Naval Intelligence, the Atlantic Campaign and the Sinking of the Bismarck: A Study in the Integration of Intelligence into the Conduct of Naval Warfare

1. This paper addresses only surface warfare. The submarine obviously has had a dramatic effect on naval warfare in the twentieth century. However, by the beginning of the second world war, it was realized that the speed and endurance of modern warships, as well as improved forms of underwater protection against torpedoes, had limited the effect of contemporary submarines on surface warfare. The advent of nuclear-powered submarines has altered that situation.

2. Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, vol. I, The Defensive (London 1954),20.

3. Ibid., 20.

4. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, made it clear, upon assuming his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy, that he intended to play an active role in the direction of operations, noting that 'at times it will be necessary for the Admiralty to alter dispositions' made by the fleet commanders. In fact, much of the Admiralty's control was tacitly executed. After 300 years of conflict at sea, there was near-unanimity amongst Royal Navy officers as to what they considered to be the fundamental principles of naval warfare. Ibid., 27.

5. Although intelligence was a British strength in the first world war, considerable difficulties existed in the co-ordination of intelligence analysis with operations, partly because of the lack of understanding of the importance and workings of intelligence demonstrated by line naval officers, and partly because the then Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Sir William Reginald 'Blinker' Hall, used his control of intelligence information 'vigorously' to wield 'extensive influence' (to use the British official historian's charitable phrase) over naval and political strategy. See F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom and R.G. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. I (London 1979), 9. For British naval intelligence in the first world war, see Patnck Beesly, Room 40. British Naval Intelligence 1914-18 (London 1982).

6. Hinsley, op. cit., 9.

7. For a summary discussion of OIC analysis responsibilities, see Donald MacLachlan, Room 39. A Study in Naval Intelligence (New York 1968), 57-9.

8. Hinsley, op. cit., 336-8.

9. Ibid., 278-82, 331-2.

10. Hinsley, op. cit., 332-3. This may have been a reflection of national prejudices; the Admiralty did not have much faith in the reporting of officers of the Vichy French navy, despite what appears to be the reliability of their reporting within the limits of their access. Reports from Scandinavian sources were accepted at face value. For details see Albert Vulliez and Jacques Mordal, Battleship Scharnhorst (London 1958), 121-36; note 12 below.

11. Hinsley, op. cit., 331.

12. Tornberg was half Norwegian and was to play a similar role in the pursuit of the Bismarck. For details, see below and Ludovic Kennedy, Pursuit. The Chase and Sinking of the Battleship Bismarck (New York 1974), 18-19.

13. Roskill, op. cit., remains the best single source on the war at sea in the European theatres. Unless otherwise indicated, details of the operations discussed in this paper may be found in this work.

14. Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet, The Electron and Sea Power (London 1975), 205.

15. Hansjürgen Reinicke, 'German Surface Force Strategy in World War II', United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 83, no. 2 (February 1957), 182.

16. Erich Raeder, My Life (Annapolis 1960), 296. Raeder's memoirs are generally considered to have been written for him in his dotage, and are largely a self-serving apologia for the actions that led to his trial and conviction at Nurnberg after the war. However, they do contain much discussion of naval matters, and are all the more valuable for representing the 'official' naval viewpoint. Raeder's 'command philosophy' is outlined on pp. 296-7. See also pp. 288-91, for his appraisal of the self-destruction of the pocket-battleship Admiral Graf Spee and pp. 352-8 for the decisions that led to the sinking of the Bismarck.

17. David Kahn, Hitler's Spies. German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York 1978), 387-8.

18. Exceptions were made: in October 1939, SKL detected a concentration against the pocket-battleship Admiral Graf Spee, then operating in the South Atlantic. I/SKL instructed Graf Spee's captain, Hans Langsdorff, to re-deploy to the Indian Ocean, thereby successfully avoiding a superior concentration of allied naval forces. Even here, however, SKL framed the order as a recommendation, instructing Langsdorff 'to consider' such a move 'should enemy pressure in the South Atlantic become stronger'. One can assume that recommendations from SKL were not lightly ignored. Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939 (Washington, DC 1947), 33. On the other hand, two months later, when Langsdorff thought himself to be bottled up in Montevideo harbour by superior forces (the result of a superbly executed British deception), SKL allowed him to scuttle his ship, despite the fact that it had valid information to the contrary. See Dudley Pope, Graf Spee. The Life and Death of a Raider (New York 1957), 201-33; Raeder, loc. cit.

19. Jak P. Mallmann Showell, The German Navy in World War II. A Reference Guide to the Kriegsmarine, 1935-1945 (Annapolis 1979), 61. For details, see also Raeder, op. cit., 297, and the British translation of the captured German Battle Instructionsfor the Navy (issue of May 1939), ADM 223/25, held in the Public Record Office (PRO), London. Command authority overlapped considerably between SKL and the Group commands, and the boundaries were not well-defined. When Bismarck and Prinz Eugen set out on their Atlantic cruise, they did so with no fewer than four sets of operational orders: one from SKL, defining the scope and purpose of the operation; one from Group North, covering the break-out into the Atlantic; one from Group West covering operations in the Atlantic; and one from the Fleet Commander, laying out his intentions and plan of operations. National Archives and Record Agency (NARA), T1022, Records of the German Navy, 1850-1945, Received from the United States Naval History Division, reel 1783 (hereinafter NARA, T1022, xxxx).

20. Kahn, op. cit., 213-8.

21. For details of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of the Atlantic, see Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries (Garden City 1968), 254-75.

22. Kahn, loc. cit.

23. Heinz Bonatz, Die deutsche Marine-Funkaufklärung, 1914-1945 (Darmstadt, 1970) 127.

24. NARA, T1022, 2003.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. See Lt. Cdr. Peter Handel-Mazzetti, 'The Scharnhorst-Gneisenau Team at Its Peak', US Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 82, no. 8 (August 1956), 854-7.

29. NARA, T1022, 2003.

30. Handel-Mazzetti, op. cit., 859.

31. NARA, T1022, 2003.

32. Roskill, op. cit., 379.

33. Reinicke, op. cit., 186.

34. Roskill, op. cit., 379-80.

35. Hinsley, op. cit., 336-7.

36. The Admiralty does not seem to have been aware of German penetration of its codes until 1943. See ADM 223/5, PRO London.

37. NARA, T1022, 1783.

38. Ibid.

39. NARA, T1022, 4077.

40. Kennedy, loc. cit.

41. Of these ships, only Tirpitz was completed.

42. ADM 1/10617, PRO London.

43. Vulliez and Mordal, loc. cit., 125-6.

44. Hinsley, op. cit., 341.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 343.

47. Although Prince of Wales had received some damage, the principal reason for her retreat was failure of her un-tried gun turret machinery. See William H. Garzke and Robert O. Dulin, Jr., Battleships. Allied Battleships m World War II (Annapolis 1980), 180-90.

48. William H. Garzke and Robert O. Dulin, Battleships. Axis Battleships in World War II (Annapolis 1985), 224-9.

49. NARA, T1022, 1783.

50. Arthur J. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran. Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace 1915-1940 (London 1974), 115.

51. NARA, T1022, 1783.

52. Raeder, op. cit., 357.

53. Russell Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode (New York 1949), 102.

54. Ibid., 112.

55. Hinsley, op. cit., 344.

56. Ibid., 342-3; NARA, T1022, 1783.

57. Ibid., 344-5. Some of Tovey's destroyers were fitted to take DF bearings, as a check on bearings plotted from the UK. The Admiralty failed to take account of the fact that all Home Fleet destroyers had returned to port for lack of fuel by this point in the operation. The bearings sent to C-in-C Home Fleet were meant to be plotted on a Gnomonic chart, drawn to take account of the magnetic field of the earth. Apparently there was some difficulty in using the special charts on board King George V. Kennedy, op. cit., 233-4.