have enough information…?*", p.112).

[6] Percentage of those who gave a positive answer to at least one of the questions in Diagram "*Would you personally like or would you like your children to become…?*"

Are you ready to provide personal financial support for the party you voted for in the latest elections to the Verkhovna Rada,
% of respondents



Among different sources of information on political parties that people lack, more people named party representatives' participation in talk shows on television (31%), meetings with party representatives (26%), analytical television and radio shows about the work of parties involving experts (23%), stories about parties in newscasts (19%) and newspaper publications (15%) (Table "*Which sources of information about political parties do you lack?*", p.112).

Parties' participation in talk shows was most named among the residents of South and East, meetings with party representatives – almost equally among residents of all regions, analytical shows – residents of South, West and Donbas, newspaper publications – residents of East and Donbas. Among East and South residents there were also more of those, who named news Internet resources as lacking. Russian-speaking respondents reported more the lack of printed materials (including, party newspapers).

The majority of citizens (57%) never heard anything about the work of local party offices in their region, 33% of respondents did hear about it. The majority of people, who heard about the work of local party offices, are in the West (45%) and in Donbas (40%), least of all – in the South (19%) (Diagram "*Have you heard anything about the work of any party's local offices…?*", p.113).

Awareness increases significantly along with the increase of respondents' level of education (22% – among respondents with incomplete or general secondary education, 42% – among people with higher education).

There are differences according to the type of settlement, where respondents live. Thus, in large cities (100 thousand and more), 36% of respondents know about local party offices, 54% – do not know about them. In towns with population under 100 thousand residents, these indicators are 33% and 57% respectively, in villages – 29% and 62%.

Compared to December 2009, percentage of those, who know about the work of local offices of any parties in their region has gone down from 42% to 33%. Evidently, this situation could be caused by the drastic changes that have been happening in political parties in recent years.

IDEOLOGICAL GUIDELINES AND PARTY PREFERENCES OF CITIZENS

Over a half of respondents (58%) were able to choose political ideology that matches their beliefs.

The relatively larger percentage of people (26%) chose national democratic direction, second largest (10%) – social democratic, 5% chose national radical direction, 4% – direction that includes ideas of reunification of Ukraine with Russia (Table "*Which political ideology best matches your beliefs?*", p.114).

Compared to November 2011, people's political ideology guidelines have undergone significant changes. Citizens have become more determined in regard to ideologies: the share of those, who have chosen a certain direction grew from 48% to 58%.

There was a significant increase of supporters of the national democratic direction (from 15% to 26%) and social democratic direction (from 4% to 10%). The share of national radical direction supporters also grew (from 2% to 5%). The shares of unification with Russia and communist directions supporters have gone down.

Do you have enough information about political parties and their work?
% of respondents



Which sources of information about political parties do you lack?*
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	REGIONS					LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME		
		West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian
Party representatives' participation in talk shows on television	30.6	30.2	26.5	37.2	38.4	26.2	30.9	28.5	32.5
Meetings with party representatives	26.4	26.7	26.9	24.3	24.9	27.8	28.3	26.5	24.2
Analytical television and radio shows about the work of parties involving experts	22.6	29.3	18.5	34.9	12.4	26.5	23.1	24.4	19.1
Stories about parties in newscasts	19.2	23.8	20.1	27.9	10.8	15.1	15.9	21.1	19.9
Newspaper publications	15.3	9.5	16.0	11.2	19.1	19.6	20.2	11.3	16.3
Discussions with other people	11.5	15.7	10.2	9.3	6.8	15.5	11.2	12.2	10.7
News or political websites in the Internet	11.0	6.7	9.9	15.3	18.1	8.2	12.9	9.3	11.5
Party newspapers	9.2	5.7	9.2	10.2	4.1	19.2	14.0	7.2	7.9
Party representatives' talks on radio	8.5	6.4	8.0	11.2	5.1	14.8	8.8	9.0	7.8
Party pages in social networks in the Internet (e.g., *VKontakte*, *Facebook*, *Odnoklassniki*, etc.)	7.8	6.4	7.6	8.8	10.2	6.3	9.5	7.2	7.3
Party leaflets and other information materials	7.6	5.2	9.2	5.6	8.6	7.6	8.6	5.6	9.3
Other	5.9	7.9	5.5	7.9	4.6	4.7	6.6	6.2	5.3
Hard to say	23.2	21.2	24.9	27.9	20.8	21.8	22.8	23.8	22.5

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

May 2015

Have you heard anything about the work of any party's local offices in your region?
% of respondents



By region, the majority of undetermined citizens are in the East, where their share exceeds 50%.

Support of national democratic direction is high (compared to support of other ideological trends) in all regions, however, in the West it got 46%, and in the East – only 13%.

The "integrationalist" direction (the idea of reunification with Russia) has relatively higher support in Donbas (14%). In the East and South, it has much less supporters – 5% each, in the Centre – 2%, in the West – 0%.

In the Centre and in the East, there were more supporters of social democratic direction.

Communist direction is relatively more popular in the South, Donbas and East (from 5% to 9%).

Among other aspects of distribution, relatively larger shares of socialist direction supporters are in the South, Christian democratic – in the West.

Thus, in the context of political ideology guidelines, we can say that the following are more common: centre-right and right-wing views in the West; centre-right and centre-left in the Centre; left-wing, centre-left and centre-right in the South and East, centre-right, "integrationalist", left-wing and centre-left in Donbas.

By the age category, a significant difference is in the larger share of communist direction supporters among the oldest respondents. By education category, the larger share of national democratic and social democratic direction supporters are among respondents with higher and specialised secondary education, and a larger share of those, who could not make a decision – among people with secondary education. By gender, there were no significant differences, however, among women there were more of those, who could not make a decision.

Along with the use of Russian language increases the share of left-wing and integrationalist views supporters, Ukrainian – an increase of national democratic views supporters.

Among representatives of least wealthy categories of people there are more of those, who could not make a decision, as well as communist and integrationalist direction supporters, and less supporters of the national democratic direction.

Most likely, the changes in citizens' ideological guidelines were caused by the Revolution of Dignity, the fall of the V. Yanukovych regime, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, as well as the consequences of this aggression – annexation of Crimea, occupation of certain regions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and mass migration of population from these areas.

Among respondents, who were able to choose a certain direction of political ideology, 62% stated that among Ukrainian parties there is a party that meets this direction. 23% noted that there is no such party (Diagram "*Is there a party in Ukraine, the real work of which…?*", p.115).

Which political ideology best matches your beliefs?
% of respondents



	REGIONS (November 2014)					AGE, y.o. (November 2014)					EDUCATION (November 2014)			GENDER (November 2014)		LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME (November 2014)			FINANCIAL STANDING (November 2014)			
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Female	Male	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian	Barely make ends meet, not enough money for necessary products	Enough for food and purchasing necessary inexpensive things	Generally enough for living, but purchasing things of long-term use, such as furniture causes difficulties	We are a well-to-do family, but for the time being unable to make certain purchases
National democratic	45.5	29.6	15.7	12.7	16.1	27.6	24.7	29.8	26.3	23.7	18.3	28.0	31.3	25.4	27.2	17.1	36.3	20.4	16.2	27.6	29.7	24.6
Social democratic	7.1	12.5	6.0	11.4	6.6	8.8	11.0	8.0	10.1	9.6	6.8	9.7	11.4	8.8	10.3	10.9	10.4	6.6	4.7	10.1	10.4	14.6
National radical	7.1	5.4	4.2	2.4	1.9	5.1	5.1	4.4	6.4	2.4	5.2	5.6	3.0	3.1	6.2	1.2	6.2	5.3	5.0	3.8	5.3	2.3
Political direction that includes ideas of reunification of Ukraine with Russia	0.0	2.2	5.1	4.9	13.9	4.2	4.0	5.6	3.6	4.7	5.3	4.2	3.7	4.4	4.3	8.9	0.6	5.7	5.6	5.0	2.5	3.1
Communist	0.0	1.2	8.8	5.4	6.0	0.2	2.1	2.7	2.2	7.7	4.0	3.5	2.7	3.2	3.5	7.2	1.0	2.9	5.6	4.0	2.2	2.3
Environmental ("greens")	3.3	1.6	4.2	5.1	3.5	4.9	3.8	2.9	1.7	2.4	3.7	3.0	2.7	2.8	3.5	1.9	3.8	3.5	3.7	2.1	3.3	6.2
Socialist	0.7	1.7	6.5	1.9	2.2	0.7	1.1	2.7	3.4	3.2	2.0	2.5	2.1	2.1	2.4	3.6	1.2	2.6	1.6	3.0	1.8	0.8
Christian democratic	5.0	1.0	2.3	1.4	1.3	1.0	1.9	2.1	3.4	2.1	2.5	1.3	2.3	2.4	1.6	1.2	3.0	1.5	1.2	1.7	2.0	6.2
Liberal	1.2	1.5	3.2	2.7	0.0	2.4	1.9	1.5	2.0	0.6	1.0	2.2	1.6	1.4	1.8	2.4	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.8	2.2	4.6
National communist	0.0	0.9	0.5	0.3	2.5	0.2	0.3	0.3	2.0	1.1	0.7	1.6	0.1	0.9	0.7	1.7	0.6	0.2	1.6	1.0	0.4	0.8
Other	0.0	1.0	1.9	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.3	1.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.6	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.1	1.7	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.8
None	2.6	6.4	7.4	11.1	6.3	5.6	5.9	10.0	8.4	4.5	6.5	6.1	7.3	5.5	7.8	8.7	3.7	8.8	8.4	6.5	6.5	4.6
I am not familiar with political trends	15.2	19.4	23.1	28.4	24.1	23.7	21.4	18.0	18.5	23.4	29.3	18.5	17.4	25.0	17.1	23.9	19.5	21.1	25.5	19.5	21.6	18.5
Hard to say	12.1	15.6	11.1	11.9	14.9	14.4	15.5	10.9	11.8	14.3	14.5	13.6	12.9	14.1	12.9	10.6	12.2	18.6	19.3	14.4	11.0	10.8

Comparison of data from 2011 and 2014 shows the growth of political-ideological determination of citizens and significant changes of their ideological guidelines.

Is there a party in Ukraine, the real work of which meets the political ideology you have chosen?
% of those, who chose a certain political ideology



PARTIES AS REPRESENTATIVES OF PEOPLE'S INTERESTS

Among institutions that have to represent people's interests in social processes in the first place, a relatively larger share of respondents (22%) chose political parties. In the second place – NGOs (20%), in the third – trade unions (15%) (Diagram "*Who should represent your interests…?*", p.116).

Percentage of citizens, who choose parties as representatives of their interests in social processes grows along with the level of education and the level of finan cial standing of respondents.

In May 2015, compared to June 2012, the share of those, who think that parties should represent their interests in social processes, grew from 17% to 22%. However, this is below the largest percentages recorded in June 2007 and May 2010, when there were over 26% of such citizens.

A third of people (34%) believe that there is a party in Ukraine that represents their interests. Almost half (48%) believe that there is no such party. 18% could not answer the question. In the East there are relatively more people (39%), who think that there is such a party. The number is also bigger among older people and among people with higher education (Diagram "*Is there a party in Ukraine, about which you could say that it represents your interests?*").

Is there a party in Ukraine. about which you could say that it represents your interests?
% of respondents



Who should represent your interests in social processes in the first place?
% of respondents



Regions (May 2015)



Education (May 2015)



Overall, as representatives of their interests, people named 20 parties, among which six parties were named by over 2% citizens (Petro Poroshenko Bloc (PPB), "Batkivshchyna", "Samopomich", "Opposition Bloc", Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, "Svoboda"), another five – from 1% to 2% of respondents ("People's Front", Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), "Strong Ukraine", "Civic Position", Right Sector) (Diagram "*If so, what party is this?*", p.118).

Regional distribution of answers demonstrated that residents of the West most often choose (over 5%) as their representatives "Samopomich" and PPB; Centre – PPB and "Batkivshchyna", South and East – "Opposition Bloc" and PPB, Donbas – "Opposition Bloc", PPB and "Strong Ukraine".

Youngest respondents more often than others choose "Samopomich", oldest – "Batkivschyna", "Opposition Bloc" and CPU, citizens with higher education – PPB, Russian-speaking – "Opposition Bloc".

Almost half of respondents (49%) were able to name a party, from among those existing in Ukraine, that matches their idea on what sort of party a party should be (Diagram "*Which of the existing parties best matches your idea…?*", p.119).

Altogether, 24 parties were named, out of them 10 were named by over 2% of respondents (PPB, "Samopomich", "Batkivshchyna", "Opposition Bloc", Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, "People's Front", "Svoboda", "Strong Ukraine", "Civic Position").

Here, people's votes divided almost in the same way as they did in the question, which party represents their interests, also asked in this survey. An exception was "Samopomich", which was named "proper" by twice as many respondents, than it was named the representative of people's interests.

So, it can be assumed that supporters of certain parties consider "their" political forces to be "real parties".[7] This is also confirmed through the regional distribution of answers, which matches the geography of support of respective political forces.

Among respondents' answers there were certain differences according to age groups. Thus, "new" parties (first of all, PPB, "Samopomich") are rather more consistent with younger people's ideas on political parties (18-39 y.o.), while "old" parties ("Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda", CPU and "Opposition Bloc") are more often named "real" by voters from older age groups.

By gender, significant differences were noted between "Batkivshchyna" and "Svoboda". The first of these two matches women's ideas on parties twice as often, than men, the latter – vice versa. In regard to other parties, differences are not so pronounced.

ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES, DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTIES CREATED BEFORE MAIDAN AND AFTER IT

The majority of respondents (58%) believe that **parties serve interests of financial and business groups.** 37% of respondents think that parties serve interests of party leaders, 24% – state authorities. Only 11% think that parties serve voters' interests (Diagram "*Whose interests do political parties in Ukraine serve?*").

Whose interests do political parties in Ukraine serve?*
% of respondents



Regions (May 2015)



* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

[7] This assumption is important, taking into account a rather popular notion among researchers that "Ukrainian parties are not parties".

If so, what party is this?*
% of respondents

UKRAINE*	
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	7.2
All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna”	4.5
“Samopomich”	4.2
“Opposition Bloc”	4.2
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	3.1
“Svoboda”	2.3
“People’s Front”	1.8
CPU	1.6
“Strong Ukraine”	1.6
“Civic Position”	1.3
Right Sector	1.3
“Zastup”	0.2
Party of Greens	0.2
“UDAR”	0.1
5.10	0.1
Democratic Alliance	0.1
Socialist party	0.1
“Power of People”	0.1
Party of Regions	0.1
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU, N. Vitrenko)	0.1
Hard to say/no answer	0.6
Question was not asked	66.2

* Respondents were asked to give their own answer.

Regions**	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	7.1	7.4	8.4	8.1	5.0
All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna”	4.5	6.1	3.7	3.8	2.5
“Samopomich”	7.6	4.1	2.3	3.2	2.2
“Opposition Bloc”	0.2	0.9	8.8	8.9	8.5
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	3.8	3.6	2.8	2.7	1.3
“Svoboda”	3.3	2.3	3.3	1.1	1.9
“People’s Front”	2.9	1.3	0.9	3.0	0.6
CPU	0.2	1.5	1.4	2.7	2.5
“Strong Ukraine”	0.0	0.1	3.7	1.1	5.7
“Civic Position”	2.4	1.3	0.5	1.6	0.6
Right Sector	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.9	0.0

** Presented answer options are the ones that gained over 1%.

	AGE, y.o.**					GENDER**		EDUCATION**			LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME**			SOCIAL CLASS**	
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Female	Male	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian	Middle	Lower
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	7.4	7.2	8.0	5.8	7.5	6.1	8.6	5.8	5.6	10.4	3.8	6.8	10.4	10.4	4.3
All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna”	1.9	5.4	2.7	4.7	7.3	5.5	3.4	4.5	4.5	4.8	3.1	4.8	5.4	4.4	4.6
“Samopomich”	7.2	3.8	4.7	3.6	2.3	4.7	3.5	3.1	3.7	5.8	2.6	5.8	3.7	5.2	3.6
“Opposition Bloc”	2.1	2.4	4.1	5.5	6.6	5.2	3.2	2.7	6.0	3.4	8.8	1.1	3.9	3.6	4.8
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	3.3	3.2	2.1	1.7	4.1	2.9	3.2	3.8	3.1	2.4	2.2	3.7	3.0	3.5	2.6
“Svoboda”	1.0	0.8	2.1	2.5	4.2	1.6	3.1	1.3	2.8	2.5	1.2	3.3	2.2	1.8	2.6
“People’s Front”	1.9	2.9	1.2	1.4	1.5	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.4	1.1	2.0	1.5
CPU	0.2	0.8	0.6	1.1	4.4	1.6	1.5	2.7	1.0	1.3	2.9	1.1	0.9	0.8	2.8
“Strong Ukraine”	1.0	1.9	1.8	1.1	2.1	1.5	1.6	0.7	1.5	2.4	3.6	0.1	1.6	2.2	0.7
“Civic Position”	1.4	1.9	0.3	1.9	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.3	1.0	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.5	1.5
Right Sector	2.1	1.6	2.4	0.3	0.4	0.9	1.8	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.1	1.9	0.5

** Presented answer options are the ones that gained over 1%.

May 2015

Which of the existing parties best matches your idea on what sort of party should a party be?*
% of respondents

UKRAINE*	
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	9.9
“Samopomich”	8.8
All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna”	5.7
“Opposition Bloc”	5.1
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	4.4
“People’s Front”	3.3
“Svoboda”	2.9
“Strong Ukraine”	2.3
“Civic Position”	2.2
CPU	2.0
Right Sector	1.8
“Zastup”	0.3
“UDAR”	0.2
People’s Movement	0.2
5.10	0.1
Party of Regions	0.1
Socialist party	0.1
Party of Greens	0.1
SDPU	0.1
PSPU	0.05
Internet Party of Ukraine	0.05
Democratic Alliance	0.05
“Power of People”	0.05
“United Centre”	0.05
None	23.6
Hard to say	15.8
No answer	11.7

* Respondents were asked to give their own answer.

Regions**	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	12.6	9.3	8.4	10.5	7.6
“Samopomich”	17.9	8.0	3.3	5.7	5.7
All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna”	6.0	7.7	3.7	4.9	3.2
“Opposition Bloc”	0.0	1.9	7.4	12.1	9.1
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	5.7	5.8	4.2	3.5	1.3
“People’s Front”	5.7	3.5	1.4	3.8	0.6
“Svoboda”	4.5	3.2	1.9	1.1	2.2
“Strong Ukraine”	0.0	0.7	4.2	1.3	8.8
“Civic Position”	1.9	3.1	0.5	1.9	1.9
CPU	0.2	1.5	1.9	3.8	3.8
Right Sector	2.6	2.3	1.4	1.6	0.0

** Presented answer options are the ones that gained over 1%.

	EDUCATION**			LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME**			SOCIAL CLASS**	
	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian	Middle	Lower
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	7.4	8.8	13.2	5.3	10.5	13.2	13.6	7.2
“Samopomich”	4.4	8.5	12.8	3.6	13.2	8.1	11.7	6.6
All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna”	5.4	5.4	6.2	4.1	6.0	6.8	5.6	5.9
“Opposition Bloc”	4.5	7.1	3.1	9.7	0.8	6.1	4.7	5.7
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	6.0	4.8	2.7	2.9	5.6	4.7	3.9	4.8
“People’s Front”	3.4	3.7	2.8	2.2	5.3	2.2	3.9	2.8
“Svoboda”	1.5	3.9	2.8	0.9	4.6	2.6	2.2	3.3
“Strong Ukraine”	2.5	1.8	3.0	5.5	0.3	2.2	3.0	1.7
“Civic Position”	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.2	1.7	2.6	2.0	2.5
CPU	4.0	1.1	1.3	4.3	0.9	1.1	0.9	3.2
Right Sector	1.3	2.0	1.9	1.6	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.6

** Presented answer options are the ones that gained over 1%.

May 2015

The least number of respondents, who think that parties serve interests of financial and business groups are in the Centre (48%). In the East and South, there are relatively more respondents, who think that parties serve interests of state authorities.

Compared to November 2014, the share of those, who think that parties serve interests of financial and business groups grew from 52% to 58%, which returned it to the 2011 level. However, compared to May 2011, also grew the number of those, who think that parties serve voters' interests (from 6% to 11%).

What do parties lack? Relatively more respondents (29%) think that parties lack ability and desire to protect the interests of common people. 25% of citizens think that parties lack a determined position regarding state development strategy, 15% – ability to solve specific problems that concern common people (Table "*What do existing Ukrainian political parties lack in the first place?*").

Smaller percentages of respondents name such problems of parties as inability to develop a clear action plan, absence of strong leaders, lack of ability to organise work in the field and cooperate with NGOs. Only 1% of respondents think that parties lack funding.

Thus, 45% of citizens stated that the main problem of parties is the lack of ability or desire to work in their interest, demonstrating quite a pragmatic approach to parties.

Most of all, parties' inability to "protect interests" and "solve specific problems" are noted by respondents in the East, South and Donbas, where the total share of such answers amounted to 50-56%.

In the Centre and in the West, more than in other regions, respondents believe that parties lack a determined position regarding state development strategy.

Men, slightly more often than women, note such drawback of parties as the lack of a determined position on state development strategy, and slightly less – ability and desire to protect interests of common people.

Ukrainian-speaking citizens significantly more often than bilingual and, especially, Russian-speaking citizens, note the lack of parties' position on state development strategy. The latter choose more often options: ability and desire to protect interests and solve specific problems.

Pre- and post-Maidan parties: similarities and differences. Relatively more citizens (42%) think that there are differences between parties created before and after Maidan. Yet, 37% of respondents do not see such differences (Diagram "*Are there differences between political parties…?*").

The shares of citizens, who see differences, are bigger in the West (52% vs. 27%), in the East (50% vs. 34%).

Are there differences between political parties created before and after Maidan?
% of respondents



What do existing Ukrainian political parties lack in the first place?
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	REGIONS					AGE, y.o.					LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME			FINANCIAL STANDING			
		West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian	Barely make ends meet, not enough money for necessary products	Enough for food and purchasing necessary inexpensive things	Generally enough for living, but purchasing things of long-term use causes difficulties	We are a well-to-do family, but for the time being unable to make certain purchases
Ability and desire to protect the interests of common people	**28.6**	29.3	21.3	44.2	27.8	33.4	25.6	26.8	28.8	30.9	30.6	29.2	27.5	29.5	31.8	29.9	23.2	27.8
A determined position regarding state development strategy	**24.5**	28.1	33.9	15.8	14.3	17.4	25.8	25.5	23.4	22.4	25.0	19.2	30.6	22.7	22.4	23.8	28.5	22.2
Ability to solve specific problems that concern common people	**15.1**	14.8	10.9	11.6	22.2	18.6	11.2	15.3	17.5	17.4	14.9	18.8	13.2	13.4	15.7	14.1	16.0	18.1
Ability to develop a clear action plan	**10.0**	10.5	10.9	8.8	10.3	7.6	12.2	9.9	11.9	8.0	8.5	10.5	9.8	10.1	8.0	10.9	10.6	9.7
Strong leaders	**6.4**	2.6	8.3	3.3	11.1	3.8	9.1	6.2	4.5	6.4	5.4	5.2	5.6	8.2	4.9	6.7	7.8	2.8
Ability to organise work in the field	**4.7**	4.0	4.1	3.3	5.9	6.3	5.0	4.6	4.5	3.9	5.4	5.0	4.0	5.1	7.7	3.5	4.2	1.4
Ability to cooperate with NGOs, associations of citizens	**3.7**	2.9	3.6	1.9	3.5	6.6	5.0	3.8	3.3	3.3	3.1	5.5	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.8	3.8	5.6
Sufficient funding	**1.3**	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.1	3.2	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.6	0.8	1.7	0.9	1.2	1.3	4.2
Other	**1.3**	3.3	0.0	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.9	1.5	1.4	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.4	0.8	0.0
Hard to say	**4.5**	3.6	6.0	9.3	2.4	1.9	3.6	4.6	3.6	5.2	5.2	4.1	4.5	5.0	4.3	4.6	3.8	8.3

May 2015

In the Centre, on the contrary, there are more of those, who see no difference (35% vs. 45%), in the South and Donbas these percentages do not have statistically significant differences.

Among voters younger than 39 y.o. there are significantly more citizens, who see differences, and their percentage grows along with the level of their education, there is also relatively more of them among Ukrainian-speaking population.

The majority or the relative majority of citizens think that between parties created before and after Maidan there are no differences by their qualities, except for one – connection to initiatives of people, volunteers, civic movements (Diagrams "*The following characteristics can be attributed to a greater degree to which of the parties (created before or after Maidan)?*", pp.124-125).

Respondents, who confirmed the existence of differences, gave their preference to parties created after Maidan almost by all parameters, except presence of organisational network in regions.

The greatest difference in favour of new parties was by the following parameters: better connection to initiatives of people, volunteers, civic movements (balance +40%); closeness to people, members of the general public (+25%); less dependence from the influence of oligarchs (+23%); less corruption (+22%); better protection of national interests of Ukraine (+21%); advancement of new ideas and projects (+20%); internal democracy (+19%); carrying out reforms necessary for the country (+17%).

Overall, slightly more positive assessment of new parties is characteristic for residents of the Western region, for younger citizens, respondents with higher level of education, Ukrainian-speaking. In the Centre and South, fewer respondents see the difference.

For the relative majority of people (37%) the time of creation does not influence their trust in a party. 22% do not trust any parties, 13% could not answer (Diagram and Table "*Which parties do you trust more?*").

16% of respondents have more trust towards parties created during Maidan or after it, 6% of respondents have more trust towards parties created between 2002 and 2012, 4% – towards parties created in the early 1990s, 2% – towards parties created before 2002.

In all regions, except the East and Donbas, the share of citizens, who trust parties created during and after Maidan, is greater than the share of those, who trust parties created earlier. In the East and Donbas, "old" parties have the trust of bigger percentages of respondents, than in other regions.

The level of trust in parties created during and after Maidan is higher among younger age groups, citizens who primarily speak Ukrainian at home, and who consider themselves middle class.[8] The oldest citizens have relatively more trust towards parties created in the early 1990s; among them, there are also more of those, for whom a party's founding time does not make a difference.

Such assessments demonstrate a certain advance of public trust towards the new parties, which also results in a high level of expectations from them.

DEMAND FOR NEW PARTIES AND NEW LEADERS

The majority of respondents (71%) rather or completely agree with the statement that parties that have been in power for a long time have discredited themselves, and the only hope are new political parties and new leaders. 13% of respondents disagree with that (Diagram "*To what extent do you agree with statement…?*").

To what extent do you agree with statement:"Parties that have been in power for a long time have compromised themselves, the only hope are new political parties and new leaders"?
% of respondents



	LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME (May 2015)		
	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian
Agree	30.2	36.5	30.4
Rather agree	30.9	43.0	39.8
Rather disagree	12.1	7.6	8.2
Disagree	7.1	2.3	2.2
Hard to say	19.8	10.7	19.4

Regions (May 2015)



[8] Further in the text, categories of citizens by the language they primarily use at home will be referred to as "Ukrainian-speaking", "Russian-speaking" and "bilingual".

Which parties do you trust more?
% of respondents

	REGIONS					EDUCATION			AGE, y.o.					LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME		
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian
Parties established in the early 1990s (right after proclamation of Ukraine's independence)	3.3	2.9	3.3	4.9	6.0	4.2	3.6	4.2	2.6	2.2	3.5	3.3	6.9	4.3	2.8	4.8
Parties established before 2002 (first elections to the Verkhovna Rada by party lists)	0.5	2.0	1.4	4.9	2.5	1.8	2.5	2.1	1.2	1.6	2.9	2.8	2.5	2.1	0.9	3.9
Parties founded after 2002, but before 2012	5.5	4.9	2.8	7.8	9.1	6.5	4.2	7.4	4.5	7.0	6.5	4.2	7.1	7.1	4.6	6.2
Parties founded in the period of Maidan or after it	25.7	13.1	14.4	15.1	9.1	13.6	16.4	16.3	18.7	17.5	17.9	13.9	11.6	9.8	19.9	15.9
Time of founding does not matter for me	36.7	38.2	33.0	38.8	36.2	32.6	37.2	41.0	34.9	37.6	31.8	37.1	42.2	40.5	36.9	34.7
I do not trust any parties	17.1	23.4	27.9	18.9	24.8	28.8	22.0	16.2	23.7	21.5	23.5	24.9	17.9	25.2	22.3	18.2
Hard to say	11.2	15.5	17.2	9.7	12.3	12.5	14.1	12.8	14.4	12.6	13.8	13.9	11.8	11.0	12.5	16.3

May 2015

The following characteristics can be attributed to a greater degree



to which of the parties (created before or after Maidan)?
% of respondents



The largest share of those that agree are in the West of Ukraine (85%), the smallest – in Donbas (56%) and South (61%). This distribution of answers is typical for all age groups, but among the oldest voters there are relatively more of those, who disagree with this statement. Also, among Russian-speaking population there are more of those, who disagree with this statement. Obviously, this is due to the fact that responses depend on political preferences of respondents.

Compared to June 2011, the share of those, who agree with the statement that old parties have discredited themselves, and the only hope are new political parties and new leaders, has significantly grown – from 54% to 71%. Accordingly, the number of those who disagree decreased.

New Parties

People have identified the following criteria, according to which a party can be considered a "new" political force: has to be led by a non-corrupt politician (48%); has to be led by a person, who has demonstrated his leadership in complicated situations (44%); a party makes only realistic promises, avoids populism (34%); a party has a clear vision, an action plan (32%); a party gives way for "new faces" (28%).[9] In the sixth place (27%) – a party brings forward common for residents of different regions problems, and avoids emphasising the existing differences in beliefs (Table "*Which of the following qualities should a party have….?*").

Having a non-corrupt leader option was in the first place in all regions. Regarding other options, there were differences between residents of different regions.

In the East, people gave more value to a party's bringing forward common issues, rather than those, where there is a difference of beliefs between residents of different regions. In the East, Donbas and Centre of less value is a party leader's young age.

Along with the increase of education level, grows the demand for a non-corrupt party leader, his leadership qualities, avoiding populism, cooperation with civic movements.

In the list of "new" political parties, respondents included 22 political parties. 45% of respondents did not answer the question, 12% believe that there are no such parties (Diagram "*Which political forces would you call "new political forces"?*).

Among the parties that were named, the leaders were "Samopomich" (20%) and Right Sector (15%). Over 1% of respondents named PPB (5%), "Zastup" (4%), Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (3%),

[9] Respondents were asked to choose up to five answer options.

Which political forces would you call "new political forces"?*
% of respondents



* Respondents were asked to give their own answer.

"People's Front" (3%), "Opposition Bloc" (2%), "UDAR" (1%).

In June 2011, when this question was asked for the first time, the list of "new political forces" made by people included "Front for Change" (21%), "UDAR" (11%), "Strong Ukraine" (9%) and All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (8%).

Thus, in the period from June 2014 to May 2015, people's perception of "Samopomich" party as a new political force has significantly increased, perception of Right Sector party remained the same, and decreased for PPB ("Solidarity"), Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko and especially for the "UDAR" party.

New Leaders

Over a half of respondents (55%) think that Ukraine needs new political leaders. 28% – that the leaders we currently have are quite enough (Diagram "*Does Ukraine need new political leaders?*", p.128).

In all regions, the share of those, who think that Ukraine needs new political leaders, exceeds the share of those, who do not support this idea. The highest demand

Which of the following qualities should a party have in order to be considered a "new political force"?*
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	REGIONS					EDUCATION		
		West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education
A party has to be led by a politician, who has not compromised himself through corrupt actions, financial fraud	**47.5**	44.9	45.6	48.4	50.9	50.8	39.6	47.8	53.8
A party has to be led by a person, who has demonstrated his leadership in complicated situations and can assume responsibility	**43.5**	48.8	46.0	35.3	38.0	43.2	40.5	43.7	46.0
A party makes only realistic promises, avoids populism	**34.0**	26.0	33.5	36.7	41.0	35.3	31.0	34.0	36.3
A party has a clear vision of social transformations, a specific action plan to implement once in power, instead of fighting for power just to gain power	**32.4**	30.0	28.5	41.9	35.3	34.1	30.3	33.8	32.4
A party gives way for "new faces", gives an opportunity for young people with future prospects to realise their potential	**27.8**	29.8	28.5	24.2	25.9	28.1	26.6	25.8	31.1
A party brings forward common for residents of different regions socio-economic problems, and avoids emphasising the existing between citizens of different regions differences in beliefs (language, religion, etc.)	**26.8**	22.4	21.5	27.0	40.7	27.4	29.0	24.7	27.2
A party has transparent financing, regularly publishes its financial reports	**24.6**	24.3	23.6	26.5	23.2	27.8	24.7	23.9	25.3
A party actively cooperates with NGOs, civic movements and initiatives, provides support for them	**20.0**	19.1	19.1	18.1	20.8	23.3	15.8	21.7	21.4
A party has to be led by a politician, who has not previously held senior positions in government	**19.7**	19.8	17.9	20.5	25.3	16.1	20.0	19.6	19.3
A party highlights problems that remain unnoticed by the majority of other parties (for example, protecting historical environment of cities. green areas from construction, the rights of bank depositors, the quality of food and water, etc.)	**18.9**	21.0	15.6	16.7	23.0	19.9	17.9	20.0	18.3
A party has to be led by a young politician (younger than 40 years old)	**18.8**	24.6	17.6	24.2	14.3	15.8	18.3	21.4	16.3
A party tries to spread its ideology, its approaches in the society, instead of gaining power	**15.5**	11.0	14.8	18.1	21.6	14.2	13.8	17.3	14.7
A party's registration must not be earlier than 5 years ago	**14.1**	18.4	9.5	15.3	21.9	8.2	13.2	14.0	14.9
A party uses in its work new information technologies, means of communication – Internet, social networks, etc.	**8.4**	9.8	7.0	7.9	10.0	7.9	6.5	8.4	9.8
Other	**1.3**	2.1	0.9	1.4	1.1	1.6	1.1	1.7	1.2
Hard to say	**8.4**	7.9	11.5	10.2	3.8	6.9	12.0	7.4	6.7

* Respondents were asked to choose up to five acceptable options.

May 2015

Does Ukraine need new political leaders?
% of respondents



	AGE, y.o. (May 2015)					EDUCATION (May 2015)			LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME (May 2015)		
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian
Yes, it does	57.3	55.2	58.3	54.0	51.1	48.9	53.9	60.8	47.2	62.1	54.0
No, those that we already have are quite enough	24.6	23.6	28.4	29.6	32.7	33.9	27.6	23.8	35.6	23.8	25.7
Hard to say	18.1	21.2	13.3	16.3	16.2	17.2	18.5	15.5	17.3	14.0	20.3

for new leaders is in the West (67%), the lowest – in the South and in Donbas (44% and 48%, respectively). These regions also have more people, who are satisfied with the "old" leaders (34% and 35%, respectively).

The demand for new leaders grows along with the increase of the level of education, it is higher among Ukrainian-speaking citizens, and among those, who include themselves in middle class.

Compared to May 2013, the share of citizens, who think that new political leaders are necessary, has grown by 5%, and those, who think that the existing are enough, – dropped by 9%.

The majority of respondents (61%) think that new political leaders must be non-corrupt[10] (Table "*What qualities should new political leaders possess?*"). This is followed by such qualities as readiness to really protect interests of common people, and integrity (readiness not to lie, not to give unrealistic promises) (44%, each). Professionalism was chosen by 25% of respondents, presence of such quality as a clear programme and an action plan – 22%.

This hierarchy of qualities is typical (with some variations) for most regions. In Donbas, a significantly smaller share of respondents believe that the main property should be the non-involvement in corruption. In the East and in Donbas, smaller shares of respondents noted the importance of professionalism.

There were no significant differences in respondents' answers by age, gender, education, class, language.

Thus, people see the "newness" in the nature of leaders' public behaviour and their interaction with people: non-involvement in corruption, honesty (towards people) and desire to protect interests of the latter.

Compared to 2013, the demand has grown for such qualities of new leaders, as non-involvement in corruption (from 48% to 61%), education, professionalism (from 16% to 25%), strong leadership qualities (from 16% to 19%).

As the environment for emergence of new leaders, relatively larger percentages of respondents noted the following: civil society organisations (33%); humanitarian or technical intellectuals (32%); ATO participants, volunteers (31%); new political forces (30%) (Table "*From what environment can new political leaders emerge?*").

Already existing political parties are considered the source of the "new leaders" (where they used to have

[10] Respondents could choose all acceptable options.

What qualities should new political leaders possess?*
% of respondents

	UKRAINE		REGIONS (May 2015)				
	May 2013	May 2015	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Non-involvement in corruption	47.7	**60.9**	59.0	67.7	67.8	62.3	42.0
Readiness to really protect interests of common people	47.8	**44.4**	45.7	39.4	48.8	54.2	39.4
Integrity (no lies, unrealistic promises)	50.1	**43.7**	53.1	43.8	41.4	39.2	37.9
Education, professionalism	15.9	**24.9**	26.4	28.5	23.8	20.5	20.6
Presence of a clear programme and an action plan	20.3	**22.1**	17.9	20.4	20.5	25.9	28.4
Strong leadership qualities, ability to lead people	15.5	**19.3**	14.3	19.4	13.5	29.7	17.7
Patriotism, nation-building approach	16.9	**15.1**	20.7	16.9	7.0	10.8	14.2
Independence from financial and economic groups	12.3	**12.9**	16.2	9.8	9.8	12.7	17.7
Modesty in everyday life, absence of lust for luxury	10.6	**10.3**	13.1	11.5	7.4	7.0	9.8
Ability to compromise, if necessary	3.2	**8.3**	2.9	7.6	12.6	8.6	13.9
Democracy, ability to lead a dialogue with people	6.4	**8.0**	6.0	7.4	7.0	8.4	12.3
Ruthlessness, readiness to reach their goals by any means	3.0	**2.4**	1.0	2.8	0.5	2.4	5.0
Other	0.6	**0.6**	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.5	0.0
Hard to say	8.2	**4.4**	3.8	3.6	8.4	2.2	6.6

* Respondents were asked to choose up to three acceptable options.

secondary roles) by 24% of citizens, small and medium business – 22%.

In the West the priority is given to ATO participants, volunteers (42%), while the potential of the "old" parties is evaluated more critically. In the Centre, the first place is given to ATO participants, volunteers, as well as humanitarian and technical intellectuals. In the South – the top environment are humanitarian and technical intellectuals, in the East – civil society organisations and new political forces. In Donbas – civil society organisations, while ATO participants and volunteers are viewed as a potential source of new leaders much less.

From what environment can new political leaders emerge?*
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	REGIONS				
		West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
From civil society organisations	**32.9**	38.3	27.5	28.4	37.2	35.4
From humanitarian or technical circles (scientists, teachers, etc.)	**31.5**	28.8	34.2	37.2	29.2	28.1
From ATO participants, volunteers	**30.9**	42.4	34.5	26.5	28.8	13.2
From new political forces	**30.0**	30.0	28.8	23.8	36.1	29.7
From already existing political parties (where they used to have secondary roles)	**23.7**	17.4	23.9	22.3	27.2	28.7
From small or medium business	**22.1**	22.4	22.6	20.0	22.4	21.8
From organisers of mass protest events	**15.0**	14.5	12.8	14.9	22.4	12.0
From defence and law enforcement agencies (army, police, etc.)	**10.0**	9.5	9.8	23.3	8.1	4.1
From big business	**9.0**	4.8	10.8	15.3	6.5	9.5
From foreign politicians	**6.1**	8.6	6.0	5.1	5.4	4.1
Other	**2.9**	3.8	2.8	3.3	1.9	3.2
Hard to say	**15.2**	13.1	15.7	20.0	14.8	13.9

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

May 2015

Overall, as "new leaders" respondents named 70 individuals, but only 13 of them were named by over 1% of citizens. Among these 13 politicians, over a half are either leaders or representatives of political parties (Diagram "*Whom could you call a "new political leader"?*).

Most frequently mentioned leaders are: A. Sadovyi (14%) and D. Yarosh (12%), which matches the "new parties" hierarchy. Further on the list are: P. Poroshenko, O. Lyashko (5%, each) and A. Yatsenyuk (3%). V. Klychko was named by 1.4% of respondents.

In June 2014, most people named as "new leaders" the following politicians: D. Yarosh (20%), O. Lyashko (18%), P. Poroshenko (14%), V. Klychko (12%), O. Bohomolets (8%), A. Sadovyi (3%).

Thus, within a year, lost their position those political leaders, who were considered "new" before the presidential and parliamentary elections, and according to their results took up highest government jobs. Especially notable is the loss of "newness" by V. Klychko, who was elected the mayor of Kyiv.

In May 2011, the list of new political leaders by a significant margin was headed by A. Yatsenyuk (23%). Followed by V. Klychko (13%), S. Tihipko (10%), O. Tiahnybok (8%) and A. Grytsenko (2,5%). Among these politicians, the top five in 2015 included only A. Yatsenyuk (5 place, 3%).

Whom could you call a "new political leader"?*
% of respondents



* Respondents were asked to give their own answer.

ATTITUDE TO LEADING POLITICAL PARTIES OF UKRAINE, ASSESSMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM[11]

Only one party from the list – "Samopomich Union" – has positive balance[12] of support of its work, though a small one (+3.1%) (Diagrams "*How would you evaluate the work of the following parties?*", p.132-133).

Other parties have negative balance of support of their work, the worst of which have CPU (-69.6%), "Strong Ukraine" (-66.4%), "Opposition Bloc" (-55.6%), Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (-52%).

PPB has positive balance in the West and in the Centre, negative – in the South, East and Donbas. "Samopomich" – positive balance in the West and in the Centre, negative – in the East and South, almost equal percentages of assessments are in Donbas. Right Sector has positive balance in the West and negative in all other regions.

"People's Front", "Batkivshchyna", Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, "Civic Position", "Svoboda", "Zastup" have negative balance in all regions. Similarly, negative balance in all regions have "Opposition Bloc", CPU and "Strong Ukraine".

In general, the perception of all political parties is mostly negative. Few parties have positive balance of assessments in certain regions. Parties, associated with the V. Yanukovych regime, have worse assessments, than parties that supported Maidan or were created after it.

Residents of the East, South and Donbas are most critical in their assessments of the work of parties – including those, that used to have these regions' support. People in these regions did not provide a positive evaluation for the work of any party. Residents of the West and Centre are also critical in their assessment of "their" parties (namely, "Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda", Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, etc.). West-Centre and East-South-Donbas residents retain their more negative attitude to "other regions'" parties.

Lines of division between parties. Relatively more respondents think that the biggest conflicts between Ukrainian parties are along the lines "coalition – opposition" (34%), pro-Western – pro-Russian orientation (30%) (Diagram "*The strongest conflict is between which of the existing Ukrainian parties?*").

The answers to this question have certain regional differences. Thus, in the West, the second most popular answer was the conflict between parties inside the coalition (29%). In the South, in the first place was the conflict between parties represented in the Verkhovna Rada and those that did not get there (33%). In the East, answers came in such order: conflict between the pro-Western and pro-Russian parties (42%); between the coalition and opposition (40%); between coalition parties on the basis of the conflict between oligarchs (26%, each). In Donbas, the order is the same, except the conflict inside the coalition.

Russian-speaking and bilingual citizens assess the intensity of conflict between pro-Western and pro-Russian parties higher, than the Ukrainian-speaking. They also assess higher the intensity of conflict between the parties, created before Maidan and after it.

[11] In relation to parties that received over 1% of votes in the national multi-mandate electoral district in the 2014 Parliamentary election.

[12] The difference of sums of answer options "*positively and rather positively*" and "*rather negatively and negatively*".

The strongest conflict is between which of the existing Ukrainian parties?*
% of respondents



	REGIONS					LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME		
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian
Those that belong to the coalition and those that are in opposition	38.6	29.2	27.4	39.6	37.9	37.1	34.2	32.5
Those that look in the direction of Western countries and those that look towards Russia	25.5	21.5	29.8	41.5	43.2	36.9	24.1	32.5
Between parties that are controlled by oligarchs, who are in conflict between themselves	21.7	21.8	27.0	26.2	26.3	24.1	22.1	25.8
Between parties inside the coalition	29.0	17.2	23.7	26.7	19.6	25.0	22.1	21.0
Those that are represented in the Verkhovna Rada and those that did not get there	18.1	17.5	32.6	25.4	16.4	23.3	20.7	17.7
Between parties, the leaders of which are in conflict between themselves	13.3	17.8	19.5	17.0	12.6	17.4	14.7	16.3
Those created before Maidan and new parties created during Maidan and after it	11.9	15.3	19.5	15.9	16.1	18.5	12.3	15.8
Those that support state-controlled, planned economy and those that support market economy, privatisation	11.0	10.9	13.0	19.4	18.0	18.6	10.2	13.5
Between all parties	13.3	18.6	12.1	10.5	8.8	13.4	15.0	12.1
Those that support Ukrainian language and culture and those that support the idea of giving Russian language the official status	11.5	7.9	9.8	19.7	15.5	14.1	10.9	12.0
There is no conflict between parties	3.6	2.0	0.9	2.2	0.6	0.3	3.7	1.6
Hard to say	9.5	7.1	11.2	4.6	9.2	7.6	7.9	8.1

* Respondents were asked to choose up to three acceptable options.

May 2015

How would evaluate the work



of the following parties?
% of respondents



Opposition and its rights. The majority of respondents (73%) completely or rather agree that presence of opposition is necessary for normal political development of Ukraine (Diagram "*To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the work of the opposition?*"). 54% of respondents agree that the work of opposition has a positive impact on the situation in the country (25% disagree). In all regions, opposition is recognised as necessary by the absolute majority of citizens.

Relative majority of citizens (48%) disagree with the statement that the government is trying to suppress opposition using any means. 31% of respondents agree with this. The share of those, who disagree is larger in the West and Centre, the share of those, who agree – in the East and in Donbas.

Regarding the state of protection of opposition's rights, people's opinions divided. The relative majority (28%) believe that these rights are protected. 23% have the opposite opinion. 21% think that the rights are protected partially, 28% – could not answer (Diagram "*Are the rights of the opposition protected in Ukraine?*"). Considerably more people, who believe that the rights of the opposition are not protected – are in Donbas (38%), and also in the South and East (27-28%).

The relative majority of citizens (38%) think that none of opposition's rights are being violated. 33% could not give an answer (Diagram "*Which rights of the opposition in Ukraine are being violated most?*", p.136).

14% of respondents think that among the rights of the opposition that are being violated are the right to hold a certain share of key positions in the Parliament, 7% – the right to conduct public political work, organise rallies, 4% – the right to free access to media.

Regional differences are significant: while in the West 59% of respondents think that none of the opposition's rights are being violated, in the South, East and Donbas the share of such answers is 21-23%. Relatively larger shares of citizens in these regions believe that the rights being violated are opposition's right to hold a certain share of key positions in the Parliament, as well as the right to conduct public political work.

The relative majority of citizens (42%) believe that opposition's rights must be captured in legislation. 30% think that this is unnecessary, 28% did not provide an answer (Diagram "*Is it necessary to capture the rights of the opposition in Law?*", p.137). In all regions, except Centre, the relative majority of citizens support capturing opposition's rights in legislation – from 41% in the West to 63% in Donbas. In the Centre, the proportion of supporters and opponents is 30% and 40%, respectively.

Are the rights of the opposition protected in Ukraine?
% of respondents



November 2014

To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the work of the opposition?
% of respondents



Presence of opposition is necessary for normal political development of Ukraine



The work of opposition has a positive impact on the situation in the country



In Ukraine the government is trying to suppress opposition using any means



May 2015

Which rights of the opposition in Ukraine are being violated most?
% of respondents

	REGIONS					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME		
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian
The right to hold a certain share of key positions in the Parliament	6.0	11.8	24.8	11.6	27.5	14.8	14.7	14.1	24.2	8.6	13.4
The right to conduct public political work among population, organise rallies	3.8	5.4	10.7	6.5	13.3	7.8	7.5	6.1	10.8	3.9	8.1
The right to free access to the media	3.6	4.2	4.2	3.2	5.1	3.2	4.6	4.1	5.5	2.9	4.6
The right to take part in elections	1.0	3.4	2.8	2.2	3.2	2.0	2.2	3.4	5.1	1.4	1.8
Other	0.7	0.9	0.5	4.3	2.5	0.7	1.3	3.0	2.4	0.7	2.6
None of the rights are being violated	59.2	44.5	21.0	22.4	22.8	32.9	39.4	39.4	20.1	52.4	32.7
Hard to say	25.8	29.9	36.0	49.7	25.6	38.6	30.4	29.9	31.9	30.2	36.9

November 2014

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR: PREFERENCE STEADINESS, CHOICE MOTIVATION

Steadiness of electoral preferences. The relative majority of respondents (39%), among statements characterising people's attitude to political forces, have chosen option "In Ukraine there are political forces, the work of which I support to some extent, but if there emerges a better political force, I may vote for it" (Diagram "*With which of the statements below do you agree more?*", p.138).

24% of respondents believe that in Ukraine there are no political forces, which they could support at least to some extent. 22% said that in Ukraine there is a political force, the work of which they consider right, and in the next elections they will vote only for it. 15% – could not answer. Thus, steady electoral preferences were shown by less than a quarter of voters.

The largest number of voters with steady preferences are in the East (27%), the least – in the West (17%). In the West, there is the largest percentage (52%) of those, who prefer certain political forces, but can change these preferences in case of a better alternative. The largest share of people, who do not support any party, are in the South (31%).

Along with the level of education, grows the share of people, who have steady party preferences or have certain preferences that can change. Among citizens with lower level of education, there are more of those, who do not support the work of any political forces.

Among Ukrainian-speaking respondents, there are more of those, who can change their choice in favour of a better political force, among the Russian-speaking – those, who do not support any political forces (29%).

Shares of people, who have steady or certain electoral preferences that can be changed, increase along with the level of financial stability, correspondingly, as this level goes down, increases the share of those, who do not favour any political forces.

Compared to November 2014, the share of people that have steady electoral preferences has gone down from

Is it necessary to capture the rights of the opposition in Law?
% of respondents



33% to 22%, the share of those, who can change their preferences – has remained almost the same (38% and 39%), while the share of those, who do not support any party has increased from 18% to 24%.

It is possible to assume that this is due to people's growing dissatisfaction with parties they have voted for in the 2014 election. Quite telling is that the same fall happened after the presidential election in 2010 – the share of people, who had steady preferences went down from 44% to 25%, while the share of those, who did not support anyone grew from 12% to 29%.

Steadiness of people's preferences in regard to political parties is also characterised by their answers to question: "If the party that shares your interests and that you support finds itself (or currently is) in opposition, what will you do?" 40% of respondents stated that they are ready to support "their" party and contribute to its rise to power. 13% of respondents will support the party closest to it by its programme among those that are currently in power, 21% in this case will not support any party (Diagram *"If the party that shares your interests and that you support finds itself (or currently is) in opposition, what will you do?"*, p.139).

In the East, Donbas and West, people demonstrate more steadiness in their electoral preferences. There, from 54% to 42% of respondents will also continue to support "their" parties in their opposition status. The majority of those, who will change their preferences in favour of another party, are in the West and in the Centre (15% and 16%, respectively). In the South, there are more of those, who will not support any party (32%).

Among different age groups, steadier preferences are demonstrated by 40-49 years old voters and those over 60 years old. Along with the level of education, increases steadiness of preferences, as well as readiness to choose another party. Among citizens with lower level of education, there are more of those, who will not support any party.

Among Russian-speaking citizens, there are more of those, who will support "their" party or will not support any. Among citizens, who speak Ukrainian or both languages at home, there were more of those, who would support a "close" party or could not answer.

Nature of electoral behaviour. A relatively major part of respondents (35%) make their choice in each election regardless of what political forces or representatives of which ideology they chose in the previous elections (Diagram *"Which of the following statements best describes your approach to choosing the political power…?"*, p.140). Second largest share (30%) tend to make a choice between political forces that are ideologically related, choosing the best among them. 15% of respondents, in the elections, tend to vote for one and the same political force.

The majority of people, who make their choice "anew" in each election, are in the West (50%).

The largest share of people, who vote for one and the same party, are in the East (21%), the least number – in the West (10%).

Relatively more of those, who in each new election choose the better of the related forces, are in the East and Donbas (34% and 35%).

More people with steady preferences are among respondents over 60 years old, women tend to change their choice slightly more, than men. Along with the level of education, slightly grows the share of voters, who choose the better of ideologically close political forces.

With which of the statements below do you agree more?
% of respondents

Regions (May 2015)



	AGE, y.o. (May 2015)					GENDER (May 2015)		EDUCATION (May 2015)			LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME (May 2015)			SOCIAL CLASS (May 2015)			
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 y.o. and over	Female	Male	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian	Barely make ends meet, not enough money for necessary products	Enough for food and purchasing necessary inexpensive things	Generally enough for living, but purchasing things of long-term use causes difficulties	We are a well-to-do family, but for the time being unable to make certain purchases
In Ukraine there are political forces, the work of which I support to some extent, but if there emerges a better political force, I may vote for it	36.8	38.6	40.5	41.2	37.5	40.1	37.0	33.8	38.1	43.5	31.4	46.0	36.9	30.8	37.3	47.6	45.8
Among Ukrainian political forces there are none, the work of which I support at least to some extent	26.0	23.9	26.6	24.9	19.3	24.5	22.9	27.9	24.3	19.7	29.4	21.8	20.6	31.6	24.3	16.3	19.4
In Ukraine there is a political force, the work of which I consider right, and in the next elections I will vote only for it and not for any other force	20.0	22.8	21.9	18.5	26.3	20.7	24.0	19.8	21.4	25.1	22.6	18.9	26.2	17.4	23.7	23.7	26.4
Hard to say	17.2	14.7	10.9	15.5	17.0	14.7	16.1	18.5	16.2	11.7	16.6	13.2	16.3	20.2	14.7	12.3	8.3

If the party that shares your interests and that you support finds itself (or currently is) in opposition, what will you do?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Will support it, contribute to its rise to power (in the next elections)	41.4	32.8	30.2	53.6	44.6
Will support the closest to it by its programme party among those that are currently in power	15.0	16.3	9.3	11.3	7.6
Will not support any party	14.5	22.6	31.6	15.4	25.9
Hard to say	29.0	28.4	28.8	19.7	21.8

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME		
	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian
Will support it, contribute to its rise to power (in the next elections)	35.2	40.3	43.8	44.0	38.8	38.7
Will support the closest to it by its programme party among those that are currently in power	8.7	13.4	16.1	10.2	14.7	13.8
Will not support any party	28.3	21.0	15.2	25.9	17.2	20.8
Hard to say	27.8	25.4	25.0	20.0	29.3	26.7

May 2015

Ukrainian-speaking voters differ from the bilingual and especially from the Russian-speaking by a higher level of variability of their electoral choice – among them, there are noticeably less of those, who vote for one and the same party, as well as those, who in each new election makes their choice regardless of their preferences in the previous elections.

Compared to May 2010, people's electoral behaviour became much more unsteady. Thus, the share of respondents, who in the elections vote for one and the same political force, has gone down from 36% to 15%, and the share of those, who votes in every new election regardless of their previous choices – has grown from 23% to 35%. The share of those, who choose the better of the related parties, has remained almost the same.

This data can be explained by considerable inconstancy of parties in the party system in this period. During 2010-2015, there were three waves of changes – during the presidential campaign and local elections campaign in 2010 (creation of such parties as "Front for Change", "UDAR", "Strong Ukraine", "Civic Position"); parliamentary elections campaign of 2012 (unification of opposition forces in the form of "United Opposition "Batkivshchyna", success of "UDAR" and "Svoboda"), and in the period before and after Maidan.

These changes have disoriented voters in regard to choosing between parties, but retained the main line of conflict between them. Clearly, this is why the relative majority would still "choose the better" within a certain ideological framework.

Motives for choosing between parties. Opposition factor. For the relative majority of respondents (34%), a party's opposition or absence of such does not have any meaning. 15% of respondents favour pro-government parties, 8% – those in opposition. 17% of respondents do not support any, 14% – could not answer (Diagram "*You favour more political parties that…?*", p.141).

Pro-government parties have more support in the East (21%) and in the West (20%). Opposition has more support in the East (19%), least – in the West (1%) and in the Centre (5%).

Along with the level of education, grows the share of those, who support pro-government parties and those, for whom pro-government/opposition status does not matter.

Which of the following statements best describes your approach to choosing the political power you will vote for in the Parliamentary elections?
% of respondents



Regions (May 2015)



	AGE, y.o. (May 2015)					GENDER (May 2015)		EDUCATION (May 2015)			LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME (May 2015)			INCOME STATUS (May 2015)			
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 y.o. and over	Female	Male	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian	Barely make ends meet, not enough money for necessary products	Enough for food and purchasing necessary inexpensive things	Generally enough for living, but purchasing things of long-term use, such as furniture causes difficulties	We are a well-to-do family, but for the time being unable to make certain purchases
At each election I make my choice regardless of what political forces and representatives of what ideologies I chose in the previous elections	34.4	35.6	38.2	38.0	30.1	36.5	32.7	33.9	36.7	33.3	27.4	43.2	31.5	35.2	34.2	34.8	32.9
In the elections, I tend to make a choice between political forces that are ideologically related, but I choose the best of them	28.4	27.8	30.8	29.5	32.0	28.9	30.9	26.6	28.4	34.1	32.8	28.6	28.7	26.4	28.3	35.9	34.2
In the elections, I tend to vote for one and the same political force	11.5	15.0	11.8	14.3	20.6	14.7	15.6	15.4	14.1	15.9	15.5	12.8	17.7	13.7	16.7	13.7	13.7
Other	6.9	7.5	7.1	5.5	5.4	6.3	6.5	6.5	8.3	4.0	8.3	4.2	7.5	9.2	7.0	3.0	6.8
Hard to say	18.9	14.2	12.1	12.7	11.9	13.7	14.3	17.6	12.5	12.6	16.0	11.1	14.6	15.5	13.7	12.5	12.3

You favour more political parties that...,
% of respondents



Regions (May 2015)



LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME (May 2015)

	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian
Support the government	10.0	18.6	16.9
Oppose the government	14.8	2.9	9.2
Do not support the government, but are also not opposed to it	8.6	10.7	11.6
Whether a party in is opposition or not does not matter for me	32.8	37.5	32.1
Do not support any	21.4	15.9	15.1
Hard to say	12.4	14.3	15.1

Compared to November 2014, there is a decrease in the number of voters, who support pro-government parties (from 27% to 15%), and an increase of those, for whom this factor does not matter (from 27% to 34%). Support of opposition has grown insignificantly. This may be the consequence, on the one hand, of people's frustration with the actions of the government and the ruling parties, on the other – the absence of a strong opposition.

Leader factor. For almost a half of respondents (49%) the personality of the leader is of primary importance in an election, for 21% of respondents – it is of secondary importance (Diagram "*Voting for a political party, how important is it for you, who leads this party?*"). The leader factor does not matter at all for 20% of voters, 10% could not answer.

Relatively more attention is paid to the leader in the West (58%), less – in the South (40%) and Donbas (41%).

The leader factor has less importance for younger respondents and more – for the oldest group. The value of the leader factor increases along with the level of education. The leader factor is also more important among the Ukrainian-speaking citizens.

Compared to May 2010, the share of those, for whom the personality of the leader has primary value,

Voting for a political party, how important is it for you, who leads this party?
% of respondents



	AGE, y.o. (May 2015)					EDUCATION (May 2015)			GENDER (May 2015)	
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 y.o. and over	Incomplete or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Female	Male
Of primary importance	43.5	49.1	49.7	48.8	53.1	46.4	48.5	51.4	49.5	48.2
Of secondary importance	23.0	19.8	20.4	20.2	20.8	17.2	22.0	22.9	21.2	20.6
Does not matter at all	22.2	19.0	21.6	20.5	17.0	25.0	19.1	16.6	18.8	21.3
Hard to say	11.2	12.1	8.3	10.5	9.1	11.4	10.3	9.1	10.5	9.9

has gone down from 58% to 49%, respectively, the shares of those, for whom this is a secondary factor or does not matter at all, have grown. However, the share of respondents, who focus on the leader is still quite high, which stimulates creation of more "leader-centred" parties.

Motives for voting in the elections of 2014. The main motive for voting for the majority of respondents (62%) was favourable attitude to the leader of the party (Diagram "*Why did you choose this party?*"). Among motives that followed were: support of a party's programme (37%), trust in politicians that head the party (34%), clear formulation of its tasks by a party (33%), faith that a party can overcome the economic crisis (32%), ability to really improve people's life (26%), representation by a party of interests of such people "as I" (23%).

Almost equal shares of respondents chose motives related to the topic of Russia's aggression: a party's ability to ensure victory over the external aggressor, terrorists and separatists (19%), and ability to resolve problems in Donbas through peaceful negotiations (18%).

Only 7% voted for the party because they had voted for it in the previous elections in 2012.

Notably, this hierarchy with slight variations of the order and absolute values is consistent through all regions of Ukraine, age, education and financial standing groups.

Among Ukrainian-speaking citizens, there were relatively more people, who chose favourable attitude to the leader and better candidates for government positions, among the Russian-speaking – trust in politicians, who head this party, programme, party's ability to resolve the issue in Donbas peacefully, as well as having voted for this party in the 2012 elections.

The biggest percentage of respondents (49%), among three top motives for voting for a party, chose favourable attitude to its leader (Table "*Name three main reasons, why you chose this party?*", p.144). This was followed by support of a party's programme (24%) and clear formulation of a party's main tasks, which it will accomplish (23%).

Among Ukrainian-speaking respondents, there were more of those, who chose favourable attitude to the leader as the chief motive, among the Russian-speaking and bilingual (compared to Ukrainian-speaking citizens) – respondents, who named a party's ability to overcome the economic crisis. Among Russian-speaking citizens there were significantly more of those, who highlighted a party's ability to resolve the issue in Donbas peacefully.

Thus, for residents in the West and Centre, it is more typical to focus on the leader of a party, its programme and tasks. For residents of the East, South and Donbas – relatively less focus on the leader, and more on pragmatic expectations from the party (improvement of living conditions, resolving the issue in Donbas).

Why did you choose this party?*
% of those, who voted for a certain party

I like its leader	61.6
I can relate to its programme	37.0
This party is headed by politicians, whom I trust	34.3
This party has clearly formulated its main tasks, which it will accomplish	33.1
This party is able to overcome the economic crisis	31.6
This party is able to really improve people's life	25.7
This party supports interests of such people as I	22.8
This party can ensure victory over the external aggressor, terrorists and separatists	18.7
This party had good chances of winning	18.2
This party is able to ensure resolution of problems in Donbas through peaceful negotiations	18.0
I liked the top five candidates of this party	15.4
It has better candidates for positions in the new government than the other parties	15.4
I liked this party candidates' speeches in media	14.2
The party has already proven its ability to operate effectively	14.0
To prevent even worse political forces from winning	13.6
I liked this party's campaign materials	9.5
I liked the list of candidates of this party	7.7
It is supported by people I consider experts	7.4
I voted for this party in the previous elections in 2012	7.1
I liked this party's advertising on radio and television	5.5
Essentially, I chose this party by chance	2.2
Other	0.9
Hard to say	1.4

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

November 2014

Name three main reasons. why you chose this party?
% of those. who voted for a certain party

	UKRAINE	REGIONS					AGE, y.o.					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE PRIMARILY SPOKEN AT HOME			INCOME STATUS			
		WEST	CENTRE	SOUTH	EAST	DONBAS	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 y.o. and over	Incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Specialised secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education	Russian	Ukrainian	Both Russian and Ukrainian	Barely make ends meet, not enough money for necessary products	Enough for food and purchasing necessary inexpensive things	Generally enough for living, but purchasing things of long-term use causes difficulties	We are a well-to-do family, but for the time being unable to make certain purchases
I like its leader	**49.1**	64.4	51.9	36.1	31.3	40.4	49.1	48.8	48.0	47.8	50.9	50.1	51.0	46.9	37.6	58.7	40.5	51.2	44.6	52.7	51.0
I can relate to its programme	**23.9**	20.7	24.9	38.2	21.6	19.9	18.7	26.4	25.2	22.1	26.2	23.0	25.1	23.4	27.9	21.8	24.7	18.6	24.6	25.3	24.0
This party has clearly formulated its main tasks, which it will accomplish	**23.2**	24.4	22.4	22.1	15.0	36.2	25.7	25.9	18.7	26.5	20.7	23.6	21.0	25.2	24.4	20.7	26.3	19.1	23.8	23.9	18.8
This party is able to overcome the economic crisis	**21.1**	15.8	21.8	13.1	30.0	25.4	17.4	19.1	24.4	22.1	21.8	19.9	19.0	23.4	26.5	15.9	26.0	16.8	23.6	19.3	26.0
This party is headed by politicians, whom I trust	**19.1**	19.8	15.4	24.4	23.9	18.4	18.3	16.2	16.4	22.8	20.2	16.4	18.4	21.1	23.0	18.4	16.7	25.4	19.8	16.7	14.6
This party is able to really improve people's life	**17.1**	14.4	12.0	29.3	19.7	27.5	17.5	14.4	16.9	18.5	17.6	14.7	19.0	17.2	20.6	14.4	19.2	16.3	15.7	17.5	24.0
This party is able to ensure resolution of problems in Donbas through peaceful negotiations	**12.0**	8.9	9.3	17.2	12.7	22.0	8.7	12.0	8.9	12.4	15.2	12.1	13.2	10.9	19.5	9.3	11.0	15.6	12.6	9.9	17.5
This party supports interests of such people as I	**11.6**	10.9	12.2	13.0	15.0	5.0	13.1	7.9	12.4	11.6	12.2	12.1	10.6	12.3	13.2	11.1	11.5	12.8	12.3	10.1	13.5
This party can ensure victory over the external aggressor, terrorists and separatists	**9.8**	9.8	12.2	8.2	5.6	9.2	11.8	11.1	6.2	10.8	9.3	7.2	10.2	11.5	9.4	10.8	8.5	5.2	9.0	11.9	10.3
I liked the top five candidates of this party	**8.4**	11.2	8.1	4.9	3.8	12.7	7.0	11.1	8.9	6.0	8.8	6.6	8.9	9.4	6.3	9.4	7.9	9.9	7.5	9.3	4.2
To prevent even worse political forces from winning	**7.9**	7.8	7.5	4.9	8.0	12.0	6.1	9.7	9.8	5.6	8.0	8.4	8.6	7.0	8.7	7.3	8.5	6.4	10.3	7.0	5.2
The party has already proven its ability to operate effectively	**7.5**	7.8	8.5	4.9	4.2	9.9	8.3	6.5	5.3	10.0	7.0	9.2	6.5	7.4	5.6	7.3	9.6	10.4	8.6	6.6	2.1
This party had good chances of winning	**6.7**	9.2	5.4	7.4	3.8	9.2	5.7	7.0	8.9	8.0	4.9	6.3	6.7	6.4	5.9	7.4	6.3	4.7	7.5	6.6	8.2
It has better candidates for positions in the new government than the other parties	**6.5**	9.2	7.9	4.9	2.8	2.8	8.7	6.5	6.2	6.0	5.7	4.6	6.9	7.8	3.1	7.6	7.4	6.4	6.1	7.4	5.2
I liked this party candidates' speeches in media	**4.6**	4.0	4.1	4.9	7.0	4.2	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.6	3.1	4.3	4.3	5.1	4.2	4.2	5.8	4.1	7.1	3.7	1.0
I liked this party's campaign materials	**4.5**	3.4	3.7	2.4	6.1	9.9	7.0	6.9	6.6	2.0	2.3	2.9	4.5	5.9	5.9	3.7	4.9	3.5	3.8	5.3	6.3
I voted for this party in the previous elections in 2012	**4.1**	2.3	4.2	7.4	4.7	4.2	1.7	3.7	3.6	4.4	5.7	6.9	3.5	2.9	6.3	3.2	4.4	5.8	5.2	3.1	1.0
It is supported by people I consider experts	**3.2**	2.6	3.3	0.8	4.2	4.2	5.2	1.9	4.9	4.0	1.3	4.0	1.7	3.9	4.5	2.5	3.6	1.2	3.6	2.9	6.2
I liked the list of candidates of this party	**3.1**	6.0	1.2	8.1	1.9	0.0	2.2	5.6	3.1	3.2	2.3	2.3	3.9	2.9	4.2	3.7	1.1	1.7	3.3	3.5	3.1
I liked this party's advertising on radio and television	**0.8**	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.5	0.0	1.7	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.8	1.4	0.2	1.0	0.0	0.8	1.6	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.0
Essentially, I chose this party by chance	**1.9**	0.9	2.5	0.0	2.8	2.8	1.7	1.9	3.1	1.2	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.6	1.0	1.7	3.0	1.7	2.1	2.1	0.0
Other	**0.7**	1.4	0.2	0.0	0.5	1.4	0.0	0.5	2.2	0.0	0.8	0.6	0.9	1.4	0.3	0.8	0.8	1.7	0.8	0.0	1.0
Hard to say	**1.3**	1.4	2.1	0.0	0.5	1.4	2.6	1.9	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.0	1.4	1.6	4.1	1.3	0.6	0.0

November 2014

PARTY SYSTEM OF UKRAINE AT PRESENT: CHALLENGES, PROBLEMS, PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS

On 16 September 2015, took place the International Roundtable "Party System of Ukraine at Present: Changes, Development Trends, Society's Demands", organised by the Razumkov Centre together with Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine.

The Roundtable included two sessions. The first one was dedicated to discussing development of Ukraine's party system against the background of modern European trends, the second – to discussing the current state and main development trends of political parties in Ukraine.

Below, we present opinions of participants in the order they were presented at the Roundtable. Texts have been prepared using discussion transcripts and are presented in somewhat shortened form. Some presentations include references made by editors.

OPENING REMARKS

TODAY, SUCCESSFUL EUROPEAN PARTIES – ARE THOSE PARTIES THAT CAN FIGURE OUT WHAT PEOPLE THINK, AND PROVIDE SOLUTIONS

Nico LANGE,
Deputy Head of Politics and Consulting Department Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Germany)

My task is to share information on a number of development trends of party systems in Europe. I chose five main aspects that I believe are important.

The first one is parliamentarism. Political system plays a key role in formation of parties and party systems, and successful political parties and successful party systems develop best within the parliamentary political system, much better than within any other environment. Strengthening of parliamentarism is truly a trend that we can observe in Europe and the EU, and it is not a coincidence that new EU member states have parliamentary political systems. There are exceptions, for example, France has a different tradition, but overall, the role of parliamentarism is paramount.

Parliamentarism means strengthening of the role of political parties, which creates a broader environment for finding political compromise, lines of cooperation and conflict resolution within the parliament. There is also legislative framework regarding political party operation, which in most cases also provides state funding for political parties and limits their private funding.

The second aspect is internal democracy in political parties. According to classical approach, development of parties and a party system is determined, *firstly*, by the political system, and *secondly* – by the electoral system. I think that **of paramount importance to the development of political parties is not the electoral system, but the system of internal democracy within the party**. If political party's candidates for any position are selected by the decision of party members and representative democracy in the party, then there is no need to talk about changing the electoral system.

The problem is that democracy crisis and political party crisis is viewed as an invitation for future authoritarian regimes. If party democracy does not function, if parties do not ensure resolution of their country's problems, – the number of new parties will grow. We can see this in Europe and in other countries, as well as in Ukraine. Formation of new parties means that people believe: their problems are not being solved by political parties that are currently in power or a part of the political process. However, very often, party democracy crisis means that new parties are not truly democratic.

The situation around the Pirate Party kickstarted the work on expanding powers of party members in decision-making.[1] The same trend is also observed in the party reform of Christian Democratic Union in Germany. At the Congress of the European People's Party taking place in several weeks, a broad-scale discussion will be conducted about reforming political parties in order to give party members more influence, and make the decision-making process more transparent. This will have a positive impact on people's perception of parties.

[1] This refers to the sharp popularity increase of the Pirate Party, some of the important features of which are the principles of transparency and personal involvement of each member in the decision-making process, using modern information technologies.

Roundtable 16 September 2015

The third aspect is dynamics. I will illustrate this with the example of centre-left party of Miro Cerar[2] in Slovenia, which only six weeks after its formation, gained 35% in the national election. We have also observed a similar trend in Germany, where Alternative for Germany (AfD) gained 6.5% half a year after party's founding.[3] We have also seen this in many other countries.

So we have some constant parties in the centre of the party system, and we have new parties that appear and exist on its periphery. This does not mean that new parties take the place of the old ones. This only means that there is more dynamics on the periphery. Looking at today's composition of the European Parliament, with its great number of small parties – some of which are in factions, while others are not, – we shall see the general picture. Long-term party identification of voters in the EU countries is on the decline, as well as people's identification with churches, trade unions, traditional large organisations. Therefore, **new parties have a chance of becoming successful very fast**.

The fourth aspect is populism. There is a new wave of success of populist parties in many European countries, first of all, in France and the United Kingdom. At this moment, there are a number of such parties in the EU, and this is an apparent trend. This does not mean that populist parties substitute the old parties, but this means that we will live in the political discourse, where populists have a certain role. This is also related to the development of journalism, funding for journalism and media systems in the European Union, as optimised online journalism needs conflicts and scandals, and this is what populists are good at providing.

The fifth aspect – **political parties in Europe undergo transformations**. We have had system stabilisation with highly ideological parties in the 1970s, during the Cold War, with establishing in most EU countries of centre-right and centre-left parties as the core ones, as well as some other parties around them. Now we see that people tend to vote more for the result – how parties solve specific problems of citizens. Thus, **parties become something like problem-solving agencies**. This is very important to understand for parties that want to be successful.

I think that parties and party leaders have to understand, what it means to be a problem-solving agency. This means that you have to have potential as a political party. First of all, understand, what problems people have. Therefore, you must have "ears" in all society groups. In this regard, I can only support the Razumkov Centre and others in providing scientific and research basis for development of political parties. Today, successful European parties – are those parties that can figure out what people think, and provide solutions. So, it is not populism in its traditional sense: "to appeal to people and tell them, what they want to hear", – it is understanding their problems and ensuring resolution of these problems, possibly – their re-thinking.

Combining inner-party democracy with the problem-solving agency approach to building a party, makes parties lasting, sustainable and successful. This is a feature of the current moment. Yes, there are populists, but populists do not solve problems. They do not stay long – some go, others come. This is why we have high dynamics.

We have already seen this in Greece, where there were populist left-wing radicals and populist right-wing parties, because traditional parties could not solve the issue and the crisis that they brought in the government. The populists had no idea, what to do, – this was all just a big improvisation, which resulted in snap parliamentary elections.

But if you want a long-lasting party, a party that would have a chance to come to power and stay in power in a certain country, you had better become a problem-solving agency.

Several words on the things that are common for Ukraine and many EU countries. Everyone talks about the crisis of political parties and party system. The time will probably never come, when people say: "There is no political party or party system crisis".

I share the opinion that there is no point for Ukraine to try to model its parties and party system on the EU patterns from the 50-60s of the last century. There are general tendencies in our societies – they are becoming more and more individualistic. For instance, what is true for the Ukrainian society, is also true for Germany or another European society. And it is parties that have to provide these answers.

It should be said that the time for grand ideologies has passed. But this does not mean that the time of ideological concepts has been exhausted as well, if you take a slightly different approach to the meaning of ideology. Therefore, **parties have one very important function** – they **have to organise a meaningful discussion of different possibilities of resolving the issues in their society**.

A meaningful discussion of solutions can happen only on the basis of a value-based concept. There must be a concept of connection between the state and a citizen in order to create ideas for solving any problems. You must have an idea on how to organise economy. Thus,

[2] See, for example: A newly created party gains victory in Slovenia elections. – Euronews agency web-site, *http://ua.euronews.com/2014/07/14/miro-cerar-s-daunting-task-to-reform-slovenia-after-election-win*.

[3] Alternative for Germany party (AfD) (Ger. *Alternative für Deutschland*), founded on 6 February 2013, has a pronounced anti-European ideology, a portion of party members support the return to Deutsche Mark. Gained 6.5% votes in the elections to the European Parliament on 25 May 2014. See, for example: Merkel's Bloc wins European Parliament elections in Germany. – The Ukrainian Week web-site *http://tyzhden.ua/News/110710*.

left-wing parties think that the state should interfere, and the right-wing – that there should be a determined order and the economy should develop. If the parties do not work in this area, you will not have a meaningful discussion of how to resolve your country's problems.

The conceptual foundation of parties, including their values and ideology, also requires a deep meaningful discussion. If you do not have a discussion inside political parties about political concepts and ideologies, how will you solve any problems, when you are in power? If you lack a conceptual foundation for this?

So, if parties want to have long-term success, they must have programmatic and conceptual foundations, and lead meaningful discussions. I have worked a lot with a great number of political parties in different countries. This is always helpful for us, Germans, as well, as it allows to have a broader perspective on the problems – we live at a time, when many trends are not exclusively national, but rather exist in many countries at the same time. It is wise not to copy, what we did 30 years ago, but to act in sync with modern reality. ■

BOTH, POLAND AND UKRAINE HAVE TO THINK, HOW TO MAKE PARTIES MORE ACCOUNTABLE TO VOTERS

Dr. Anthony KAMINSKI,
Deputy Head of the Scientific Council at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences

Poland is seen as a country that has had success in political and economic transformations, and I think this is, to a certain extent, justified. But when I look at Ukraine's party system, I see that our systems, surprisingly for me, do not differ that much.

Today, government and political institutions face many problems. According to sociological surveys, the rating of trust in politicians is the lowest among all trust ratings. There is, probably, one exception from all political and government institutions – police, people trust them for some reason. Courts, prosecution, politicians are not trusted. Parliament and public administration have a very low level of support. So, **there is a problem of attitude to state operation**, despite the fact that we have had several changes of government, that the rate of economic growth is rather high, etc.

Another problem is low level of institutionalisation of political parties. 10 years ago, I would have said that we had two political parties that are institutionalised. These were the post-communist parties – Democratic Left Alliance (the successor of Polish United Labour Party) and Polish People's Party (the successor of United People's Party). They functioned as rather integrated political forces. Most parties that came from opposition, the Solidarity movement – have disappeared. And those that remained, in particular, "Law and Justice" and "Civic Platform", have serious problems.

So, **Poland's political system is currently in crisis**, and the crisis is deeper than it looks. What are the symptoms of this crisis? First of all, the relative success in the presidential election of P. Kukiz.[4] The key ideas of his election campaign were the introduction of single-mandate district elections, the change of leadership and destruction of the privileged ruling elite. According to him, this is the Westminster model. His slogans and activity played the key role in initiating a referendum, which, among other, included two really important questions – party funding and majority electoral system. 80% of those, who took part in the referendum, supported the Westminster model, and over 80% opposed party funding from the state budget, – however, we do not know, what they supported. The problem was that the referendum turnout was below 8%, which delighted the majority of political class, as it made the referendum non-binding.[5]

The next election is coming soon.[6] In my opinion, participation in this election will also be extremely low – it is unlikely to be more than 30%, and this is very low. The turnout for most of Poland's elections is below 50%, and very often even below 40%.

We are presented with **people's dissatisfaction with the political system**, and I believe there are several reasons for this. They are rooted not in the electoral system alone, and not in the party system alone, but in the constitutional system, which includes both, party and electoral systems. This means that these – are the signs of the beginning of our transformation.

For example, people think that almost all Warsaw government posts are taken by Civic Platform members,

Roundtable 16 September 2015

[4] Pawel Kukiz (born 1963) – Polish actor, musician and politician, deputy of the Lower Silesian Voivodeship Sejm. In Polish presidential election of 2015, ran as an independent candidate, and came third in the first round with 20% of votes.

[5] Polish referendum on 6 September 2015 included three questions: (1) on the possibility of introducing single-mandate districts in Sejm elections, (2) on cancelling party funding from the state budget, as well as (3) on ruling in favour of the taxpayer in controversial legal issues. See: The most expensive referendum in the history of Poland fell through due to low turnout. – Ukrinform, 7 September 2015, *http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-abroad/1881474-naydorogchiy_v_istoriii_polshchi_referendum_provalivsya_cherez_nizku_yavku_2092432.html.*

[6] The next parliamentary elections in Poland will take place on 25 October 2015.

Roundtable 16 September 2015

including the janitor job. This means that if you are not part of the Civic Platform, you have no chance of taking a post.

One of the reasons that we have not privatised some companies is that they are partly owned by state and have a board of directors, who they pay good money. In their turn, the leaders of coalition parties influence the board of directors. Thus, **political parties become the necessary tool for distribution of power, privileges, and money**. This is one of the reasons, why I expect a crisis.

The crisis will result in certain limiting of powers that political parties currently enjoy, so that they are more accountable to the public. And I believe that the issue of responsibility is of essence here – accountability of political parties to voters, government's accountability to parliament, and horizontal accountability.

Regarding political party funding. Today, in Poland there are several sources of party income. One source is funding an election campaign. In this case, parties have to provide a detailed report on their spending of election campaign funds. Second source – private donations and membership fees, and this is not the main portion of parties' income, which is, by the way, also more or less effectively controlled. Third (and the biggest) source is the foundation that finances parties' everyday operation, and is proportional to a party's electoral support during the latest elections. This means that the parties that gained more people's support, receive significant amounts of funds. In the case of Civic Platform – this is more than 17 mln PLN.[7] In case of Law and Justice – almost 17 mln PLN. And the third party gets 5 mln PLN.

This means that parties that were successful in the latest elections have significantly more financial resources to support their activity, than parties that had less success. And, for instance, the co-author of this law, Mr. L. Dorn,[8] who left Law and Justice for another party, found himself without any resources for launching this party, resulting, of course, in this party's disappearance.

Maybe, what we should think about, is how to make parties more accountable to people in a more efficient way, and I think, that this is not the issue of legal and regulatory changes. This is the question of creating serious mechanisms. ■

Session 1. DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE'S PARTY SYSTEM AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF MODERN EUROPEAN TRENDS

OUR POLITICAL PARTIES ARE PROTO-PARTIES, WHICH CAN POTENTIALLY TRANSFORM IN CLASSICAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Yuriy SHVEDA,
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Ukraine's party system is a part of its political system. Today we can speak about the crisis of the quasi-democratic system, which resulted in the Revolution of Dignity. And within the political system, we should speak about a serious crisis of the party system. **Such strong negative attitude to parties and politicians that exists in our society today, has not been observed for quite a while.**

A crisis has two aspects – it is an impulse to see the situation, and to map out ways of overcoming it. Party system crisis is not a unique occurrence. Many countries have found themselves in similar situations in regard to their political life, e.g., Italy and USA. But they found ways and mechanisms to restore, to purify the system.

Thus, raising the issue of our party system crisis should stimulate a discussion focused on finding mechanisms and ways out of the situation, in which parties within the political system have found themselves today. We need to demonstrate ways of purifying, restoring and normal operation of the party system as a mechanism of representation in a liberal democracy.

There is a classical definition by M. Duverger: "the character of a party system is determined by the character of political parties".[9] I.e., analysing the party system, one must consider the character of political parties that form it. Today, among those who study the political system and parties in Ukraine, there is a theoretical analytical discussion that actually is of practical value. It concerns the following question: are we really dealing with political parties in Ukraine in their classical form? Is what we call political parties really that in the scientific sense?

[7] 98.3 mln UAH by the official NBU exchange rate set on 19 October 2015.

[8] Ludwik Dorn (born 1954) – Polish politician, Sejm deputy. At the end of 2008, left Law and Justice party, and in October 2009, headed the new party Poland Plus.

[9] See Maurice Duverger. Political parties, 2002, p.263.

Some scientists say that we are dealing with impostors, fakes. Others (who also include me) believe that we are dealing with parties as institutions that are in the process of formation. Our political parties are proto-parties, which can potentially transform in classical political parties in the framework of liberal democracy, undergo the process of respective institutionalisation. With all the corresponding characteristics and functions that they have to carry out within the party system.

This raises the next question: what must be done for these proto-parties to transform into parties in their classical form? And, consequently, for the political system to transform into a real representative democracy with participation of political parties.

I think that **today the main problem concerning political party operation is the issue of their funding**. Numerous studies show that today political parties are perceived by experts and citizens as political projects of certain financial industrial groups, as political representatives of financial industrial capital.

We know that behind each party, particularly behind those represented in the Parliament, there are always economic interests. Which raises a question: whose interests does this or that party represent? Does it represent (as a classical political party should) interests of a certain social group, or interests of the capital that it serves, which enables it to get into the Parliament and partake in the government?

This question is followed by another – what is the nature of democracy that we have? We say that we have representative democracy, that the main tool for realisation of social interests are political parties, but it turns out that in fact they do not represent interests of social groups, but those of the capital that funds them.

Therefore, the issue of funding political parties is, in my opinion, the main one. Having resolved it, we will allow political parties to tear away from financial industrial groups in their work, focus on political and social functions that political parties have to carry out.

The question of state funding for political parties is debatable. Some support a liberal approach: if there is an association – look for ways to fund it. This has a grain of rationality. But there is also a European approach, according to which, parties carry out an important socio-political function and therefore require decent funding, which can come from the state budget. This has been in discussion for a long time – practically since early 1990s. At one point, the Law on state funding of political parties has been adopted,[10] but up until now this type of funding has not been introduced. Ukraine is possibly the last country in Europe, where such funding does not exist.[11] This is where all our problems come from.

The organisational problem is that **parties turn into associations of people that unite around a donor, a sponsor or a leader, whose objective is not to implement policies according to voters' interests, but to search for funding**.

The problem of determining the place of political parties is the problem of their position in regard to the state and civil society. "State – political parties" relations revive the old system of party operation, which is based on using administrative resources. Unfortunately, we already have experience of creating political parties using administrative resources. This is a faulty system that has led to a crisis of party building and political life in general. The crisis has not been overcome. Regrettably, **the government is taking the usual road of political party formation**.

Regarding political parties-civil society relations. In many countries (especially, in Eastern and Central Europe) that took the road of democratisation, the agents of change were not political parties, but large-scale socio-political movements. Here, a competition between political players is taking place in political life. On the one hand, it is political parties, on the other – socio-political movements, volunteer and other organisations, which participate in the political process.

The problem that hampers the development, preserves the situation as is, is that **political life is monopolised by political parties that do not have people's support** concerning nomination of candidates, coming to power, etc. Of course, political parties should be the subjects of political life, but not the only ones.

If we do not unfreeze people's participation in political life, other than through political parties, we will create an oligopoly, where parties do not perform the functions that they should. ■

PARTIES ARE TURNING INTO ELECTORAL MACHINES SERVING SELECT INTERESTS

Volodymyr FESENKO,
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Development of political parties and the political system itself is an indicator of the democratic system, all of its contradictions, shortcomings, features.

What is the problem in perception of the institute of political parties in Ukraine by experts and politicians? We perceive them compared to the ideal model, as if there was a typical, classical model of political parties. Specialists, who researched political parties, know: parties in the USA, Western and Eastern Europe, Asia, are very different. There are even discussions about the definition of the concept of "party" itself. And there is no single approach here. That is why, in my opinion, it is incorrect to compare parties with the ideal model.

[10] Apparently, this refers to the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Introduction of State Financing of Political Parties in Ukraine", adopted on 27 November 2003.

[11] At the time of the Roundtable of the above law, introducing state funding of political parties has not yet been adopted. However, on 8 October 2015 Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law "On State Funding of Parties", which position on the introduction of statutory annual state funding of political parties shall enter into force on 1 January 2017, financing start of the 2Q 2017.

Sometimes we compare our parties to the distinguished parties of the second half of the 20th century in Western Europe, in the European democracy. Technically, it is possible to take this approach, but we **have to consider changes that took place within the last 20 years**. Even in Western Europe parties are undergoing serious changes.

We sometimes say that parties should be purely ideological. But this phenomenon from the era of modernism is also undergoing a crisis. Division into right- and left-wing, conservative and liberal, socialist, etc., is not working that well today. Even in Western Europe these definitions are blurred. And in our society, the ideological scale of left and right almost does not work at all. This is not beneficial for parties.

In our country, it is not so much that parties define the nature of the political system, but rather – special features of the national political system determine characteristics of parties. While in the 1990s, parties tried to copy Western parties in their structure, ideological model, starting from the 2000s, they started doing a different thing. Parties are turning into electoral machines serving select interests. But whose interests are these? A popular opinion is that those, of oligarchs. I only agree partially.

Since the 2000s, the key actors in party formation and development are not oligarchs, but political leaders. In Ukraine, there formed a peculiar political market model. In the early 2000s, V. Yushchenko entered the political arena, later – V. Yanukovych, then – A. Yatseniuk, Yu. Tymoshenko, etc. Oligarchs started "investing" in leaders. **The higher the rating, the higher the level of capitalisation.** This is similar to stock market. Also, everybody thinks that a leader depends on oligarchs. In reality, this is not quite it. Once a leader has won the presidential election: «*Thanks a lot, you can go now*!", I do not owe anyone anything. Yes, at first he can give a little bit back for the money they have invested. But with a high rating, he can change sponsors. One example is O. Lyashko and his Radical Party. In the beginning, he was supported by oligarchs, now – by different ones. Later, there will be yet other ones.

Thus, **the leader factor is the dominating one**. Whether we like it or not, it works even better than the influence of oligarchs. The influence of big money is more indirect. It is the leader factor that causes the instability of political parties in Ukraine. Because the **inconstancy of political sympathies is a typical feature of our political life**.

Why does our cycle of influence of political parties last 10 - maximum 15 years? Our situation is similar to the one in Poland. V. Yushchenko became unpopular – and where is "Our Ukraine"? With V. Yanukovych gone – where is the Party of Regions? There have been many examples. Ideological parties in this sense are more stable. Today, CPU is practically gone from political life, socialists have found themselves in a similar situation. Let us see, what happens to "Svoboda", as here a leader's age and political generation aspects have effect.

Instability of political parties is also connected to the fact that **while political leaders and oligarchs come from interests, voters come from public sentiments**. In Western Ukraine, the favourites (persons and parties) change every 3-4 years. Sometimes more often. This is variability of party life, this is the so-called "disease of young democrats". The random nature of our politics also influences this.

Another important problem that I would like to note is the ambivalent attitude of our voters to parties. Ambivalence of public opinion is a characteristic feature of Ukrainian politics. A significant portion of our people want opposite things at the same time, e.g. as they wanted European integration along with an alliance with Russia. Today the situation is different.

The ambivalent attitude to parties manifests itself in the lack of trust, critical attitude to parties, and at the same time in the fact that the majority of people go and cast their vote. Preferences can change, choices, but people still vote. In this context, our situation is better than in Poland. Although the tendency of mistrust will lead to a decrease in voter turnout. **Ambivalence is a chance for political parties and democracy.**

A party that relies on results, and not on promises, will achieve improvement, stabilisation. Now, we are just at the beginning of the new party system. I cannot predict, what will become of it. This can be discussed after we come out of the military crisis, and others. Approximately in 2-3 years, a new research must be conducted.

I think that **resolution of the funding issue will not solve all the problems**. We see a critical attitude to this in Poland, and Razumkov Centre study confirmed this opinion also for Ukraine. I am afraid, some parties will speculate on this. We should seek a balanced approach to financing parties: on the one hand, introduce state funding, on the other – limit funding by private capital. **We need to work on the transparency of funding.** The problem is tied to transition from shadow to transparent economy.

This is one of the key problems. If we want our parties to come close to European ones, we must take care of the development of party democracy. Today, there is no normal internal party democracy even in the new parties. ■

PARTIES START RESEMBLING SOMETHING LIKE A CROSS BETWEEN BUSINESS START-UP LOGIC AND SHOW BUSINESS STAR PROMOTION

Maksym ROZUMNYI,
Head of the Department for Political Strategies, Senior Research Scientist of the National Institute for Strategic Studies

Crisis of Ukraine's party system and political system as a whole has two dimensions. On the one hand, it is part of the general crisis of civilizations, European politics, political institutions, motivation, participation. On the other hand, there is a specific Ukrainian dimension of crisis that has different origins and aspects.

I will highlight a point, to which we rarely pay attention. Western democracies, including the US, were built with the idea of how to make life in society more just, rational, understandable. Post-communist democracies were built with the idea of how to make life in society more like in Western democracies. Ukrainian democracy was built as a student-type. This is an additional factor in its susceptibility to crises.

Regarding the essence of crisis, we find ourselves in. Party and overall political system susceptibility to crises cannot be regarded out of social and cultural context. **You cannot consider internal party factors, political factors as tools to overcome crisis without looking at the general social context.**

How do I see the resolution of the current crisis? The hope shared by Ukrainian political system optimists that modernisation is taking place, a return to modernist connections between party operation and the political system, are illusory. We are not going to return to classical modernism in any dimension (be it social, cultural or political).

In today's civilization development, there are two powerful and uniquely possible vectors. One – is the vector leading to archaism, – represented in particular by the Islamic state Boko Haram, DPR, LPR, Cossak republics, etc. If Ukraine takes the path of ideologisation, it is bound to turn into archaisation.

Second vector – post-modernisation. Something that is already happening in Europe and in Ukraine (even to a greater extent). Parties start resembling something like a cross between business start-up logic and show business logic, the logic of show business star promotion. These are the phenomena of postmodern society. This is today's alternative to archaisation.

At this point, Ukraine's political system is leaning more towards the postmodern vector. Alternatives will appear in the form of archaic initiatives, which will integrate into the postmodern reality in the form of imitation projects. ■

IT IS EASIER FOR PARTIES TO RECEIVE "BLACK CASH"

Viktor TARAN,
Director of the Centre for Political Studies and Analysis

Introducing state funding for parties alone will not change anything, because parties will remain nontransparent, closed from public, unaccountable. They will still be able to receive "shadow cash" from oligarchs. Over the past six months, we have conducted more than 10 roundtables in the regions. The conclusion is – people are strongly against this system.

Roundtable 16 September 2015

This is why we have developed a draft "On Fighting Political Corruption".[12] Party funding topic takes half a page there. The model is simple – according to the 2003 draft law, where 1% of minimum salary is multiplied by the number of voters in the state registry, i.e. we multiply 12.78 UAH by 36 mln – this equals 442 mln.[13] This is the amount that parties can use starting from 1 January 2017. But 90% of the draft law talks about introducing new principles of transparency and accountability for political parties.

What must be introduced? First, restrictions for private capital, and legal entities and individuals. We offer such restrictions as 100 one-time contributions in a year for individuals and 200 – for legal entities. Everywhere we are talking about amounts tied to the minimum salary. Moreover, there will be a provision, according to which people and companies that provide such contributions have to report their sources of income.

Why do we have no trust for parties? Because they are nontransparent. We know nothing about their assets, how they spend their money – we only have one row at the end of the year in the tax service report. Over the next year, parties will have to undergo an audit and make its results available to the public. And, starting from the first day of receiving state funding, every three months, they will have to report *on-line* in this manner. At the end of the year, auditing companies with stringent standards of work will audit the parties.

We have named three main bodies, which are to control parties and their records. The CEC is joined by the Accounting Chamber and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption. They will review the reports, conduct logical and arithmetic analysis. If problems are found – strict measures will be applied to parties, from punitive penalties to termination of funding.

There is a great risk that this draft law will not be approved by the Parliament. Because there is resistance among political parties – they are not ready for such openness and transparency, even taking into account the "carrot" of state funding, as it is easier for them to receive "black cash".

[12] This refers to the draft Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning Prevention and Fighting Political Corruption" (reg. No.2123a), approved by the Verkhovna Rada as a whole on 8 October 2015.

[13] Apparently, the speaker cites calculations according to Art.17-2 of the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Introduction of State Financing of Political Parties in Ukraine", adopted on 27 November 2003.

We understand well that **the main funding violations take place during election campaigns**. Therefore, without a new law on political advertising, this law will not work. We hope that this law will be adopted, as it is the necessary one.

Another necessary law – a new version of the law on political parties. The version, according to which parties now work, – is the middle of the last millennium. It is out of touch with current reality. It talks about formation of parties based on hierarchical structure, the principle of democratic centralism. However, parties will be able to operate, only if we introduce new, horizontal structures. ■

PARTIES HAVE TO SERVE AS SOCIAL LIFTS, NOT BE THE LIFTS FOR A SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE

Halyna ZELENKO,
Leading Research Scientist at the I. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies of the National Academy of Scienses of Ukraine

In my opinion, introduction of innovations alone is not enough. The issue of political parties is a matter not only of parties themselves, but rather the political system as a whole. I object to calling what we currently have a party system. Rather, this is a set of political instruments that serve as lift to power for a large number of people. Rich people, whom it is almost impossible to control.

Today we have a new stage in the development of parties and party system. There are several factors that have a positive influence. One of them is the return to the parliamentary model, which strengthens competition. This factor generates social demand for development, formation of the party system. Another factor – the change of functions of parliamentary parties, transition to the parliamentary principle of Government formation. This has the effect of increasing political responsibility.

However, the positive impact of these factors is levelled out by the old electoral system. Its preservation is an enormous mistake, which is causing the complicated political situation that we now have.

I think that **so far, parties in Ukraine are not executing the classical functions that political parties have to execute**. And when a part of body does not execute its functions – it atrophies. This is what is happening to our parties.

The biggest problem of parties is the non-execution of their political representation functions. Parties have to serve as social lifts, not be the lifts for a small group of people.

Retaining closed party lists and old electoral system has caused the situation, where parties' organisational structure only exists on paper, because parties have no need to appeal directly to voters using their organisational structure – they use media.

In Ukraine, the electoral selection is rather simulated. People do not believe in parties, but go and cast their vote, because they have no choice. The space for movement is rather narrow. People voted based on the "lesser evil" principle.

Projections of party system development in Ukraine require institutional changes of the political system. We are facing the problem of finishing up the reform of the parliamentary model, to which we transitioned. **Unregulated problems**, starting from the powers of opposition parties and up to electoral system and improving the system of political accountability, **will not allow political parties to change on the qualitative level**.

The second component, which will influence the quality of formation of the party system, is **reducing the degree of political alienation**. At this point, it is very high, which is slowing down the development of political interests and political structure of society. ■

WE NEED TO LOOK FOR ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF INFLUENCE ON THE EXISTING PARTY SYSTEM

Olena STOIKO,
Senior Research Scientist at the V. M. Koretsky Institute of State and Law of the National Academy of Scienses of Ukraine

I want to draw attention to the problem, which is common for both, developed European countries, and for ours. It concerns the following question: who initiates changes in the party system? Why does a crisis occur? Because **the system does not adapt to conditions of the environment**.

Lack of system sensitivity to change is caused by the fact that parties set the rules of the game by themselves – it happens in developed countries, as well as in young democracies. People's dissatisfaction with existing game rules and the current situation, in Western Europe, leads to voting for extreme radical, anti-system parties. In Poland, there was public demand to change the electoral system, but the turnout for the referendum on transition to majority system was only 10% of voters.

In Ukraine, after the Orange Revolution, elections had been held according to proportional system only twice. Then we returned to the mixed system. After 2004, many parties promised to introduce the open party list system. However, this never happened, which resulted in the lack of trust for parties.

What are the ways out of this situation? We need to look for alternative methods of influence on the existing

party system. In Germany, in 1962, the Constitutional Court ruled that the 10% threshold is democratic, which limited party competition,[14] but facilitated development of the system.

Today, in Ukraine, the deputies who want to change something do not have the majority of votes. Why would they not appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding the fact that the proportional system with closed lists is not democratic? We do not know, what the decision will be, but this could be a push to change the situation.

The specific character of the situation in Ukraine is that the laws are not executed. The Ministry of Justice is the only authorised body that oversees parties' compliance with legislation. Ukraine's legislation prohibits operation of parties that aim to change the existing constitutional order and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice awaits the submission from State Security Service to ban the party headed by Pushylin.[15] This is unacceptable. ■

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP THE PARTY SYSTEM WITHOUT CHANGING THE UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

Oleksiy ANTYPOVYCH,
Director of the Sociological Group "Rating"

This entire time we have been talking about changing Ukraine's party system "from the top". Gradually, we are moving to the topic of voters, who are changing along with parties. Or parties are changing along with voters.

If there is public demand for populism, for leader-centred parties, – of course, there will be leader-centred and populist parties. There will be war topics, voter bribing through the use of different socio-economic factors. But parties use all of those things because voters accept them.

I am not saying that parties should be guided by voters' opinions only. But **because voters** go to the polling station and **give their support to this or that party, it keeps existing**. In Ukraine, if a party did not cross the threshold, did not manage to get into Parliament on its first or second try, there is little chance that it would get there on the third one.

Parties in Ukraine are being created with the purpose of gaining power, not for a longer perspective. There were two ideological parties – CPU and "Svoboda". Communists were banned, and "Svoboda" did not get into Parliament.

The existing parties are situational. We have already heard questions: where is "Our Ukraine", where is the Party of Regions? Where will be PPB, "People's Front", other parties? This is not a system that aims to develop the state, democracy, advancement into the European society. This is a system that ensures the rise to power of certain politicians.

It is impossible to develop the party system without changing the Ukrainian society. Civil society in Ukraine is developing, this process is still going on. But this movement is slow. In the nearest future, we should not expect European parties to appear in Ukraine or parties that focus on state development as they do in Europe. ■

PARTIES CONTINUE TO BE AN INSTRUMENT IN THE HANDS OF FINANCIAL OR OLIGARCHIC GROUPS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

Taras STETSKIV,
Member of the Central Office of the Republican Platform Party, People's Deputy of Ukraine of the I-IV, VI convocations

The first point is obvious – **Ukraine has no party tradition of Western European model**. This is one of the reasons, why our parties are like the European ones more in title and form, than the essence. Perhaps, in the future, they will also not become alike, – different tradition, historical development, etc.

Second point – today, **in Ukraine**, **there are no parties** that even **come close to classical**. In this regard, the period before Maidan and after it are not that different. The main reason for the current state, in which parties exist, is the oligarchic system in the country.

The fact is that even after Maidan, parties continue to be an instrument in the hands of financial or oligarchic groups in the struggle for power as means to access the distribution routes of country's resources. This does not depend on the will of ordinary party members, deputies, party members elected to government positions, even on the opinion of the leaders of these parties.

I disagree that leaders have in some way started to shape the face of their parties, at the moment they gain access – turn on the mechanisms of financial and other influence, coercion, and the leader returns to the boundaries set for him.

I can describe a classical way of creating, operation, and death of almost all (with several exceptions) political parties in Ukraine. First, we find a group of people, or an official (President or Prime Minister), or an oligarch, who want to create a party. Then, a brand is produced, which has to be brought to television

[14] Bundesverfassungsgericht, Urteil vom 5. April 1952 "*Sperrklausel Landeswahlgesetz SH*". – *http://www.wahlrecht.de/wahlpruefung/19520405.htm*.

[15] D. Pushylin is one of the leaders of the terrorist group "DNR", who is on the wanted list. Yet, CEC web-site lists party "We Have a Goal" headed by D. Pushylin among other political parties. See: Official CEC web-site, *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vm2015/PVM111?PT001F01=100*.

This party is also listed in the registry of political parties on the web-site of the Department of State Registration at the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. – *http://ddr.minjust.gov.ua/uk/ca9c78cf6b6ee6db5c05f0604acdbdec/politychni_partiyi*.

through advertising, corresponding messages are formulated. This is how all parties operate in our country. Access to television and major financial resources form a particular political party. This is a way to either "raise" a party from "ground level" to a certain position, or to destroy the party that does not correspond with the interests of a certain "money-bag".

My conclusion is very simple: **we will not be accepted in the EU with such parties**. We must do something with this. In what direction should we develop our parties? What is the "perfect", "right" party?

I believe that people, who want to engage in political activities, create political parties or develop existing ones, must not go with the stream. They must educate society, raise it to a certain level, offer it such solutions and ideas, which will pull it up to that level.

In my opinion, there are at least five features characteristic of a "right" party. *First*. **The party has to have an ideology** – only not in its modernist sense. We are talking not about the "-isms" (liberalisms, conservativisms, centre-right or centre-left orientation), this is all in the past.

A political party should play the role similar to what there is in the USA – a party should offer solutions for certain social issues. Parties should differ in their vision of the country's future. This is party ideology of the 21st century. Simply put, parties should provide answers to questions like these: "How do we resolve the issue of Ukraine's war in Donbas?", "What do we do with the land?", "What do we do with the oligarchs?"

Second. Parties must have a different structure from what they currently have. The structure of the majority of our parties is hierarchical, headed by a leader who is easily susceptible to external, mainly financial, control. Therefore, parties are easily controlled through controlling their leaders: one oligarch can easily buy one leader and control the party and the deputy corps through him. So all current parliamentary parties in Ukraine, without exception, are run like that.

Instead of hierarchical parties, we have to build horizontal and networking models. While in 1990s this issue was up for discussion, now, in the era of Internet, this is an obvious thing. Those **parties that can transform into horizontal, networking and poly-leader parties, will have a future**. While leader-centred parties have no future.

I am not against leadership. Quite the opposite, **Ukraine now is in dire need of leadership**. But not the leadership in its hierarchical sense: leader – herd or top dog – pack. A party is born, when the leader wants it, and dies when the leader ceases to want its existence, – the majority of our parties are like this.

Leadership must grow out of such horizontal and networking structure as the management of concepts and production of ideas that have the support of a certain part of society. In leader-centred parties this is impossible – they have a permanent leader in bronze.

Third feature is the presence of a real membership base. I can say that the position of a part of Ukrainian society that wants leader-centred parties, but pays no attention to the membership base, is the proof of paternalistic system. Somebody has to step beyond the boundaries. If a party has no membership base, it does not fulfil one of its four main functions – raising talent and bringing them to power.

In these local elections, we had a situation, where a number of parties with ratings and ability to get into local self-government bodies, had no membership base, to say nothing of deputy candidates. They had to look for them outside of the party. This is a consequence of the party system, which was being build in the country during 25 years, and did not care to build a real membership base. Here **we must launch mechanisms of inner-party democracy through legislation**. We need to use legislation to make our parties build a real membership base, to conduct real party meetings, etc.

Fourth are the multiple funding sources. A system, in which one oligarch funds one party, is doomed. This will always return the low quality deputy corps, which will vote in the Parliament or in local self-government bodies according to oligarchs' financial interests. This is unless there are multiple sources of funding for political parties, including state funding. At this point, **introduction of state funding would be a plus**.

Fifth feature is the **presence of regular civic activity**. There is a big difference between presenting a party through billboard or television advertising, and showing on television a particular action that the party has taken in some locality.

In my opinion, if a group of politicians or a political party used these five features as the basis for reforming their organisation, they would be the future of the Ukrainian party system.

Thus, when there appears a party, built on a different basis than the existing, it will own the future, it will lead the transformation of the entire political system of Ukraine. ■

THE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE'S POLITICAL SYSTEM LAGS FAR BEHIND THE EUROPEAN LEVEL

Dmytro SIMANSKYI,
Member of the Political Council of "Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP", Head of Kyiv City Branch of the party

We are a young party. "UKROP" is taking part in the elections. And we view any discussions on limiting party competition[16] as restrictions for conducting political activities.

When we talk about limiting the funding of political parties, their possibility of political advertising, we must clearly realise that in this way we preserve the existing political system and existing political leaders.

[16] This was mentioned in the context of introducing state funding for parties.

Let us speak honestly: political parties in the entire world compete not only for people's votes, but also for the wallets of those who finance political parties. Do they not?

We support the need to work towards transparency, not only of the funding of political parties. But voters that come to local elections are people, who cast their votes for people. **The political parties that are currently in the Parliament, have created for us the system of local elections that throws us back into Middle Ages!** With gender quotas!

Dear European organisers! Let us honestly acknowledge that the level of development of Ukrainian society and Ukrainian political system lags far behind the European level. So maybe it is unwise to rashly impose the European model upon us? Maybe we had better take the road of the American system? ■

WE HAVE A GREAT CHANCE TO CREATE A POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

Yuriy SHTEPA,
Political Expert

What has Maidan shown us? Millions of people in the streets, the most educated representatives of the Ukrainian society. None of the registered parties has come forward, none has assumed responsibility for further actions. We stood and kept silent, we were waiting.

What has Maidan shown us? **There is no political party system in Ukraine.** There are many parties, but no system. There are no backbone parties. We can talk as long as we want about the influence of Europe, America, Canada, etc. But party system should be based on two legs, and then others are added. These are the conservative and the liberal ideologies, and then – all the other "isms". We cannot avoid the "isms". This is the tree, on which branches and leaves grow, this is the development of the political system.

Roundtable 16 September 2015

Before this Round Table, I was trying to figure out – where is the Ukrainian conservative party, where is the Ukrainian liberal party? Where is the democratic party of Ukraine? Meanwhile, when survey information on people's expectations was presented – it contained conservative ideology, 100%. We know, that in many countries (in particular, in the UK, Canada), conservative parties assume responsibility for salaried employees, socially vulnerable groups of people, etc.

So we have no system. This means that we have a great opportunity to create it. What has Maidan given us? New people! Those that the previous government tried to suppress. In the past five years, there have been no new leaders, no new faces in politics. Now we have new people. Who are they? Public opinion leaders? No. Public attention leaders.

They have come forward, but they do not know, what to do next. They cannot institutionalise themselves. In the last parliamentary elections we had to create new parties, which got into Parliament in the end. Now – local elections – new parties again. This means that there is no party system. This is anything but the party system. We **need** to make a step forward, not back, **and create new conservatives, liberals, democrats**.

What has changed in Ukraine? Ukrainian society as a whole was decapitalised. I.e. the level of capitalisation has dropped, thus, there is an opportunity. We have reached public consensus – any political parties can be created, function, but they have to be based on two principles: patriotism and democracy. This will be the basis for creating a new party system in Ukraine. ■

Session 2. CURRENT STATE AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE

PARTIES SHOULD ENGAGE IN POLITICAL SOCIALISATION OF CITIZENS

Antonina KOLODIY,
Head of the Department of Political Science and Philosophy of Lviv Regional Institute of Public Administration of the National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine

I am very concerned about political parties and their development because they should be the foundation of democracy. In our country, they are not such a foundation. But they still perform certain functions that someone must perform, even in such an immature, in terms of democratic development, society as ours.

If we compare the segment of civil society as the foundation of democracy and the party life segment, this comparison will not be in favour of parties. The

Roundtable 16 September 2015

word "crisis" was said many times. I also believe that our party system and the parties are in crisis. The party system has simply not yet formed.

The development of political parties happened in many stages that were very different. There were attempts to create a one-party system or an authoritarian two-party system. Maidan has crushed these intentions. After it, we have found ourselves back at the bottom of the ladder. Those **democratically-minded political forces**, which are ready to build the democratic society in Ukraine, **have united into what they call "parties"**. In reality, these are corporation type leader-focused associations. Mainly, **politicians united around those leaders, who had money**. Where the money came from is another story. Either from oligarchs or own pocket. The leader of PPB "Solidarity" says that P. Porosheko funds this party by himself. The same is said by "Samopomich" leader A. Sadovyi. People join the party hoping to gain access to power, to have a leader who will provide such access.

So I would call this quasi-parties. We should try to create such associations, which in the absence of real parties would perform the functions that should be performed by parties. Pluralistic politics cannot exist without such associations.

We have no party system, because parties are changing. There was information that only 22% of people, in the elections, voted for the same parties, which they chose previously. This is why parties disappear. So what party system can we talk about? There is no stability of political parties – no party system, so voters cannot vote for the same parties. The problem is not the voters. The problem is in the institutional foundation of the entire party mechanism.

What kind of parties should we aim for? We have heard detailed characteristics. In a pluralistic society, we must assume that parties can be different. We cannot impose one model for the entire society. There will always be a certain range of different types of parties – whether we want this or not.

A desirable model – networking member-based parties. But is it possible to implement it in Ukraine? I have been carefully watching organisation "Power of People" – originally, it was a public association, then a political party. But they do not assert themselves as politicians in any way. Same with other projects. We have to move from project to real life. Life should create stimuli, which would help form this type of parties. Perhaps such parties can coexist with personnel-based parties.

Different parties can coexist. But there have to be restrictions. The Constitution and laws are written so that there is no arbitrariness, abuse of power, ways to power. In our country, ways of gaining power are greatly abused. Today, there are 290 parties, over 50 from which were registered within the past nine months.[17] I teach students not to worry about that number. In the USA, there are also over 150 parties.[18] The important ones are those that take part in the electoral process.

But what kind of parties are these new parties? After 21 February 2014, I have divided them into the following groups: corporate-type parties around people with money; there is an attempt to create voter-based parties, or programme parties. Ideological and programme parties are not the same thing. We need programme parties, ideological – not so much. Programme parties are exactly the ones that realise the declared statement that parties have to provide solutions to problems, have to become laboratories for solution development. They have to tell voters, how they plan to solve certain problems. And then implement it in real life. According to a set of attributes they will be appreciated as an effective party. Programme parties are: "Democratic Alliance", which also failed to achieve anything, "Power of people", others, which are few.

The majority of new political parties, people that head them, their names, tell that these parties are nothing. So maybe we should just ignore this? We should not. Because, what are they created for? Just in case. To include more people in the election commission. Unfortunately, our legislation allows strong oligarchic parties to use these puppet parties. This is why, some people, in order to sell themselves, create parties out of thin air.

What kind of legislation do we have, that allows to register 30 political parties in a week? Who is checking, what these parties are? Several years ago, one of my post-graduate students has researched that most parties do not have a real structure "beneath". Then, this must be controlled. **Our legislation must be more strict and must be abided by.** There should probably be a volunteer movement, which would support this.

A purely oligarchic party is UKROP. Leader-centred oligarchic parties exist to support leaders. An oligarch creates a party, because someone is after his business.

In social networks there is a buzz around Pushylin's party.[19] Yes, separatist parties are also registered in our country – no one controls this.

Ideological parties – far right and far left. However, we are aware that **pure ideology** (be it nationalistic or

[17] Department of State Registration web-site, "Information on political parties registered in the order defined by law as of 07 September 2015". – *http://ddr.minjust.gov.ua/uk/ca9c78cf6b6ee6db5c05f0604acdbdec/politychni_partiyi*.

[18] According to information from the independent non-partisan web-site BallotPedia, as of April 2015, there are 221 parties in the USA. See: List of political parties in the United States. – Online encyclopedia Ballotpedia, *http://ballotpedia.org/List_of_political_parties_in_the_United_States*.

[19] See note 15.

communist) **can never be implemented in the country**. Both are outdated, both are out of touch with society's relevant problems. Therefore, these are quasi-ideologies.

Old-style parties have no place in modern society. And **programmes of new parties have to talk about values**. Values can also be presented in programmes as mechanisms of resolving problems. Sometimes programmes are written only on the level of slogans. In case real programmes are developed, which include mechanisms of resolving problems, not just their enumeration, such programmes will differ.

It has been said that we need to improve the efficiency of legal regulation. This is 100% true. Regarding restrictions – where is the limit? Oligarchic parties have set such a high level of financial competition in our society that the majority of actors in the political process, – those, who want to work for the benefit of the society, not those standing behind parties, – simply cannot afford it. **The oligarchs have virtually introduced an unofficial electoral threshold.** I.e. qualification to be elected. This concerns not only the deposit. The entire election campaign costs enormous amounts of money. This is why, legislation should limit anything that can raise the cost of elections. We have enough specialists, who know how to do this technically.

In a democratic society, all associations that want to have a specific name, allegedly, have to be registered. But checks must be conducted, the work of the party – monitored. In my opinion, we do not need to register those "worthless" formations (I will allow myself to use this harsh word) – we should not legitimise them by publishing their details on CEC's web-site. They have not yet declared themselves as entities within the electoral process. This is why there was such a buzz about Pushylin's party – people thought it would participate in the electoral process. We should publish information on those parties that meet all the requirements, have registered for the elections.

Educating people is a very important function of political parties. This is political socialisation of people. If the parties together do not lead public discussions, do not develop policies, do not have any programmes for problem resolution, – they do not work with people, they have no members. Then there is no internal party democracy by definition, because we have no parties, in which to realise it. Parties should engage in political socialisation of citizens. While in our country – they are trying to have their way through buckwheat and other similar means. ■

Roundtable 16 September 2015

IT IS NECESSARY TO BUILD A MODEL THAT WILL HAVE A HIGHER PRICE FOR THE SOCIETY, BUT WILL BE A BETTER ONE

Anatoliy LUTSENKO,
GMT Group Director

Our current situation is the consequence of how much our practices differ from our theories. I participated in the development of many large party projects in our country. In "People's Union "Our Ukraine" there was an attempt to introduce public funding: "white" salary for the management, party staff, a separate account was opened in the state-owned "Eximbank", in order to keep the incoming funds completely transparent, etc. And what did this beautiful experiment result in? In a year, V. Yanukovych became Prime Minister. And through tax authorities, party staff were so blatantly chased and prosecuted in courts that the experiment was ended. There were no chances to keep it going.

Along with experiment, there was the first (and so far, the only) attempt to create party structure based on the European model. At that time, many European experts were involved. They wanted to apply the European model of party "lifts", many details were worked through in order to impose own "agenda" and lead in the necessary direction. But Ukrainian politics absorbs everything very fast. That was back at time of the Constitution of 2004 – before the usurpation of power and the rest.

The following political projects were more adapted to practices, less concerned with basic things that were important in their shape for Europe and the world. But in Ukraine, event at the primary level, no one could bring those into the field of practical action.

Degradation reached the point, where most of the current political projects are nothing but a brand pumped with funding, the 90% of which has no structure.

We are talking about ideology. I, as a person with a post-graduate degree in political studies, understand everything. And in our parties, people do not understand the word "ideology". Parties come for a certain result. They think that "ideology" is something from the past century, something from Marxism-Leninism. This is why we see the situation that we have. Degradation continues, because having even with this approach, parties can still get into the Parliament, form huge factions, coalitions, etc.

What is the motivation for the political class? What is the motivation for active members of society, who are concerned with the political process? To change, to move to theoretically comprehensible to us (and

once even tested) rails. I see this transition in the exceptionally practical level. We should start with the first step – change completely the Law on Political Parties and the Law on Elections. I, like many political strategists and other people, had hopes that democratic parliamentary elections will bring the change of the Law on Elections, CEC composition, as well as legislation on the CEC.

Society's electoral matrix is very agitated. So today we must ensure a methodologically correct approach to resolving problems on the level of legislation: new laws on elections and political parties, CEC reform. What do I mean by the CEC reform? I am familiar with the practice of going through our elections. **Local elections is an obstacle race, when chaos creates chaos.**

Therefore, it is necessary to build a model that will possibly have a higher price for the society, but will be a better one. If we fund patrol police, why cannot we fund the reform of the CEC as an agency that makes crucial decisions? I would follow the model of reforming CEC and establishing regular regional offices and commissions at the local level.

Changing the legislation, we should also change the core of committees' employees. We need to get rid of such practices, when members of "technical" parties get into most election commissions.[20]

Several practical things. We need to give proper consideration to the issue of political advertising. First: not to destroy completely our advertising market, which is destitute enough, having refused from political advertising. Second: if the money is not used for advertising, this will cause the spread of direct bribing of voters. The money will simply go "in the shadows". Then there will be not just the buckwheat, but the entire set according to marketing schemes. So we have to approach these issues carefully. With the current Parliament composition is hard to think about this, as everything is very chaotic. ■

Roundtable 16 September 2015

PARTIES ARE WHAT SOCIETY ALLOWS THEM TO BE

Mariia KARMAZINA,
Head of Department for Socio-Political History at the I. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies of the National Academy of Scienses of Ukraine

I will start with the fact that there are 293 officially registered parties.[21]

I would like to say a few words about the plane, in which we are looking at our problem. We are saying that the party system is in crisis. And I at once ask: and in 24.5 years it has not been in crisis?

We are saying that we lack a normal party system. Question: what is a "normal party system"? What is a norm? It turns out, everyone has their own norm. "Quasi-", "proto-parties", "nothing-parties", "sub-institutes", etc.

I believe that our thinking is stuck in theories and concepts of the II half of XX century. Our consciousness is somewhere in the past. The same is true of speaking about what a classical party should do. I remembered the woman (or the man?..), who won the Eurovision – Conchita Wurst.[22] You can tell this person that he/she is neither a man, nor a woman, that there is no place for such people on television – but this person is there. What I mean is that if someone, who calls itself a party, goes through state registration, then even if it has a beard and wears a skirt, we shall treat it as a party. **We need to base our judgments on real life, not on created illusions and theoretical concepts that have nothing in common with life.**

One of parties' characteristics today is Proteus-like inconstancy. In 2014-2015, they are different from what they used to be 2010, and even more so than in the 1990s. Parties are, on the one hand, what society allows them to be, and on the other, – the state, the registrar, those who embody the power, who make up the rules in the country, in the party system, in society.

Society has long been passive, indifferent to itself, and parties have been using this. **Our party system, political system simply did not have provisions for an individual's activity.** This is why we say that parties are ugly. They created the rules, and they play by them.

We have talked about the legislation, and about the rewriting of many laws. But I would like to emphasise the role of the state, those agencies that register, give the go-ahead for a party's existence. We have a problem

[20] This obviously refers to the situation that took place during elections of people's deputies of Ukraine in 2012. Then, following the results of drawing for including candidates in the 225 territorial election committees (TEC), most places were taken by technical parties, which nominated the minimum number of candidates for the elections and did not conduct an active election campaign. See, in particular: TEC composition drawing results: Dwarf-parties gained representation in all territorial commissions. – RBC Ukraine, 28 August 2012, *http://www.rbc.ua/ukr/analytics/itogi-zherebevki-sostav-oik-partii-karliki-poluchili-predstavitelstvo-28082012102700*.

[21] Although the web-site of the Department of State Registration lists 290 (For more information, see: *http://ddr.minjust.gov.ua/uk/ca9c78cf6b6ee6db5c05f0604acdbdec/politychni_partiyi*), and the official CEC web-site – 294 (*http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vm2015/PVM111?PT001F01=100*).

[22] Thomas Neuwirth – a pop artist from Austria, who portrays a drag queen (male artist dressing in female clothes) under the name Conchita Wurst. He became the winner of the Eurovision song contest in 2014 in Copenhagen (Denmark), with the song Rise Like a Phoenix.

with those agencies. Why cannot we figure out, how many parties we have – 200, 290 or 293? The web-site was down for half a year – it was being rebuilt, money was invested once more, but even now it does not reflect the real situation. It shows 290 items. There are also blank cells opposite items 199, 200, 201.[23] Who are they reserved for? Why are they blank?

When we see this picture, we can say that everything is turning into farce. In the late 1980s, we were starting with the people's movement "For Reformation".[24] And today we are finishing "For Kernes!".[25] What ideology are we talking about, what programmes? One of the speakers voiced a very sound idea: parties should educate people. And I start thinking: what can a party like "For Kernes" teach me, an average voter? I do not even want to hear about it, but I understand that every Jack has his Jill.

Studying registration lists, one can see that some parties cannot cease their work for years, for example, "The Ukrainian Platform" is unable to do it since 2011.[26] The state creates such conditions that a party cannot die. One cannot die, another one – cannot be born. In V. Yanukovych's time, many parties were refused registration several times. The Polish Party of Ukraine, Galician party, "Green Trident", etc. are now legalised. How do we evaluate the process that allowed them to be born? Is this a positive tendency or not? The registrar is not very careful, it does no monitoring, it is indifferent to the quality of parties. For many years, certain parties have been portrayed as anti-Ukrainian. I am asking: should there be a threshold for registration? You will be allowed to officially exist, will be legitimised, but what are you really doing (as opposed to writing in the programmes)? We should base our judgments on the real life, because programmes and statutes are all very well written. But in reality, a very different process is taking place.

Why does the registrar remain indifferent, when parties are refused registration? In the end, a party will find a loophole. The old party is renamed as The Polish Party of Ukraine.[27]

Looking at the Ministry of Justice list of parties, the oldest party of 1990 today is called "The Republican Platform". In its history, this party has changed its name at least five times. Its origins are connected with L. Lukianenko. How authentic is this party in its programmes, ideologies? This is of no importance to the registrar. It only formalises the process. And then parties come into the society and instead of educating it, pour into it their share of poison. Some end up with paralysed willpower, some – indifferent, some – with the shifted focus of consciousness. Should the registrar think about this in the moment of registration?

The government has changed, but I like the current Ministry of Justice web-site less, than the previous. The previous one gave a clear idea of how many offices there are, the location of these regional offices, last names of their heads. Today, the information is scarce. Why does the government not want for simple citizens or potential party members to know about the resource potential of the party in the form of organisational structure?

Previously, all decisions of the State Registration Service of Ukraine were published, now we could only hope for this. With these decisions, one could see, who was refused, their number, and in which situations issues were ignored and parties – registered.

Why are we facing this situation? I believe, because **we keep wavering between authoritarianism and democracy**. Whatever laws we write – regarding parties, funding – if the situation in the country is not changed on all levels, in the context of legislation, judicial system, corruption, – we will keep wavering. **If the entire system becomes democratic, then the party system and parties will become democratic by themselves**, their face will be changing. ■

WE ARE UNABLE TO CLEARLY FORMULATE, WHAT IT IS THAT WE WANT FROM A PARTY

Nataliia BOHASHEVA,
Chief Consultant of Legislation Institute of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

What is it that we want from a party, how do we see it? We talk a lot, but we cannot clearly formulate, what it is that we want from it.

There is a European Code of good practice in the field of political parties.[28] It states that there should not be excessive requirements for political parties. Parties must be registered and be functioning. Our Constitution states that citizens have the right to form associations.[29]

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[23] Department of State Registration web-site, "Information on political parties registered in the order defined by law as of 07 September 2015". – *http://ddr.minjust.gov.ua/uk/ca9c78cf6b6ee6db5c05f0604acdbdec/politychni_partiyi*.

[24] This refers to political party "People's Movement of Ukraine" (Rukh, NRU), founded in 1989 as a public political organisation, with a founding congress titled "People's Movement of Ukraine for Reformation" took place in September 1989 in Kyiv. In 1993, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine registered NRU as a political party.

[25] This refers to political party "For Kernes! (for constructive economic reforms, non-acceptance of extremism, resistance to authoritarianism!)", registered on 9 September 2015, and taking part in local elections on 25 October 2015. See, for example: official web-site of the CEC, section local elections Ukraine 2015, *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vm2015/PVM109?PT001F01=100*.

[26] For more information, see: Department of State Registration web-site, "Information on political parties registered in the order defined by law as of 07 September 2015"…

[27] This obviously refers to a refusal to register political party "The Polish Party of Ukraine" in September 2014. – Web-site of the State Registration Service of Ukraine, *http://www.drsu.gov.ua/show/13413*. However, on the web-site of the Department of State Registration, in section "Information on political parties registered in the order defined by law as of 07 September 2015", under No. 228, is listed political party "The Polish Party of Ukraine" with date of registration 6 October 2014. – *http://ddr.minjust.gov.ua/uk/ca9c78cf6b6ee6db5c05f0604acdbdec/politychni_partiyi*.

[28] This obviously refers to the Code of Good Practice in the field of Political Parties. – European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), *http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282009%29002-e*.

[29] The Constitution of Ukraine, Art. 36. "Citizens of Ukraine have the right to freedom of association in political parties and public organisations…".

And political parties should facilitate the exertion of political will of citizens through taking part in elections. Article 37 of the Constitution defines limitations for political parties, the operation of which can be prohibited, in particular those, goals or actions of which are aimed at liquidation of the independence of Ukraine. Then we look at the Law of Ukraine "Political Parties in Ukraine".

There are restrictions for the names of parties, associations. In 2014, 42 political parties were created. The registration of three was cancelled. In 2015, as of 15 September, 56 parties were created. I.e., **there are no problems in creating parties**.

About the registrar. What can it do? Comply with the Constitution, law, European practice. Because there is also the European Court of Human Rights, which stated that a party can be prohibited only under certain circumstances.[30] This ensures the right to exist for any parties that comply with the law. The requirements are set by the law – about the name, about maintaining a certain number of regional offices, etc. The registrar has other requirements – if a party has not established its offices, regional organisations within half a year, this gives grounds for cancelling its registration certificate. Also, if a party's actions are in conflict with the Constitution, laws.

Today, there are 290 parties.[31] Whereas, 360 were registered. The registration of some of them was cancelled, some ceased their operations. Their programmes are hardly different from each other. Requirements to statutes are also limited to only ten points. All the rest is up to the party itself.

Starting from 2013, we have a new tendency – parties are actively changing their statute, programme, and along with this, their name and steering bodies. In 2103, there have been not less than 10 of such cases. Indeed, previously, the web-site of the state registrar provided information on the decisions of the legalising body in the closed form - the decision on registration, ceasing of activity, etc. has been made. This allowed to search for documents and figure out what to do next. Today, were have none of this. We do not know, what parties have been registered, and why others have been refused registration.

I have worked at the Ministry of Justice, in the Department that registers political parties. The documents are submitted in the horrible form! Those signatures that have to be collected by law, are forged, as a rule, in one room. They even do not correspond with the administrative-territorial structure of Ukraine. Therefore, refusal is a natural response.

Regarding party names. There are no other requirements in the legislation, than the one that the name must be different from other parties' names. There used to be People's Movement of Ukraine, then People's Movement "For Unity!" was registered. There are no grounds for the state authority to ban this. Maybe, today this is right.

Out of 290 parties that we currently have, up to 90 parties participate in elections.[32] Why? Because today we have one more requirement to cancel a party's registration – non-participation in elections for 10 years. Such parties are liquidated. Voters rate party funding as the last factor that influences their choice. However, for parties this is extremely important. A party cannot have air time on television, print information about itself in a newspaper (besides the one that it publishes itself), because it is terribly short of funds. This is without the involvement of oligarchs. This is also a problem that prevents a party from active actions.

Internal party democracy should be defined on the level of legislation. Another problem – where do we get party statutes? On political parties' web-sites we have found 30 statutes, and there is no access to others. The question of internal party democracy is raised in the statutes of two or three parties, "from the old ones".

If there is a possibility to introduce state funding for parties – this will be good. There is a 5% threshold for a party to get into Parliament, if a party gains over 1% – then there is a possibility for funding by the state.

Six parties gained from 1% to 4% of votes in the last elections.[33] In the elections of 2012, there were only two such parties. Previous years – 2-3 parties. Therefore, the issue of funding parties that gained over 1% of votes will not be a problem for the state. But there is no political will and desire to change this number.

A huge problem for the law is the termination of a political party's operation, certificate revocation, party merger. This, in my opinion, is also something that should be changed in it. In regard to other things, our law is rather democratic, it meets European requirements set for political parties. ■

A PARTY SHOULD PROVE IN SOME WAY THAT IT IS TRULY NATIONAL

Yuriy KLIUCHKOVSKYI,
President of the Election Law Institute, People's Deputy of Ukraine of the III-VI convocation

I will speak not about elections, but about parties. There is a need for legal resolution of these problems. We can analyse the political system at length, – its type, parties' types, but if regulations do not match the real needs, – then there develops the situation that we currently find ourselves in.

Frankly, it was unpleasant to hear the words about parties pouring poison into society. This is an almost direct quotation of C. Schmitt[34] – one of the ideologists of the Nazi regime. Despite all our dislike for parties, such anti-party attitude should not exist.

[30] This refers to the Criteria Developed by the European Court of Human Rights on the Dissolution of Political Parties. – Fordham International Law Journal, *http://fordhamilj.org/files/2015/09/2.CriteriaDevelopedbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsontheD.pdf*.

[31] See note 21.

[32] As of 20 October 2015, 142 parties will be taking part in local elections. For more information, see: official CEC web-site, *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vm2015/PVM109?PT001F01=100*.

[33] This refers to early elections of people's deputies of Ukraine on 26 October 2014. For results in the national multi-mandate electoral district, see *http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp300?PT001F01=910*.

[34] *Carl Schmitt*, a well-known German jurist of the interwar period, state (constitutional) law researcher, classic of political thought. Critic of liberalism, proponent of conservative approaches. Was a member of the NSDAP, had to undergo de-nazification.

Looking at the issue of parties, we have to consider it from the legal point of view. The law itself establishes boundaries, in which parties are allowed to operate. Venice Commission has a very good slogan: "Democracy through Law".[35] This is an important thing.

What is the main function of political parties? Why are parties created at all? Looking at international standards we see that **the main function of parties is to nominate candidates for elections**. All the rest – support this function, all the rest is consequential. It is because a party must nominate candidates for elections, it should unite them, consider various programmes. Nominating candidates, a party should tell people, what they will do, etc. Therefore, all definitions of political parties in all documents are reduced to this basic function – nominating candidates for elections and coming to power through elections.

What should be the requirements to nominate candidates for elections? I would like to voice my opinion regarding parties without members. In this case, what is nominating candidates for elections? A label? This is impossible. As defined by the Constitution and the law on political parties, a party is an association of citizens[36], and these citizens are its members. If there is no association of citizens – there is no party. A party without membership, in my opinion, is a fiction. However, there can be a party with a small number of members. A well-known phrase, which was often repeated during scrupulous consideration of issues related to developing People's Union "Our Ukraine": "You can build a party all you want, you will still end up with the CPSU".[37] We are used to big parties, to massive involvement, but this is not mandatory at all.

How do we determine the number of members a party has? Some countries establish an official requirement for parties to annually report on the number of their members and even list each of them by name. In some countries these numbers become humongous. In Russia, a party has to name 50 thousand members in order to be able to operate.[38] Moldova requires a by-name list of 1 000 members submitted to the Ministry of Justice – without this a party ceases to exist.[39]

What requirements for party scale should we establish? At first, we need to answer the question, whether we accept operation of regional parties or parties can only be national. I think, the answer should be such as provided in the Law on parties – only national parties have the right to function.[40] This means that a party must prove in some way that it is truly national, that not all of its members are in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk

or Donetsk. We should look for ways to prove this. The Law is offering such a way – presence of a corresponding number of local offices. But there is still a question: are those dummy organisations? Maybe there are no members there, just registration?

We must have parties confirm their national character through presence of corresponding local organisations and an annual public confirmation of their senior staff composition, both on the level of the party as a whole, and on the level of local organisations. Starting from the level, at which they start nominating candidates in local elections, districts and oblasts.

There is a great variety of approaches to creating parties in different European countries. It is said, there are two main approaches to legal regulation of party operation – British and German. The British is considered very liberal. But let us look at British legislation concerning political parties. Officially, parties in the United Kingdom do not nominate candidates. France too has the majority system, Germany – single-member districts. And in the United Kingdom, parties only declare a candidate's connection to the corresponding political party in a political statement. The party simply states: this is our candidate. And the candidate's registration happens on the basis of his own desire and 10 signatures of voters from the corresponding district.[41] This is why they can take the liberal approach.

In our situation, we want to be aware not only politically, but also legally, who is nominating the candidates. We have to see that a party exists, that is has members, that it is registered – otherwise, we do not know, who nominates the candidates.

However, **party registration cannot be viewed as state's approval of its existence**. This is just the

[35] Official name of the Venice Commission is "The European Commission for Democracy through Law".

[36] The Constitution of Ukraine, Art. 36, the Law of Ukraine "On Political Parties in Ukraine", Art. 2.

[37] This is a paraphrase of the famous saying of V. Chernomyrdin ((1938-2010) – Russian statesman, RF Prime Minister in 1992-1998, RF Ambassador to Ukraine in 2001-2009) "*Whatever public organisation we build, we still end up with the CPSU*".

[38] Art. 3 "*The notion of political party and its structure*" of the Federal Law of the RF "*On Political Parties*" among other things states "*…a political party must include not less than fifty thousand political party members…*".

[39] According to Art. 8 "*Submitting documents for political party registration*" (Ch. III. Registration and records of political parties) of the Law of the Republic of Moldova "*On Political Parties*", "*in order to register a political party at the Ministry of Justice, the following documents must be submitted*: …d) *a founding document, supplemented by the list of party members, the number of which should not be less than four thousand…*".

[40] This, obviously, refers to p. 2 of Art. 3 of the Law of Ukraine "On Political Parties in Ukraine", namely "Political parties in Ukraine are created and operate only with the national status".

[41] See: *UK Parliamentary general election and local government elections in England on 7 May 2015: guidance for (Acting)*, *http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/175376/Part-C-Administering-the-poll-UKPGE-LGEW.pdf, p. 16.*

Roundtable 16 September 2015

acknowledgement of a party's existence and the fact that it meets certain set requirements, constitutional norms, which have already been mentioned.

Party registration provides protection for the party itself. We know of a case during local elections of 2010, when in Kyiv and Lviv oblasts, candidates from the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" were people, excluded from the party.[42] They were registered, and then a party brought their candidate lists – it turned out that it nominates them for the second time. The case was being considered in court for a long time, which paralysed the party's participation in elections in those oblasts. The court ruled that the statutory leadership of the party had the right to nominate those candidates, but this happened already after the elections.

There is also a question, which party has the right to bear the corresponding name, as we have numerous occasions of mimicry of political parties... I think that **one of the main flaws in party regulation is the absence of clear requirements for their names**. Only when we prohibit the practices of naming parties after personalities, regions, changing their name during the period of their operation (when the Party of Pensioners changes into the "For Ukraine!" party, having changed nothing but their name and senior staff), this will help stabilise the party system.

Article 37 of the Constitution defines requirements for the programmes.[43] We can say that parties do not necessarily have to have differences in ideology, only in programmes of action – national socio-political development programmes. However, we cannot say that parties can do without any ideology. One can not realise he speaks in prose, but he still speaks in it. If a party does not teach its members a certain set of values, then drastic changes of this party are viewed as acceptable – and party members do not protest.

After World War II, in the entire world a democracy of values was established, not a procedural democracy. This type of democracy allows certain basic values accepted by society into political and social discourse. If a party programme does not match these values, does not promote them – we are dealing with anti-system parties. And their existence should not be allowed.

Internal party democracy is closely linked to this. I am convinced that without the relevant legislative provisions we cannot create a system of parties, each of which educates its members in the spirit of democracy. If under the Statute the party's leader can remove any elected official of the party's local organisation at his own desire, – which democracy are we speaking about? What will such party be doing in the state, having come to power?

Today's legislation does not provide completely legal sources of party funding, i.e., today, parties cannot legally finance their operations. Is this not, where parties' oligarchic ties stem from? Is this not the root of the situation, in which parties are competing not just for people's votes, but also for oligarch's wallets? Competing, because they will not be able to exist otherwise. **Transparent budget funding of parties is the only way to start ruining the oligarchic system.**

Cutting parties expenses during elections – is an absolutely necessary requirement. Political parties must not be governed by the needs of advertising market! This is a twisted system of priorities. Advertising market must follow social processes, and not vice versa.

There is one type of activity, which I would categorically prohibit – political technologies. It is they that serve as means for manipulating voters. No one is surprised already that we have political projects instead of political parties. They live through one electoral cycle, and in the next elections – there are other projects. Let us think, how do we ensure that it is not political technologies that determine what parties articulate in their relations with voters, but that those things reflect the real views of political parties as declared in their programmes. ■

WE SHOULD LOOK AT THE LAID IN 1996 CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES INSTITUTE AND THE PARTY SYSTEM ITSELF

Petro STETSYUK,
Judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine

Two brief ideas. *First* – things we are discussing today as a relevant problem, are a component of general processes in the country, in the society. If today we state the fact that for the good or bad, but there is an attempt to reform the current legislation, the Basic Law, the constitutional matter, we see that there are problems in the legislative regulation of political parties, – then may it would be wise to look at the laid in 1996 constitutional

[42] See, for example: An open letter from Yuliya Tymoshenko to Viktor Yanukovych on the illegal takeover of "Batkivshchyna" party offices. – Yuliya Tymoshenko's official web-site, 9 September 2010, *http://www.tymoshenko.ua/uk/article/uw6cvu8z*.

[43] "Article 37. Foundation and activity of political parties and public associations shall be prohibited if their programme goals or actions are aimed at the liquidation of the independence of Ukraine, change of the constitutional order by force, violation of the sovereignty and territorial indivisibility of the State, undermining national security, unlawful seizure of the state power, the propaganda of war…".

foundation of political parties institute and the party system itself? I am not saying that it is bad, too extensive or too brief. But the fact is – none of it has worked as of today. And it is this foundation that is the basis for legislation in this area.

Maybe **we should revise not only the regulations related to the institute of political parties, but also those guarantees that have to be observed during realisation by us, citizens of Ukraine, of all our constitutional rights**. It is a fact, that there is a covert form of income qualification to participate in political activities, – the constitutional principle of equality is gravely violated here. We need constitutional regulation of these relations. All the more, as almost 20 years have passed since the adoption of the Constitution, almost 25 years from the moment of creation of our national parties. This is a rather long period of time to analyse, how this institute has worked.

Second. Regarding party names. In this large bloc of issues, there is a question: can national general political brands exist as property of certain individuals or groups of individuals? When the name of the political party is something personal – it is one thing, but when for 25 years in a row they privatise a national general political brand, almost privatise historical characters that were related to certain parties in our history, – something is wrong here.[44] This is an important issue. This is why some day we will have the issue of re-privatisation of political brands. Some people privatised a factory, some – a wellsite, and some – since the early 1990s – a general political brand. ■

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PROHIBIT POLITICAL TECHNOLOGIES

Volodymyr FESENKO,
Chairman of the Board of the Centre for Applied Political Studies "Penta"

I would like to stress two aspects. About real parties and parties-labels, parties-avatars. There is a total of 290 parties, real parties – previously there were not more than 10, now it is even less. Not even all parliamentary parties are real – i.e., have their apparatus, party infrastructure, including regional organisations. Thus, it turns out that **the vast majority of parties are nothing but legal labels**.

Before each elections (especially local), opens a party fair – labels are being sold. This is where name changes come in place. Here we had a representative of UKROP – also bought, renamed, new leadership appointed.[45] There are many such parties. They are formed and registered specifically for sale – either before local elections, or to participate in the drawing before parliamentary elections. We need a separate discussion on how to resolve this.

It is impossible to prohibit political technologies. Here is an idea – let us register only those parties that participate in national elections. There are some details though – in local elections participate more parties, than in the national. In the latest local elections of 2010,

Roundtable 16 September 2015

deputies from 130 parties got seats, the threshold was crossed by 98. This does not mean that all of them truly function. Local elites used them as a brand.

In order not to violate democracy, we need to resolve this on the legal level. How do we stabilise the party system is a topic for a separate discussion.

State funding has a great advantage. It will facilitate parties' institutionalisation, as their work will be more active not only in the period before elections, but also in the period between them. If there is money, the party will run regular operations. Whatever attitude we had to it, but the Party of Regions was an institutionalised party with a branched structure. Which explains why the "Opposition Bloc" was able to restore it so quickly. The organisation remained, so it was easy to restore it. Other organisations do not even attempt to do this. If there is money, there will be youth organisations, party publications.

There is another problem, which we have to start thinking about now. In the "Yalta European Strategy" conference (*YES*)[46] I saw a peculiar scene: representative of the "Opposition Bloc" S. Liovochkin was offering western partners – take us in as partners. And they do not want to take them in, especially representatives of civil society, because "Opposition Bloc" being the former Party of Regions – are the "untouchables". This is a problem in the context of coalition politics in the future.

In the Parliament (if not in this one, then in the next), we will need a partner from the East, with which we can work. Today this is impossible, no one would work with representatives of "Opposition Bloc". And a party representing the East is an important factor for stable political situation. **We cannot have the domination of parties that are supported only by voters of the West and Centre.** This is an open problem.

There appear local elites in the East and South, which used to be in the Party of Regions, and which are distancing themselves from it now, trying to create their own party projects – "Our Land", "Revival", etc. Will they stay after local elections? Will these parties be something else than the "one-day" parties? In any case, the issue of looking for partners in the Parliament coming from another side of the country, is the issue of democracy, as well as country's stability. ■

[44] The Law of Ukraine "On Political Parties in Ukraine". – Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14*.

[45] Party UKROP registered for a certificate No250-пп of 25 September 2014, which was incorporated by "Political alliance". See: site of the State Registration Service of Ukraine, *http://www.drsu.gov.ua/party*.

[46] 12th annual congress of Yalta European Strategy, which took place in Kyiv on 10-12 September 2015. See: Official Yalta European Strategy (YES) web-site, *http://yes-ukraine.org*.

IN SEARCH OF THE 'CORE ELECTORATE': HOW SHOULD PARTIES REACT TO AN INDIVIDUALISTIC SOCIETY?

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Voters are becoming unstable in their voting behaviour, and party identification is in decline. These are only two of the developments that have their roots in a more individualistic society. Parties are confronted with these developments and have to find a way to maintain their attraction for the electorate. This article illustrates the challenges for parties and gives recommendations for action to maintain political stability.

Core voters: a romantic dream?

It is election day. Father, mother, son and daughter are sitting at the breakfast table in their Sunday best. Having finished reading the Sunday papers, they leave together to attend church. Then they walk from the church to the polling station, meeting some neighbours on the way. They chat about newspaper reports and the Saturday night entertainment on television, which each family would have watched together. They generally vote for one of the people's parties. Then the parents go off to spend Sunday afternoon in trade union meetings, engaging in parish work or in club activities. And the children play together.

This romantic image of an election Sunday is hardly applicable to Europe these days. Many of the voting pensioners, families, single parents, singles, patchwork families and immigrants would have cast their vote by post before election day. Instead of jointly watching the Saturday night family entertainment on TV, they will have viewed different digital cable channels or used a streaming service to watch TV. Many would have surfed the Internet on their tablets at the same time. If they had sought to keep up with the news at all, it would have been from online media and TV, which do not overlap to a great extent. Neighbours hardly know one another, and there are few common points of reference to stimulate conversation. Voluntary work in churches, trade unions and clubs are also increasingly characterised by temporary commitment and project-based involvement.

The transformed electorate

There is a clear understanding of the long-term social developments which have changed voters and there fore voter behaviour so fundamentally over recent decades. In the political party system, this social transformation manifests itself particularly in the loss of long-term party allegiance and its power to influence people's conduct. As is the case for trade unions and churches, membership is declining, officials are aging and few new people are joining. Since the democratic transformation, levels of party allegiance have been low in countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It would appear that the dynamic and frequently fragmented party systems of the new EU member states are increasingly setting the trend for development in the old member states.

Against this backdrop it is remarkable that traditional positions have continued to play such a large role in the analyses and discussions of election results and voter behaviour. No interpretational approaches are available yet for gaining a true picture of the transformed electorate and of the associated impact on election results and the party landscape. Over a long period, societies throughout Europe have been undergoing noticeable changes which have undermined previously existing certainties with respect to voters, the underlying reasons for voter behaviour, developments in party systems and in government compositions. Yet despite this, many commentators and analysts are still primarily trying to identify 'core voters', 'camps' and 'milieus'.

New parties come and go

Analysts and political planners who still work with conceptions of ideologically motivated core voters disregard the fact that new parties are forming and disappearing again in Europe, that recently formed parties are achieving good election results within weeks, and that even in the rigid British multiparty system there has been a coalition government in place for some time and an increasing number of relevant parties. In many EU member states, people's parties from the centre-right and centre-left now attract support from less than half the voting public. The European Parliament too acquired broader fringes and a narrower centre at the last European elections. Many political analysts run the risk of working on the basis of an outdated model of European societies, which no longer matches the realities in many respects. This is reflected in the efforts still made by political actors and analysts to pigeonhole on the basis of left–right criteria new phenomena such as the Italian Five Star Movement, the Slovenian Modern Centre Party, the German Pirate Party or the Alternative for Germany.

Within the parties too, the above classic election Sunday, which may have existed in the 1970s, appears to continue to be a generally accepted ideal or at least a romantic notion. During many discussions between party members and party officials all across Europe, the parties are still frequently called upon to make greater efforts to return to the proven concepts of membership parties with a clear ideological orientation.

When reviewing election results, many party representatives mistakenly assume that voters 'belong' to them. Seen from that perspective, losses are then frequently interpreted as meaning that the voters 'belonging' to the party had merely 'moved away' and could be made to 'return to the fold' by the party repositioning itself with respect to certain issues. Citizens' freedom in deciding where to cast their votes is left out of the equation.

In contrast with this viewpoint, the continuation of long-term trends towards extensive individualisation of society that are apparent within the EU clearly suggests that other forces are at work. Permanent identification with a particular party is either on a continuous decline or non-existent. **The picture is characterised by voter indecision, low turnouts and an ever greater willingness on the part of voters to experiment.**

Where is the core electorate?

The electorate and the party system are experiencing ever greater changes. During national elections, most European voters cast their votes for a different party from the one they voted for in the previous election. Many voters do not make up their mind about which party to vote for until shortly before polling day. There are large voter shifts, and conditions are favourable to the sudden emergence of new parties. These movements produce great uncertainties and risks in Europe, which are expected to play an even larger role during future elections.

Assuming that current trends will continue, it appears likely that achieving good elections results will depend less on parties making efforts to appeal to who they mistakenly believe are their 'core' voters. Instead, it will be important to convince floating voters anew every time. This means that **each campaign will be a competition to appeal to all voters.**

In individualistic societies that are devoid of ideologies to a large extent, achievements in solving problems as part of government action will be the main means of convincing voters. **Modern voters want parties to solve their individual problems, not to explain the world to them**. Taking up positions based on ideology in the political debate runs the risk of fragmentation under these circumstances. Due to the demographic development if nothing else, parties will have to make efforts to attract new voters just to stand still in electoral results. **Great triumphs and disastrous failures frequently lie close together, given volatile electorates.**

The numerous new parties created in Europe over recent years-you have only to look at the rapid rise and fall of the Pirate Party in Germany-demonstrate above all that declining identification with parties, voter indecision and the fading importance of ideological orientation mean that it is becoming ever easier in Europe to found a new party and achieve good results within a short time. Unfortunately, European elections often perform an incubator role, as party allegiance traditionally plays an even smaller role in that context and voter turnout is lower in what are considered second-order elections. In many countries, a volatile electorate encourages the arrival and departure of new political parties, many of which resist traditional classification on the left–right spectrum.

This scenario produces an important realisation for political planning. If the rise of new parties is first and foremost a consequence of volatile and increasingly non-aligned, highly heterogeneous electorates, then it is an illusion based on past performance if conventional parties think that they can 'win back' voters who had abandoned them for new parties, by adopting certain positions on the left–right spectrum. Instead, long-term trends indicate that it is very likely that new parties will continue to appear and disappear rapidly because individualistic, non-ideological voters will be increasingly swinging between parties and be open to experiments in voting for different parties. Against the backdrop of a highly heterogeneous electorate, taking up uncompromising positions with respect to certain issues will be more likely to encourage fragmentation rather than stabilisation. Under these circumstances, people's parties will have to take up integrative rather than confrontational political positions. Given the conditions of an individualistic society, the frequently quoted 'hard line' or entrenched ideological stances are only likely to produce fragmentation, fundamentalism and marginalisation.

Personalities and problem-solving more important than party ideology

However, despite the long-term trend towards the rapidly advancing individualisation of society, it appears to be possible for a party to appeal to and represent society in all its diversity. This has been illustrated not least by the election results of the CDU/CSU[1] in Germany and the fact that its approval rating has held steady at over 40% for years.[2] But people's parties will obviously have to undergo significant changes to achieve this goal. The recipe for success does not appear to be a return to old traditions but the beginning of something new instead. Earning 41.5% as an election result in the society of 2013 is simply a totally different challenge from a similar result back in 1976.[3] The CDU/CSU did not earn 41,5% in the federal elections because the returned to old recipies but because under Angela Merkel they did something new.

Long-term allegiances and ideological orientation are of less importance to parties in individualistic societies than are the impact of personalities and the demonstration of concrete problem-solving capabilities. In the new and still changing circumstances, the latter also suggests that **successful action while in government is the most promising way to strengthen the standing of people's parties.**

It appears that the effects of personalisation above all have the capability of stabilising parties faced with a volatile electorate. Integrative leaders, who can convince the party's own membership as well as having charisma that impresses the heterogeneous segments of wider society, can help parties to gain greater appeal. The successful parties of the future will not leave the development of these leaders to chance. The early identification of talented individuals, efforts to foster their talents and their development as well as the assignment of responsibilities to them are becoming important to the survival of the political parties. This idea of purposeful personnel development frequently stands in contradiction to the existing selection and decision-making processes within the parties.

What applies to personnel also applies to political issues; in future, parties will have to increase their efforts to find processes that enable positioning and decision-making, taking into account not only the party's homogenous membership but also the increasingly heterogeneous society. Modern parties will likely be characterised by efforts to reach out to non-members, from regular targeted surveys to co-decision rights. The reality of political parties will also increasingly involve open lists, preliminary elections, public candidate hearings and open forums on specific issues.

Problem-solving capabilities can only be demonstrated when the parties are capable of picking up on the problems that are relevant to their very diverse voters and to devise approaches to solve those problems. If the people's parties in particular want to avoid being left behind by social changes, they must be capable of extending their reach into all segments of individualistic society. This is where they encounter a serious problem. While society is changing at an ever faster pace, the rate of change at the organisational

level of the political parties has lagged behind. This applies similarly to churches, trade unions and other major organisations. To date, the parties in Europe have not changed sufficiently to reflect phenomena such as the rapid changes in working practices, the increasing digitisation of everyday activities, and changed expectations with respect to social engagement. The injection of new blood into the membership and the ranks of party officials is not keeping pace with social change. At the same time, the forms of organisation and participation of political parties in Europe, which have not changed in decades in many cases, have not allowed the parties to tailor their offering to members with very different demands, different time budgets, different interests in issues, and different qualifications and competences. There is still generally one participation model for all.

Conclusion

The successful parties of the future will have to offer their members different membership models. These can range from passive membership and classic participation in the local association to purely issue-based involvement and virtual association structures to temporary involvement in individual projects. Purposeful mentoring for new party members, new member officers in the parties, trial and premium memberships will soon be a matter of course.

Established European parties will be well advised to recognise the anti-party parties of the populists, the unpopularity of political parties and the protest behaviour of many voters as indications that the accelerating social change makes it necessary for them to contemplate the consequences for their internal forms of organisation and participation. This places the parties in a paradoxical situation. They claim to be involved in shaping social change, but the parties are themselves driven by social changes that they can neither steer nor undo.

The ability of political parties in Europe, and particularly the people's parties, to achieve substantial success will depend to a very large extent on their capability to keep adapting to social developments. The parties' flexibility in issues, organisation and participation is increasingly turning into a decisive success factor for political stability.

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1 Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union of Bavaria (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/ Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*).

2 Wolfram, N. (2015). Parties and elections in Europe: Germany. *http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/germany2.html. Accessed 11 May 2015.*

3 Ibid.

PARTY SYSTEMS OF EU MEMBER STATES[1]

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Starting from 2007, the European Union is comprised of 27 countries. After two rounds of enlargement – in May 2004 and January 2007 – the 15 countries of Western Europe, along with Malta and Cyprus, were joined by ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This brought about changes, and not just those in the nature of the EU. This gave birth to new challenges for comparative studies of party systems in Europe. While previously we were speaking about stable party systems of Western Europe, at this time they were joined by countries, in which the competing party systems were established under absolutely different conditions, in the context of systemic transformations that took place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 80s – beginning of the 90s. Still, party system researchers have not truly grasped the new situation: so far, there is no compilation with a detailed by-country analysis of party systems of EU member states.

Quantitative analysis of systemic properties of some party systems is presented by *Siaroff* (2000); *Niedermayer* (2010) compares the development of structure of 27 European party systems starting from 1990 based on quantitative indicators; *Niedermayer* (2008) additionally analyses qualitative indicators to determine polarisation. A brief description of modern processes is given by *Decker* (2010) and *Helms* (2008). The studies mostly present separate research of West European[2] party systems and party systems of Central and East European countries.[3]

Further, all 27 party systems in the European Union are discussed.[4] Clearly, due to limited space, this analysis cannot look at each system in detail, and we will have to limit ourselves to depicting general tendencies in the development or similarities and differences between party systems. With this purpose, we first analyse structural features of party systems, and then build a typology based on this.[5] In the second stage, we analyse defining party systems as systems of a certain type and their development between 1990 and 2012.[6]

1 O.Nidermayer's article is published in the Handbuch Partienforschung (Springer VS, 2013), which was printed out in March 2013, when 27 countries were included in the European Union.
Article submitted with some cuts and editorial amendments, which in no way distorted the content.

2 Cf. e.g., compilations of Broughton/Donovan (1999), Daalder/Mair (1983), Merkl (1980) and Niedermayer/Ströss/Haas (2006).

3 Cf. e.g., compilations of Berglund/Dellenbrant (1994), Bos/Segert (2008), Jungerstam-Mulders (2006a) and Segert/Stöss/Niedermayer (1997).

4 This chapter presents an updated and abridged version of Niedermayer's analysis of 2008 and 2010.

5 For detailed information, cf. the author's chapter on party system analysis in Handbuch Partienforschung (Springer VS, 2013).

6 As the manuscript was finished in the autumn of 2012, it was impossible to include possible changes of Romanian party system in connection with the parliamentary elections in December 2012.

The article is translated from German. The original version was published in Handbuch Partienforschung, 2013, p.847-874.
The Razumkov Centre expounds gratitude to Professor O.Nidermayer for his consent to the publication of the article in the "National Security and Defence" magazine.

The criterion for inclusion of a party system in the analysis was its membership in the EU at the moment, regardless of the date of accession.[7] In the third stage, we look at key conceptual conflict lines that define competition between parties of EU member states, which gives us a possibility to characterise party systems also from the point of view of their content-related systemic properties.

However, before we proceed to analyse the characteristics of party systems, it is necessary to clarify the issue of how well has the process of will expression and political representation consolidated in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe on the basis of political parties. A relatively reliable quantitative indicator in this regard is the share of independent deputies in the total number of seats at national parliaments, as it helps to determine whether the nature of corresponding national political cultures and the type of electoral legislation have led to the quasi-monopoly of parties in recruiting political management officials. Application of this indicator allows to talk about such quasimonopoly in all countries of Central and Eastern Europe: independent candidates had difficulties from the very beginning, and during the period of the study they were able to get into Parliament only in Lithuania and Hungary, and their share in the Parliament balanced between 0.3 and 4.3 percent. Apart from one independent candidate in the elections to the Danish Parliament in 1994, in Western Europe, only electoral legislation in Ireland, using a complicated procedure, allows voters to choose a path between parties and independent candidates. Consequently, from 1990 to 2012, the Irish Parliament had from 5 (3 %) to 15 (9 %) independent deputies.

Structural Characteristics and Types of Party Systems

A party system "can be defined through its elements, i.e. separate parties, and through the interconnecting ties that exist between these elements or their characteristics. Essential for the systemic level of analysis is the interconnection of these ties" (*Niedermayer* 1997: 106), which can be expressed as a number of properties of the party system. In comparative studies of party systems this approach is fundamentally approved. However, written materials still do not provide a unified approach as to which of these party system characteristics to include in the analysis, and how to operationalise them.[8] Here, we believe in the approach that the largest possible number of system variations must be covered by the minimum number of characteristics. System variations can be related to structural or to content-based characteristics of a party system, and they can be analysed on the electoral and the parliamentary level. We will further analyse structural characteristics on the parliamentary level, as in the second stage they will be used to create a structural typology of party systems.

First, the structure of a party system on the parliamentary level is determined by the number of parties represented in the parliament. Along with this systemic property named format,[9] the analysis also uses the ratio between party sizes, which is measured by their share of parliamentary seats, i.e. party system fragmentation or degree of fragmentation are defined. A whole number of indices were proposed to operationalise this characteristic, among which, due to its apparency, the most popular is the "*effective number of parties*" by *Laakso* and *Taagepera* (1979).[10] When we speak about domination in the party system of two major parties, it is necessary to additionally consider the extent of dominance of both parties, and then answer the question, whether the party system is defined by structural asymmetry, i.e. the prevalent position in the medium term of one of the two major parties in the political competition.[11]

By systemic properties, party systems can be divided into groups. In the literature, one can find classifications, i.e. division of party systems into classes, which exclude one another based on just one characteristic,

[7] Regarding party systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, this means that they were included in the analysis from the moment of their parliamentary elections taking place after the declaration of state independence, or after constitutional conditions were created for free elections: Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary from 1990 (in the case of Romania, we refer to its inclusion after the election of the Legislative Assembly in May 1990, although given the violent overthrow of Ceausescu, there are doubts as to the democratic nature of those elections), Poland from 1991, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia from 1992, Latvia from 1993, Slovakia from 1994 and the Czech Republic from 1996.

[8] Cf. the author's chapter on analysis of party systems inHandbuch Partienforschung (Springer VS, 2013), p.83-117.

[9] In determining the format, along with the total number of parties represented in Parliament, one can use the number of relevant parties, although in the literature different criteria of relevance are used.

[10] Calculation: 1/sum of squares of each party's proportion of all seats. The effective number of parties equals the real number, when all parties have equal proportion of seats. The more unequal the proportion of seats, the smaller the effective number of parties compared to the real number, and if one party dominates, – index value approaches 1.

[11] The extent of dominance of both major parties can be easily determined by adding the proportions of their seats, the scale of asymmetry – through the difference between proportions of seats, and we consider a long-term structural asymmetry in favour of one party only when this party can win elections at least five times in a row.

as well as typologies – which combine several properties. The typology presented below combines three structural properties on the parliamentary level, i.e. party system typology is created on the basis of their competition structure. **There are party systems with one predominant party, party systems with two dominant parties, pluralist party systems and highly fragmented party systems**. In order to differentiate between the first two types, we must define the ratio of sizes of the two or three largest parties. In order to avoid arbitrary or empirically obtained distinctions, as the main criterion, we are using a qualitative change of position in power of a parliamentary party, when two borders are crossed in relation to the number of seats: one – absolute majority that allows a party to form its own government, another one – the two-thirds majority, which in many countries allows to change the Constitution. An additional criterion for distinguishing between smaller parties says that party "A" will be significantly smaller than party "B", if it has less than a half of the proportion of seats that party "B" holds.

Party system with one predominant party means a system, under which one party in the Parliament has the absolute majority, and the next, smaller party, has no more than a quarter of seats, so that its proportion of seats is less than a half of proportion of seats that the predominant party holds. Second structural type is often defined as a "two-party system". Although, as in the European Union – with the exception of Malta – there are no systems with only two parliamentary parties, it makes sense to define this type as a party system with two dominant parties. In this situation, the dominance of the two major parties should have a certain minimum value, in the ratio of their sizes there should not be a significant asymmetry, and the gap with the third party according to its size should be large enough. Operationalisation of these criteria is presented through the fact that both major parties in the Parliament have correspondingly more than a quarter, and combined – at least over two-thirds of votes, and the next smaller party holds less than a half of votes of the smaller among the two major parties. To differentiate between the other two – more fragmented – types, the effective number of parliamentary parties is used. Coming from the tradition based on empirical data of West European studies of party systems, a party system is considered highly fragmented, if it has an effective number of parties over 5.

If this number does not exceed 5 and we do not speak about one of the two structural types named above, then this is a pluralist party system. This type can easily include a "modal party", which has the absolute majority of seats, but is not a predominant party, as the next smaller party has over a half of seats of the modal party.

This typology serves for primary structuring of the 27 party systems. But it is also used to answer the question about stability or variability of party systems

in the period under study, where variability is defined as the change of party system competition structure that leads to the change of party system type. Along with the change of the system, we shall also look at the change of the actors' structure, as one and the same competition structure can hold different structures of actors resulting in the same party system competition structure at two different moments of time, while the structure of actors – i.e. the parties that form the system and their competitive positions – have significantly changed. Essentially, such change can take place in three ways: (1) due to a change of proportions of existing parties, (2) through restructuring (merger, detachment) of existing parties and (3) due to emergence of completely new parties. Thus, a change of actors' structure means that party configuration experiences significant changes, while the competition structure remains the same. In party systems with a predominant party we view it as given, when the predominant party changes; in the system with two major parties – when a change of one or both major parties occurs; in the pluralist party system – when a modal party emerges or changes; in highly fragmented systems – when new parties receive the majority of seats in the parliament.

The main idea of studies in European party systems stability or variability in the period until the mid-90s is summarised by *Pennings* and *Lane* (1998: XIV) in the following way: "Until the end of 1980s the majority of party systems were viewed as stable(…) The situation has drastically changed in less than ten years. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, we witnessed many forms of party system changes in all parts of Europe". After nearly two decades, the question arose, whether we are really dealing with a prolonged phase of general changes of European party systems; and if so, will there be convergence of these systems over time due to these changes, and, therefore, are we on the road to a single European type of party systems; or the process of changes in separate party systems is happening in such a way that the variety of systems that existed in the early 90s remains to this day.

Stability and Variability of European Party Systems.

Diagram "*Distribution of European party systems into four types, 1990-2012*" shows distribution of 27 European party systems in the period of study from 1990 to 2012 into four different structural types. It is immediately apparent that a change of system does not represent a general European phenomenon.

Six out of twenty-seven party systems – in Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom – have remained stable, i.e. have not changed their type; the seventh – in Portugal – is included in this list starting from 1991. All stable systems are located in Western Europe.[12] The following four West European party systems have gone through a moderate transformation to the next system type: Denmark in 2007, Germany in 2009, Greece in 2012[13] and Austria, which after the change in 2002, after two terms, has returned to the previous type in 2008. Finland, Ireland and Cyprus are characterised by alternating different types, while party systems of France, Italy and Netherlands have gone through drastic changes during the period of study, i.e. they have undergone several comprehensive changes of type.

In contrast, none of the ten party systems in Central and Eastern Europe have remained stable. At the end of the study period (2010), in Latvia occurred moderate changes due to transfer to an adjacent type of system, in Slovenia a similar process took place back in 2000. Estonia and Czech Republic have seen alternating of different types, while more than half of party systems in Central and Eastern Europe – Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary – during the study period, have undergone a number of comprehensive changes of their type, which led to a radical change in the competition structure. However, during the last three elections in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania no change of type was observed, thus, indicating the arrival of long-term stability.

Looking at the distribution of party systems into four types, as shown in Diagram,[14] in this period we will see no convergence, thus demonstrating that party systems of 27 EU member states are not on the path to a single European type of party systems. Until 2010, it seemed that party systems with one predominant party will vanish from the list of system types, however, there has been a recent re-addition of two systems to this type. Another extreme party type – highly fragmented system – included from four to seven party systems during the study period, while no stable tendency was observed. Two largest groups are formed by moderate system types, where with time the biggest changes were observed – from eight to twelve or thirteen party systems belonged respectively to pluralist systems and to the two-party domination systems. Here, there was also no lasting trend. Therefore, we can state that in general, **within the last two decades, the diversity of European party systems that encompasses all possible types remains unchanged and no convergence is taking shape**.

Distribution of European party systems into four types, 1990-2012



[12] In this analysis, Malta and Cyprus are included in Western Europe.

[13] Due to heavy distress in Greece because of the debt crisis, on 7 May 2012 a snap election was held, which, however, did not lead to formation of an efficient government majority. Therefore, on 17 June, repeat elections took place. A change of type was secured after the second election.

[14] The figure represents the situation starting from 1996, as only since then all 27 party systems have been included. In 2012, Romania still belonged to pluralist systems.

Stable Party Systems

Among party systems that remained stable throughout the whole period of study, i.e. belonged to one and the same type, we see four systems with two-party domination (Malta, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom), two pluralist systems (Luxembourg and Sweden) and one highly fragmented system (Belgium).

In party systems with two-party domination, we observe prevalence of two major parties that define the structure of inter-party competition and hold the two-thirds majority of parliamentary seats; third parties are either not in the parliament at all or have relatively insignificant proportions of seats. If, in this situation, one of the two major parties, due to a certain configuration of influences, has a long-term competitive advantage, as a result of which it has long-term domination in the formation of government – in the form of one-party government or together with the smaller government coalition partner, i.e. if the system has structural asymmetry between the two major parties, – then such system is approaching party system type with one predominant party, in which there is no democratic mechanism of party alternation.

If a European party system is the system with two-party domination, then – with one exception – along with two major parties, at least one more party is represented in the parliament. The exception is Malta, the system of which literally represents the two-party system, as in this country's parliament since 1966 there have been only two parties – Christian-democratic *PN* and social-democratic *MLP*.[15]

European party systems (PS) by type (1990-2012)

Country \ Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Belgium	**h**	h				h				h				h				h			h		
Bulgaria	z	z			z			d				p				p				p			
Denmark	p				p				p			p				p		h				h	
Germany	z				z				z				z			z				p			
Estonia			h			p				h				p				p				p	
Finland	**p**	h				p				h				p				h				h	
France	**p**			z				p					d					z					z
Greece	z			z			z				z				z			z		z			p
Ireland	**z**		p					z					p					z					p
Italy	**p**		h		h		h					h					h		z				
Latvia				h		h			h				h				h				p	p	
Lithuania			d				d				p				h				h				h
Luxembourg	**p**				p					p					p					p			
Malta	**z**		z				z		z					z					z				
Netherlands	**z**				h				p				h	p			h				h		h
Austria	p				p	p				p			z				z		p				
Poland		h		p				z				p				p		z				z	
Portugal	**p**	z				z				z			z			z				z		z	
Romania	d		p				h				p				p				p				?
Sweden	**p**	p			p				p				p				p				p		
Slovakia					p				p				h				p				p		d
Slovenia			h				h				p				p				p			p	
Spain	z			z			z				z				z				z			z	
Czech Republic							p		z				p				z				p		
Hungary	p				d				z				z				z				d		
United Kingdom	z		z					z				z				z					z		
Cyprus	**p**	p					p					z					p					z	

Explanation of types: d – PS with a predominant party; z – PS with two-party domination; p – pluralist PS; h – highly fragmented PS. The potential change of type in Romania in view of elections in December 2012 is not considered due to manuscript submission into printing in the autumn of 2012.

PS types in bold are those based on the results of previous elections held before 1990 in the countries of Western Europe (where there was no election in 1990).

Source: own calculations.

[15] In two decades, only two other parties participated in parliamentary elections (AD and AN), which, however, did not gain more than 1.7% of votes.

Malta is characterised by a high degree of voter loyalty to their parties, a rather high degree of polarisation, meaning clear distinctions in the programmes of two major parties (for example, in the sphere of privatisation, taxes, EU issues), centre-based competition based on this, and a small difference of both parties' potential on the electoral level. So far, none of the two major parties could win the election more than three times in a row, and thus in Malta there is no structural asymmetry.

In both south European systems with two-party domination – in Portugal and Spain – there is also no long-term structural asymmetry in favour of one of the two major parties. Until the elections of 2008 and 2009, respectively, both systems were characterised by different trends in domination of the two major parties. In Portugal, the total proportion of seats held by socialists (*PS*) and liberal conservatives (*PSD*) dropped from 90 to 77 percent; in Spain, the beginning of the century marked a much greater advantage of the social democratic *PSOE* and conservative *PP* in the party system than before, as the parties won over 92% of seats in 2008. Both countries, which along with Greece and Ireland suffered most from the debt crisis in Europe, because of resistance to the unpopular government budget-saving measures (*PS* in Portugal and *PSOE* in Spain), had to conduct snap elections in 2011, which led to the change of governments. However, while in Portugal the losses of *PS* were compensated with excess by the success of *PSD*, and the common share of both major parties slightly increased, – from 77 to 79 percent, in Spain, the disastrous result of *PSOE*, which lost a third of its seats and got the worst results since 1975, was not fully compensated by the success of *PP*, which received the absolute majority of seats, resulting in a decrease of domination of the two major parties from 92 to 85 percent. Thus, in both countries, the 2011 election brought about the change of the prior pattern.

A slight movement to reduced dominance of the two major parties can be also observed in the United Kingdom, where the common share of seats of the Labour and Conservative Party has dropped from 93% (1992) to 87% (2010). On the other hand, majority election system in the UK results in the fact that the rather significant "weight loss" of the party duopoly on the electoral level[16] only very slightly affects the proportions of seats. However, much more important is the fact that in the elections to the House of Commons in 2010, both major parties – for the first time since 1974 – failed to win the absolute majority of seats, and for the first time since World War II, they had to create a coalition government (with the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats).[17]

Party systems that always stayed pluralistic throughout the entire study period can be found in Luxembourg and Sweden. In Luxembourg the situation has been the same from the late 60s. Until now, the Christian democrats (*CSV*) were always able to win the relative majority of seats; followed by social democrats (*LSAP*), liberals (*DP*), and starting in the 90s – also the greens. In Sweden, in the post-war era, the relative majority of seats was taken by the Social Democratic party (and in the elections of 1968 – even the absolute majority). Nothing has changed here in the past two decades. Second by the number of seats, from 1990 to 2012, has always been the conservative *Moderata Samlingspartiet*, which in the 2010 elections has come very close to the social democrats. That being said, only in 1994 both parties were able to gain parliamentary majority of two-thirds of votes, while *Moderata Samlingspartiet* alone was too weak to bring the party system on the level of systems with two-party domination. Additionally, five other parties were represented in the parliament, and in 2010 – six.

The only highly fragmented system among stable party systems is the party system in Belgium. Heavy fragmentation is associated with the regional character of the Belgian state, which consists of regions Flanders and Wallonia, as well as the Brussels-Capital Region, which led to regionalisation of Belgian party landscape in the 70s. As the electoral system does not cause a strong effect of concentration of political forces, heavy electoral fragmentation finds its continuation in the fragmented parliamentary party landscape. Thus, in the period of study, the Belgian parliament regularly had from 10 to 13 parties. This was not without consequences for the formation of the Belgian government: although almost all parties, in principle, can enter into coalition with one another, in the 70s and 80s, coalitions of several parties often turned out to be unstable. Starting from the 90s, this was no longer observed, however, after the elections of 2007, once again there were strong clashes between parties first regarding the formation of government, and then inside the government, which, in the end, led to early elections in 2010, after which disputes about forming a coalition continued with the same intensity. This is why in recent years, many observers had serious concerns about the final dissolution of the Belgian state.

Party Systems with Moderate Transformations

Party systems that during the study period have gone through a moderate transformation by changing to the respective adjacent type of system or are characterised by alternating their type, include over a third of European party systems.

Starting from the first elections to the Bundestag in 1949 and the first free parliamentary elections after the end of the military dictatorship in 1974, and up to the latest elections included in the study period, Germany and Greece respectively belonged to party systems with two-party domination. In the elections of 2009 in Germany, CDU and SPD received only 62 percent of parliamentary seats, social democrats – only 23.5%, and the third runner-up – Free Democratic Party – only got 15%.[18] Thus, it ran a little bit short of meeting the criteria to be considered among systems with two-party domination.

In Greece these processes were more dramatic. There, both major parties, social democratic *PASOK* and

[16] In 1992, both parties gained the total 76% share of votes, while in 2010 – only 65%.

[17] In 1974, the problem was solved through early elections conducted in the same year.

[18] See the chapter "Party system of Germany" by O.Nidermayer in the publication Handbuch Partienforschung, …, pp.739-764.

conservative *ND* in the period between 1977 and 2004 used to receive from 88 to 94 percent of seats together, and in the elections of 2007 and 2009 – got only 88 and 84% respectively. Not taking into account a short intermediate stage, when in 1989-1990 three elections took place one after another, both parties, alternating each other, were single-handedly ruling in Greece starting from 1974.[19] However, in spring 2010, as the *PASOK* government applied to receive assistance from the EU to prevent default, and as it introduced as demanded by the Eurozone and IMF economising measures and structural reforms, which led to social protests, processes started that brought about formation of a transitional government in November 2011 with participation of *ND*, as well as early elections on 7 May 2012. These elections were a turning point in the political history of the country. *PASOK* was severely punished: its share of seats dropped from 54 to almost 14 percent, while *ND* slightly improved its result – from 30 to 36%; thus, both major parties together received about 50% of seats. At the same time, far-left *SYRIZA* was able to increase its representation fourfold, and new parties got into parliament, which turned Greece's party system into the rather highly fragmented pluralist system. As the negotiations on the formation of government fell through, in six months, new parliamentary elections took place, in which *ND*, as well as its opponent *SYRIZA* were again able to increase the proportion of their seats, while other five parties lost theirs, due to which fragmentation decreased again, but the system remained pluralistic.

At the end of the study period, the party system of Denmark also changed. Before 2007, it belonged to pluralist party systems; there were from seven to ten parties in the parliament. However, already in the 2001 elections, Danish *Socialdemokratiet* lost the relative majority of its seats to the right-wing liberal *Venstre*, which marked the end of the era that lasted for over 80 years. The following two elections – in 2001 and the early elections in 2007 – were also won by *Venstre*, along with which, in 2007, party system fragmentation increased so much that Denmark changed its party system type to highly fragmented. This was confirmed by the 2011 elections, after which fragmentation increased even more.

Latvia and Slovenia took the opposite path, from a highly fragmented to pluralist party system. At first Latvia had a highly fragmented system, even though this country has a 5% votes threshold. However, as a result of formation in the elections of 2010 of two electoral blocs – Unity (*V*) and Harmony Centre (*SC*) – Latvia made a transition to the pluralist system, which was confirmed in the elections of 2011.[20] At the time of the first two parliaments, Slovenia's party system was very fragmented, however, already starting from 2000, it changed to the pluralist system, even though the parliament still includes 8-9 parties. It seemed that the elections of 2008 will mark the beginning of transition to two-party domination – conservative Slovenian Democratic Party (*SDS*) and social democrats (*SD*). However, the early elections in 2011, conducted as a result of a successful no-confidence vote for the coalition government headed by *SD*, were unexpectedly won by the founded in the same year *LZJ-PS* party of the mayor of Ljubljana, which gained 31% of seats and was

somewhat ahead of SDS (29%), while *SD* dropped to 11%, so the pluralist system remained.

The remaining six party systems, during the period of study, were defined by alternating their types. Until the 80s, Austria belonged to the two-party domination type. Inter-party competition was defined by the duopoly of the two major parties *ÖVP* and *SPÖ* with the addition of *FPÖ* as a small "swivelling-type" party. However, in 1986, *FPÖ* was headed by Jörg Haider, who turned it in a short period of time into a right-wing populist protest party. This marked the beginning of the pluralist system period with the unprecedented rise of *FPÖ* up to the elections to the National Council in 1999, when *FPÖ* caught up with *ÖVP* by the number of gained seats. In the early elections of 2002, *FPÖ* suffered big losses – primarily due to the escalation of conflicts around its programme principles and staff policy, and Austria went back to two-party domination. In 2005, internal clashes in the *FPÖ* led to the separation of a Jörg Haider group named *BZÖ*, which participated in the National Council elections already in 2006. Only in the elections of 2008, *FPÖ* and *BZÖ* were able to increase the number of their seats to the point that Austria's party system became pluralist again.

Starting from the 50s, Ireland's party system was determined by domination of two parties – *Fianna Fáil* and *Fine Gael*, which from the end of the 60s regularly received over 85% of seats. Along with this, there was a constant clear structural asymmetry in favour of *Fianna Fáil*, which considered itself the manifestation of Ireland itself. From the mid-80s, system transformation started, which brought more and more parties into the parliament along with stronger fragmentation. In particular, in 1992 and 2002, the Labour Party managed to bridge the gap with *Fine Gael* to the extent that one of the three conditions for two-party domination disappeared – a big gap with the party in the third place, which led to system pluralisation. In the elections of 2007, due to significant strengthening of *Fine Gael*, two-party domination restored, with *Fianna Fáil* remaining the strongest party. However, the situation changed after the early elections of 2011, conducted due to Ireland's banking and financial crisis and the demands of the EU, IMF and ECB to introduce economising policies. *Fianna Fáil* suffered unprecedented losses: its proportion of seats dropped from 47 to 12%, and the party system transformed again into the pluralistic.

[19] First of all, due to the circumstance that Greece has "reinforced proportional electoral legislation", according to which the party with the majority of votes gets 40 additional seats in the parliament.

[20] In the elections of 2010, V became the strongest party, and in 2011 – *SC*.

Until today, the party system in Cyprus remains the same. The reason lies in the historically conditioned and connected with Britain's colonial rule competition between the three major parties: conservative (*DISY*), which declares its loyalty to church and approves the unification with Greece; right-wing (*DIKO*) and communist workers' movement (*AKEL*). Since the early 90s, *DIKO* was structurally weaker than the other two parties, and in 2001 and 2011 this weakness led to two-party domination.

The only party system in Central and Eastern Europe with similar alternation of party system types is Czech. There, inter-party competition, from the very beginning, was defined by two major competing parties – Social Democratic (*CSSD*) and Civic Democratic Party (*ODS*), and in 1998 and 2006 both parties became increasingly strong, and the gap to the third largest party became so big, that party system changed from pluralism to two-party domination. However, in the elections of 2010, first of all, *ODS*, but also *CSSD*, suffered significant losses, while the newly created *TOP 09* came rather close to *ODS*, due to which, currently, the party system demonstrates the highest degree of fragmentation in its entire history.

The last two party systems – those of Estonia and Finland – during the study period were characterised by alternating their type between pluralistic and highly fragmented. Estonia was on this verge only in the beginning: there, in the first three elections, the five-party effective number threshold, set to differentiate between the highly fragmented and pluralist systems, was crossed twice. However, starting from 2003, a pluralist system established, which is confirmed after each election: the number of parties represented in the parliament went down from 6 (in 2003) to 4 (in 2011), and parliament fragmentation decreased from 4.7 (in 2003) to 3.8 (in 2011).

Before the 2007 elections, Finland was changing its party system type from election to election. However, after the elections of 2011, the system remained as highly fragmented as in 2007, which is primarily connected with significant strengthening of the right-wing populist *PS* party (also named "The True Finns"). The Finnish example demonstrates that rather heavy fragmentation of the parliament does not necessarily (as in Belgium) lead to complications in formation of government and an unstable government coalition: Finnish governments, formed by three-five parties, usually work till the end of the parliament's term.

Party Systems with Radical Transformations

Party systems that within the period of the study radically changed their competition structure through several large-scale changes of their type include three West European ones – in France, Italy and Netherlands, and over a half of systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

In 1988, France's political system was pluralistic and composed of undoubtedly the strongest socialist party (*PS*, 45% of seats), followed by two equally represented parties *UDF* (centrists) and *RPR* (neo-Gaullists). But in the elections of 1993, socialists suffered an overwhelming defeat, which led to two-party domination of the significantly strengthened *UDF* and *RPR*. In the following election of 1997, the former balance of powers restored, i.e. the system went back to being pluralistic. In the elections of 2002, supporters of the re-elected president Jacques Chirac, who represented *RPR*, part of *UDF* and *DL* (liberals), came together in the Union of the Presidential Majority (*UMP*), which gained almost 62% of seats in the parliament and became the predominant party, while socialists with 24% of seats came second. However, the period of predominance did not last long. Already in the following elections of 2007, the party of the newly elected president Nicolas Sarkozy, which, having retained the abbreviation *UMP*, changed its name to the "Union for a Popular Movement" (*Union pour un mouvement Populaire*), once again was able to gain the majority of seats (54%); however, *PS* improved its results to 32%, while none of the other parties gained more than 4%. Thus, emerged the two-party domination system. In the light of electing socialist Francois Hollande the president shortly before the National Assembly elections of 2012, socialists were able to win the parliamentary elections once again. *UMP* remained the second dominant party.

Until the beginning of the 90s, in Italy, the party system of the so-called First Republic was characterised by a great number of parties represented in the parliament, but it was primarily defined by two parties – Christian Democracy (*DC*) and the Communist Party (*PCI*). In the 70s - first half of the 80s, their proportions ensured two-party domination, while starting from 1946, *DC* was also the stronger party, even though it never got the absolute majority of votes. It must be said that the main property of inter-party competition in the entire period was that coming from the nature of *PCI* as an anti-system party and, consequently, its isolation, the mechanism of alternating positions in power did not work: *DC* was always the one to form the government in coalition with different partners. For a variety of reasons – the external shock from the collapse of the communist systems in Eastern Europe and its consequences for *PCI*, inefficiency of government policy grounded in the party system, erosion of subcultures and scandals about illegal practices of party financing, known as "*Tangentopoli*" – in the late 80s-early 90s, the Italian party system underwent unprecedented transformations of the structure of its actors in the form of dissolution, division, merger and newly created parties, which led to a change of its type from two-party domination, through an intermediate stage of pluralism, to the highly fragmented party system. Despite the fact that after 1994, with the new

party system, there was a steady decrease of parliament fragmentation, the hopes for a strong concentration effect connected with the reform of labour legislation at the beginning of the 90s, have not come true by the 2006 elections. However, in 2007, noticeable changes started in Italy's party landscape: after initial difficulties, the consolidation of left-wing democrats (*DS*) and liberal democrats (*Margherita*) into a democratic party (*DP, Partito Democratico*), supported by Prime Minister Romano Prodi, started taking shape. After that, former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi achieved establishing by the opposition of a new "assembled" party on the basis of his *Forza Italia*, *Alleanza Nazionale* led by Gianfranco Fini and a number of smaller parties, named *Popolo della Libertá* (The People of Freedom). In 2008, PdL gained 44% of seats and became the most powerful party,[21] while DP gained a good 34%, and all the other parties remained below the 10% threshold, due to which currently the party system of Italy belongs to two-party domination systems.[22]

During the period of study, the party system of Netherlands, just like the Italian, also underwent some major changes of type, though in the opposite direction. While in the early 90s there was two-party domination – Christian democrats (*CDA*) and social democrats (*PvdA*), in 1994, due to strengthening of right-wing liberals (*VVD*) and Democrats 66, the party system transformed into the highly fragmented system. After this and until 2006, in each election the system changed its type from highly fragmented to pluralistic and back, and stronger fragmentation was caused by another, fourth party, along with *CDA*, *PvdA* and *VVD*.[23] However, in the elections of 2010 and 2012, there were no more changes of type, so starting from 2006, Netherlands belonged to highly fragmented party systems with 10 – 11 parliamentary parties.

As revealed by the typological analysis, among party systems in Central and Eastern Europe generally dominates significantly greater structural instability than in West European countries. Nevertheless, numerous concerns expressed regarding the combination of such systems did not prove true. These concerns were summarised by *Veen* (2005: 25) in the following way: "After the overthrow of communist one-party dictatorships, given the free development of party life in the new environment, there were two main concerns: 1. Party system … explosion can occur, with formation of numerous new parties and high degree of fragmentation [of the party landscape], and 2. It can happen so that after a brief triumph of new parties and civic movements, domination of old party elites will be reinstated (due to their higher professionalism) under new names in new post-communist states, if not as sole leaders, then as predominant parties in the party system".

The first concern regarding the high degree of fragmentation did not come true. Even the three Baltic states, in which "*reemergence of multi-partism*" was expected after the advance of democracy (*Dellenbrant* 1994:74), which had its roots in the democratic tradition of the short period between the two World Wars, belonged to highly fragmented party systems throughout the entire period of study. Since 2003, Estonia, and since 2010, Latvia – belong to pluralist systems. Lithuania, as will be shown in this chapter, only since 2004 belongs to highly fragmented systems.

The second concern also did not come true. Despite questions about how the old party elites of the former communist state parties have dominated or still dominate through their employees and concepts in post-communist parties, which after system reforms call themselves mostly socialist or social-democratic, in Central and Eastern Europe, there is not a single party system which has had a predominant party for a long period of time. Among the five systems of Central and Eastern Europe, where for a short period there was or still remains such domination – in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary – only Hungary in the very beginning followed the example of predominance of communist parties – after a brief transitory stage of strong parties from the former opposition movement. Parties that formed from the anti-communist opposition movement – Hungarian Democratic Forum (*MDF*) and Alliance of Free Democrats (*SZ-DSZ*), in the first free elections of 1990 gained almost 43 and 24% of seats respectively, while the post-communist *MSZP* had to make do with 8.5%, while the other two parties (*FKgP* and *Fidesz*) gained respectively 11 and 6 percent. Thus, one could speak about the emergence of a pluralist party system with a tendency to two-party domination. However, due to a sharp decline of the government's popularity, in the next elections in 1994 *MSZP* was able to gain a sensational victory with 54% of seats, which made it the predominant party, while *MDF* lost the elections, and *SZDSZ* got only 18%. After the following elections, the system returned to two-party domination, which this time was defined by competition between *MSZP* and conservative *Fidesz* (Civic Alliance), which in 1998 came as the strongest party, but in 2002 and 2006 had to make do with the second place. In the elections of 2010, socialists – because of their reformist policy of reducing staff, government spending and other restrictive measures, and also due to rampant corruption – were severely punished by voters, and *Fidesz* with 68% of seats became the predominant party.

In contrast, in Bulgaria, already in the first 1990 elections, post-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) with almost 53% was able to get the absolute majority of seats; opposition bloc Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) received 36 percent. In a year, during the second elections, it was able to get slightly ahead of electoral bloc led by BSP, but already in the 1994 elections, lost again to the post-communist bloc; in 1997, in the form of an extended bloc named "United Democratic Forces" (ODS) SDS became the predominant party. In 2001, the former monarch Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha returned to Bulgaria and founded the National Movement for Simeon II (NDSV), and in the elections of the same year gained 50% of seats, moving ODS (21%) to the second place, due to which, with a small gap, the threshold of the pluralist system was crossed.

[21] First as an electoral bloc; the party was founded in late March 2009.

[22] In the mid-2010, after loud disputes between Berlusconi and Fini, his supporters left him and founded their own party named Futuro e Libertá per l'Italia. Berlusconi himself stepped down from the Prime Minister's post in November 2011.

[23] In 1994, it was the liberal *D66*, in 2002 – right-wing populist *LPF*, in 2006 – socialist *SP*, and in 2010 – anti-Islamic *PVV*.

In the elections of 2005, Bulgaria's party system presented itself as fully pluralistic, including three major parties (BSP, NDSV and Turkish minority party DPS), while in the elections of 2009, 48% of seats were gained by the newly established GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria), which has chances to become the modal party in the pluralist system.

In Romania, where in 1989 *forced* transformation of political system occurred not as a result of large-scale people's movement, but as a form of inner-party change of communist elite, post-communist National Salvation Front (*FSN*) led by former Secretary of the Central Committee Ion Iliescu, who systematically created barriers for the work of new democratic parties, in the parliamentary elections of 1990, was able to gain two-thirds of seats, thus, becoming the predominant party. However, already in the following elections of 1992, due to a number of party rifts and formation of new groups, a pluralist system emerged, which in 1996 even transformed into highly fragmented system. After the process of consolidation that took place due to renewal of influence of post-communists and their antipode – right-wing nationalist *PRM* (Greater Romania Party), starting from 2000, Romania changed to the pluralist system again,[24] which includes social-democrats (*PDS*) as the major party formed from *FSN* through several organisational and ideological stages of transformation, and starting from 2004 created an electoral alliance with a small Conservative Party (*PC*). However, in 2008, with a small difference, it lost elections to the right-wing bloc *PD-L*. At this point (autumn, 2012), it is unclear, what will be the outcomes for the party system after the elections in December 2012 of the state crisis in Romania, which has lasted throughout 2012 and is characterised by the fight for power between the Government and the President.

In Lithuania, already in the elections of 1992, post-communists (*LDDP*) were able to gain the absolute majority in the parliament, while opposition bloc *Sajudis* got only 21 seats, due to which formed a system with one predominant party. Yet, in the following elections of 1996, the role of the predominant party came to Homeland Union (*TS*), which was formed on the basis of *Sajudis*. Thus occurred a radical transformation, which, however, did not lead to a change of party system type. In the third elections in 2002, another large-scale shift of electorate happened, which – despite the electoral bloc made of four parties and headed by former President Algirdas Brazauskas – led to a pluralist party system. In 2004, in the next elections, there was a strong fragmentation of the system – among others, due to creation of a new Labour Party (*DP*) of the Russian-born millionaire Viktor Uspaskich; since then, Lithuania belongs to highly fragmented party systems, even though in the two elections that followed, fragmentation gradually decreased.[25]

In the 90s, Slovakia could be included in the pluralist systems. In the first elections in 1994, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (*HZDS*), which came from Slovak opposition movement, gained the overwhelming majority and became the strongest party, and its head Vladimír Mečiar took the post of the Prime Minister. Changing electoral legislation shortly before the 1998 elections, as well as attempts of the fragmented opposition to displace the Mečiar's authoritarian government started consolidation processes, and the newly created Slovak Democratic Coalition (*SDK*) gained second place preceded only by *HZDS*. The next term was marked by strong disintegration processes in almost all parties, which after the 2002 elections resulted in creation of a highly fragmented system that, nevertheless, returned to pluralist competition structure already in 2006. It remained also after the 2010 elections, in which social-democrats (*SMER-SD*) were able to significantly increase the gap between themselves and other parties that existed since 2006. In the early elections of 2012, *SMER-SD* was able to gain the absolute majority of seats, while none of its competitors gained more than 11%, which made *SMER-SD* the predominant party.

Out of six party systems of Central and Eastern Europe, which during the study period experienced a radical transformation of their competition structure, only Poland did not have a period with the predominant party. During the first elections in 1991, which were conducted according to proportional system without the electoral threshold, 29 parties got into parliament, and the largest faction was created by one of the parties that came from the opposition movement – The Democratic Union (*UD*), with less than 14% of seats, so within the study period the party system had the highest degree of parliamentary fragmentation among all 27 of party systems. Before the 1993 elections, the electoral system was changed in order to lessen its fragmentation, which was finally a success and led to party system transformation into pluralistic. In the elections of 1997, due to significant success of a newly created conglomerate of *AWS* and good results of the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (*SLD*), party system was able to achieve the two-party domination status, which was, however, lost again in the following 2001 elections due to disintegration of *AWS* and high results of the newly created Civic Platform (*PO*). In the next elections in 2005, pluralist system remained. Early elections, set for 2007 as a result of government crisis, led to two-party domination again: *PO* as the stronger one and conservative *PiS* (Law and Justice) as the second largest party; elections of 2011 confirmed this configuration.

[24] Fragmentation is also supported by the fact that parties of the 18 recognised national minorities can nominate only one candidate each, who automatically gets into the Chamber of Deputies.

[25] In the elections of 2012, three major parties gained 71.4% of seats, but five other parties and three independent candidates also got into the Parliament.

Polarisation of European Party Systems: Lines of Conflict that Define Competition between Parties

As noted at the beginning of the chapter, party systems can be described not only in terms of structure, but also according to their conceptual qualities. This being said, starting from the works of *Sartori* (1976) at the latest, the discussion centres around polarisation – the property that concerns ideological and programmatic differences between parties. Operationalisation of this property requires us first to answer the question about what are the fundamental, concept-based lines of conflict in the competition between parties.[26] Party researchers have been debating this topic for several decades.[27] The starting points in these debates are, on the one hand, the spatial model of inter-party competition within the economic theory of democracy by *Downs* (1957), on the other – the theory of social conflict lines (cleavages) by *Lipset* and *Rokkan* (1967) and their politicisation by parties.[28] In this regard, debatable is not only to what extent, if at all, traditional social lines of conflict still define the structure of conflicts in party systems, but also if/or they have been supplemented by new cleavages. The question is whether inter-party competition, particularly in party systems of Central and Eastern Europe, is based on *cleavages* at all, i.e. whether it is defined by political lines of conflict between parties based on social division lines.[29]

However, today there is enough empirical evidence that, usually, one should proceed from *cleavage-based* competition. In an attempt to develop a table of possible party-political conflict lines on the basis of professional literature, conflicts can be divided into three dimensions – socio-economic, socio-cultural and political-constitutional. In the socio-economic dimension the debate is around the role of state in economy, in the socio-cultural – around organisation of people's co-existence, and in the political-constitutional – around the form of political order. These basic dimensions of conflicts in the inter-party competition are articulated depending on the moment and context in the form of various specific lines of conflict, which today, in most cases, look like the conflict of values with varying degrees of being engrained in the social structure. Table 2 shows a general overview of the possible conflict structure of European party systems.

After formation of West European party systems in the 19th century, in the period that followed "the greatest political influence was in conflicts between church and state, and between capital and labour" (*Eith* 2001: 325). Today, in West European party systems, traditional class conflict is a conflict of values regarding the role of state in the distribution of goods and services, i.e. the conflict is realised as the welfare state conflict within "social justice – free market" poles. Within this conflict, both sides provide as arguments different concepts of

Potential conflict lines in the inter-party competition

Socio-Economic Dimension: Conflicts regarding the role of state in economy	Socio-Cultural Dimension: Conflicts regarding organisation of people's co-existence	Political-Constitutional Dimension: Conflicts regarding the form of political order
Conflict in the welfare state (social justice – market justice), conflict regarding the role of state in distribution of goods and services	"Church-state" conflict (conflict between the Catholic church and state)	System conflict (conflict between democratic and non-democratic perceptions of values)
Ownership conflict (state property – private property), conflict regarding the role of state in production of goods and services	Religious conflict (Conflict between religious and secular perceptions of values)	
"City-village" conflict (conflict between secondary/tertiary and primary sectors)	"Libertarianism-authoritarianism" conflict (conflict between libertarian and authoritarian perceptions of values)	
"Environment-economy" conflict (conflict regarding direction of policy in favour of economic or environmental needs)		
Traditional "centre-periphery" conflict (conflict between the majority and ethnic, linguistic, religious or other cultural minorities in a nation state)		
Conflict regarding European integration as the modern version of the "centre-periphery" conflict (conflict between the nation state and the European Union)		

[26] In the second stage, it is necessary to place separate parties along these conflict lines, ultimately, to determine, how homogeneous or heterogeneous the entire party system is, in relation to these lines of conflict.

[27] Regarding this discussion, cf. the author's chapter in Handbuch Partienforschung (Springer VS, 2013) on analysis of party systems.

[28] Within the tradition of this approach, party-political lines of conflict can be defined as "deep, stable, lasting conflict lines of division in the party system, based on party-political representation of interests of different social groups, determined by their social and structural position and the resulting material interests and perception of values, or primarily different perceptions of values" (Niedermayer, 2009 : 37).

[29] Alternatives: (1) topical competition, in which, from election to election, parties choose respective controversial by their target concepts (positioning topics), depending on whether the topic currently promises them the largest number of people's votes, or try in some form or the other to appeal to both sides, or to direct the competition only to polar topics, where the conflict centres around different means of reaching non-controversial goals, and (2) personal competition, which is based on "personalistic, demagogic, and populist appeals" (Whitefield 2002: 185).

the fundamental value of justice, referencing in this regard the fundamental values of freedom and equality. Under the concept of market justice, the results of market distribution, which arise according to certain basic rules, are also fair. Accordingly, state – through ensuring market freedom – only has to oversee that the basic rules are adhered to. Here we observe an appeal to freedom as a fundamental value, while justice emerges as a fair result. The counterposition is that materially unequal market results are viewed as socially unjust, the emphasis is placed on the basic value of equality, and social justice emerges as distributive justice and solidarity, which is achieved through state intervention.

At first, the focus of attention in Central and Eastern Europe was the role of state in the production of goods and services, thus, the confrontation was in the form of privatisation conflict "public ownership – private ownership of production means". After a consensus had been reached in many countries regarding the issue "whether to conduct privatisation", and while "pro-state parties" "kept covertly coming after the goal of privatisation" (*Eckert* 2004/2005: 35 et seq.), this conflict was turning into the conflict of a welfare state around the issue of mitigating the social cost of market transformation through the policy of state intervention in the distribution process.

According to many party system researchers, welfare state conflict dominates in the structure of conflicts of West European party systems, and in view of the consequences of globalisation and demographic changes, among other things, it has recently gained significant relevance.[30] Many authors also see it as the "primary cleavage in post-communist society" (*Lewis* 2001: 145),[31] while other researchers come to conclusion that party systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are definitely dominated by conflict lines that belong to socio-cultural sphere, and socio-economic dimension is mostly "secondary or subordinated" (*Jungerstam-Mulders* 2006b:246; cf. also Tavits 2005: 288), even though in some countries, it may play a more significant role in the future. Expert surveys determined that the first statement is correct: they showed that back in 2003-2004 competition between parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was defined by several conflict lines with domination of the welfare state conflict (cf. *Rohrschneider/Whitefield* 2009).

The third line of conflict in this area is between city and village, which in its modern form is first of all the conflict between urban (post)industrial and rural agricultural interests. However, it becomes politically relevant only through justification of conflicting parties' positions by referencing higher social values. In most West European party systems, this line of conflict has now almost lost its relevance.[32] According to *Eckert* (2004/2005:31), it has "due to the policy of urbanisation during socialist times, lost its significance" also in Central and Eastern Europe, even though in some countries – first of all, in Estonia and Slovenia – it is still a relevant line of conflict (cf. *Jungestam-Mulders* 2006b:246 and *Whitefield* 2002:188 et seq.).

In socio-cultural dimension, the traditional conflict with Catholics as a social structure group along the "state-church" line, has transformed into a religious conflict between religious and secular value systems, significance of which in most West European party systems was continuously decreasing in the latest decades due to the processes of secularisation (*Dobbelaere/Jagodzinski* 1995)[33], and yet in some party systems of Central and Eastern Europe – e.g., in Poland and Lithuania – it still plays a rather notable role (cf., e.g., *Whitefield* 2002:188 et seq.).

Certain positions based on cultural and moral values and associated with religious concepts were also integrated into a new conflict line between libertarian and authoritarian value systems, which in the late 70s, in most West European countries, was picked up by political elites and implemented into party-political structure of conflicts.[34] The reason for appearance of libertarian and authoritarian value systems is seen in the transition from a classical industrial to a globalised post-industrial society, the major feature of which is the simultaneous growth of opportunities and risks, and also the process of blurring of cultural boundaries, which – depending on the living conditions and the mental capacity of an individual – are either perceived and processed as enrichment or as a threat. The processing can either happen "in the form of 'opening up' towards moral and cultural elasticity", or in the form of "protective 'lock-up' with the help of authoritarian systems" (*Ruß/Schmidt* 1998: 277). This results in the formation of libertarian attitudes, such as the priority of self-fulfilment, tolerance of minorities, acceptance of multiculturalism and support of nonconformist behaviours, or authoritarian values, such as subordination to authority, intolerance of minorities, cultural isolation, xenophobia and support of conformist behaviours.

The conflict along the "environment – economy" line revolves around the policy focus on either economic or environmental needs, has both socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions, and can, in fact, be associated with different values. Therefore, the question of whether this conflict can be united in a certain political system with one of the other conflict lines, or whether it is a separate conflict, is empirical. A more modern analysis of parties' positions on the welfare state conflict (viewed as a traditional conflict between left- and right-wing parties) and the "environment – economy" conflict, based on expert survey results in developed industrial countries, has shown that even though there is "a strong relationship between party positions on both dimensions", "leftist parties still continue to diverge with respect to how they respond to the environmental cleavage" (*Dalton* 2009: 161).

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[30] Yet, as studies of separate countries by *Niedermayer*, *Stöss* and *Haas* from 2006 show, significance of this conflict varies greatly depending on the particular party system.

[31] See. e.g., *Eckert* (2004/2005:31 et seq.).

[32] An exception is Finland (see *Jahn/Kuitto/Oberst* 2006:139).

[33] Yet, in Netherlands there "still exists the division into secular and Christian parties" (*Lucardie* 2006: 139).

[34] The integration was taking place primarily through the formation of two new party families: green and ethnocentric parties, which are usually called right-wing populist.

The political-constitutional dimension includes system conflict related to political order, which divides parties into pro-system and anti-system. In Western Europe, this conflict emerged in the form of a cleavage between democratic and anti-democratic parties, in Central and Eastern Europe – as a "communism – anti-communism" conflict. And as in Western Europe, on the one hand, the "communist and socialist parties lost their significance, and also abandoned their opposition to the system, or at least weakened their opposition" (*Stöss/Haas/Niedermayer* 2006:30 et seq.), and on the other hand, openly hostile to the system extreme right parties "in the elections, with few exceptions, remain at margin" (*Stöss* 2010:196), in West European party systems this line of conflict is no longer relevant. In Central and Eastern Europe it was "evident that the first dimension of conflict … was the communist-anti-communist cleavage. This cleavage dominated politics in the early years of the democratic regime". While in the majority of countries this cleavage "has started to fade away" (*Jungerstam-Mulders* 2006b:245), and "extremist parties demanding a radical change of system essentially do not have any chances to win supporters, except for marginal minority" (*Thieme* 2007:23).[35]

The traditional cleavage "centre – periphery" is originally rooted in the socio-cultural dimension, but it goes beyond that into other areas. Usually, it exists between nationwide parties and political representations of ethnic, linguistic, religious or other cultural minorities, and in extreme cases can lead to a split of the entire party system into regional parties. An example of this in Western Europe is Belgium. In this "split country" (*Schmitz-Rainers* 2007:1) between the Dutch-speaking north and the French-speaking south there are deep cleavages based on "linguistic, cultural, economic, religious and ideological grounds" (*Hecking* 2006:48), which led to complete regionalisation of the party system. In the United Kingdom, intensification of the centre-periphery conflict led to strengthening of regional parties, in Italy the conflict is escalated by the Northern League, which "balances between the demands of federalisation and separation of the North ('*Padanien*')" (*Zolnhöfer* 2006:289), and in Spain the cleavage emerges "first of all, in the two autonomous communities – the Basque Country and Catalonia, the party systems of which are characterised by competition between nationalistic forces and nationwide parties" (*Haas* 2006:447). In the 19th century, in Finland, the language conflict between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking population was "the first line of conflict that determined formation of parties" (*Jahn/Kuitto/Oberst* 2006:137), which today, however, thanks to the exemplary policy towards minorities, found its best possible solution. In most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there is an ethnically conditioned "centre-periphery" cleavage. This cleavage used to be the dominant one in Latvia quite recently (cf. *Pabriks/Stokenberga* 2006:54), in Estonia, the interests of the Russian minority are represented by two parties, in Lithuania and Poland, respectively the Polish and German minorities are represented by their own parties in the parliament, and Article 62 of the Romanian Constitution states that national minority organisations, which fail to gain the required 5% of votes to get into parliament, are entitled to one seat in the parliament. In Slovakia, the Hungarian *SMK* party, from 1998 to 2006, was even represented in the government, while in Bulgaria, from 2005 to 2009, Turkish minority party *DPS* had a similar status.

The new form of "centre – periphery" conflict is the European integration conflict line, which after the 2010 crisis of Euro became very relevant in the national competition between parties in many European countries. This is not about problems of national minorities within nation states, but rather about conflicts arising in connection with countries' integration in the European Union. However, this conflict line, depending on the framing (cf. *Helbling/Hoeglinger/Wüest* 2010) of issues of European integration by parties in the course of inter-party competition, is in most cases already integrated in the existing socio-economic, socio-cultural or political-institutional conflict lines.[36] The key issues in the socio-economic dimension are those of redistribution, in the socio-cultural dimension – national identity vs. multiculturalism, and in political-institutional – the transfer of sovereignty to the supranational level.

Conclusions

Analysis of structural development of party systems within the EU from 1990, showed that the situation is defined by diversity, rather than uniformity. We can neither speak of a common type, nor any convergence occurring within the period of time. Nevertheless, we are not dealing with an atomised party system landscape, which can be rationally analysed only in reference to characteristics of a certain singled out party system. By their structural properties, party systems can be divided into four types, and their majority belongs to approximately equal in volume moderate types: party systems with two-party domination, or pluralist party systems. During the research, party systems of Central and Eastern Europe by their structure were much more unstable than West European systems. Firstly, this is due to the fact that the study period covered the stage of formation of these systems, while in Western Europe, we are dealing with long-established systems. However, in the second decade of their existence, development of Central and East European systems showed that, clearly, consolidation in the majority of countries was still not complete.

Analysis of conceptual polarisation of party systems determined that inter-party competition is defined by a limited number of socio-economic, socio-cultural and political-constitutional conflict lines, and that the tools for analysing conflict lines developed for Western Europe may be possibly used in the future – after passing through the initial transitory period – for the systems in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, together, party systems of the European Union will continue to offer enough material for international comparative analysis.

[35] This does not eliminate threats to democracy in some countries. For example, at the start of the new millennium, in Romania, the ruling PSD "has turned into a state party", and "opposition as a democratic counterweight has almost no effect" (Habersack 2003: 54 et seq.). The latest processes in Hungary, when the elections of 2010 brought to power the far-right party "Jobbik", give causes for concern.

[36] On different positions regarding the inclusion of European integration in the party-political structure of conflicts cf., e.g., Benoit/Laver 2006, de Vries 2010, Hix 1999 and 2004, Hooge/Marks 1999 and 2008, Kriesi 2007, Mat tila/Raunio 2006 and Taggart 1998.

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