Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Restricted access Research articles

Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation

Rick O'Gorman

Rick O'Gorman

Psychology Group, Sheffield Hallam UniversityCollegiate Crescent Campus, Sheffield S10 2BP, UK

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,
Joseph Henrich

Joseph Henrich

Psychology and Economics Departments, University of British ColumbiaVancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z4

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and
Mark Van Vugt

Mark Van Vugt

Psychology Department, University of KentCanterbury CT2 7NP, UK

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Published:https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2008.1082

    Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically.

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